5 NEA V Gonzaga

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1/31/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 539

388 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

*
G.R. No. 158761. December 4, 2007.

NATIONAL ELECTRIFICATION
ADMINISTRATION, petitioner, vs.
VICTORIANO B. GONZAGA, respondent.

Administrative Law; National


Electrification Administration (NEA);
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 269; Judicial
Review; Where the issue centers on the validity
of National Electrification Administration’s
(NEA’s) rules in light of the publication
requirement of the Administrative Code and
New Civil Code, the same is cognizable by
regular courts.—It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD
269 refers to “order, ruling or decision” of NEA.
What is being challenged in this case is the
decision of the screening committee of
ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent.
Likewise assailed is the validity of the ECEC,
particularly, whether the requirement of
publication was complied with. The ECEC was
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issued by NEA pursuant to its rule-making


authority, not its quasi-judicial function. Hence,
the issue regarding the controversy over
respondent’s disqualification and the question
on the ECEC’s validity are within the inherent
jurisdiction of regular courts to review.
Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is misplaced. The
subject in that case was the electricity rates
charged by a cooperative, a matter which is
clearly within NEA’s jurisdiction. The issue in
the present petition, however, centers on the
validity of NEA’s rules in light of the
publication requirements of the Administrative
Code and New Civil Code. The present issue is
cognizable by regular courts.

_______________

* SECOND DIVISION.

389

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National Electrification Administration vs.


Gonzaga

Same; Same; Effectivity of Laws; Article 2 of


the New Civil Code provides that laws shall take
effect after fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise

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provided.—We find no error in the appellate


and trial courts’ nullification of the ECEC. The
CA correctly observed that while ZAMSURECO
complied with the requirements of filing the
code with the University of the Philippines Law
Center, it offered no proof of publication in the
Official Gazette nor in a newspaper of general
circulation. Without compliance with the
requirement of publication, the rules and
regulations contained in the ECEC cannot be
enforced and implemented. Article 2 of the New
Civil Code provides that laws shall take effect
after fifteen (15) days following the completion
of their publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided.

Same; Same; Same; Electric Cooperative


Election Code (ECEC); Since the Electric
Cooperative Election Code (ECEC) applies to all
electric cooperatives in the country, and it is not
a mere internal memorandum, interpretative
regulation, or instruction to subordinates, then
it should comply with the requirements of the
Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987
relative to the publication requirement.—The
ECEC applies to all electric cooperatives in the
country. It is not a mere internal memorandum,
interpretative regulation, or instruction to
subordinates. Thus, the ECEC should comply
with the requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. In previous cases
involving the election of directors for electric
cooperatives, the validity of the ECEC was not

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put in issue. The ECEC then enjoyed the


presumption of validity. In this case, however,
respondent directly questioned the validity of
the ECEC in his second amended petition. The
trial court thus required petitioner to show
proof of publication of the ECEC. Petitioner
could have easily provided such proof had the
ECEC actually been published in the Official
Gazette or newspaper of general circulation in
the country. This simple proof could have
immediately laid this case to rest. Petitioner’s
failure to do so only implies that the ECEC was
not published accordingly, a fact supported by
the certification from the National Printing
Office.

Actions; Declaratory Relief; Prohibition;


Mandamus; A requirement under Rule 63 is
that the petition for declaratory relief must be
filed “before any breach or violation” the
questioned docu-

390

390 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED

National Electrification Administration vs.


Gonzaga

ment may cause; It is familiar and fundamental


doctrine that a writ of prohibition or mandamus
may issue when a board unlawfully excludes
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another from enjoyment of a right or office to


which such other is entitled.—A requirement
under Rule 63 is that the petition for
declaratory relief must be filed “before any
breach or violation” the questioned document
may cause. In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that a breach has not yet occurred
since an actual dispute has already arisen
between ZAMSURECO and respondent—the
screening committee of the cooperative on the
erroneous implementation of a code whose
legality and implementation is being
questioned. On the other hand, it is familiar
and fundamental doctrine that a writ of
prohibition or mandamus may issue when “x x x
a board unlawfully excludes another from x x x
enjoyment of a right or office to which such
other is entitled x x x.” Considering that the
screening committee of the board has excluded
respondent from being elected as board member
of ZAMSURECO because of the latter’s
improper implementation of the code, a petition
for mandamus and prohibition is the proper
recourse.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the


decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the
Court.
          The Government Corporate Counsel
for petitioner.
     Georgina L. Ariosa-Lopez for private
respondent.

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          Felizardo V. Cataluna, Jr. for


ZAMSURECO II.

VELASCO, JR., J.:

For review under1


Rule 45 are the March 6,
2003 Decision
2
and June 10, 2003
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68769, which dismissed
petitioner’s
3
appeal of the July 23, 2001
Order of the Pagadian City Regional Trial

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 34-39. Penned by Associate Justice Jose


L. Sabio, Jr. and concurred in by Associate Justices
Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Amelita G. Tolentino.
2 Id., at p. 40.
3 Id., at pp. 41-49.

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VOL. 539, DECEMBER 4, 2007 391


National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

Court (RTC), Branch 21 in Civil Case No.


4282-2K, and denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration, respectively.
On November 13, 2000, respondent
Victoriano B. Gonzaga filed his Certificate
of Candidacy for membership in the Board
of Directors of Zamboanga del Sur II
Electric Cooperative, Inc., District II
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(ZAMSURECO). Later that day, the


screening committee resolved to disqualify
respondent because his spouse was an
incumbent member of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Diplahan, Zamboanga del Sur.
Based on the Electric Cooperative Election
Code (ECEC), promulgated by petitioner
National Electrification Administration
(NEA), a candidate whose spouse occupies
an elective government position higher
than Barangay Captain is prohibited to
run as director of an electric cooperative.
ZAMSURECO’s by-laws, however, do not
provide for 4 such ground for
disqualification.
On November 21, 2000, respondent filed
a Petition for Prohibition and Damages,
docketed as Civil Case No. 4282-2K with
the Pagadian City RTC.
ZAMSURECO filed a Motion to Dismiss
and Answer on November 24, 2000, which
the RTC denied. However, it issued a
temporary restraining order, ordering
ZAMSURECO’s officials to refrain from
conducting the election for directorship set
on December 2, 2000.

_______________

4 Id., at 45. Art. 2, Sec. 7 of the ECEC specifically


provides:

8. He/she does not hold an elective office in the government


nor appointed to an elective position above the level of a
Barangay Captain.

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xxxx
12. His/her spouse is not disqualified under Nos. 6, 7 and
8.
xxxx
14. Any bonafide member seeking election or re-election
and any incumbent director shall satisfy all of the above-
mentioned qualifications. Non-compliance with any single
item shall mean disqualification or termination.

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392 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

The RTC said that the petition was


dismissible because of the failure of
respondent to exhaust all administrative
remedies, as required by Section 2, 2.C of
the ECEC Guidelines on the Conduct of
District Elections for Electric Cooperative.
The section required that “a protest arising
from disqualification shall be filed with the
screening committee in not less than FIVE
(5) days before the election. The screening
committee shall decide the protest within
FORTY-EIGHT (48) hours from receipt
thereof. Failure of the applicant to file
his/her protest within the above-cited
period shall be 5 deemed a waiver of his
right to protest.”
As observed by the RTC, respondent had
urgently filed the petition on November 21,
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2000 because the election sought to be


restrained was going to be held on
December 2, 2000 and November 20 was a
holiday. Under the circumstances,
respondent had little time to exhaust the
remedy in Sec. 2 of the Guidelines, such
that an exception could be made. More
importantly, according to the RTC, the rule
on exhaustion of administrative remedies
cannot be invoked in the instant case since
the guidelines prescribing the
administrative remedy is a subject matter
of the ECEC, which is at issue, and is
exactly what 6
is being sought to be
invalidated.
On December 12, 2000, respondent filed
a motion to withdraw the amended
petition, and to admit a second amended
petition that impleaded NEA as
indispensable party. Respondent also
averred that the ECEC was null and void
because it had not been published. On
December 20, 2000, the RTC admitted the
second amended petition, issued a writ of
preliminary injunction to prevent the
conduct of election for directorship, issued
summons to NEA, and required NEA to
comment if the ECEC was published 7
in
any newspaper of general circulation.

_______________

5 Id., at pp. 43-44.


6 Id.

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7 Id., at p. 41.

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National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

On January 29, 2001, NEA filed a motion


for extension of time to file an answer, and
subsequently on April 10, 2001, a Motion
for Leave to Admit Pleading to which a
Motion to Dismiss was attached. NEA
questioned the jurisdiction of the RTC and
alleged that respondent 8 failed to exhaust
administrative remedies. 9
In its July 23, 2001 Order, the RTC
denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss for
being filed out of time. More importantly, it
noted NEA’s failure to state whether the
ECEC was indeed published in a
newspaper of general circulation as
required by the New Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. The RTC said
the failure rendered the ECEC null and
void. As regards the lack of jurisdiction and
nonexhaustion of administrative remedies,
the RTC noted that NEA erroneously
relied on Sec. 59 of Presidential Decree No.
(PD) 269 and misapplied the cases it cited.
According to the RTC, Sec. 59 of PD 269
refers to “order, ruling or decision of the
NEA” in the exercise of NEA’s
quasijudicial functions. And the RTC noted
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that Secs. 51 to 58 refer to hearings,


investigations, and procedures. On the
other hand, the validity of the ECEC,
subject of the instant petition, was an
exercise of NEA’s quasi-legislative function
or rulemaking authority.
Further, according to the RTC, NEA
took Sec. 58 of PD 269 out of context when
it said Sec. 58 dealt with the
administrative remedy available to
petitioner. It said that Sec. 58 presupposed
a ruling or decision of the NEA and there
was none in the case before it. The RTC
ruled in favor of Gonzaga, and ordered
ZAMSURECO to accept Gonzaga’s
10
certificate of candidacy for director. The
RTC denied NEA’s motion for
reconsideration.

_______________

8 Id., at pp. 21, 41-42.


9 Supra note 3.
10 Id., at pp. 42-44.

394

394 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

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The CA Ruled that the Courts Have


Jurisdiction Over
Issues on Legality of Codes

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA.


The CA denied due course and dismissed
the petition. It said that NEA was not
exercising its quasi-judicial powers but its
rule-making authority. In the case before
the trial court, the CA stressed that the
issue involved the interpretation of the
ECEC, and to this extent, NEA had no
jurisdiction because the issue is within the
province of the courts.
The CA denied petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration in its June 10, 2003
Resolution. Hence, we have this petition.

The Issues

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF


APPEALS ERRED IN NOT APPLYING
SECTION 59 OF P.D. 269
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN UPHOLDING THE
TRIAL COURT’S NULLIFICATION OF THE
ECEC

Issues Involving NEA’s Rule-Making


Authority
Are Cognizable by Regular Courts
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The petition has no merit.


Sec. 59 of PD 269 provides:

“SEC. 59. Court Review.—The Supreme Court is


hereby given jurisdiction to review any order,
ruling or decision of the NEA and to modify or
set aside such order, ruling or decision when it
clearly appears that there is no evidence before
the NEA to support reasonably such order,
ruling or decision, or that the same is contrary
to law, or that it was without the jurisdiction of
the NEA. The evidence presented to the NEA,
together with the record of the proceedings
before the NEA, shall be certified by the NEA to
the Supreme Court. Any order, ruling or
decision of the NEA may likewise be reviewed
by the Supreme Court upon writ of certiorari in
proper case. The procedure for review, except as
herein provided, shall be presented by rules of
the Supreme Court. Any order or decision of

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VOL. 539, DECEMBER 4, 2007 395


National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

the NEA may be reviewed on the application of


any person or public service entity aggrieved
thereby and who was a party in the subject
proceeding, by certiorari in appropriate cases or
by a petition for review, which shall be filed
within thirty (30) days from the notification of
the NEA order, decision or ruling on
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reconsideration. Said petition shall be placed on


file in the office of the Clerk for the Supreme
Court who shall furnish copies thereof to the
NEA and other interested parties.”

Petitioner argues that based on the


foregoing provision, only the Supreme
Court has the authority to review the
“acts” of NEA as an administrative body
with adjudicative and rulemaking power.
It cited NEA v. Mendoza, using the Court’s
pronouncement that:

“[T]he power of judicial review of NEA’s order or


decision pertains to the Supreme Court as
decreed in Section 59 of P.D. 269 which vests
specifically on the Supreme Court the
jurisdiction to review any order, ruling or
decision of the NEA and to modify 11
or set aside
such orders, rulings or decisions.”

It is obvious that Sec. 59 of PD 269 refers


to “order, ruling or decision” of NEA. What
is being challenged in this case is the
decision of the screening committee of
ZAMSURECO to disqualify respondent.
Likewise assailed is the validity of the
ECEC, particularly, whether the
requirement of publication was complied
with. The ECEC was issued by NEA
pursuant to its rule-making authority, not
its quasi-judicial function. Hence, the issue
regarding the controversy over
respondent’s disqualification and the
question on the ECEC’s validity are within

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the inherent jurisdiction of regular courts


to review. Petitioner’s reliance on NEA is
misplaced. The subject in that case was the
electricity rates charged by a cooperative, a
matter which is clearly within NEA’s
jurisdiction. The issue in the present
petition, however, centers on the validity of
NEA’s rules in light of the publication
requirements of the Adminis-

_______________

11 No. L-62038, September 25, 1985, 138 SCRA


632, 637.

396

396 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

trative Code and New Civil Code. The


present issue is cognizable by regular
courts.
With regard to the second issue, we find
no error in the appellate and trial courts’
nullification of the ECEC. The CA correctly
observed that while ZAMSURECO
complied with the requirements of filing
the code with the University of the
Philippines Law Center, it offered no proof
of publication in the Official Gazette nor in
a newspaper of general circulation.
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Without compliance with the requirement


of publication, the rules and regulations
contained in the ECEC cannot be enforced
and implemented.
Article 2 of the New Civil Code provides
that laws shall take effect after fifteen (15)
days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette or in a
newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines, unless it is otherwise
provided.
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise
known as the Administrative Code of 1987,
reinforced the requirement of publication
and outlined the procedure, as follows:

“Sec. 3. Filing.—(1) Every Agency shall file with


the University of the Philippines Law Center
three (3) Certified copies of every rule adopted
by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of
this Code which are not filed within three (3)
months from that date shall not thereafter be
the basis of any sanction against any party or
persons.
(2) The Records Officer of the agency, or his
equivalent functionary, shall carry out the
requirements of this section under pain of
disciplinary action.
(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be
kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to
public inspection.
Sec. 4. Effectivity.—In addition to other rule-
making requirements provided by law not
inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall
become effective fifteen (15) days from the date
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of filing as above provided unless a different


date is fixed by law, or specified in this rule.

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National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

Sec. 18. When Laws Take Effect.—Laws shall


take effect after Fifteen (15) days following the
completion of their publication in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation, unless it is otherwise provided.”

We have already emphasized and clarified


the requirement of publication in this
Court’s Resolution in Tañada v. Tuvera:

“We hold therefore that all statutes, including


those of local application and private laws, shall
be published as a condition for their effectivity
which shall begin fifteen (15) days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is
fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees
and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers
whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature or, at present, directly conferred by
the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement

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existing law pursuant also to a valid


delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not
the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of
instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed
by their subordinates in the performance
12
of
their duties. (Emphasis supplied.)”

The aforequoted ruling was reiterated


13
in
Dadole v. Commission on 14Audit, De Jesus
v. Commission on Audit, and Philippine
International Trading 15
Corporation v.
Commission on Audit.
In the case at bar, the ECEC was issued
by petitioner pursuant to its rule-making
authority provided in PD 269, as amended,
particularly Sec. 24:

_______________

12 No. L-63915, December 29, 1986, 146 SCRA 446,


453-454.
13 G.R. No. 125350, December 3, 2002, 393 SCRA
262.
14 G.R. No. 109023, August 12, 1998, 294 SCRA
152.
15 G.R. No. 132593, June 25, 1999, 309 SCRA 177.

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ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

“Section 24. Board of Directors.—(a) The


Management of a Cooperative shall be vested in
its Board, subject to the supervision and control
of NEA which shall have the right to be
represented and to participate in all Board
meetings and deliberations and to approve all
policies and resolutions.
The composition, qualifications, the manner
of elections and filling of vacancies, the
procedures for holding meetings and other
similar provisions shall be defined in the By-
laws of the Cooperative subject to NEA policies,
rules and regulations x x x.”

The ECEC applies to all electric


cooperatives in the country. It is not a
mere internal memorandum, interpretative
regulation, or instruction to subordinates.
Thus, the ECEC should comply with the
requirements of the Civil Code and the
Administrative Code of 1987. In previous
cases involving the election of directors for
electric cooperatives, the validity of the
ECEC was not put in issue. The ECEC
then enjoyed the presumption of validity.
In this case, however, respondent directly
questioned the validity of the ECEC in his
second amended petition. The trial court
thus required petitioner to show proof of
publication of the ECEC. Petitioner could
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have easily provided such proof had the


ECEC actually been published in the
Official Gazette or newspaper of general
circulation in the country. This simple
proof could have immediately laid this case
to rest. Petitioner’s failure to do so only
implies that the ECEC was not published
accordingly, a fact supported by the
certification from the National Printing
Office.
Lastly, petitioner avers that a petition
for mandamus and prohibition should not
have been resorted to by respondent. The
proper recourse, according to petitioner, is
a petition for declaratory relief. Petitioner
miserably errs on this point. Rule 63 on
declaratory relief states:

“Section 1. Who may file petition.—Any person


interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, or whose rights are affected
by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental
regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate
Regional Trial

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National Electrification Administration vs.
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Court to determine any question of construction


or validity arising, and for a declaration of his
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rights or duties thereunder.”

As stated above, a requirement under Rule


63 is that the petition for declaratory relief
must be filed “before any breach or
violation” the questioned document may
cause. In the instant case, it cannot be
gainsaid that a breach has not yet occurred
since an actual dispute has already arisen
between ZAMSURECO and respondent—
the screening committee of the cooperative
on the erroneous implementation of a code
whose legality and implementation is being
questioned.
On the other hand, it is familiar and
fundamental doctrine that a writ of
prohibition or mandamus may issue when
“x x x a board unlawfully excludes another
from x x x enjoyment of a right or16office to
which such other is entitled x x x.”

_______________

16 RULES OF COURT, Rule 65, Sec. 2. Petition for


prohibition.—When the proceedings of any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, are without or in excess of his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and
praying that judgment be rendered commanding the
respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
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action or matter specified therein, or otherwise


granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may acquire.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any
tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person
unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which
the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from
an office, trust, or station, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use and enjoyment of a right or
office to which such other is entitled, and there is
no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court,
alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent,
immediately or at some other time to be specified by
the court, to do the act required to be done to protect
the rights of the

400

400 SUPREME COURT REPORTS


ANNOTATED
National Electrification Administration vs.
Gonzaga

Considering that the screening committee


of the board has excluded respondent from
being elected as board member of
ZAMSURECO because of the latter’s
improper implementation of the code, a
petition for mandamus and prohibition is
the proper recourse.
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1/31/2021 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 539

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition,


and AFFIRM IN TOTO the March 6, 2003
Decision and June 10, 2003 Resolution in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68769. Costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

     Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio,


Carpio-Morales and Tinga, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution


affirmed in toto.

Notes.—The regulation and fixing of


power rates to be charged by electric
cooperatives remain within the jurisdiction
of the National Electrification
Administration, despite the enactment of
Executive Order No. 172, creating the
Energy Regulatory Board. (Province of
Zamboanga Del Norte vs. Court of Appeals,
342 SCRA 549 [2000])
In exercising its power of supervision
and control over electric cooperatives, the
NEA, through its Board of Administrators,
can issue orders, rules and regulations,
and motu proprio or upon petition of third
parties, can conduct investigations in all
matters affecting electric cooperatives
pursuant to Section 10 of PD 269, as
amended. (Silva vs. Mationg, 499 SCRA
724 [2006])

——o0o——

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_______________

petitioner, and to pay the damages sustained by


the petitioner by reason of the wrongful acts of the
respondent. (Emphasis supplied.)

401

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