EN BANC

G.R. No. L-45130             February 17, 1937

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CELESTINO BONOAN Y CRUZ, defendant-appellant.

Paulino Sevilla, Fernando Arce and Gaudencio Garcia for appellant.

Undersecretary of Justice for appellee.

LAUREL, J.:

On January 5, 1935, the prosecuting attorney of the City of Manila filed an information charging
Celestino Bonoan, the defendant-appellant herein, with the crime of murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1934, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands,
the said accused, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, without any justifiable motive and with the decided purpose to kill
one Carlos Guison, attack, assault and stab the said Carlos Guison on the different parts of
his body with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him the following injuries, to wit:

"One stab wound at the right epigastric region penetrating one cm. into the superior surace
of the right lobe of the liver; and three non-penetrating stab wounds located respectively at
the posterior and lateral lumbar region, and left elbow", which directly caused the death of
the said Carlos Guison three days afterwards.

On January 16, 1935, the case was called for the arraignment of the accused. The defense counsel
forthwith objected to the arraignment on the ground that the defendant was mentally deranged and
was at the time confined in the Psychopatic Hospital. The court thereupon issued an order requiring
the Director of the Hospital to render a report on the mental condition of the accused. Accordingly,
Dr. Toribio Joson, assistant alientist, rendered his report,Exhibit 4, hereinbelow incorporated. On
March 23, 1935, the case was again called for the arraignment of the accused, but in view of the
objection of the fiscal, the court issued another order requiring the doctor of the Psyhopatic Hospital
who examined the defendant to appear and produce the complete record pertaining to the mental
condition of the said defendant. Pursuant to this order, Dr. Toribio Joson appeared before the court
on March 26, 1935 for the necessary inquiry. Thereafter, the prosecution and the defense asked the
court to summon the other doctors of the hospital for questioning as to the mental condition of the
accused, or to place the latter under a competent doctor for a closer observation. The trial court then
issued an order directing that the accused be placed under the chief alienist or an assistant alienist
of the Psychopatic Hospital for his personal observation and the subsequent submission of a report
as to the true mental condition of the patient. Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, assistant alienist of the
Psychopathic Hospital, rendered his report, Exhibit 5, on June 11, 1935. On June 28, 1935, the case
was called again. Dr. Fernandez appeared before the court and ratified his report, Exhibit 5, stating
that the accused was not in a condition to defend himself. In view thereof, the case was suspended
indefinitely.

On January 21, 1936, Dr. Dr. Fernandez reported to the court that the defendant could be
discharged from the hospital and appear for trial, as he was "considered a recovered case."
Summoned by the court, Dr. Fernandez, appeared and testified that the accused "had recovered
from the disease." On February 27, 1936, the accused was arraigned, pleaded "not guilty" and trial
was had.
After trial, the lower court found the defendant guilty of the offense charged in the information above-
quoted and sentenced him to life imprisonment, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the sum of
P1,000, and to pay the costs.

The defendant now appeals to this court and his counsel makes the following assignment of errors:

A. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence establishes that the accused has
had dementia only occasionally and intermittently and has not had it immediately prior to the
commission of the defense.

B. The court a quo erred in finding that the evidence in this case further shows that during
and immediately after the commission of the offense, the accused did not show any kind of
abnormality either in behavior, language and appearance, or any kind of action showing that
he was mentally deranged.

C. The court a quo erred in declaring that under the circumstances that burden was on the
defense to show hat the accused was mentally deranged at the time of the commission of
the offense, and that the defense did not establish any evidence to this effect.

D. The court a quo in finding the accused guilty of the offense charged and in not acquitting
him thereof.

It appears that in the morning of December 12, 1934, the defendant Celestino Bonoan met the now
deceased Carlos Guison on Avenida Rizal near a barbershop close to Tom's Dixie Kitchen.
Francisco Beech, who was at the time in the barbershop, heard the defendant say in Tagalog, "I will
kill you."

Beech turned around and saw the accused withdrawing his right hand, which held a knife, from the
side of Guison who said, also in Tagalog, "I will pay you", but Bonoan replied saying that he would
kill him and then stabbed Guison thrice on the left side.

The assault was witnessed by policeman Damaso Arnoco who rushed to the scene and arrested
Bonoan and took possession of the knife, Exhibit A. Guison was taken to the Philippine General
Hospital where he died two days later. Exhibit C is the report of the autopsy performed on December
15, 1934, by Dr. Sixto de los Angeles.

As the killing of the deceased by the defendant-appellant is admitted, it does not seem necessary to
indulge in any extended analysis of the testimony of the witnesses for the prosecution. The defense
set up being that of insanity, the only question to be determined in this appeal is whether or not the
defendant-appellant was insane at the time of the commission of the crime charged.

On the question of insanity as a defense in criminal cases, and the incidental corollaries as to the
legal presumption and the kind and quantum of evidence required, theories abound and authorities
are in sharp conflict. Stated generally, courts in the United States proceed upon three different
theories. (See Herzog, Alfred W., Medical Jurisprudence [1931], sec. 655 et seq., p. 479 et
seq.; also Lawson, Insanity in Criminal Cases, p. 11 et seq.) The first view is that insanity as a
defense in a confession and avoidance and as must be proved beyond reasonable doubt when the
commission of a crime is established, and the defense of insanity is not made out beyond a
reasonable doubt, conviction follows. In other words, proof of insanity at the time of committing the
criminal act should be clear and satisfactory in order to acquit the accused on the ground of insanity
(Hornblower, C. J., in State vs. Spencer, 21 N. J. L., 196). The second view is that an affirmative
verdict of insanity is to be governed by a preponderance of evidence, and in this view, insanity
is not to be established beyond a reasonable doubt. According to Wharton in his "Criminal Evidence"
(10th ed.,vol. I, sec. 338), this is the rule in England (Reg. vs. Layton, 4 Cox, C. C., 149; Reg. vs.
Higginson, 1 Car. & K., 130), and in Alabama, Arkansas, California, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, Texas, Virginia and West Virginia. The third
view is that the prosecution must prove sanity beyond a reasonable doubt (Dais vs. United States,
160 U. S. 496; 40 Law. ed., 499; 16 Sup. Ct. Rep., 353; Hotema vs. United States, 186 U. S., 413;
46 Law. ed., 1225; 22 Sup. Ct. Rep., 895; United States vs. Lancaster, 7 Biss., 440; Fed. Cas. No.
15,555; United States vs. Faulkner, 35 Fed., 730). This liberal view is premised on the proposition
that while it is true that the presumption of sanity exists at the outset, the prosecution affirms every
essential ingredients of the crime charged, and hence affirms sanity as one essential ingredients,
and that a fortiori where the accused introduces evidence to prove insanity it becomes the duty of
the State to prove the sanity of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt.

In the Philippines, we have approximated the first and stricter view (People vs. Bacos [1922], 44
Phil., 204). The burden, to be sure, is on the prosecution to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant committed the crime, but insanity is presumed, and ". . . when a defendant in a
criminal case interposes the defense of mental incapacity, the burden of establishing that fact rests
upon him. . . ." (U. S. vs. Martinez [1916], 34 Phil., 305, 308, 309; U. S. vs. Bascos, supra.) We
affirm and reiterate this doctrine.

In the case at bar, the defense interposed being that the defendant was insane at the time he killed
the deceased, the obligation of proving that affirmative allegation rests on the defense. Without
indulging in fine distinctions as to the character and degree of evidence that must be presented
sufficiently convincing evidence, direct or circumstantial, to a degree that satisfies the judicial mind
that the accused was insane at the time of the perpetration of the offense? In order to ascertain a
person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition
of his mind a reasonable period both before and after that time. Direct testimony is not required
(Wharton, Criminal Evidence, p. 684; State vs. Wright, 134 Mo., 404; 35 S. W., 1145; State vs.
Simms, 68 Mo., 305; Rinkard vs. State, 157 Ind., 534; 62 N. E., 14; People vs. Tripler, I Wheeler,
Crim. Cas., 48), nor are specific acts of derangement essential (People vs. Tripler, supra) to
established insanity as a defense. Mind can only be known by outward acts. Thereby, we read the
thoughts, the motives and emotions of a person and come to determine whether his acts conform to
the practice of people of sound mind. To prove insanity, therefore, cicumstantial evidence, if clear
and convincing, suffice (People vs. Bascos [1922], 44 Phil., 204).

The trial judge arrived at the conclusion that the defendantwas not insane at the time of the
commission of the act for which he was prosecuted on the theory that the insanity was only
occassional or intermittent and not permanentor continuous (32 C. J., sec. 561, p. 757). We are
appraised of the danger of indulging in the preseumption ofcontinuity in cases of temporary or
spasmodic insanity.We appreciate the reason forthe contrary rule. To be sure, courts should be
careful to distinguish insanity in law from passion or eccentricity, mental weakness or mere
depression resulting from physical ailment. The State should guard against sane murderers
escaping punishment through a general plea of insanity. In the case at bar, however, we are not
cconcerned with connecting two or more attacks of insanity to show the continuance thereof during
the intervening period or periods but with the continuity of a particular and isolated attack prior to the
commission of the crime charged, and ending with a positive diagnosis of insanity immediately
following the commission of the act complained of. Upon the other hand, there are facts and
circumstances of record which can not be overlooked.The following considerations have weighed
heavily upon the minds of the majority of this court in arriving at a conclusion different from that
reached by the court below:.
(a) From the evidence presented by the defense, uncontradicted by the prosecution, it
appears that the herein defendant-appellant, during the periods from April 11 to April 26,
1922, and from January 6 to January 10, 1926, was confined in the insane department of the
San Lazaro Hospital suffering from a disease diagnosed as dementia præcox. His
confinement during these periods, it is true, was long before the commission of the offense
on December 12, 1934, but this is a circumstance which tends to show that the recurrence of
the ailment at the time of the occurence of the crime is not entirely lacking of any rational or
scientific foundation.

(b) All persons suffering from dementia præcox are clearly to be regarded as having mental
disease to a degree that disqualifies them for legal responsibility for their actions (Mental
Disorder in Medico-Legal Relations by Dr. Albert M. Barrett in Peterson, Haines and
Webster, Legal Medicine and Toxology, vol. I, p. 613). According to Dr. Elias Domingo, chief
alienist of the Insular Psychopathic Hospital, the symptoms of dementia præcox, in certain
peeriods of excitement, are similar to those of manic depresive psychosis (p. 19, t. s. n.)
and, in either case, the mind appears "deteriorated" because, "when a person becomes
affected by this kind of disease, either dementia præcox or manic depresive psychosis,
during the period of excitement, he has no control whatever of his acts." (P. 21, t. s. n.) Even
if viewed under the general medico-legal classification of manic-depressive insanity, "it is
largely in relation with the question of irrestible impulse that forensic relations of manic
actions will have to be considered. There is in this disorder a pathologic lessening or normal
inhibitions and the case with which impulses may lead to actions impairs deliberations and
the use of normal checks to motor impulses" (Peterson, Haines and Webster, Legal
Medicine and Toxology [2d ed., 1926], vol, I, p. 617).

(c) According to the uncontradicted testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, at one time an
interne at San LazaroHospital, for four (4) days immediately preceding December 12, 1934
— the date when the crime was committed — the defendant and appellant had "an attack of
insomnia", which is one of the symptoms of, and may lead to, dementia præcox (Exhibit 3,
defense testimony of Dr. Celedonio S. Francisco, pp. 13, 14, t. s. n.).

(d) The defendant-appellant appears to have been arrested and taken to the police station
on the very same day of the perpetration of the crime, and although attempted were made by
detectives to secure a statement from him (see Exhibit B and D and testimony of Charles
Strabel, t. s. n. pp. 9, 10) he was sent by the police department to the Psychopathic Hospital
the day following the commission of the crime. This is an indication that the police authorities
themselves doubted the mental normalcy of the acused, which doubt found confirmation in
the official reports submitted by the specialists of the San Lazaro Hospital.

(e) According to the report (Exhibit 4) of the alienist in charge, Dr. Toribio Joson, which report
was made within the first month of treatment, the defendant was suffering from a form of
psychosis, called manic depressive psychosis.We quote the report in full:

INSULAR PSYCHOPATIC HOSPITAL

MANDALUYONG, RIZAL

January 15, 1935.

MEMORANDUM FOR: The chief Alienist, Insular Psychopatic

Hospital, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
SUBJECT: Patient Celestino Bonoan, male,
 Filipino, 30 years old, sent by the
Secret Service of the City of Manila
for mental examinition.

1. MENTAL STATUS:

(a) General behavior. — The patient is undetective, staying most of the time in his
bed with his eyes closed and practically totally motionless. At other times, however,
but on very rare occassions and at short intervals he apparently wakes up and then
he walks around, and makes signs and ritualistic movements with the extremities and
other parts of the body. Ordinarily he takes his meal but at times he refuses to take
even the food offered by his mother or sister, so that there have been days in the
hospital when he did not take any nourishment. On several occassions he refused to
have the bath, or to have his hair cut and beard shaved, and thus appear untidy. He
would also sometimes refuse his medicine, and during some of the intervals he
displayed impulsive acts, such as stricking his chest or other parts of the body with
his fists and at one time after a short interview, he struck strongly with his fist the
door of the nurse's office without apparent motivation. He also sometimes laughs, or
smiles, or claps his hands strongly without provocation.

(b) Stream of talk. — Usually the patient is speechless, can't be persuaded to speak,

and would not answer in any form the questions propounded to him. Very often he is
seen with his eyes closed apparently praying as he was mumbling words but would
not answer at all when talked to. At one time he was seen in this condition with a
cross made of small pieces of strick in his hand. He at times during the interviews
recited passages in the literature as for example the following.

"La virtud y las buenas costumbres son la verdadera nobleza del hombre.
(Truthfulness, honesty and loyalty are among the attributes of a dependable
character.)"

At one time he tried to recite the mass in a very loud voice in the hospital.

(c) Mood. — Patient is usually apathetic and indifferent but at times he looks anxious
and rather irritable. He himself states that the often feels said in the hospital.

(d) Orientation. — During the periods that he was acccessible he was found oriented
as to place and person but he did not know the day or the date.

(e) Illusion and hallucination. — The patient states that during the nights that he
could not sleep he could hear voices telling him many things. Voices, for example,
told that he should escape. That he was going to be killed because he was
benevolet. That he could sometimes see the shadow of his former sweetheart in the
hospital. There are times however when he could not hear or see at all anything.

(f ) Delusion and misinterpretation. — On one occassion he told the examiner that he

could not talk in his first day in the hospital because of a mass he felt he had in his
throat. He sometimes thinks that he is already dead and already buried in the La
Loma Cemetery.

(g) Compulsive phenomena. — None.

 (h) Memory. — The patient has a fairly good memory for remote events, but his
memory for recent events or for example, for events that took place during his stay in
the hospital he has no recollection at all.

(i) Grasp of general informartion. — He has a fairly good grasp of general

information. He could not, however, do simple numerial tests as the 100-7 test.

( j) Insight and judgment. — At his fairly clear periods he stated that he might have
been insane during his first days in the hospital, but just during the interview on
January 14, 1935, he felt fairly well. Insight and judgment were, of course, nil during
his stuporous condition. During the last two days he has shown marked improvement
in his behavior as to be cooperative, and coherent in his speech.

2. OPINION AND DIAGNOSIS:

The patient during his confinement in the hospital has been found suffering from a
form of physchosis, called Manic depressive psychosis.

(Sgd.) TORIBIO JOSON, M. D.

Assistant Alienist

In the subsequent report, dated June 11, 1935 (Exhibit 5), filed by Dr. Jose A. Fernandez, another
assistant alienist in the Insular Pshychopatic Hospital, the following conclusion was reached:

I am of the opinion that actually this patient is sick. He is suffering from the Manic
Depressive form of psychosis. It might be premature to state before the court has
decided this case, but I believe it a duty to state, that this person is not safe to be at
large. He has a peculiar personality make-up, a personality lacking in control, overtly
serious in his dealings with the every day events of this earthly world, taking justice
with his own hands and many times executing it in an impulsive manner as to make
his action over proportionate — beyond normal acceptance. He is sensitive, overtly
religious, too idealistic has taste and desires as to make him queer before the
average conception of an earthly man.

He will always have troubles and difficulaties with this world of realities.

(Sgd.) J. A. Fernandez, M. D.
Assistant Alienist

To prove motive and premeditation and, indirectly, mental normlacy of the accused at the time of the
commission of the crime, the prosecution called on policeman Damaso Arnoco. Arnoco testified that
upon arresting the defendant-appellant he inquired from the latter for the reason for the assault and
the defendant-appellant replied that the deceased Guison owed him P55 and would pay; that
appellant bought the knife, Exhibit A, for 55 centavos in Tabora Street and that for two days he had
been watching for Guison in order to kill him (pp. 5, 6, t. s. n.). Benjamin Cruz, a detective, was also
called and corroborated the testimony of policeman Arnoco. That such kind of evidence is not
necessarily proof of the sanity of the accused during the commission of the offense, is clear from
what Dr. Sydney Smith, Regius Professor of Forensic Medicine, University of Edinburg, said in his
work on Forensic Medicine (3d ed. [London], p. 382), that in the type of dementia præcox, "the crime
is ussually preceded by much complaining and planning. In these people, homicidal attcks are
common, because of delusions that they are being interfered with sexually or that their property is
being taken."

In view of the foregoing, we are of the opinion that the defendant-appellant was demented at the
time he perpetrated the serious offense charged in the information and that conseuently he is
exempt from criminal liability. Accordingly, the judgment of the lower court is hereby reversed, and
the defendant-appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio in both instances. In conforminty with
paragraph 1 of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code, the defendant shall kept in confinement in the
San Lazaro Hospital or such other hospital for the insane as may be desiganted by the Director of
the Philippine Health Service, there to remain confined until the Court of First Instance of Manila
shall otherwise order or decree. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real and Abad Santos, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

IMPERIAL, J., dissenting:

I agree with the dissenting opinions of Hustices Diaz and Concepcion.

There is not question as to the facts constituting the crime imputed to the accused. The
disagreement arises from the conclusions which both opinions attempt to infer therefrom. The
majority opinon establishes the conclusion that the accused was not in his sound mind when he
committed the crime because he was then suffering from dementia præcox. The dissenting opinions,
in establishing the conclusion that the accused was then in the possession of his mental facilities, or,
at leats, at a lucid interval, are based on the fact admitted by the parties and supported by expert
testimony, that the accused, before the commission of the crime, had been cured of dementia
præcox and later of manic depressive psychosis. The majority opinion admits that there is no
positive evidence regarding the mantal state of the accused when he comitted the crime, but it infers
from the facts that he must have then been deprived of his reason. This inference is not sufficiently
supported by the circumtantial evidence. I it is admitted that the legal presumption is that a person
who commits a crime is in his right mind (U. S. vs. Hontiveros Carmona, 18 Phil., 62; U. S. vs.
Guevara, 27 Phil., 547; U. S. vs. Zamora, 32 Phil., 218; U. S. vs. Martinez, 34 Phil., 305; People vs.
Bascos, 44 Phil., 204), because the law presumes all acts and ommissions punishable by law to be
voluntary (art. 1, Penal Code; article 4, subsection 1, Revised Penal Code), and if, as it appears,
there is sufficient or satisfactory evidence that the accused was mentally incapacitated when he
committed the crime, the conclusion of fact must be the same presumption established by law, that
is, that he was in his right mind, and the conclusion of law must be that he is criminal liable.

There is another detail worth mentioning which is that no credit was given to the conclusions of fact
arrived at by the judge who tried the case. He observed and heard the witnesses who testified and
he had the advantage of testing their credibility nearby. After weighing all the evidence he arrived at
the conclusion that the accused committed the crime while he was in his right mind. This court
generally gives much weight to the conclusions of fact of the judge who tried the case in the first
instance and does not reject them useless they are clearly in conflict with the evidence.

DIAZ, J., dissenting:
I do not agree to the majority opinion. The appellant committed the crime while he was sane, or at
least, during a lucid interval. He did not kill his victim without rhyme or reason and only for the sake
of killing him. He did so to avenge himself or to punish his victim for having refused, according to
him, to pay a debt of P55 after having made him many promises. He so stated clearly to the
policeman who arrested him immediately after the incident; and he made it so understood to the
witness Mariano Yamson, a friend of both the appellant and his victim, before the commission of the
crime.

The law presumes that everybody is in his sound mind because ordinarily such is his normal
condition. Insanity is an exception which may be said to exist only when thereis satisfactorily
evidence establishing it and it certainly is not always permanent because there are cases in which it
comes and takes place only occasionaly and lasts more or less time according to the circumstances
of the individual, that is, the condition of his health, his environment, and the other contributory
causes thereof. The law itself recognizes this, so much so that in establishing the rule that insane
persons are excempt from criminal liability, because they commit no crime, it also makes the
exception that this is true only when they have not acted during a lucid intervals (art. 12, subsec. 1,
of the Revised Penal Code).

The appellant was afflicted with insanity only for a few days during the months stated in the majority
opinion; April 1922 and January 1926, but he was later pronounced cured in the hospital where he
had been confined because he had already returned to normalcy by recovering his reason. For this
one fact alone, instead of stating that he acted during a lucid interval on said occasion, it should be
said on the contrary, taking into consideration the explanations given by him to the policemen who
arrested him and to other witnesses for the prosecution with whom he had been talking before and
after the incident, that he acted while in the full possession of his mental faculties.

The fact that the appellant was aflicted with manic depressive psychosis after the crime, as certified
by Drs. Toribio Joson, J. A. Fernandez and Elias Domingo who examined him, does not prove that
he was so afflicted on the date and at the time of the commission of the crime nor that said ailment,
taking for granted that he was suffering therefrom, had deprived him of his reason to such an extent
that he could not account for his acts.

There is no evidence of record to show that the appellant was actually insane when he committed
the crime or that he continued to be afflicted with said ailment for which he had to be confined in the
insane asylum for some days during the months above-stated, in 1922 and 1926. The most
reasonable rule which should be adopted in these cases is the one followed by various courts of the
United States stated in 32 C. J., 757, section 561, and 16 C. J., 538, 539, section 1012 as follows:

If the insanity, admitted, or proved, is only occassional or intermittent in its nature, the
presumption of its continuance does not arise, and he who relies on such insanity proved at
another time must prove its existence also at the time alleged. (32 C. J., 757, sec. 561.)

Where it is shown that defendant had lucid intervals, it will be presumed that the offense was
committed in one of them. A person who has been adjudged insane, or who has been
committed to a hospital or to an asylum for the insane, is presumed to continue insane; but
as in the case of prior insanity generally, a prior adjudication of insanity does not raise a
presumption of continued insanity, where the insanity is not of a permanent or continuing
character, or where, for a considerable period of time, the person has been on parole from
the hospital or asylum to which he was committed, or where he escaped from the asylum at
a time when he was about to be discharged. (16 C. J., 538, 539, sec. 1012.)
On the other hand, in Clevenger's Medical Jirusprudence of Insanity (vol. 1, pp. 482 and 484, the
following appears:

Fitful and exceptional attacks of insanity are not presumed to be continuous. And the
existence of prior or subsequent lunacy, except where it is habitual, does not suffice to
change the burden of proof. And where an insane person has lucid intervals offenses
committed by him will be presumed to have been committed in a lucid intervals unless the
contrary appears. The maxim "Once insane presumed always to be insane" does not apply
where the malady or delusion under which the alleged insane person labored was in its
nature accidental or temporary, or the effect of some sickness or disease.

And in order to raise a presumption of continuance it must be of permanent type or a

continuing nature or possessed of the characteristics of an habitual and confirmed disorder
of the mind. And it must appear to have been of such duration and character as to indicate
the probability of its continuance, and not simply the possibility or probability of its
recurrence. And there should be some evidence tending to show settled insanity as
contradistinguished from temporary aberration or hallucination, to justify an instruction which
does nor recognize such a distinction.

It is alleged that the appellant was suffering from insomia before he committed the crime in question.
Such condition does not necessarily prove that on the day in question he was actually insane.
Insomia, according to Dr. Elias Domingo, is not an exlcusive symptom of insanity; other diseases
and ailments also have it (t. s. n., p.19).

In view of the foregoing considerations and of those stated in the dissenting opinion of Justice
Concepcion, I vote for the affirmance of the appealed sentence, because in my opinion it is
supported by the evidence and in accordance with law.

CONCEPCION, J., dissenting:

I dissent: Above all, I wish to state: (1) that the crime committed by the accused is an admitted fact;
and (2) that I adhere to the statement of the majority that it is settled in this jurisdiction that a defense
based upon the insanity of the accused should be established by means of clear, indubitable and
satisfactory evidence.

On December 12, 1934, the accused stabbed the deceased Carlos Guison who, as a result the
wounds received by him, died in the hospital two days after the aggression.

It is alleged that the accused was insane at the time he committed this crime. What evidence is there
of record in support of this defense? Mention has been made of the fact that the accused had been
confined in the san Lazaro Hospital and later in the Psychopathic Hospital. He was confined in the
San Lazaro Hospital from April 11 to April 26, 1922. He returned to the hospital on January 6, 1926,
and left on the 10th of said month and years. Dr Elias Domingo, chief alienist of the Psychopathic
Hospital was questioned as follows:

Q. When he left the hospital, can you state whether he was already completely cured of his
insanity? — A. He wassocially adjustable.

Q. What do you mean by socially adjustable? — A. That he could adapt himself to

environment.
There is no evidence that from the month of January, 1926, when he was declared cured at the
Psychopathic Hospital, to December 12, 1934, the date of the crime, he had shown signs of having
had a relapse. Therefore it is a proven fact during the long period of nine years the accused had
been sane.

It is alleged, however, that four days before the crime the accused was under treatment by Dr.
Celedonio S. Francisco because he was suffering from insomia. Dr. Francisco admitted that he was
not a specialist in mental diseases. He is, therefore, disqualified from testifying satisfactorily on the
mental condition of the accused four days before the crime; and in fact neither has Dr. Francisco
given any convincing testimony to prove that when the accused was under treatment by him he was
suffering from dementia præcox, as the only thing he said was that the accused-appellant had an
attack of insomia which is one of the symptoms of and may lead to dementia præcox (Exhibit 3; t. s.
n., pp. 13, 14). This is not an affirmation of a fact but of a mere possibility. The innoncence of the
accused cannot be based on mere theories or possibilities. To prove insanity as a defense, material,
incontrovertible facts, although circumstantial, are necessary.

On the contrary the evidence shows that on the day the accused committed the crime he talked and
behaved as an entirely normal man. Policemen Damaso T. Arnoco and Benjamin Cruz testified that
the accused, after having been asked why he had attacked Carlos Guison, replied that it was
because Guison owed him P55 for a long time and did not pay him. The accused stated that he
bought the knife with which he had stabbed Guison on Tabora Street for fifty centavos and he had
been waiting for two days to kill Guison. The accused took his dinner at noon on December 12th.
The statement of the accused which was taken in writing by detectives Charles Strubel and Manalo
on December12th was left unfinished because Cruz of the Bureau of Labor arrived and told the
accused not to be a fool and not to make any statement. Thereafter the accused refused to continue
his statement. All of these show that on that day the accused behaved as a sane man and he even
appeared to be prudent, knowing how to take advantage of advice favorable to him, as that given
him by Cruz of the Bureau of Labor. Furthermore it cannot be said hat the accused had stabbed
Guison through hallucination because it is an established fact that his victim really owed him money
as confirmed by the fact that when Guison was stabbed he cried to the accused "I am going to pay
you", according to the testimony of an eyewitness. Therefore the motive of the aggression was a real
and positive fact: vengeance.

Some days after the commission of the crime, the accused was placed under observation in the
Psychopathic Hospital because he showed symptoms of a form of psychosis called depressive
psychosis from which he had already been cured when the case was tried. This pyschosis is of
course evidence that the accused was afflicted with this ailment after the commission of the crime. It
would not be casual to affirm that the commission of the crime had affected his reason. Nervous
shock is one of the causes of insanity (Angeles, Legal Medicine, p. 728); but it cannot be logically
inferred therefrom that the accused was also mentally deranged on the day of the crime, aside from
the ciscumstance that the evidence shows just the contrary. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the
appealed sentence should be affirmed.