1.

    Liang vs. People, G.R. No. 125865 January 28, 2000 - Abuan, O.

2.    US vs Look Chaw, G.R. No. L-5887 December 16, 1910 – Acosta, J.

3.    US vs Wong Cheng, G.R. No. L-18924 October 19, 1922 – Aurora, M.

4.    US vs Ah Sing, G.R. No. L-13005  October 10, 1917 – Ballatong, E.

5.    Norma Del Socoro vs. Van Wilsem GR 193707, December 10, 2014

DOCTRINE: Doctrine of Processual Presumption; Under this doctrine, if the

foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that
the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
 
FACTS: Petitioner Del Socorro and Respondent Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland in 1990. Consequently, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age. Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland. At that time, their son was only eighteen
(18) months old. Thereafter, Del Socorro and her son came home to the Philippines.
 
According Del Socorro, Wilsem made a promise to provide monthly support. Not
long thereafter, respondent came to the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. To date, all the parties, including
their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City. Through her counsel, Del
Socorro sent a letter demanding for support from Wilsem. However, Wilsem refused
to receive the letter. Because of the foregoing circumstances, Del Socorro filed a
complaint-affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City.
 
ARGUMENT OF DEFENDANT AND RTC RULING: Aliens are not subject to
our civil code and family code. Case is dismissed.
 
ISSUES:
 
1.  Do a foreign national have an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law? NO
2.  Can a foreign national be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child? YES
 
RULING:
 
The Court agreed with Respondent Wilsem that Petitioner Del Soccoro cannot rely on
Article 195 of the New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a
foreign citizen because the obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls
under family rights and duties governing the national law of such person concerned. 
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the
RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippine law, as to
whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his
failure to do so. It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner's son under Article 195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the
Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland.
 
However, this does not mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner's son
altogether. In view of respondent's failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands
in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine,
if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will
presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not
been properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same
with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children
and penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
 
The Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show that he is
not liable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. The Court
likewise agreed with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of
respondent states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country. The public policy sought to be
protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing
the splitting up of a single cause of action.
 
Lastly, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in
relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which
provides that: “penal laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory
upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations.”  On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is
committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the
Province of Cebu City.  As such, our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the
offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the
respondent was acquired upon his arrest. As such, Wilsem is liable for support of their
child.

6.    AAA vs. BBB, G.R. No. 212448, January 11, 2018 – Bangilan, F.

7.    Dorado vs. People, G.R. No. 216671, October 3, 2016 – Bas-ang, B.

FACTS: Dorado was a minor at the time of the commission of the crime, he was only
16 years old. Dorado and others were charged with the crime of frustrated murder
committed against the victim named Ronald Bonion, they were also charged with
violation of R.A. 7610 or the Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
exploitation and Discrimination committed against Rabiel Parino. They pleaded not
guilty. The prosecution presented witnesses, they tend to prove that on April 15, 2004
at around 11:00 o’clock in the evening Dorado carrying a sumpak and his group
 arrived where the victim and his group were situated and started to throw stones and
bottles. Afterwards, Dorado fired his sumpak and hit Ronald between the eyes.

         On defense, they said that Dorado was at home watching television and
suddenly, the barangay tanods arrived and blamed him for the shooting of Ronald.
That they did not find the weapon sumpak in his possession.

            

RTC found dorado guilty of the crime of frustrated murder because he had intent to
kill Ronald since their group had a feud between the victim. While on the case of
violation of R.A. 7610 they were all acquitted as the crime was not proven beyond
reasonable doubt and the prosecutuin failed to prove Ronald’s minority. The CA
affirmed.

ISSUE: Whether the findings of the lower courts were correct.

HELD: NO. This court ruled that he must benefit from the provisions of R.A. 9344.

  Under the provision: minors shall be exempt from criminal liability:

a.       Those below 15 years of age at the time of the commission of the crime; and

b.       Those above 15 years of age but below 18 years of age who acted without discernment.

Once the CICL is found guilty of the offense charged, the court shall not
immediately execute its judgement rather it shall place the CICL under
suspended sentence.

Also, the prosecution did not determine the discernment of Dorado at the time
of the commission of the crime. The S.C. said that the lower courts did not
make an effort to prove that Dorado acted with discernment. The RTC simply
stated the mitigating circumstance of minority in favor of Dorado. For
discernment cannot be presumed even if Dorado intended to do away with
Ronald.

The court in this case made a distinction between intent and discernment.

Intent Discernment

Design: a determination to do a Discernment constitutes an exception to the

certain thing; an aim the purpose of exemption from criminal liability of a minor… who
the mind including such knowledge commits an act prohibited by law, is his mental
as is essential to such intent…; the capacity to understand the difference between right
design resolve or determination and wrong, and such capacity may be known and
with which a person acts.   should be determined by taking into consideration
all the facts and circumstances.
  

Thus, the judgement of conviction of Jerwin dorado is hereby reversed and set
aside by reason of exempting circumstance of minority.  

8.    Corpuz vs. People G.R. No. 180016, April 29, 2014 – Cayatoc, B.

9.    Hernan vs. Sandiganbayan, GR 217874 Dec 5, 2017 – Chongael, G.

Article 1 to 11

10.US vs Ah Chong, G.R. No. L-5272, March 19, 1910 – Corpuz, R.

11.People vs. Oanis, G.R. No. L-47722, July 27, 1943 – Dacpano, J.

12.Jacinto vs. People, G.R. No. 162540   July 13, 2009 – Dalanao, J.

13.People vs. Balmores, G.R. No. L-1896, February 16, 1950 – Daniel, B.

14.Intod vs. CA, G.R. No. 103119 October 21, 1992 – Daniwis, D.

Impossible Crime (Art. 4)

FACTS: 

At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig,
all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house. At the instance of his companions,
Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian,
Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in
another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was
in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. 

RTC: Convicted Intod of ATTEMPTED MURDER 

CA: Affirmed in toto 

Petitioner questioned the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), as affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, holding that Petitioner was guilty of attempted murder. Petitioner sought to
modify the judgment by holding him liable only for an impossible crime, citing Article 4(2)
of the Revised Penal Code which provides:

ARTICLE 4(2). Criminal Responsibility. — Criminal Responsibility shall be

incurred:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x   x   x
 2. By any person performing an act which would be an offense
against persons or property, were it not for the inherent
impossibility of its accomplishment or on account of the
employment of inadequate or ineffectual means.

Petitioner contends that, Palangpangan’s absence from her room on the night he and his
companions riddled it with bullets made the crime inherently impossible.

Respondent People of the Philippines argues that the crime was not impossible. Instead, the
facts were sufficient to constitute an attempt and to convict Intod for attempted murder.
Respondent alleged that there was intent.

ISSUE: Is the committed crime an impossible crime?

RULING: YES.Under ARTICLE 4, the act performed by the offender cannot produce an
offense against persons or property because: 

(1) the commission of the offense is inherently impossible of accomplishment; or 

(2) the means employed is either 

(a) inadequate or 

(b)ineffectual.

To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one
impossible of accomplishment. There must be either 

(1) legal impossibility, or 

(2) physical impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify 

     the act as an impossible crime. chanrobles.com:cralaw:red

Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to
a crime. Thus, legal impossibility would apply to those circumstances where:

1. the motive, desire and expectation is to perform an act in violation of the law; 

2. there is intention to perform the physical act; 

3. there is a performance of the intended physical act; and 

4. the consequence resulting from the intended act does not amount to a crime. 

The impossibility of killing a person already dead falls in this category. 

Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or

beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. One example is the man
who puts his hand in the coat pocket of another with the intention to steal the latter's wallet
and finds the pocket empty. 
The case at bar belongs to this category. Petitioner shoots the place where he thought his
victim would be, although in reality, the victim was not present in said place and thus, the
petitioner failed to accomplish his end.

In Philippine jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of

accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself.

DECISION:

Petition was GRANTED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals holding Petitioner
guilty of Attempted Murder was MODIFIED. Petitioner was found guilty of an impossible
crime as defined and penalized in Articles 4, paragraph 2, and 59 of the Revised Penal Code,
respectively

15.Valenzuela vs People, G. R. No. 160188, June 21, 2007 – Dapilloza, E.

DOCTRINE: 

Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the element
which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without unlawful
taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all. With these
considerations, the Court can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated

FACTS: Valenzuela and Calderon were sighted outside the Super Sale Club, a supermarket
within the ShoeMart (SM) complex along North EDSA, by Lorenzo Lago (Lago), a security
guard who was then manning his post at the open parking area of the supermarket. Lago saw
Valenzuela hauling a push cart with cases of detergent of the well-known “Tide” brand.
Valenzuela unloaded these cases in an open parking space, where Calderon was waiting.
Valenzuela then returned inside the supermarket, and after five (5) minutes, emerged with
more cartons of Tide Ultramatic and again unloaded these boxes to the same area in the open
parking space. When Lago asked Valenzuela for a receipt of the merchandise, Valenzuela
and Calderon reacted by fleeting on foot, but Lago fired a warning shot to alert his fellow
security guards of the incident. Petitioner and Calderon were apprehended at the scene, and
the stolen merchandise recovered. Before the Court of Appeals, petitioner argued that he
should only be convicted of frustrated theft since at the time he was apprehended, he was
never placed in a position to freely dispose of the articles stolen.

ISSUE: Whether petitioner is guilty of frustrated theft only.

RULING: No, Valenzuela is guilty of consummated theft. he following elements of theft as

provided for in Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code, namely: (1) that there be taking of
personal property; (2) that said property belongs to another; (3) that the taking be done with
intent to gain; (4) that the taking be done without the consent of the owner; and (5) that the
taking be accomplished without the use of violence against or intimidation of persons or force
upon things. There was no need of an intent to permanently deprive the owner of his property
to constitute an unlawful taking.

So long as the descriptive circumstances that qualify the taking are present, including
animo lucrandi and apoderamiento, the completion of the operative act that is the taking of
personal property of another establishes, at least, that the transgression went beyond the
attempted stage. Insofar as we consider the present question, unlawful taking is most material
in this respect. Unlawful taking, which is the deprivation of one’s personal property, is the
element which produces the felony in its consummated stage. At the same time, without
unlawful taking as an act of execution, the offense could only be attempted theft, if at all.
With these considerations, we can only conclude that under Article 308 of the Revised Penal
Code, theft cannot have a frustrated stage. Theft can only be attempted or consummated.

16.People vs. Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016 – Davis, A.

17.Joel Yongco, G.R. No. 209373 vs. People July 30, 2014 – De Leon, M.

18.People vs. Fabro, G.R. No. 114261,  February 10, 2000

Doctrine: While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt
act is not punishable, the exception is when such is specifically penalized by law.

Facts: Around 5pm in Camp Henry Allen, Baguio City, two "concerned individuals"
identified as Gloria and Emma Borce reported to Chief Inspector Allyn Evasco that a couple
living in Quirino Hill was engaged in selling marijuana.

Subsequently, a buy-bust operation was conducted. Gloria and Emma, along with PO2
Ellonito Apduhan (poseur-buyer), met with Fabro. Gloria and Emma introduced Apduhan to
Fabro as a stranger in the place who wanted to buy marijuana. After Apduhan had ordered a
kilo of the contraband, Fabro told them to wait a while. Fabro then went to a house just
behind her own.

Fabro then returned holding a brick wrapped in newspaper placed in a plastic bag. She also
returned with Irene Martin tagging along. Fabro handed the stuff to Apduhan. Her
companion, Irene Martin, demanded payment. Apduhan gave her the P600. Apduhan
removed the wrapping of the merchandise. After ascertaining that it was a brick of marijuana,
he made the pre-arranged signal of lighting his cigarette where the team rushed in. However,
before the team could reach them, Irene Martin ran away

Fabro contends that she cannot be held liable as, based on the testimony of the NBI, the real
possessor of the confiscated properties was her co-accused Irene Martin.

Issue: Whether or not Fabro can be held liable.

Held: Fabro is liable.

The contention that Irene Martin was the real culprit being the source of the contraband does
not in any way absolve her of the crime of selling marijuana. While it is true that it was Irene
Martin who took the money, appellant was the one who negotiated with the poseur-buyers;
fetched her co-accused; carried and handed over the marijuana to Apduhan.

The acts of Martin and appellant clearly show a unity of purpose in the consummation of the
sale of marijuana. In other words, between Martin and appellant, conspiracy in the
commission of the crime was indubitably proven by the prosecution.

Also, Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 reads:

"Sec. 21. Attempt and Conspiracy. The same penalty prescribed by this Act for the
commission of the offense shall be imposed in case of any . . . conspiracy to commit the same
in the following cases:

b) Sale, administration, delivery, distribution and transportation of dangerous drugs."

It is clear that Section 21 (b) of R.A. 6425 punishes the mere conspiracy to commit the
offense of selling, delivering, distributing and transporting of dangerous drugs. Conspiracy
herein refers to the mere agreement to commit the said acts and not the actual execution
thereof.

While the rule is that a mere conspiracy to commit a crime without doing any overt act is not
punishable, the exception is when such is specifically penalized by law, as in the case of
Section 21 of Republic Act 6425. Conspiracy as crime should be distinguished from
conspiracy as a manner of incurring criminal liability the latter being applicable to the case at
bar.

19.People vs. Jesalva, G.R. No. 227306 June 19, 2017

FACTS: On September 16, 2007, at around 1:00 a.m., Ortigosa, his cousin Renato B. Flores
(Flores) and Manny Boy Ditche were drinking in Dupax Street, Old Balara, Quezon City.
Later, they decided to go to a store to buy cigarettes. On their way to the store, Flores noticed
accused-appellant standing in a comer near the store and staring at them. Then, accused-
appellant walked away and disappeared. Later, accused-appellant reappeared, accompanied
by Menieva and Ilaw, and followed Ortigosa and his group to the store. When accused-
appellant and his companions were already in front of Ortigosa, Menieva uttered, "Ne!, ano
ba yan?" and proceeded to stab Ortigosa twice with an icepick. Menieva stabbed Ortigosa
first on the right portion of his chest, then on his left armpit. As Menieva stabbed Ortigosa,
Ilaw pointed a sumpak at Ortigosa while accused-appellant pointed at Ortigosa' s group and
left.

After the stabbing, Ortigosa and his group tried to run back to where they were
drinking. Before they reached the place, Ortigosa fell on the ground. His companions rushed
him to East Avenue Medical Center where he died.

A case was filed before the RTC and the accused-appellant denied any participation in
Ortigosa's stabbing. He claimed that on the night of the incident, he was waiting for his sister
on the corner of Dupax Street. While waiting, he saw and heard people running and shouting
which caused him to leave the place.

The RTC found the accused appellant guilty of murder. The CA affirmed with
modification the trial court's Decision and held that conspiracy was evident from the
coordinated movements of the three accused.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a conspiracy between the accused-appellant and the other
accused

HELD: No. The prosecution failed to prove that accused-appellant conspired with Menieva
and Ilaw in committing the crime of murder.

Conspiracy is said to exist where two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Accused-appellant's act of pointing to the victim and his group is not an overt act which
shows that accused-appellant acted in concert with his co-accused to cause the death of
Ortigosa. It is stressed that mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the
cooperation and the agreement to cooperate, is not enough to establish conspiracy. Even if the
accused were present and agreed to cooperate with the main perpetrators of the crime, their
mere presence does not make them parties to it, absent any active participation in the
furtherance of the common design or purpose. Likewise, where the only act attributable to the
other accused is an apparent readiness to provide assistance, but with no certainty as to its
ripening into an overt act, there is no conspiracy. In this case, while accused-appellant's
presence and act of pointing at the victim and his group may mean he approved of the crime
or that he was ready to assist his co-accused, absent any other overt act on his part, there is no
conspiracy.

20.People vs. Simon, G.R. No. 93028 – Falag-ey, R. (-)

Doctrine:

Laws shall take effect fifteen days after its complete publication in Official Gazette or any
newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines.

Facts:

The respondent was sentenced with the punishment of reclusion perpetua for violating the
Dangerous Drug Act (RA No. 6425). He allegedly sold four tea bags of marijuana to a
Narcotics Command during a buy-bust operation which was sold for P40.00. The said buy-
bust operation was executed on or about October 22, 1988.

In this case, the respondent was praying for a lesser punishment under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC).

Issue: Whether or not the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment pursuant to Art. 22
of the RPC.

Held: Yes, the respondent can avail of the lesser punishment prescribed by Art 22 of the
RPC.

Republic Act No. 7659 already took effect on December 31, 1993 after its publication on
December 16, 1993 while the respondent was still serving his sentence.

Hence, the respondent was given an indeterminate penalty of arresto mayor or prision

correctional instead of serving its full sentence of reclusion perpetua.

FACTS:

Accused Martin Simon was charged with a violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act
No. 6425 or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. He sold tea bags of marijuana to a Narcotics
Command (NARCOM) poseur-buyer. The confiscated 4 tea bags, weighing a total of 3.8
grams, when subjected to laboratory examination, were found positive for marijuana.

Simon denied the accusation against him, claiming that on the day of question, he was picked
up by the police at their house while watching TV. He was told that he was a pusher so he
attempted to alight from the jeep but he was handcuffed instead. When they finally reached
the camp, he was ordered to sign some papers and, when he refused, he was boxed in the
stomach eight or nine times by Sgt. Pejoro. He was then compelled to affix his signature and
fingerprints on the documents presented to him. He denied knowledge of the marked money
or the 4 teabags of dried marijuana leaves, and insisted that the marked money came from the
pocket of Pejoro. Moreover, the reason why he vomited blood was because of the blows he
suffered at the hands of Pejoro.

Dr. Evelyn Gomez-Aguas, a resident physician of Romana Pangan District Hospital, declared
that she treated appellant for three days due to abdominal pain, but her examination revealed
that the cause for this ailment was appellant’s peptic ulcer. She did not see any sign of slight
or serious external injury, abrasion or contusion on his body.

Simon was sentenced to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment, to pay a fine of twenty
thousand pesos and to pay the costs.

Simon then seek the reversal of the judgement

ISSUE:

Was the conviction of Simon correct?

RULING:

To sustain a conviction for selling prohibited drugs, the sale must be clearly and
unmistakably established. To sell means to give, whether for money or any other material
consideration. It must, therefore, be established beyond doubt that appellant actually sold and
delivered two tea bags of marijuana dried leaves to Sgt. Lopez, who acted as the poseur-
buyer, in exchange for two twenty-peso bills.

After careful review, the Court held that there were 2 tea bags of marijuana that was sold and
there were 2 other tea bags of marijuana confiscated. Thus, Simon should be charged of
selling for the 2 tea bags of marijuana only.

However, there is an overlapping error in the provisions on the penalty of reclusion

perpetua by reason of its dual imposition, that is, as the maximum of the penalty where the
marijuana is less than 750 grams, and also as the minimum of the penalty where the
marijuana involved is 750 grams or more. The same error has been committed with respect to
the other prohibited and regulated drugs provided in said Section 20. To harmonize such
conflicting provisions in order to give effect to the whole law, the court hereby hold that the
penalty to be imposed where the quantity of the drugs involved is less than the quantities
stated in the first paragraph shall range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, and
not reclusion perpetua. This is also concordant with the fundamental rule in criminal law that
all doubts should be construed in a manner favorable to the accused.

The court held that Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act No. 7659, has
unqualifiedly adopted the penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms,
hence with their technical signification and effects. In fact, for purposes of determining
the maximum of said sentence, the court have applied the provisions of the amended Section
20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the
same in the medium period. Such offense, although provided for in a special law, is now in
effect punished by and under the Revised Penal Code. Correlatively, to determine the
minimum, the court applied first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs that “in
imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its
amendments, the court shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence
the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances,
could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall be
within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense.”

Thus, in the case at bar, appellant should be begrudged the benefit of a minimum sentence
within the range of arresto mayor, the penalty next lower to prision correccional which is the
maximum range have fixed through the application of Articles 61 and 71 of the Revised
Penal Code. For, with fealty to the law, the court may set the minimum sentence at 6 months
of arresto mayor, instead of 6 months and 1 day of prision correccional.

21.US vs. Merced, G.R. No. 14170, Nov. 23, 1918 – Fayangcao, D.

US v. CATALINO MERCED, GR No. 14170, 1918-11-23

Facts:
On the night of March 4th,Catalino Merced went to the house of Teodora Sarasin... in
Palimpinon Luzuriaga... and... sat down to supper with her... afterwards
Apolonia Patron also arrived... some morisqueta or cooked rice... likewise sat down to
supper with the two other persons
After supper Merced and Patron successively went down from the house... and the
former... upon his... return... went into the main room... to rest
Apolonia Patron... did likewise... and they... met in said room to lie down to sleep there
Teodora Sarasin, went to bed with her children... and while asleep was awakened by the
noise caused by a struggle... at that moment Sarasin heard Apolonia say to her (the
latter's) husband that she (Apolonia) was wounded... the husband reply to... her, saying:
"That is what you got."... the owner of the house left it, passing through the kitchen, and
on her return a few moments afterwards to get her children, she found Pantaleon Arabe,
the husband of- Apolonia Patron,... stretched out on the mat... he was bloody and was
pressing in his stomach... several hours afterwards, the justice of the peace... found
Arabe's body on the river bank, near the house of the deceased... defendant Catalino
Merced pleaded not guilty
He testified that while he was resting, in company with Apolonia Patron Pantaleon Arabe
entered the place and, after... telling the defendant to prepare himself because he,
Arabe, was going to kill him, put out the light and gave him several blows with the bolo,
Exhibit B, with which he was provided, inflicting three wounds in his right leg and one in
his right arm... he arose to defend himself and a struggle ensued between them during
which he succeeded in snatching from Arabe's belt the dagger... and with it wounded
Arabe in the back, as a result of which wound,... he, Arabe, died.
Issues: crime of homicide
Ruling: judgment... is, affirmed.

22. ] People vs. Dulin, GR No. 171284, June 29, 2015

Doctrines:  1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is the primordial element of the
justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without unlawful aggression, there can be no
justified killing in defense of oneself.
 
2)  The essence of treachery is that the attack comes without warning, or is done in a swift,
deliberate and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim
no chance to resist or to escape, without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
 
Facts:  On August 22, 1990, Alfredo Dulin was out with Nicanor Annariao and Raymund
Soriano when Angel Bancud called out to him.  While his companions went ahead, Dulin
approached Bancud when Francisco Batulan, appeared and stabbed the right side of his
body.  Dulin ran away to the upper level of Carolina Danao’s house.  Batulan chased after
him, and tried to stab him several times.  They grappled for the weapon until Dulin was able
to wrest the knife from Batulan.
 
The commotion was heard by Alexander Tamayao and Romulo Cabalza.  They found Dulin
wielding the knife, holding Batulan by the hair and thrusting the knife.  Tamayao ran to
inform Batulan’s wife of the incident.  Cabalza sought help to bring Batulan to the hospital. 
Batulan was found to have two wounds in the back and several stab wounds in the front.
Francisco died from the wounds, prompting the filing of murder charges against Dulin.
 
Issues:  1) Whether there was self-defense; 2) Whether there was treachery
 
Ruling:  1) There was no-self defense. In this case, there was no unlawful aggression.  The
test for the presence of unlawful aggression under the circumstances is whether the
aggression from the victim put in real peril the life or personal safety of the person defending
himself.  Accordingly, the accused must establish the elements of unlawful aggression:  1)
there must be a physical or material attack or assault; 2) the attack or assault must be actual,
or at least, imminent; and 3) the attack or assault must be unlawful.
 
Although Francisco initiated the attack against Dulin, the unlawful aggression from Francisco
ceased once Dulin was able to take the weapon from Francisco.  At that point Dulin had
nothing to repel by the time he fatally stabbed Francisco.  In addition, the number and nature
of the wounds inflicted shows his determination to kill Francisco, and the absence of self-
defense. 
 
2) There was no treachery. Two conditions must be present for there to be treachery: a) the
assailant employed means, methods or forms in the execution of the criminal act which give
the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to retaliate; and b) the means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted by the assailant.
 
Dulin and Francisco fought for control of the weapon that Francisco initially wielded against
Dulin. Dulin was able to take the weapon from Francisco and ran with it into the house of
Danao, with Francisco in immediate pursuit.  They continued fighting over the weapon,
resulting to Dulin stabbing Francisco several times.  There is no treachery under these
circumstances because Dulin’s attacks did not take Francisco by surprise because of him
being sufficiently forewarned of Dulin’s assault, and being afforded the opportunity to defend
himself, escape, or recover control of the weapon.

23.People vs. Don Vega, G.R. No. 216018 March 27, 2019 – Gundran, A.

FACTS:

RTC and CA convicted Don Vega Ramil for the crime of murder under Art. 248 of the RPC.
On January 18, 2009 at about 11:30pm, Manuel Padilla Isip, victim, was at Arellano St.,
Malate, Mla. because his friend Ogad Venus' birthday. Among them was Aldrin Fernandez,
the witness. About 15 of them were drinking and spotted Vega, sniffing rugby from a bottle.
He disturbed them and while having commotions and while the victim is on his back, the
accused held the victim's neck and stabbed him with a knife in his chest four times.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in convicting the accused.

HELD: No. The accused failed to prove self-defense. An accused who pleads self-defense
admits to the commission of the crime charged He has the burden to prove, by clear and
convincing evidence, that the killing was attended by the following circumstances: (1)
unlawful aggression on the part of the victim; (2) reasonable necessity of the means
employed to prevent or repel such aggression; and (3) lack of sufficient provocation on the
part of the person resorting to self-defense. Aside from Don's self-serving statement that it
was Manuel who punched and attacked him, not one of the persons present at the incident
corroborated his account. Neither did he present any medical record showing that he
sustained any injuries as the result of the attack by Manuel. Manuel was unarmed and had his
back turned while Don used a bladed weapon to "repel the attack" and stab Manuel
repeatedly. From the statements of Fernandez and Calixto, accused- appellant wrapped his
arm around the neck of Manuel and stabbed the victim the moment he turned his back from
the accused-appellant. Evidently, the attack is so sudden and unexpected preventing any
chance from the victim to defend himself. In other words, accused-appellant's position in
attacking Manuel rendered the victim defenseless and unable to retaliate. In order to
appreciate treachery, both elements must be present.  It is not enough that the attack was
"sudden," "unexpected," and "without any warning or provocation." There must also be a
showing that the offender consciously and deliberately adopted the particular means, methods
and forms in the execution of the crime which tended directly to insure such execution,
without risk to himself. as testified to by the witnesses of the prosecution, the incident
happened during a drinking spree where there were more or less 15 people, excluding Don
and Manuel. If Don wanted to make certain that no risk would come to him, he could have
chosen another time and place to stab Manuel. In another case, the Court held that when aid
was easily available to the victim, such as when the attendant circumstances show that there
were several eyewitnesses to the incident, no treachery could be appreciated because if the
accused indeed consciously adopted means to insure the facilitation of the crime, he could
have chosen another place or time. Wherefore, Don Vega is guilty of homicide.
 24.Tabuena vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 103501-03

Doctrine: 
To constitute a crime, the act must, except in certain crimes made such by statute, be
accompanied by a criminal intent, or by such negligence or indifference to duty or to
consequences as, in law, is equivalent to criminal intent. The maxim is actus non facit reum,
nisi mens sit rea - a crime is not committed if the mind of the person performing the act
complained of is innocent. 1. Good faith in the payment of public funds relieves a public
officer from the crime of malversation. 2. Compliance to a patently lawful order is rectitude
far better than contumacious disobedience. In the case at bench, the order emanated from the
Office of the President and bears the signature of the President himself, the highest official of
the land.
 
Facts:
President Marcos instructed Luis Tabuena over the phone to pay directly to the
president’s office and in cash what the Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) owes
the Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC), pursuant to the 7 January 1985
memorandum of then Minister Trade and Industry Roberto Ongpin. Tabuena agreed. About a
week later, Tabuena received from Mrs. Fe Roa-Gimenez, then private secretary of Marcos, a
Presidential Memorandum dated 8 January 1986 reiterating in black and white such verbal
instruction. In obedience to President Marcos’ verbal instruction and memorandum, Tabuena,
with the help of Gerardo G. Dabao and Adolfo Peralta, caused the release of P55 Million of
MIAA funds by means of three (3) withdrawals. 
On 10 January 1986, the first withdrawal was made for P25 Million, following a letter of
even date signed by Tabuena and Dabao requesting the PNB extension office at the MIAA
the depository branch of MIAA funds, to issue a manager’s check for said amount payable to
Tabuena. The check was encashed, however, at the PNB Villamor Branch. Dabao and the
cashier of the PNB Villamor branch counted the money after which Tabuena took delivery
thereof. The P25 Million in cash was delivered on the same day to the office of Mrs.
Gimenez. Mrs. Gimenez did not issue any receipt for the money received. Similar
circumstances surrounded the second withdrawal/encashment and delivery of another P25
Million, made on 16 January 1986. The third and last withdrawal was made on 31 January
1986 for P5 Million. 
Peralta was Tabuena’s co-signatory to the letter- request for a manager’s check for this
amount. Peralta accompanied Tabuena to the PNB Villamor branch as Tabuena requested
him to do the counting of the P5 Million. After the counting, the money was loaded in the
trunk of Tabuena’s car. Peralta did not go with Tabuena to deliver the money to Mrs.
Gimenez’ office. It was only upon delivery of the P5 Million that Mrs. Gimenez issued a
receipt for all the amounts she received from Tabuena. The receipt was dated January
30,1986. Tabuena and Peralta were charged for malversation of funds, while Dabao remained
at large. One of the justices of the Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of a
defense witness and of the accused themselves; the volume of the questions asked were more
the combined questions of the counsels. On 12 October 1990, they were found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt. 
 
Issue: Whether the petitioners can raise the defense of good faith and obedience of a lawful
order, given the fact that it was the President himself who gave such order.
 
Ruling: Yes. Tabuena and Peralta were acquitted. Good faith in the payment of public funds
relieves a public officer from the crime of malversation.
  
First. Tabuena had no other choice but to make the withdrawals, for that was what the
MARCOS Memorandum required him to do. He could not be faulted if he had to obey and
strictly comply with the presidential directive, and to argue otherwise is something easier said
than done. Marcos was undeniably Tabuena’s superior, the former being then the President
who unquestionably exercised control over government agencies such as the MIAA and
PNCC. Tabuena therefore is entitled to the justifying circumstance of “Any person who acts
in obedience to an order issued by a superior for some lawful purpose.” The subordinate
relationship between Marcos and Tabuena is very clear.
Second. There is no denying that the disbursement, which Tabuena admitted as out of the
ordinary but this deviation was inevitable under the circumstances Tabuena was in. He did
not have the luxury of time to observe all auditing procedures of disbursement considering
the fact that the MARCOS Memorandum enjoined his immediate compliance with the
directive that he forward to the President's Office the P55 Million in cash. Be that as it may,
Tabuena surely cannot escape responsibility for such omission. But since he was acting in
good faith, his liability should only be administrative or civil in nature, and not criminal.
 
 25.People vs. Genosa, G.R. No. 135981  January 15, 2004 – Lantud, A.

People of the Philippines vs. Marivic Genosa

FACTS: This case stemmed from the killing of Ben Genosa, by his wife Marivic Genosa,
appellant herein. During their first year of marriage, Marivic and Ben lived happily but
apparently thereafter, Ben changed and the couple would always quarrel and sometimes their
quarrels became violent. Appellant testified that every time her husband came home drunk,
he would provoke her and sometimes beat her. Whenever beaten by her husband, she
consulted medical doctors who testified during the trial. On the night of the killing, appellant
and the victim were quarreled and the victim beat the appellant. However, appellant was able
to run to another room. Appellant admitted having killed the victim with the use of a gun.
The information for parricide against appellant, however, alleged that the cause of death of
the victim was by beating through the use of a lead pipe. Appellant invoked self defense and
defense of her unborn child. After trial, the Regional Trial Court found appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide with an aggravating circumstance of
treachery and imposed the penalty of death.

On automatic review before the Supreme Court, appellant filed an URGENT OMNIBUS
MOTION praying that the Honorable Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
re-examination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of Marivic Genosa by qualified
psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the time she killed her
husband; and finally, (3) the inclusion of the said experts’ reports in the records of the case
for purposes of the automatic review or, in the alternative, a partial re-opening of the case a
quo to take the testimony of said psychologists and psychiatrists. The Supreme Court partly
granted the URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION of the appellant. It remanded the case to the trial
court for reception of expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the “battered
woman syndrome” plea. Testimonies of two expert witnesses on the “battered woman
syndrome”, Dra. Dayan and Dr. Pajarillo, were presented and admitted by the trial court and
subsequently submitted to the Supreme Court as part of the records.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not appellant herein can validly invoke the “battered woman syndrome” as
constituting self defense.
2. Whether or not treachery attended the killing of Ben Genosa.

Ruling: 1. The Court ruled in the negative as appellant failed to prove that she is afflicted
with the “battered woman syndrome”.

A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly subjected to any forceful
physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to coerce her to do something he wants
her to do without concern for her rights. Battered women include wives or women in any
form of intimate relationship with men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered
woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find
herself in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains
in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the so-called “cycle of
violence,” which has three phases: (1) the tension-building phase; (2) the acute battering
incident; and (3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.

The Court, however, is not discounting the possibility of self-defense arising from the
battered woman syndrome. First, each of the phases of the cycle of violence must be proven
to have characterized at least two battering episodes between the appellant and her intimate
partner. Second, the final acute battering episode preceding the killing of the batterer must
have produced in the battered person’s mind an actual fear of an imminent harm from her
batterer and an honest belief that she needed to use force in order to save her life. Third, at
the time of the killing, the batterer must have posed probable -- not necessarily immediate
and actual -- grave harm to the accused, based on the history of violence perpetrated by the
former against the latter. Taken altogether, these circumstances could satisfy the requisites of
self-defense. Under the existing facts of the present case, however, not all of these elements
were duly established.

The defense fell short of proving all three phases of the “cycle of violence” supposedly
characterizing the relationship of Ben and Marivic Genosa. No doubt there were acute
battering incidents but appellant failed to prove that in at least another battering episode in
the past, she had gone through a similar pattern. Neither did appellant proffer sufficient
evidence in regard to the third phase of the cycle.

In any event, the existence of the syndrome in a relationship does not in itself establish the
legal right of the woman to kill her abusive partner. Evidence must still be considered in the
context of self-defense. Settled in our jurisprudence, is the rule that the one who resorts to
self-defense must face a real threat on one’s life; and the peril sought to be avoided must be
imminent and actual, not merely imaginary. Thus, the Revised Penal Code provides that the
following requisites of self-defense must concur: (1) Unlawful aggression; (2) Reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) Lack of sufficient provocation
on the part of the person defending himself.

Unlawful aggression is the most essential element of self-defense. It presupposes actual,

sudden and unexpected attack -- or an imminent danger thereof -- on the life or safety of a
person. In the present case, however, according to the testimony of Marivic herself, there was
a sufficient time interval between the unlawful aggression of Ben and her fatal attack upon
him. She had already been able to withdraw from his violent behavior and escape to their
children’s bedroom. During that time, he apparently ceased his attack and went to bed. The
reality or even the imminence of the danger he posed had ended altogether. He was no longer
in a position that presented an actual threat on her life or safety.

The mitigating factors of psychological paralysis and passion and obfuscation were, however,
taken in favor of appellant. It should be clarified that these two circumstances --
psychological paralysis as well as passion and obfuscation -- did not arise from the same set
of facts.

The first circumstance arose from the cyclical nature and the severity of the battery inflicted
by the batterer-spouse upon appellant. That is, the repeated beatings over a period of time
resulted in her psychological paralysis, which was analogous to an illness diminishing the
exercise of her will power without depriving her of consciousness of her acts.

As to the extenuating circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have

naturally produced passion and obfuscation, it has been held that this state of mind is present
when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior
unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. To
appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is not far
removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length of time, during which
the accused might recover her normal equanimity.

2. NO. Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved as
conclusively as the killing itself. Besides, equally axiomatic is the rule that when a killing is
preceded by an argument or a quarrel, treachery cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
circumstance, because the deceased may be said to have been forewarned and to have
anticipated aggression from the assailant. Moreover, in order to appreciate alevosia, the
method of assault adopted by the aggressor must have been consciously and deliberately
chosen for the specific purpose of accomplishing the unlawful act without risk from any
defense that might be put up by the party attacked.

The appellant acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion or
obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of her batterer-
spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight (8) months pregnant with their child,
overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental state, which overcame
her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and that of her unborn child.

The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction of appellant for parricide. However, considering
the presence of two (2) mitigating circumstances and without any aggravating circumstance,
the penalty is reduced to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum; to 14
years 8 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum. Inasmuch as appellant has been
detained for more than the minimum penalty hereby imposed upon her, the director of the
Bureau of Corrections may immediately RELEASE her from custody upon due determination
that she is eligible for parole, unless she is being held for some other lawful cause.

 NOTE: After this case was decided by the Supreme Court, R.A. 9262, otherwise known as
Anti-Violence Against Women and their Children Act of 2004 was enacted. Sec. 26 of said
law provides that "xxx. Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered women syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil liability nothwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised
Penal Code.xxx"

Article 12 to 20

 26.Solomon Verdadero vs. People, G.R. No. 216021 March 2, 2016

FACTS:

         On March 12, 2009, at t the Bagao Police Station, a complaint was reported by
Maynard Plata, together with his father Romeo and his companion Ronnie Elaydo, against
Solomon Verdadero. The complaint was about Verdadero for stealing a fan belt of their
irrigation pump.

         After a confrontation with Verdadero, the three men made their way home but took a
stop at a drugstore because Maynard intended to buy some supplies there. Romeo proceeded
to the dru

gstore, and after a while Maynard and Ronnie saw Romeo being stabbed by Verdadero. At
that moment, Maynard tried to help his father but Verdadero tried to attack him. As a
response, Maynard tried to defend himself with a stool, which he used to hit Verdadero in the
chest. Meanwhile, Ronnie ran toward the police station to seek assistance. After arriving at
the scene, the responding police officer arrested Verdadero. While Maynard and Ronnie rush
Romeo to a clinic. After arriving at the clinic, they were advised to transfer him to Cagayan
Valley Medical Center (CVMC), where he soon died of cardiopulmonary arrest after arriving
there.

         During the trial, Verdadero pleaded guilty and invoked his defense of insanity. He
admitted that he was not in the proper state of mind during that faithful night. As early as
1999, he was brought to the Psychiatric Department of CVMC for treatment. Then he was
diagnosed with depression and schizophrenia in the subsequent years. He also suffered a
relapse in 2009, and became an in and out patient from his confinement in 2009 until the
stabbing events.

 ISSUE: Whether the exempting circumstance under Article 12- That an imbecile or insane
person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval can be appreciated in this case.

RULING: Yes, it can be appreciated in this case. According to Revised Penal Code Article
12 Paragraph 1- An imbecile or insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid
interval is exempted from criminal liability. It must be pointed out that in order for this
circumstance to be exempted from criminal liability, there must be a complete deprivation of
intelligence or that there be total deprivation of the freedom of will at the commission of the
felony. Thus, mere abnormality of mental faculties is not enough, especially if the offender
has not lost consciousness of his act. In the case under consideration,

         Verdadero is already diagnosed with schizophrenia, a chronic mental disorder

characterized by inability to distinguish between fantasy and reality and often accompanied
by hallucination and delusion. Worth emphasizing that he already suffered from this mental
disorder before the commission of the felony, and suffered a relapse during that year. Thus he
is afforded reservation if he did it in a lucid interval during the commission of the felony.
From the facts given, it can be said that this exempting circumstance can be appreciated in
this case.

27.People vs. Racal, GR 224886, September 4, 2017 – Latugat, G.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROGER RACAL

G.R. No. 224886, September 4, 2017 
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: In an Information, Racal was charged with the crime of murder when the said
accused, armed with a knife, with treachery, unexpectedly, attack and use personal
violence upon the person of one Jose Francisco by stabbing the latter, at his body,
thereby inflicting a fatal wound and as a consequence of which he died. The
prosecution established that while the “trisikad” drivers were waiting for passengers,
Racal told the group of drivers not to trust Francisco because he is a traitor.
Francisco asked Racal why the latter called him a traitor. Without warning, Racal
approached Francisco and stabbed him several times with a knife, hitting him in the
chest and other parts of his body.
Racal did not deny having stabbed Francisco but he raised the defense of insanity
contending that he has a predisposition to snap into an episode where he loses his
reason and thereby acts outside his conscious control.
Issue: Whether or not the defense of insanity may be validly invoked.
Ruling: No, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. In the eyes of
the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the act. The accused must be deprived of reason and act without the
least discernment because there is a complete absence of the power to discern or a
total deprivation of freedom of the will.
In the present case, the separate psychiatric evaluations of appellant were taken
three and four years after the crime was committed. An inquiry into the mental state
of an accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very moment
the felony is committed. On his part, Dr. Gerong testified that he found appellant to
have “diminished capacity to discern what was wrong or right at the time of the
commission of the crime.” “Diminished capacity” is not the same as “complete
deprivation of intelligence or discernment.”
The Court, however, appreciated the mitigating circumstance of illness as would
diminish the exercise of willpower of appellant without, however, depriving him of the
consciousness of his acts, pursuant to Article 13, paragraphs 9 and 10 of the RPC.
Ratio Decidendi: In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that
every person is of sound mind and that all acts are voluntary.
Gist: Before the Court is an ordinary appeal filed by accused-appellant, Roger
Racal, assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals, which affirmed, with
modification, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City finding
herein appellant guilty of the crime of murder
 28.US vs. Tañedo, G.R. No. L-5418 Feb 12, 1910 – Lawaguey, S.

29.People vs. Siao, G.R. No. 126021 March 3, 2000 – Likigan, L.

People vs. Siao

Date promulgated: March 3, 2000

Nature of case: APPEAL from a decision of the Cebu City RTC

Ponente: J. Gonzaga-Reyes

Facts:

 Rene Siao and Reylan Gimena were charged with the crime of rape. They allegedly
raped 14-year old Ester/Estrella Raymundo on May 27, 1994. On March 29, 1996,
RTC rendered the ff. verdict:

o Siao – convicted of rape as principal by induction; penalty of reclusion

perpetua; ordered to indemnify Ester P50,000.00 in moral damages.

o Gimena – acquitted because he was acting under impulse of uncontrollable

fear of an equal/greater injury
 Cast of characters

o Rene Siao – son of Jose Siao, owner of the house in which the crime occurred;
employer of Reylan Gimena and Ester Raymundo

o Ester Raymundo – housemaid of Siao family

o Reylan Gimena – helper of Siao family

 There are two versions of the story: that of 1) Ester/Gimena and 2) Siao. The court
believed the former.

o Ester/Gimena’s version

 3 PM: Siao ordered Gimena to pull Ester into the women’s room.

 Once inside, Siao pushed her to the bed. Siao pointed a gun at Gimena
and Ester.

 Siao asked Ester to choose among a pistol, candle or bottle of Sprite.

She chose Sprite. Siao lit candle and dropped melting wax on Ester’s
chest + poured Sprite into her nostrils.

 FIRST SEXUAL ACT: ORAL SEX. Siao tied her hands and feet
with electric cord/wire as she lay face down on the bed. He made her
undress herself and ordered her to suck Gimena’s penis at gunpoint.

 SECOND SEXUAL ACT: MISSIONARY STYLE. Siao ordered

Gimena to get on top of her. Gimena made “push-and-pull
movements” for 10 minutes (“Why did it take you long to
penetrate?”) while Siao held her legs to keep them apart.

 THIRD SEXUAL ACT: SIDE BY SIDE. Despite their protestations

of exhaustion, Gimena and Ester were made to lie side by side.
Gimena, who was behind Ester, made push-and-pull movements so
that his organ would reach her private part.

 FOURTH SEXUAL ACT: DOGGY STYLE. Despite their

protestations of exhaustion, Gimena and Ester were forced to do it
doggy style.

 Gimena shouted for help. Somebody knocked on the door. They heard
the voice of Teresita Pañares, Siao’s older sister. But Siao ignored her
and kept on pointing the gun at Gimena and Ester. He told them to go
to the boys’ room. They complied with his order tearfully, after he
followed them laughing all the while. He warned them: “If you will
tell the police, I will kill your mothers.”

 6 PM: Ester and her cousin, Joy, also a housemaid of the Siao family,
asked permission to go home. On their way home, they met an old man
who saw Ester crying. He took them to his house and the incident as
 reported to the police. The police investigated and arrested Gimena.
They couldn’t locate Siao.

o Siao’s version

 MORNING: Teresita was awakened by a commotion in the house.

Gimena was accusing Ester of stealing his wristwatch. This wasn’t the
first time he’d accused her of stealing his watch. Earlier in the week,
there had been more thefts: Teresita lost P1,300.00; her daughter lost a
necklace; other helpers lost personal articles. Until the employment of
the Raymundo cousins, the Siaos had not fallen victim to thievery.

 NOONTIME: After returning from his morning chores, Gimena asked

Teresita whether his watch had been found. When she said no, he
confronted Ester, who offered to pay for the value of the watch instead.
Joy agreed to accompany Gimena to her and Ester’s aunt for financial
assistance. But they returned an hour later and told Teresita that the
aunt couldn’t/didn’t help them.

 Ester admitted to Teresita that she’d stolen Teresita’s money

(P1,300.00) but not the necklace. Ester returned a total of P800 to
Teresita, but she could no longer produce the rest of the money
because she’d already spent it on personal effects.

 Gimena and Ester went to the boys’ room. Shortly thereafter, Gimena
came out and announced that he’d recovered his watch—Ester had
showed him where she’d hidden it (under the ironing board).

 There were lots of people there: Jose Siao (dad of Rene and Teresita),
Beatriz Baricuatro, Joy, Teresita, Jose’s grandchildren

 3 PM: To solve the case of the missing necklace, Teresita left the
compound and returned within the hour accompanied by Barangay
Tanod Arturo Jabines. Ester begged for forgiveness and promised not
to steal again. She admitted to stealing the necklace. But Teresita
wasn’t satisfied. She started to bring Ester to the barangay hall to
report the theft, but en route, Ester confessed and begged for
forgiveness, so Teresita decided to give her a second chance.

 Back at the compound, Ester and Joy asked Beatriz’s permission to

return to their home in Leyte. She said yes and even gave money for
boat fare.

 6 PM: Ester and Joy left the Siao residence with all their belongings.

 7 PM: Some people came to the house looking for Ester and Joy.

 What was Rene Siao, the accused, doing all this time? Morning: made
the rounds collecting the obligations of his father’s creditors.
Noontime: went to Jose’s store and had lunch with his wife Gina.
  9 PM: A barangay tanod came to the store and invited Gimena to the
barangay hall.

 At the barngay hall, upon the complaint of Rosalie Sallentes (claimed

to be related to Ester and Joy), Barangay Captain George Rama asked
Gimena re: Ester and Joy’s whereabouts. He didn’t know. Eventually,
he confessed that he had tied Ester up to force her to reveal where
she’d hidden his watch. He untied her after he recovered his watch
from under the ironing board.

 NEXT DAY: Gimena was picked up by police at the store and brought
to the police station.

 NOTE: neither the police nor the barangay tanod looked for Siao on
May 27 and 28.

 JUNE 21, 1994: Ester filed a complaint against Siao and Gimena.

 After case was filed but before trial commenced, a person claiming to
be Ester’s father met with the Siaos, demanding P1M from them to
drop the case.

o TRIAL COURT’S DECISION: Siao guilty of rape as principal by induction;

Gimena acquitted

o Siao appealed

o SUPREME COURT’S DECISION: trial court’s decision upheld; Siao’s

claims dismissed

 Agreed with trial court’s observation: The court cannot believe that a
14-year old girl who is a stranger in the city will vent her ire on Rene
Siao. If Rene Siao were to be believed that he did not confront Ester
about the latter’s act of committing the crime of theft, why would
Ester take revenge on Rene Siao? The court cannot believe that this
14-year old probinsyana will concoct a story so as to do damage
against business men like Jose Siao, Beatriz Baricuatro and Rene
Siao. As a matter of fact, filing a case in court would mean untold
misery and inconvenience. It will expose her to shame. She mustered
enough courage if only to make the truth prevail. She ventured to
assume the role of David against Goliath.

 Siao’s claim #1: prosecution’s failure to present the gun used

by Siao to force and intimidate Ester and Gimena is fatal to the
prosecution’s cause.

o Rebuttal: People vs. Travero – the non-presentation of

the weapon used in the commission of the rape is not
essential to the conviction of the accused. It suffices that
the testimony of the rape victim is credible because the
established rule is that the sole testimony of the
 offended party is sufficient to sustain the accused’s
conviction if it rings the truth or is otherwise credible

o The testimony of Ester and Gimena were assessed by

the trial court to be credible. Unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if
considered, might affect the result of the case, its
assessment must be respected for it had the opportunity
to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses
while testifying and detect if they are lying.

 Siao’s claim #2: the trial court erred in giving credence to the
testimonies of Ester and Gimena despite being fraught with
substantial inconsistencies.

o Rebuttal: it can be readily seen that the alleged

inconsistencies are inconsequential considering that
they refer to trivial matters which have nothing to do
with the essential fact of the commission of rape –
carnal knowledge through force and intimidation.

 Inconsistencies on minor details of the

testimonies of witnesses serve to strengthen their
credibility as they are badges of truth rather than
an indicia of falsehood. If at all, they serve as
proof that they witnesses were not coached and
rehearsed.

 Siao’s claim #3: Ester and Gimena’s testimonies don’t conform

to common experience (e.g. Gimena ejaculated 3x in less than
30 minutes; rape took place within earshot and near presence of
other people, including a barangay tanod; Ester and Gimena
didn’t try to escape in the 10 minutes it took for Siao to follow
them from women’s to the boys’ room; Ester reported the
incident to an old man she chanced upon on her way home)

o Rebuttal:

 Ejaculation – the important consideration in rape

is not the emission of semen but the penetration
of the female genitalia by the male organ

 Within earshot and near presence of other

people – lust is no respecter of time and place

 No attempt to escape – considering their ages

(14 and 17) and low position (household help),
they were easily intimidated and cowed into
submission, especially since Siao was their
employer and had a gun; also, not all victims
 flee from their aggressors – some become
virtually catatonic because of the mental shock

 Reported incident to old man – no one else to

turn to

o SENTENCE: RTC decision AFFIRMED (reclusion perpetua + civil liability

of P50,000 indemnity) with MODIFICATION (P50,000 moral damages +
P20,000 exemplary damages)

 Rape was committed AFTER the effectivity of R.A. 7659 on

December 31, 19993. The governing law, Art. 335 of the RPC, as
amended, imposes the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, if
committed with the use of a deadly weapon.

 RTC overlooked aggravating circumstance of ignominy

(accused in committing the rape used not only the missionary
position, but also the dog position) -

 Use of deadly weapon serves to increase the penalty. But said

fact should be alleged in the information, due to the accused’s
right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him. Since the complaint (later converted into
Information) failed to allege the use of a deadly weapon, the
penalty to be reckoned with in determining the penalty for rape
would be reclusion perpetua, the penalty prescribed for simple
rape – single indivisible penalty which must be applied
regardless of any mitigating/aggravating circumstances.

 TC erred in ordering Siao to pay only indemnity (civil liability

arising from the offense) of P50,000. Siao should also pay
moral damages (automatically granted in rape cases without
need of any proof; fixed at P50,000) and exemplary damages
(presence of 1 aggravating circumstance justifies the award of
exemplary damages pursuant to Art. 2230 of the Civil Code)

30.People vs. Ampatuan, G.R. No. 188707 July 30, 2014 – Lising, J.

31.People vs. Cual, G.R. No. 131925   March 9, 2000 -Mariano, C.

People vs Cual G.R. No. 131925 March 9, 2000

Facts: Accused-appellants Dario Cabanas Cual and Dario Maranan Villoceno were charged
w ith the crime of murder. The information filed states that the two accused, arme d with a
sharp bolo attacked and killed Ramil Macasalhig Sabturani. The trial court was of the
impression that the prosecution's version of the even ts and witnesses was more credible than
those of the defense. It struck down app ellant's tale of self-defense particularly of the
contention of the defense that the victim was the aggressor and that he was armed with a lead
pipe. The court also stated that the presence of 21 stab wounds could not have been inflicted
wi thout the conspiracy and mutual participation of the two accused-appellants. With respect
to accused-appellant Dario Villoceno, the court was convinced that he was an accomplice to
the murder as his act of grappling with the victim for the possession of a lead pipe gave
accused-appellant Dario Cual the "necessary inspi ration and impetus in consummating the
act of murder. The court held the two accused guilty sentencing Dario Cual to suffer the
penalt y of imprisonment of Reclusion Perpetua for not being a heinous crime, and Dario
Villoceno to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Temporal which is the next lower i n degree to
that of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not the deliberate grappling of the victim by Villocenco for t he
possession of a steel pipe was sufficient to hold him as an accomplice?
Held: No. Under current jurisprudence, in order that a person may be considered an accompl
ice, the following requisites must concur: (1) community of design; that is, kno wing the
criminal design of the principal by direct participation, he concurs wi th the latter in his
purpose; (2) that he cooperates in the execution of the off ense by previous or simultaneous
acts, with the intention of supplying material and moral aid in the execution of the crime in an
efficacious way; and (3) that there be a relation between the acts and those attributed to the
person charged as an accomplice. In the case at bench, there is nothing in the records which
show that accused-ap pellant Villoceno knew that accused Cual was going to hack Ramil
Sabturani. Neit her was it shown accused-appellant Villoceno concurred in the criminal
design of his co-accused. The only involvement of accused-appellant Cual in the incident was
when he was e ngaged in a struggle with the victim just before Villoceno made his initial atta
ck on the victim. This circumstance does not by itself show his unity with the c riminal
design of Villoceno. On this point, we are inclined to believe his testi mony that the struggle
was not deliberate on his part and that, in fact, it was the victim who initiated the struggle.
The victim, who had just been deprived of a job opportunity by accused-appellant Cual,
surely had more reason to feel agg rieved and thus engage accused-appellant Cual to a fight.
The fact that accused-appellant Cual immediately disengaged from his struggle wi th the
victim after Villoceno's attack is yet another indication that he is inno cent of the charge
against him. Verily, if he had indeed conspired with Villocen o, he would have continued to
hold the victim and prevent him from escaping unti l he expired from Villoceno's attack.

32.People vs. Oandasan, G.R. No. L-29532 September 28, 1968 – Micu, R.

DOCTRINE: The proper forum where a plea in mitigation may be presented is the court
which has jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case.

FACTS: Mariano Oandasan was charged with homicide. At the preliminary investigation in
the Municipal Court (MC) of Flora, he pleaded ‘not guilty’. However, after elevation to the
CFI of Cagayan for trial on the merits and upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty and presented
evidence to prove the mitigating circumstances of incomplete self-defense and voluntary
surrender, aside from the pleas of guilty.

The judge ignored the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense, and the
plea of guilty as a mitigating circumstance “in view of his former plea before the MC of
Flora”; he merely accorded the benefits of provocation and voluntary surrender as ordinary
mitigating circumstances. So, Oandasan was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor as
maximum.

ISSUE: Whether the mitigating circumstances of plea of guilty and incomplete self-defense
be considered in Oandasan’s favor.
 RULING: Yes, both circumstances should be taken in consideration.

The proper forum where a plea in mitigation may be presented is the court which has
jurisdiction to take cognizance of the case. Here, the court having original jurisdiction over
homicide in the CFI. Thus, Oandasan’s plea of not guilty in the MC may not be taken against
him. The instance where a change of plea is not taken as a mitigating circumstance is when
the plea changes on appeal, which is absent in this case.

The privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense is present: Oandasan saw

the deceased Quirino Duldulao chasing his son, approached him and asked why Duldulao
was chasing his son, and got hit by Duldulao with a wooden club on his left shoulder and
head, which prompted him to stab Duldulao twice. The only absent element is the
“reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel”. This instance does not
show mere provocation, but unlawful aggression by the deceased and lack of sufficient
provocation by Oandasan.

33.People vs. Jabalde, G.R. No. 195224, June 15, 2016 – Peralta, J.

FACT:  Lin is a grade 1 elementary student. He testified that he was playing during recess
with Nova and other classmates. During the course of their game, he touched the shoulder of
Nova, Jabalde's daughter, causing the latter to fall down and wounding her head. He then
helped Nova to stand while one of his classmates called Jabalde. Afraid of what happened, he
ran towards a dilapidated building, which was near the place of the incident. Soon thereafter,
Jabalde arrived and slapped him on his neck and choked him causing Lin to sustain
abrasions.

Jabalde denied the allegation saying that Lin just kept on jumping when he was asked the
whereabouts of Nova and so she held him still.

The lower court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section
10(a), Article VI, of R.A. No. 7610.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the facts established, the lower court erred in appreciating the
acts of Jabalde as constitutive of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of R.A. No. 7610. 

RULING:  Yes because the records of the case do not show that Jabalde intended to debase,
degrade or demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of Lin as a human being. Further, the
laying of the hands on Lin was an offshoot of Jabalde's emotional outrage after being
informed that her daughter's head was punctured, and whom she thought was already dead. In
fact, her vision got blurred and she fainted. When she returned into consciousness, she sat on
her chair in front of the board for about five to ten minutes.

Considering these factual circumstances of the case the Supreme Court ruled Jabalde is liable
for slight physical injuries under Article 266(2) of the RPC. However, in imposing the correct
penalty, however, the Court has to consider the mitigating circumstance of passion or
obfuscation under Article 13(6). of the RPC, because Jabalde lost his reason and self-control,
thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power. There is passional obfuscation when the
crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or
improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. For passion
and obfuscation to be considered a mitigating circumstance, it must be shown that:
 (1) an unlawful act sufficient to produce passion and obfuscation was committed
by the intended victim;

 (2) the crime was committed within a reasonable length of time from the
commission of the unlawful act that produced the obfuscation in the accused's
mind; and

 (3) the passion and obfuscation arose from lawful sentiments and not from a
spirit of lawlessness or revenge.

With her having acted under the belief that Lin had killed her daughter, Jabalde is entitled to
the mitigating circumstance of passion and obfuscation.

34.People vs. Rolando Solar, G.R. No. 225595 August 6, 2019

– Puctiyao, F.

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO SOLAR

G.R. No. 225595, August 06, 2019

FACTS: Ma. Theresa, the wife of the victim, Joseph Capinig testified that on March
9, 2008, at around 2:00 a.m., she decided to follow her husband who left the house
to get his Cell phone from Rolando Solar. Along the way, she saw Rolando and Mark
Kenneth Solar hit Joseph with a baseball bat on his nape. When Joseph fell down,
the two simultaneously ganged up on him. She then shouted for help and the
assailants ran away. Immediately, Joseph was rushed to the hospital but was
pronounced "dead on arrival." According to Dr. Nulud, the death resulted from
traumatic injuries on the brain caused by a blunt force applied on the head of the
victim.
Rolando denied the accusation and claimed that he was attending a wake on the
night of March 8, 2008, from 11:00 p.m. until 2:00 a.m. the following day. Joseph
was also there drinking and playing cara with his group. After a while, Joseph
approached him and offered to pawn a cellphone in exchange of cash. However, he
refused because he also needed money. On his way home, he met Joseph who,
upon seeing him, drew out a kitchen knife and tried to stab him thrice. Fortunately,
he was not hit and he immediately ran away.

The RTC found the testimony of Ma. Theresa, the sole eyewitness of the
prosecution, to be clear, positive, categorical, and credible to establish Rolando's
guilt for the crime charged. The RTC also held that the qualifying circumstance of
treachery was present in the killing of Joseph, and hence, the crime committed by
Rolando was Murder.

Nevertheless, the CA downgraded the offense from Murder to Homicide, holding

that the Information did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances
describing how treachery attended the killing
ISSUE:
Whether the CA is correct in convicting Solar of Homicide on the ground that the
Information did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing the
attendance of treachery in the the killing.
RULING: No. The CA erred in modifying Rolando's conviction in the way that it did
when he had effectively waived the right to question his conviction on that ground.
The Court notes that the right to question the defects in an Information is not
absolute. In fact, defects in an Information with regard to its form may be waived by
the accused.
In this case, Rolando did not question the supposed insufficiency of the Information
filed against him through either a motion to quash or motion for bill of particulars. He
voluntarily entered his plea during the arraignment and proceeded with the trial.
Thus, he is deemed to have waived any of the waivable defects in the Information,
including the supposed lack of particularity in the description of the attendant
circumstances. In other words, Rolando is deemed to have understood the acts
imputed against him by the Information.
It is for this reason that the Court modifies Rolando's conviction from Homicide to
Murder — he failed to question the sufficiency of the Information by availing any of
the remedies provided under the procedural rules, namely: either by filing a motion to
quash for failure of the Information to conform substantially to the prescribed form , or
by filing a motion for bill of particulars. Again, he is deemed to have waived any of
the waivable defects in the Information filed against him.

In view of the foregoing, the Court thus reversed the assailed Decision of the CA. It
finds the accused-appellant Rolando Solar y Dumbrique GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt for the crime of Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of
the Revised Penal Code.

35.People vs. Pagal, G.R. No. 241257 September 29, 2020 – Pudlao, J.

36.People vs. Lapaz, G.R. No. 68898 March 31, 1989 – Revita, R.

37.People v. Jaurigue, C.A. No. 384 February 21, 1946 – Romero-Domingo

C.A. No. 384         February 21, 1946 

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. NICOLAS JAURIGUE and AVELINA
JAURIGUE, defendants. 

DOCTRINE:

The attempt to rape a woman constitutes an unlawful aggression sufficient to put her
in a state of legitimate defense, inasmuch as a woman's honor cannot but be esteemed as a
right as precious, if not more, than her very existence. As long as there is actual danger of
being raped, a woman is justified in killing her aggressor, in the defense of her honor.

FACTS:
         Avelina Jarigue (girl) and appellant Amado Capino lived in the same barrio. Prior to
the incident at hand, Capino had been courting Jarigue to no avail. A month prior to the
incident, Capino stole a hanky belonging to Jarigue bearing her nickname “Aveling” while I
was being washed. On another night, Jarigue was feeding a dog under her house, when
Capino approached her and spoke to her of his love, which she flatly refused, and he
thereupon suddenly embraced and kissed her and touched her boobs. She thereafter kept a
long fan knife to protect herself. A few days later, Capino climbed up the house of Jarigue
and entered the room where she was sleeping. He felt her forehead with the intention of
raping her. She immediately screamed for help, which awakened her parents and brought
them to her side. Capino then came out from where he was hiding, under the bed, and
kissed the hand of Jarigue’s father to beg for forgiveness.

Several days later on the fateful night, her family went to the local church where it was quite
bright. When Jarigue was left alone in the bench while her father ended to some business,
Capino sat beside Jarigue and placed his hand on top of her thigh. On observing this highly
improper conduct, Jaurigue stabbed Capino in the neck,fatally causing a single wound from
which he died. Jaurigue surrendered without question.

ISSUE: Whether or not Jaurigue acted in the legitimate defense of her honor and should be
completely absolved from all criminal liability

RULING: Jaurigue is not absolved from criminal liability. If Jaurigue had killed Capino when
he climbed up her house to rape her, she could have been perfectly justified in killing him.
However, when the deceased sat beside the defendant on the same bench in a well lit
chapel with several people inside, including her own father and the barrio lieutenant where
there is no possibility of being raped. She cannot be legally declared completely exempt
from criminal liability for fatally wounding the deceased since the means employer by her in
the defense of her honor was evidently excessive.

On the side:

The fact that she voluntarily surrendered to the lieutenant in the chapel and admitted to
stabbing the deceased , and the fact that she had acted in the immediate vindication of a
grave offense committed against her a few moments before, and upon such provocation as
to produce passion or temporary loss of reason, should be considered as mitigating
circumstances in her favor. The aggravating circumstance that the killing was done in a
place dedicated to religious worship cannot be legally sustained as there is no evidence to
show that defendant had murder in her heart when she entered the chapel. She should
therefore be charged with homicide without aggravating circumstances and with mitigating
circumstances.

38.People vs. Olazo, G.R. No. 220761 October 3, 2016 – Sabyat, J.

39.US vs. Cornejo, G.R. No. 9773, November 20, 1914 – Sanchez, T.

40.Rustia vs. People, G.R. No. 208351 October 5, 2016 – Santiago, J.

41.Quintos vs. People, GR 205298, Sept 10, 2014 – Santowen, C.

42.People vs. Nierra et al., G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980 – Somera

Facts:
 Juliana Nierra, and Paciano Nierra (her brother-in-law) were competitors in the
business of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in a Barrio in General Santos
City. Juliana sold coca cola, while Paciano sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of the two
Lauches (Sylvania I and II). Paciano conceived an idea of liquidating his competitor, Juliana.
Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano’s house, Gaspar
Misa, a convicted murderer who had escaped from Davao Penal Colony. Misa, in the
presence of Paciano’s wife agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand pesos.
Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing, he would pay Misa four hundred
pesos. In the evening of July 6, 1969, Rojas posted himself near the creek or canal about
twenty seven steps from the scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house of
Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of the crime. Misa secluded himself
near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back
of Juliana’s house where, as he had previously observed some nights before, she used to
answer the call of nature. Between seven to eight o’clock that night, Juliana went to the beach
where she was accustomed to void, and when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared
behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture, he inserted to her
mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Misa was arrested and confessed pointing to
Nierra spouses, Doblen, and Rojas as co- conspirators of the crime of murder.

Issue: Whether Doblen and Rojas are accomplices in the commission of the crime of murder

Held: Yes. The contention that there is no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied
by the facts shown in the record. Misa had no personal motive for killing Juliana. He was
induced to do so because of the monetary consideration promised  by the spouses Nierra.
Doblen, married to Paciano’s cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses. Doblen’s role
was that of having introduced MIsa to the Nierra spouses and delivering the murder weapon
to Misa.He was not present at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, Rijas acted as a
lookout and received fifty pesos for his work. After a conscientious reflection on the
complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should be held
guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be
punished as co-principals. However, since their participation was not absolutely
indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the rule that the court should favor the
milder form of liability may be applied to them (People v. Tamayo, 44 Phil., 38)

43.People vs. Bayabos, G.R. No. 171222, Feb 18, 2015 – Tamayao, J.

Article 21 to Article 113

(Read RA 10592)

44.Inmates of New Bilibid Prison vs. DOJ Secretary, G.R. No. 212719, June 25,
2019 – Tegui-in, L.

45.Sealion vs. People, G.R. No. 172678, Mar 23, 2011 – Torres, J.

 
Article 48

46.People vs. Vargas, G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990 – Toyoken, M.

47.People vs. Desierto, G.R. No. 86728, April 6, 1990 – Valbuena, A.

48.People vs. Lawas, GR Nos. L-7618-20, Jun 30, 1955 – Valdez, K.

49.People vs. Remollino, G.R. No. L-14008 September 30, 1960 – Yusoph

50.People vs. Tabaco G.R. Nos. 100382-100385. March 19, 1997 - Abuan

51.People vs. Ladjaalam, G.R. Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000

- Acosta, J.

52.People vs. Pulusan et al., G.R. No. 110037. May 21, 1998 – Aurora, M.

53.People vs. Sanota et al., G.R. No. 233659. December 10, 2019 see People vs.
Ebet, G.R. No. 181635, November 15, 2010 – Ballatong, E.

54.People vs. Palema et al., G.R. No. 228000, July 10, 2019 – Banasan, G.

55.People vs. Mancao G.R. No. 228951. July 17, 2019 – Bangilan, F.

56.People vs. ZZZ G.R. No. 228828, July 24, 2019 – Bas-ang, B.

PEOPLE Vs. ZZZ

G.R. No. 228828

FACTS:

             An information was filed against ZZZ, on October 14, 1996, ZZZ was charged
with the crime of rape with homicide. The incident of rape happened on May 16,1996 where
he raped the victim at the same time the said accused did strike, assault and club the victim as
a result the skull was cracked with brains coming out, this caused her death. Upon
arraignment ZZZ pleaded not guilty. The prosecution presented 5 witnesses they are:

 1. BBB (the victims uncle), who narrated that the victim and the accused were
related, and at the time of the commission of the crime he said that he saw ZZZ
dragging AAA.;

2. Senior Police Officer;

3. Jaime Lavarias (SPO 3 Lavarias) he testified that they saw the corpse under the
bamboo grove and they went to ZZZ’s house, but he was nowhere to be found;

 4. Dr. Ronald Bandonill, the medico-legal officer of the NBI, testified that he
conducted an autopsy on AAA. Upon examination, he found that the cadaver was at
an advanced state of decomposition, he as well observed contusions on AAA’s face;
  5. The victim’s father CCC, he testified that AAA was 11 years old when she was
raped and killed.

             On defense, ZZZ testified that he was 15 years old when the incident
happened. He confirmed that he knew AAA as his cousin. That on the night of the incident,
he said that he went to his grandmother’s house, where he watched television with his brother
including the victim. That on May 22, 1996, his stepfather brought him to Tarlac to work.

             The RTC found ZZZ guilty of the crime charged, the court based their
conviction on circumstantial evidence presented by the prosecution. The trial court ruled that
the positive identification of ZZZ prevailed over the defense of denial. However, the service
of sentence is hereby suspended, the trial court applied the R.A 9344 retroactively.  

             On appeal, the CA affirmed ZZZ’s conviction, they said that the trial court
was correct in retroactively applying R.A. 9344(Juvenile Justice and Welfare act of 2006).
Because at the time of the commission of the crime the accused was still a minor however it
was said that he acted with discernment. This was denied by the accused arguing that the
prosecution failed to prove that he acted with discernment.

             This was elevated to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether the prosecution proved that the accused acted with discernment.

 RULING: YES.

             The accused acted with discernment because:

a.       He perpetrated the crime in a dark and isolated place.

b.       After knowing the he had been tagged as a suspect he evaded authorities by

fleeing to Tarlac and concealed his identity.

c.       As confirmed by the social worker, he knew and understood the consequences

of his act.

d.       4. According to the doctor, AAA was raped by means of force.

R.A. 9344 provides the minimum age of criminal responsibility.

·         A child 15 years or under at the time of the commission shall be

exempt from criminal liability.

·         A child 15 years of age but below 18 years of age shall likewise be

exempt, unless he or she acted with discernment.

Discernment has been defined in this case as the mental capacity of minor to fully
appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. 
 

ISL (Read Act 4103)

57.Legrama vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 178626, June 13, 2012

– Cayatoc, B.

58.People vs. Aseniero G.R. No. 218209, April 10, 2019 – Chongael, G.