Legitimate Children Marissa Benitez-Badua Vs Ca

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LEGITIMATE CHILDREN

MARISSA BENITEZ-BADUA VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 11:03 AM
G.R. No. 105625 January 24 1994 [Article 163-171 - Legitimate Children]

FACTS:
Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian had various properties. They both
died intestate. The special proceedings for administration of the properties were
filed with the trial court. Vicente's sister Victoria B. Lirio filed for issuance of
letters of administration in favor of the nephew. Marissa opposed the petition,
saying that she is the sole heir of deceased Vicente and that she is capable of
administering his estate. She submitted the pieces of documentary evidence and
testified that the spouses treated her as their own daughter. The relatives of
Vicente tried to prove through testimonial evidence, that the spouses failed to
beget a child during their marriage. Victoria categorically declared that Marissa
was not the biological child of the spouses who were unable to physically
procreate.

Trial court relied on Arts. 166 and 170 of the Family Code and ruled in favor of
Marissa. On appeal, the CA reversed the lower court decision and declared
Marissa Benitez-Badua is not the biological child of the late spouses.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Marissa Benitez-Badua is the legitimate child and the sole heir of
the late spouses.

RULING:
No. The SC find no merit to the petition.

Articles 164, 166, 170 and 171 of the Family Code cannot be applied in the case at
bar. The above provisions do not contemplate a situation where a child is alleged
not to be the biological child of a certain couple.

In Article 166, it is the husband who can impugn the legitimacy of the child by:
(1) it was physically impossible for him to have sexual intercourse, with his wife
within the first 120 days of the 300 days which immediately preceded the birth of
the child; 
(2) that for biological or other scientific reasons, the child could not have been his
child; 

(3) that in case of children conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification by either parent was obtained through mistake,
fraud, violence, intimidation or undue influence.

Articles 170 and 171 speak of the prescription period within which the husband or
any of his heirs should file an action impugning the legitimacy of the child. In this
case, it is not where the heirs of the late Vicente are contending that Marissa is
not his child or a child by Isabel, but they are contending that Marissa was not
born to Vicente and Isabel.

Marissa was not the biological child of the dead spouses. Marissa's Certificate of
Live Birth was repudiated by the Deed of Extra-Judicial Settlement of the Estate of
the late Isabel by Vicente, saying that he and his brother-in-law are the sole heirs
of the estate.
Categories: Legitimate Children, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil
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TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTAL


Posted by kaye lee on 11:33 PM
G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000

FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She
asserted that the birth certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated
birth, the signature of informant forged, and contained false entries, to wit:
 That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio
Babiera and Hermogena Cariñosa;
 Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
 Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
 Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate
child;
 It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a
child at 54 years of age; her last child birth was when Presentacion
was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and
ineffective, and to order the City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the
hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed
therein her certificate of birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card.
She also filed a motion on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the
child of Hermogena and Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file
the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of
the Family Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial
court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings
pursuant to Art. 171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute
of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral
testimony of Presentacion.

RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.

1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows
that it applies to instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's
child. The provision, however, presupposes that the child was the undisputed
child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that Hermogena did not give
birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to
Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first
place. The reason why Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect
the former's successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive
period for action to impugn the legitimacy of the child. The present action
involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it does not impugn her
legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it
was allegedly declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence
presented during trial, sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the
issuance of birth certificate.

First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the
mother's signature was different from other signatures. Second,  no medical
records or doctor's prescription that provide as evidence of Hermogena's
pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age. Third,
the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista
and that the latter was not hers of Eugenio.

DE JESUS vs. DIZON


G.R. No. 142877, 2 October 2001

FACTS:
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964.  It
was during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de
Jesus, herein petitioners, were born.

In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged


Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina
Aves de Jesus.  Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind
considerable assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some
real property.  It was on the strength of his notarized acknowledgment that
petitioners filed a complaint on 01 July 1993 for “Partition with Inventory and
Accounting” of the Dizon estate with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 88, of
Quezon City.
Respondents, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan
G. Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder,
sought the dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while
denominated as being one for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the
status of petitioners from being the legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de
Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be the illegitimate children of Carolina de
Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.  The trial court denied, due to lack of merit.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioners can impugn their own legitimacy.

HELD:
Petitioners were born during the marriage of their parents.  The certificates of live
birth would also identify Danilo de Jesus as being their father. The law established
the presumption that children born in wedlock are legitimate.

In an attempt to establish their illegitimate filiation to the late Juan G. Dizon,


petitioners, in effect, would impugn their legitimate status as being children of
Danilo de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus which the law does not allow. The
presumption of legitimacy fixes a civil status for the child born in wedlock, and
only the father, or in exceptional instances the latter’s heirs, can contest in an
appropriate action the legitimacy of a child born to his wife.  Thus, it is only when
the legitimacy of a child has been successfully impugned that the paternity of the
husband can be rejected.

Whether petitioners are indeed the acknowledged illegitimate offspring of the


decedent, cannot be aptly adjudicated without an action having been first been
instituted to impugn their legitimacy as being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus
and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful wedlock.

Liyao vs. Liyao


GR No. 138961, March 7, 2002

FACTS:
William Liyao Jr., the illegitimate son of the deceased, as represented by her
mother (Corazon), filed a petition ordering Juanita Tanhoti-Liyao, Pearl L. Tan, Tita
L. Tan and Linda Liyao to recognize and acknowledge the former as a compulsory
heir of the deceased and to be entitled to all successional rights.  Liyao Jr. was in
continuous possession and enjoyment of the status as the child of the deceased
having been recognized and acknowledged as such child by the decedent during
his lifetime.  There were two sides of the story.  Corazon maintained that she and
the deceased were legally married but living separately for more than 10 years
and that they cohabited from 1965 until the death of the deceased.  On the other
hand, one of the chidren of the deceased stated that her mom and the deceased
were legally married and that her parents were not separated legally or in fact. 

ISSUE: WON the petitioner can impugn his own legitimacy to be able to claim
from the estate of the deceased.

HELD:

Under the New Civil Code, a child born and conceived during a valid marriage is
presumed to be legitimate. The presumption of legitimacy of children does not
only flow out from a declaration contained in the statute but is based on the
broad principles of natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The
presumption is grounded in a policy to protect innocent offspring from the odium
of illegitimacy.The presumption of legitimacy of the child, however, is not
conclusive and consequently, may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary.
Hence, Article 255 of the New Civil Code provides:

Article 255. Children born after one hundred and eighty days following the
celebration of the marriage, and before three hundred days following its
dissolution or the separation of the spouses shall be presumed to be legitimate.

Against this presumption no evidence shall be admitted other than that of the
physical impossibility of the husband having access to his wife within the first one
hundred and twenty days of the three hundred which preceded the birth of the
child.

This physical impossibility may be caused:

1)By the impotence of the husband;


2) By the fact that husband and wife were living separately in such a way that
access was not possible;

3) By the serious illness of the husband.

The fact that Corazon Garcia had been living separately from her husband, Ramon
Yulo, at the time petitioner was conceived and born is of no moment. While
physical impossibility for the husband to have sexual intercourse with his wife is
one of the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child, it bears emphasis
that the grounds for impugning the legitimacy of the child mentioned in Article
255 of the Civil Code may only be invoked by the husband, or in proper cases, his
heirs under the conditions set forth under Article 262 of the Civil Code. Impugning
the legitimacy of the child is a strictly personal right of the husband, or in
exceptional cases, his heirs for the simple reason that he is the one directly
confronted with the scandal and ridicule which the infidelity of his wife produces
and he should be the one to decide whether to conceal that infidelity or expose it
in view of the moral and economic interest involved. It is only in exceptional cases
that his heirs are allowed to contest such legitimacy. Outside of these cases, none
– even his heirs – can impugn legitimacy; that would amount of an insult to his
memory.

Furthermore, the court held that there was no clear, competent and positive
evidence presented by the petitioner that his alleged father had admitted or
recognized his paternity.

Concepcion v. Court of Appeals

G.R. No. 123450, 31 August 2005

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private


respondent, was married in December 1989 and begotten a child named Jose
Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on December 1991, a petition to
have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married a
certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the
husband was still alive and living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the
son was an illegitimate child and the custody was awarded to the wife while
Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in
the law granting “visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate
child”. She further wanted to have the surname of the son changed from
“Concepcion to Almonte”, her maiden name, since an illegitimate child should use
his mother’s surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court reversed its
ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the
child was a legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

ISSUE:

Whether the child is the legitimate child of Ma.Theresa and Gopiao or the
illegimate child of Ma.Theresa and Gerardo.

RULING:

The status and filiation of a child cannot be compromised. Article 164 of the
Family Code is clear. A child who is conceived or born during the marriage of his
parents is legitimate. As a guaranty in favor of the child and to protect his status
of legitimacy, Article 167 of the Family Code provides:

Article 167. The child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress.

The law requires that every reasonable presumption be made in favor of


legitimacy. Gerardo has no standing in law to dispute the status of Jose Gerardo.
Only Ma. Theresas husband Mario or, in a proper case, his heirs, who can contest
the legitimacy of the child Jose Gerardo born to his wife. Impugning the legitimacy
of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. Since the marriage of Gerardo and Ma. Theresa was void from the very
beginning; he never became her husband and thus never acquired any right to
impugn the legitimacy of her child.

During the period that Gerardo and Ma. Theresa were living together in Fairview,
Quezon City, Mario was living in Loyola Heights which is also in Quezon City.
Fairview and Loyola Heights are only a scant four kilometres apart.
Considering these circumstances, the separation between Ma. Theresa and her
lawful husband, Mario, was certainly not such as to make it physically impossible
for them to engage in the marital act. Sexual union between spouses is assumed.
Evidence sufficient to defeat the assumption should be presented by him who
asserts the contrary. There is no such evidence here. Thus, the presumption of
legitimacy in favor of Jose Gerardo, as the issue of the marriage between Ma.
Theresa and Mario, stands.

First, the import of Ma. Theres as statement is that Jose Gerardo is not her
legitimate son with Mario but her illegitimate son with Gerardo. This declaration
― an avowal by the mother that her child is illegitimate ― is the very declaration
that is proscribed by Article 167 of the Family Code. The language of the law is
unmistakable. An assertion by the mother against the legitimacy of her child
cannot affect the legitimacy of a child born or conceived within a valid marriage.

Second, even assuming the truth of her statement, it does not mean that there
was never an instance where Ma. Theresa could have been together with Mario
or that there occurred absolutely no intercourse between them. All she said was
that she never lived with Mario. She never claimed that nothing ever happened
between them. Telling is the fact that both of them were living in Quezon City
during the time material to Jose Gerardos conception and birth. Far from
foreclosing the possibility of marital intimacy, their proximity to each other only
serves to reinforce such possibility. Thus, the impossibility of physical access was
never established beyond reasonable doubt.

Third, to give credence to Ma. Theresa’s statement is to allow her to arrogate


unto herself a right exclusively lodged in the husband, or in a proper case, his
heirs. A mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never
uncertain. Hence, Ma. Theresa is not permitted by law to question Jose Gerardos
legitimacy.

Finally, for reasons of public decency and morality, a married woman cannot say
that she had no intercourse with her husband and that her offspring is
illegitimate. The proscription is in consonance with the presumption in favor of
family solidarity. It also promotes the intention of the law to lean toward the
legitimacy of children.
The Court upholds the presumption of his legitimacy. As a legitimate child, Jose
Gerardo shall have the right to bear the surnames of his father Mario and mother
Ma. Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of the Civil Code on surnames. A
persons surname or family name identifies the family to which he belongs and is
passed on from parent to child. Hence, Gerardo cannot impose his surname on
Jose Gerardo who is, in the eyes of the law, not related to him in any way.

* Case digest by Paula Bianca B. Eguia, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY
2017-2018

Estate of Rogelio Ong v. Diaz

G.R. No. 171713, 17 December 2007

FACTS:

Minor Diaz filed a complaint before the Regional Trial Court for compulsory
recognition with prayer for support against Rogelio Ong, she was represented by
her mother Jinky. Before the case, Jinky married a certain Hasegawa Katsuo,
Japanese. That same year, Jinky met Rogelio, they fell in love. The next year,
Rogelio and Jinky cohabited. After four years, Joanna was born, Rogelio
recognized Joanna as his, however, that same year, Rogelio abandoned them and
stopped giving support to Joanna, he alleged that he is not the father of Joanna,
hence this petition. RTC rendered a decision and declared the minor to be the
illegitimate child of Ong with Jinky Diaz, and ordering him to support the child
until she reaches the age of majority. Ong opposed the CA’s order to directing the
Estate and Joanne Rodgin Diaz for DNA analysis for determining the paternity of
the minor Joanne.

During the pendency of the case, Rogelion Died. The Estate filed a motion for
reconsideration with the Court of Appeals. They contended that a dead person
cannot be subject to testing. CA justified that “DNA paternity testing, as current
jurisprudence affirms, would be the most reliable and effective method of settling
the present paternity dispute.

ISSUE:
Whether or not DNA analysis can still be done even if the person is whose DNA is
the subject is dead.

RULING:

Yes.The court held that the death of Rogelio does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA analysis so long as there exist, suitable biological samples of
his DNA. The New Rules on DNA Evidence permits the manner of DNA testing by
using biological samples–organic material originating from the person’s body, for
example, blood, saliva, other body fluids, tissues, hair, bones, even inorganic
materials- that is susceptible to DNA testing. In case proof of filiation or paternity
would be unlikely to adequately found or would be hard to get, DNA testing,
which examines genetic codes found from body cells of the illegitimate child and
any physical remains of the long dead parent could be resorted to.

* Case digest by Jason S. Olasiman, LLB-1, Andres Bonifacio Law School, SY 2017-
2018
PROOF OF FILIATION

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