I.

GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS

A. Constitution: definition, nature, and concepts

- Rules on Constitutional Interpretation

- Doctrine of Constitutional Supremacy

Chavez v. Judicial and Bar Council (JBC) G.R. No. 202242 July 17, 2012

Facts

In 1994, instead of having only seven members, an eighth member was added to the JBC as two
representatives from Congress began sitting in the JBC – one from the House of Representatives and
one from the Senate, with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote. A body representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process was conceived and called the Judicial and Bar Council
(JBC) and its composition, term and functions are provided under Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution which also indicates that the JBC shall be composed of seven (7) members. In separate
meetings held in 2000 and 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the representatives from the Senate
and the House of Representatives one full vote each. At present, Senator Francis Joseph G. Escudero and
Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr. (respondents) simultaneously sit in the JBC as representatives of the
legislature. Francisco I. Chavez, (petitioner) questioned this practice in this petition.

Issue

Whether or not the conditions sine qua non for the exercise of the power of judicial review have been
met in this case

Rulings

Yes. The Courts’ power of judicial review is subject to several limitations, namely: (a) there must be an
actual case or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act
must have “standing” to challenge; he must have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such
that he has sustained or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (c) the question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality
must be the very lis mota of the case. The court recognizes the petitioner’s right to sue in this case and
that he has the legal standing to bring the present action because he has a personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy. According to petitioner, “since the JBC derives financial support for its
functions, operation and proceedings from taxes paid, petitioner possesses as taxpayer both right and
legal standing to demand that the JBC’s proceedings are not tainted with illegality and that its
composition and actions do not violate the Constitution.
Ifurung v. Carpio-Morales, G.R. No. 232131, April 24, 2018FACTS

FACTS

In his Petition, Ifurung argued that Respondent Morales and her deputies must vacate their post for
supposedly overstaying as they must serve only the unexpired term of their predecessor. Hence,
petitioner insists that the incumbent Ombudsman and deputies have been overstaying in their present
positions for more than two years considering that their terms have expired on 1 February 2015. On July
25, 2011, Conchita Carpio Morales was appointed to a seven-year term following the resignation of
then-Ombudsman Merceditas Gutierrez who resigned on May 6, 2011 to avoid impeachment trial in the
Senate over allegations of incompetence and inaction on various cases. Merceditas Gutierrez left an
unexpired term until November 30, 2012 "To allow them to stay in the said positions one day longer
constitutes a continuing affront to the 1987 Constitution, unduly clips presidential prerogatives, and
deprives the nation of the services of legitimate Ombudsman and Deputies Ombudsman."

ISSUES

Whether or not Sec. 8(3) in relation to Sec. 7 of RA 6770 also known as Ombudsman Act of 1989 is
unconstitutional for being outright transgression of Sec. 11 in relation to Sec. 8 and 10 of Article XI of the
1987 Constitution

Ruling

NO. Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 is not unconstitutional. Petitioner anchors his challenge on the
constitutionality of Sec. 8(3) of R.A. No. 6770 in the belief that because the Ombudsman and the
deputies have the same rank and salary as the chairman and the members of the constitutional
commissions, their term of office, following the Court's disquisition in Gaminde case, shall always be
seven years counted from 2 February 1987 and seven years thereafter, and not the full term of seven
years. However, the Office of the Ombudsman is not a constitutional commission. A commission is
defined as "a board or committee officially appointed and empowered to perform certain acts or
exercise certain jurisdiction of a public nature or relation." Noteworthy, the CSC is composed of a
chairman and two commissioners; the COMELEC, a chairman and six commissioners and the COA, a
chairman and two commissioners.
Padilla v. Congress of the Philippines, G.R. No. 231671, July 25, 2017

FACTS

On May 23, 2017, President Duterte issued Proclamation No. 216, declaring a state of martial law and
suspending the writ of habeas corpus in the Mindanao group of islands on the grounds of rebellion and
necessity of public safety. Within 48 hours after the proclamation and while the Congress was in session,
President Duterte transmitted his Report to the Senate and House of Representatives. The petition for
Certiorari and Mandamus of former Senator Tanada et al. (Tanada Petition) seeks to (a) declare the
refusal of the Congress to convene in joint session to be in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and (b) to direct the Congress to convene in joint session. Subsequently, the
petitioners in the Padilla Petition filed a Manifestation, due to the imminent expiration of the 60-day
period of the validity of Proclamation No. 216, to still resolve the instant cases for the guidance of the
Congress, State actors, and all Filipinos. Consequently, the Congress convened in joint session and
approved by virtue of a majority vote the extension of the proclamation and suspension in Mindanao
until December 31, 2017.

ISSUE/S:

Whether or not the Congress has the mandatory duty to convene jointly upon the President’s
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.

HELD:

NO. The Congress is not constitutionally mandated to convene in joint session EXCEPT to vote jointly to
revoke or extend the President’s declaration or suspension. According to the SC, applying the plain
meaning rule or verba legis, the use of the word “may” in the provision is to be construed as permissive
and operating to confer discretion on the Congress on WON to revoke. Moreover, the Court stated that
the provision does not actually refer to a “joint session.” The requirement that the Congress “voting
jointly” explicitly applies only to the situation when the Congress revokes the President’s proclamation
and/or suspension. the Court has no authority to compel the Senate and the House to convene in joint
session absent a clear ministerial duty on its part to do so under the Constitution and in complete
disregard of the separate actions already undertaken by both Houses on Proclamation No. 216,
including their respective decisions to no longer hold a joint session, considering their respective
resolutions not to revoke said Proclamation.
Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156,

February 3, 1997

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
December 8, 1986, the GSIS,petitioner, decided to sell 30 up to 51 % of the shares of Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). There are only two bidders participated; 1) Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered 51% of MHC shares at P41.58 per share and 2) Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, which bid for the same shares at P44.00 per share more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as winning bidder, the petitioner matched the bid price and
sent a check to serve as Bid Security but the respondent refused to accept. Perhaps apprehensive that
respondent disregarded the matching of bid price by the petitioner and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by the respondent GSIS and consummated by Renong Berhad, the petitioner came to
the court on prohibition and mandamus. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. The petitioner invoked
Sec. 10, second par., Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution also known as The Filipino First Policy because of
its bid to acquire 51% shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owned the “historic” Manila Hotel.
The respondent GSIS opposed that the provision is not self-executing and that Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par. Art. XII of the Constitution is not self-executing. 2. Whether or not
the 51% share of Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony.

RULINGS:

No. Since Sec. 10, second par.,Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that; “in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos. It means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative v. La Trinidad Water District, G.R. No. 166471, 22

March 2011

Facts:

This is a petition filed by Tawang Multi-Purpose Cooperative (TMPC) against La Trinidad Water District
(LTWD). TWPC is a cooperative, registered with the Cooperative Development Authority, and organized
to provide domestic water services in Barangay Tawang, La Trinidad, Benguet. La Trinidad Water District
(LTWD) is a local water utility created under PD No. 198. It’s authorized to supply water for domestic,
industrial and commercial purposes within the municipality of La Trinidad, Benguet. TMPC filed an
application for a certificate of public convenience (CPC) to operate waterworks system in the said
barangay. However, LTWD opposed and filed a case to RTC. It contends that its franchise is exclusive as
stated in Section 47 of PD 198. RTC rendered a decision in favor of LTWD.

Issue:

Whether or not the decision rendered by RTC granting exclusive franchise to La Trinidad Water District is
valid (Section 47 of PD No. 198).

Ruling:

The decision is invalid. Sec 47 of PD No. 198 does not conform to Section 8, Article XIII of 1935
Constitution, Section 5, Article XIV of the 1973 Constitution and Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. Franchises for the operation of a public utility cannot be exclusive in character. The
President, Congress and the Court cannot create directly franchises that are exclusive in character. What
the President, Congress and the Court cannot legally do directly they cannot do indirectly. Thus, the
President, Congress and the Court cannot create indirectly franchises that are exclusive in character by
allowing the Board of Directors (BOD) of a water district and the Local Water Utilities Administration
(LWUA) to create franchises that are exclusive in character.
Dueñas v. HRET, G.R. No. 185401, 21 July 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Henry “Jun” Dueñas, Jr. and private respondent Angelito “Jett” P. Reyes were rivals for the
congressional seat in the 2nd district of Taguig in the 2007 National Elections. After the canvass of the
votes, Dueñas received 28,564 votes and was declared the winner. After the declaration, Reyes filed an
election protest and prayed for the revision or recount on the ground that he was cheated through
insidious and well-orchestrated election frauds in the protested 170 (of 732) precincts. In the September
25, 2008 order, HRET instructed the continuation of the revision of the remaining 75% of the counter-
protested precincts as governed by Rule 88 of HRET rules. On October 27, 2008, Dueñas filed an urgent
motion to withdraw/abandon the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. HRET denied this motion
and recalled its order requiring Duenas to segment his cash deposit. HRET instead use its own fund for
the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. Moreover, HRET issued Resolution No.
08-353 under Rule 88 of the HRET Rules and settled jurisprudence on November 27, 2008. This
resolution states that HRET has the discretionary power to dismiss the protest and counter-protest or
continue the revision based on reasonable grounds which might compromise the integrity of the
election results.

Issue

Whether the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in issuing Resolution No. 08-353 dated November 27, 2008

Ruling

The Court finds no evidence of such grave abuse of discretion by the HRET. HRET has constitutional
authority as the "sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications"36 of its
members but also on the limitation of the Court’s power of judicial review. Thus, the Court cannot and
should not exercise jurisdiction on the raised issues. Petitioner was also wrong when he claimed that
there was no point in continuing the revision of the remaining 75% counter-protested precincts. The
Court argued that such a claim is plainly a conjecture which he also alleged against the respondents. the
Constitution mandates HRET to "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications"42 of its members. The Court cannot use its own judgment as a replacement for HRET’s
constitutional mandate.
Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, 03 February 2015

Held

On September 3, 2013, Belgica and Villegas filed an Urgent Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for the Immediate issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of
Preliminary Injunction seeking that the annual "Pork Barrel System," presently embodied in the
provisions of the GAA of 2013 which provided for the 2013 PDAF, and the Executive‘s lump-sum,
discretionary funds, such as the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund, be declared
unconstitutional and null and void for being acts constituting grave abuse of discretion.

On September 25, 2013, Sen. Jinggoy Estrada delivered his privilege speech stating that some
senators received Php 50 Million each as incentive for impeaching Chief Justice Corona. On Secretary
Abad responded through a public statement explaining that the funds released were based on the
Senators’ letters of request for funding and explained further that these funds were part of the DAP
designed by the DBM to ramp up spending to accelerate economic expansion, they also made claims in
their website regarding DAP and where it comes from.

Issues

Whether or not the DAP violates: (1) the Equal Protection Clause, (2) the system of checks and balances,
and (3) the principle of public accountability enshrined in the 1987 Constitution considering that it
authorizes the release of funds upon the request of legislators

Ruling

There is no violation of equal protection. Petitioners claim that the Executive discriminated against some
legislators on the ground alone of their receiving less than the others could not of itself warrant a
finding of contravention of the Equal Protection Clause. The denial of equal protection of any law should
be an issue to be raised only by parties who supposedly suffer it, and, in these cases, such parties would
be the few legislators claimed to have been discriminated against in the releases of funds under the
DAP. The reason for the requirement is that only such affected legislators could properly and fully bring
to the fore when and how the denial of equal protection occurred, and explain why there was a denial in
their situation. The requirement was not met here.
B. Parts

C. Self-executing and non-self-executing provisions

Manila Prince Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997

FACTS:

Pursuant to the privatization program of the Philippine Government under Proclamation No. 50 dated
December 8, 1986, the GSIS, petitioner, decided to sell 30 up to 51 % of the shares of Manila Hotel
Corporation (MHC). There are only two bidders participated; 1) Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a
Filipino corporation, which offered 51% of MHC shares at P41.58 per share and 2) Renong Berhad, a
Malaysian firm, which bid for the same shares at P44.00 per share more than the bid of petitioner.
Pending the declaration of Renong Berhad as winning bidder, the petitioner matched the bid price and
sent a check to serve as Bid Security but the respondent refused to accept. Perhaps apprehensive that
respondent disregarded the matching of bid price by the petitioner and that the sale of 51% of the MHC
may be hastened by the respondent GSIS and consummated by Renong Berhad, the petitioner came to
the court on prohibition and mandamus. The court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining
respondents from perfecting and consummating the sale to the Malaysian firm. The petitioner invoked
Sec. 10, second par., Art. VII of the 1987 Constitution also known as The Filipino First Policy because of
its bid to acquire 51% shares of the Manila Hotel Corporation which owned the “historic” Manila Hotel.
The respondent GSIS opposed that the provision is not self-executing and that Manila Hotel does not fall
under the term national patrimony.

ISSUES:

Whether or not Sec. 10, second par. Art. XII of the Constitution is not self-executing. 2. Whether or not
the 51% share of Manila Hotel falls under the term national patrimony.

RULINGS:

No. Since Sec. 10, second par.,Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution is mandatory, positive command which is
complete in itself and which needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its
enforcement. It is per sejudicially enforceable. When our Constitution mandates that; “in the grant of
rights, privileges, and concessions covering national economy and patrimony, the State shall give
preference to qualified Filipinos. It means that qualified Filipinos shall be preferred.
Facts:

The Health Sector Reform Agenda (HSRA) was launched by the Department of Health (DOH) in 1999,
which provided five areas of general reform. One in particular was the provision of fiscal autonomy to
government hospitals that implements the collection of socialized user fees and the corporate
restructuring of government hospitals. The petitioners alleged that the implementation of the
aforementioned reform had resulted in making free medicine and free medical services inaccessible to
economically disadvantage Filipinos. Thus, they alleged that the HSRA is void for violating the following
constitutional provisions: Sections 5, 9, 10, 11, 13, 15, 18 of Article II, Section 1 of Article III, Sections 11
and 14 of Article XIII, and Sections 1 and 3(2) of Article XV.

Issue:

W/O the HSRA is void for violating various provisions of the Constitution

Ruling

No. As a general rule, the provisions of the constitution are considered self-executing, and do not
require future legislation for their enforcement. However, some provisions have already been
categorically declared by this Court as non self-executing. In Tañada v. Angara, the Court specifically set
apart the sections found under Article II of the 1987 Constitution as non self-executing and ruled that
such broad principles need legislative enactments before they can be implemented. In Basco v.
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation, this Court declared that Sections 11, 12, and 13 of
Article II; Section 13 of Article XIII; and Section 2 of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution are not self-
executing provisions.
Tañada v. Angara, G.R. No. 118295, 02 May 1997

Facts

The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new opportunities for the services sector, the
reduction of costs and uncertainty associated with exporting and the attraction of more investments
into the country. The Philippines joined World Trade Organization as a founding member with the goal
of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners, through the
reduction of tariffs on its exports. On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, then DTI Secretary, signed in
Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Negotiations. On December 14, 1994, the Senate concurred in the ratification of the President of the
Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the WTO which includes various agreements and associated
legal instruments. On December 16, 1994,the President signed the Instrument of Ratification.

Issue

Whether the provisions of the WTO Agreement restricts and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically
the legislative power vested in the Congress

Ruling

No. While sovereignty has traditionally been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic
level, it is however subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines,
expressly or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did not
envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. By the doctrine of
incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of international law, which are
considered to be automatically part of our laws. A treaty engagement is not a mere moral obligation on
the parties. By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of sovereignty. The
Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent
domain and police power. The underlying consideration in this partial sovereignty is the reciprocal
commitment of the other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the
Philippines, its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the same commitments under
WTO-GATT. The point is that a portion of sovereignty may be waived without violating the Constitution,
based on the rationale that the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of cooperation and amity with all nations.
Facts

The New PAGCOR – Responding Through Responsible Gaming.” But the petitioners think otherwise, that
is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR charter – PD 1869, because it is
allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law. It waived the Manila city government’s right to impose taxes
and license fees, which is recognized by law and It violates the equal protection clause of the
constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR – conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are
outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices.

Issue

Whether or not PD 1896 is valid/constitutional

Ruling

The Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this petition
is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the issues of
"morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on social
justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
Oposa v. Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, 30 July 1993

FACTS

The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint
was filed as a taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court,
National capital Judicial Region against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit,
use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests. They
further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted
that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and
have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies. Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the
respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.

ISSUE

Whether or not there is a right violated

RULING

Secretary Factoran argued that there is none because the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
under the 1987 Constitution is under Article II and, therefore, it is not a self-executing provision. It was
argued that there is a need to wait for an enabling law. According to the SC, there is a right violated;
provisions on the right to health and the right to a balanced and healthful ecology are self-executing and
they can be the basis of an action in court.
D. Concept of the State

· Elements

· Doctrine of Parens Patriae

· De Jure v. De Facto Government

 Magallona v. Ermita, G.R. No. 187167, 16 August 2011.

FACTS

Petitioners in their capacity as taxpayer, citizen and legislator assailed the constitutionality of RA 9522:-
it reduces the territory of the Philippines in violation to the Constitution and it opens the country to
maritime passage of vessels and aircrafts of other states to the detriment of the economy, sovereignty,
national security and of the Constitution as well. They added that the classification of Regime of Islands
would be prejudicial to the lives of the fishermen

ISSUE

Whether or not RA 9522 is unconstitutional.

Ruling

RA 9522 is Not Unconstitutional - RA 9522 is a Statutory Tool To Demarcate the Country's Maritime
Zones and Continental Shelf Under UNCLOS III, not to Delineate Philippine Territory

Petitioners submit that RA 9522 dismembers a large portion of the national territory because it discards
the pre-UNCLOS III demarcation of Philippine territory under the Treaty of Paris and related treaties,
successively encoded in the definition of national territory under the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
Petitioners theorize that this constitutional definition trumps any treaty or statutory provision denying
the Philippines sovereign control over waters, beyond the territorial sea recognized at the time of the
Treaty of Paris, that Spain supposedly ceded to the United States. Petitioners argue that from the Treaty
of Paris technical description, Philippine sovereignty over territorial waters extends hundreds of nautical
miles around the Philippine archipelago, embracing the rectangular area delineated in the Treaty of
Paris
 The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines

Peace Panel on Ancestral Domain, G.R. No. 183591, 14 October 2008.

Facts

Invoking the right to information on matters of public concern, the petitioners seek to compel
respondents to disclose and furnish them the complete and official copies of the MA-AD and to prohibit
the slated signing of the MOA-AD and the holding of public consultation thereon. On August 5, 2008, the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were
scheduled to sign a Memorandum of Agreement of the Ancestral Domain Aspect of the GRP - MILF
Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. They also pray that the MOA-AD be
declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a TRO enjoining the GRP from signing the same.

Issue

Whether or not the signing of the MOA, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines
would be binding itself

Ruling

No, province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is recognized under our laws as having an
“associative” relationship with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers that go
beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any local or regional government. It also implies
the recognition of the associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not contemplate
any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine State, much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.
Reagan v. Commissioner, 30 SCRA 968.

FACTS

Petitioner questioned the payment of an income tax assessed on him by public respondent on an
amount realized by him on a sale of his automobile to a member of the US Marine Corps, the
transaction having taken place at the Clark Field Air Base. Petitioner contends that the base is outside
Philippine territory and therefore beyond the jurisdictional power to tax.

ISSUE:

Whether or not a sale made on a foreign military base is excluded from tax.

HELD:

No. The said foreign military bases is not a foreign soil or territory for purposes of income tax
legislation. Philippine jurisdictional rights including the power to tax are preserved.
PVTA v. CIR, 65 SCRA 416.

Facts:

In 1966 private respondents filed a petition seeking relief for their alleged overtime services and the
petitioner’s failure to pay for said compensation in accordance with CA No. 444. Petitioner denied the
allegations for lack of a cause of cause of action and lack of jurisdiction. Judge Martinez issued an order,
directing petitioner to pay. Hence, this petition for certiorari on grounds that the corporation is
exercising governmental functions and is therefore exempt from Commonwealth Act No. 444. PVTA
contended it is beyond the jurisdiction of respondent Court as it is exercising governmental functions
and that it is exempt from the operation of Commonwealth Act No. 444. This case involves the
expanded role of the government necessitated by the increased responsibility to
provide for the general welfare.

Issue:

Whether or not PVTA discharges governmental and not proprietary functions.

Ruling

YES. the distinction between the constituent and ministrant functions of the government has become
obsolete. The government has to provide for the welfare of its people. RA No. 2265 providing
for a distinction between constituent and the ministrant functions is irrelevant considering the needs of
the present time: “The growing complexities of modern society have rendered this traditional
classification of the functions of government obsolete.”
The contention of petitioner that the Labor Code does not apply to them deserve scant consideration.
There is no question based on RA 4155, that petitioner is a governmental agency. As such, the petitioner
can rightfully invoke the doctrine announced in the leading ACCFA case.
ACCFA v. Federation of Labor Unions, 30 SCRA 649.

FACTS
On October 30, 1962 the Unions, together with its mother union, the Confederation of Unions in
Government Corporations and Offices (CUGCO), filed a complaint with the Court of Industrial Relations
against the ACCFA for having allegedly committed acts of unfair labor practice, namely: violation of the
collective bargaining agreement in order to discourage the members of the Unions in the exercise of
their right to self-organization, discrimination against said members in the matter of promotions, and
refusal to bargain. The ACCFA moved to reconsider but was turned down in a resolution dated April 25,
1963 of the CIR en banc. Hence this appeal. During the pendency of the case, the union filed a petition
for certification election with the Court of Industrial Relations praying that they be certified as the
exclusive bargaining agents for the supervisors and rank-and-file employees, respectively, in the
ACA.Trial court agreed with this move. The ACA filed for a stay of execution which the trial court
granted.

ISSUE

Whether or not the CIR has jurisdiction to entertain the petition of the Unions for certification election
given that the mother company (ACA) is engaged in governmental functions

RULING

The Unions are not entitled. Decision modified. the Land Reform Code was enacted and the various
agencies, the ACA among them, established to carry out its purposes. There can be no dispute as to the
fact that the land reform program contemplated in the said Code is beyond the capabilities of any
private enterprise to translate into reality. It is a purely governmental function, no less than, say, the
establishment and maintenance of public schools and public hospitals. Given these, the respondent
Unions are not entitled to the certification election sought in the Court below. Such certification is
admittedly for purposes of bargaining in behalf of the employees with respect to terms and conditions
of employment, including the right to strike as a coercive economic weapon, as in fact the said unions
did strike in 1962 against the ACCFA.
Republic v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, 99 SCRA 660.

FACTS

Jose Sison filed a complaint against the petitioner Rice and Corn Administration (RCA) for a sum of
money with the Court of First Instance, presided by the respondent Judge. The RCA later on filed its
record on appeal. Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for the RCA's failure to post an appeal bond
and the RCA, represented by the office of the Solicitor General, filed an opposition to Sison's motion to
dismiss the appeal. The record on appeal filed by the RCA was approved by the respondent Judge but
the RCA's exemption from the payment of legal fees and from posting of the appeal bond was denied.
The respondent Judge issued an order giving the RCA 5 days within which to post an appeal bond. The
RCA filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that they are exempt from posting an appeal bond.
Sison filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground of petitioner's refusal to file the appeal bond.
MThe respondent Judge dismissed the RCA's appeal and ruled that the RCA, being a mere
instrumentality of the Government of the Philippines, is not exempt from the payment of legal fees and
from posting of an appeal bond.

Issue:

Whether or not the petitioner RCA is exempt from paying legal fees and from posting an appeal bond.

Held:

Yes, RCA is a governmental agency of Republic of the Philippines without a separate, distinct and
independent legal personality from the latter. And, as a governmental agency under the Office of the
President, the RCA is thus exempt from the payment of legal fees and from posting of an appeal bond.
Badillo v. Tayag, 400 SCRA 494.

Facts

Petitioners are plaintiffs in the case where MTC of San Jose del Monte, Bulacan ordered the NHA

To vacate the disputed land; to return possession thereof to petitioners; to pay rental for its use

And occupation at the rate of P10 per square meter per month; and to shoulder the attorney’s

Fees, the litigation expenses and the costs of suit.

On June 9, 2000, the NHA filed a Motion to set aside the Writ of Execution and the Notice of

Garnishment. The Motion was, however, denied by the MTC in its June 23, 2000 Orde

Acting on the NHA Petition, RTC Executive Judge Danio A. Manalastas issued a 72-hour

Temporary Restraining Order. Thereafter, the case was assigned to RTC Branch 79, which

issued the first assailed July 19, 2000 Order annulling the Writ. Upon transmittal of the records

from the MTC, the case was raffled to RTC Branch 11, which issued the second assailed October

23, 2000 Decision. Two consolidated petitions for review seek to set aside two rulings of the RTC
Malolos, Bulacan.

Issue

Whether or not the failure of the NHA to pay the appellate docket fee is a ground to dismiss its appeal?

Ruling

It contends that it is exempt from paying all kinds of fees and charges, because it performs
governmental functions. It cites Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico, which holds that the Public Estates
Authority (PEA), a GOCC, is exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its
governmental functions although NHA is a GOCC that is required to pay legal fees under Sec 21 of Rule
141 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure
Manila International Airport Authority v. Court of Appeals, 495 SCRA 591.

Facts

MIAA filed with the Court of Appeals an original petition for prohibition and injunction, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order. The petition sought to restrain the City of
Parañaque from imposing real estate tax on, levying against, and auctioning for public sale the Airport
Lands and Buildings. Respondents argue that a basic rule of statutory construction is that the express
mention of one person, thing, or act excludes all others. An international airport is not among the
exceptions mentioned in Section 193 of the Local Government Code. Thus, respondents assert that
MIAA cannot claim that the Airport Lands and Buildings are exempt from real estate tax. MIAA’s
contends that Airport Lands and Buildings are owned by the Republic. The government cannot tax itself.
The reason for tax exemption of public property is that its taxation would not inure to any public
advantage, since in such a case the tax debtor is also the tax creditor.

Issue

Whether or not Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are exempt from real estate tax

Ruling

MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled corporation but an instrumentality of the National

Government and thus exempt from local taxation. MIAA is not a stock corporation because it has no
capital stock divided into shares. MIAA has no stockholders or voting shares. MIAA exercises the
governmental powers of eminent domain, police authority and the levying of fees and charges. At the
same time, MIAA exercises all the powers of a corporation under the Corporation Law, insofar as these
powers are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Executive Order.
Government of the Philippine Islands v. Monte de Piedad, 35 Phil. 728.

Facts

Petitioner brings suit to recover $80,000 of the relief fund in installments of $20,000 each with interest
against respondents in behalf of the various petitions of the persons and heirs to whom the relief was
intended. Defendant contends that the amount was given as a donation and that the court erred in
stating that the Philippine Islands has subrogated the Spanish government in its rights.

Issue

Whether or not the government of the Philippines have authority to file a suit against the respondent

Ruling

The Government of the State, as parens patriae, has the right to enforce all charities of public nature.
The court further asserted that said amount was not a donation and that respondent is liable for the
debt regardless of the cession of the Philippine Islands to the United States. It is said that there is a total
abrogation of the former political relations of the inhabitants of the ceded region, however, the
circumstances present in the case are not political in nature. the government has the authority to file a
suit on behalf of its people by virtue of the principle of parens patriae.
Cabanas v. Pilapil, 58 SCRA 94.

Facts

The insured, Florentino Pilapil had a child, Millian Pilapil, with a married woman, the plaintiff, Melchora
Cabanas. She was ten years old at the time the complaint was filed. The deceased insured himself and
instituted as beneficiary, his child, with his brother to act as trustee during her minority. Upon his death,
the proceeds were paid to him. Hence this complaint by the mother, with whom the child is living,
seeking the delivery of such sum. She filed the bond required by the Civil Code.

Issue

Whether or not the mother is entitled to act as the trustee of a minor beneficiary of the proceeds of an
insurance policy.

Ruling

Yes, There is recognition in the law of the deep ties that bind parent and child. In the event that there is
less than full measure of concern for the offspring, the protection is supplied by the bond required. With
the added circumstance that the child stays with the mother, not the uncle, without any evidence of lack
of maternal care, the decision arrived at can stand the test of the strictest scrutiny. It is further fortified
by the assumption, both logical and natural, that infidelity to the trust imposed by the deceased is much
less in the case of a mother than in the case of an uncle.
Soriano v. Laguardia, G.R. No. 164785, 29 April 2009.

Facts

Petitioner Eliseo F. Soriano, the host o the television program, Ang Dating Daan, made remarks that
were found malicious. the preliminary conference in which petitioner appeared, the MTRCB,
preventively suspended the showing of Ang Dating Daan for 20 days, in accordance with Section 3(d) of
Presidential Decree No. 1986, creating the MTRCB, in relation to Sec. 3, Chapter XIII of the 2004
Implementing Rulesand Regulations (IRR) of P.D. No. 1986 and Sec. 7, Rule VII of the MTRCB Rules of
Procedure. The petitioner seeks to nullify the decision of the Movie and Television Review and
Classification Board (MTRCB) in connection with certain utterances in his television show, Ang Dating
Daan.

Issue

Whether or not the television program may be subjected to suspension.

Ruling

Yes. The language of the petitioner that was made accessible to the children may lead to failure of the
government to protect and promote the welfare of the youth. The State is mandated under Section 13
of 1987 Constitution to recognize and support the vital role of the youth in nation-building
De la Cruz v. Gracia, G.R. No. 177728, 31 July 2009.

Facts

21-year old Jenie San Juan dela Cruz (Jenie) and then 19-year old Christian Dominique Sto. Tomas
Aquino (Dominique) lived together as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage. They resided in
the house of Dominique's parents Domingo B. Aquino and Raquel Sto. Tomas Aquino at Teresa, Rizal. On
September 4, 2005, Dominique died. After almost two months, Jenie, who continued to live with
Dominique's parents, gave birth to her minor child Christian dela Cruz "Aquino" at the Antipolo Doctors
Hospital, Antipolo City. Jenie applied for registration of the child's birth, using Dominique's surname
Aquino, with the Office of the City Civil Registrar, Antipolo City, in support of which she submitted the
child's Certificate of Live Birth, Affidavit to Use the Surname of the Father (AUSF) which she had
executed and signed, and Affidavit of Acknowledgment executed by Dominique's father Domingo Butch
Aquino. Both affidavits attested, inter alia, that during the lifetime of Dominique, he had continuously
acknowledged his yet unborn child, and that his paternity had never been questioned.

Issue

Whether or not the minor child can bear the surname of the deceased.

Ruling

Yes. Under the policy of the Family Code to liberalize the rule on the investigation of the paternity and
filiation of children, especially of illegitimate children. The State as parens patriae affords special
protection to children from abuse, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development. In
the eyes of society, a child with an unknown father bears the stigma of dishonor. It is to petitioner minor
child's best interests to allow him to bear the surname of the now deceased Dominique and enter it in
his birth certificate.
Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan v. Quezon City, G.R. No. 225442, 08 August

2017

Facts

Petitioners,[9] spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of

young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors[10] - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.[11] In addition, petitioners assert that
the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.[12]

Issue

Whether or not deprive parents of their natural and primary right in rearing the youth without
substantive due process

Ruling

Petitioners are wrong that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of
their natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this
regard, they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go
home at a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is
primarily with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically
be compelling. Where minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an unfavorable
position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns them, they have
the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up to. It cannot be
recreant to such a trust.
Southern Luzon Drug Corporation v. Department of Social Welfare and Development,

G.R. No. 199669, 25 April 2017

Facts

Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision[2] dated
June 17, 2011, and Resolution dated November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No.
102486, which dismissed the petition for prohibition filed by Southern Luzon Drug Corporation
(petitioner) against the Department of Social Welfare and Development (DSWD), the National Council
for the Welfare of Disabled Persons (NCWDP) (now National Council on Disability Affairs or NCDA), the
Department of Finance (DOF) and the Bureau of Internal Revenue (collectively, the respondents), which
sought to prohibit the implementation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9257, otherwise known
as the "Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003" and Section 32 of R.A. No. 9442, which amends the
"Magna Carta for Disabled Persons," particularly the granting of 20% discount on the purchase of
medicines by senior citizens and persons with disability (PWD), respectively, and treating them as tax
deduction.

Issue

Whether or not the 20% Sales Discount for Senior Citizens PWDs does not violate the petitioner’s right
to equal protection of the law

Ruling

Yes. The subject laws do not violate the equal protection clause. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be
treated and regulated differently from another." For a classification to be valid, (1) it must be based
upon substantial distinctions, (2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law, (3) it must not be
limited to existing conditions only, and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Caballo v. People, G.R. No. 198732, 10 June 2013

FACTS

Christian 23 years old, a dancer, met AAA a 17 years old, his choreographer’s niece, in her uncle’s place.
When she stayed in her uncle’s place, AAA and Christian became sweethearts. He succeeded in
convincing her to have repeated sexual intercourse because of his promise to marry and an assurance
that they will use the withdrawal method so she will not get pregnant. AAA, however, became pregnant,
and Christian, was shocked with the development, proposed that she had an abortion. She acceded to
the request but failed. Hence a child was born out of the relationship. When confronted by her mother,
Christian promised to marry AAA. The mother later filed a case for violation of Section 10(a) of Republic
Act 7610. He argues that his promise to marry and use of the withdrawal method are not inducement or
persuasion as to make the case within the purview of the offense. The phrase “due to the coercion or
influence of any adult” is the relevant phrase for interpretation. According to him, it must be
accompanied by some form of coercion or intimidation to constitute child abuse

Issue

Whether or not Christian may be convicted for violation of Republic Act 7610.

The Court observes that Caballo’s actuations may be classified as “coercion” and “influence” within the
purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610: First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of the commission of the crime and is hence,
considered a child under the law. Christian is convicted for the violation of Republic Act 7610 . The State,
as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who, because of their
minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a sexual encounter may be infinitely more
damaging to her than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
Imbong v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, 08 April 2014

Facts

The RH Law was challenged on the grounds that it violated a range of constitutional rights, such as the
rights to life, health, freedom of religion and speech, and privacy. Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354,
otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was
enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012. The law also mandated reproductive health education in
government schools and recognized the right to post-abortion care as part of the right to reproductive
healthcare. The Supreme Court of the Philippines issued an order preventing the law from going into
effect pending a final judgment.

Issue

Whether or not Whether the RH law is unconstitutional

Ruling

The RH Law is not unconstitutional with regards to Right of Life. The Court finds that, at this point,
the attack on the RH Law on this ground is premature, because not a single contraceptive has
yet been submitted to the FDA pursuant to the RH Law. The Constitution is replete with provisions
protecting and promoting the right to health. The RH Law is unconstitutional by intruding into marital
privacy and autonomy. No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services,
whether natural or artificial: Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of
family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is
already a parent or has had a miscarriage. It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs
the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural
mother and father when it comes to providing her needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no
longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the
constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the family as an inviolable social institution.
Lawyers League for a Better Philippines v. Aquino, G.R. No. 73748, 22 May 1986.

Facts

President Corazon Aquino issued Proclamation No. 1 On February 25, 1986 announcing that she and
Vice President Laurel were taking power. On March 25, 1986, proclamation No.3 was issued providing
the basis of the Aquino government assumption of power by stating that the "new government was
installed through a direct exercise of the power of the Filipino people assisted by units of the New
Armed Forces of the Philippines."

Issue

Whether or not the government of Corazon Aquino is legitimate.

Held

Yes. The Court further held that the people have accepted the Aquino government which is in effective
control of the entire country. It is not merely a de facto government but in fact and law a de jure
government. The community of nations has recognized the legitimacy of the new government.
Laurel v. Misa, 77 Phil. 856.

Facts

This is a resolution of the decision of the SC denying the petition for the writ of habeas corpus filed by
Laurel. Anastacio Laurel was arrested by the US Army and was interned under a commitment order for
collaborating with the Japanese during the Japanese occupation. He was turned over to the
Commonwealth Government and since then has been under the custody of the respondent Director of
Prisons. He filed an original action in the Supreme Court invoking the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus.  He maintains that his arrest was illegal and in violation of his constitutional rights and that the
People’s Court Act 682 which suspends the application of the six-hour limitation on detention to political
prisoners is unconstitutional. The SC court in its decision, denied his petition and rejected the
petitioner’s contention mainly because no vested right was violated as the Act is not an ex-post facto
law.

Issue

Whether the sovereignty of the legitimate government in the Philippines is suspended upon occupation

Ruling

No. Sovereignty of the government or sovereign de jure is not transferred to the occupier but remains
with the legitimate government. It cannot be suspended because the existence of sovereignty cannot be
suspended without putting it out of existence or divesting the possessor thereof. What is suspended is
the exercise of the rights of sovereignty with the control and government of the territory occupied by
the enemy which passes temporarily to the occupant.
Co Kim Chan v. Valdez, 75 Phil. 113.

Facts

A petition for mandamus was filed by the petitioners to continue proceedings in civil case No. 3012
which were initiated under the regime of the so-called Republic of the Philippines established during the
Japanese military occupation. The respondent judge refused to take cognizance of and continue the
proceedings in said case on the ground that the proclamation issued by General McArthur has the effect
of invalidating and nullifying all judicial proceedings and judgments of the courts in the Philippines under
the Philippine Executive Commission and the Republic of the Philippines established during the Japanese
military occupation and that the lower court have no jurisdiction to take cognizance of and continue
judicial proceedings pending in the courts of the defunct Republic of the PH in the absence of an
enabling law granting such authority. Also, the court contends that the government established in the
PH during the Japanese occupation were not de facto government.

Held

Is the government organized by the Japanese a de facto government?

Ruling

YES. It is evident that the Philippine Executive Commission was a civil government established by the
military forces or occupation and therefore a de facto government of the second kind: “that while it
exists it must necessarily be obeyed in civil matters by private citizens who, by acts of obedience
rendered in submission to such force, do not become responsible, as wrongdoers, for those acts, though
not warranted by the laws of the rightful government. Actual governments of this sort are established
over all districts differing greatly in extent and conditions. They are usually administered by military
authority, but they may be administered, also, by civil authority, supported more or less directly by
military
Bacani v. Nococo, 100 Phil. 468.

Facts

Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to Counsel Alikpala the needed transcript containing
714 pages and thereafter submitted to him their billsfor the payment of their fees. Plaintiffs herein are
court stenographers assigned in Branch VI of the Court of First Instance of Manila. he National Coconut
Corporation paid the amount of P564 to Leopoldo T. Bacaniand P150 to Mateo A. Matoto for said
transcript at the rate of P1 per page the Auditor General required the Plaintiffs to reimburse said
amounts on the strength of a circular of the Department of Justice wherein the opinion was expressed
that the National Coconut Corporation, being a government entity, was exempt from the payment of
the fees in question.

Issue

Whether or not NACOCO is a Government Entity

Ruling

NACOCO’s function which our government has chosen to, is toexercise to promote the coconut industry,
however, it was given a corporate power separate and distinct from our government, for it wasmade
subject to the provisions of our Corporation Law in so far as its corporate existence and the powers that
it may exercise are concerned (sections 2 and 4, Commonwealth Act No. 518). It may sue and be sued in
the same manner as any other private corporations, and in this sense it is an entity different from our
government.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 104768, 21 July 2003.

Facts

Petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Sandiganbayan resolution dismissing petitioner’s
amended complaint and ordering the return of the items confiscated belonging to Elizabeth Dimaano.
Petitioner appealed before the Supreme Court, stressing that the conduct of the search and seizure was
a product of an act made by a revolutionary government bound by no constitutional limitation. It is
worth noting that Petitioners argued that during the interregnum, which is identified as the period
where normal government is suspended, especially between successive regimes, The exclusionary right
from illegal search and seizure granted to Ramas and Dimaano by the Bill of Rights was not in effect.

Issue

Whether or not the assets confiscated from the house of Dimaano were seized illegally and are thereby
inadmissible as evidence against Respondents.

Ruling

Yes. Under the Bill of Rights were inoperative during the Interregnum, the Revolutionary Government
still operated as a Government paying heed to treaty obligations provided by the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights as (ICCPR) as well as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). The
Revolutionary Government, which was in fact a De Jure Government, assumed under International Law,
assumed responsibility for the compliance of the state with Good Faith with the Covenant, to which the
Philippines is a signatory and a part of.
Alcantara v. Director of Prisons, 75 Phil. 749.

Facts

Aniceto Alcantara was convicted in the CFI Ilocos Sur in Criminal Case 23 for the felony of illegal
discharge of firearms with less serious physical injuries. Upon his appeal, the Court of Appeals of
Northern Luzon in Baguio City modified his sentence to an indeterminate sentence ranging from 4 mos.
and 21 days of arresto mayor to 3 years, 9 mos. and 3 days of prision correctional.

Issue

W/N the Court of Appeals of Northern Luzon had jurisdiction over the case of Alcantara, on the ground
that it was a validly-created court

Ruling

The Court held that the sentence served by Alcantara (illegal discharge of firearms with less serious
physical injuries) is an criminal act that has no political complexion. It cited the case of Co Kim Cham vs
Valdez, where the Japanese Republic (of the Philippines) and the Phil. Executive Commission were
governments de facto and the judicial acts of the courts thereof were good and valid and remained as
such even after the Commonwealth Government was restored, except those crimes with political
complexion.
Ruffy v. Chief of Staff, 75 Phil. 875.

Facts

When the Japanese forces landed in Mindoro, Major Ruffy retreated to the mountains instead of
surrendering to the enemy, disbanded his company, and organized and led a guerrilla outfit known as
Bolo Combat team of Bolo Area. A change in the command of the Bolo Area was effected by Colonel
Jurado on June 8, 1944: Major Ruffy was relieved of his assignment as Commanding Officer, Bolo
Battalion, and Capt. Esteban P. Beloncio was put in Ruffy's place. On October 19, 1944, Lieut. Col. Jurado
was slain allegedly by the petitioners. After the commission of this crime, the petitioners, it is alleged,
seceded from the 6th Military District. It was this murder which gave rise to petitioner's trial, the legality
of which is now being contested.

Issue

Petition has no merit and should be dismissed with costs

Ruling

The Court held that the petitioners come within the general application of the clause in sub-paragraph
(a) Article 2 of the 2d Article of War; "and all other persons lawfully called, drafted, or ordered into, or
to duty for training in, the said service, from the dates they are required by the terms of the call, draft,
or order to obey the same." By their acceptance of appointments as officers in the Bolo Area from the
General Headquarters of the 6th Military District, they became members of the Philippine Army
amendable to the Articles of War.
People v. Perfecto, 43 Phil. 887.

Facts

The Secretary of the Philippine Senate, Fernando M. Guerrero, discovered that documents which
consists of records of testimony given by witnesses in the investigation of oil companies had
disappeared from his office.The day after he had informed the Senate body of the loss of documents in
the session called by the Governor-General, an article against the Senate, which was edited by the
herein defendant, Mr. Gregorio Perfecto, was published in the newspaper La Nacion.Mr. Perfecto was
accused to have violated the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) which punishes “any person
who, by writing, shall defame, abuse, or insult, any Minister of the Crown or other person in authority”.

Issue

Whether or not the Article 256 of the Spanish Penal Code (SPC) is still in effect despite the change of
soveriegnty from Spanish to United State.

Ruling

No, the Article 256 of the SPC is not in effect and cannot be applied in this case. First, the article was
enacted to protect the Spanish officials who were representatives of the King. However, there are no
longer Kings nor representatives of the Kings to protect at present and “Minister of the Crown” does not
exist in the current government.Second, the Philippine Libel Law (Act No. 227) had repealed so much in
the provision that relates to written defamation, abuse and insult in the SPC and based on the facts, the
defendant violatedneither of the two laws.
Macariola v. Asuncion, 229 SCRA 77

Facts

Macariola and her step sister (Reyes) had a dispute over their inheritance involving parcels of land
located in Leyte. A trial ensued and Judge Macariola, after determining the legibility of the parties to
inherit rendered a decision in the civil case. Thereafter, the counsels of the parties submitted a project
partition reflecting the preference of the parties. The project partition was, however, unsigned by
Macariola. But her lawyer assured Asuncion that he is duly authorized by Macariola as counsel. The
judge then approved the project partition. The decision became final in 1963 as well.

Issue

Whether or not Judge Asuncion violated said provision

Ruling

No. The prohibition only applies if the litigation is under pendency. The judge bought the property in
1965 – 2 years after his decision became final. Further, Asuncion did not buy the property directly from
any of the parties since the property was directly bought by Galapon, who then sold the property to
Asuncion. There was no showing that Galapon acted as a “dummy” of Asuncion. Also, Macariola did not
show proof that there was a gross inequality in the partition; or that what she got were insignificant
portions of the land.
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, G.R. No. L-55963, 01 December 1989

FACTS:

On December 1, 1989, the Court rendered a decision declaring National Irrigation Administration (NIA),
a government agency performing proprietary functions. Like an ordinary employer, NIA was held liable
for the injuries, resulting in death, of Francisco Fontanilla, son of petitioner spouses Jose and Virginia
Fontanilla, caused by the fault and/or negligence of NIA’s driver employee Hugo Garcia; and NIA was
ordered to pay the petitioners the amounts of P 12,000 for the death of the victim; P3,389 for
hospitalization and burial expenses; P30,000 as moral damages; P8,000 as exemplary damages, and
attorney’s fees of 20% of the total award. The National Irrigation Administration (NIA) maintains,
however, that it does not perform solely and primarily proprietary functions, but is an agency of the
government tasked with governmental functions, and is therefore not liable for the tortuous act of its
driver Garcia, who was not its special agent. For this, they have filed a motion for reconsideration on
January 26, 1990.

ISSUE

Whether or not NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality separate and distinct from the
government, thereby opening it up to the possibility that it may be held liable for the damages caused
by its driver, who was not its special agent

Ruling

Yes. Reasoning the functions of government have been classified into governmental or constituent and
proprietary or ministrant. The former involves the exercise of sovereignty and considered as
compulsory; the latter connotes merely the exercise of proprietary functions and thus considered as
optional. The National Irrigation Administration was not created for purposes of local government.
Romuladez-Yap v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 104226, 12 August 1993

Facts

Conchita Romualdez-Yap started working with the PNB on September 20, 1972 as special assistant with
the rank of Second Assistant Manager assigned to the office of the PNB President. After several
promotions, she was appointed in 1983 Senior V-President assigned to the Fund Transfer Department.
While she was on leave, E.O No. 80 (Revised Charter of the PNB) was approved. Said Order authorized
the restructure/reorganization and rehabilitation of PNB. , petitioner was notified of her separation
from the service. Petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission questioning her separation. Then
CSC Chairman upheld the validity of her separation.

Issue

Whether or not the reorganization of the PNB resulting in the separation from the service of petitioner

Ruling

NO. A reorganization whether in a government bureau performing constituent functions or in a

government-owned or controlled corporation performing ministrant functions must meet a common
test, the test of good faith.
Republic of the Philippines and HUDCC v. Roque, G.R. No. 203610, 10 October 2016

Facts

When martial law was in force, the Republic, through DPWH, asked the respondents to sell a portion of
their land at a price lower than the market value for the National Government Center (NGC) Project. The
respondents agreed on Republic’s representation that the Project would eventually enhance the value
of the surrounding portions of the land that they still own and that, if it abandons the project, they will
have the right to buy back the land. After several years, informal settlers began to occupy parts of the
land. The respondents filed a complaint for the annulment of the sale of the properties on the ground of
fraud and asserted their right to repurchase after the Republic abandoned the NGC Project. Republic
invoked its immunity from suit and that no such conditions were agreed upon.

Issue

Whether or not the Republic can invoke the immunity from suit

Ruling

Republic is not immune from suit in the present case. The Constitution provides that "the State may not
be sued without its consent. One instance when a suit is against the State is when the Republic is sued
by name. In this case a suit against the State is allowed when the State gives its consent, either expressly
or impliedly. Express consent is given through a statute while implied consent is given when the State
enters into a contract or commences litigation. Although not all contracts entered into by the
government operates as a waiver of its non-suability, the Court held in the two cases below that the
State effectively gave its consent when it entered into contracts and committed breach.
Arigo v. Swift, G.R. No. 206510, September 16, 2014

Facts

In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a marine
habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded protection by a
Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for issuance of Writ of Kalikasan
with TEPO from the SC. Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers
of the US Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity
from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Issue

W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA

Ruling

No. The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this case. First, any waiver of State
immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not to special civil actions such as for
the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to petitioners’ claim, the US government could not
be deemed to have waived its immunity from suit. Second, the US respondents were sued in their
official capacity as commanding officers of the US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS
Guardian and its crew.
Department of Health v. Phil. Pharmawealth Inc., G.R. No. 169304, March 13, 2007

Facts

PPI filed a complaint to declare certain DOH issuances (Memorandum No. 171-C, AO 10, Series 2000,
Usec Galon’s suspension order; and AO 14, Series 2001) null and void for being in violation of Section 26,
Republic Act 3720, with prayer for injunction and damages against Usec Galon and later DOH Secretary
Dayrit. It claimed that its accreditation was suspended without due notice and hearing. It prayed that it
be awarded moral damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit. The DOH officials, herein petitioners,
elevated the case to the Supreme Court, arguing that PPI’s prayer for damages should be considered a
suit against the State for it would require the needed appropriation to satisfy PPI’s claim for damages
should it win. In issuing the assailed DOH issuances, they acted within the scope of their authority,
hence should not be made to account individually.

Issue

Whether or not DOH, in this circumstance, is under the mantle of state immunity

Ruling

A state may not be sued. However, if it consents, either expressly or impliedly, then it may be the
subject of a suit. There is express consent when a law, either special or general, so provides. On the
other hand, there is implied consent when the state “enters into a contract or it itself commences
litigation.” However, it must be clarified that when a state enters into a contract, it does not
automatically mean that it has waived its nonsuability.
Caltex Phils., Inc. v. Customs Arrastre Services, G.R. No. L-26994, November 28, 1969

Facts

Caltex Phils Inc. filed a case against Customs Arrastre Services for the recovery of the value of eleven
packages of assorted goods which amounted to P10, 682.66.Caltex Phils Inc. alleged that the eleven
packages were missing, but subsequent deliveries were made to it, thereby reducing the total of non-
delivered packages to only three, which totalled to P795.67. The Court favoured Caltex Phils Inc. for the
latter amount. The sole issue of non-suability of the Republic with respect to its operation through the
Bureau of Customs of the Arrastre Service in the Port of Manila has already been settled in the case of
Mobil Philippines Exploration, Inc. vs. Customs Arrastre Service

Issue

Whether or not both Customs Arrastre Service and the Bureau of Customs can invoke state immunity.

Ruling

The Bureau of Custom, is a part of Department of Finance. It does not have a separate juridical
personality of its own apart from that of the national government. Its primary function is governmental,
that of assessing and collecting lawful revenues from imported articles and all other tariff and customs
duties, fees, charges, fines and penalties (Sec. 602, R.A. 1937). As stated in the law, agencies of the
government is not suable if it is performing governmental functions and if it an unincorporated
government entity without a separate juridical personality.
Air Transportation Office v. Spouses Ramos, G.R. No. 159402, February 23, 2011

Facts

Sps. Ramos discovered that a portion of their land (somewhere in Baguio) was being used as part of the
runway and running shoulder of the Loakan Airport which is operated by ATO. Sometime in 1995,
respondents agreed to convey the subject portion by deed of sale to ATO in consideration of the
amount of Php778,150.00. However, ATO failed to pay despite repeated verbal and written demands.
Thus, an action for collection against ATO was filed by the respondents before the RTC. ATO’s primary
contention was that the deed of sale was entered into the performance of governmental functions. RTC
ruled in favor of the respondents. CA affirmed RTC.

Issue

Whether ATO could be sued without the State’s consent.

Ruling

SC dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The State’s immunity from suit does not extend to the
petitioner (ATO) because it is an agency of the State engaged in an enterprise that is far from being the
State’s exclusive prerogative. The CA thereby correctly appreciated the juridical character of the ATO as
an agency of the Government not performing a purely governmental or sovereign function, but was
instead involved in the management and maintenance of the Loakan Airport, an activity that was not
the exclusive prerogative of the State in its sovereign capacity
Delos Santos v. IAC, 223 SCRA 1

Facts

Petitioners allege that in October 1981, without their knowledge or consent, Lorenzo Cadiente, a private
contractor and the Provincial Engineer of Rizal constructed a road 9 meters wide and 128.70 meters long
occupying 1,165 sq m of their parcel of land. Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss both cases
several grounds, including that both cases were in reality suits against the state which could not be
maintained without the State's consent.

Issue

Whether or not the consolidated actions, as suits against the State, can be maintained

Ruling

The doctrine of governmental immunity from suit cannot serve as an instrument for perpetrating an
injustice on a citizen; it cannot serve as defense by the State against an action for payment by the owner
The respondent government officials executed a shortcut in appropriating petitioners' property for
public use; no expropriation proceedings had been undertaken prior to the construction of the projects.
Damages may be awarded the petitioners in the form of legal interest on the price of the land to be
reckoned from the time of the unlawful taking
Syquia v. Almeda Lopez, 84 Phil. 312

Facts

Pedro Syquia and Leopoldo Syquia are the undivided joint owners of three apartment buildings situated
in Manila. They executed three lease contracts. Plaintiffs served a formal notice to the occupants
demanding: (a) cancellation of said leases; (b) increase in rentals to P300 a month; (c) execution of new
leases (d) release of said apartment buildings within thirty days of said notice in the event of failure to
comply with said demands.The thirty-day period lapsed without any of the respondents complying with
the demand. Plaintiffs commenced an action in the Municipal Court of Manila in the form of an action
for Unlawful Detainer against respondents. Respondents filed a Motion toDismiss on the ground that
the court had no jurisdiction over the defendants and over the subject matter of the action because the
real party in interest was the US Government and not the individual defendants.

Issue

Whether or not the Philippine Courts have a lack of jurisdiction, considering, under the doctrine of
Sovereign Immunity, that USA has not given their consent to be a respondent.

Ruling

The real defendant party is the United States of America, as it was the U.S. Army who were occupying
the buildings, with the rent being paid for by their government. USA has not given their consent to be
sued in this case, and any action against them without the consent would constitue a lack of jurisdiction.