Mountain Warfare Other Lonv Problems

G)
~
c Mountain warfare
Qo
OJ
)>
and
~
r
m
Other lonv Problems:
en Foreign Perspectives On High-Altitude Combat
•=
0
s=
-·=
I
..•
i
CD
Foreign
mountain-combat
=
1:1.
a veterans discuss
The United States has been in a mountain war in Afghanistan
for almost a decade. Other nations have different, extensive
experience in training and conducting mountain combat. Les
Grau and Chuck Bartles gathered this experience in this book
.....
s
CD
0
movement and maneuver,
training and resupply
in the hope that it will benefit our mountain training community
and assist in the preparation of brigades for mountain combat
before they deploy to mountainous regions. ......
~
The Foreign Military Studies Office does foreign-language

open-source research in military topics in a variety of areas.
Les Grau and Chuck Bartles have done extensive work in
-a
0
l:r
CD
en
Lester W. Grau
Charles K. Bartles
Editors
Afghanistan, Russia, and Central and Southern Asia.
.,
:s::
en Foreign Military Studies Office
0 Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Form Approved
Report Documentation Page OMB No. 0704-0188
Public reporting burden for the collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and
maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information,
including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to a penalty for failing to comply with a collection of information if it
does not display a currently valid OMB control number.
1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

2. REPORT TYPE
2011 00-00-2011 to 00-00-2011
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems: Foreign Perspectives On 5b. GRANT NUMBER
High-Altitude Combat
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER
6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER
5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

REPORT NUMBER
Foreign Military Studies Office,731 McClellan Avenue,Fort
Leavenworth,KS,66027
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

NUMBER(S)
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
15. SUBJECT TERMS
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION OF 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF
ABSTRACT OF PAGES RESPONSIBLE PERSON
a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE Same as 225
unclassified unclassified unclassified Report (SAR)
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

Prescribed by ANSI Std Z39-18
I
/
!54th Spclsnaz. Balla

I
I
I
_
~#'
_ c:>/3341h Spctsnaz
® t;:J' ~
)IhBd
., ~~4th Spetsnaz
Balla lion c1 Bitlllltion- ..._
6 -
...,./ -
cc HiJ.~
Advanang Spetsnaz BattaiJon
Aitack Jt'---·· ...,_,..,.00 ~

MUJAilTDEEN
r:IIUNG POSITIONS:
- DShK Heavy Maclunc Gw1
"b ! - Battalion oonunand pos1 6 - Hdicoph:r L!Dlding Zone

-
-
Recoille.5S R10o
1\.lonar
~ - Company 001runand post ~-\..-~
... - HcliooplcrGun Ship firing l.mc ,- T -1 - MuJaludeen AMault Line
in Lhe deft"lts~
Introduction i
Mountain
Warfare and
other Lofty
Problems
ii Passing It On
Introduction iii
Mountain
Warfare and
other Lofty
Problems:
Foreign Perspectives on
High-Altitude Combat
Lester W. Grau & Charles K. Bartles

Foreign Military Studies Office l Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
iv Passing It On
The views expressed in this book are those of the authors and
do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the
Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the U.S.
Government.
© 2011 United States Government, as represented by the

Secretary of the Army. All rights reserved.
The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an

open source research organization of the U.S. Army. Founded as the Soviet Army
Studies Office in 1986, it was an innovative program that brought together military
specialists and civilian academics to focus on military and security topics derived
from unclassified, foreign media. The results were unclassified articles and papers
that provided new understandings and broad access to information from a base of
expertise in the U.S. Army, Department of Defense, and foreign and U.S. defense
communities and universities.
Today FMSO maintains this research tradition of special insight and highly
collaborative work. FMSO conducts unclassified research of foreign perspectives
of defense and security issues that are understudied or unconsidered but that are
important for understanding the environments in which the U.S. military operates.
FMSO’s work today is still aimed at publication in unclassified journals and its
research findings are taught in both military and civilian venues in the United States
and around the world. FMSO is organized in the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
Command under the TRADOC G-2.
Foreign Military Studies Office

731 McClellan Avenue
Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027
[email protected]
Introduction v
The mountains are fountains of men as well as

of rivers, of glaciers, of fertile soil. The great poets,
philosophers, prophets, able men whose thought
and deeds have moved the world, have come down
from the mountains --- mountain-dwellers who have
grown up strong there with the forest trees in
Nature's workshops.
--- John Muir, John of the Mountains, 1938
vi Passing It On
Contents
Foreword . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
MOUNTAIN COMBAT
1 - Ground Combat at High Altitudes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.)
and LTC Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army
2 - Mountain Warfare: The Need for Specialized Training . . . 15
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army
SMALL UNIT
3 - Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta: Spetsnaz Strike
into Pakistan during the Soviet-Afghan War . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and Ali Ahmad Jalali
4 - Small Secrets of Great Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), based on the work of Ikram Nazarov
5 - Flanking Detachment In The Mountains:
A Soviet Experience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.)
and Major V. A. Selivanov, former Soviet Army
6 - Cave Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
Ikram Karimov, Mountaineer Trainer and Instructor, Uzbekistan
LARGE UNIT
7 - The Campaign For The Caves: The Battles
for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and Ali Ahmad Jalali
RECONNAISSANCE
8 - Mountain Reconnaissance Russian Style . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), based on the work
of Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army
ARTILLERY
9 - Moving Artillery Forward: A Concept for
the Fight in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
Major Joseph A. Jackson, US Army
SMALL ARMS FIRE

10 - The Right Way To Shoot: How to Select
Firing Positions and Firing Ready Positions
in Mountainous Conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
Colonel Michael Panov, Russian Army
11 - It is Difficult --- But Possible and Necessary --- to Master
the Skills and Techniques of Shooting in Mountains . . . 106
Introduction vii
SHELTER
12 - So That Making Camp Makes You Stronger:
Organizing Rest and Overnight Halts for Personnel
in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
RUSSIAN ARMY TRAINING

13 - Along Slopes and Tracks: Training Method
for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
14 - Forward, Up, and then Down: How to Use a Rope
to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
15 - Don’t Let Me Down --- Belay: Training Method for
Negotiating Mountain Obstacles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
16 - How to “Tame” a River: Getting Across
Water Obstacles in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
17 - Train to Win: Organizing and Conducting
Physical Training For Soldiers in the Mountains . . . . . . 139
LOGISTICS
18 - Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military
Transport Along Mountain Rivers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
Vladimir Shiryayev, Military Mountaineering Instructor, Tashkent
19 - What a Water Transport Company Should Be:
The Need for Special Supply Delivery Transport
Units in Mountain Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
Vladimir Shiryayev, Military Mountaineering Instructor, Tashkent
COMMUNICATIONS
20 - Mountain Combat: Hard to Move, Hard to Shoot,
Even Harder to Communicate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 169
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), Lieutenant Jason Falivene, USMC
MEDICAL CONSIDERATIONS
21 - Medical Implications of High Altitude Combat . . . . . . . . 176
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), and William A. Jorgensen, DO MC USAR
AVIATION
22 - Helicopter Landings in the Mountains . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 186
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.), CW4 Anthony Reed, US Army, and CW3
James W. Grau, US Army, based on the work of COL D.B. Zipir, Russian Army
Conclusion - Further Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
viii Passing It On
Introduction ix
Foreword
The mission of the Foreign Military Studies Office is to research and
present foreign ideas and perspectives for a better understanding of
present and future military and security issues. Good ideas are not ex-
clusively found in the English language or even the American military
experience. FMSO analysts are foreign area specialists with the language
skills, military backgrounds, and the regional experience that enables
them to mine foreign sources for insights that uniquely enhance our
forces’ understanding of the operational environment. Mountain Warfare
and Other Lofty Problems uses Russian, Pakistani, Indian, Argentine,
Afghan, and Uzbek sources.
The United States Army has been involved in a mountain war for
a decade. After all this time, mountain combat remains a stubbornly
difficult mission and technology can offer only modest support to the
infantry’s mission of closing with the enemy or the logistician’s mission
of getting support forward. Training, equipment, weapons, tactics, and
logistics all require significant adjustment for mountain combat. This
book covers operations and tactics, artillery, and aviation support, re-
connaissance, communications, training, and logistics. It demonstrates
that the key to enhancing effectiveness is using the terrain effectively,
preparing the soldiers properly, and understanding the environment.
This book is not United States Army doctrine. Rather, it is offered as
an alternate view that could help our forces successfully adapt to a
most-challenging environment and carry out their mission.

Tom Wilhelm
Director, Foreign Military Studies Office
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
x Passing It On
Editors
Les Grau is a retired infantry Lieutenant Colonel who fought in
Vietnam and trained as a Soviet Foreign Area Officer. He has pub-
lished over 150 articles on tactical subjects and three books on
Afghanistan — The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics
in Afghanistan; The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in
the Soviet-Afghan War (coauthored with Ali A. Jalali); and The Russian
General Staff’s The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and
Lost (translated with Michael Gress). He has a doctoral degree in Mili-
tary History with a concentration in Central Asia and South Asia. He is
a very amature climber with some modest peaks to his credit.
Charles Bartles is a Russian linguist and captain in the US Army

Reserve who has served in Iraq, Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgistan, and
Uzbekistan. He has written on Russian military TTPs, Russian military
reform, and security assistance programs in Russia and Central Asia.
Introduction xi
Introduction
This book started as a pamphlet of recent Russian articles on mountain
combat. The Russians have a lot of recent experience fighting in the
mountains of Afghanistan, Chechnya, Georgia, Ossetia, and Abkhazia.
Some of these are dry mountains and some are wet. This has given their
force a certain edge that they do not want to lose over time. However, the
Russians are not the only peoples with experience in mountain warfare,
training, firing, logistics, communications, engineering, fire support,
medical support, and the like. The Foreign Military Studies Office
(FMSO) studies the experience of other militaries with the belief that
no nation or people have a corner on good ideas. In order to provide
a more comprehensive treatment and collect mountain material
under the same cover, this book includes published FMSO articles on
foreign mountain combat as well as recent Russian publications. It is
not intended to replace US doctrine, rather it hopes to supplement US
material and provide a view of a different, proven approach.
Why the emphasis on Russian experience? The Caucasus Mountains,
Ural Mountains and Pamir Mountains are part of Russia and consequently,
the Russian Army has a long history of mountain troops, production of
specialized mountain warfare gear, and mountain training centers. Even
during the Cold War, when the emphasis was on high-speed maneuver
war, the Soviets still maintained mountain troops in their force structure.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, the mountain warfare training requirement
steadily increased until, at the end, there were seven mountain warfare
training centers preparing troops prior to commitment to combat.
After the collapse of the Soviet Union, mountain warfare training —
along with most other military training — slowed or stopped due to lack
of funds. However, the Russian War in Chechnya demonstrated that
the Russian military needed to once again promote mountain warfare
training. In May 2007, Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest) printed a series
of articles on mountain warfare and mountain warfare training. We have
included these articles.
xii Passing It On
The target audience of this book is the cadre of mountain warfare

trainers in the United States Army and Marine Corps as well as units that
are deploying to Afghanistan. There are marked differences between
Russian and US mountain warfare training. The Russians put much
more emphasis on weapons firing and unit movement in the mountains.
They emphasize long-range logistics support using vehicles, animals,
and rivers. The US Army approach is more about knots, rappelling,
and individual climbing skills. The USMC trains infantry battalions
at Bridgeport, California, which includes animal packing and sniper
training; however, it does not train the gunners, sappers, drivers, and
logisticians who are central to mountain warfare.
Mountain warfare training is not routinely part of the training a US
battalion or brigade undergoes prior to deployment to Afghanistan.
Consequently, most soldiers and marines lack individual and unit
mountain movement skills, proper mountain equipment and the
knowledge of how to use it. Soldiers and marines certainly have not faced
an OPFOR in the mountains before they face a dedicated combatant in
Afghanistan in a live firefight. Most soldiers and marines do not know
how to fire in the mountains. Further, there are large areas of Afghanistan
that cannot be reached by helicopter. A serious consequence of all
this is that the Taliban has established mountain sanctuary areas inside
Afghanistan, since coalition forces generally don’t “do” mountains
and certainly do not trek deep inside mountain ranges. This will have
to change and the editors offer this collection of articles with the hope
that they will help in preparing soldiers and marines for the challenge
ahead.
Lester W. Grau
Charles Bartles
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
Ground Combat at High Altitudes 1
Ground Combat at
High Altitudes
Lieutenant Colonel Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.)
and Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army
This article first appeared in the January-February 2002 edition of Military Review
A general who allows himself to be decisively defeated in an extended

mountain position deserves to be court-martialed.
Carl von Clausewitz1
H igh mountain terrain is often inaccessible, uninhabitable or of no

apparent value, yet peoples and states still fight to possess it. Long,
bloody wars have been fought, and are being fought, for mountain real
estate located between 10,000 and 23,000 feet [3050 and 7015 meters].
Over the past fifty years, high-altitude combat has raged in Africa, Asia,
and South America. The Chinese invaded Tibet in 1953 and fought a
subsequent guerrilla war there until 1974. From 1953 to 1958, British
troops fought Mau-Mau separatists in the Aberdares Mountains of Kenya.
In 1962, China and India battled in the Himalayan Mountains bordering
Bhutan and Tibet. Soviets fought Afghan Mujahideen in the towering
Hindu Kush Mountains from 1979 to 1989. The Peruvian government
hunted the Sendero Luminoso guerrillas in the Andes Mountains
throughout the 1980s. India and Pakistan have continually battled for
possession of the Siachen Glacier since April 1984 and fight sporadically
over disputed Kashmir as they have since 1948. Today, Colombia’s
government troops are fighting the Revolutionary Armed Forces of
Colombia (FARC), and the National Liberation Army (ELN) guerrillas
high in the Andes, and Russian soldiers are fighting Chechen separatists
high in the Caucasus Mountains.
The U.S. Army has no experience fighting in truly high mountains
and its mountain warfare manuals deal primarily with low and medium
mountains and stress the use of helicopter aviation to conduct that
combat. However, helicopters cannot haul normal loads over 13,000
feet [3965 meters] since their rotors lack thick enough air to “bite” into,
and high altitude weather conditions will frequently shut down flying
for days. High-altitude combat differs from medium- and low-mountain
2 Mountain Warfare and Other Lofty Problems
altitude combat and requires a different orientation and force structure.
Other armies have experience in truly high mountains and can provide
valuable guidance and expertise. The U.S. Army needs to know how to
conduct high-altitude mountain warfare, develop the tactics, techniques,
and procedures to do so, and share the experience of other armies to
understand and prepare for possible high-altitude conflicts.
The Environment
Mountains are generally classified as low (600 to 1500 meters),
medium (from 1500 to 3500 meters) and high-altitude mountains (above
3600 meters). The world’s highest mountains are not in the United States,
Europe, or Korea— where the U.S. Army is accustomed to working. The
Himalayan Mountain chain of Asia stretches 1,500 miles and contains nine
of the world’s 10 highest peaks. The Hindu Kush/Karakoram mountain
chain of Asia stretches well over 500 miles with its highest peak at 28,250
feet [8,616 meters]. The South American Andes stretches over 5,000
miles and rise above 22,000 feet [6,710 meters] at many points. The
Caucasus Mountains, which divide Europe and Asia, run some 700 miles
with many peaks over 15,000 feet [4572 meters]. The Himalayan Mount
Everest towers at 29,028 feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point
in the United States, Mount McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6
meters]. The highest point in the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at
14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters]. The highest point in the European Alps is
Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2 meters].2
Although high mountains occupy a good portion of the earth’s
surface, man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high
altitudes. When a person travels to an altitude of 8,000 to 10,000 feet
[2440 to 3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure
and available oxygen cause physiological changes, which attempt to
ensure that the body gets enough oxygen.3 These physiological changes
are pronounced among mountain people who have lived in cold, high
altitudes for generations. Compared to lowlanders, their bodies are
short, squat, stocky, and barrel-chested, and their hands and feet are
stubby. Their hearts are bigger and slower beating and their capillaries
are wider. Their bodies contain 20 percent more red blood cells than
lowlanders’ do and these red blood cells are larger. The alveoli in
their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption. Many develop a
fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract cataract and snow
blindness.4 Populations at high altitude often use narcotics, such as coca
or hashish, to help manage the pain and stress of high altitude.
High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds,
thin air, intense solar and ultraviolet radiation, deep snow, raging
thunderstorms and blizzards, heavy fog, and rapidly changing weather,

including severe storms which can cut off outside contact for a week or
longer. Avalanches and rockslides are not uncommon. Although jungle
or forest may hug the mountain base, trees do not grow past 10,000 to
11,500 feet [3,000 to 3,500 meters], depending on the latitude.
Physical conditions at high altitude are often more dangerous than
enemy fire. Superficial bullet and shrapnel wounds can quickly turn
fatal at altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken
bones, severe lacerations, contusions, and internal injuries caused by
falls and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger.
Acute mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral
edema are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude.
Mental and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude
also induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a
problem. The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultraviolet ray
exposure, which creates problems with sunburn and snow blindness.
High altitude shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which
means that personnel breathe air which is thick with soot.5
Equipment will not function, or functions marginally, at high altitudes.
On the average, vehicles lose 20 to 25 percent of their rated carrying
capability and use up to 75 percent more fuel.6 Military generators and
vehicles are often diesel-powered, but standard diesel engines lose
efficiency at 10,000 feet [3050 meters] and eventually stop functioning
altogether because of insufficient oxygen. Artillery firing tables are
wildly inaccurate as the changed environment allows rounds to fly
much farther. Lubricants freeze; altitude and weather limit helicopters;
and additional animal or gasoline-fueled overland transport adds to the
physical demands and logistic requirements of this environment.
Getting There is Half the Fun

At high altitude, personnel have difficulty breathing because of
decreased atmospheric pressure and subsequent rarified oxygen.
Soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their
ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent
physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers
are preferred to tall, muscular soldiers. Selected soldiers should have
above-average intelligence to allow them to more-readily adapt to the
trying terrain. Personnel who have had radial keratotomy corrective
eye surgery should not go to high altitudes because their vision may
permanently cloud.
All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to
accustom them to their new environment and to improve their
respiratory and cardiovascular systems. A physically fit soldier can
adapt to the cold in about 3 weeks.7 The body normally adapts to a
higher altitude in about 2 week’s time. During the acclimatization phase,
the body accumulates additional red blood cells which help transport
needed oxygen.8 The Pakistani army acclimates their personnel over
7 weeks. They begin with a 3-week stay at 10,000 feet [3050 meters]
where personnel acclimate to the cold while they undergo daily physical
conditioning and learn mountaineering, rock climbing, rappelling, and
mountain survival. During the final 4 weeks, soldiers learn advanced
mountaineering techniques, trek to 14,000 feet [4270 meters] and return;
trek to 17,000 feet [5185 meters] and return; and finally trek to 19,135 feet
[5836 meters]. 9
Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at
heights over 18,000 feet [5418 meters], so exposure at these heights
must be limited and closely supervised. Personnel at high altitudes
need to be rotated out every 10 to 14 days. The Indian army acclimates
its personnel over a 14-day schedule with increases in altitude at 6 days,
4 days and then another 4 days. The Indian army characteristically
conducts its acclimatization by having the battalion hike from its road
head to the staging area. All experienced armies agree that high-altitude
acclimatization cannot be achieved in less than 10 days. An acclimated
soldier is still not an experienced mountaineer. Experience counts and
is not gained in 2 months of training. Some armies, such as Italy’s, believe
that 10 years is not too long to produce a truly capable, experienced
mountain warrior.
Nothing is fast in high-altitude combat. Logistics support is key
and the location of logistics dumps determines operational axes. The
distance between the road head—the furthest point that supplies can be
moved by truck—and the forward posts determines how many troops
can actually man the forward posts. Forward posts can be a 3 to 14 day
foot march from the road head. The farther the forward post is from
Low and Medium High

Type of Mountains Mountains
March Up to From 3000 to From 4000 to
One Day of Rest
3000 meters 4000 meters 5000 meters After Marching
On foot Mounted On foot Mounted On foot Mounted
Normal, not affecting
combat power 8 10 6 8 4 6 6 hours
Affecting
combat power 10 12 8 10 6 8 3 days
Considerably affecting 12 14 10 12 8 10 1 day

combat power Hours Marching Per Day
Figure 1.
Source: ROP-OO-06, Conducción de la Brigada de Montána (Mountain Brigade Field Manual)
(Buenos Aires, Argentina: Government Printing Office, 1998), Annex 15, 279.
the road head, the greater the number of troops necessary to support
it. Base camps are usually built around road heads. Supplies and men
travel forward from the base camps through intermittent staging posts
to the forward posts. Helicopters, porters, or mules are used to move
supplies from the road head. Despite attempted technology fixes, the
mule is the most efficient way of moving material in the high mountains.
Mules require care, attention, and training. Armies with experience in
high mountains maintain trained mules and muleteers. Even mules
cannot reach the higher elevations, and porters must haul the supplies
forward.
Movement is calculated in time rather than distance at high altitude.
Figure1 shows average movement rates of trained, acclimated personnel
and pack animals in the mountains.
The terrain slope as well as physical conditioning and altitude
acclimatization of the troops determines the distance that can be covered.
Figure 2 gives a rough average for determining distances over time
using conditioned, acclimated troops.
Moving in the high mountains can be perilous. Weather can rapidly
change and columns can become lost in blizzards or fog. Trail markers
can quickly disappear under falling snow. Snow bridges can collapse and
swallow climbers into deep crevasses. Entire patrols have disappeared
without a trace while moving to the Siachen Glacier.
Line-of-sight communications is excellent in the mountains but
difficult to achieve because of high peaks. Therefore, communications
sites are carefully selected and often become key terrain. Very-high
frequency radios with automatic frequency hopping, encryption, and
burst transmission capabilities work best. Normal batteries quickly
lose power in the cold, so lithium batteries should be the normal issue.10
Frequently, mountain tops become part of the national communications
infrastructure because they are crowded with military, national, and
commercial radio and television sites and telephone relay towers. These
vital areas need to be protected, and military platoons often garrison
such communications sites against guerrilla attacks.
Low and Medium High

Slope Mountains Mountains
Observations
Grade On foot Mounted On foot Mounted
Mounted troops
Descent 4.0 Km/hr 8.0 Km/hr 4.0 Km/hr 7.0 Km/hr travel walk speed
0% to 4% Ascent 4.0 Km/hr 8.0 Km/hr 3.7 Km/hr 7.0 Km/hr
Descent 4.0 Km/hr 8.0 Km/hr 4.0 Km/hr 7.0 Km/hr
5% to 9% 3.0 Km/hr 6.5 Km/hr
Ascent 3.7 Km/hr 7.3 Km/hr
Figure 2.
Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 13, 271. Conditions for the march: day, good weather
conditions, on a trail or road in good condition, firm ground, troops and pack animals trained and acclimatized.
Combat at Altitude
There are two primary scenarios for combat at altitude. First, two
states dispute the boundary between their countries and maintain forces
supporting a rough line of demarcation along the disputed zone (Kashmir
and Siachen Glacier between India and Pakistan, and the Kameng
Frontier Division between India and China). In this scenario, opposing
forces hold linear defenses along the line of demarcation, regardless of
altitude, and conduct a fairly positional fight.
Second, a light infantry force of guerrillas, smugglers, bandits, or
forces from a neighboring state transverses the mountainous region to
establish base camps in the mountains from which they patrol, launch
raids, or maintain smuggling routes. This has been the pattern for a
number of high-altitude disputes such as the Mau Mau uprising, Soviet-
Afghan war, Sendero Luminoso in Peru, Russo-Chechen wars, and
Colombian efforts against the FARC and ELN. In this scenario, the fighting
does not automatically gravitate to a border zone, but usually stays below
the tree line.
At altitude, the first enemy is the environment. The second enemy
is the human foe. At altitude, high ground is not always key terrain.
Frequently, key terrain is related to mobility—passes, main supply
routes, road heads, and intermittent staging posts. Light infantry and
artillery are the primary combat forces.
Offensive actions in the mountains include infiltration, ambush, raids,
patrolling, shelling attacks, limited air assault, and limited offensives.
Pursuit is seldom possible. Envelopment is the most common maneuver
and the frontal attack is the least desired option. Defensive actions
include counter-infiltration, ambush, patrolling, and positional defense.
Relief in place is routine small-unit action.
Offensive actions should focus on interdicting logistics by blocking
passes, denying use of supply and transit routes, capturing base
camps and intermittent staging posts, and destroying transport.11 Force
oriented offensive actions, such as interdicting patrols or raiding artillery
positions, make great headlines and can boost morale, but they seldom
have the long-term effect as actions against logistics. Offensive actions
are small-unit actions, since only small units can be supported at altitude,
and frequently the terrain is so restricted that too many soldiers would
hamper the effort. Movement is by small groups moving at a walk
to avoid sweating because sweat freezes quickly leading to frostbite.
Objectives are close at hand so the attackers will not be exhausted
before they arrive and will not be caught in the open by rapidly changing
weather. Assembly areas may be nonexistent and the attackers will
have to move directly from forward positions. The attack may have to
go in waves if suppressive fire is inadequate or the enemy is conducting

a reverse-slope defense. The offensive plan must be clear, as most
mountain maps are problematic. Maneuver is dictated by terrain and the
reserve is committed early since movement is slow and mutual support
is very difficult to achieve. Maneuver is slow and limited in distance.
A maneuver force can range from one or two men to a full battalion if
weather and the enemy situation permits.
Defending at altitude is difficult because of limited troops and
material. When defending along a border, a battalion holds an extended
frontage (7,000 to 8,000 yards) while a company holds 1,500 yards, so
there is little depth, or large gaps, in the defense.12 Further, the complete
battalion is seldom on line simultaneously. Often, a platoon holds a
company position since the rest of the company is being held in reserve
at lower elevations where the deterioration of the body is not as rapid.
The platoon is rotated every 10 to 14 days. The entire company must
still be rotated to lower elevations to recoup every 3 to 4 months. This
means that the long, linear defense is actually a string of strong points
built around a machine gun. Reverse slope defense, with forward slope
observation posts is preferred, since the defensive positions often lack
overhead cover and are susceptible to artillery airburst.
A great deal of daily effort is required to keep snow from completely
filling the defensive positions and hiding the trails. Permanent shelter,
such as portable fiberglass huts, are essential at the defensive positions.13
Fortifying defensive positions is difficult since this usually requires the
delivery of heavy materials such as cement, sand, water, and roofing
timbers. Sensors are a welcome addition to the defense in those areas
where they will not be rapidly covered by snow. Defensive positions
should be designed and stocked to hold out independently for days
since relief in the mountains is problematic due to weather. Conversely,
when the enemy is a guerrilla force, the defensive position is a perimeter
defense from which patrols, ambushes, and raids are launched.
Mountain patrolling is a common feature of the offense and defense.
Small patrols are at risk, so platoon-sized patrols are common. Single
patrols are useless, so multiple patrols are normal. Local guides or scouts
are an essential part of each patrol. Detailed planning is an essential part
of the patrol plan and includes a reaction force or reserve. The meeting
battle is normal combat at altitude resulting from probing actions by
opposing patrols.
Raids are a common offensive and defensive tactic. They are
designed to seize a point, exploit success, and then withdraw. Raids
are a temporary measure to capture personnel and equipment, destroy
installations, bait traps to draw enemy reaction, and attack morale. Since
there is no intention of holding the objective for a length of time, the
logistics burden is less onerous than a deliberate attack. Successful
mountain raids normally incorporate an assault force, a fire support
group, and a security element.14
Fire Support at Altitude

Mountains restrict effective bombing and strafing by jet aircraft. It is
difficult for them to pick out targets that are camouflaged or concealed
by natural cover. Weather, deep shadows, and the environment also
restrict pilots’ vision. There are few approach routes and most of those
are along valleys, which are covered by air defense and infantry forces
using massed fire. Climate and terrain restrict jet aircraft from diving
freely or flying low enough to engage targets effectively. Still, camouflage
discipline, controlled movement, and layered air defense are essential to
prevent savaging by high-performance aircraft.15 Helicopter gunships
are more of a danger to ground forces, but eventually altitude limits
their effectiveness. Lightweight helicopters can serve effectively as
artillery spotters. All aviation is subject to the vagaries of weather at high
elevation, which is powerful, constantly changing, and often shuts down
flying. Dense fog, high winds, and blizzards are common and whiteouts
are a constant threat to pilots.
Artillery remains the round-the-clock fire support system. However,
artillery is often constrained during high-altitude combat. Sharp bends,
high gradients, and the general condition of mountain roads restrict
the movement of artillery, towed guns in particular. There are a limited
number of gun positions, so artillery batteries are seldom deployed
intact. One- and two-gun or rocket launcher positions are common.
Consequently, the number of alternate firing positions is also restricted
and these positions tend to become permanent. Guns should be moved
at night for protection against enemy aircraft and artillery. However,
night movement of guns in mountainous terrain is risky and accident-
prone. Artillery positions should be constructed so that gun crews
can defend them against ground attack. Firing positions should be on
reverse slopes and as close to the crest as possible—considering crest
clearance and flash-cover. Individual guns should be sited in terrain
folds and other places where they are naturally concealed.16 Artillery
plays a major role in logistics interdiction, counterbattery and shelling
front-line units. Artillery can create havoc with a forward defense by
targeting living accommodations and using airbursts against troops in
the open.17 Mortars are frequently more effective than guns or howitzers.
They are easier to shift around, can better engage reverse slopes and
can be moved closer to the forward posts.
Transport frequently determines the location of artillery and mortars

and the supporting range of artillery. Artillery cannot be readily moved
where there are not roads. Artillery firing points are usually located
where ammunition can be delivered—in valleys, villages, and near road
heads.
Logistics Support
High-altitude logistics are key since the terrain and unique
environment hamper delivery to the forward troops. Logistics always
drives the battle, but in high-altitude combat, this is especially so.
Without good highways or railroads, dump sites cannot be readily
moved, it takes an inordinate amount of time to shift troops from one
sector to another, and logistics demands are considerably higher than
in other types of light infantry combat. Trucks, helicopters, mechanical
mules, and snowmobiles are key to mountain logistics, but above 13,000
feet, the logistics effort shifts to the backs of mules and porters. Naturally,
this is the point where the logistics delivery system snarls since porters
and mules have distinct limitations and there are never enough of them.
Trucks are important to logistics support and gasoline-powered
trucks are clearly preferred over diesel. As the truck ascends the
mountain, the amount of oxygen available is reduced and the engine
efficiency drops off. Cross-country and climbing capability decline as
fuel usage soars. Diesel engines may need to be fitted with turbochargers
and gasoline engines may need their carburetors adjusted. Figure 3
shows the average increase in fuel consumption at altitude.
Helicopter-based logistics are the preferred mode in mountain
warfare, but the mountains are not the optimum helicopter environment.
Air density decreases with altitude and mountain winds and updrafts are
unpredictable and dangerous. Proper landing zones are difficult to find
and, if close to the enemy, probably under enemy mortar and small-arms
coverage. Helicopters must follow the terrain features of the mountains
Light Vehicles Trucks 3 to 5 Tons

(Gasoline) (Diesel)
Type of Slope Average Load Loaded Unloaded
Observations
Low 3 to 5% 16 25 20
Good engine
Mountains performance
6 to 8% 17 30 25
Medium Up to
3000
3 to 5% 17 30 25
Mountains meters 6 to 8% 18 32 27 With good roads
3000 to 3 to 5% 18 32 27
High 4000 Head winds increase
Mountains meters 6 to 8% 20 35 30 consumption by 10%
Above 3 to 5% 20 35 30
4000
meters 6 to 8% 25 38 33
Figure 3.
Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 16, 281.
adding predictability to their approaches and increasing the risk to
the crew. Fog, sudden storms, icing, and variable winds can quickly
shut down helicopter support. Mountain terrain interferes with air-to-
ground communications and with air-to-air communications. Planning for
helicopter support in the mountains requires detailed planning, first-rate
liaison, and a habitual association between the helicopter and ground
unit encompassing training and social events. Flying in the mountains
is so different that the armies of India, Pakistan, Columbia, Argentina,
and Switzerland have special mountain flight courses for their helicopter
crews.
A Step Back in Time

High mountains are counter-technology. Mules are a good option for
high-altitude logistics. They can use very narrow trails, can carry more
than a human porter, and tire less over long distance. American mules
can carry up to 20 percent of their body weight (150-300 pounds) for
15 to 20 miles per day in mountains.18 Smaller mules in other locales
will carry less. The maximum carrying weight for an Argentine mule
is between 200 and 250 pounds. However, this is for low- and medium-
altitude mountains. At high altitude, the maximum carrying weight drops
below 200 pounds. Organized mule cargo units, rather than ad hoc
teams led by local teamsters, are the preferred option, but local mules
are always preferred over deployed mules.
Mules were part of the U.S. Army during World War II in Burma and
Italy and were a critical element of the Mujahideen supply effort in the
Soviet-Afghan war. They remain part of the force structure of many
contemporary forces with high-altitude mountain troops. Other armies
contract mule transport through local teamsters. Yet mules have their
limitations. If the snow is too deep, they simply refuse to move.
Rations 1,620 kilos Assault & field rations

Ammunition 1,021 kilos One basic load-circumstances may require carrying more
Water 2,262 kilos 2,565 liters
(drinking and cooking)
Total weight 4,903 kilos Not counting food, water, ammo, and packs carried by soldiers
(for company)
Mules 61 mules Small mules haul 80 kilos; Big mules up to 150 kilos
(to haul weight)
Mules 20 mules Machine guns and mortars

(to haul crew-served weapons)
Mules 5,620 kilos of fodder, 4,060 kilos of grain, 348 kilos of salt,
(to haul fodder, grain, salt and 151 mules
water for mules) and 18,416 kilos of water
Figure 4.
Source: Major Valero, Army of Argentina training exercise material.
American mules require 10 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay

per day, which also becomes part of the logistics load.19 The smaller
mules of Argentina require eight pounds of grain and eight pounds of hay
per day. Mules consume 25 to 30 liters of water a day and up to 50 liters
in desert country. They also require a daily ounce of salt. Like humans,
mules require time to acclimate to altitude. Muleteers and mules require
about a month’s training to get them ready to work above 3,000 meters.
Like humans, mules tire easily above 4,000 meters and need to be rested
frequently. Mules also have to be trained not to fear the noise of firearms
and explosives so that they do not run off during a march.20
Mules are subject to colic, heat exhaustion, injuries, and wounds. Most
injuries and wounds result from poorly adjusted saddles, pack frames and
harnesses. Stones, rocks, and debris on the trail can also wound a mule’s
hoof. Local mules are more immune to disease at altitude than humans
and all mules have a keen sense of self-preservation that keeps them
alive in mountain storms.21 Mules require a great deal of daily care and
training. Muleteers, farriers, blacksmiths, and large animal veterinarians,
who have been absent from many armies for decades, are essential for
mule-borne logistics. Mules need new shoes every 30 days and there
are special mule shoes for snow and ice. Figure 4 shows the supply
and transport estimate for a 171-man light infantry company planning a
mountain march, attack and defense lasting for a total of 6 days. Since
much of the material will be kept in dumps and moved in stages, the
commander has managed to keep his transport requirements in hand.
Porters should be hired from the local populace since they are
acclimated to the elevation and are accustomed to moving around
the mountains safely. Locals used to carrying loads have developed
endurance and are accustomed to breathing thin air. Although a porter
cannot carry as much as a mule, they can move in places where mules
cannot. However, porters will probably be reluctant to work too far away
from their homes and villages. There is always a security consideration
when using local porters. Figure 5 shows porter-carrying capabilities.
During the Peru-Ecuador border conflict for the Condor Cordillera
in 1994, the Peruvian army relied on porters exclusively for resupply.
Low and Medium High

Personnel Mountains Mountains
Up to 3000 meters 3000 to 4000 meters Above 4000 meters
Porter 20 Kg 20 Kg 15 Kg or less
Man on foot Combat Soldier 15 Kg 10 to 12 Kg 8 to 12 Kg or less
Man with skis Porter 20 Kg 12 to 15 Kg 12 Kg or less
Combat Soldier 12 Kg 12 Kg 10 Kg or less
Figure 5.
Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 17.
Although the fight was in medium-altitude mountains, not over 2500
meters, the forward logistics support was restricted to porters because
the steep mountains were covered with thick jungle, had few trails, and
the Peruvian army lacked trained mules and muleteers. The Peruvian
army moved its supplies from one small village to the next, using local
villagers as porters to carry the supplies eventually to the fighting up on
the Condor Cordillera.
Front-line combatants need daily supplies of ammunition, food,
water, and heat for survival. Figure 6 shows daily consumption rates of
water and wood fuel.
In the mountains, a battalion task orce tries to carry and stockpile
enough supplies to operate for 1 to 2 weeks. This requires expending
time and energy to establish supply dumps along the main supply route.
Naturally, the shorter the supply route, the easier it is to protect. If roads,
tracks, and trails are under enemy control, the unit might be restricted to
helicopter supply and its inherent problems in the mountains. Logistics
support at higher altitudes during winter may become impossible
causing opposing forces to withdraw.
Medical evacuation at altitude is frequently difficult. Weather or
weight limitations may prevent a helicopter from flying to a patient.
Often, patients must be carried on stretchers to lower elevations where
the helicopters can reach. Soviet experience in the mountains of
Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might be involved in carrying
one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult and the stretcher party has to
provide its own security as well.22 Patients cannot be effectively treated
at altitude, but have to be evacuated to lower altitudes to survive.23
The Eternal Mountains

Mountain terrain is difficult, movement is slow and the hazards to
health and physical well being are significant and constant. Combat at
high altitude is a historical constant and a contemporary fact. It cannot
always be avoided. Training for mountain combat is not simply light
infantry training. Special training and acclimatization is necessary.
Water Wood
Man Animal Cooking Heating
Low and Drinking Cooking Summer Winter Uncovered Tent/shelter Open
Medium 1.5 to 2 5 15 10 1 kg 1 kg 1 kg
Mountains Liters Liters Liters Liters per man per man per man
High 2 to 2.5 8 15 10 1 kg Every Every

Mountains Liters Liters Liters Liters per man 6 hours 2 hours
for fire
Figure 6.
Source: Conducción de la Brigada de Montána, Annex 18.
Leadership is particularly important in mountain combat. The harsh

living conditions, physical deterioration, and psychological depression
inherent in mountain combat require skilled leaders. Armies with
regimental systems and years-long association find it easier to cope with
the leadership challenges of mountain combat. Combat is primarily
small unit, placing a great deal of responsibility on platoon and squad
leaders.
Fire support is difficult. Artillery firing tables are inaccurate
and artillery is hard to move on mountain roads. Transporting guns
by helicopter is recommended where possible. Moving guns and
ammunition takes an unusual amount of time. Helicopter gunships
provide excellent support at lower altitudes. Mortars are excellent for
hitting reverse slope positions, but have limited range.
Logistics are a primary concern in mountain combat with transport
to altitude requiring special effort. Sustained combat requires an
inordinate logistics effort. Small-unit actions, where units do not remain
for extended periods of time, do not impose the same logistics burden.
Although the U.S. Army has not fought at truly high altitude, this may
not always be the case. High mountains occupy much of the world’s
surface and they are not immune to the world’s conflicts. Other nations
have successfully fought at altitudes above 10,000 feet. Should the U.S.
Army find itself committed at these altitudes, the experiences of other
nations are invaluable. Preparation for such an eventuality should begin
well before crisis dictates deployment.
________________________________________
1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, ed. and trans. by Michael Howard and Peter Paret
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989), 432. The authors thank mountain
warriors Lieutenant Colonel (LTC) German Giraldo, Army of Colombia; LTC Foto Duro,
Albanian Army; Major (MAJ) Alejandro Valero, Army of Argentina, MAJ Akbar Khan,
Army of Pakistan; and LTC Tejbir Singh, Army of India, for their input, suggestions,
critique, and guidance. The authors retain responsibility for the accuracy and ideas
in the article.
2. The Houghton-Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World
(Boston, MA: Houghton-Mifflin Company, 1997), 48, 164, 165, and 450.
3. Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue (Boston, MA: Appalachian
Mountain Club, 1980), 620.
4. Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi, Pakistan: Amer-
ican Commercial PVT Ltd., 1991), 15-16 and 110-11.
5. Lester W. Grau and William A. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High-Altitude
Combat,” U.S. Army Medical Department Journal, to be published April 2002.
6. Aleksey Svetlanov, “Osobennosti razvedki v gorakh” (Peculiarities of Mountain
Reconnaissance), Voyennye znaniya (Military Bannerr) (June 2000), 13.
7. Salman Beg Punjab, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army Journal
(Spring 1994), 5.
8. Setnicka, 623.
9. Ali, 16-17; Punjab, 5-6.
10. Punjab, 7.
11. Ibid., 8-9.
12. Iftikhar ur Rahman, “Defensive Battle in Mountains,” Pakistan Army Journal (Sep-
tember 1984), 31.
13. Punjab, 4.
14. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Quantico, VA: U.S. Marine Corps Study: DM:
980701, 1998), 69-103 and 211-25.
15. Sikandar Hameed, “Local Defence of Gun Area in Mountainous Terrain,” Pakistan
Army Journal (March 1983), 35-41.
16. Ibid.
17. Punjab, 10.
18. U.S. Army Field Manual 31-27, Pack Animals in Support of Army Special Oper-
ations Forces (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, February 2000),
1-2.
19. Ibid., 2-14.
20. Reglamento Funcional Público (Public Functional Regulation) 24-02, Reglamento
Ganado de Servicio (Service Livestock Regulation) (Buenos Aires, Argentina, 1994),
36.
21. Ibid, Annex 18.
22. Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent) (Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 1994), 186.
23. Grau and Jorgensen.
________________________________________
At the time of original publication, Lieutenant Colonel Herán Vázquez

was the Argentine Army’s liaison office to the US Army Combined Arms
Center and consulting editor for the Hispano-American edition of Military
Review, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. He is a graduate of the Argentine Army
War College. He has served in a variety of infantry and mountain units
in Argentina. He served as S3 of a Motorized Light Infantry Battalion in
the Patagonia Desert; S3 of the Mountain School Battalion; two tours as a
member of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus with the Joint
Operations Center, Operations Department, Headquarters Peacekeeping
Force; operations officer for Argentine Task Force 10 “Chipre”; and tactics
and MDMP instructor at the Argentine Army War School. He is a qualified
mountain troop leader, commando and paratrooper.
The Need for Specialized Training 15
Mountain Warfare --
The Need for
Specialized Training
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army
This article first appeared in the September-October 2004 edition of Military Review
M ountain Warfare is specialized combat with unique characteristics.

Military leaders and soldiers need training and experience to
understand the peculiarities of mountainous environments and how they
affect combat. Armies that train for mountain combat perform much
better than those that do not.
During World War II, the German Army raised an entire corps of
elite mountain troops called gebirgs jaeger (mountain troops). Although
not all of these troops were used in the mountains, they demonstrated
superior abilities in almost all theaters in which they were used. The
German Fifth Mountain Division marched more than 248 miles, crossed
mountain passes above 6,500 feet, and secured well-entrenched
defenses on the Mestksas Line.1 Other gebirgs jaeger captured most of
the Caucasus mountain region in the summer of 1942.
The US Army 10th Mountain Division, trained in the mountains of
Colorado during World War II, captured Riva Ridge in northern Italy. US
Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations, cites this action as
clearly demonstrating the value of superior skills in mountain warfare.2
The importance of preparing leaders and soldiers for high-altitude
combat cannot be overemphasized.
The Pakistan Army has been in Kashmir for more than 50 years and
has a great deal of experience in fighting in mountainous, glaciated
terrain. While the US Army has quality training institutions for mountain
warfare, it does not have many troops with extensive, current mountain-
combat experience. A comparison of the training techniques of US and
Pakistan armies provides insight into preparing for mountain combat.
Training Prerequisites for Mountain Warfare
Physical fitness is the first prerequisite of mountain-warfare training.
The effects of cold weather and unforgiving terrain require a high level of
physical fitness for long-distance climbing and walking, and the physical
fitness required for mountainous terrain must be developed at high
altitude. But being physically fit does not necessarily mean soldiers will
be able to perform adequately at high elevations. US soldiers selected
to attend the mountain-warfare school in Kakul, Pakistan, required
additional climbing time to attain the desired level of physical fitness.
The body must adjust to the thin mountain air, and climbing muscles
must be developed.3
Mountainous terrain can be an ally or a dangerous adversary.
In Kashmir each year, thousands of troops are introduced to the
mountainous environment to help them understand and appreciate it. A
marked difference exists in the performance of units that have conducted
vigorous acclimatization training and those that have not. Weather and
terrain-related casualties are a big indicator. During initial training in
Colorado during the early 1940s, the US 10th Mountain Division suffered
more casualties from weather-related injuries than from actual mountain
combat in Italy.4
Field Manual 3-97.6 defines high mountains as those above 3,000
feet; however, it does not fully explain the high-altitude environment.
Despite the fact the Pakistan Army has been fighting in Kashmir for a
long time, operations at higher altitudes (18,000 to 22,000 feet) were not
fully understood before the Siachen conflict between India and Pakistan
in 1984.5 During the conflict, frostbite, sunburn, and other high-altitude
sicknesses caused large numbers of casualties. Such incidences are
now rare, however, because troops and commanders are trained to take
precautionary measures.
In Kashmir, stone or wooden bunkers, which double as living
accommodations and fighting bunkers, are found at posts below 13,000
feet, but at high altitudes, stone structures are not practical. Cement
will not bind, and the underlying glacier is always moving. Instead,
prefabricated, synthetic domes (igloos) are used.6 The domes are easy
to carry and assemble even at 18,000 feet and above. They can be
retrieved from even large amounts of snow and set up again quickly.
Soldiers must also be trained to wear proper clothing. Loose-fitting
layers and insulated and polypropylene clothing that does not allow
perspiration to accumulate close to the body are best. Developing
frostbite from touching metal equipment with one’s bare hands is
possible when temperatures drop to minus 22 degrees Fahrenheit.
Pressurized sleeping bags help stabilize soldiers suffering from altitude-
related sicknesses.7
Basic mountaineering and high-altitude skills are vital for soldiers
to develop confidence and survive in mountainous environments and
essential in combat. As mountain height increases, so does the required
skill level. At altitudes below 13,000 feet, it might be enough for soldiers
to understand climbing techniques, navigation, route selection, the use

of ropes, and procedures to avoid landslides and snow avalanches, but
at high altitudes, soldiers must learn more complex techniques, such as
those required for mountain expeditions.8
Because it is not always possible to transport material by helicopter,
troops are often required to carry awkward loads, including kerosene
oilcans, rations, and building materials for bunkers. The Soviets learned
this lesson while fighting in difficult terrain in Afghanistan.9
At high altitudes, where it is difficult to keep weapons functioning,
covering and protecting weapons and equipment against snow and ice
is a necessity. Batteries often will not perform optimally in the cold, and
complicated mechanisms, such as those in surface-to-air missiles, can
easily malfunction. Also, artillery shells sometimes behave erratically
because of thin air and gusting winds.10
Surviving and operating in mountainous terrain requires more
energy than usual. A soldier who needs 3,000 to 4,000 calories under
normal circumstances will require 6,000 or more calories in the
mountains. To complicate the situation, high altitude adversely affects a
person’s appetite. Soldiers tend to eat and drink less in high altitudes,
which reduces morale and fighting capabilities and makes them more
susceptible to mountain-related illnesses.11 US soldiers conducting
mountain-warfare training at Abbotabad, Pakistan, which is at 4,000
feet, lost approximately 25 pounds during a 3-week training period.12
Commanders must ensure soldiers consume proper diets and are well-
hydrated.
Physiological and psychological effects become more pronounced
at altitudes above 8,000 feet. Soldiers must take preventive measures
and be trained to detect signs of illness in colleagues. Common
symptoms include severe, persistent headaches; coughing; difficulty
in breathing; and aloofness. Other symptoms might include swelling
around the eyelids, incoherent speech, intolerance, and even outright
aggressiveness.13
Many problems, including altitude sickness, can occur during the
initial stages of a soldier’s arrival at high altitude. The biggest killer,
cerebral or pulmonary edema, is difficult to detect, but often develops if
soldiers stay too long at high altitude.14
The normal practice in glaciated areas is to not keep soldiers above
19,000 feet for more than three to four weeks before returning them to
lower elevations. If soldiers experience any signs of altitude illnesses,
commanders must evacuate them promptly. For most mountain
illnesses, evacuation to below at least 3,000 feet is the first requirement
for saving a person’s life.15 Delaying evacuation might not only cost
the soldier’s life, but imperil the lives of the soldiers who might have
to conduct evacuation procedures during bad weather.
Replacements being sent to high-altitude environments must
have operated at heights similar to those to which they are being sent
for at least 10 to 15 days. If not, they could quickly become casualties
themselves. Well-trained, acclimatized troops must be available to
replace those at higher altitudes.
High-altitude environments can take heavy physical and mental tolls
on soldiers. While in the Caucasus, the Germans learned that troops
wore down much faster in mountains despite the fact they were elite
troops, picked for their mental abilities and physical prowess. Operations
in such environments involve extreme physical exertion.16 Living
conditions in mountainous terrain can be difficult. At times all movement
is stopped, soldiers do not receive mail, and replacements might not
arrive on time. These factors can lead to depression and boredom
and a sharp decrease in fighting spirit. Simple tasks such as manning
weapons, sentry duty, and patrolling require determination.
Offensive actions in mountainous terrain are difficult and costly. Not
only must soldiers fight the enemy, they must also brave the elements
of harsh terrain, which are equally formidable. These conditions call for
strong leadership by junior leaders, who must physically lead and be
mentally tough.
Leadership. Mountainous and high-altitude environments are
extremely demanding and require a high level of leadership at the
small-unit level as well as at higher levels. Leaders must understand
the constraints placed on their soldiers’ performances and should
include terrain and weather in planning and executing actions to avoid
miscalculating the timeframe, logistic requirements, and force capability.
Mountain combat is decentralized and often takes place at the
platoon or squad level. The quality of junior leadership is decisive. The
Russians observed in Afghanistan that even a small unit, maneuvering
boldly, could decide the outcome of a battle.17
A hallmark of German alpine troops during World Wars I and II was
the quality of their leadership. German Field Marshal Erwin Rommel,
who began his career in a German mountain regiment during World
War I, relentlessly advanced his small detachment in difficult terrain
capturing one hilltop after another.
Mountainous environments demand that junior leaders set the
example of physical fitness and endurance. During the Pakistan-India
conflict at Kargill in northern Kashmir in 1998, Captain Sher Khan was
posthumously awarded the “Nishan-E-Haider,” Pakistan’s highest military
award, for conducting daring raids with a handful of men against enemy
patrols and convoys. His last action included a successful counterattack
to recapture a post against overwhelming odds. Such leadership
inspires subordinates and raises the morale of the entire unit.

At high altitudes, small-unit leaders must be trained to recognize
and address physical and psychological fatigue in their soldiers,
including loneliness, depression, and violent mood swings. The
relationship between officers and troops is more intimate than under
normal circumstances, so leaders should be able to identify signs of
deterioration in soldiers before they become pronounced.
Decisions at higher levels influence the conduct of tactical actions.
The German Army emphasized the importance of meticulous planning
and preparation even for small-scale operations.18
Field Manual 3-97.6 emphasizes realistic timetables based on
reconnaissance and the commander’s practical knowledge of the
mountain battlefield.19 Planners must understand that mountainous ter-
rain adversely affects time and space calculations— an important lesson
learned during the US Marine Corps (USMC) exercise Alpine Warrior at
Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, in 1986.20
Cost-effective mountain combat requires skilled and well-trained
troops. Soldiers cannot be sent into a fight at high altitude at the last
moment. Doing so could invite disaster. One example of such an action
is the employment of the 7th Indian Brigade against the Chinese in the
1962 Himalayan conflict.21 The brigade had not been stationed in the
mountains previously, and when things began going badly, the brigade
was moved from the plains straight into mountain combat. The soldiers,
who had not been acclimatized or equipped to fight in the mountains,
suffered heavy casualties because of frostbite, edema, and other high-
altitude-induced illnesses.
Communications. Terrain and unpredictable weather con-
ditions affect communications at high altitudes. Satellite communications
and the use of command and control (C2) aircraft can offset some terrain
limitations and reduce reliance on bulky radio equipment. Crews
responsible for installing and maintaining retransmission stations— often
situated on the highest peaks to provide adequate range and coverage—
must be well trained in mountain-survival techniques. Also, these isolated
stations are targets for guerrilla bands, as the Soviets discovered when
they tried to protect similar sites in Afghanistan.22
Fire support. Mountainous terrain significantly influences artil-
lery fire support. Targets are located on peaks, in ravines, and on
reverse slopes; no continuous front exists; and weather conditions are
unpredictable. Undulating terrain and intervening crests require a large
number of observers located on dominating heights to cover the entire
area of operations. Gun positions that are ideal for range and coverage
might not be suitable because of intervening features and masking fire.
At other times a location might be tactically sound but will be an area
prone to avalanches or flash floods. Once guns are deployed, major
engineering and logistical efforts might be necessary to shift them to
alternate locations in a timely fashion.
Air burst and variable time fuzes are more effective than point-
detonating artillery rounds. Howitzers and mortars are more effective
because of their ability to engage targets on reverse slopes. The
Taliban used mortars to hit US troops successfully during operations in
Afghanistan.23
Maneuver. Mountainous terrain is ideally suited for the defense.
During World War II, some of the heaviest casualties in the Italian Theater
occurred during an attempt to overcome German defenses at Mount
Casino. In Afghanistan, the Russians attacked the strategic Panjshir
Valley repeatedly but were unable to clear it despite their advantage
in firepower and mobility.24 The line of control in Kashmir in 2003 was
not much different from the cease-fire line of the India-Pakistan war in
1949.25 Both Indian and Pakistan forces found that an assault on well-
defended positions was extremely costly. Defense requires the control of
dominating heights, passes, and lines of communication by strong-points.
An integrated defense is not possible in cut up, mountainous terrain.
During training, commanders need to understand the techniques of
defense with all-around protection and emplacement of direct fighting
weapons. Field Manual 3-97.6 highlights that reserves must be closer
to important defense locations because reaction times in mountainous
terrains are longer than usual, which could require several small rather
than one large centralized reserve.26
Mountainous terrain offers opportunities for infiltration, requiring
defenders to be aggressive at all times. Aggressive patrolling enhances
security and keeps soldiers active and sharp. In Kashmir this helped
prevent a bunker mentality. Although sensors provide some protection,
mountainous terrain is too compartmentalized for complete electronic
surveillance. Combat service support (CSS) elements must provide
their own protection and must train in patrolling and perimeter defense
while developing a mindset focused on constant vigilance.
Offensive operations require meticulous planning and preparation
because of the inherent strength mountainous terrain provides to
the defender. Training plays a vital role in ensuring an edge for the
attackers. Since the defender has an advantage, successful attacks
should isolate the defender and keep him under constant pressure.
The Soviets laid great emphasis on junior leaders and company-level
mountain operations, advocating envelopment by smaller, autonomous
groups.
During Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan, US forces used more
decentralized combat than on normal terrain. Junior leaders’ initiative
and skill is vital to the mission’s success, especially in security and

reconnaissance missions. Mountainous terrain and bad weather provide
opportunities for small forces to concentrate and achieve surprise.
Russian and Afghan government forces suffered heavily when they
neglected this aspect of the battlefield environment.27
The Soviets used helicopters in Afghanistan to airlift troops and
supplies into battle.28 Helicopter gunships effectively supported ground
operations until the Mujahideen obtained Stinger missiles, which tilted
the situation in their favor.
US forces also rely on helicopters for transportation and movement in
the mountains, requiring aviation planners to be involved in the planning
process early. With beyond-line-of-sight and precision-guided munitions,
aviation and air assets have neutralized many inherent problems in
mountain warfare, but they have not eliminated the need for specialized
training. Because mountain combat tends to be decentralized, control of
supporting fire is more difficult. Tight control of jet aircraft and helicopter
gunships is necessary to avoid fratricide.
Logistics. Logistics support in the mountains is difficult and
time-consuming. In Kashmir, a variety of transport is used for logistical
support, road transport being the most reliable and cost-effective. At
higher altitudes where tracks cannot be maintained because of snow and
difficult terrain, mules are a preferred means of transport.29 At altitudes
where even mules cannot go, porters can. Porters are local people
capable of carrying heavy loads across difficult terrain.
In the Caucasus Campaign, the German army used sleds, mules, and
horses in addition to trucks.30 Recently, despite technological advances,
the US Army had to use horses and mules in Afghanistan. Helicopters
are a quick, versatile means of transportation, but at higher altitudes their
lift capability is severely limited. The French Alouette helicopter can
fly higher than U.S helicopters can, but even it can deliver only about
180 pounds above 20,000 feet. Because helicopters cannot be used in
adverse weather, a mixture of resources is necessary to ensure reliability
and flexibility.31
The road network in the mountains is generally a logistician’s night-
mare. Main supply routes are limited and often do not support vehicles
that require large turning radii. Many roads do not permit two-way traffic.
While tactical plans take into account main roads, tactical
engagements do not usually occur close to roadheads. At Siachen, the
Pakistan Army built roads near forward defenses, but the real challenge
was in transporting supplies across the last few miles from roadheads to
forward posts.
The Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) analysis of the
operation in Afghanistan recognized the need to have logistics as far
forward as possible: “It might require additional staff work from the
logisticians to deploy the logistics to the work area (like rations to the
platoons, mortar rounds to the mortars), but the advantage is reduced
expenditure of energy for those on the ground.”32
Logistics estimates and loads must be customized for the
mountainous environment. For example, using mules requires loads
be broken up according to their carrying capacity. Also, overages must
be built into supply estimates because there is always a need for a
large reserve of items that wear out quickly, such as boots, jackets, and
gloves. If soldiers use improper or worn clothing for even a short time,
the chance of developing altitude and cold-related sicknesses increases
significantly. In addition, combat casualty evacuation involves many
challenges. Air evacuation remains the preferred method, but because
of the dispersed nature of troops, expert medical help might not be
available quickly. Therefore, self-aid, buddy help, and the availability of
more combat life savers in the unit is important.33
Canadian small-unit support vehicles, specially designed for
restrictive terrain, were particularly useful for logistics support at high
altitude in Afghanistan, whereas the bulky ground-held laser designating
system was not. Soldiers’ personal loads of more than 50 pounds were
too heavy at high altitudes. Equipment must be upgraded for future
mountain warfare.34
Training for Mountain Warfare

Recent operations by US and other Allied forces confirm the need for
specialized mountain-warfare training. CALL’s analysis recognizes that
soldiers with mountain experience exhibit exceptional morale, physical
stamina, and technical competence in decisive combat operations. The
analysis also recognizes that coalition forces specially trained in moun-
tainous environments are better trained overall.35
Acclimatization training. Mountain troops should be stationed at
high altitudes to maintain a high standard of physical fitness and
acclimatization. Before World War I, German alpine troops were
stationed in the Bavarian Alps.36 In Transcaucasia at 6,500 feet, Soviet
troops occupied ideal terrain to train soldiers.37 Pakistan and India
maintain a large number of troops on the line of control in Kashmir. This
automatically provides ample opportunities for ac-climatization. The US
10th Mountain Division, however, is stationed at Fort Drum, New York,
which is not in high mountains.
Although troops need to be acclimatized for any kind of mountainous
terrain, the duration depends on the altitude at which the unit must
operate. Acclimatization for mountains below 13,000 feet takes three to
four weeks. Pakistan troops train by bivouacking at high altitudes and
conducting routine administrative activities and route marches. Each

week they conduct hill climbing at increasingly higher altitudes to
increase their ability to function. The rigorous training also helps identify
soldiers who have medical problems.
Acclimatization for higher altitudes is rigid, and the length of training
cannot be shortened without serious consequences. Although the
pattern of training remains the same, troops are trained at an altitude of
between 8,000 and 10,000 feet for two weeks, followed by one month’s
training at 11,000 feet. The troops conduct route marches, fire weapons,
climb rocks, and cross crevasses. They then move in stages from 13,000
feet to forward posts at heights up to 21,000 feet. The basic principle
is to bivouac one night for about every 3,000-foot increase in altitude.
Troops returning from leave must repeat the process.
Because the US 10th Mountain Division is not stationed in a high-
altitude environment and its soldiers are not acclimatized, deployment
to high mountains would require an additional two to three weeks of
acclimatization. This also applies to units that have conducted mountain-
warfare training but are not currently stationed at high altitudes. Physical
conditioning is essential to mountain combat in Afghanistan.38
Leadership training. Leadership training is extremely important for
mountain warfare. During World War II, German alpine troops displayed
strong leadership traits based on their culture of auftragstaktik.39 In the
Pakistan Army, mountain training is considered part of overall training.
The Soviet Army recognized the critical importance of junior-leader
initiative during its experiences in Afghanistan.40 The US Army focuses
on leadership, but it does not have a package designed specifically for
training at different levels of leadership in mountainous environments.
Mountain leadership training should be based on the unique
characteristics and demands placed on leaders.
Junior leader training requires initiative, personnel management,
and mental toughness. In the Pakistan Army, most of these skills are
learned through experience and exposure to tough environments.
During mountain-combat deployment, junior-leaders often conduct
patrols, lead expeditions, and direct command posts, despite sometimes
having to endure heavy artillery shelling and adverse living and weather
conditions. The US Army Mountain Warfare School emphasizes gaining
mountaineering skills rather than training combat leaders. The US
Marine Corps Mountain Warfare Center has a mountain leader course
designed for junior leaders, but it is heavily skills-oriented.41
Mountain leader training should begin with an introduction to issues
and problems unique to mountainous terrain. Practical exercises and
historical case studies increase leader awareness. Training outdoors in
command positions with specific tasks, such as navigation, patrolling,
raids, and ambushes, should be conducted at altitudes above 8,000 feet.
Simulations that force junior leaders to make tough choices between
their soldiers’ physical capabilities and mission accomplishment are
essential to mountain leader training.
Many senior leaders consider themselves well-equipped to plan
and conduct operations in any environment, but commanders who have
served in the mountains as young leaders are far better at understanding
and planning for such environments. Wargames and live exercises are
valuable tools to help senior leaders understand mountain warfare. Live
exercises illustrate human limitations in such an environment.
Individual/team training. Most armies from countries with
mountainous terrain have well-established training institutions. Location
of training institutions is an important consideration for mountain training.
The Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School, at Rattu in Northern Kashmir,
is an ideal location on the confluence of the Hindukush, Himalayas, and
Karakorum ranges. The school conducts training throughout the year
and includes mountain climbing on peaks ranging from 15,000 to 20,000
feet and survival on glaciated terrain and in snowy and icy conditions.
The Indian Army’s high-altitude warfare school is at Gulmarg, which is at
8,000 feet.42 The US Army Mountain Warfare School is located in Vermont
[which is at 560 feet], while the USMC Mountain Warfare School is located
in Bridgeport, California, which is at 9,000 feet.
The purpose of these training institutions is to train individuals
to survive and take advantage of the extreme terrain and weather
conditions in the mountains. Physical conditioning is the first prerequisite
of mountain warfare. Training should be progressive, starting with light
physical exertion followed by route marches and mountain climbing,
culminating in test exercises in difficult terrain. Most schools have similar
programs for this purpose. Although training individuals at heights up
to 10,000 feet can achieve a great deal, to develop high-altitude skills,
some training should occur above 13,000 feet.
The ability to navigate and move across difficult terrain builds
confidence and enables soldiers to plan and execute maneuvers
across seemingly impenetrable and inhospitable terrain. The small-
unit mountain operation exercise the US Army Mountain Warfare School
conducts is a good example.43 Participants must navigate to six different
sites within a set time. The exercise incorporates various skills soldiers
need to complete actions successfully in a time-compressed, competitive
environment. Some skills frequently required during mountain warfare
include using rope bridges and vertical haul lines and medical
evacuation. Mobility in winter has several prerequisites, including using
snowshoes, skiing, climbing ice, crossing crevasses, and detecting
avalanche hazards.
A key training objective in mountain training is properly using winter

clothing, weapons, and equipment and recognizing and preventing cold-
weather injuries. Such skills are especially important for officers and
noncommissioned officers who must enforce these practices. Lectures,
demonstrations, and practical experience can help address these
problems. The Pakistan Army’s standard training procedures cover most
safety issues, such as frostbite prevention, high-altitude sickness, and
pulmonary and cerebral edema.
The Army’s Mountain Warfare School teaches winter sustainment
using the Akhio tent and stove group. The Akhio sledge contains a
10-man arctic tent, a diesel-fired stove, fuel, and other basic supplies.
Kashmir tents have a short lifespan because of the wear and tear from
blizzards and heavy snowfall. Stone structures and synthetic igloos
are the preferred structures. In noncontiguous and nonlinear battle-
field environments, soldiers must build protective shields around
winter shelters to avoid becoming targets for raiding parties and
artillery fire.
Once trainees understand mountainous terrain and its effects on
combat, the next step is to conduct small exercises involving patrolling,
raids, and ambushes.These exercises should incorporate mountaineering
skills in situations that tests trainees’ abilities to modify traditional tactics
to mountainous terrain. These exercises build leadership skills, initiative,
flexibility, and team spirit. Although no opposing force (OPFOR)
exists in the Pakistan Army’s High-Altitude School or at the US Army
Mountain Warfare School, an OPFOR is necessary for creating a realistic
environment and developing mountain warfare skills.
US Army Mountain Warfare School instructors are topnotch
mountaineers. However, most do not have actual mountain-combat
experience.44 Posting officers who served in Afghanistan to the Mountain
Warfare School might address this problem.
Collective training. Collective training is an opportunity to test
units and formations in actual mountainous environments, reinforcing and
building on skills gained through acclimatization and individual training
and allowing commanders to check the viability of their assumptions and
plans in a realistic setting. Synchronization and coordination between
fighting and supporting arms and among all the battlefield operating
systems are also key elements of this training.
Collective training in winter and summer environments is a regular
part of the Pakistan Army’s mountain training. Because altitude is an
important consideration, reserve units train at heights equivalent to those
at which they are expected to fight. Training is primarily mission-centric,
based on the nature of tasks assigned to the units, and includes offensive
and defensive tasks and small-unit actions.
The US Army does not conduct collective training in mountain
warfare; it focuses more on survival training rather than high-altitude
combat.45 The USMC conducts infantry battalion training, but the training
does not include artillery, engineers, aviation, or other supporting arms.46
Considering the unique requirements of mountainous and high-altitude
en-vironments, these can be serious limiting factors for coordinating
and synchronizing the combined arms fight and can easily lead to faulty
planning and wrong assumptions about each other’s capabilities and
limitations.
Operation Anaconda demonstrated that fighting in the mountains is
not a special operation or exclusively an infantry domain.47 Mountain
warfare involves logistics, aviation, artillery, communications, and air
assets. With the level of sophistication in these branches and services,
there is an even greater need for collective training in order to use their
unique characteristics fully.
Branch-specific training. All branches and services need to
train for mountain combat to understand the capabilities and limitations
of their equipment. Aviation is critical to mobility, timely logistics, and
precision firepower. Pilots should be well trained in mountain flying and
in understanding an infantryman’s problems in mountainous terrain.
The Pakistan Army’s 8th Aviation Squadron supports operations in
Kashmir. Pilots have hundreds of hours of combat flying experience and
understand the mountainous environment.
With the enhanced capabilities of Apache helicopters to acquire and
engage targets beyond visual range, US Army pilots, in conjunction with
ground troops, need to practice firing in the mountains. The Russians
recognized the need for close coordination between aviation and
ground troops during their war in Afghanistan.48 The US experience in
Afghanistan highlighted the need for attack aviation to train with Special
Operations Forces and to practice using night-vision devices.49 Pilots for
cargo and troop-carrying helicopters also need to train in mountains in
various weather conditions. High-altitude training combining attack and
cargo helicopters is essential for high-altitude combat.50
The US Army has a variety of sophisticated communication
equipment. Although some equipment works well in the mountains, some
requires improvisation and alternatives because FM communications are
often ineffective at high altitudes and distances impeded by mountainous
terrain.51 Shifting retransmission stations and using equipment in various
weather conditions is essential to providing a variety of options to
communication providers and users.
Engineers, who are key to mobility, countermobility, and survivability,
must also train and work in high-altitude conditions. Constructing shel-
ters, laying minefields, providing clean water supplies, and constructing
bridges and roads require different considerations in the mountains.

Training in a mountainous environment is the only way to ascertain the
type and quantity of materials and equipment needed.
Artillery units need to train in mountains to ensure optimum fire
support under all circumstances and all weather conditions. Selecting
gun positions and shifting and readjusting guns by air, as well as ground
transport, to support various tactical contingencies require training and
experience, as do observation and fire direction.
In mountainous environments, CSS elements also need to learn
how best to use trucks, aircraft, porters, and mules. Training under real
mountain conditions helps them identify the differences in logistical
calculations for mountainous environments. Other issues, such as
protecting logistic bases, are equally important. The Mujahideen often
successfully attacked and destroyed Soviet logistic bases in Afghanistan.52
Doctors and medical staff also need special training in recognizing
and treating high-altitude-related injuries and illnesses. In Kashmir,
doctors are fairly confident in dealing with them. During World War II,
medics accompanying German mountain troops were experts at treating
frostbite, snow blindness, and other problems.53 The Soviet Army
instituted more than 100 hours of training through a special course for
doctors and their staffs.54
Contemporary High-Altitude Operations
The US Army had a distinguished history of mountain operations
during World War II. The 10th Mountain Division proved its utility as
an elite mountain-trained force during the Italian Campaign. More
than 50 years later, Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan highlighted
the continued need for specialized training in mountain warfare. The
Army has embarked on an impressive Transformation intended to
meet the challenges of the 21st century; expert mountain troops
available for deployment on a short notice should be a part of this
Transformation.
________________________________________
1. James Lucas, Alpine Elite: German Mountain Troops of World War II (London:
Janes, 1980), 13, 130.
2. US Army Field Manual (FM) 3-97.6, Mountain Operations (Washington, DC: US
Government Printing Office [GPO], 28 November 2000).
3. CPT John Clearwater, Above and Beyond, on-line at <www.pakmil/com/army/insti/
highalti.html>, 1, accessed 12 September 2002.
4. Bruce C. Patton, Cold Casualties and Conquests: The Effects of Cold on Warfare,
23, on-line at <www.Armymedicine.Mil/history/Borden/medaspofharshenvrnmnts>,
accessed 29 November 2002.
5. FM 3-97.6. At 18,000 to 22,000 feet, the glaciated area in northern Kashmir is
considered the highest battleground in the world.
6. Brigadier Ghazanfar Ali and A. Ghani, Siachen: The World’s Highest Battlefield,
on-line at <www.Pakdef.info/pakmil/army/siachen/>, 3, accessed 2 December 2002.
7. CPT John R. Ballard, “Training an Arctic Raid Force,” Marine Corps Gazette
(February 1987): 64; LTC Salman Beg, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan
Army Journal (Spring 1994): 3.
8. Kevin Fedarko, “War at 21,000 Feet,” Outside Magazine (April 2002): 41, 44.
9. LTC John E. Sray, Mountain Warfare: The Russian Perspective (Washington, DC:
GPO, March 1994), 20, on-line at <www.fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/fsmopubs/issues/
mountain>, accessed 12 September 2002.
10. Ali and Ghani, 4.
11. Ibid.
12. Clearwater, 2.
13. Lester W. Grau and William K. Jorgensen, “Medical Implications of High Altitude
Combat,” US Army Medical Journal (April 2002): 1; Ali and Ghani, 3.
14. Fedarko, 50.
15. LT Craig M. Banull, “High Altitude Medicine: Case Report,” Navy Medicine
(January-February 2000): 27.
16. Ibid., 48.
17. Sray, 1.
18. Lucas, 196.
19. FM 3-97.6, 2-15.
20. Ballard, 63.
21. MG D.K. Palit, War in High Himalaya (London: Lancer International, 1991), 205.
22. Sray, 8.
23. George J. Mordica, High Altitude Operations, on-line at <http//call.army.mil/
products/trngqtr/tq4-02/mordica>, accessed 2 December 2002, 7.
24. Robert F. Baumann, “Russian Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus,
Central Asia, and Afghanistan,” Leavenworth Papers 20, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas,
November 2000, 141.
25. Ahmed Ashfaq, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen (Rawalpindi: Pak American
Commercial, 1991), 25.
26. FM 3-97.6, 3-29.
27. Sray, 16-18, Grau and Ali a Jalali, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War (Washington, DC, GPO), 187.
28. Gerhard Sheppe, Mountain Warfare in Europe (Kingston, Canada, 1983), 37.
29. Fedarko, 50.
30. Lucas, 130.
31. Ali and Ghani, 3; FM 3-97.6, 5-7.
32. Mordica, 9.
33. Ibid., 5-13.
34. Ibid., 4-5.
35. Ibid., 4.
36. Ibid.
37. Sheppe, 35.
38. Mordica, 4.
39. Lucas, 197.
40. Sheppe, 35.

41. Grau, interview by author, January 2003.
42. Indian Armed Forces, Training Institutions, on-line at <www.indianarmedforces.
com/def/army/def9.html>, 6, accessed 12 September 2002.
43. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.
44. Grau interview.
45. Major John G. Bechtol, “Fighting the Cold: The Need for Standing Cold Weather
Combat Capabilities,” unpublished article, Naval War College, 4 February 2002.
46. Grau interview.
47. Mordica, 4-5.
48. Sray, 20.
49. Mordica, 4-5.
50. Ibid, 8.
51. Ibid, 9.
52. Grau, The Bear Went over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in Afghanistan
(Collingsdale, PA: Diane Publishing Co, March 1996), 128.
53. Lucas, 210.
54. Grau and Jorgensen, 5.
________________________________________
Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army, received an M.M.A.S.

from the US Army Command and General Staff College. He also attended
the Command and Staff College, Quetta, Pakistan. He has served as
Brigade Major of an Infantry Brigade; an instructor at the Pakistan Military
Academy, Kakul; a company commander of an Infantry Company, Siachen
Glacier, Kashmir; aide-de-camp to the corps commander; and a platoon
commander and adjutant of the 12th Baloch Regiment, Infantry, Kashmir.
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta:

Spetsnaz Strike
into Pakistan during
the Soviet-Afghan War
LTC Lester W. Grau, US Army (ret.) and Ali Ahmad Jalali
This article first appeared in the December 2005 Journal of Slavic Military Studies
L ieutenant-Colonel Babushkin wanted revenge. The Mujahideen

guerrillas maintained a large base camp in his 15th Spetsnaz
Brigade area of operations and the Soviet command in Kabul would
not let him go get it. The Mujahideen used their border base at Krer to
launch forays against him and resupply Mujahideen forces throughout
northeast Afghanistan. In February 1985, the Mujahideen “Black Storks”
unit had massacred one of his Spetsnaz companies. Only Captain Oleg
Mart’yanov, the deputy commander, and a wounded RTO survived. Then
in August 1985, Captain Bykov and 50 of his men were caught during a
reconnaissance of Krer’s well-prepared forward defenses and took more
casualties.
The reaction of 40th Army was gutless. They forbad any combat
within five kilometers of the border. They were worried that Soviet
forces might stray across the Pakistan border and create an international
incident. The Mujahideen crossed that border daily and no one seemed
to give a damn. Now, however, the Soviets finally had a “tongue”—a
captured Mujahideen who served in Krer and who, with some persuasion,
provided good intelligence on the personnel strength, weaponry and
lay-down of the defending Mujahideen regiment. The time to settle Krer
was now, and those bastards in Kabul were playing international niceties.
The frigid January wind howling down the Kunar valley did nothing to
cool his desire for revenge. (See map on page 2 of this PDF.)1
Krer–Mujahideen Bastion on the Kunar River
By January 1986, the Soviet-Afghan War had settled into a struggle
to strangle each other’s logistics. The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet’s
long convoy route and trucks hauling supplies from the Soviet Union to
Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta -- Spetsnaz Strike 31
the major garrisons in Afghanistan. Since the Mujahideen depended on

the rural population for food and shelter, the Soviets attacked the rural
population’s villages, standing crops, orchards, granaries, animal herds,
windmills and irrigation systems with bombers and artillery to drive
them off their land. This ruthless approach forced over seven million (of
17 million) people in Afghanistan to become refugees fleeing to the cities
of Afghanistan or the refugee camps in Pakistan and Iran. It also forced
the Mujahideen to carry their own rations with them on operations. In
order to stay in the fight, the Mujahideen were forced to create a logistics
network of bases, dumps and caches in order to sustain their forces.
Krer was a major logistics base supplying Mujahideen forces in Kunar
Province and northeast Afghanistan.
The Krer base complex was located on the route from Bajuar,
Pakistan, a Mujahideen supply distribution point and camp. Krer was
garrisoned by the Asama Ben Zaid Regiment. It was usually under-
strength but could grow to some 400 for an upcoming battle.2 (Soviet
intelligence estimated the regiment’s present-for-duty strength at
500 and misidentified it as the Abdul Vakilya Islamic Regiment). The
regiment belonged to the Sayyaf faction and was commanded by
Commander Assadullah.3 It was well armed with mortars, recoilless
rifles, and DShK and ZGU heavy machine guns. Krer base was located
some 20 kilometers southwest of the Afghan town of Asadabad at the
head of Krer canyon on the heights of Spina ridge and Spina Tsoka peak.
The approach to Krer from Pakistan is easy and gradual, but the approach
from the Afghanistan side is difficult. First, the broad Kunar River has
to be crossed. A bare plateau, some 600 meters [1969 feet] above sea
level dominates the river crossing. Then mountains rise sharply from the
plateau until they reach some 2000 meters [6562 feet] above sea level
along the Spina ridge. The first 1000 meters of the mountains are bare
and then larch, aspen and juniper forests and alpine meadows begin and
continue to the top.
The 15th Spetsnaz Brigade was headquartered in Jalalabad and
commanded by LTC Babushkin.4 The brigade’s 334th Spetsnaz Battalion
was garrisoned in Asadabad and was commanded by Captain Grigori
“Grisha” Bykov.5 The brigade’s 154th Spetsnaz Battalion was garrisoned
in Jalalabad and was commanded by Captain Roman “Roma” Abzalimov.6
The brigade drew aviation and artillery support from the 66th Separate
Motorized Rifle Brigade that was also stationed in Jalalabad. Often, the
brigade was augmented by forces from the Democratic Republic of
Afghanistan (DRA) army, Sarandoy (armed police) and KHAD (KGB). The
brigade’s primary mission was to interdict Mujahideen supplies coming
in from Pakistan.
The Reconnaissance Raid

LTC Babushkin needed more information before launching a
major effort against Krer, so he planned a reconnaissance raid against
Krer’s forward defenses. He drafted a plan to establish ambushes at the
fording sites along the Kunar river close by the Krer canyon approaches.
He sent this plan up through channels and the 40th Army staff in Kabul
approved it. LTC Babushkin then dispatched a raiding force from the
334th Spetsnaz battalion to the ambush sites. The raiding force consisted
of two company-command groups with about 45 men each. The two
companies trudged through the winter night to the ambush sites. Once
on site, they radioed their battalion Combat Control Center and reported
that they had been in contact and were pursuing the fleeing enemy into
Krer canyon. In fact, there had been no contact. The raiders moved
onto the plateau. They climbed the heights until they discovered two
forward Mujahideen posts. The company commanders talked it over
and decided to raid the posts. They reorganized their force into three
groups—two raiding groups and a support group that would stay on the
mountain ridge to provide covering fire and support the raiding groups’
withdrawals.
As the Spetsnaz neared the posts, it became obvious that one of the
posts was much harder to reach due to the rugged terrain. A simultaneous
raid on both sites was impossible. The company commanders conferred
on the move and altered the plan. One group would first attack its post
over the more-accessible approach route. The second raiding group
would wait for the enemy security element in the second post to get out
of their bunkers to determine what was going on at their neighboring
post. The first group attacked and overran its post. As expected, the
Mujahideen in the neighboring post occupied their positions, but when
they could not detect a threat, they climbed out of their positions to try
and see what was going on to their flank. At that moment, the second
group opened up on the Mujahideen and then overran their post.
The Mujahideen posts were well laid out—by the book. There were
deep bunkers and storage areas for arms, ammunition and food. They
were prepared for sustained, unsupported combat and were equipped
with radios and telephones. The raiders held the posts for a total of ten
minutes. They grabbed enemy weapons and blew up those enemy
weapons they couldn’t carry. The support group fired on the remaining
Mujahideen forward security posts in order to draw their fire while the
raiding groups withdrew into the darkness. The raid was successful,
developed good intelligence information and proved that there was a
way to get around those sanctimonious meatheads in Kabul who were
so nervous about border fighting. It was time to begin planning for the
main event.
Getting ready for the Main Event
The information from the raid and from the Mujahideen “tongue”
helped develop a picture of how Krer was defended. LTC Babushkin
began planning a feint and end-run designed to destroy Krer base. The
attack would go in on the afternoon and night of 30 March 1986. The
334th and 154th Spetsnaz battalions would conduct the attack. They
would be supported by a platoon of 122mm D-30 howitzers and a BM-21
multiple rocket launcher from the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.
DRA and KHAD troops would accompany the raid.
The staffs of the two battalions began working together on details
of the plan. Grisha Bykov’s 334th Spetsnaz Battalion would travel from
Asadabad to the District Capital of Sarkani on armored personnel
carriers. There, they would cross the river, move to the mountain and
then dismount and climb. Their personnel carriers would cover their
advance as they climbed up the same northern crest where they had
earlier conducted the reconnaissance raid. They would advance up
this crest while drawing Mujahideen attention to their approach. Roma
Abzalimov’s 154th Spetsnaz Battalion would move from Jalalabad to the
ferry site on armored personnel carriers. The artillery would accompany
them. The carriers and artillery would remain on the western bank.
The raiders would ferry across the river and secretly advance along
the southern ridge while the Mujahideen were focused on the northern
advance. In the morning, both battalions would link-up on Spina ridge
near Spina Tsoka peak. They would destroy Mujahideen weapons,
ammunition and fortifications as they advanced. Once they seized the
ridge and linked up, they would remain for the day, destroying the base,
and then withdraw under the cover of darkness.
The battalions conducted mission training, issued ammunition and
inspected equipment for the raid. Unfortunately, there was an outbreak
of hepatitis in the 154th Spetsnaz battalion.7 Even after drafting cooks,
clerks and other battalion support personnel, the battalion could only
muster 150 combat-effective personnel for the mission. Lieutenant Oleg
Mart’yanov’s 3rd Company was the strongest with some 70 personnel.
The 1st Company was second strongest and it was lead by Lieutenant
Udovichenko, the deputy company commander. The 2nd Company was
down to two platoons and moved with the battalion headquarters.
The Raid Begins in the North
The weather was still cold and the mountaintops were covered
with snow. Commander Assadullah, the Krer commandant, could
see a column of Soviet and DRA vehicles approach Sarkani in the late
afternoon. They moved through the town and across the Nawabad
Bridge. They headed toward his northern ridge—the main approach
route into Krer base and the expected route of enemy attack. Heavy
fighting broke out as the Soviets dismounted and began to attack the
forward security positions under the covering fire of their armored
personnel carriers. Darkness fell and fighting continued. The 334th
Battalion had a local guide, but the battalion got lost in the darkness and
finally ended up climbing a flank of the ridge. Getting lost was lucky
since the Mujahideen concentrated murderous heavy machine gun
and recoilless rifle fire against the expected Spetsnaz route of advance.
The Spetsnaz approached the Mujahideen positions from the flank and
systematically took them out with hand grenades. Still, both sides took
heavy casualties as they slugged it out in the night.
One of the Mujahideen groups that the 334th bumped into was not
from the regiment guarding Krer. Ahamadullah Wejdani and his group
of 16 Mujahideen were returning from Pakistan to their base in the Pech
Valley of Kunar Province. They were armed with two PK machine guns
and 15 AK-47 rifles. They were carrying a large load of ammunition and
a battery-operated megaphone. They had tried to cross the river earlier,
but the ferry operator warned them of DRA and Soviet military activity in
the area. They decided to return to Pakistan and wait for things to calm
down. On the way back to Pakistan, they formed a defensive perimeter
and camped for the night. About ten PM, they heard noises that sounded
like a stampede of wild hogs. They jumped to their feet and, in a flash
of lightning, saw a large group of soldiers below them climbing in their
direction.
Ahamadullah Wejdani put his men in position to open fire on the
soldiers during the next lightning flash. Moments later, the target was
illuminated by lightning and they opened up on the Spetsnaz. The
Spetsnaz returned fire and the Mujahideen ceased fire and withdrew
up the hill. They lost their megaphone during the withdrawal. After
the Mujahideen climbed some 300 meters, they settled in to repeat the
process. They heard the squeal from their megaphone and realized that
the Spetsnaz were in their old positions and playing with the megaphone.
They opened fire on their old position and started to climb again. They
systematically withdrew up the mountain, firing at the Spetsnaz and then
moving out of the path of return fire.
The Raid Begins in the South
The 154th Spetsnaz Battalion left Jalalabad on the night of 29 March
and arrived at the ferry-crossing site in the morning. The battalion
dismounted and began to cross. The armored vehicles and artillery
stayed on the western bank. The ferry was old and it took four hours to
get the raiding party across. Then the group started to climb the plateau
and moved toward the mountains. The second platoon leader of the 1st
Company had to be replaced since he had come down with hepatitis.
By nightfall, the southern raiding group started climbing the mountain.
It was tough going and the group that was having the most trouble was
the 20-man rear guard composed of DRA and KHAD troops. They were
out of shape and refused to keep up. When the rear guard commander,
Lieutenant N. Zubkov, radioed his problem to the battalion commander,
Captain Roma Abzalimov replied “Abandon them. Screw them.” When
Zubkov relayed this to the reluctant warriors from the KHAD, they realized
that being abandoned in Mujahideen territory might be unpleasant and
suddenly were able to keep up with the battalion.
The terrain was rugged and the climb was tough. At several places,
the only way the soldiers could climb up was by standing on each other’s
shoulders. Thanks to the attack by the 334th Battalion, the 154th Battalion
was able to climb to the top of the mountain undetected. They reached
the Spina crest shortly before dawn. The company commanders and
battalion commander were deciding on how to seize and occupy the
area when a loudspeaker broke the early calm. The loudspeaker
was waking the faithful and calling them to morning prayers. The 3rd
Company immediately assaulted a Mujahideen firing position they
discovered during the ascent.
The battalion moved across the Spina crest, seizing well-constructed,
amply-supplied Mujahideen fighting positions and digging in. By 0400
hours, the 154th Battalion controlled the Spina crest and could fire down
at the Mujahideen trapped below them. They overran the bases and
supply depot and captured a lot of ammunition and many Mujahideen
heavy machine guns and RPGs. The 1st Company moved onto the
heights where it could dominate all the approaches into the camp from
Pakistan. The company began to dig in some 700 meters inside Pakistan.
The Spetsnaz controlled the area. Ahamadullah Wejdani’s group was still
fighting a systematic retreat but was now out of ammunition and could
see the signal rockets of the Spetsnaz above them. He gathered his men
and withdrew through a side canyon and headed into Pakistan.
Counterattack
Dawn broke and the winter sun warmed the troops of the 154th
Battalion. Another lieutenant fell to hepatitis and had to be replaced.
Around 0730 hours, 40 Mujahideen came strolling toward the 1st
Company positions inside Pakistan. They were chattering and relaxed
and many of them were at sling arms. When they were about 70 meters
from the 1st Company, the Spetsnaz opened up on them. Some 15
fell and the rest jumped behind the shelter of some rocks. About 40
minutes later, some trucks began to move toward them from the town
of Bajuar. When the 154th Battalion overran the Krer bases and supply
depot earlier, Commander Assadullah had hurriedly crossed over
to the Mujahideen camps in Bajuar to raise a relief force. That relief
force was now loaded on the trucks. The Spetsnaz called artillery fire
on the Mujahideen as they began to dismount from the trucks into an
assembly area. The artillery fire slowed the Mujahideen down, but the
Mujahideen counterattack was beginning. Soon the Mujahideen assault
fire was so thick that the Spetsnaz had to hold their assault rifles up over
the rocks and fire back blindly. The Mujahideen approached closer
to the Spetsnaz. Lieutenant Osobenko continued to adjust artillery but
it was not falling close enough to allow the Spetsnaz to break contact.
Osobenko finally called the artillery on top of his own position.
After a brief radio argument with the brigade commander, the
rounds slammed onto the Spetsnaz position. The surviving Spetsnaz
withdrew pell-mell. The Mujahideen now controlled the high ground
and were firing directly into the command post of the 154th Battalion.
It was now 1045 hours and the 1st and 2nd Companies were combat
ineffective. Radio calls for help from the 3rd Company went unanswered.
The 334th Battalion was still below the 154th Battalion and there were
an increasing number of Mujahideen moving into the gap between the
two battalions. The Brigade Commander finally requested helicopter
gun ship and medevac assistance—disclosing his unauthorized raid to
the high command. But as the first medevac helicopter approached
the 154th Battalion, it was unable to land due to the intensity of the
Mujahideen fire.
Enter the Gun ships
Commander Assadullah’s counterattack was going well. While some
of his force overran the defending 1st Company of the 154th Battalion,
the bulk of his force infiltrated through concealed approaches into Krer.
His gunners occupied the high ground and fired down into the disjointed
Spetsnaz. Commander Assadullah’s six-man security group bumped
into the command group of the 1st Company and killed a Soviet officer
during the fierce AK and grenade fight. The 154th Battalion was falling
apart and only air strikes and artillery could save the pieces.
Finally, Soviet helicopter gunships arrived overhead. Lt. Osobenko,
who had survived the artillery strike on his own position, was now inside
an adobe building with other Soviet wounded. Mujahideen were on the
roof tossing F-1 hand grenades at the building doorway. LTC Babushkin
directed Lt. Osobenko to adjust helicopter gunship fire. Lt. Osobenko
called the helicopter flight leader and asked him them to hit various
targets. Instead, the pilot answered “I am not allowed to because of the
international border.” Then the helicopters made a dry run over the
area, but did not fire. They did this six or seven more times and then,
after a half hour of dry runs, a quiet, ice-cold voice spoke over the radio
“I am tail number 25 and I am ready to fire. Give me the target.”
Lt. Osobenko directed the gunship runs. They first cleared the
Mujahideen from the roof of the building in which Osobenko and the
wounded were sheltering. Then the helicopters flew repeated low-
level gun runs at the Mujahideen. The helicopters stayed on station
until darkness. The surviving Spetsnaz began dragging their dead and
wounded downhill as they moved to link up with the 334th Battalion.
Policing the battlefield
The helicopter gunship strikes and artillery fire had saved the 154th
Battalion from certain annihilation, but their trial was not over. Two
companies of the 334th Battalion pushed up the mountain to link up with
the 154th. These companies helped carry out the dead and wounded of
the 154th. The nearest spot that helicopters could set down that was not
controlled by the Mujahideen was on hill 1917—about ten kilometers
away. This was not a regular landing zone, rather a rock ledge where a
helicopter could touch down with one wheel on the ledge while ground
troops threw the dead and wounded into the troop compartment. As
the night passed, one of the companies of the 334th went back up the
mountain to look for the dead and wounded.
The morning of the 1st of April dawned as the company pushed
forward. Soviet air and artillery strikes were pounding the Krer region.
Later in the morning, Soviet helicopters landed the air assault battalion
of the 66th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade from Jalalabad. The
troops of the 66th and the 154th were able to find and evacuate more
Soviet dead, wounded and missing. Two patrols of the 334th strayed into
Pakistan and discovered a Pakistani border security post apparently
abandoned by the Pakistani border guards with the advent of the
fighting. Finally, on the morning of 2 April, the Soviets abandoned the
search for their two remaining missing Soviet Spetsnaz and withdrew
completely from the fight.
Aftermath
Mujahideen casualties among the Krer regiment were 33 killed and
40 wounded (about 25 percent of the regiment’s pre-battle strength).
Exact casualty figures from the Mujahideen counter-attack force are
not known. Soviet casualties have not been released. Two Soviets
hid in one of the supply caves after the general Soviet withdrawal and
were eventually killed following a prolonged fight. The Soviets never
recovered their bodies. The Mujahideen captured some 60 Soviet small
arms and felt that Soviet casualties were at least 60. Indications are that
they were much higher.
The Soviet 40th Army forbad any future attacks on Krer (although
they attacked again in December 1987). The over-blown Soviet estimates
of Mujahideen losses were over 300 casualties and they also reported the
lurid, but fictitious, account of the Mujahideen execution of Commander
Assadullah and his deputy for letting the base be overrun. Soviet after-
action reports also incorrectly stated that Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the
leader of the major Islamic Party faction, personally led the fighting on
31 March.8
LTC Babushkin and his officers were quickly called on the carpet
for an official investigation of the cross-border fight. The colonel and
his officers were waiting for a helicopter to Kabul in a Jalalabad airfield
hanger. Lieutenant Osobenko approached some aviators and said
“Guys, who’s the fag who flies tail number 25?”
The aviators stared back at him and LTC Tseloval’nik answered
“That’s my bird. Do you have a problem with it?”
“Yeah, what’s the idea of leaving us stranded for a half-hour while
you made all those dry-fire runs?’
LTC Tseloval’nik replied, “As soon as we returned to this airbase,
we began reloading and refueling our aircraft. Uniformed KGB officers
immediately approached me and said ‘Explain to us, Lieutenant Colonel,
who gave you the right to conduct combat beyond the border?’ I looked
back at them with astonishment and denied doing so. The military
prosecutor who was with the KGB stated ‘There was a group across
the border and you provided fire support for them.’ ‘That cannot be,’
replied. ‘Here, listen to the flight recorder tapes.’ They listened to our
tapes and heard your requests and our denials over and over again.”
The aviators had played this charade for a half hour, then shut off the
tapes and provided fire support.
The inquiry found against LTC Babushkin and he was relieved of
command and sent back to the Soviet Union. Commander Assadullah
rebuilt the Krer base and it was soon supplying the Mujahideen in
northeast Afghanistan again. The Pakistani Strategic Studies Review, which
provided detailed coverage of the war reported in April on the Krer
fighting. “Soviet forces launched air-cum-ground attack on Mujahideen
base in Krer area killed 26 Mujahideen destroyed their entire armament
and lost 42 men after 15 hours fighting March 26. Mujahideen killed 70
Kabul and 50 Soviet troops and lost 42 men in their bid to break Soviet-
Kabul encirclement of Soran base in Krer area of Sarkani District March
28-31.9 Mujahideen repulsed Soviet attack after hours of occupation

of their base in Krer after inflicting heavy losses and capturing three
Soviet troops during 48 hours fighting March 30-31.” After all the Soviet
concern about cross-border operations, the Pakistani authorities were
either unaware that the Soviets had crossed their international border or
did not want to make an issue of it.
Krer was a major stationary depot and had to be defended—the
antithesis of guerrilla war. To hold the base, the Mujahideen built their
defenses around heavy crew-served weapons and well-positioned
permanent fighting positions. These protected them from Soviet aircraft
and artillery fire. But Krer was not protected from well-trained Soviet
light infantry who moved at night. The Mujahideen felt that Soviets did
not fight well at night and would not fight at long distances from their
armored personnel carriers. The Spetsnaz were the exception and they
succeeded in overrunning Krer. However, since they did this in secret,
they were unable to mass Soviet fire power in support until it was too late.
The Spetsnaz vendetta ended badly—as uncontrolled actions by elite
forces often do.
________________________________________
1. Source of the Soviet information in Sergei Kozlov, “Karera: Novyy vzglyad” [Krer: A New
Look], Soldat udachi [Soldier of Fortune], Number 7, 1997, pages 4-9 and 41. His account
is based on interviews with four officer participants. The map is based on a Russian map
from this article.
2. Asama Ben Zaid was a close companion of the Prophet Mohammad and one of the
prophet’s military leaders. At one point, Asama Ben Zaid fought the Byzantines.
3. Commander Assadullah gave an interview to the authors. His account of the battle is in
Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics
in the Soviet-Afghan War, Quantico: USMC Study DM-980701, 1998, 327-330. The source
for other Mujahideen information in this article is an unpublished interview conducted by Ali
Jalali in the summer of 1998 with Ahamadullah Wejdani, a Mujahideen Commander from
the Kahlis faction.
4. The 15th Spetsnaz Brigade codename was the 150th Spetsnaz Brigade.
5. The 334th Spetsnaz Battalion was also known as the 334th Separate Spetsnaz
Detachment and the Asadabad battalion. Its code name was the 500th Spetsnaz Detach-
ment or battalion.
6. The 154th Spetsnaz Battalion was also known as the 154th Separate Spetsnaz De-
tachment. Its code name was the 100th Spetsnaz Detachment or battalion.
7. Viral hepatitis was common among Soviet forces and often incapacitated entire units.
It was a product of poor field sanitation–particularly the failure of cooks to wash their
hands thoroughly after defecating. During 1980, the entire 5th Motorized Rifle Division in
the Western corridor of Afghanistan was rendered combat ineffective by hepatitis. See
Lester W. Grau and Dr. William A. Jorgensen, “Medical Support in a Counter-Guerrilla War:
Epidemiologic Lessons Learned in the Soviet-Afghan War,” U.S. Army Medical Department
Journal, May-June 1995.
8. Krer was garrisoned by fighters from the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan
faction.
9. Strategic Studies Review, April 1986, Islamabad, Pakistan.
Small Secrets of
Great Mountains
based on the work of Ikram Nazarov
This article first appeared in the May-June 2010 Infantry Magazine
Usual military mountain training focuses on individual climbing skills.

How to place pitons, how to rappel down slopes, how to tie knots, how to
ascend and descend steep rock faces or cross loose fields of scree (rock
fragments) or shelves of snow. Armies, however, do not fight as individuals.
They fight as units and so mountain training should concentrate on unit
movement and unit fighting in the mountains. Units should learn to climb,
to fire and to maneuver by teams, squads and platoons. The people who
support the infantry— the gunners, the sappers, the logisticians and the
transporters also need training in mountain movement and mountain com-
bat skills. It is particularly beneficial when they accompany the Infantry
for this training.
Ikram Nazarov is a mountaineer instructor/trainer with more than
forty years experience in military mountaineering. He was involved in
training Soviet units for mountain combat during the Soviet-Afghan War
and has trained Russian units for the mountains of Chechnya. Now he is
working with the Army of Uzbekistan imparting mountaineering skills.
He published the following article in the May 2008 issue of the Russian
Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest).1 The article demanded translation
so that it can reach a wider audience. Although the Russian Army and the
US Army train and fight differently, there is much in it that is of use to the
American mountain soldier.
I n the mountains, the time set to depart on a mission and to

return to camp is law. If a group of mountain soldiers has not re-
turned by the deadline, it is an emergency, and dozens, if not hundreds,
of people will have to work under extreme conditions to find the
“lost expedition.” In general, there are strict laws in the mountains:
discipline above all; never leave a comrade who has fallen off a rock
face; and, if you have to, sacrifice your own life to save him.
Small Secrets of Great Mountains 41
Another rule is that the shortest soldier always leads the column
and everyone else keeps in step with him. In the mountains, the pace
of movement depends on stride length. If a column is led by a soldier
who is six foot six, his stride length will be a lot for even for a person
of average height to keep up with. A trailing short soldier will have to
run, not walk. The soldier at the end of the line will soon begin to lag
behind; which, by the way, is absolutely forbidden. Remember, the
pace of movement must always be the same throughout the column.
Your right and left legs have different stride lengths, so in the dark
or in a thick fog you will always move a little off the track. Therefore
you have to adjust the direction of your movement frequently.
Mountain sickness can be a problem. There is only one way to
deal with it— soldiers must train regularly at altitude over several years.
Only a person who is physically fit, acclimated and trained to fight in
the mountains need not fear this sickness.
Remember, do not leave any trash whatsoever behind. It is fairly
easy for an experienced enemy to determine that your unit is there and
how large it is from discarded items, chocolate wrappers and empty
cans. It goes without saying that the enemy should not even guess that
your group is in the mountains on a combat mission until the very last
moment.
Get your soldiers accustomed to mountain wind, foul weather,
sun and frost. Only then will your soldiers look on foul weather as an
everyday occurrence. This is a factor for victory in battle. Foul weather
is always an obstacle to your enemy as well.
You must train your soldiers so that they automatically select
the best sites and firing positions. Small-arms firing is difficult in the
mountains. It is difficult to fire accurately from one rock face at another,
since you have to factor in meteorological conditions and your distance
perception is distorted in the mountains.2
Remember that the best position for firing in the mountains is the
prone position. You should always press as hard as possible against the
rock face so that you are almost invisible. If, however, you decide to
shoot while sitting or standing, a good shooter is sure to spot you and
you can be sure he won’t miss. The mountain units of foreign armies
have spent years developing a well-worked-out technique for training
Jägers.
What gear should you to take to the mountains? The law here is
to take only the absolute necessities. Anything extra is going to be
a drag on you both on the march and during the fight. I know from
experience that when you first come into contact with the enemy, you
will not be able to assume a firing position rapidly, much less change
it. So all these jumar ascenders,3 descent and arresting devices, pretty
backpacks with hundreds of pockets, artificial warmers, and Chinese
flashlights are simply going to end up discarded in the mountains.
Remember that your gear should depend on the mountain terrain
and how you’re your target is located. In a combat situation, you should
take a climbing rope, a 20-25 foot reepschnur,4 two-three carabiners,5
a pair of climbing irons, glasses, and a pick. The carabiners are used
for descent and for a lot more. The reepschnur can be used in lieu of
jumar ascenders and descenders, and the pick can do everything: cut
out steps in the ice, chip a stone off a rock face, arrest a fall from a rock
face, or kill the enemy in hand-to-hand combat.
Be cautious about using imported gear. I know from experience
that foreign carabiners such as the French- and German-manufactured
Irbit have failed when someone falls from a rock face, if the gate has to
bear the load. Remember that there is nothing better or more reliable
than our Abalakovsky carabiner.
Footwear is important. In 1959, I hiked to the 22,906-foot Revo-
lyutsiya Peak in ordinary felt boots and was comfortable, but when I
went up the face a second time in shoes, my feet were cold. You need
to choose climbing footwear very carefully, especially when going 16-
20,000 feet or higher. Above all, remember to put Tricouni nails on
your hiking footwear.6 For example, some soldiers in Afghanistan’s
mountains did not put on Tricounis because they are fairly heavy and
seem awkward at first. Many of these soldiers paid for this with their
lives. And you will not, by the way, find better footwear than Tricouni.
With regards to cosmetics, remember that veteran mountain
soldiers do not need creams, ointments or lip balm for protection
against sunburn or the wind. It is only over time that wind and sun
“harden” the skin and lips stop chapping. That is why I recommend
that it is better to take a first-aid kit with a good variety of medications
instead of cosmetics.7
Under no circumstances should you take alcohol with you on a
mission to the mountains. The popular belief is that it warms you up in
extreme cold. Take my word for it, this is an illusion. A person who has
been drinking, and is tired after a long march to boot, will sleep like the
dead in the cold and will not realize that he is freezing to death.
Remember to always have a sentry in the mountains. This is
critical for ensuring that you accomplish your mission and return
alive. Vigilance must be at the highest level. Anyone who fought
in Afghanistan knows a lot of examples of weary soldiers assigned
Small Secrets of Great Mountains 43
to sentry duty who fell asleep while on watch. The result was that
the sentry, along with the unit, never did wake up: the Mujahideen
slaughtered the sleeping soldiers like sheep, without firing a single
shot.
And the main thing, in the mountains the commander should
always be the most experienced and respected person. At least that
is how it should be. Disaster is inevitable otherwise. The commander’s
professionalism as both a soldier and a mountaineer should therefore
be head-and-shoulders above any rank-and-file soldier. This is the
guarantee that all his orders will be carried out without fail.
The professionalism of the rank-and-file soldier is something that
he gains only through years of hard combat training and systematic
drills, as well as in marches and tactical exercises. In the final analysis,
this is how all soldiers learn teamwork.
Remember that there is yet another rule in the mountains. Each
soldier does what he is better at doing than anyone else. The soldier
who knows about radio equipment is in charge of the radio and
communications. Another soldier can always manage to light a fire in
the mountains. He is in charge of campfires and oil stoves. The soldier
who is best at stanching blood and bandaging a wounded comrade
takes care of the wounded. The best shot has the sniper rifle and so
on.
Nazarov’s tips seem like common sense, but they are common sense
developed over forty years of mountaineering experience. The ancient
Roman legionaires used to call themselves “Marius’ mules” (muli mariani).
The Emperor Gaius Marius (157-86 BC) initiated sweeping organizational
reforms and greatly reduced the size of the logistics train by requiring
each legionnaire to carry his armor, weapons, 15 days of rations (grain)
and other gear. This onerous load weighed somewhere between 50 and
60 pounds. The normal days march was about 20 miles. The Roman
Legion spent little time in the mountains. Today, the American infantryman
goes into the mountains of Afghanistan carrying 85 pounds or more of
light-weight gear. Afghans jokingly call the US Infantry the “heavy mules.”
After all these centuries, the soldier’s load is still important—particularly
in the mountains.
________________________________________
1. Ikram Nazarov, “Malenkie secreti bol’shikh gor” [Small secrets of Great Mountains],
Armeyskiy sbornik [Army Digest], May 2008, pages 35-36.
2. Small-arms fire invariably goes over the target when firing uphill or downhill. This can
be corrected through training, but most armies only conduct marksmanship training on flat
land.
3. A Jumar is a rope ascending/descending device that was first manufactured by the
Swiss in the 1950s. It is a metal devise that fits on a rope and has a cam that allows the
device to slide freely in one direction.
4. The Russians adopted a variety of German technical climbing words, among them
reepschnur or rope-cord. This refers to an auxiliary cord five to six millimeters in diameter.
5. A carabiner (karabiner in German) is a metal loop (snap-link) with a spring-gate or
screw-gate.
6. Tricouni nails (edge nails) are manufactured in Geneva, Switzerland, and are mounted
on the sides of the soles of nailed climbing boots. They mount under the balls of the feet,
toes and heel.
7. Sunscreen and Chapstick© are still essential until one develops a leather face.
Flanking Detachment in the Mountains 45
Flanking Detachment
In The Mountains:
A Soviet Experience
This article first appeared in the May-June 2010 Infantry Magazine.
Defending mountain terrain has its own challenges. Mountains offer

good observation, but the terrain also blocks observation, particularly
close up. Mountains offer good long-range fields of fire, but mountains
are also full of dead space and concealment. Mountain defenses are not
continuous, but are normally separate outposts and fighting positions
which may be mutually supporting, but usually are not. They are often
not even in the same plane. Mountain fighting positions are difficult to
construct and maintain. Mountain fighting positions can be stockpiled
with ammunition, but food and water quickly runs out at these positions
and food and water are normally supplied in the villages and hamlets
down in the mountain valleys and canyons. Consequently, in Afghanistan,
the Mujahideen usually congregated in the valley except when they felt
threatened. Some security was maintained at the fighting positions,
but this was usually slack without indications or intelligence of enemy
actions.
Attacking in the mountains has its own set of problems. First, the enemy
holds the high ground and, if he has occupied the area for any time, he
has had time to establish fighting positions and emplace long-range crew-
served weapons such as mortars, heavy machine guns, recoilless rifles and
even direct-lay artillery. He has had time to reinforce the defenses with
mines and other obstacles. Entries into the mountain valley or canyon
are limited and liable to interdiction by a skilled defender. Still, the
irregular mountain terrain offers distinct advantages to the attacker. The
enemy is seldom able to mass fires; the terrain offers numerous concealed
attack approaches to defending positions. Enemy withdrawal will be by
small groups and he will often be forced to abandon heavy weapons,
ammunition stockpiles and wounded.
A FRONTAL ATTACK...IS NOT RECOMMENDED

by Major V. A. Selivanov1
I n April 1985, according to intelligence reports, there was a significant

grouping of the armed opposition concentrated in the Mazlirud
and Kakh Canyons. Their number was estimated at 1,200. Besides
assault rifles, this group had 35-40 DShK heavy machine guns and up
to 15 ZU anti-aircraft machine guns as well as mortars, recoilless rifles
and rockets.2 The main body of the enemy (400-600 men) was located
in the village of Malakhairu. The general situation was complicated
by the fact that earlier large-scale operations in the area showed that
surprise was not possible and that, other than the casualties inflicted,
the results were insignificant. The main body of the enemy, as a rule,
managed to withdraw from the canyon before our troops arrived. The
enemy had managed to establish a significant, well-constructed system
of observation and early warning. Further, this region was particularly
unsuited for air assaults and military vehicles could enter the canyon
only on one road which ran through Mazilishakhr, Zagan, and Malakhairu
(see map on following page).3
Considering the peculiarities of the region, during planning,
our battalion commander determined to carry out the mission in the
following fashion. We were briefed at an officers’ call that at 1330 hours
on the 9th of April, the bronegruppa of the main body would move from
its base camp along the road from the south with the mission of closing
in to the village of Mazlishakhr by 1800 hours.4 My parachute company
was ordered to support the departure and movement of the march
column. Then, after the column had passed, my company was to return
to garrison to carry out guard duty. The combat action, planned for the
10th and 11th of April, was to destroy the enemy grouping by moving the
bronnegruppa to link up with its paratroopers who would move from the
west into the valley.
However, at noon on the 7th of April, my regimental commander,
without any witnesses, gave me an order for a totally different plan.5
The new mission was a follows: at 1600 hours on 8 April, my parachute
company would serve as a flanking detachment, and without attracting
any attention, would secretly move to the region of Khakfakhai village
in order to conduct a route reconnaissance for movement through the
Afedshakh Pass. With the advent of darkness, I would leave my combat
vehicles on the road, go on foot through the pass, enter into the Mazirrud
valley and, by dawn, occupy positions on Khaduzan Mountain. At
dawn on 9 April, I would be in position to adjust artillery fire and direct
close air support with the goal of creating panic among the assembled
Mujahideen and not allowing them to exit the canyon before the main
body struck them. While carrying out this mission, very strict attention
had to be paid to the secret movement and independent actions since
it would be impossible to support my detachment in case we were
discovered.
At 1800 hours on the 8th of April, my company was assembled in
the designated area near Khakfakhai village. Soon, our observation
disclosed that groups of armed men periodically moved on the path

through the Afedshakh Pass. There was also a group of eight Mujahideen
located in a guard post on that very same pass. Everything appeared
calm in the target area. Everyone discussed it and agreed that the
“ghosts” [Mujahideen] were not expecting our force. With the onset of
darkness, we conducted a radio check with our armored vehicles and
our higher headquarters and then I gave the order to begin movement.
We crossed through the pass by 2200 hours, bypassing the guard
post to the south without drawing the attention of the Mujahideen.
During night time, this post was a main [security] link. They were tied in
with other posts using a complex system of varying signals. Even though
these “stinkers” were one of the [security] links, we bypassed them
literally in 15 minutes.
Just as we began to descend into the canyon, we lost radio contact
with our company bronnegruppa and with our higher headquarters.
By all rules of military science, I must immediately either restore
communications or return.6 But then our company’s combat mission
would not be accomplished. Therefore, I made a decision to continue
to move and to restore communications once we reached high ground.
I had to make this decision because I knew that if the Mujahideen
discovered our company at night, we could only count on ourselves for
help.
From the depths of the canyon, we heard the noise of night firing. We
were convinced that the Mujahideen were not expecting the appearance
of our force and had occupied their fighting positions to sort things out
[conducted an alert]. At midnight, we entered the hamlet of Gusak.
This is where I, the company commander, made a mistake that might
have compromised all our measures for secrecy. Despite the ample
number of night-vision devices that we had, we discovered too late
that there were two Mujahideen patrols that we barely avoided running
into. Taking necessary precautions, we lost about two hours before we
exited the village. At 0300 hours, the company assembled at the foot of
Khaduzan Mountain.
The heavens were clear and things were now visible thanks to the
appearance of the moon. This additional lighting “worked” to the enemy’s
advantage and forced us to hurry up. The first platoon, commanded by
Senior Lieutenant A. Mikenin, climbed the mountain. After an hour, he
reported that his platoon had occupied positions on the heights. I placed
two platoons, under the command of Senior Lieutenant V. Plotnikov, in an
ambush directed against the hamlet of Gusak, and I followed the path of
the first platoon to the top. We established our primary observation post
on height 2705.0. I placed Lieutenant Mikenin’s platoon on the northern

slope and I placed the other two platoons on the southern slope. From
these positions, they could also interdict paths on the eastern side and
partially on the western side, while blocking enemy bands located in the
hamlet of Gusak.
At 0500 hours, we were prepared to carry out our mission. At that
time we were able to reestablish radio contact. Our under-strength
paratrooper company had secretly crossed 12 kilometers of enemy-
controlled territory, assembled in the rear of a strong enemy force
and taken the commanding heights. It should be noted that the secret
movement of my company was key to the success of the action and the
complete lack of company casualities.
On the morning of 9 April, the bronnegrupa of the main body of the
battalion inconspicuously passed through the village of Mazilishakhr and
began to enter the canyon. Instantly, the signal (three individual shots)
repeatedly rang from the mountain slopes from the north to the south
and even the west. It announced the arrival of our force. Some 15 to 20
minutes after the signal, a band of 120-200 men emerged from the hamlet
of Gusak and began to advance on my company. When the Mujahideen
were close to our second and third platoon positions, my paratroopers
opened up on them. The deadly fire caught the enemy completely by
surprise and inflicted such heavy casualties on them, that they were
unable to offer resistance. The “ghosts” panicked and ran back into the
hamlet.
At this point, I should note that the sun was in our eyes and it was
hard to find the enemy. After five minutes, the Mujahideen suddenly
launched an attempt to break out of the canyon to the northeast. I called
artillery fire on them. Again, after a half hour, they attempted to bypass
the company to the north and up the southern slope of height 2946.6, but
they came under the fire of Senior Lieutenant Mikenin’s platoon.
From 1400-1500, we conducted two tactical air assaults [with the
remaining two companies of paratroopers] on the western side of the
canyon. The [bronnegruppa of the] main force, by this time, had already
pushed through the hamlet of Gusak. The company’s mission was over.
Thinking over our combat action as a flanking detachment in the
mountains of Afghanistan, I have arrived at several conclusions. First,
in order to conduct combat in similar circumstances, it is necessary
to plan to assign an element of the combat formation to be a flanking
detachment. It will be able to secretly enter the flank or rear of the enemy
without engaging in combat with small subunits and guard posts. It will
be able to prevent the enemy withdrawal, hit him with a surprise attack
to destroy him and his capabilities in order to facilitate the successful

mission accomplishment of the main force.
The experience of conducting such operations shows that most
successful flanking detachments are company-sized. Use well-trained
subunits and personnel in forming the detachment.
Second, the nature of mountainous terrain prevents small subunits
from carrying heavy weapons and ammunition. At the same time,
it is necessary to have sufficient fire power to conduct effective fires at
various ranges. Besides our assault rifles and sniper rifles, my company
carried one AGS-17 and a heavy machine gun.7 In every squad, we
had one AKM assault rifle with the under-barrel grenade launcher.8 Our
ammunition load was 600-700 rounds per assault rifle and 1200 rounds
for the machine gun. Our special gear included some night-vision
devices.
The successful actions of a flanking detachment in the mountains
are dependent on close, well-planned coordination with the forces
and resources of the senior commander. Of primary importance is
the support of artillery and aviation as well as agreement on the
action with the main force before it departs to carry out its mission.
Thus, in the course of combat it is impossible to fulfill the mission
without reliable uninterrupted communications. Experience shows
that in order to guarantee communications, it is better to establish
retransmission stations or simply to use aircraft that are equipped
for retransmission.
In conclusion, selection of company-grade officers for assignment to
a flanking detachment requires care. You know that they will be required
to make independent mission decisions while separated from the
main body on unfamiliar territory that is controlled by the enemy. This
requires detailed planning and thorough preparation as well as a high
degree of individual training. In part, it is absolutely necessary that the
commander has concrete experience working with maps, can quickly
detect objectives in the mountains, determine the necessary data for
their destruction, precisely direct the fires of his subordinate units, and
skillfully use all possibilities for secret and sudden actions.
________________________________________
In this article, the Soviets conducted the apparent main attack with
their armored vehicles moving into the canyon on the only road. This
attack included the personnel carriers of two paratroop companies,
attached tanks, and an attached battalion of self-propelled artillery.
There was little infantry in this attack. The two airborne companies that
the armored vehicles belonged to conducted an air assault approximately

six hours after the beginning of the supposed main attack to eliminate
Mujahideen positions in the west and then to move into the canyon to link
up with their vehicles. Helicopter gunships provided close air support to
the air assault. The flanking detachment, which had inserted itself into the
depths of the enemy position, was particularly useful in calling in artillery
strikes and defeating an enemy advance and an enemy withdrawal attempt.
Although the article provides no casualty figures, the flanking detachment
suffered none while the Mujahideen did.
There are some interesting aspects to this attack. The flanking
detachment left its armored personnel carriers (bronnegruppa) at the
dismount point. It was responsible for its own security and served as a
mobile reserve in the event that the flanking detachment got into trouble,
but once the flanking detachment was deep into enemy territory, the
reserve role was problematic. A self-propelled artillery battery joined
the bronnegrupa for the attack the following morning. The Soviets had
entered this war with a limited ability to conduct split-Fire Direction Center
operations. By 1986, this capability was well developed. Soviet artillery
usually accompanied the ground attack since it was more accurate than jet-
aircraft in support in the mountains. Further, the artillery was often used in
direct-lay against a stubborn enemy.
The flanking detachment was not part of the original battalion planning
and was controlled by regiment. In the interests of operational security,
the company’s role and presence were not disclosed to the rest of the
battalion. The company was basically on its own for at least 15 hours except
on-call artillery and close air support. Both require communications and
were iffy at night. Communications were a problem and remain such in
the mountains despite modern technology. Mountains absorb radio
waves and distort GPS signals.9 Satellite communications are spotty and
a saavy opponent could jam the GPS and satellite telephone receivers in
the mountains. Ground retransmission units are hard to move, emplace
and defend and retransmission aircraft are few and seem to go down for
maintenance at critical points.
The infantryman’s load remains a problem and in Afghanistan, where
the bulk of engagements are beyond 500 meters, small-caliber supersonic
bullets fired from short-barreled carbines are ineffective. The fight devolves
to the machine gunners while the rest of the platoon tries to get involved.
The Soviets issued the AK-74 with the thought that the infantryman could
now carry more ammunition. Where possible, units such as this airborne
unit, went back to the longer-range, medium weight 7.62 cartridge. Still,
the weapons that the airborne carried did not give it an advantage over its
opponent. The airborne company’s position on commanding terrain did.
Going into the mountains is critical to gaining the initiative and bringing
the fight to the enemy’s sanctuary. Still, bulling into the mountain valleys
and canyons without securing high ground or establishing a blocking
force is futile. The lightly-equipped enemy will withdraw over familiar
territory leaving his burdened attacker behind. Flanking detachments are
an excellent way to shape the battlefield and hold the enemy in place for
punishment.
________________________________________
1. Major V. A. Selivanov, “Nastupat’ v lob...ne rekomendyetsya” [A frontal attack...Is not

recommend], Armeykiy Sbornik (Army Digest), October 2009, 21-22.
2. The ZU is an anti-aircraft 23mm machine gun which comes in a single and dual-barrel
model (the ZU-23-1 and ZU-23-2).
3. All place names in this article have been changed. The Russian Army has become
hyper-security conscious to the point where even place names connected with historic
events in official accounts are now being changed. Fortunately, this silliness does not
extend to the veterans who are no longer on active service.
4. The bronnegruppa [armored group] consists of the tanks and personnel carriers of a
unit which, after the infantry has dismounted the carriers, are used as a separate reserve.
It is usually commanded by the unit’s first deputy. In this case, the bronnegruppa has
the BMPs of two companies (22 vehicles), probably at least two tank platoons (six tanks)
and 12 self-propelled howitzers plus other vehicles supporting the mortar platoon, signal
platoon and so on.
5. The Soviets always insured that orders and plans were witnessed and approved
so that if things went wrong, the blame might be assigned or shifted. The regimental
commander is undertaking a risky ploy, so he issues the order without any witnesses.
Apparently, even the battalion commander does not know that one of his subordinate units
has this mission. The company commander is on his own, if things go wrong.
6. The commander is already out there on his own without support and loses com-
munication. By Soviet regulations, he is required to reestablish communications or abort
the mission. This is a very risky decision.
7. The AGS-17 is a tripod-mounted 30mm automatic grenade launcher which fires
rounds out to 1,700 meters. The machine gun was probably the 7.62mm PKM machine
gun.
8. The GP-25 sub-barrel grenade launcher would fire a 40mm grenade out to 100
meters. These paratroopers preferred the older AKM Kalashnikov, with its 7.62mm round
over the newly issued AK-74 with its 5.45mm round. Combat in the mountains is long-
range and requires a subsonic medium-weight bullet. The AK-74 was designed for close
combat and has less range and punch over distance.
9. In the mountains, GPS accuracy can slip from a five-meter diameter circle to a
500-meter diameter circle or more.
Cave Warfare 53
Cave Warfare
Ikram Karimov
This article first appeared in the February 2008 Armeisky sbornik
W hile reading several installments of “Komandirsky praktikum”

[“Practicum for Commanders”] in Armeisky sbornik [Army
Digest], I could not help but notice some inaccuracies and even errors
in both obstacle negotiation and ready positions for shooting. But it is
not just a matter of a few mistakes. Unfortunately, I did not see the most
important thing in “Komandirsky praktikum”: how to teach soldiers to
fight in the mountains. I will therefore take the liberty of giving some
examples of how a soldier should operate in so-called “cave warfare.”
To begin with, let me remind you that 1999 and 2000 were very
tense years for Uzbekistan.1 Government troops were battling various
separatist groups in the mountains. The telephone rang one evening
and a Ministry of the Interior representative asked me to help prepare
an operation to annihilate the separatists who were entrenched in the
mountains and, while I was at it, train the civilian Ministry of the Interior
personnel who were going to be the first to take part in such an endeavor.
I agreed and called in Ulugbek Pulatov, my old fellow mountaineer
soldier and former paratrooper. We met at the staff office at the Sarisiye
airfield and were quickly briefed in military fashion. As it happened, a
battle was being fought in the upper reaches of the Kshut River, below
the village of Tamarkhut, and in retreating the insurgents had taken up a
defensive position in a cave that was hard to reach. It was on a cliff, by
the confluence of a lateral tributary of the river, where mountain ridges
with ravines formed a triangle in whose upper section was the cave with
the insurgents in it— located at a height of 1,000 feet.
The rebels were ideally located, from a professional point of view:
they had a view of the entire stretch from the confluence to the mountain
range peaks, so it was virtually impossible to approach them unobserved.
The government wanted to use a helicopter in the operation, but the
mountain terrain ruled out maneuvering, and there was too great a risk
that the helicopter would be shot down.
After carefully studying the mountain terrain, Pulatov and I saw the
only possible way: approach the cave from above. A helicopter would
land our group above the cave in the mountain where there was a more
or less suitable landing area. We would then cautiously approach the spot
where the sheer wall of the ravine in which the cave is located begins. In
order to reach the precise spot, Ministry of the Interior personnel would
have to make corrections to our movement by radio from points located
opposite the wall, from where the cave entrance could be seen fairly well.
They watched the insurgents before setting the time for the attack.
They selected early morning when the enemy would all be asleep. A
group of six Spetsnaz soldiers were assigned to the group, three of whom
were to make a sudden descent by rope and hang above the cave.
They formed three-man rope teams: one person would descend,
another would belay, and the third would provide covering fire. It was
important to gain time to hang opposite the cave entrance, which is why
we decided that the Spetsnaz soldier who would descend first and hang
above the entrance would throw a grenade and a smoke canister into
the cave. And while the enemy was recovering, the rest of the Spetsnaz
soldiers would descend and finish off the insurgents with assault rifles
and grenades.
And after that it would be a matter of technique: the rest of the
combat team would rush into the cave and finish off the resisting rebels.
The entire group therefore numbered 30, of which 15 would directly
participate in the attack while the rest would be in the support group.
Soldiers who already had combat experience were picked for these
groups. They underwent mountain training exercises for several days
and then conducted a whole series of battle drills in which the Spetsnaz
soldiers trained to operate in conditions that were very close to those in
which they would soon be going into action (see figure).
Having trained the groups, we expected that we would participate
directly in annihilating the rebels that were entrenched in the mountains.
However, the operation leader thanked us for our help and said that
he did not have the right to risk civilian lives. We found out later that
everything went exactly according to our scenario using only the
Spetsnaz soldiers: the insurgents were caught unawares and, unable to
offer serious resistance, were annihilated.
So the textbook that I am preparing now has a “Cave Warfare”
chapter that offers practical advice on organizing a mountain battle using
natural shelters, including caves.
Caves are well hidden and generally camouflaged by nature itself
with shrubs or trees. They are excellent shelter. In guerilla warfare, it
is convenient to use them in defense or for setting up firing ambushes.
At one time, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan made firing emplacements
Cave Warfare 55
out of mountain caves in particularly important areas along valleys and

roads.
There was a case in which the Mujahideen sealed off a cave
entrance with a large stone several meters in size which they would lift
with powerful lifting jacks whenever they wanted to shoot at a vehicle
convoy of our “pourers” [fuel tankers] or at a motorized rifle company on
the march. It was easy for them to monitor their enemy and shoot at us
through the gap (embrasure) and then put the stone back in place after
the attack. As a result, the mountain terrain on nearby slopes and ridges
remained undisturbed. For a long time, both Afghan and Soviet soldiers
who came under surprise fire could not understand how the Mujahideen
managed to vanish so quickly in an unknown direction–until it dawned
on them to set up a watch of the slope from which our units were fired on.
If an offensive is being planned, caves can be used as a supply
storage base or a temporary infirmary, to keep prisoners in or a place
for soldiers to rest in. Lastly, a cave can be turned into a convenient
command post.
The Mujahideen in the Republic of Afghanistan made use of caves’
tactical features: their distance from populated places, concealment,
good camouflage in mountain terrain, and the difficulty finding and
destroying them. In the notorious Tora Bora caves, they constructed wide
corridors, multi-level galleries and halls, convenient passageways to
firing positions with vehicular delivery of ammunition, and rooms for a
hospital, recreation and headquarters.2
I remember a difficult situation that occured in the spurs of a
mountain range. The enemy had occupied a cave. It was clear from the
regularity of their radio traffic, that the insurgents were entrenched there.
At night, they would go down to a nearby river for water, and in the
daytime, they recharged solar batteries. Both the terrain and the cave’s
location were very similar to the one mentioned earlier. A small grassy
slope with scrub went all the way up to the cave, and there was a small
overhang— a rocky canopy that made it almost invisible.
We set up an ambush by the water. It was unsuccessful. Then in
the morning, snipers opened fire on the lookouts and sentries from the
ridges opposite, preventing the insurgents from detecting our soldiers in
time. Our soldiers were, at that moment, rapidly descending by rope to
the cave from above. Meanwhile, it was clear to everyone that as soon as
just one of them appeared in front of the cave, they would be killed. But
our soldiers were not only good mountaineers but experienced fighters
as well. When they reached the cave canopy, they leaned forward as
far as possible and threw grenades into the cave. The grenades were
tethered to their right arms with cord.
When throwing a grenade on a cord, the distance and trajectory of its
flight are measured visually. It takes systematic training to master this art.
A grenade should not be thrown from the shoulder with a sweep of the
hand but gently away from yourself, as if pushing it away, so that it swings
like a pendulum into the cave. So when the grenade, like a pendulum,
reaches the cave entrance and begins to swing inside, the end of the
cord is released, thereby sending the grenade into free flight.
Cave Warfare 57
After the grenades exploded, the soldiers finished off the insurgents
with assault rifles.
Experience shows that if the enemy continues to offer fierce
resistance and shoot from deep within a cave, it is a good idea to use
smoke canisters and teargas. A rocket-propelled anti-tank flame thrower
(RPO) is particularly effective in this case. For example, in 1982, in
Afghanistan, Captain S. Vlasenko successfully employed an RPO in a
fight with Mujahideen who were entrenched in a cave near the town of
Gogamunda (Jalalabad).
I conclude this article about techniques for annihilating an enemy
that is entrenched in a cave by underscoring the following: the success
of such actions depends first and foremost on the soldiers’ physical,
psychological and combat readiness, how well equipped they are with
mountain gear, means of communication, and lightweight weapons,
and the skill level of the support (covering fire) group. Developing the
necessary skills requires daily training in mountains or in mountain
training centers. It makes sense to include subjects such as the specific
features of combat to annihilate the enemy in mountain caves in the
mandatory training program.
Other major factors for success in a mountain battle are selection of
the right time of day and weather conditions, as well as the psychological
effect of our combat on the enemy that is defending the cave.
________________________________________
1. At this time, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan were involved in fighting a

bloody civil war against the Independence Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which had
trained and equipped in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan.
2. The author is probably confusing the caves at Zhawar with those at Tora Bora.
The Campaign for the Caves:

The Battles for Zhawar in
the Soviet Afghan War
and Ali Ahmad Jalali
This article first appeared in the September 2001 Journal of Slavic Military Studies.
T he Soviets entered Afghanistan in late December 1979 to suppress

a growing insurgency and to replace an out-of-control communist
regime with another communist, pro-Moscow government. The Soviet
government realized too late that they were then stuck in the middle
of a civil war fighting guerrilla forces on some of the world’s toughest
terrain. The Soviets had planned to merely prop up the Democratic
Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) and let the Afghan communist forces
fight the Mujahideen guerrillas. Instead, the Soviets found their forces
increasingly drawn into the battle — a nonlinear, unconventional battle
which they were ill equipped or trained for.
The Soviet-Afghan War was primarily fought on the tactical level,
but the strategic focus was a struggle by each side to strangle the others
logistics lifeline. The Mujahideen and Soviets spent a great deal of time
and energy defending their logistics network and attacking the other’s.
The Mujahideen targeted the Soviet lines of communication-the crucial
road network over which the Soviet and DRA supplies had to move
and ambushed convoys or cut off roads at critical mountain passes. The
Soviet attack on the Mujahideen logistics was done in two phases. From
1980 until 1985, the Soviets sought to eliminate Mujahideen support in
the countryside.
Early in the war, Mujahideen logistics requirements were fairly
simple and primarily concerned with ammunition resupply and
evacuating the wounded. The rural population willingly provided food
and shelter to the Mujahideen, who were usually neighbors. The Soviets
bombed rural villages and granaries, destroyed irrigation systems and
crops, destroyed herds and launched sweeps through the countryside,
conscripting young men and destroying the village infrastructure. The
Soviet leadership believed Mao Tse Tung’s dictum that the guerrilla lives
The Battles for Zhawar in the Soviet-Afghan War 59
in the population like a fish in water. They decided “to kill the fish by
draining off the water.”1
Afghanistan became a nation of refugees as more than seven million
people left their farms and fled to neighboring Pakistan and Iran or to
the cities of Afghanistan. The Mujahideen, who were used to living off the
good will of the rural population, now had to transport rations as well as
ammunition from Pakistan and Iran into Afghanistan.
The Mujahideen responded by establishing a series of supply depots,
transfer depots and forward supply points logistics bases inside
Afghanistan. These logistics facilities made it easier to provision the
Mujahideen, but also had to be defended. The second Soviet phase
was to find and destroy the Mujahideen logistics facilities. The odds are
stacked against a defending guerrilla force since the attacker has the
initiative, armored vehicles, air power and the bulk of artillery and fire
power. The Mujahideen tried to offset this with a wise use of terrain and
prepared defenses.2
Zhawar was a Mujahideen logistics transfer base in Paktia Province
in the eastern part of Afghanistan. It was located four kilometers from
the Pakistan border and 15 kilometers from the major Pakistani forward
supply base at Miram Shah. Zhawar began as a Mujahideen training
center and expanded into a major Mujahideen combat base for supply,
training and staging. The base was located inside a canyon surrounded
by Sodyaki Ghar and Moghulgi Ghar mountains. The canyon opens
to the southeast facing Pakistan.
As the base expanded, Mujahideen used bulldozers and explosives
to dig at least eleven major tunnels into the south-east facing ridge of
Sodyaki Ghar Mountain. Some of these huge tunnels reached 500
meters and contained a hotel, a mosque, arms depots and repair shops,
a garage, a medical point, a radio center and a kitchen. A gasoline
generator provided power to the tunnels and the hotel’s video player.
This impressive base became a mandatory stop for visiting journalists,
dignitaries and other “war tourists.” Apparently, this construction
effort also interfered with construction of fighting positions and field
fortifications.
The Mujahideen “Zhawar Regiment,” some 500 strong, was
permanently based there. This regiment was primarily responsible
for logistics support of the mobile groups fighting in the area and
for supplying the Islamic Party (HIK) groups in other provinces of
Afghanistan. Due to its primary logistic function, the regiment was
not fully equipped for combat, but was a credible combat force. The
regiment was responsible for local defense and for stopping infiltration
of Khad and KGB agents between Afghanistan and Pakistan. They
manned checkpoints along the road to screen identification papers. The
Zhawar and vivinity.
regiment had a Soviet D30 122mm howitzer, two tanks (captured from the
DRA post at Bori in 1983), some six-barrel Chinese-manufactured BM-
12 multiple rocket launchers (MRL) and some machine guns and small
arms. A Mujahideen air defense company defended Zhawar with five
ZPU-1 and four ZPU-2 antiaircraft heavy machine guns. These 14.5-mm
air defense machine guns were positioned on high ground around the
base.3
Defense of the approaches to the base was the responsibility of
Mujahideen groups from the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan
(NIFA), the Islamic Revolutionary Movement (IRMA), and the two Islamic
Party factions (HIH and HIK).4 There were six major Mujahideen supply
routes into Afghanistan.5 Twenty percent of all the Mujahideen supplies
came through the Zhawar route.6 The overall Mujahideen commander of
Paktia Province, including Zhawar base, was Jalaluddin Haqani, who was
a member of HIK.
Zhawar I
In September 1985, the DRA 12th Infantry Division from Gardez,
with elements of the 37th and 38th Commando Brigades moved from
Gardez circuitously through Jaji Maidan to Khost since the direct route
through the Sata-Kandow Pass had been under Mujahideen control since
1981. This force joined elements of the 25th Infantry Division which was
garrisoned in Khost. General Shahnawaz Tani7 commanded this mixed
force. The DRA military units had their full complement of weapons
and equipment, but desertion, security details, and other duties kept
their units chronically understrength. Since the DRA could not mobilize
sufficient force from one regiment or division, they formed composite
forces for these missions.8
First battle of Zhawar.
Late one September afternoon, the DRA force began an infantry

attack supported by heavy artillery fire and air strikes on Bori, which
is northeast of Zhawar. Zhawar was not prepared for this attack since
most of its major commanders, including Haqani, were on a pilgrimage
to Mecca (the Haj). The DRA recaptured Bori and drove on to Zhawar.
The Mujahideen reacted by positioning an 80-man group to block the
ridge on the eastern slope of the Moghulgai mountains which form the
eastern wall of the Zhawar base. The DRA force arrived at night and
during the night fighting lost two APCs and four trucks. Eventually, the
DRA became discouraged, withdrew and returned to Khost.9 Mujahideen
from the nomad Kochi tribe (led by Malang Kochi and Dadmir Kochi)
and Gorbez Mujahideen, recaptured Bori.
The DRA then launched its next attempt from the town of Tani.
They recaptured the town of Lezhi from the Mujahideen and killed
Commander Mawlawi Ahmad Gul. The major Mujahideen commanders
returned to Pakistan from the Haj on that day (September 4) and hurried
north to Zhawar to take command. The Mujahideen from Lezhi retreated
south while a 20-man Mujahideen force blocked the Manay Kandow pass.
The pass is dominated by a high peak which is capped with a thick rock
slab. Under the slab was a natural cave which the Mujahideen improved.
The cave could accommodate the 20 Mujahideen during artillery and air
strikes. The Mujahideen also dug communications trenches so that they
could quickly reoccupy their fighting positions once the firing stopped.
The firing positions dominated the Tani Plain and were well positioned to
stop any infantry attack.
The DRA repeatedly attacked the pass but could make no headway.
The infantry would attack, meet withering Mujahideen fire and stop. Then
massed air and artillery would pound the area. The infantry would again
try to attack, but would again be stopped immediately. The procedure
would then repeat itself, but the DRA made no headway during its ten-
day attack. After ten days, the DRA called in heavy Soviet airstrikes which
continuously hit the mountain top. The thick rock slab began to sway
and rock. The Mujahideen were afraid that the rock slab might shift and
crush their cave, so they finally withdrew. It was September 14, 1985.
As the Mujahideen fell back, the DRA established observation posts
on high ground and started adjusting air and artillery strikes. This gave
the tactical advantage to the DRA and their infantry moved through the
pass. The Mujahideen rear guard desperately engaged the DRA infantry
with machine gun fire and aircraft with ZGU machine guns. The DRA
continued to advance and seized the high ground of Tor Kamar. Tor
Kamar is within a kilometer of Zhawar base and well within the range
of machine gun fire. The DRA thought that the Mujahideen did not have
any heavy weapons and became careless and bunched their forces on
the high ground. Two Mujahideen, Alam Jan and Muhammad Salim, were
former tank commanders in the DRA. In the late afternoon, they moved
their two tanks out of the caves and swung north into firing positions.
They opened fire and their first rounds destroyed a DRA observation post
as an artillery spotting scope and soldiers went flying. The Mujahideen
tankers then traversed to the second observation post and destroyed it
with their next rounds. Then they opened up on the other DRA soldiers.
The mauled DRA force fell back and maneuvered through the “bird
droppings” saddle10 to the east side of Tamberi Ghar. The Mujahideen
countered with blocking positions which they held for five days. Haji
Amanullah Khan and Ismail Khan played major roles in the fighting at
this stage. The DRA Commander, General Tani moved his CP into the
Many Kandow Pass and tried to reinvigorate the DRA assault, but the
Mujahideen held. During the fighting, the Mujahideen shot down a
helicopter, but lost a major commander-, Mawlawi Fathullah. Mujahideen
reinforcements, including Commander Mawlawi Arsalah, arrived from
Pakistan and as far away as Jalalabad and Urgun. The DRA were getting
chronically low on men and supplies and, after 42 days of fighting,
General Tani broke contact and conducted a night withdrawal.
Mujahideen casualties were 106 KIA and 321 WIA. DRA and Soviet
losses were heavy, but their numbers are unknown since they evacuated
their dead and wounded. Zhawar was a symbol of Mujahideen invin-
cibility in the border area and the Soviets and DRA felt that they had
to destroy this myth. The Mujahideen were convinced that Zhawar
was impregnable and failed to take some basic security precautions.
September-October and April-May are historically the best months in
Afghanistan for campaigning, since the weather is reasonable and the
roads are dry. August-September was also the time of the Haj and the
senior leadership of the area all made this religious pilgrimage together.
Consequently, the senior leadership was absent when the battle started
and other Mujahideen commanders had to take command of the battle.
Field fortifications around Zhawar were neglected and incomplete.
The excellent field fortifications at the mouth of the Manay Kandow Pass
bought time to improve the other fortifications. A complacent attitude
almost cost the Mujahideen their base. Only the unexpected appearance
of Mujahideen armor at a crucial minute prevented a DRA victory. The
Mujahideen were able to move men and supplies from Miram Shah in
Pakistan throughout the battle. The DRA apparently made no attempt to
impede access by deploying scatterable mines against the route.
Zhawar II
In February 1986, during the XXVII Congress of the Communist
Party of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev informed the
delegates that the Soviet Government had worked out a plan with the
Afghan Government to conduct a phased withdrawal of Soviet forces.
The plan would immediately be put into effect after the political situation
stabilized. The Soviet High Command issued orders to their forces to not
get involved in direct combat when possible, but to emphasize security
missions, guarding lines of communication and important installations.
Simultaneously, they adopted additional measures to strengthen the DRA
forces. The Soviets felt that the DRA should now take the leading combat
role against the Mujahideen and urged the DRA to again attack Zhawar.11
Plan for Zhawar II.
The DRA Ministry of Defense decided to destroy Zhawar. General

of the Army Varrenikov12 approved the decision and the high command
developed the plan for a combined operation.13 The plan committed 54
under-strength DRA maneuver battalions plus DRA artillery and aviation
to the assault.14 The 7th Infantry Division (II Army Corps) from Kandahar
andthe 8th Infantry Division (III Army Corps) from Kabul were committed
to the fight. From III Army Corps’ came the 14th Infantry Division from
Gazni, the 25th Infantry Division from Khost, plus the 38th Commando
Brigade and 666th Air Assault Regiment “Commando” also from Khost.
The commander of the III Afghan Army Corps, General-Major
Mohammad Asef Delavar, was appointed the leader of the Afghan
ground forces in this operation.15 Deputy Minister of Defense General-
Lieutenant Nabi Azimi was the overall commander of the Afghan Group
of Forces. His adviser was Deputy to the Senior Military Adviser for
Combat, General-Major V. G. Trofimenko.16
Prelude to Zhawar II.
Azimi and Trofimenko planned the offensive. They constituted an

eastern combat group comprised of the 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions
and the 666th Air Assault Regiment. They also constituted a western
combat group consisting of the 8th and 25th Infantry Divisions.17 The
38th Commando Brigade was committed to make a an air assault onto
Dawri Gar mountain which rose 3,600 meters above sea level and
towered over Zhawar. The commando group had little experience in air
assault missions, and the first lift was scheduled to go in before sunrise as
the ground assault began (see map Plan for Zhawar II).
On the February 28, government forces, covered by Soviet aviation,
began to move out of Gardez to the combat zone (see map Prelude to
Zhawar II). Their movement was aided by two Soviet battalions18 which
occupied the dominant terrain between Kharzun (Mirazi Kalay) and
Matwarkh. However, when units of the Afghan force arrived in Matwarkh
region, they ceased further movement and stayed there for about a
month, simply marking time.
Taking advantage of this passive government force, the Mujahideen
began to launch shelling attacks against them. The Afghan forces took
casualties, but did not move forward. The operation began to show
signs of breaking down.19 The 25th Infantry Division had moved out of
Khost and after engaging the Mujahideen and looting and destroying the
villages of Sekan Dara, Kot Kalay, Chine Kalay and Seto Kalay, moved to
secure the Naray Pass so the composite DRA force could move into the
Khost valley. The weather was wet snow mixed with rain and a strong
wind. After several days, the composite force moved into the valley and
prepared for the offensive.20
The Initial Disaster

The 7th Infantry Division was in the east with the 14th Infantry
Division following and the 8th Infantry Division was in the west with the
25th Infantry Division following. Sometime around midnight on 2d of
April, the DRA began a two-hour artillery and aviation preparation of the
target area. Then six Mi-8 armed helicopter transport ships flew from
Khost airfield to insert the initial assault group of the 38th Commando
Brigade. The commandos landed without opposition, but the ground
assault ran into immediate, heavy resistance from Mujahideen defending
Dawri Gar Mountain. The ground advance was forced to halt.
The command post for the operation had moved from Khost to Tani
and was in radio contact with the initial air assault group.21 Despite all
the Mujahideen fire, the air assault group commander reported that the
firing was far away from his location. It was now 0300 hours in the early
morning. The DRA artillery fired an illumination round on the northern
slope of Dawri Gar mountain. “Do you see the round?” they asked
the commandos. “Yes, we see it. It’s about 15 kilometers from us” they
replied. The DRA fired another illumination round five kilometers further
away on the southern side of Dawri Gar mountain. “Do you see the
round?” the command post again asked the commandos. “Yes, we see
it. It’s about ten kilometers from us” they replied. The commandos had
landed some five kilometers inside Pakistan, beyond the base at Zhawar!
The command post informed the commandos of the fact. The insertion
group commander quietly answered “I understand. We will withdraw.”
But after an hour he reported that he was surrounded and locked in
combat.22
The air assault was botched and someone, probably Generals Azimi
and Trofimenko, made it much worse. They committed the rest of the
brigade to combat — not onto the Dawri Gar mountain landing zone,
which was well-populated with Mujahideen, but onto the open areas
around Zhawar itself (see map Zhawar 2).
Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani was in the Zadran area when he
saw approximately 20 transport helicopters flying over. He radioed
the commanders at Zhawar and warned them. He expected that the
helicopters would land at Lezhi or Darakai. After his radio message,
he saw another group of helicopters, including some heavy transport
helicopters, flying the same direction. These were escorted by jet
fighters. He again radioed this information to Zhawar. Zhawar had
700-800 Mujahideen combatants, plus air defense forces, at the time.
However Jalaluddin Haqani, the Zhawar Commander, was at Miram Shah.
Mawlawi Haqani also radioed this information separately to Jalaluddin
Haqani, who set out immediately for Zhawar.23
Zhawar II.
The usual Soviet/DRA pattern for an attack on a Mujahideen base

was to pound the area heavily with air strikes and then follow the air
strikes with air assault landings, artillery fire, and a ground advance to
link up with the air assault forces. The air strike gave the Mujahideen
commanders warning, reaction time and a solid indicator where the
attack would go. In this case, the Mujahideen were caught by surprise.
Their intelligence agents within the DRA failed to tip them off and the
helicopters landed the rest of the 38th Commando Brigade on seven
dispersed landing zones around Zhawar. There were 15 helicopters in
the first lift which landed at 0700 hours. More lifts followed to get the
entire brigade on the ground. The first two helicopters landed on Spin
Khwara Plain. Some of the landing zones were within a kilometer of the
Pakistani border. Most of the helicopters landed on the high ground to
the west of Zhawar. Mujahideen gunners destroyed many helicopters
while they were on the ground. Following the air assault, Soviet jet aircraft
bombed and strafed Mujahideen positions. Mujahideen air defense was
not very effective against these aircraft.
Instead of defending in positions being pounded by fighter-bombers
and close-air support aircraft, the Mujahideen went on the offensive and
attacked the landing zones. They quickly overran four landing zones and
captured many of the DRA commandos. Mujahideen reinforcements
moved from Miram Shah in Pakistan to Zhawar and took the commandos
from the rear. The commandos were trapped between two forces and
were killed or captured. By the end of the day, the Mujahideen captured
530 commandos from the 38th Brigade.24
Meanwhile, Soviet aircraft with smart munitions made ordnance runs
on the caves.25 Since the caves faced southeast toward Pakistan, the Soviet
aircraft overflew Pakistan in order to turn and fly at the southern face with
the smart weapons. Smart missiles hit the first western cave and killed
18 Mujahideen outright. Smart missiles hit the second western cave and
collapsed the cave opening trapping some 150 Mujahideen inside. This
second cave was 150-meters long and used as the radio transmission
bunker. The commander, Jalaluddin Haqani, who had just arrived from
Miram Shah, was among those trapped in the second cave.26
Soviet bombers followed the attack of the aircraft with conventional
ordnance. They dropped tons of bombs and, in so doing, blasted away the
rubble blocking the cave entrances. The trapped Mujahideen escaped.
The battle for the remaining landing zones continued. There was one
group of commandos on high ground who held out for three days before
they were finally overrun.27 The chief of counter-reconnaissance in one
of the commando battalions managed to exifiltrate and lead 24 of the
commandos to the safety of their own forces. It took eight days. Of the 32
helicopters assigned to the mission, only eight survived.28
The 7th and 14th Infantry Divisions were in the corps first echelon.
They tried to link up with the already destroyed air assault-force. In the
course of three days, they shot up their entire supply of ammunition and
lost control. At the end of April 9, these divisions pulled back to their
start points. The 25th Infantry Division, located in the second echelon,
covered the western flank, the artillery positions and the corps rear
area.29 The 14th Infantry Division covered the eastern flank. The DRA
had regarrisoned Lezhi since Zhawar One and continued to fight for the
possession of the Manay Kandow Pass for some ten days following the
air landing. The Mujahideen attacked the DRA LOCs and the airfield at
Khost while the Mujahideen holding the Manay Kandow checked their
advance.30
General Varrenikov sent a message to the Soviet Minister of Defense
in which he criticized the leadership of the 7th, 8th and 14th Infantry
Divisions and the III Corps Commander. He presented various alibis
(weather, length of campaign, poor intelligence) and outlined his plan to
reinforce the effort with three DRA regiments, a DRA spetsnaz battalion,
and six Soviet battalions. He noted General Azimi’s replacement as
operations commander and requested time to resupply and prepare the
force to resume the offensive. General Sokolov, the Minister of Defense,
responded with a stern reply and gave Varrenikov twelve days to prepare
for resumption of the operation (see Annex 1).
Once Again
The Soviet and DRA military leadership were in damage control.
DRA reinforcements included a regiment each from the 11th and
18th Infantry Divisions and the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade as
well as the 203d Separate Spetsnaz Battalion (special forces) and 37th
Commando Brigade.31 Following urgent requests from the leadership
of the DRA, Varrenikov authorized five battalions of Soviet forces which
were sent to Khost and Tani between 5 and 9 April.32 Soviet Forward Air
controllers were assigned to work with Afghan Forward Air Controllers
in the infantry divisions and the reinforcing Soviet unit commanders
were assigned to work with the Afghan division commanders.33
General-Lieutenant Azimi flew off to Kabul on “important business.”
From Kabul, he issued orders to arrest the helicopter regiment
commander, but the commander was hiding. The helicopter pilots
who landed the commandos in Pakistan said that the commander of
the commandos had ordered them to land where they did.34 General-
Lieutenant Gafur from the DRA Operations Section of the General Staff
replaced General-Lieutenant Azimi. The Chief of Staff of the 40th Army,
General-Major Yu. P. Grekov took command of the five Soviet battalions.
General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the Ministry of
Defense, USSR in Afghanistan) assumed overall coordination of all the
forces. They reworked the operations plan while the force was refitted.
The total DRA/Soviet force now exceeded 6,600 men. Then Varrenikov
himself arrived at the battlefield. DRA President Karmal had requested
that General of the Army V. I. Varrenikov take over as overall commander
of the operation.35
While this refitting, restructuring, and replanning were going on, the
communists kept the pressure on the Mujahideen with air strikes and
artillery. In first battle for Zhawar, DRA/Soviet artillery and air strikes
stopped at night, but this time they were conducted around the clock. At
night, they dropped aerial flares for illumination. This heavy fire support
continued for 12 days.36 The tempo of the air and artillery increased on
the morning of April 17. Said Colonel S. Korennoy:
“Soviet pilots showed a miraculous mastery and heroism. Many of us
saw how the aircraft of LTC A. Rutskoy, the commander of the aviation
regiment, was shot down. . . . His aircraft seemed to draw all the air
defense fire. He made four or five runs on the base and then we saw his
plane dart and he then flashed from the mountain ridge into the valley.
We felt, from the convulsive jerks, that the pilot was attempting to start
his engine, but alas. The bang of the ejection seat rang out. The aircraft
flew straight and level for a few seconds and then the nose dipped and
the aircraft slammed into the ground and exploded somewhere in the
vicinity of Barankhel. A BTR from the operations group of the 40th Army
went and picked up the pilot.”37
Pakistan was clearly concerned with the major battle raging on her
border. The Mujahideen lacked effective air defense against helicopter
gunships, and the strafing and bombing attacks of high-performance
aircraft. The Mujahideen had some British Blowpipe shoulder-fired air
defense missiles, but they were not effective. Pakistan sent some officers
into Zhawar during the fighting to take out attacking aircraft with the
Blowpipe and show the Mujahideen how it was done. After climbing a
mountain and firing thirteen Blowpipe missiles to no avail, a Pakistani
captain and his NCO were severely wounded by the attacking aircraft.38
The renewed ground attack began on the morning of April 17. The
25th Infantry Division led the assault in the west and the 14th Infantry
Division led the assault in the east. In order to deceive the Mujahideen
and divert their forces, the eastern group began its attack at 0630 and
the western group began at 1030.39 The DRA 25th Infantry Division
was concentrated at Lezhi. The Mujahideen had fortified the Dawri
Gar Mountain and could cover the majority of the slopes with accurate
fire. Multiple attacks on the mountain failed. When the artillery fire
preparation would start, the Mujahideen would shelter in caves and
when the preparation ceased, they reoccupied their firing positions
and repulsed the attack. General-Major Asef, the DRA 25th Infantry
Division Commander and Lieutenant Colonel Mikhail Karaev, his
adviser, observed this. During the night, they silently moved one of their
regiments toward the summit and, at dawn, launched an attack on the
Mujahideen without any artillery preparation.
The Mujahideen did not expect this and faltered. The regiment
captured the summit in a matter of minutes.40 The Mujahideen fell back
from the Lezhi area into the higher mountains and slowly the DRA/Soviet
force moved through the Manay Kandow Pass.
At the same time, the DRA/Soviet force launched a flanking column

from the Lezhi area that moved to the east. This column moved toward
Moghulgai Mountain on the east flank of Zhawar. There, a regiment
of HIH Mujahideen waited in defense. However, as the DRA column
neared, the HIH regiment withdrew without a fight. At the same time,
Jalaluddin Haqani was wounded by attacking aircraft. He had head and
facial wounds, but rumors spread among the Mujahideen that Haqani
was dead. The Mujahideen evacuated Zhawar and moved high into
surrounding mountains as the two ground columns closed onto Zhawar.41
The Mujahideen were unable to evacuate most of the stores from
Zhawar. They pulled out the two T-55 tanks and fought the advancing
column for awhile before abandoning the tanks in the foothills.
Lieutenant Colonel Kulenin, the adviser to the commander of the DRA
21st Mechanized Brigade and his political deputy were killed by a T-55
round.42 The Soviet and DRA forces entered Zhawar. It was noon on
1April 19, 1986.
A Short Stay
As Viktor Kutsenko recalls: 43
“After a narrow passage of mountain road, it opened up into a wide
canyon of 150 meters, whose sides stretched upwards for two kilometers.
Caves were carved into the rock face of the side facing Pakistan. The
caves were up to 10 meters long, four meters wide and three meters tall.
The walls were faced with brick. The cave entrances were covered with
powerful iron doors which were painted in bright colors. There were 41
caves in all. All had electricity. Behind a fence there was a mosque with
a beautiful brick entrance and a hospital with new medical equipment
manufactured in the United States. They even had an ultra-sound
machine which we moved to the Khost hospital. There was nickel-plated
furniture including adjustable beds. There was a library with English-
language and Farsi-language books. There was a bakery and by the
entrance was a stack of fresh nan.44
“In the storage area, there were metal shelving units where boxes
of arms and ammunition were neatly stacked. Further on, there was a
storage cave for mines. There was every kind of mine imaginable:
antitank, antivehicular, and antipersonnel mines from Italy, France, the
Netherlands, and Germany. Hand grenade and artillery simulators
were stored separately. The demolition explosives of various types and
detonators were stored in a separate cave. In the very furthest part of
the base were repair and maintenance bays complete with grease pits.
There was a T-34 tank in one of them. The tank was serviced, fueled
and had new batteries. It started right up and drove out of the service
bay. Above the storage caves was a beautiful building marked “Hotel.”
There was overstuffed furniture inside and the floors were covered with
carpets. How many of our aircraft had worked this site over and the hotel
and caves were still intact.”
The Afghan soldiers began to loot the base. Even the two-meter high
brick facing wall was pulled down and hauled back to the 25th Infantry
Division at Khost. The DRA had no intention of staying in Zhawar long
enough for the Mujahideen to organize a counterattack. The Mujahideen
were moving MRL up to the Pakistan border to fire on the communist
forces.
Colonel Kutsenko was in charge of destroying Zhawar and had four
hours to do so. He split up the detonation of the caves and buildings
between the sappers of the 45th Engineer Regiment of the 40th Army
and Afghan sappers. He knew that he could not destroy the caves in the
available time. Above the caves was a 30-meter thick layer of rock. If
they could drill a one-to-two meter shaft into the cave ceiling, they could
have crammed that full of explosives and caused a collapse, but there
was not time to do that before the troops had to leave. So the sappers
stacked about 200 antitank mines in the primary caves and rigged them
for simultaneous electric detonation. Even if they had laid ten times
more explosives, it would not have made any difference since the force
of the explosion would follow the path of least resistance and the caves
would channel the force out the caves’ mouths.45 Said Kutsenko:
“And the moment finally arrived. The caves ... shot out their contents.
After the dust settled, all of the canyon was filled with clumps of earth,
shattered bricks and stones. The caves were swept clean, but were
somewhat larger and their entries were partially clogged by rock slides
from above. The gates were torn pieces of iron laying at the foot of the
opposite canyon wall.” 46
The combat soldiers were withdrawing as the sappers remained
behind to mine the base. The work was hard and complicated by the
lack of time. The sappers had to depart before nightfall. At 1700 hours,
the command was given for the remaining force to leave and head for
Tani. The Mujahideen were quick to fall on the heels of a retiring foe.
Anyone who would fall behind or stop would be in serious trouble.
Rockets fired from across the Pakistan border were landing near the
sappers and these rounds were becoming more precise. It was time for
the sappers to join the exodus. Kutsenko gave the command to depart
on his radio. The Afghan sappers immediately quit working and boarded
their armored vehicles. The Soviet commander of the sappers from the
45th Engineer Regiment answered “Right away.” His “right away” lasted
15 minutes. Kutsenko again called him and ordered that they cease work
and depart. Their commander again answered “Right away.” Kutsenko
then I told him “You may stay here for an hour, but your soldiers need to
quickly join the convoy. The Mujahideen are here and we are leaving.”
This time, the Soviet sappers quit work and immediately boarded their
vehicles. Kutsenko insured that everyone was on board and the trail
party left. Kutsenko sat in the captured tank and returned to Tani on it.47
After 57 days of campaigning, the DRA held Zhawar for only five
hours. In addition to the standard mines and booby traps, the communist
forces planted seismic-detonated mines and sprinkled aerial-delivered
butterfly bombs over the area. The Mujahideen returned to Zhawar on
the following day. The first Mujahideen to enter the area were killed
by seismic mines. The Mujahideen withdrew and fired mortars, BM12
and machine guns into the area to set off the seismic mines. Then they
began the slow process of finding the rest of the mines manually. The
Mujahideen pushed forward from Zhawar to retake Lezhi and other
areas. Since the DRA was only in Zhawar for five hours, the DRA did not
manage to destroy the caves, but collapsed some entrances. Weapons
that were stored in some of the caves were still intact and useable.48
Mujahideen casualties were 281 KIA and 363 WIA. DRA and
Soviet losses are unknown, but the Mujahideen reportedly destroyed
24 helicopters, shot down two jets and captured 530 personnel of the
38th Commando Brigade. The Mujahideen held a field tribunal. Yunis
Khalis and other Mujahideen commanders were the judges. They
tried and executed Colonel Qalandar Shah, the commander of the 38th
Commando Brigade and another colonel who landed with the brigade
to adjust artillery fire. There were 78 other officers among the prisoners.
They were given a chance to confess to their crimes from different
battles and then all the officers were executed. All the soldiers were
given amnesty since they were conscripts who were forced to fight. The
amnestied soldiers were asked to perform two years of labor service
in exchange for the amnesty. They did their service in logistics, were
“reeducated” and released after two years.
Aftermath
The withdrawal of the HIH regiment, coupled with the rumors of
Haqani’s death, greatly aided the DRA victory. Haqani’s loss, besides
affecting Mujahideen morale, cost the Mujahideen what little command
and control they had left at this juncture of the battle. The DRA failed
to throw a blocking force on the Miram Shah road, although they knew
that Mujahideen reinforcements were moving along this route. As a
minimum, they could have employed scatterable mines on the road, but
they left the route open.
Clearly there were intelligence failures on both sides. The DRA and
Soviets had ample opportunity to collect information on Zhawar, but
failed to determine the basic outline of the Mujahideen defenses and
their manning. The DRA and Soviets never detected the presence of
the Mujahideen regiment that slipped away at the crucial juncture and
allowed their victory. The Mujahideen, on the other hand, should have
been aware that Zhawar was at risk since the DRA had been moving
forces toward the Khost valley for some forty days. Yet, the leadership
of Zhawar was out of country during the lengthy build-up. The usual
Mujahideen sources failed to tip them off as to the start time of the assault
or the air assault. And, although the pathfinder commando element that
landed in Pakistan was overrun by Mujahideen, these Mujahideen did
not get the word to Zhawar. The Zhawar defenders were surprised by
the air assault of the commando main body.
The DRA and Soviet reluctance to hold Zhawar for any length of time
in order to do a thorough job of destroying the base is a strong testament
to the ability of the Mujahideen to threaten their lines of communication.
The commanders had no desire to risk being trapped in Zhawar and
having to mount yet another operation to fight their way in and out of
Zhawar. Their reserves were committed and the danger was real.
The DRA celebrated the fall of Zhawar with parades and medals as
a major victory. But Zhawar was back in full operation within weeks of
the attack. Having been trapped in the caves, the Mujahideen learned
to make connecting tunnels between caves. They reopened the caves
and built connecting tunnels. The caves were improved and lengthened
to 400-500 meters long.49 In retrospect, the battles of Zhawar seem to
have been exercises in futility, but at the time, they were considered tests
of whether the DRA could stand up to the Mujahideen after the Soviet
withdrawal.
________________________________________
Annex 1: Correspondence between
General Varrenikov and General Sokolov
SECRET (URGENT)
USSR Ministry of Defense
To Marshal of the Soviet Union
Comrade S. L. Sokolov
I report.
Preliminary results from the combat conducted by the Afghan Army in the region
of Khost may be evaluated as unsatisfactory, although the Mujahideen suffered
significant personnel and weapons losses.
Reasons
1. The forces and aviation assigned to the operation were poorly trained and the
personnel had poor morale and fighting spirit. The combat potential of the divisions
was weak and their potential was very limited. Further, the commanders of the 7th,
8th, and 14th Infantry Divisions and, especially, the commander of the III Corps were
completely unprepared to lead their forces.
2. At the start of the operation, there was an incomplete intelligence picture and
a wrong estimate of enemy strength. Enemy strength was much greater than deter-
mined. The close proximity of Pakistan allowed the enemy complete maneuverability
and the unimpeded capability to replace personnel and weapons losses. Further, the
Mujahideen were able to use strong fire support from the territory of Pakistan. This
was particularly true against our forces moving along the border.
Young, well-trained, steadfast Pakistanis participated directly in the battle in the base
region of Zhawar and Miram Shah (south of Khost).
3. This was an unfortunate time of year to conduct combat. A more advantageous time
would have been in January to the start of February or in April. The end of February
and March are characterized by an abundance of rain mixed with snow (particularly
this year). This forced the troops to move through the thawed mud along the existing
road under enemy fire.
4. The difficult weather, length of the combat (30 days) and the “uncomfortable”
column formation forced on the troops in their advance to the international border
exhausted the troops and led to low morale. The short preparation time for combat in
Khost from 31 March to 4 April did not revitalize the forces.
5. During the course of combat, the leadership tolerated nonobjective estimates of the
situation, false situation reports and false combat reports. As a result, they were unable
to provide the necessary picture of the situation.
6. There were mistakes in the conduct of the assault landing. The planning was
conducted correctly. However, the practical application was organized unsatisfactorily.
Because of this, the assault force was scattered over LZs located four to 20 kilometers
from their planned LZs and this allowed the Mujahideen to defeat the air assault in the
course of a day. The preparation of the helicopter crew navigators was unsatisfactory
and they were poorly oriented on the terrain during the landing. They only had
bearings and times of flight. These were the main reasons for the errors.
Measures that were taken
1. Additional massive air and artillery strikes were planned and conducted on strong
points and pin-pointed enemy firing points. The “Shleyf” round was employed (on the
approaches to the base, strong points equipped with cement structures, and armored
cupolas of dug-in tanks).
2. Reinforcing units were moved into the combat zone. These included the 50th
Infantry Regiment from the 18th Infantry Division, the 81st Infantry Regiment from the
11th Infantry Division, an infantry regiment from the 21st Mechanized Infantry Brigade
and a battalion of spetsnaz.
Soviet forces were moved to support the Afghan forces. These included two battalions
from a separate air assault brigade and two battalions from a separate parachute
regiment.
3. All types of intelligence collection were reinforced, particularly that directed against
the Zhadran tribe.
4. The leadership of the Afghan forces was reinforced. With this goal, General-
Lieutenant Azimi (who was ill) was replaced by General-Lieutenant Gafur to direct the
battle....
The Army Chief of Staff directed the 40th Army units. Overall coordination of all the
forces was provided by General-Lieutenant V. P. Grishin (Operations Group of the
Ministry of Defense, USSR in Afghanistan).
Preventive Measures (lessons learned)
1. It is necessary to take radical measures to replenish the personnel in the Afghan

Army (particularly in the 1st and III Army Corps). Right now, the line strength of the
combat divisions is 200-300 men . . . . [Desertion, combat loses and an inefficient
conscript system bled divisions down to mini-battalion size.] . . . .
5. Refrain from conducting large-scale independent actions by the Afghan forces,

particularly those that last a long time or are conducted far from their garrisons.
Combat must not exceed 10-12 days.
6. The forces must not conduct actions against Mujahideen bases located close to the
border or in a region where it is impossible to isolate the enemy from the arrival of
his reserves. These regions should be subjected to massive aviation strikes, dropping
powerful bombs, scatterable mines, etc.
Further actions
....Consider that the result of the conduct of military actions will convey a significant
military-political ideal, it is expedient to increase the aviation strikes to the maximum,
to destroy enemy points and simultaneously take measures to train the Afghan forces
for decisive battle....
Varrenikov
April 198650
The Minister of Defense of the USSR replied with the following order to the Operations
Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan:
SECRET
First Deputy Chief of the General Staff
General of the Army Comrade V. I. Varrenikov
Chief Military Adviser in the DRA

General-Colonel Comrade V. A. Vostrov
The Chief Military Adviser in the DRA and his operatives were mistaken in their
estimate of the size of the enemy groupings and their potential in Paktia Province.
During the preparation for combat, they did not consider the changes which had
occurred since 1985 in that region. The Mujahideen have received new weapons and
equipment and learned from the experience of the 1985 strike in that region. The
timing of the operation was a mistake. In the course of the operation, neither the new
Chief Military Adviser to the DRA, General-Colonel V. A. Vostrov, nor the Operational
Group of the USSR Ministry of Defense took the necessary measures in order to
correct the errors in a timely manner.
I demand:
1. The conduct of a comprehensive estimate of the correlation of forces assembled

in the region of Khost. Improve intelligence activities against the enemy. Conduct air
strikes based on targets identified by intelligence and cease area bombing.
2. Organize troop control. Subordinate the reinforcing units brought from the center of
the country to the appropriate division commanders before accepting combat again.
3. If necessary, delay your offensive actions for several days. Ready the units and
subunits of the Afghan forces for the upcoming combat. Replenish their ammunition
and material stocks and clarify their combat missions. Organize coordination with
aviation.
4. Your plan for the conduct of future combat will be present for confirmation by 17
April.
Sokolov
312/1/07 sh
April 198651
________________________________________
1. Claude Malhauret, Afghan Alternative Seminar, Monterey, California, November

1993.
2. Ali Ahmad Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen
Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, to be published in 1998, xvii and Chapter 11, page
1.
3. Interviews with participants Lieutenant Omar and Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani in
Jalali and Grau, chapter 11.
4. Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan’s Untold Story,
London: Leo Cooper, 168.
5. Ibid, 111.
6. Ibid. 159.
7. General Shahnawaz Tani was from the neighboring town of Tani and enjoyed
some popular support in the area. He later became DRA Defense Minister.
8. Omar and Haqani.
9. Perhaps this was a reconnaissance in force.
10. Local name for the chalk layers in the rock that mark this saddle.
11. Aleksandr Lyakhovskiy, Tragediya i doblest’ Afgana [The Tragedy and Valor of the
Afghan Veterans], Moscow: Iskona, 1995, 300-301.
12. General of the Army Valentin Leonidovich Varrenikov was head of the operations
group of the Soviet Ministry of Defense in Afghanistan from 1985-1989.
13. Viktor Kutsenko, “Dzhavara” [Zhawar], Soldat udachi [Soldier of Fortune], July
1996, 24. Soldat udachi is affiliated with the American Soldier of Fortune magazine
and does translate and print some articles on weapons and warfare from its parent
magazine, but is an editorially-independent magazine that has enjoyed popularity in
Russia and serves as a publishing outlet for veterans from Afghanistan, Chechnya,
Ethiopia, Angola, and Mozambique. Some 60-percent of its articles are written by
Russians.
14. Lyakhovskiy, 301.
15. Ibid.
16. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovskiy, 307-308.
17. Kutsenko, 24.
18. The 1st and 3d battalions of the 191 Separate Motorized Rifle Regiment stationed
in Gazni.
19. Lyakhovksiy, 301.
20. S. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 306-309.
21. The maximum size this force could have been was sixty men, since the Mi-8 could
lift ten fully-equipped men at this altitude.
22. Kutsenko, 24-25.
23. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi Abdul-
Rahman in Jalali and Grau, Chapter 11.
24. Following Zhawar Two, the 38th Commando Brigade became the base of the
newly-formed 2nd Division. Casualty figures vary. The Soviet figures are 312 landed of
which 25 survived. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309.
25. Most probably, these were KAB-1500L-PR laser-guided bombs launched from
the SU-25 ground attack aircraft. The KAB-1500L-PR carries a 1100 kilogram (2425
pound) warhead and can penetrate two meters of reinforced concrete buried in 20
meters of soil. It has a one-two meter CEP (circular error probable). Yuri Zuenko
and Sergey Korostelev, Boevye samolety Rossii [Russian Combat Aircraft], Moscow:
ELAKOS, 1994, 170-171.
26. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani and Mawlawi Abdul-
27. Ibid.
28. Korennoy in Lyakhovksi, 309.
29. Ibid
31. Ibid. Spetsnaz is a Russian term for Special Forces used in long-range reconnais-
sance and rugged fighting.
32. The 1st and 3d Battalions of the 345th Separate Parachute Regiment stationed at
Bagram, the 4th Battalion of the 56th Air Assault Brigade and another battalion of this
brigade stationed at Gardez and 2d Battalion of the 191st Separate Motorized Rifle
Regiment stationed in Ghazni. The airborne and air assault battalions flew in Khost
airfield while the Motorized Rifle Battalion drove into Tani.
33. Lyakhovski, 301.
34. Kutsenko, 25.
37. Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 310. At the end of 1988, Colonel Aleksandr Rutskoy, who
was by then the deputy to the 40th Army Commander for aviation, was flying in this
same region and was again shot down-this time with an air-to-air missile. He landed
in Pakistan and was captured, and subsequently ransomed by the Soviet government.
He was decorated with the title of “Hero of the Soviet Union.” Later, Rutskoy entered
politics and became the Vice President of the Russian Federation. However, in
October 1993, he lead the opposition to Russian Federation President Yeltsin. He was
arrested. In February 1994, he was freed from imprisonment by decree of the Duma of
the Russian Federation.
38. Yousaf and Adkin, 171 and interviews conducted by Ali Jalali with Mujahideen in
the fall of 1996. Mr. Jalali’s sources chose to remain anonymous since they were
sworn to secrecy at the time.
40. Kutsenko, 25.
41. Interviews with Lieutenant Omar, Mawlawi Nezamuddin Haqani, and Mawlawi Abdul-
42 Korennoy in Lyakhovski, 311.
43. Nan is an unleavened oval-shaped flatbread, ranging in size from a small to a
regular pizza.
44. Kutsenko, 25-26.
45. Ibid, 26.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
49. Veterans of Zhawar have proposed to Haqani that the caves be restored and kept
as a museum so that 200 years from now, people can visit them and reflect on their
heritage. From 7-9 May 1990, 47 major Mujahideen field commanders from all over
Afghanistan met at Zhawar in the first united of all major commanders of all factions.
The purpose was to chart post-Soviet military strategy. Zhawar was chosen for the
conference for its symbolic importance. Afghan Information Center Monthly Bulletin,
Peshawar, May 1990.
50. Lyakhovski, 302-303.
51. Ibid, 304.
Ali Ahmad Jalali, former Interior Minister of Afghanistan (January 2003-

September 2005), is currently serving as a Distinguished Professor at the
Near East South Asia Center for Strategic Studies (NESA) at the National
Defense University in Washington D.C. He served as the Director of Afghan-
istan National Radio Network Initiative and Chief of the Pashto and Persian
Services at the Voice of America in Washington D.C. He covered the war in
Afghanistan (1982-1993) and extensively traveled in the former Soviet Central
Asian republics. A former officer in the Afghan Army, Colonel Jalali served
as a top military planner with the Afghan Resistance following the Soviet in-
vasion of Afghanistan. He graduated from high command and staff colleges
in Afghanistan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and the Soviet Union.
A published writer in three languages (English, Pashto, Dari/Farsi), Ali A.
Jalali is the author of numerous books and articles on political, military and
security issues in Afghanistan, Iran and Central Asia.
Mountain
Reconnaissance
Russian Style
based on the work of Colonel Michael Panov
This article first appeared in the March-April 2010 edition of Infantry
Sensors are wonderful; unmanned reconnaissance planes are great.

But sensors cannot detect all activity, particularly in the mountains. Heat
sensors can be defeated with a piece of carpet or a space blanket. Motion
sensors can be defeated by freezing in place, since many sensor platforms
are noisy and readily detected. Sensors should not be the sole basis of
tactical intelligence. Human intelligence, derived from the local populace,
is an integral part of tactical intelligence. But the best tactical intelligence
still comes from boots on the ground. Sensors can identify areas that
require a closer look, but the eyes of the skilled scout are still the best way
to know what is going on in the folds and recesses of the mountains.
Movement in the mountains is difficult. It is not just the climbing and
the effects of thinner air at altitude. The mountains can be a very harsh and
unforgiving environment. Observation is not always enhanced by altitude
and the distances are difficult to gauge by the novice. Communications and
supply are difficult. The following Russian article discusses mountain con-
ditions and movement considerations while scouting in them.
You’re Not On the Plains Here:

Combat Experience of Reconnaissance
Units in Mountainous Terrain
Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007 1
H ow reconnaissance groups move around in mountainous terrain

is very different from how they move on level ground. In the

mountains, they will encounter rapid rivers, cliffs, impassable ravines,

ranges, mountain passes, and icy and snowy slopes. The scouts will
face rockfalls and ice or snow avalanches. Severe climatic conditions
(hurricane-force winds, thunderstorms, gales) in mountainous areas can
negatively impact a reconnaissance group’s operational capability since
Mountain Reconnaissance -- Russian Style 81
changes in weather fatigue them and the hot sun of the mountains make
it hard to rest normally during the daytime.
However, in spite of the scouts’ enormous difficulties in the mountains,
it is precisely the mountain conditions that provide maximum stealth
for setting up camp and moving to combat locations. This material will
deal with how to move about correctly in mountain terrain and put its
advantages to maximum use.
To operate successfully in the mountains, scouts need to be specially
trained in conditions that most closely approximate the conditions of the
locality in which they will have to operate behind enemy lines. From
the standpoint of ease of movement, mountain terrain can tentatively be
divided into: foothills (600-1,800 meters above sea level), and mountain
(1,800-3,000 m) and high mountain areas (3,000 and above). Although
tentative, this division is important when evaluating mountain terrain for
reconnaissance actions.
Frequent and drastic temperature change in the mountains produces
phenomena that are very dangerous for scouts, which is why they have
to be able to use different external signs to identify these phenomena
and take timely safety measures. Above all, the scouts must be able to
determine in a timely fashion that inclement weather — thunderstorms,
gales, snowstorms, etc.— is approaching.
Each scout should be familiar with the mountain climate and be able
to take timely protective measures.
Solar radiation is much stronger in mountains than on plains and it
increases with elevation. Ultraviolet rays greatly affect the human body.
Sunburn is possible. The sun’s rays harm the retina, causing acute pain
and at times even temporary blindness. Sun glasses should be used
to protect the eyes. The face should be protected with wide-brimmed
headgear or gauze covering mask; breaks and rests should be taken in
the shade.
Thin air is one of the numerous difficulties that are encountered in
mountain conditions. Scouts who have not been properly trained or
acclimated to the elevation experience oxygen deprivation, which
causes “altitude sickness,” accompanied by breathlessness, headache,
nausea, vomiting, and so on. Thin air weakens the joints of the arms and
legs, which could easily result in dislocation of the leg or arm even from
a minor fall.
Thunderstorms create the risk of being struck by lightning,
especially when scouts are on the crest of a slope, hilltop, or ledge. When
a thunderstorm is approaching, you should seek cover in a cave or snow
pit. Do not get under single overhanging rocks. Large metallic articles
should be set apart and covered during a thunderstorm.
If the situation does not allow the scouts to wait out the storm because
they have to “shake off” an enemy tail, they should continue along icy
or snowy slopes, where there is less danger of being struck by a bolt of
lightning, although a new danger arises, that of ice or snow avalanches.
Thunderstorms are usually accompanied by heavy rain or snow-
storms, which makes it difficult and very dangerous to move in the
mountains because the grassy and rocky slopes become slippery.
Rain can trigger rock falls and snow/ice avalanches. You need to move
carefully in these conditions and keep a close watch on all sides. It is
known that atmospheric discharges more commonly strike tall, solitary
trees. To seek cover under them from a thunderstorm is to subject
oneself to danger.
Snowfall in the mountains makes it difficult to take one’s bearings
and visually monitor the terrain, which could mean falling completely
unexpectedly into a deep snow-covered fracture. Snowfall raises the
risk of snow slides. Snow can penetrate clothes and cause cold weather
injury. It makes sense to seek cover and wait out heavy snowfall.
Special care, belay and self-belay should be practiced if it is
necessary to continue to move during a snowstorm. Snow slides are most
likely on moderately steep slopes because snow does not usually stick
on very steep slopes. There could be slides from smooth rocky slopes
as well as from smooth slopes covered by tall grass. With thaw, rain, or
a warm wind, the mass of snow that has accumulated in the mountains
begins to melt and breaks away, forming wet snow slides. Slide-prone
regions can be identified by dug-out channels, broken trees and shrubs,
and large piles of snow at the base of a slope. These areas should be
circumvented. If it is not possible to circumvent, the snow should be
tested for firmness. The recommended method is to move along one
route, following in each other’s footsteps, in single file, with more distance
(five-six meters) between the men.
If a scout does find himself in a slide, he should do everything to
remain on the surface of the moving snow and immediately close his nose
and mouth so as not to be suffocated by snow powder. If, despite his
efforts, a scout is engulfed by snow, he should assume a vertical position
and work vigorously to make a space for air around his mouth and chest,
and then try to burrow to the snow surface by expanding the space.
The chief causes of ice avalanches are drastic temperature changes
in the mountains and the weight of masses of ice. To be safe, areas of
possible avalanches should be traversed early in the morning when
packed ice stays in place. These areas should be negotiated quickly and
one at a time.
Rock falls are most dangerous after sunset and in the first few hours
after sunrise. Rock fall-prone areas can be identified by rock piles at the
foot of slopes, visible furrows from tumbling rocks, and scree and dust
on ledges. Dangerous areas should be negotiated quickly, one by one,
moving from cover to cover and keeping an eye on the slopes above.
After protracted rain and abundant snow thaw in the mountains, the
upper soil layer becomes waterlogged. In some areas there is a build-up
of semi-liquid masses of water, sand, pebbles, dirt, rock fragments, and so
on. These masses of dirt and stones [mud-rock flow] sometimes slide down
the slopes and along the valleys. A mudslide usually moves slowly, but on
occasion it can fall without warning, sweeping away everything in its path.
It is easy to identify mudslide-prone areas because of the accumulation of
dirt, stones, and scree in the mountain valleys and at the foot of slopes.
There are other difficulties in addition to the ones mentioned above,
first and foremost orientation difficulties. It is difficult to take one’s bearings
in the mountains, even with a map and compass. When choosing a
direction on a map, it should be borne in mind that distances measured
on a map are roughly 8-10 percent less than in actuality because a map
shows a projection rather than the actual distance; neither does it take
into account possible deviations from the planned route.2
It is difficult and dangerous to march at night in mountainous
areas, especially where there are no roads or trails. Moving along an
unexplored path at night could cause casualties.
Prior to a march, the group commander should reconnoiter the route
to determine where there could be rock falls or snow or ice avalanches,
and where there is cover; how to get over or bypass the hardest sections;
where and how to ford mountain rivers [gorges]; and where to set up day
rests or temporary cover in a thunderstorm.
In addition, the group commander needs to map landmarks that can
easily be used at night and figure out the distances to them, as well as
adjust route times and map reference points.
Prior to leaving the base area, the group commander should task
his deputy or the most experienced scout with carefully monitoring the
surroundings for at least two hours, paying particular attention to the
direction of the planned march. The group usually sets up an observation
post for this purpose on a commanding height to which the scout goes
in secret and carries out surveillance with an optical device.
The unique characteristics of marching in the mountains require
correct regulation of meals and water intake. The meals of scouts
operating in the mountains should be substantial. With the major
physical stress, they should receive a hot meal once or twice per day.
A strict water intake schedule will keep the scouts combat ready and
Figure 1. Descent with stick, spade or rope belay.
prevent “altitude sickness.”

While on the move, water intake should be limited to small amounts
drunk from a canteen. A little bit of salt should be added to the drinking
water because water in the mountains lacks salt. It is categorically
forbidden to consume ice or snow instead of water [as they lower core
body temperature].
A successful mountain trek depends largely on preliminary
preparation and the group commander’s level of experience. When
preparing for a mountain trek you should thoroughly examine your
footgear, wash your feet and carefully smooth your socks or foot wraps
so that they do not chafe your feet; you should lighten your load as much
as possible, taking only vital necessities. You should place something
soft between the load and your back, and pad the straps of the backpack
(rucksack), using grass or moss.
You should breathe evenly while on the move, inhaling only through
the nose and exhaling fully. You should not speak when climbing up the
mountain and under no circumstances should you smoke. Brief three-
five minute stops are usually taken to restore normal breathing rhythm.
Move at an even pace, bending slightly and not straining. When
going uphill, tilt the body slightly forward and step on the entire sole
without bobbing. When going downhill, tilt the body back and step on
the heel so as not to slide or fall (figure 1).
On steep slopes, your feet should be wrapped in rope or wire, or you
should wear specially-adapted footgear to prevent sliding. You should
Figure 2. “Herringbone” and “Sidestep.”
loosen your belt slightly and undo your collar. Your step length should
match the steepness of the slope. The steeper the climb, the shorter
the step you should take. When going downhill, your step should be
increased somewhat.
If the route is not along roads or tracks, you should walk uphill in
a zigzag pattern rather than straight upward to make it easier, and
“sidestep” or “herringbone” (figure 2). When going over unstable
stones, talus, or narrow passes on a precipice, place your sole where
there is a toehold and do not remove it until you have placed the other
foot forward in a firm position.
Move carefully on steep rocky slopes so as not to kick downward
rocks that could injury the scouts below. Use a stick on steep slopes. It
is a good idea to carve out steps roughly 50 centimeters apart to make
it easier to climb on steep, slippery, clayey, or icy slopes. Steps can be
made by stamping in soft ground or in snow.
When going uphill on a grassy slope, your legs should be moved
forward slightly, and the heavier the load and the steeper the slope, the
further forward you should lean. When the climb is straight, your feet
should be placed at an angle to each other in a “herringbone” pattern.
The steeper the slope, the wider your foot angle should be, and the
shorter the steps you take. Set your foot down on the entire sole. You
should zigzag on long steep grassy slopes, and if the slope is sparsely
covered with talus or rocks, you should move more tightly and not kick
the talus downward.
Figure 3. Training gorge for practicing mountain techniques.

All scouts should practice mountain techniques, including those
whose units are deployed on level ground. They can use training gorges
for this purpose (figure 3).
Colonel Panov’s article emphasizes features of mountain movement

and climate. Slow is fast in the mountains and steady, methodical movement,
light packs, and acclimated physically-fit troops are necessary for mountain
patrols. Effective patrols may last for days or weeks. Russian scouts are
considered elite forces that perform missions that might be assigned to
long-range reconnaissance patrols (LRRP) or special operations forces.
Like US forces, scouts are assigned down to infantry battalion level.
Injured or wounded scouts are a problem in the mountains. Scouts
frequently move at altitudes that are above helicopter ceilings. During
the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets usually committed 12 troops to carry a
single casualty down to the point a helicopter could reach the patient. Four
men would carry, four would provide security and four would be ready to
take over the carrying mission. A small number of casualties could quickly
decimate a patrol.
________________________________________
1. Michael Panov, “Zdes’ vam ne ravnina…” [You’re not on the plains here…”],
Armeiskiy Sbornik [Army Digest], May 2007, 24-26.
2. GPS does not always work particularly well in the mountains. Mountain configur-
ations can cause over a 500-meter circular area probable (CEP). Do not trust GPS
readings without confirming them on the map sheet.
Artillery In the Mountains 87
Moving Artillery Forward:

A Concept for the
Fight in Afghanistan
Major Joseph A. Jackson, US Army
This article first appeared in the March 23, 2010 Small Wars Journal blog.
T he United States Army is no stranger to mountainous and high-

altitude war fighting. American history contains many instances of
successfully executed mountain conflicts. Central to this success was the
movement and use of artillery in direct support of those campaigns. The
first notable American instance of moving artillery across mountainous
terrain occurred when Colonel Henry Knox’s Continental Army soldiers
wheeled, sledged, and levered the guns from Fort Ticonderoga across
the Berkshire Mountains in the winter of 1776. These fifty-nine assorted
cannon became the deciding factor in General George Washington’s
siege of Boston. Other notable campaigns include the U.S. Army
operations in the Italian Alps during World War II, the Taebaek Range
of Korea, and the Annamite Range in Vietnam. Each of these locations
and conditions provides ample instruction on artillery use in mountain
warfare; yet this time fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan is proving
to be a greater challenge than anticipated.
Strategists and commanders who consider employment of artillery
in Afghanistan should take a fresh look at history, doctrine, and tactical
concepts. Doing so will ensure artillery can employ optimally, and
in sufficient strength, and of the correct caliber to create the tactical
conditions for success. Without a significant increase in firepower
delivered by a correspondingly lightweight and maneuverable field
howitzer, the long-range fight in Afghanistan will devolve into an even
deadlier and protracted conflict.
Solely relying on technology and precision munitions incrementally
applied across the current arsenal will not achieve the conditions to
exploit and pursue the insurgent fighters ever higher and farther into
the mountains between Afghanistan and Pakistan. Operational planners,
artillery professionals, congressional staffers, and military acquisition
officers should examine these relevant histories, review doctrine, and
consider their implications. These sources serve as a guide to develop
successful and sustained operational approaches to combat the Afghan
insurgency. They also provide a reference for adaptive tactics and
procurement requirements for weapons needed in protracted high-
altitude mountain warfare.
Defining the Operational Environment

In Afghanistan, the terrain and weather dictate the tactics and choice
of weapons. Understanding the operational environment necessitates
consideration of multiple factors. These dynamics include warfare in
mountains that force non-linear fighting, training that does not prepare
soldiers for vertical terrain, awkward and counterproductive positioning
of the weapons, changing and treacherous weather conditions, and
punishing temperatures that renders troops less effective.
In Afghanistan, significant mountain ranges such as the Himalayas
and the Karakoram rise in the east. The Hindu Kush towers in the center
of the country. The Suleman and Kirthar ranges jut toward the eastern
border with Pakistan and extend into Baluchistan. Finally, the Paghman
Range shrouds the capital city of Kabul. These ranges elevate more
than two-thirds of Afghanistan’s territory above 5,000 feet. These ranges
provide natural concealment and protection for the insurgent fighters.
Fighting in extremely mountainous terrain and at high-altitudes is
not linear. While forces move along pre-designated phase lines as on flat
terrain, difficulties arise in maintaining continuity between units as they
methodically scale from one point to the next. Fronts do not necessarily
follow contiguous and sequential sets of ridges; they may even require
simultaneous attacks on crests, ledges, and tactical objectives in opposite
directions. A valley floor lying several thousand meters below may
provide the only geographical point of continuity.1
Most armies train and equip themselves for conventional warfare on
terrain that facilitates effective command and control and allows efficient
employment of combined arms. Ideal terrain for mechanized forces are
wide plains, rolling hills, plateaus, deserts, or sparsely populated regions
that favor the linear and contiguous properties of maneuver warfare.
None of these conditions is present in the bordering highlands along the
eastern length of Afghanistan.
Extreme terrain also constrains fire support weapons. Artillery
faces limitations imposed by steep road gradients and sharp bends that
prevent deployment of the support vehicles and guns. To maintain the
employment of guns as far forward as possible, batteries must disperse

into sections, one or two guns per position, to maximize coverage to
the supported units. To optimize the usefulness of the artillery, forces
position their guns in terrain folds and on reverse slopes. Other
positioning options include road heads, near villages, and along valleys.
Deployment of artillery is often constrained because of logistics to
support their use.2
Positioning of artillery becomes even more important when de-
fending in mountainous terrain. The drastic changes in elevation and
uneven ground make maintaining a continuous line of units tied together
along their flanks difficult. A reverse-slope defense poses problems as
well. While these positions mask unit movements and strengths, troops
often lack sufficient overhead cover. Positions become susceptible to
artillery fire and airbursts showering positions with fragmentation.3
Meteorological implications affect artillery use at higher elevations.
Low air pressure, cold temperatures, and high wind speeds make
standard firing tables ineffective.4 These conditions increase inaccuracy.
The lack of adequate maps and surveyed locations and the lack of
precise meteorological reports increase the probability of error in range
and altitude. Spotting rounds at high-altitude requires extra observers to
walk rounds onto targets and to make drastic shifts to achieve accurate
fire.
Human endurance must factor into the problem as well. Men cannot
long endure temperatures ranging from as high as 128°F and as low as
-15°F in the central highlands of Afghanistan and greater Southwest Asia.
Prolonged exposure at high-altitudes depletes the strength of infantry
units and requires frequent rotations of the troops.5 This condition places
greater responsibility for augmentation by the field artillery. Firepower
must compensate for the aggregate reduction in troop strength. The
tactical, geographical, and physical conditions interlock. Continued
exploitation of the environmental conditions by the insurgents who are
accustomed to these extremes allows them to engender more credibility
than their weaponry and troop strength warrant.
Other weapons systems do not improve these circumstances. In
fact, their limitations reinforce the demand for an artillery capability.
Aircraft are of limited utility in high-altitude operations. Atmospheric
conditions such as heavy rain, blizzards, fog, high winds, and low oxygen
density limit performance. Camouflaged ground troops use the natural
contours of the mountains that include deep shadows and overhanging
ledges to prevent visual identification by aircraft. Aircraft use in valleys is
dangerous; pre-positioned air defense weapons and massed small arms
fire force aircraft to fly higher. This technique creates a visual positive
identification problem and increases the risk of fratricide. Helicopters
serve as good artillery spotters but weather and elevation limit their
usefulness. Noise from approaching aircraft provides advance warning
for units giving them time to hide among the rocks.6
The Current Paradigm

Presently, the US Army has implemented self-limiting measures
in Afghanistan. This formidable institution refuses to commit its full
spectrum of ground combat capabilities to overwhelm the enemy forces
of the Taliban and Al Qaida. Instead, it continues to deploy its weapons in
piece-meal fashion, arriving with a force that is too little too late. Nowhere
is this more obvious than in the employment of the field artillery.
Delineating present limitations on the current artillery corps helps
define the problem. Field Artillery battalions in support of expeditionary
brigades continue to deploy with less than their full complement of
cannons. Batteries often deploy with only 50-percent of their guns while
the troops spend alternate periods serving as provisional infantry, quick
reaction forces, augment logistics activities, and a myriad of training tasks
focused on host nation capabilities. Additionally, the current arsenal
lacks mobility. Cannons positioned on Forward Operating Bases arrive
by helicopter. Once in position, they do not often reposition. U.S. artillery
limits itself to only two calibers, 105-mm and 155-mm to engage targeted
Taliban cells. Although these have proved effective in conventional wars
in the mountains of Afghanistan, two is not enough. The other choice of
weaponry, the M270, Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS), provides
a significant capability and extreme precision. However, its optimal use
fires at targets well beyond the immediate reach of the infantry involved
in the fighting where individual and crew-served weapons make the
difference.
Afghanistan presents a prolonged challenge. The restrictive practices
of US forces coupled with creative Taliban tactics create an operational
dilemma. Direct insurgent attacks against fortified positions pit enemy
rockets, rocket-propelled grenades, and machine guns against mortars,
and heavy and light crew-served weapons. The distance created by the
insurgents using these weapons ensures that rifleman cannot effectively
range them with their small arms. These tactics enable a small group of
insurgents to attack and pin down a technologically advanced force in
a fixed position. The result is that two divergent tactical fights emerge.
The first fight belongs to the infantry, fighting in platoon or squad-
sized actions at ranges of one kilometer or less. The second fight is in
the purview of the artillery as it attempts to fight a much deeper battle
against selected small targets out to 30 kilometers (see figure 1).
Figure 1: Field Artillery Application and Capability Gap in Afghanistan.7
Taliban groups study and comprehend the US tactics. They observe

that artillery remains fixed on bases and lacks mobility to follow the
infantry into the deep defiles and higher elevations. After eight years of
conflict, insurgent fighters further understand the limitations of shell fuse
combinations and the restrictions that the environment places on rotary
and fixed wing aircraft. By moving under cover of the mountains and
along remote paths, they can avoid US radar and the limited number of
forward observers who can engage them.
Insurgent fighters use the natural shape, strength, and remoteness
of mountains to retain their freedom of maneuver and create the
conditions for a long-range fight. They utilize the man-made caves that
served them well during the Soviet conflict twenty years ago. Cave
utilization forces heavily encumbered American soldiers to pursue the
enemy into forbidding regions often beyond the range of direct support
artillery. While mortars may provide a quick response, they still lack
the punch, mass, and range to support the fight in Afghanistan for the
long-term. This lack limits the ability of offensive forces to achieve two
important aspects of offensive operations –– exploitation and pursuit.
The inadequate application of combat power over the past six years
facilitated the increase in hostilities by the Taliban (see figure 2).
As recently as 2009, improved insurgent tactics now include firing
volleys of rocket-propelled grenades, mortar rounds, and missiles from
the back of trucks to allow insurgent groups to maneuver to disrupt
coalition forces and seize key objectives such as remote outposts and
Figure 2: Location and Percentage of Taliban Attacks by Region in Afghanistan.

Source: School of Advanced Military Studies, Exercise One.
Data Extracted from U.S. Government Accounting Office Report on Iraq and Afghanistan, March 2009.
towns. The lack of coalition troops in any given area and a corresponding
lack of artillery to mitigate that deficiency in troop density has allowed
the insurgency to fight along increasingly conventional lines not
witnessed since Operation Anaconda in 2002.8 The tactical dilemma
that presented itself then emerges again now. The weapon system
designed to engage in the long-range fight (cannons, howitzers, and
rockets) remains noticeably absent from the majority of the fighting in
significant numbers.
The Lens of History

The Soviet occupation and American approaches to fighting in
Afghanistan warrant attention and denote significant but important
contrasts. For the Soviet Union’s five and two-thirds divisions, the geo-
graphical and operational limitations of Afghanistan reinforced the
Soviet reliance on artillery as the centerpiece of their army formations.
In contrast, Afghanistan has been an example of limited incremental
technological application for the United States.
The complexity of fighting in Afghanistan produced an arguably
counter-intuitive response for the Soviets. At first glance, the task of
fighting an asymmetric enemy in largely uncharted territory would
seem to warrant limited artillery formations in favor of lighter and more
mobile forces. However, the experience of the Soviet artillery corps in
Figure 3: Diagram of the Artillery Ambush near Talukan, Afghanistan February 1986.
Source: Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.
http://www.ciaonet.org/cbr/cbr00/video/cbr_ctd/cbr_ctd_51.html (accessed 10 August 2009).
the prosecution of the army’s campaigns clearly noted that it remained

a central combat arm in counterinsurgency warfare. Despite the limited
maneuver space, winding mountain roads, and narrow valleys, creative
methods of utilization allowed the artillery in certain circumstances to
fight with limited or no infantry support. Moreover, the Soviet infantry
fully appreciated the necessity for maintaining adequate fire support
assets on all types of missions given the limited numbers of infantry
battalions attempting to cover the entire country.
The Soviet Artillery Corps worked to integrate their weapons systems
into the overall operational plan, rather than work to the exclusion of other
arms. Mortars in significant numbers shared battle space with howitzers,
aircraft, and cannons in large numbers synchronized their efforts against
objectives, the Soviets sought to integrate as many weapons systems of
as many calibers as possible to execute a combat mission. The Soviets
did not permit the Mujahedeen’s tactical exploitation of the environment
to dictate the terms of the utility of rockets and howitzers, both towed and
self-propelled systems proved useful. The decentralization of the artillery
to support infantry platoon, company, and battalion level operations also
revealed that Soviet Army officers became more adaptive and innovative
over time. Though initially resistant to change, the Soviet Army proved
increasingly flexible and adaptive out of tactical necessity.
Two notable examples illustrate the effectiveness of the Soviet
artillery in Afghanistan. First, the successful artillery ambush conducted
by Lieutenant V. Kozhbergenov, a D30 (122-mm) howitzer platoon leader,
displays the accuracy that Soviet artillery operating in decentralized
platoons could achieve through indirect and unobserved fire planning
(figure 3). At night, the Realii-U operator, (a seismic recording device),
reported that 10-15 people, two trucks and pack animals were passing
through the eastern most target area, number 112. The platoon leader
fired three concentrations. As the Mujahedeen continued to approach
concentration 111, the gunners fired a volley. Then, the first piece
switched to fire concentration 110 and the third piece switched to fire
concentration 112. Number 2 gun continued to fire on concentration 111.
The platoon destroyed two Toyota trucks, four pack animals and six men
as well as destroying small arms and ammunition.9
In a second example, the Soviets made maximum use of a battalion of
152-mm 2S3 howitzers in direct fire mode in 1986 in the Baghlan Province
of Afghanistan. A battalion of self-propelled howitzers employed direct
fire across a wide front and moved forward by coordinated bounds
by battery. Each successive bound brought the guns between 100
and 150 meters closer to their targets. The supporting towed 122-mm
D30 artillery battery groups continued to fire concentrations across a
one-and-a-half kilometer front and a depth of three kilometers. These
concentrations effectively pinned the enemy inside the valley and the
fortified villages, while the maneuvering 152-mm batteries systematically
reduced specific enemy targets. By matching the sequencing of the fire
plan to map lines, the guns accurately shifted fires from one line to the
next destroying the enemy-covered firing positions.10 The integrated
fire plan successfully suppressed the opposition and enabled the
capture of the village with limited exposure of Soviet troops to enemy
fire. It eliminated the village stronghold.
For the Soviet Army changing tactics and fully integrating their
indirect firing systems into the fighting gave them an increased level
of success. The final withdrawal from Afghanistan rested not on faulty
tactics. The Soviet political leadership in Moscow realized that the
continued cost in lives and materiel could not substantiate or guarantee
a clear political victory.12
The Artillery Gap of Operation Anaconda

In 2002, the United States committed troops to fight in Paktia province.
Ironically, this had also been the location of brutal fighting between the
Soviets and the mujahedeen during the Soviet-Afghan War. The Shah-
i-Kot Valley, the “Place of the King” had historically been a refuge for
Afghan guerrillas. The valley became the scene for one of the largest
battles of the US-Afghan War.
The fighting in the Shah-i-Kot valley rested on two inferences. First,
that Al Qaida would not stand and fight, and second, that those weapons
systems at hand (mortars and fixed and rotary-wing aircraft) would be

sufficient to handle any fighting that did occur. In the months prior to
Operation Anaconda, the US military, coalition special operations troops,
and local Afghan militias banded together and defeated Al Qaida and
elements of the Taliban in their attempt to control of the city of Kandahar
and a few weeks later at Tora Bora.12
The United States Army did not recognize the fallacy in those
assumptions until after fighting in the Shah-i-Kot Valley commenced.
During Operation Anaconda, 1-18 March 2002, unlike the previous Soviet
intervention, no artillery was present for the coalition and American
troops. This absence of artillery created a noticeable capability gap
that placed an increased burden on other weapons platforms such as
mortars, helicopters, and an array of fixed-wing aircraft. Eventually, the
application of mortars combined with air power destroyed large stores
of enemy munitions, sealed off caves, spoiled a would-be counterattack,
and scattered the survivors.13
Unfortunately, the notable achievements made by the use of
coordinated close air support did not occur before significant delays,
including fratricide, occurred in the original plan for the operation.
Initially, the enemy retained the advantage in weapons and used them to
disrupt the sweep through the valley. They not only possessed mortars
of equal and greater caliber than the Americans, but also employed D30,
122-mm howitzers that could range the length of the valley floor.14 In
response, U.S. forces employed a number of aircraft including Apache
AH-64 helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft that included A-10s, F-15Es,
F-18s, and AC-130 gunships. These eventually bridged the gap between
the limited mortar range and total lack of friendly artillery.
It is doubtful that the use of the current U.S. artillery arsenal in support
of Operation Anaconda would have produced a decisive change in the
immediate engagement. The overall inability of the artillery to support
the mission due to a lack of expeditionary systems is the real point of
significance. Of the two American systems that are air transportable (the
155-mm M198 and the 105-mm M119), only the M119 howitzer might
have provided some measure of equal range and impact to offset the
enemy D30s. The real value of Operation Anaconda to the artillery is
that it illustrated how unprepared the US artillery arsenal was to fight an
expeditionary war in Afghanistan’s rugged landscape.
Future Possibilities
Fighting in Afghanistan reinforces the point that the fundamentals of
artillery gunnery remain relevant regardless of the nature of the conflict
and terrain. These recommendations serve as a basis of consideration
Figure 4: Diagram of the 75-mm Pack Howitzer from U.S. Army TM 9-319.16
Source: http://www.ww2gyrene.org/weapons_pack_howitzer.75mm.htm.
and warning that while digital advancements in weaponry and precision

munitions serve an important role, fighting in extremely mountainous
terrain also requires the ability to move and to mass fire support at close
ranges. During these engagements, aggregate rounds, not surgical
precision establish a decisive advantage. Therefore, fundamental
changes should match the demands of the operational environment.
Reforms must align people with devices, and that combination
with the geography. To accomplish this, the US Army should consider
expanding its arsenal of weapons systems and revising its doctrine.
Specifically, the 75-mm pack howitzer is ideally suited for Afghanistan.
This system, still in use by Pakistan and India along the Siachen Glacier
and Kargil regions of the Kashmir, allows the artillery to move with the
infantry into narrow defiles and up steep escarpments. It permits a high
velocity, direct or indirect fire capability to destroy targets nested in
caves and formidable terrain.
The 75-mm pack howitzer saw extensive wartime service with the
US.Army issuing them to airborne and mountain units during World War
II, (see figure 4). An airborne division, according to the organization of
February 1944, had three 75-mm howitzer battalions. Glider units fielded
two field artillery battalions that contained two 6-gun batteries each and
one parachute field artillery battalion (three 4-gun batteries) totaling 36
pieces per division. In December 1944, new Tables of Organization and
Equipment increased the divisional firepower to 60, 75-mm howitzers.
The 10th Mountain Division contained three 75-mm howitzer battalions,
containing 12 guns each.15
In the US Marine Corps, under the E-series Tables of Organization

(TO), from 15 April 1943 divisional artillery included three 75-mm
howitzer battalions of 12 guns each. The F-series TO from 5 May 1944
reduced the number of 75-mm battalions to two, and the G-series TO
eventually removed them. The Marine Corps then shifted to 105-mm
and 155-mm howitzers. Although the G-series TO was only adopted
on 4 September 1945, in practice in some divisions the change was
introduced early in 1945.17
The 75-mm howitzer, during its time of employment, proved suc-
cessful. Nearly 5,000 guns were produced. As a part of Lend Lease, more
than 800 saw service with the British forces in the Balkans where they
proved excellent for fighting in that mountainous region. Today, Afghan-
istan provides another opportunity to use this weapon or something
similar.18
As a practical matter, converting these largely ceremonial guns into
operational howitzers should not be beyond consideration. The pack
howitzer ranges out to 9 kilometers firing high explosive, anti-tank, and
smoke rounds. It disassembles into six components and its total combat
configured weight is 1,009 pounds. A concept for employment would
not require replacement of the current 105-mm and 155-mm systems
already present in Afghanistan. Instead, these weapons would augment
the infantry with platoons or sections of pack howitzers as they pursue
the Taliban into the highest points along the Afghan-Pakistan border.
Recommendations do not limit themselves to weapons systems.
Training doctrine provides the link among the soldier, weapon, and the
environment. Soldiers and leaders require access to core documents
from which to draw relevant and expedient tactics and methods. A review
of U.S. doctrinal history reveals that the army previously experienced
fighting in mountainous terrain. The following points regarding texts
and training deserve consideration. The Army should revise and publish
Field Manual 70-10 Mountain Operations, Field Manual 70-15 Operations
in Snow and Extreme Cold, and Field Manual 25-7 Pack Operations,
all published in 1944.19 These manuals explain in detail methods of
mountain warfare. The lessons and methods still apply to the mountain
ranges of Afghanistan and Southwest Asia.
Conclusion
Historical case studies and eight years of experience validate the
need and utility of a significant artillery arsenal in Afghanistan. The
rugged landscape provides a natural fortress for insurgents that make
locating and destroying them difficult.20 Transnational insurgencies
such as Al Qaida and the Taliban exploit the network of mountain ranges
between Afghanistan and Pakistan to their advantage.21 Insurgents use
the mountains and the protection they offer to maintain weapons parity
with U.S. forces. American forces must adjust to the limits imparted
by geographical and environmental conditions to offset the enemy
advantage.
Mountain warfare dictates that combatants redefine their tactics and
operational approaches to isolate and destroy these natural makeshift
forts. Creating that isolation requires artillery. However, to fill that
requirement the artillery must become mobile and directly support
a limited number of infantry with a significant volume of fire to reduce
and destroy these positions. The example of the Soviet Union’s forces
in Afghanistan points to the utility of using the full spectrum of indirect
weapons systems from mortars to rockets, towed cannon, and self-
propelled howitzers. They further reveal that field artillery can provide
a useful and leading role in shaping operations and can directly defeat
known insurgent defenses.
The United States Army’s institutional memory remains short and
neglects the fact that the field artillery proved effective in massing fires
for decades in full-spectrum operations. Whether for offense, defense,
or in deterring enemy forces, the artillery facilitated operational success
in numerous contingency operations.22 Maneuver commanders rely
upon the presence of artillery to provide “firepower insurance” –– having
organic or assigned artillery capabilities present for any eventuality.
Certainly fighting in rugged terrain with artillery presents difficulties,
but the case studies reveal that it is possible to use all types of artillery
effectively and well beyond the confines of forward operating bases
in Afghanistan and in the greater region of Southwest Asia. American
forces need weapons that can destroy a smaller force in terrain not
suitable for the current arsenal.
________________________________________
1. Lester Grau and Lieutenant Colonel Hernán Vázquez, Argentine Army. “Ground
Combat at High Altitude,” Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, KS. http://
fmso.leavenworth.army.mil/products.htm#casia (accessed March 20, 2009) 4.
2. Ibid., 9.
3. Ibid., 5.
4. Ibid., 6.
5. Ibid., 6-9.
6. Ibid., 6-9.
7. This diagram represents more than just the present mobility gap hindering combined
infantry and artillery missions. It also represents how artillery might be echeloned by
caliber according to altitude to fight in increasingly higher altitudes. The weapons systems
displayed, with the exception of the 75mm pack howitzer, are currently in use by the
U.S. Army. The Multiple Launch Rocket System typically engages targets beyond 20
kilometers and serves to fight the “deep fight” in American doctrine. Joseph A. Jackson,
Howitzers on High Ground: Considerations for Artillery in Southwest Asia, School of
Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth, KS October 2009) 35.
8. Alfred de Montesquiou, “Marines launch new Afghan assault against Taliban,”
Associated Press, http://news.yahoo.com/s/ap/20090812/ap_on_re_as/as_afghanistan
(accessed 12 August 2009).
9. Lester W. Grau, Artillery and Counterinsurgency: The Soviet Experience in Afghan-
istan, (Foreign Military Studies Office, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, June 1997) 1-9.
10. Soviet artillery proved not only extremely valuable in the offensive examples above,
but also in support of infantry breaking contact with the Mujahedeen. The supporting
artillery fired suppressing fires in front of withdrawing troops to keep the enemy from
closing or immediately reoccupying their fighting positions. Additional suppressive fires
targeted key terrain along the flanks preventing the infantry from being enveloped or from
receiving enfilading fires. The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a
Super Power Fought and Lost. Translated and edited by Lester Grau and Michael A.
Gress, (University of Kansas Press, 2002) 173-74.
11. Robert F. Baumann, Russian-Soviet Unconventional Wars in the Caucasus, Central
Asia, and Afghanistan, (Washington: U.S. Army Center for Military History, 1993) 216.
12. The US Special Forces groups to included elements of forces from USSOCOM,
JSOC and CIA’s Special Activities Division. Other units and coalition partners consisted
of TF 11, TF Bowie, and TF Dagger, British Royal Marines, and Canada’s 3d Battalion,
Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry, and Joint Task Force 2. The German KSK,
the Norwegian FSK and elements of the Australian Special Air Service Regiment, the
New Zealand Special Air Service and Danish Special Forces from Jaegerkorpset and
the Danish Frogman Corps and the Dutch Special Forces (Korps Commando Troepen)
took part in Operation Anaconda. Steve Call, Danger Close: Tactical Air Controllers in
Afghanistan and Iraq, (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2007) 59.
13. Ibid., 78.
14. The decision not to deploy even light artillery –– 105-mm cannons –– was deliberate.
General Tommy Franks concluded that there was too little airlift capability to haul the
pieces into the high altitudes. Instead, artillerymen of the 10th Mountain Division trained
to operate the 120-mm mortar. This battle in the Shah-i-Kot Valley fueled the discussion
on the use of mortars and airpower to fill the void where artillery pieces could provide
a sufficient bridge in the tactical weapons system gap. The D30 122-mm howitzer
possesses an effective range of 15.4 kilometers, with a rocket assisted projectile, this
increases to 21.9 kilometers. In contrast, the 120mm mortar’s maximum range is 7.6
kilometers. OP 4: Field Artillery in Military Operations Other Than War: An Overview of
the US Experience, (Combat Studies Institute, CSI Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas) 37.
15. The U.S. Army recently decided to use the XVIII Airborne Corps and its aligned
divisions consisting of the 82d Airborne Division, 101st Air Assault Division, and the 10th
Mountain Division to rotate through Afghanistan. These light divisions could readily
adapt to integrate a lightweight howitzer such as the 75-mm. A suitable stockpile of
these weapons could conceivably be left in theater while individual brigades would
employ them. This would allow a consistent and more mobile artillery presence in each
brigade area of operations and not increase the logistical cost of shipping more of their
own assigned artillery of 105-mm or 155-mm to Afghanistan.
16. The 75mm pack howitzer is a mobile, general purpose, field artillery piece. It is
manually operated single loaded, and uses fixed and semi fixed ammunition. The firing
mechanism is a continuous pull (self-cocking type, actuated by pulling a lanyard. The
recoil mechanism is a hydro pneumatic type, having a floating piston and a pneumatic
respirator. It provided direct or indirect fire and could elevate to fire high angle fire to
deliver plunging fire on a target to a range of 9 kilometers. Data extracted from TM
9-319 (75mm Pack Howitzer).
17. In addition to service with mule units, the 75mm howitzer became the main gun for
glider and parachute artillery battalions in World War II. Airborne units so equipped won
battle honors at Bastogne, Normandy, and Arnhem. The chief difference between pack
howitzers for mule use and those for airborne operations were the wheels. The glider
units had spoke wheels and the parachute units had pneumatic tires. See http://ibiblio.
net/pub/academic/history/marshall/military/mil_hist_inst/a/artyC.asc.
18. Other systems are readily available on the world markets ready for use. The
Italian-made OTOBREDA 105-mm howitzer, manufactured by GIAT industries –
disassembles into 11 components (a section can assemble it in three minutes) and is
transportable by pack animals. It weighs 1,310 kilograms, or 2,880 pounds. This is a
favorable savings in weight even when compared to the 4,690 pounds for the M119.
The OTOBREDA fires nine different charges with a maximum range of 18.1 kilometers.
Thirty countries presently field more than 3,000 of these systems worldwide. Tests
and actual employment of this system in demanding environments such as Sweden,
India, and Malaysia proved successful. Within the immediate area of Afghanistan,
India’s Ordnance Factory Board currently produces the India Field Gun (IFG), a 105-
mm howitzer specifically designed for mountain deployment. It weighs 2350 Kg
(5,170 pounds) with a maximum range of 17.5 kilometers and deploys by either truck
or helicopter. For heavier calibers, GIAT Industries produces the Caesar 155-mm self-
propelled howitzer. This system integrates the prime mover and gun. The gun rests
on the truck bed. The design specifically addresses the inability of towed 155-mm
howitzers to deploy into mountainous areas. Sengupta, Prasun K., “105-mm Guns for
Rapid Deployment Force and Mountain Warfare,” Asian Defence Journal, no. 3 (March
1999) 24.
19. Some reprinted field manuals do exist. Nevertheless, they remain in the prevue of
Special Operations forces. A significant portion of the army experienced fighting in rugged
terrain well beyond the units comprising the traditional Special Forces community in
Afghanistan since 2002. Previous army experience from World War II captured practical
information of mountain troops in manuals such as, FM 25-7 Pack Operations, published in
1944. Presently published as FM 3-05 Special Forces Use of Pack Animals, Department
of the Army, (Washington D.C., June 2004).
20. Ibid., 1-2.
21. Bard E. O’Neill, Insurgency and Terrorism: From Revolution to Apocalypse, 2nd ed.
(Washington D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc., 2005) 65-66.
22. Ibid., 36-41.
________________________________________
Major Joseph A. Jackson is a US Army Field Artillery officer

with de-ployment and combat experiences in Bosnia, Korea, Iraq,
and Afghanistan. He earned a bachelor’s degree in history and
Russian from Purdue University and master’s degrees from the
US Army Command and General Staff College and the School
of Advanced Military Studies. Major Jackson is presently serving
his second tour in Afghanistan with the NATO Training Mission,
(NTM-A).
Small Arms Fire 101
Small Arms Fire

Marksmanship ranges are located on flat land, firing positions are

developed for flat land, firing tables are calculated for flat land. Things
change when you shoot in the mountains. First off, it is much harder
to determine range in the mountains, second, if you shoot uphill or
downhill using flat-land marksmanship techniques, you will shoot over
the target every time. Third, the wind, the temperature and the humidity
is different in the mountains –– and all play havoc with normal flat-land
ballistics. In mountainous terrain like Afghanistan, the situation for the
soldier or marine is compounded by the primary issue firearm –– the
M16 rifle or M4 carbine. These weapons fire a light-weight, high-
velocity, short-range, flat-trajectory round in an area that requires a
heavy-weight, medium-velocity, long-range, normal-trajectory round.
From the 1870s through the Korean War, US infantry trained to
engage the enemy out past 900 yards and trained in the use of long-
range plunging fire –– a technique that works well in the mountains but does
not work well with the 5.56-mm round. The current round’s lethality
falls off markedly at 200 meters (50 meters with the M4 carbine using
standard M16 ball ammunition) and the M4 is sighted for maximum
engagement at 300 meters.
Other countries have fought in the mountains and experienced
many of the same problems. Russia has recently fought in the Caucasus
Mountains and in the Hindu Kush and Suleiman Mountains of Afghanistan.
They are working on many of the issues involved with shooting in the
mountains. Russia’s military comes from a different small arms tradition.
They see the primary use of small arms fire as suppression of the enemy
enabling the soldier to hold the enemy in place while artillery pummels
him or allows the soldier to get close enough to dispatch him. The
Kalashnikov assault rifle selector switch goes from “safe” to “automatic”
to “semi-automatic.” The US Marine Corps and Army come from a
marksmanship tradition of hitting the enemy with single well-aimed shots,
although they have gotten away from that tradition over the past three
decades and more into suppressive fire. The M16 assault rifle selector
switch goes from “safe” to “semi-automatic” to “automatic.”
In May 2007, the Russian Army Digest began their series on mountain
warfare with the basics –– firing positions.*
The Right Way to Shoot:

How to Select Firing and Firing Ready
Positions in Mountainous Conditions
Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007
M ountainous terrain greatly impacts how well and effectively

motorized rifle and tank units employ standard weapons
(small arms). For example, there are a lot of unassailable (dead)
spaces and hidden approaches that restrict the field of vision along
the front as well as in depth. The varying rocky ground and vegetation
also makes it much more difficult to locate and track targets. Indeed,
wind direction and speed can change in a heartbeat depending on air
temperature. Factor in that mountain climate is not at all uniform and
extremely unstable, and that the air temperature varies considerably
not only at different times of the year but even throughout the day, and
sometimes even in the course of a few hours). It nowbecomes clear
how important it is for soldiers to master the art of shooting accurately
under such atypical conditions. In this issue of Army Digest, we offer
just a few practical recommendations on training for firing and
shooting in mountains. When preparing for battle in a mountainous
area, remember that shooting accuracy is greatly influenced by the
height difference between the firing position and the targets, shooting
method, shooter position, limited ability to track targets on ridges, and
other factors.
Personnel should acquire basic weapons skills during weapons
training and range firing on level ground. Their shooting knowledge,
proficiency and skills should then be improved at weapons training
camps in the mountains.
Mountain marksmanship training should focus not only on firing
position selection but also on the firing stance. The correct firing
stance for small arms fire is critical because it stabilizes the weapon,
thereby ensuring a hit.
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Strelyat’-tak pravil’no” (“The Right Way to Shoot”), in Armeisky
Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 19-21, and “Ochen’ slozhno, no mozhno i nuzhno” (“Very
difficult, but possible and necessary”), 22-23, in the same edition.
Small Arms Fire 103
When considering a particular

firing stance, it is important to
remember that mountain conditions
require that the position must be
adjusted which, in turn, introduces
new considerations or even different
parts of the target into the ready
position.
Let me remind you that a
firing stance includes assuming
a firing position and loading the
Figure 1: Prone position for firing an automatic
weapon. Since there are no special
rifle down a slope facing the target. techniques of weapon loading in
the mountains, with the exception of the grenade launcher operator, let
us take a closer look at position assumption. Let me point out straight
away that the position will depend on the selected site (sloping or level
ground) and the direction of fire (upward or downward). The firing
position assumption technique is the same as on level ground, so we will
consider firing stance (body, arm and leg position).
Shooting downward from a slope facing the target

Prone Position. The body is turned left and sideways at a 90º angle
toward the plane of fire; the left leg is laid down against the slope in the
direction of the target and the inner
foot is thrust into a prepared hollow
space (protrusion); the left elbow is
thrust into the ground; the elbow angle
is much larger than usual (120-160º);
the right elbow is held close to the
body. An automatic rifle is held by the
front grip (Figure 1); a machine gun’s
bipod is thrust into the ground and the
gun is held by the butt (figure 2).
When a soldier is firing a grenade Figure 2. Prone position for firing a light
launcher, his loader is on his right machine gun down a slope facing the target.
at of his outstretched left arm from the grenade launcher tube. The
loader’s body is turned right sideways toward the target; the right
leg is laid down against the slope; the grenade pack is placed
against the slope below the body. To load the launcher, the loader
passes the grenade over the muzzle, holding it at the top with his
left hand keeping the propellant motor at a palm’s distance from
the nozzle with the pin up.
Figure 3. Kneeling position Figure 4. Sitting position for Figure 5. Standing position
for firing an automatic rifle down a firing an automatic rifle down a for firing an automatic rifle down a
slope facing the target. steep slope facing the target. gentle slope facing the target.
The grenade launcher operator takes the grenade with his left hand
from below by the nozzle and inserts it into the tube.
This arrangement ensures complete coordination between the gren-
ade launcher operator and his assistant, enables rapid loading, and
allows the loader to adjust fire.
Kneeling Position. The right leg is turned in the direction of fire
at an almost 90º angle; the foot is turned so that the right side lies on
the ground; the left leg is laid down against the slope in the direction of
fire, and the heel is thrust into a hollow space (protrusion). The shooter’s
right buttock is on the ground, and the left is thrust against the right heel
(the heel keeps him from sliding down); the left elbow is thrust against
the left kneecap; the right elbow is in the same position as for shooting
on level ground; the automatic rifle (machine gun) is held by the front
grip (figure 3).
Sitting Position. The shooter can fire from two positions, depending
on the steepness of the slope. For example, if the slope is very steep
(figure 4), the body is barely turned in the direction of fire. The shooter sits
on the ground with his legs downward against the slope in the direction of
the target, digging his heels into hollow spaces (protrusions) a shoulder
width apart; the left elbow rests on the inner left knee or on the thigh, a
palm’s length above the knee; the right elbow lies at the top of the right
thigh; the automatic rifle (machine gun) is held by the front grip.
The shooter assumes a slightly different sitting position on a gentler
slope (figure 5). He sits on the ground with his legs crossed and drawn
up under him (Eastern-style); the right heel is a support under the left
thigh; the left heel is thrust into a hollow space (protrusion) of the slope;
the left elbow is thrust against the thigh; the right elbow is at an 80-90º
angle to the body; the left hand holds the automatic rifle (machine gun)
by the front grip.
Standing Position. The body is turned left sideways in the direction
of fire with the feet as close as possible (a wide stance causes too
Small Arms Fire 105
much height difference, making the position

uncomfortable); both feet are turned toward
the plane of fire at 90º; the automatic rifle is
held by the foregrip (figure 6).
Shooting upward from a slope

facing the shooter:
Prone Position. The body is turned slightly
toward the target; the shooter leans slightly on
his left side; the left leg is stretched downward
against the slope and the toecap is thrust into
Figure 6. Standing position for firing a hollow space (protrusion) in the ground; the
an automatic rifle down a slope
facing the target. right leg is firmly bent at the knee and pulled
under the right side of the stomach; the toecap is thrust into a hollow
space (protrusion); the arm position is the same as for firing on level
ground; an automatic rifle is held by the front grip (a machine gun – by
the bipod). If this does not provide the necessary angle of fire, the rifle is
held by the magazine body (figure 7).
When firing a machine gun, recommend that you place a support
under the front grip to raise the barrel.
Kneeling Position. The toecap is thrust into a hollow space (pro-
trusion); the right knee rests on the ground, the thigh is in a vertical
position; the left elbow rests on the upper kneecap; the right elbow is
held at an almost straight angle; the automatic rifle is held by the lower
magazine case (figure 8). If this arm position does not provide the
necessary angle of fire, the arm is straightened and stretched upward;
the automatic rifle (Kalashnikov light machine gun) is held by the front
grip.
Standing Position. The following position should be assumed when
firing on a very steep slopes: the body is turned in the direction of fire at
an almost 90º angle; the left leg is firmly bent at the knee, with the foot
turned inward and thrust into a hollow space (protrusion) on the ground;
Figure 7. Prone position for Figure 8. Kneeling position for Figure 9. Standing position
firing an automatic rifle up a slope firing an automatic rifle up a slope for firing an automatic rifle up a
facing the shooter. facing the shooter. steep slope facing the shooter.
the right foot stands parallel to the left
one, the leg is straight at the knee; the
left elbow is thrust into the left knee at
the upper kneecap; the right elbow
hangs down freely (the angle between
it and the body is 30-45º); the automatic
rifle is held by the lower magazine body
(figure 9).
On gentler slopes, body position is
the same as on level ground, the width
between the feet is minimal, the feet
are parallel, the left leg is half-bent, and
the right leg is straight; the left elbow is anFigure 10. Standing position for firing
automatic rifle up a gentle slope facing
pressed against the left side of the chest the shooter.
and the right elbow hangs down freely; the automatic rifle is held by
the front grip or the lower magazine body (figure 10).
________________________________________
It is Difficult ---But Possible and Necessary ---
to Master the Skills and Techniques of
Shooting in Mountains
W e have reviewed some firing stance techniques for shooting

in mountains. Let us pause briefly to better understand that all
of them (techniques) are determined by the terrain features as well as
the best firing conditions. In addition, mountain combat experience has
confirmed that the abovementioned
firing positions are optimal. But what is
the best thing to do if one has to shoot
upward or downward from a level area
in the mountains? Here, too, there are
time-tested techniques. Let us review
them.
Downward shooting position
Prone Position. The body is turned
at a 15-25º angle in the direction of fire, Figure 1. Prone position for firing an
the legs are slightly spread apart, the automatic rifle downward from a level area.
right leg is half-bent; the left elbow is down over the edge of the slope;
the right elbow is further off to the side than when shooting on level
ground; the left hand holds the front grip of the automatic rifle. This
shooting position is assumed by automatic riflemen, machine gunners,
Small Arms Fire 107
grenade launcher gunner and snipers

(figure 1). Kalashnikov machine gun and
Kalashnikov light machine gun bipods
are placed on the slope.
Kneeling Position. The right leg
is at a 60-70º angle to the plane of fire; the
left leg is placed a half step forward, the
lower leg is vertical, the foot is at a 45-60º
angle to the plane of fire; the left elbow
is lowered as close as possible to the left
knee; the right elbow is held at a 75-90º
Figure 2. Kneeling position for firing angle to the body; the automatic rifle is
downward from a level area.
held by the front grip (figure 2).
Standing Position. The body is turned left sideways toward
the plane of fire, the feet are no more than a shoulder width apart, the
toecaps are turned slightly outwards; the
left elbow rests on the hip; the right elbow
is slightly lowered (45-60º) toward the
body; the left hand holds the automatic
rifle’s front grip (figure 3).
Upward shooting position

Prone Position. Position remains the
same as on level ground, except that the
left hand holds the automatic rifle’s maga-
zine by the bottom (figure 4). If a support
is used, it is higher than on level ground.
Kneeling Position. The leg position Figure 3. Standing position for firing
downward from a level area.
is the same as for shooting downward
but the right foot is completely turned, the right side of the heel touches
the ground, the buttock rests on the
inner foot rather than the back of
the heel, the left elbow rests on the
upper left knee; the left hand holds
the automatic rifle’s magazine by
the bottom (figure 5a).
If this position does not provide
the necessary angle of fire, the left
elbow is not rested on the knee
but is stretched upward, the elbow
joint is straight, with the automatic
Figure 4. Prone position for firing an automatic
rifle upward from a level area. rifle held by the front grip in this
case (Figure 5b).
Standing Position.
The standing position
differs in only one re-
spect: the left elbow
rests on the left side of
the chest rather than
on the hip; the auto-
matic rifle is held by
the bottom of the mag- Figure 5. Kneeling position for firing an automatic rifle upward
from a level area: (A) The left hand holds the automatic rifle
azine (figure 6a). If this magazine by the bottom.
position does not provide the necessary angle of fire, the left hand is
removed from the support and stretched upward, the left elbow straight;
the automatic rifle is held by the front grip (figure 6b).
It should be pointed out that when shooting upward from a level
area (road, bottom of a ravine or pit), a “kneeling” or “standing” posi-
tion will be used most
often since a “prone”
position will be ex-
posed and present the
largest target.
Training in shoot-
ing along a slope
should focus on the
following: if the moun-
tain peak is to the
Figure 6. Standing position for firing an automatic rifle upward
from a level area: (A) The left hand holds the automatic rifle right, the left leg is
magazine by the bottom. lower down the slope
and the inner boot side pushed against the slope, and the right
leg is bent slightly and the outer boot rand thrust against the slope
(figure 7a). If the moun-
tain peak is to the left,
the right leg is lower
down the slope and the
inner boot side is pushed
against the slope, and the
left leg is bent slightly
and the outer boot side
thrust against the slope Figure 7. Standing position for firing an automatic rifle
(figure 7b). along a slope. (A) Slope to the right; (B) Slope to the left.
All of the above techniques ensure the most stable position and
effective firing.
Small Arms Fire 109
These techniques do not preclude other, more advantageous

positions for shooting in the mountains. It all depends on the specific
conditions: steepness of the slopes, soil conditions (icy, rocky, talus-
strewn, grassy or snow-covered, creviced, uneven), weather (rain, snow).
Use of fractures on the terrain, stones, boulders and crevices as cover
for shooters improves fire effectiveness and protects the shooter from
enemy fire. Moreover, firing positions should be selected where there is
less dead space. Large stones, shelf rocks, openings, rain channels, trees,
shrubs, and so on should be used to cover the shooter.
In conclusion, firing position selection and ready positions need
to be learned, and these techniques should be practiced at specially
prepared sites that have slopes with varying steepness, large stones,
shelf rocks, and so on.
________________________________________
These two articles may seem to be fairly basic and simple, and they
are. But, for those who have not done mountain shooting, they contain
good, time-saving information. Training for mountain firing should begin
with a dry-fire stage where coaches and trainees move up and down
mountains while identifying targets and taking up firing positions and
stances to quickly and accurately engage the targets while using the
terrain for protection from return fire. Once the trainee can automatically
and smoothly assume the proper position and stance, he can begin live-
fire training. Unlike conventional range fire, the coach and trainee move
up and down and laterally in the mountains, identifying and engaging
targets. Accuracy and speed of engagement are measured during this
training and the tendency to overshoot the target is corrected. The trainee
also conducts deliberate ricochet fire and plunging fire.
Once the trainees have mastered these measures, they should be
reintegrated into squads for dry-fire maneuver training using bounding
over-watch, flanking attacks and supporting and area fire while moving
up, down and laterally in the mountains. Upon completion of this training,
squads and platoons are ready to move into training against opposing
forces (OPFOR) using MILES gear or simunitions.
So That Making Camp Makes You Stronger:
Organizing Rest
and Overnight Halts
for Personnel in the
Mountains
Colonel Michael Panov
Originally published in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*
It is important to get the soldiers into some sort of shelter for sleep
and to escape storms. Naturally, the soldier’s load prohibits carrying
much more than a shelter half for that shelter, so the soldiers will need
to use what nature provides.
T he simplest shelter in a deeply snow-covered area is a snow hole.

If there is no time to build comfortable shelter, it is necessary to
dig a hole (cave), place brushwood, tree branches, grass, or moss in it,
and close the entrance (with a shelter half, snow blocks). Here you can
rest and wait out the foul weather. If the scouts expect to use this type
of shelter for a long time, there should be space for beds, a fire, and
gear, a hole for smoke, and ventilation.
You need to be careful when lighting a fire inside the shelter
because beds and stocks of wood and brushwood could easily catch
fire. You should also guard against fumes inside the shelter where the
fire is burning.
Although it is warm inside the shelter, it is very dangerous to sleep
on the bare ground or on snow, even in a sleeping bag. You must make
a bed from small branches and fir twigs. To be warmer, the bed should
be raised off the floor and at least 40-50 cm from the fire. If there are
several people in the shelter, one of them should always keep watch
* “Daby prival sil pribavlyal: Ob organizatsii otdykha lichnogo sostava v gorakh” (“So that
making camp makes you stronger: Organizing rest and overnight halts for personnel in the
mountains”) in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 27.
Shelter 111
Figure 1. Temporary shelter in deep snow Figure 2. Rawhide-tent type temporary

(left – a snow hole; right – a cave). winter shelter (left – made of skis and snow;
right – made of sticks and shelter halves).
to keep the fire going, guard the others while they rest, dry their shoes
and clothes, and prepare a hot meal. He should also wake the other
scouts from time to time to change their sleep position because the
part of the body facing the fire warms up while the other cools way
down.
Snow holes and caves (figure 1) in high mountain areas can be
used not only for temporary shelter for the scouts but also as the main
base for a reconnaissance group
if it is not possible to build an
underground shelter or convert
a cave into a base. Rawhide tents
(figure 2) or canvas tents (figure
3) are more reliable temporary
shelters where a fire can burn
continually.
It takes a lot of energy to
build snow shelters, even though
they are simple. To reduce per-
spiration, while working you
should remove outerwear, loosen
Figure 3. Tent setup in a mountain area.
your belt, and remove gear. All
snow and ice should be brushed off clothing and shoes before entering
the shelter.
Probable rockfall areas should be avoided when selecting a base.
It is also dangerous to set up a base in snow or ice avalanche-prone
areas. Neither should you select dry riverbeds or areas where there
could be mud flows (mudslides).
Russian Army
Training
Captain Charles K. Bartles, US Army
Russian/Soviet military traditions are very different than those en-

countered in Western/NATO armies. Despite efforts to modernize and
develop a “contract” system of service similar to the system used in the
United States, the Russian Armed Forces are still predominately conscript.
The Russian draft process is a much dreaded event for most Russian
men. In Russia, poor treatment and living conditions are synonymous with
conscription. Conscripts are paid poorly by Russian standards, and their
abuse is a well-known facet of military life in Russian society.
Unsurprisingly, conscription avoidance has become commonplace.
Only about 10-percent of conscription age Russian males report for service
in the Armed Forces every year even though there are many exemptions,
deferments, and releases that will allow a potential conscript to legally avoid
service. Often more illicit means are utilized to dodge the draft; bribery of
the draft boards is common, as well simply not reporting for service. The
end result of this process is a draft that is far from egalitarian. Wealthy and
better educated Russian men (education deferments) rarely serve, while
the vast majority of Russian conscripts come from poorer, less affluent
families. This has caused great consternation in the military leadership due
to missed recruiting quotas and the low quality of conscripts.
Training a conscript force presents many challenges to Russian
commanders. Although conditions have improved in the Russian military in
the last several years, the Russian military budget is still a fraction of Soviet
levels. The priorities of the Russian defense budget are developing new
weapon systems and paying salaries, not investing in the training of short
term conscripts. Little time or money can be invested in soldiers that will
only serve 12 months and the Russian Army has no centralized method
of conscript training. Russian conscripts attend no “initial entry training”
center, but are put into training platoons upon arrival at their units of
assignment. In the Russian system, the unit commander (battalion level) has
direct control over his conscripts’ initial training, allowing training standards
to vary widely between different units.
Russia’s system of decentralized training presents a serious challenge
for the commander of mountain troops. Any soldier operating in a mountain
Russian Army Training l Along Slopes and Tracks 113
environment will quickly notice that the basic infantry skills (moving,
shooting, and communicating) become quite difficult.
The Russian commander is faced with many difficulties training for
mountain operations. Most of his conscripts are not the best and brightest,
will cycle out every twelve months, and he has little in the way of specialized
equipment to conduct training. Yet despite these difficulties Russia has
enjoyed some success in mountain warfare. The Russian method presented
below is Russia’s approach to train short-term conscripts for the challenging
task of mountain warfare.
The Russian Army approaches this challenge as it does most others, with
the simplest solution possible. Graduates of the Marine Corps’ Mountain
Warfare Training Center, Bridgeport, California, and the US Army’s Mountain
Warfare School in Jericho,Vermont, may be surprised at how little emphasis
is placed on land navigation and survival skills. In the Russian Army, Russian
officers perform many duties performed by NCOs in Western/NATO armies
and are trained to a much higher standard than their conscripts. Officer training
is on par with many Western armies. Much of the advanced aspects of
warfare that would normally be taught to all soldiers in Western/NATO
armies are instead taught to only officers in the Russian Army. Land naviga-
tion, as well as many other duties, is an officers responsibility, little or no effort
is made to train conscripts in this task. As for survival skills, one advantage
of the Russian system of conscription is that recruits often serve in the same
geographic area from which they are conscripted. Although the Russian
conscript may not be familiar with the exact area in which he is serving, he
may well already be accustomed to a mountain environment. The practice
of assigning conscripts to areas around their homes further benefits the
unit, as conscripts are demobilized and return to civilian life. In the event
of national emergency, demobilized conscripts may return to duty with the
same unit they demobilized from.
Although repetition is a common training strategy for most armies,
the extent to which it is practiced in the Russian army will seem strange
to those familiar with training in Western armies. Short service durations,
no professional NCO corps, and little formalized training causes much
less emphasis to be put on individual initiative at the tactical level. Instead
Russian officers focus on training their troops on set drills and maneuvers.
In tactical situations Russian officers pick from a “menu” of well rehearsed
maneuvers. In the Russian view it far better to do several maneuvers very
well, then trying ad-hoc tactics for situations as they develop.
Lessons for the US/NATO

The higher quality of training at US Army’s mountain warfare schools
is obvious, but there are still benefits to be had from studying Russian
methods of training. These higher quality schools are available only to a
small percentage of American troops. Most soldiers and marines deploying
to Afghanistan do not receive mountain training and often these schools

cater to the training of the infantry, with few slots for support personnel. The
Global War on Terror has changed the military’s emphasis from large scale
conventional warfare, to low intensity conflict not characterized by defined
fronts. There is no rear area and the “battle” can be anywhere in the Area of
Operations. Consequently, Combat Support and Combat Service Support
assets are in harm’s way, as much as their Combat Arms brethren but,
often without the same level of protection and training. The challenging
conditions of mountain warfare and lack of availability of formalized training
presents commanders with a difficult problem—how to conduct simple
and effective training with a limited amount of resources. This problem is
commonplace in the Russian army, and their solution to this problem may
prove beneficial.
Perhaps the greatest benefit of these drills could be signatories to
the NATO Partnership for Peace Program. This is a program for States of
the former Soviet Union, which has focused on increasing security and
democratic principles, while building a closer relationship with NATO.
Although many of these nations are adopting more US/NATO ideas
into their armies, they are still patterned off their Soviet predecessor. There
has been many changes in leadership and allegiances of the new armies
of the former Soviet Union in the last 15 years, but the day-to-day lives of
the officers have changed little. Generally, the conscription systems, role of
NCOs, duties of officers, and resource constraints of the new armies of the
former Soviet Union are still much closer to the Soviet/Russian model than
to any of the traditional NATO members. The training methods discussed
will be useful, familiar, and supportable to these armies.*
Along Slopes and Tracks: Training

Method for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles
Negotiating Grassy Slopes

Objective: Teach how to negotiate grassy slopes with and without
tracks and practice belay and self-belay with an ice axe.
Site: Rock-free grassy slopes of varying steepness overgrown by low
grass, with and without tracks.
Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, boots, work gloves, climbing
harness, ice axe, 20-tooth crampon per student.
Walking on tracks
Exercise 1. Single file, one step apart, climb 30-40 meters up a 20-
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Po sklonam i po tropam: Metodika obucheniya lichnogo

sostava tekhnike preodoleniya gornykh prepyatsviy” (“Along Slopes and Tracks:
Training Method for Overcoming Mountain Obstacles”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest),
May 2007, 28-30.
30º track, turn around, and descend in the same formation to the initial
position. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but with a full marching pack.
Ascending and descending grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Lined up abreast, facing the grassy slope (25-30º), two-
three steps apart, “herringbone” up 15-20 meters, turn around via the
right shoulder (so that the spike of the ice axe is toward the slope) and
descend “straight forward” to the initial position. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but on a steeper slope.
Exercise 3. Single file, facing a 25-30º slope at a 45º angle and two-
three steps apart, climb up 15-20 meters, turn around and descend to the
initial position. Repeat two-four times.
Exercise 4. Single file climb 10-15 meters up a slope at a 45º angle,
turn at a right angle to the path of ascent and “zigzag” up the same
distance. Then turn around and descend by the same route to the initial
position. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 5. Single file, “zigzag” up a steeper slope with turns every
five-seven meters, turn around and descend by the same route to the
initial position. Repeat two-three times.
Crossing grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Single file, left shoulder to a 25-30º slope, two-three
steps apart, go 20-30 meters across the slope, change the ice axe ready
position, turn around via the left shoulder, and return to the initial position.
Repeat two-four times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1
but on a steeper slope.
Self-arrest on grassy slopes

Exercise 1. Lined up and facing
a 30-45º slope, two-three steps apart,
“herringbone” up five-six meters,
holding the ice axe on the slope side
with the adze back and the spike
forward. Lean forward, ice axe pick
into the slope, then stick the adze
into the slope, lie on the stomach
and assume a comfortable position,
holding the head of the ice axe with
one hand and the shaft with the other,
and brace spread legs against the slope (see figure). Stand up, turn
around and descend to the initial position. Repeat two-four times.
Exercise 2. While climbing up the slope (as in Exercise 1), execute a
fall and self-arrest with an ice axe two-three times at a sudden command.
Exercise 3. Execute a fall and self-arrest with an ice axe several
times at a sudden command while zigzagging up a slope in single file (at
a 45º angle) two-three steps apart. Perform the exercise one-two times at
a standstill, left (right) sideways to the slope, and then on the move.
Exercise 4. Same as Exercise 3 but while descending.
times at a sudden command while descending “straight forward” and
lined up two-three steps apart. Repeat one-two times at a standstill, and
then on the move.
Exercise 6. Single file, standing left (right) sideways to the slope,
two-three steps apart, execute a fall and self-arrest at a standstill with an
ice axe. Repeat two-four times.
times at a sudden command while crossing a slope left (right) sideways
to the slope 20-30 meters apart. Repeat three-four times.
Methodical instruction
Once familiar with the technique, the students simultaneously
execute the techniques and actions under the general command of the
instructor.
When teaching grassy slope negotiation techniques, the instructor
should make sure that the students place their feet correctly and position
the ice axe with the pick toward the slope; the students should learn to
use the ice axe right away for support and self-arrest when falling.
Some techniques should be learned without gear or weapons, first at
in place and then on the move. The techniques should then be executed
in full marching gear, moving at different rates on different slopes.
While the techniques are being learned without gear or weapons, this
equipment should be removed and placed where it cannot fall down and
can be put on when needed.
Students should be taught self-arrest techniques with an ice axe
after they have, for the most part, learned the rassy-slope negotiating
technique.
The following is the training method for self-arrest with an ice axe
at the instructor’s sudden command: at the “Fall” command, the students
self-arrest. It is important to learn how to move without kicking down
loose stones. This way of walking teaches carefulness and precise
movements.
In conclusion, the training is conducted in full marching gear
and small arms. In addition to the “Fall” command, give the “Action”
command while pointing in the direction of the enemy. At the same time,
emphasize rapid and correct assumption of the ready position on a slope.
To prevent injury and accidents during grassy slope negotiating

training there must be no:
l exercises on grassy slopes located under a rock mass where
rockfall is possible or on a slope that ends in a steep cliff;
l simultaneous exercises by two groups located one above the other
on the same grassy slope where there are loose individual stones;
l teaching of self-arrest techniques with an ice axe by falling on a
grassy slope covered with rocks;
l ascent or descent on grassy slopes covered with loose stones
without strict observance of the key rules of movement: keeping
a certain distance, simultaneous turning by the entire group when
zigzagging upwards, etc.
How to walk correctly on stones (talus)

Objective: Teach how to walk on small and large stones.
Site: Gentle slopes with small and large stones, old moraine, and a
small rock pile.
Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, work gloves,
ice axe.
Walking on small and large stones

Exercise 1. Line up one step apart, walk 15-20 meters on small
stones and return to the initial position. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Walk 15-20 meters on large stones no more than a step
apart and return to the initial position. Repeat two-three times at different
speeds.
Exercise 3. Walk and run 15-20 meters on large stones slightly more
than a step apart, landing on one foot in the initial position. Repeat two-
three times at different speeds.
Exercise 4. Same as Exercises 1, 2 and 3 in full marching gear.
When teaching how to walk on stones, emphasize the placing the
foot lightly, using the ice axe pick for support when off balance; and the
danger of wedging a foot between large stones, and loose and fixed
stones.
Negotiating talus-covered slopes

Objective: Teach the techniques of negotiating talus-covered slopes.
Site: Large, small, loose and fixed talus.
Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, gloves, ice axe.
Ascent and descent on talus

Exercise 1. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 15-20 meters on
large talus, turn around and descend to the initial position. Repeat one-
two times.
Exercise 2. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 20-25 meters
on small packed talus, turn around and descend to the initial position.
Repeat one-two times.
Exercise 3. Climb down 15-20 meters on small talus using the
slipping of the talus itself – sliding on the feet, as it were - along with the
sand and small stones, and gliding; return to the initial position taking
small steps. Repeat two-three times at different speeds.
Exercise 4. Single file, two-three steps apart, climb 15-20 meters
on small unstable talus, step onto hardened talus (small level surface
area), turn around and descend to the initial position. Repeat two-three
times.
Exercise 5. Climb 15-20 meters on unstable talus in full marching
gear and run down to the initial position one by one. Repeat two-three
times.
Moving across talus
Exercise 1. Single file, left sideways to the slope, two-three steps
apart, go 15-20 meters across a slope with large talus. Turn around and
go across the slope in the opposite direction, right sideways to the slope.
Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but on a slope with packed talus.
Exercise 3. Single file, cross a slope on unstable talus in full marching
gear; after 15-20 meters, move to hardened talus or a grassy slope, turn
around and cross the slope in the opposite direction. Repeat two-four
times.
During ascent and descent on talus, make sure that the students are
no more than two-three steps apart and that they immediately stop any
stone movement.
To prevent injury and accidents when moving on talus, there must
be no:
l exercises in rockfall-prone areas or on talus that ends in a steep
cliff;
l simultaneous exercises of several groups in the same direction at
different elevations;
l no group ascent or descent without strict observance of the basic
rules of movement on talus;
l exercises held at sites that have not been inspected.
During exercises, it is necessary to watch the slopes and warn
everyone there of a rockfall using the command “Rock.”
Russian Army Training l How to Use a Rope 119
Forward, Up, and then Down: How to

Use a Rope to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope
Colonel Mikhail Panov in Armeisky Sbornik, May 2007*
Climbing using climbing stirrups

Objective: Teach how to climb on climbing stirrups.
Site: Two-three meter high cliffs and rock platforms.
Outfit and gear: Field uniforms, hiking boots, work gloves; two
anchor ropes per squad; a backup rope (six meters) for each student.
Climbing on climbing stirrups with two anchor ropes

Exercise 1. Students gather near two or three sites that have been
prepared for climbing with anchor ropes. One by one, they climb on
climbing stirrups to the top of the two to three meter platform pulling
and securing first one and then the other end of the anchor rope. Repeat
two or three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but in full field gear.
Carefully verify that the anchor rope is correctly secured for
climbing with climbing stirrups.
To prevent injury and accidents, there must be no:
l start of training until it has been verified that the ropes are secured
for climbing with climbing stirrups;
l ascent by the students by rope with stirrups until the inspector
verifies that they have tied the knots correctly.
Rappelling
Objective: Teach sport, classic Dulfersitz and “figure eight” rap-
pelling techniques.
Site: Grassy slopes that turn into cliffs, 45º rocky plates, eight to ten
meters sheer rocky sections with outcroppings (terraces) above and
below.
Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots, work gloves; one
30 meters backup rope and two anchor ropes – per squad; a climbing
harness, “figure eight” rappel device, two carabiners and one back-up
rope (six meter) per student.
Sport rappelling down an anchor rope

Exercise 1. Students gather near anchor ropes. Then, in turn,
holding the rope with both hands in a facing stance, they rappel adown
a 35-40º grassy slope, pressing against the slope with legs positioned far
apart. Gloved hands should slide (grip by turns) along the rope. Repeat
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Vpered, naverkh, a potom vniz: Kak c pomoshch’yu verevki
podnyat’cya po krutomu sklonu gory” (“Forward, Up, and then Down: How to Use a Rope
to Climb a Steep Mountain Slope”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 31-36.
the exercise two-three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but in full field gear and self-belay
with a Prusik knot.
Dulfersitz rappel with primary rope

Exercise 1. Secure the primary rope to a ledge or hook and throw
the end down onto the grassy slope. Take turns passing the primary
rope over the hips and body for a
Dulfersitz rappel then removing it.
Repeat three-five times.
Exercise 2. Take turns rappel-
ling down a 40-45º grassy slope on
a Dulfersitz rope with belay from
above.
Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 3. Take turns execut-
ing a Dulfersitz rappel down a 40-45º
grassy slope with a “figure eight”
and belay from above. Repeat two-
three times.
Exercise 4. Same as Exercise
2 but with a Prusik knot for self-
belaying.
Exercise 5. Execute a Dulfersitz
or “figure eight” rappel on an eight-
Practicing a Dulfersitz rappel.
ten meter rock wall in full field gear
and with belay from above (figure). Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 6. Same as Exercise 5 but rappel down the rock wall in a
pendulum traverse. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 7. Execute a free rappel down a recessed rock wall; use
a Prusik knot for self-belay in addition to a belay from above.
Exercise 8. Same as Exercise 7 but with two rappels in a row.
Methodological instruction
Students should be taught how to rappel on a primary rope in
places where there are no rockfalls and where there are outcroppings
(platforms) eight-ten meters above each other. The students take turns
executing the exercise. Make sure that the hook has been securely
hammered in, that the primary rope is properly anchored, etc.
Slope steepness should be gradually increased, ensuring belay
from above. Before executing an exercise, the students should check
the security of the hook and the primary rope. The students should be
required to use a Prusik knot whenever there is the slightest danger of a
fall during an exercise.
l exercises on deteriorating cliffs or in rockfall-prone areas;
l rappel on a primary rope until the leader has checked that it is
securely anchored to a ring placed a ledge or to a piton;
l rappel without belay from above or self-belay with a Prusik knot;
l no execution of an exercise by the next student until the inspector
has checked that the rappel seat is secured and the knot has been
correctly tied for belay and self-belay;
l unmonitored ascent to the platform for descent (see Addendum).
Conduct of training
Students begin this subject after they have learned the main
rock climbing rules and self-belay and belay techniques, and have
developed the necessary physical qualities and endurance.
The company commander organizes and conducts the lesson
at the mountain training center’s rock climbing training site. At the
direction of the company commander, platoon commanders train the
personnel in simple rock climbing techniques.
Before starting, the company commander checks that the person-
nel and mountain equipment are ready, and states the subject, training
objectives, as well as the procedure for practicing the training points
at the training sites. He then reminds the personnel of the general
rock climbing safety requirements and takes the platoons around to
the training sites and gives the command (signal) to start.
At training site No. 1, the platoon commander begins the lesson
with practicing how to scale a rocky area of average difficulty while
following the three anchor points rule. On a five to six meter rocky
area, he selects three to four routes with overhangs, hollows, crevices
and other unevenness for anchors and toeholds. He then explains
and demonstrates how to execute it by personally completing one of
the routes, after which he begins the practical training.
At the direction of the platoon commander (one per route), the
students scale a rocky area and execute an easy rappel back to the
initial position.
The platoon commander should follow the actions of all the
students and correct their mistakes, focusing on correct and secure
use of anchor points and toeholds, as well as well as watching the
students’ self-belay.
The platoon commander then moves on to training in ascent
and sport rappel with a primary rope. He first checks the secured
ropes and personally demonstrates the ascent and descent. He
then decides the order (two students ascend, two stand in the initial
position, two stand above, and the rest watch the ascent) and trains
the platoon to ascend and then descend the two routes.
Once the students have mastered ascent and descent, the platoon
commander moves on to intensive training in integrated ascent and
descent using the flow-line method.
During this exercise, the platoon commander focuses on ensuring
that the students correctly execute the footholds and rope pulls while
ascending, and rappel in a strictly upright position, eliminating the
possibility of “penduluming.”
After practicing all exercise elements on the training site, the
platoon commander does a brief review and moves to the next
training site at the direction of the company commander.
At training site No. 2, the platoon commander begins by checking
that the personnel have mastered the basic techniques of climbing
a rocky area of average difficulty. When he is sure that they have
done so, he moves on to how to scale a rocky ridge and crevice. If
it turns out that some of the students have not mastered the climbing
techniques (rules), the deputy platoon commander (mountain training
instructor) provides them with additional training.
The platoon commander selects a slope with two or three hori-
zontal or vertical ridges of varying form and steepness to teach how
to negotiate a rocky ridge.
The platoon commander begins the rocky ridge negotiation
training with a look at the obstacle and a demonstration of a technique
for negotiating it, for example, sitting astride with shoulder belay from
above. He then divides the students into shifts, decides the practice
order (sequence) (two per ridge: one to execute the technique and
the other to belay) and begins their practical training.
The students take their positions and prepare: the number
ones for negotiating the ridge and the number twos for belaying,
reporting to the platoon commander when they are ready. At the
platoon commander’s command, the ones negotiate a ridge three or
four meters long sitting astride it, and the twos belay and watch the
actions of the ones. After executing the exercise, the ones position
themselves to belay and the belayers (the twos) rappel by an easy
route and report their observations on the performance of the ones.
The platoon commander critiques the first shift and continues the
training in the same order, checking the preparedness of each shift.
When he is sure that the technique has been mastered, he moves on
to practicing negotiating the ridge sideways in the same order.
Before practicing negotiating crevices, the platoon commander
reminds the students that various forms and sizes of crevices make
it much easier to negotiate difficult rocky routes because they have
convenient supports and toeholds. He then reminds them of the
safety requirements and explains and demonstrates how to negotiate
a vertical crevice using a horizontal thrust with back belay from above
and a piton. When he is sure that the students have correctly grasped
the techniques, the platoon commander decides the exercise order
(sequence) and moves on to practical training until all students are
fully able to negotiate the crevice as well as belay.
In the same order, the students practice negotiating a horizontal
crevice by crawling sideways with a piton belay.
After all techniques have been practiced, the platoon commander
does a review and leads the platoon to training site No. 3.
Here, the company commander teaches how to negotiate difficult
rocky areas (walls).
Two routes -– one five to six meters and the other 10 to 12 meters
high -– are prepared for ascent and descent of a difficult rocky area
(wall). The routes’ relative positions and distance should make it
possible to follow safety requirements while there is simultaneous
training on both routes. The routes are checked and cleared of loose
hanging rocks and rock debris ahead of time.
Following a brief explanation and tasking, the company com-
mander checks the secured ropes and pitons, positions the platoon
commander to belay, and demonstrates the technique by personally

negotiating one of the routes. He then reminds the students of the
safety requirements, advises them of the specifics of each route,
decides the exercise order (sequence), and begins the practical
training. Each student should first learn how to negotiate a five-
six meter rock wall then perform a belay, after which he practices
negotiating a 10-12 meter rock wall.
After teaching rock wall ascent, the company commander teaches
in the same order how to perform a Dulfersitz rappel (with a “figure
eight”) and a pulley (carabiner) descent with belay from above.
During training to negotiate difficult rocky areas (walls), the
company commander should focus on the correct use of various crags,
cavities and cracks for toeholds and handholds, on the coordination
of the belayer and the belayed, on following the belay and self-belay
rules, as well as on the condition of the ropes, carabiners and pulleys.
The platoons change training sites 1, 2 and 3 every 50 minutes at
the commander’s command.
After all the scheduled training points have been practiced at
sites 1, 2 and 3, the company commander at site No. 4 demonstrates
how to set up a canyon crossing using a special cable, primary and
backup ropes, pulleys and carabiners. He then demonstrates how to
transport ammunition, crew-served weapons, food rations and gear,
as well as people across a canyon.
After the practice, the company commander conducts an overall
review and directs fixing particular weak points and preparing for the
next lesson.
________________________________________
Addendum
SAMPLE
“approved”
Commander, Motorized Rifle Battalion
___________________________________
(rank, signature, last name)
____________ 2009
LESSON PLAN
Scaling Rocky Slopes of Varying Steepness

_____ Motorized Rifle Company
____________ 2009
SUBJECT:
“Scaling Rocky Areas of Varying Difficulty”
OBJECTIVES:
1. Train the company in the techniques of scaling rocky areas of varying
difficulty and in self-belay.
2. Develop in the company personnel the physical and psychological
qualities, endurance and stamina necessary for executing various tasks in
the mountains.
TRAINING POINTS:
1. Scale rocky areas of average difficulty using various techniques.
2. Negotiate typical rocky terrain.
3. Scale difficult rocky areas (walls).
4. Move personnel, weapons and ammunition across a canyon.
TIME: 4 hours
PLACE: Alpinism training site, mountain training center.
TEXTBOOK AND GUIDE:

Training Units for Combat Operations in Mountain Regions (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 2007).
UNIFORM:
Summer mountain climbing gear and hiking boots, with weapons.
SUPPLIES:
Primary rope – two per squad, backup rope – one per squad, piton
hammer – one per squad, pitons – 30, self-belay system, carabiner and work
gloves – per student.
1. Preparatory Part – 10 minutes.

Check the training sites (mountain obstacles), personnel attendance,
health (by asking), personnel and mountain gear preparedness; state the
subject, training objectives and points, training procedure and time at the
training sites; review general rock climbing safety requirements; move the
platoons to the training sites and execute the preparatory exercises.
2. Main Part – 180 minutes.

Training Site No. 1
(50 minutes.)
(1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, Company Command)
1. Scale a rocky area of average difficulty using the three anchor
points and self-belay rules.
2. Scale a rocky slope of average difficulty with a primary rope.
3. Execute a sport rappel.
Instructor: Platoon Commander
Training Site No. 2

(50 minutes.)
(2nd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Flame Thrower and Anti-Tank Squad)
1. Scale a rocky ridge with belay from above.
2. Scale a rock chimney.
3. Scale a rocky area of average difficulty using three anchor points.
Training Site No. 3

(50 minutes.)
(3rd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Machine Gun and Grenade Launcher
Squads)
1. Scale a difficult rocky area (wall) with belay from above.
2. Execute a Dulfersitz rappel (with a “figure eight”).
3. Execute a pulley (carabiner) rappel.
Instructor: Company Commander.
Training Site No. 4

(30 minutes.)
(Company Personnel)
1. Train to traverse a canyon using primary and backup ropes and
pulleys (carabiners).
2. Move weapons and ammunition using a primary rope and pulleys
(carabiners).
3. Move personnel on two primary ropes on a pulley (carabiner) using
self-belay.
Instructor: Company Commander
3. Concluding Part – 5 minutes.

Perform muscle relaxation exercises (while moving to the lesson review
site); form the company, check that personnel, weapons and equipment are
present; summarize the lesson: determine how well the techniques for scaling
mountain obstacles have been learned, give grades, note the strengths and
weaknesses; set tasks for eliminating the weaknesses and preparing for the
next lesson.
Company Commander Work Procedure

1. Check the training site – on the day of the lesson before the company
arrives.
2. Check that the company is prepared for the lessons, set tasks – five
minutes.
3. Conduct the lesson at training site No. 3 – 150 minutes.
4. Check the organization and progress of the lessons at training sites
Nos. 1 and 2 – 20 minutes. (at the start of each hour of study).
5. Conduct the lesson at training site No. 4 – 30 minutes.
6. Review and summarize the lesson – five minutes.
____ Motorized Rifle Company Commander
__________________________________
Don’t Let Me Down -- Belay:

Training Method for Negotiating
Mountain Obstacles
Shoulder and back belay

Objective: Teach soldiers how to use the shoulder and back belay.
Site: Grassy slopes of varying steepness with small outcropings
and low cliffs.
Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots and work gloves;
primary rope –– one for every two students; six meters backup rope,
ice axe, and 20-tooth crampon per person.
Shoulder belay
Exercise 1. Students assume a facing stance in pairs on a 25-30º
grassy slope. Each “pair” is tied together with a “leader’s” knot. The
first soldier of each “pair” descends six-eight meters, and the second
assumes the correct shoulder belay position and feeds him the rope.
The first warns that he is going to check the belay and begins to
jerk slightly and then more and more forcefully. The second feeds
or tightens the rope to match the force of the jerking. The first then
rappels the entire length of the rope and then climbs up. The second
feeds or hauls up the rope in proportion to the descent and ascent. The
students switch roles and repeat the exercise two or three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but check the belay after giving
warning, first with a bob, then with a jump, and finally with a sudden fall
(figure 1).
Exercise 3. Paired together, the students begin to practice (by
turns) assuming the appropriate belay position depending on the
direction of the belayed’s movement and the expected main jerk
movement in the event of his fall. Repeat two or three times.
Exercise 4. Same as Exercise 3 but in full field gear.
Exercise 5. Train the students to stop a 60-kilogram log falling
from a height of two meters.
Back belay
Exercise 1. Students gather in pairs on small platforms. Each
“pair” is tied together with a rope. One serviceman seats himself
comfortably on the platform and assumes the belay position, bracing
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Ne provedi, ctpakhovka: Metodika obycheniya voenno-

slyzhashashchikh preodolehiyu prepyatstviy v gorakh” (“Don’t Let Me Down, Belay:
Training Method for Negotiating Mountain Obstacles”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army
Digest), May 2007, 37-40.
Russian Army Training l Negotiating Obstacles 127
his feet firmly. The other warns that

he is going to check the belay and
then does various jerks. They then
switch roles. Repeat two or three
times.
Exercise 2. Same as Testing belay
by falling >
Exercise 1 but in full field
Testing belay
gear. Jump instead of jerk- by jumping >
ing to check the belay. Testing belay
by jerking >
Methodological Ascent and

instruction pull-up >
To familiarize the sol- Descent and
rope feed >
diers with shoulder and
back belay techniques,
Figure 1. Shoulder belay training.
they are seated on a
gentle slope. The instructor is located below them. He explains and
demonstrates the techniques standing up (the best trained soldiers
may also be used to demonstrate).
After a technique is demonstrated, the students execute it simul-
taneously on command. Some do so individually at the commander’s
instruction. The officer checks the execution and provides appropriate
suggestions and explanations.
The commander must make sure that the students handle the
rope properly, being especially watchful that the belayer assumes the
correct position and has a good foot anchor, and that the belayed jerks
and jumps to check the belay, gradually increasing the rope tension.
All students should be able to correctly determine the direction
and force of the main jerk movement in the event that the belayed falls
in order to quickly assume the necessary position and feed the rope to
match the force of the jerk, thereby providing reliable belay.
l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes close to precipices;
l belay training with jerks and falls on stone-covered grassy slopes;
l forceful jerks without making sure that the belayer is ready;
l belaying without work gloves.
Overhang piton and ice axe belay

Objective: Teach overhang, piton and ice axe belay.
Site: Rocky areas of low and average difficulty with sturdy over-
hangs and crevices of varying sizes that turn into grassy slopes. In
winter, use icy and snowy slopes.
Outfit and Gear: Field uniform,
hiking boots, work gloves; six
meters of backup rope; an ice
axe for each student; a primary
rope, four pitons or ice axes, four
artificial anchors, two hammers and
two carabiners per “pair.”
Overhang belay
Exercise 1. The students gather
on overhangs in pairs. The second
student in each “pair” throws
the rope onto the overhang and
positions himself for belay from
above. The first student descends
five-six meters, and the second
Figure 2: Instruction in piton belay.
feeds him rope. Then the first tests
the belay with a jerk and hangs freely on the rope, holding his arms out
to the sides. Then the first climbs up and the second pulls up the rope.
The students then switch roles and repeat the same thing. Repeat two
or three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but the first student moves cross-
wise the slope instead of down, and the second positions himself to
belay from the side.
Exercise 3. The first student moves up the slope at a 45º angle, and
the second belays from below. Then the first rappels to the second by
the same route to replace him. Repeat two or three times.
Exercise 4. Same as Exercises 1, 2 and 3 but in full field gear.
Piton belay
Exercise 1. The students gather by a rock wall in pairs (figure 2).
The second student of each “pair” finds a crack, drives in a piton and
checks that it is secure. He then clips a carabiner into the piton, inserts
a rope in it and positions himself for belay from above after letting
the first student know that he is ready. The first descends three to five
meters (the second feeds him rope), tests the belay with a jerk and
hangs freely on the rope, moving his arms out to the sides. The first
then ascends to the second, who pulls up the rope. They switch roles
and repeat the exercise. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Perform the exercise in full field gear.
Artificial Anchor Belay

Exercise 1. Students gather by a rock wall in pairs. The second
student of each “pair” finds a crack, lays an appropriate anchor in
it and checks that it is secure. He then clips a caribiner to the loop,

inserts a rope in it, positions himself for belay from above, and lets the
first student know that he is ready. The first student descends three to
five meters (the second feeds him rope), tests the belay with a jerk and
hangs freely on the rope, moving his arms out to the sides. The first
then ascends to the second, who pulls up the rope. They switch roles
and repeat the exercise. Repeat two or three times.
Ice axe belay on an icy slope

Exercise 1. Students gather on an icy slope in pairs. The second
student of each “pair” screws in an ice axe above his head, checks
that it is secure, and covers it with snow. He then inserts a piton into a
carabiner with the gate upward, inserts a rope in it, positions himself
for belay from above, and lets the first student know that he is ready.
The first student descends three to five meters (the second feeds him
rope), tests the belay with a jerk and hangs freely on the rope, moving
his arms out to the sides. The first then ascends to the second, who
pulls up the rope. They switch roles and repeat the exercise. Repeat
two or three times.
Ice axe belay on a snowy slope

Exercise 1. Students line up in pairs on a 30-35º snowy slope five to
six meters apart. The second student of each “pair” drives in an ice axe
halfway, throws a rope on it, and positions himself for belay from above.
The first student then descends five-six meters (the second feeds him
rope), tests the belay with a jerk and ascends to his partner, who pulls
up the rope. They switch roles and repeat the exercise. Repeat two to
three times.
Exercise 2. Repeat the same exercise in full field gear.
Methodological instruction
Sites for overhang, piton and ice axe belay training should be
carefully inspected and cleared of unstable rocks.
The instructor uses the best trained soldiers to demonstrate the
belay techniques to the students.
After familiarizing themselves with the exercises, the students are
paired up, receive their assignments, and move to their designated
sites, where they perform the exercises.
The commander observes the exercises and critiques as necessary.
The overhangs used for belay should be carefully prepared. The
students should test the piton, artificial anchor and ice axe belay to
make sure that they are secure.
To prevent injury and accidents, there should be no:
l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes close to precipices;
l training with a primary rope that has not been pre-tested;
l independent exercises until the students are able to conduct a
reliable belay;
l working in “pairs” without the instructor testing the belay
(overhang prepared, piton properly secured, rope properly placed in
the carabiner, etc.).
Prusik and Carabiner Belay (mass) with rope hand rail

Objective: Teach rope hand rail installation plus Prusik and cara-
biner belay.
Site: Grassy 30-40º slope and rocky areas of low to average diffi-
culty with narrow terraces at heights of two meters and above.
Outfit and Gear: Field uniform; hiking boots and work gloves,
backup rope, six meters climbing harness, carabiner and ice axe for
each student; two primary ropes, four hammers, four pitons and four
anchors per squad.
Exercise 1. Students line up in single files on anchored ropes
with three to five meters between them. The students take turns
approaching the primary rope, tie themselves to it with a Prusik knot,
and climb three-five meters up the grassy slope, moving the knot along
the rope. After testing the self-belay in the “hands down” position by
stepping back and jumping, the students loosen the knot and continue
to climb. In this way they all climb up one-by-one. The next student
begins to tie himself to the rope when the previous student reaches
the uppermost point of the secured rail and positions himself for self-
belay or moves to a safe place. After the ascent, the students take turn
rappelling back down using ice axe self-belay. Repeat two or three
times.
Exercise 2. Students gather in a single file on a grassy slope side-
ways to a rock wall on which a rope has been anchored with carabiners
and pitons driven in five or six meters apart. The students take turns
approaching the primary rope, tie themselves to it with either a Prusik
knot or a sliding carabiner, and traverse the slope, moving the knot
or the carabiner along the slope. In the middle of the rope (between
two pitons), they lower themselves and hang on the backup rope.
They then ascend and continue to the end of the rope, after which they
secure themselves to another rope with a carabiner and return to the
starting point by another route. The next student in the squad begins
to tie himself with a Prusik knot or sliding carabiner when the previous
student has tested the self-belay and moved on. Repeat two-three
times.
Exercise 3. Same as Exer-

cise 3 but in full field gear. The
primary rope is stretched one
meter above a terrace path that
is at least three meters above a
grassy slope. Move lengthwise
along the terrace rope using a
Prusik knot or sliding carabiner
self-belay (figure 3).
Methodological
instruction
The site selected to teach rail
setup and Prusik knot or sliding
carabiner self-belay, especially
on rocky areas, should be care-
fully checked and cleared of un- Figure 3. Training to use a Prusik
stable rocks. knot on a rocky route.
The instructor should monitor the securing of the primary rope and
the hand rail setup.
During the exercises, the instructor should ensure that the se-
quence and movement along the hand rails are strictly followed, and
that the students first clip themselves to the next rail strand and then,
and only then, unclip themselves from the previous one.
When one group of students has performed all the exercises, the
next group trains at the same site using the rails that have been set up.
It should be pointed out to the students that at difficult points along
the rope they must remember to move the knot an outstretched arm’s
length away before moving on (the knot should always be smooth).
All students should make sure that the Prusik self-belay is secure.
To avoid injury and accidents, there should be no:
l lessons at rockfall-prone sites or on slopes with loose rocks;
l exercises until the instructor tests the rails and the primary rope;
l movement along the rope until the student checks that the knot
has been correctly tied.
How to “Tame” a River: Getting Across

Water Obstacles in the Mountains
Fording
Objective: Teach how to ford mountain streams and rivers.
Site: Dry mountain riverbeds with rocks; rivers 50-60 centimeters
deep, four-eight meters wide, with current velocity of up to three
meters-per-second (m/sec).
Outfit and Gear: Field uniform, hiking boots, work gloves; three
poles, three primary ropes per squad; climbing harness, backup rope
(twice the length of the primary rope), one carabiner per student.
Exercise 1. Ford a knee-deep mountain river singly with pole self-
belay and primary rope belay from the bank. Repeat one or two times.
Exercise 2. Ford a knee-deep mountain river in three ranks with
hands on each other’s shoulders. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 3. Ford a mountain river in a circle of eight to ten people
using hands on each other’s shoulders. As it moves forward, the circle
turns against the current. Repeat two to four times.
Exercise 4. Ford in a single file (eight to ten people) holding onto
each other’s belts. Repeat two-four times.
Exercise 5. Same as Exercises 2, 3, and 4 but in full field gear.
Exercise 6. Ford a 50-60 centimeter-deep mountain river singly with
self-belay using a carabiner or a Prusik knot on a primary rope that
is stretched diagonally from one bank to the other 30-40 centimeters
above the water level. Students cross on the downstream side of the
rope at a stretched arm’s length from the primary rope. Repeat one-
two times.
Training in the various fording methods should begin with exer-
cises in an old mountain river bed (with no water) or on a four to eight
meter area with stones.
Select a suitable river, determine its depth and current velocity,
and physically check (using a belay) that it is fordable.
Set up rescue stations a short distance downstream from the fording
spot to monitor the fording. Rescue “pairs” should be linked by rope
so that one of them is ready to render aid while the other, positioned for
self-belay, is ready to provide belay.
The instructor must be on the bank between those fording the river
and the rescue station and personally direct the fording.
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Kak “ykrotit’ ” reku: Ymet’ perepravlyat’cya cherez vodnye
pregrady v gorakh” (“How to ‘Tame’ a River: Getting Across Water Obstacles in the
Mountains”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), May 2007, 41-45.
Russian Army Training l Getting Across Water Obstacles 133
Ford in footgear and clothing. Make sure that the students do not
lift their legs high when fording. Fording training should take place in
sunny (warm) weather at the end of the training day.
To avoid injury and accidents during fording, there should be no:
l training at river sites that the commander has not personally
inspected (where it has not been established ahead of time that the
river is fordable);
l fording until the appropriate preparatory exercises have been
practiced on land;
l fording without rescue posts;
l training in low water and air temperature or fording without
footgear and uniform;
l fording with a carabiner or Prusik knot on a long leash from
which it is not possible to reach the primary rope.
Water Crossing
Objective: Teach crossing of mountain rivers.
Site: Mountain rivers and rivers with scattered stones and high
bluff banks.
Outfit and Gear: Everyday uniform, hiking boots, work gloves;
three poles, three primary ropes per squad; climbing harness, backup
rope twice as long as the primary rope, one carabiner per student.
Exercise 1. Negotiate a three-meter wide mountain river by jump-
ing on stones 80-100 centimeters apart. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 2. Same as Exercise 1 but with the stones further apart
and with self-belay with a primary rope, stretched from bank to bank,
to which a backup rope with carabiner is attached.
Exercise 3. Negotiate a mountain river by log-crossing with self-
belay as in Exercise 2. Repeat two-three times.
Exercise 4. Take a load across a mountain river along two primary
ropes using a pulley or carabiner. Repeat one-two times.
Exercise 5. Cross along two primary ropes using a climbing
harness and pulley or carabiner. Repeat one-two times.
Exercise 6. Same as Exercises 1 and 3 but in full field gear.
The success of training in overwater mountain river crossing
largely depends on skilful selection of the training sites.
Prior to training, set up rescue stations downstream not only on the
bank but also in mid-river on separate large stones.
The instructor personally directs the crossing from the bank while
located between those performing the exercise area and the rescue
station.
The instructor needs to make sure that the students jump lightly
from stone to stone and that one arm is free for self-belay. Students
should cross with self-belay one-by-one along a stretched primary
rope, and they should be on the downstream side of the rope on a
sliding carabiner at a leash distance from which they can reach the
primary rope.
The two primary ropes should be thoroughly tested when crossing
along a rope with a climbing harness and pulley or carabiner. Gear
should be well assembled and secured.
To prevent injury and accidents when crossing over water, there
should be no:
l training unless the instructor has checked the security and setup
of the crossing;
l crossing by the next student until the instructor (mountaineer
trainer) checks that the climbing harness fits and that the pulley or
carabiner is securely attached to the rope;
l water crossing without belay;
l crossing training before the rescue posts are ready (see Adden-
dum).
________________________________________
Addendum
SAMPLE
“approved”
Commander, Motorized Rifle Battalion
___________________________________
____________ 2009
LESSON PLAN
Negotiating Mountain Obstacles

_____ Motorized Rifle Company
____________ 2009
SUBJECT:
“Different Ways to Cross Mountain Rivers on Foot”
OBJECTIVES:
1. Train the company in different ways to cross mountain rivers on foot.
2. Develop in company personnel the physical and psychological qualities
and endurance to perform various tasks in the mountains.
TRAINING POINTS:
1. Fording a mountain river using different techniques.
2. Water crossing of a mountain river.
3. Moving personnel, weapons and ammunition across a mountain river

using ropes and pulleys (carabiners).
TIME: 3 hours
PLACE: Mountain river crossing (forced crossing) training site, mountain

training center.
TEXTBOOKS AND GUIDES:

Training Units for Combat Operations in Mountain Regions (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 2007).
UNIFORM:
Summer field gear, with weapons.
SUPPLIES:
Two primary ropes per squad, one backup rope one per squad, one piton
hammer per squad, 30 pitons, ten 2-2.5 meter-long wooden poles; one self-
belay system, carabiner and pair work gloves per student.
1. Preparatory Part – 10 minutes.

Check the training sites (mountain obstacles), personnel attendance,
health (by asking), personnel and mountain gear preparedness; state the
subject, training objectives and points, training procedure and time at the
training sites; review general mountain river crossing requirements; move the
platoons to the training sites and perform the preparatory exercises.
2. Main Part – 135 minutes.

Training Site No. 1
(45 minutes.)
(1st Motorized Rifle Platoon, Company Command)
1. Select and fit out a ford.
2. Ford a mountain river single file, in ranks, and in a circle.
3. Ford a mountain river along a stretched mountain rope.
Training Site No. 2

(45 minutes.)
(2nd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Flame Thrower and Anti-Tank Squad)
1. Cross a mountain river on exposed stones.
2. Cross a mountain river by log-crossing.
3. Cross a mountain river on a suspendeed pedestrian bridge.
Training Site No. 3

(45 minutes.)
(3rd Motorized Rifle Platoon, Machine Gun and Grenade Launcher Squad)
1. Prepare to cross using a primary rope and pulleys (carabiners).
2. Move weapons and ammunition across using a primary rope and
pulleys (carabiners).
3. Move personnel across along two primary ropes on a pulley (carabiner)
with self-belay. Instructor: Platoon Commander.
3. Concluding Part – 5 minutes.

Perform muscle relaxation exercises (while moving to the lesson review
site); form the company, check that personnel, weapons and equipment
are present; summarize the lesson: determine how well the techniques for
scaling mountain obstacles have been learned, give grades, note the strengths
and weaknesses; set tasks for eliminating the weaknesses and preparing for
the next lesson.
Company Commander Work Procedure

1. Check the training and crossing sites and organize the rescue station –
on the day of the lesson before the company arrives.
2. Check that the company is prepared for the lessons, set tasks – five
minutes.
3. Check the progress of the lessons at the training sites and organize
belay – 30 minutes. (at the start of the first hour of training).
4. Assist the platoon commanders at training sites Nos. 1 and 3 – 30
minutes at each site (at training site No. 2 – in the third hour of study).
5. Review and summarize the lesson – five minutes.
____ Motorized Rifle Company Commander

__________________________________
Lesson procedure
The training in different ways to cross mountain rivers typically begins
with preparatory exercises in an old (dry) riverbed or at a specially equipped
training site.
Prior to the mountain river negotiation (forced crossing) training, three
sites are fitted out with different crossings.
Prior to the training, the instructor rechecks the river depth and current
velocity to determine fordability and organize belay. A rescue station is set up
downstream for student safety and belay. In addition, there is a rope stretched
by each crossing (at each training site).
When the company arrives at the training area, the company commander
states the subject, training objectives, and the procedure for practicing
the training points at the training sites, reminds the personnel of the safety
measures, and takes the platoons to the training sites.
When the training starts, the company commander monitors the platoon
commanders’ teaching process, checks the rescue stations, makes sure that
the safety requirements are followed, and helps the platoon commanders at
training sites Nos. 1 and 3.
At training site No. 1, the platoon commander begins the lesson by briefly
explaining and preparing the fording site. As the ford is prepared, individual
students practice crossing the river with pole self-belay. At the same time,
the end of the rope is taken across to the other bank, the fording is scouted
out, and the ends of the rope are secured to the river banks using pitons,
crags, trees, etc.

After selecting and preparing a ford, the platoon commander explains
and demonstrates on dry land how to ford a river single file, in ranks, and in
a circle. He then moves on to practical training on the river, practicing each
technique in sequence with the squads, which initially perform the exercises
without weapons or marching gear, putting boots on their bare feet, and then
in full gear.
As the students master a technique, the platoon commander intensifies the
training and makes the squads compete for speed and quality while observing
the safety requirements.
Moving on to fording (crossing) a river along a stretched rope, the platoon
commander reminds the students that this method is used to cross high-
velocity and relatively deep (up to the waist) rivers. He then reminds them of
the safety requirements, demonstrates the technique on dry land and in the
river, and moves on to practical training. One squad executes the technique on
the river under the platoon commander’s direction, and the others practices on
the bank under the squad commanders’ direction.
The platoon commander must be on the bank between the river being
forded and the rescue station and personally direct the crossing. He makes
sure that the leash with the Prusik knot (carabiner) is of a length that allows a
student to reach the primary rope if he is pulled away by the current, and that
the students in the water do not raise their legs high or move in step, and that
they self-belay.
After all the training points have been practiced, the platoon commander
arranges for the uniforms and footgear to be dried (change of clothes and
footwear), then gives a brief review and, on the company commander’s com-
mand, leads the platoon to another training site.
The training at site No. 2 should be conducted in the following sequence.
First, the platoon commander explains how to cross a river on exposed rocks,
by log-crossing and on a suspended pedestrian bridge. He then checks the
crossing and belay ropes, demonstrates each method of crossing a river,
reminds students of the safety requirements, and organizes the training by
squad.
Each squad practices one of the crossing methods under the direction of
the squad commanders, then they change places on the platoon commander’s
command.
The platoon commander watches the squad training to ensure that the
students jump lightly on the rocks, using the pole for support, and that they
move slowly and out of step, two to three meters apart, when crossing by log or
hanging bridge.
After all the scheduled overwater crossing methods have been prac-
ticed, the platoon commander does a review, summarizes the results of the
competition between the squads, sets assignments to improve the skills
learned, and takes the platoon to the next training site.
At site No. 3, the platoon commander explains how to prepare the cros-
sing with primary ropes and pulleys (carabiners) then assigns students to
work on this bank and on the opposite one, and to carry the primary ropes
to the opposite bank by fording the river with a pole. Two crossings are then
prepared: one for training to carry weapons and ammunition to the other bank,
and the other for the students to cross the river. When he has made sure that
the platoon knows how to prepare the crossings, the platoon commander
moves on to practical training. Weapons (ammunition, gear) are transported
first, and then the students cross. Each student should cross to the opposite
bank one-two times along a rope on a pulley (carabiner) with self-belay.
The students return from the opposite bank by a suspended foot bridge or
by log-crossing.
The commander does a brief review once all the scheduled crossing
methods have been practiced.
The platoons change training sites every 45 minutes, on the company
commander’s command.
The company commander ends the training by critiquing the exercises,
noting to what extent the objectives were met, and summarizes the results of
the competition between the squads and platoons. In conclusion, he grades
the units and gives orders to fix the weak points.
Russian Army Training l Physical Training 139
Train to Win: Organizing and

Conducting Physical Training For Soldiers
in the Mountains
Begin to develop and improve a soldier’s physical, special and

psychological qualities for com-bat under special conditions before
they attend mountain training centers. Use all forms of physical
training for soldiers and sergeants to achieve this: morning exercise,
classes, physical training during mock combat, athletic activity. Let us
look at each of these forms of physical training individually.
Morning exercise should include short and medium distance
running, one to five kilometer cross-country races, as well as exercises
on multi-purpose gymnastic apparatus (hip pull-overs, pull-ups,
arm walking on parallel bars, parallel bar dips), gymnastic bench
exercises, and rope and pole climbing. Soldiers should negotiate
several obstacle and training areas multiple times or completely
negotiate both a general and a mountain obstacle course. Sports with
simplified rules can also be included (handball, basketball, soccer),
and in summer –– going for a dip and swimming.
Conduct physical training classes in speed walking, track and
field, obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat, swimming (in summer),
and ski training (in winter). In addition, conduct integrated gymnastic
classes that include physical exercises, athletic games, mountain
obstacle courses, hand-to-hand combat, and others.
After the soldiers have learned to negotiate mountain obstacle
courses in the initial classes, they should train to negotiate them with
weapons and in gear. Simulate enemy fire and everything typical of
mountain combat.
Collateral physical conditioning exercises include natural mountain
and water obstacles, speed walking, field hikes, ski treks, etc.
Mass sporting activity should focus on applied sports (general
and mountain obstacle courses, military triathlon, track and field, skiing,
swimming, etc.) and military-professional techniques and actions.
Before a unit goes to a mountain training center, all personnel
undergo a medical exam to see if they are fit to train under special
conditions and physical strain. If a serviceman’s overall grade is
unsatisfactory, he is not allowed to participate in the mountain training
* Colonel Mikhail Panov, “Trenirovat’cya shtobypobezhdat’: Ob organizatsii i provedenii
fizicheskoy podgotovki voennoslyzhashchikh v gorakh” (“Train to Win: Organizing and
Conducting Physical Training For Soldiers in the Mountains”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army
Digest), May 2007, 46-48.
but is given additional physical training that focuses on developing
endurance and those physical qualities that are poorly developed.
If personnel are well prepared physically on the plains, they will
more quickly adapt to activity in mountain conditions, the negative
“shifts” in body functioning are mitigated, and the onset of altitude
sickness is slowed. Mountain physical training should therefore
aim to develop and improve the same physical, psychological, and
special qualities and motor skills that are present prior to going to the
mountains.
During the first two weeks at the mountain training center, physical
training classes are held every day except on days off, and morning
exercises take place daily for at least 40 minutes. It is important that
there should be not only weight-lifting, body-building and gymnastic
exercises but also short, medium, and long distance runs; cross-country
races; six to ten kilometer full-field marches; and treks to the mountain
training sites (the sites should be 15 to 20 kilometers from the training
center). Soldiers must be trained in hand-to-hand combat in mountain
conditions, and to throw a grenade accurately and far while standing,
kneeling, lying. Also, they must be able to throw a grenade from a
trench or bunker, on a level area, as well as downhill and uphill.
In winter, classes should also include ski training (how to move on
skis across rugged terrain, negotiating various mountain obstacles on
skis, Alpine skiing).
Classes are not organized by physical training category but rather
integrate exercises from the various categories. The preparatory part
of classes with soldiers who have been in the mountains for less than a
week should be increased up to 15 minutes. Their physical load during
this period should be light.
There should be two-minute breaks between exercises to catch
one’s breath and control the pulse rate. As the soldiers adapt (10-12
days after arriving in the mountains), training intensity and load are
increased to what they were on the plains. Classes are conducted in
accordance with the physical training and sport field manual.
The knowledge and skills that the students gain in the special
mountain obstacle classes should be developed in the physical
training classes. Mountain and physical training classes are gen-
erally integrated. This makes possible all-round general physical
conditioning of the students, strengthens their health and makes the
body more resistant to the impact of high altitude and combat.
Success in mountain combat tasks will largely depend on the
students’ all-round physical training. Mountain obstacle training should
therefore be planned so as to develop all the physical and special
qualities of mountain marksmen, where strength is a critical quality

of mountain combat. And strength is best developed by resistance
exercises (barbells, weights, rocks) as well as by pull-ups on a crossbar
or other contrivance, rope climbing, etc.
Sample exercises to develop strength:
1. Push-ups on the ground.
2. Two-leg squats without a partner, with a partner, and with
weights.
3. One-leg squats.
4. Jumping in place on one leg or both legs.
5. Forward/backward tilt without a partner, with a partner, and
with weights.
6. Tugging each other while standing and while sitting.
7. Throwing rocks of different weights with both arms forward
and upward, and backward and upward over the head.
8. Pushing stones with one and both arms.
9. Pull-ups on a crossbar, tree, pole, and so on.
10. Dips on bars, poles, overhangs, etc.
11. Arm swings on parallel bars.
In the mountains, the soldiers must be able to relax their muscles
so that when some muscles are being exerted, others are resting.
Alternately contracting and relaxing the muscles makes it possible to
exercise for a long time.
Sample muscle relaxation exercises:
1. Jiggle relaxed arm and leg muscles (one by one).
2. Alternate the body weight between the left and right foot.
3. Lightly massage the neck, chest, stomach and back.
A critical quality for soldiers in the mountains is endurance, which
depends on the state and efficiency of all human organs and systems.
There is general and special endurance: the latter is the ability to
negotiate mountain obstacles over a long period of time and march for
a long duration and in different terrain.
Walking and running are necessary to develop overall endurance.
Best endurance training comes from marches, cross-country races, ski
races, and man-made and various natural obstacle courses.
The ability to maintain balance is vital for soldiers in the mountains.
Without balance, it is virtually impossible to master rock climbing,
mountain-river crossing, moving across ice and talus, or conducting
belay and self-belay.
Sample exercises for strengthening balance:
1. Balance on one leg.
2. Tilt quickly forward, backward and sideways with eyes closed.
3. Rotate the head and body.
4. Walk and run with and without weapons on a narrow surface.
5. Jump from stone to stone (circle to circle), making a firm
landing each time.
6. Negotiate a multi-event mountain obstacle course.
Swiftness and agility are critical for negotiating the mountain ob-
stacles and dangers related to rockfalls and snow and ice avalanches.
Exercises to develop swiftness and agility:
1. Short distance run (100 meters).
2. Running and standing long jumps.
3. Precision throwing of grenades, rocks, and other articles.
4. Negotiate standard and mountain obstacle courses.
5. Perform pommel horse jumps and vaults.
6. Perform different exercises on gymnastics apparatuses and
calisthenics.
These exercises are used in all forms of physical training and
during mountain training.
During mass sporting activity and rock climbing training, contests
should be held to ease the soldiers’ and sergeants’ emotional strain.
The final stage of training should be a graded ascent to a peak
or pass, and a qualifying test for the right to the title and badge of
“Alpinist of Russia.”
The following exercises are recommended to test the physical
training done at 2,500 meters above sea level:
One kilometer cross-country run in military uniform and hiking
boots to measure endurance (“excellent” –– 4 minutes 30 seconds,“good”
–– 4 minutes 50 seconds, “satisfactory” –– 5 minutes 30 seconds);
Walk along a narrow ledge (length –– six meters, breadth –– 20
centimeters, height above the ground –– two meters) to gauge balance
(“excellent” –– walk quickly and confidently, “good” –– walk without
stopping, “satisfactory” –– walk with stops and without falling off); jump
from a height of two meters onto a 50x50 centimeter square on
the ground to gauge precision and orientation in the air (“excellent”
– land on the square and stop without hands touching [the ground]
and no forward or backward step, “good” –– land slightly outside the
square, “satisfactory” – same, but with hands touching the ground);
rope climbing (primary rope, doubled) without using the legs to
gauge arm strength (“excellent” –– seven meters, “good” –– six meters,
“satisfactory” – five meters); one-legged squat (on an even platform,
bench or rock; the other leg is lowered freely or stretched forward; arms
are held in an optional position; the knee of the squatting leg touches
the chest with each squat) to gauge leg strength (“excellent” –– 12 times,
“good” –– 10 times, “satisfactory” –– 8 times); 15 meter jumping race

on stones (five meter race, then jump from rock to rock; rock height – at
least 10 centimeters; nine-ten rocks should be spaced over 10 meters
in such a way that either the right or the left foot can tread on a rock
once; with the last jump, land on both feet, stopping in the designated
square on the finish line) to gauge reaction and motor coordination
(“excellent” –– 3.9 seconds, “good” –– 4.0 seconds, “satisfactory” –– 4.5
seconds).
Physical fitness is tested over the course of one day in the following
sequence: walk along a narrow surface, jump from a height, rope
climbing (primary rope), one-legged squat, jumping race on stones,
one-kilometer cross-country race.
The physical fitness grade is made up of the grades received for
the six exercises, namely:
“Excellent” – if at least half of the exercises are graded “excellent,”
and the rest “good”;
“Good” – if at least half of the exercises are graded “good” or
“excellent,” and the rest “satisfactory”;
“Satisfactory” – if more than half the exercises are graded
“satisfactory” and there are no unsatisfactory grades.
A soldier’s fitness is graded “unsatisfactory” if there is even one
unsatisfactory grade.
Build and equip sites and sport facilities for personnel physical
training.
Sport facilities are built and sites equipped for military units
assigned to mountain operations in accordance with the “Suggested
List of Sport Facilities and Sites for Physical Training” (Addendum 2 to
the Handbook of Physical Training and Sport in the Russian Federation
Armed Forces). Special mountain training camps or training sites are
also built.
Mountain training centers usually have track and field grounds,
gymnastic courts with a gymnastic floor and multipurpose gymnastic
equipment; rings for hand-to-hand combat; an area for throwing
grenades accurately and for distance, downward and upward; sport
courts (for volleyball, basketball, soccer, handball); and, if conditions
allow, an outdoor swimming pool or aquatic facility.
Logistics in
the Mountains
Supply in the mountains is tough. Helicopters cannot reach many
areas, trucks have a hard time negotiating mountain roads, and diesel
engines have real problems at altitude. River transport is one answer to
resupply through the mountains and, though tricky, rivers have been used
in this role for centuries. The following two articles by Vladimir Shiryayev
discuss the need to move supplies by river, pack animal, and truck as well
as do a logistics water reconnaissance. A mountaineering instructor with
much experience in military and adventure rafting, Shiryayev presents
ideas that have a great deal of value in mountain combat and are being
considered for adoption by the Russian military.
The difficult mountain rivers of Afghanistan make it hard to move
large amounts of material and the times they can be used in this role is
seasonable. Still, serious mountain combat requires the ability to penetrate
beyond the first mountain range and often pack animals, water transport
and porters can penetrate where trucks and helicopters cannot.
Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military

Transport Along Mountain Rivers
Vladimir Shiryayev in Armeisky Sbornik, September 2009*
U sing mountain rivers for supply deliveries, evacuation of the

wounded and sick, and other military transport missions require
reliable hydro-meteorological support since they are completely de-
pendent on the hydrographic network in combat areas. Transport oper-
ations in such unusual and nontraditional conditions will be successful
if there is good hydrologic reconnaissance, which is the basis of hydro-
meteorological support for rafting.
Since the objective of hydrologic reconnaissance is to gather,
process and provide information to the troops about the hydrologic
network and to predict probable natural phenomena in mountain river
* Vladimir Shiryayev, “Gidrometeorologicheskoe obespechenie voinskikh perevozok,

osyshchestvlyaemikh po gornim rekam” (“Hydro-Meteorological Support of Military Trans-
port Along Mountain Rivers”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), September 2009, 15-22.
Shiryayev is a military mountaineering instructor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Military Transport Along Mountain Rivers 145
basins, it needs to be provided by special military support. It is a key

component of rear-area reconnaissance since it determines the routes
for delivery and evacuation using mountain rivers, and makes transport
safety recommendations. Given the many matters that hydrologic
reconnaissance deals with, it may be conducted by the staff of large
formations as well as subordinate logistic support entities that make
deliveries to their own units and detachments within a certain segment
of the logistics route.
The hydrologic state of a riverine network can be studied while
preparing for and conducting an operation. The study may be based on
the following key objectives:
l ascertain the hydrologic and topographic conditions in order to
select a staging area;
l study the shoreline to determine the capacity of the vortexes
(eddies) for simultaneous loading of watercraft in the staging area and
unloading of supplies at the destinations, or for transferring supplies
at places where they must be portaged around impassable obstacles
during stage-by-stage and segment transport [in stage-by-stage
transport, the transport unit moves the entire length of the river, moving
supplies from one dump site to the next in states. In segment transport,
the transport unit moves the supplies along one segment of the river and
then another transport unit moves them further];
l search the riverside in a valley (gorge) for suitable and secure
locations for field depots and supply dumps;
l inspect dangerous rapids, narrow passages, and forest obstruc-
tions, and make recommendations on how to negotiate them;
l determine the suitability of mountain river stretches for sending
supplies by unmanned raft, the forces and assets required for those
purposes, and the types of rafts and packaging;
l determine the work to clear the riverbed of minefields, non-
explosive obstacles, and materiel and gear that have fallen into the water;
l determine conveyance methods based on route difficulty and
rafting conditions;
l work up transport safety recommendations;
l mark water conveyance routes and set up beacons and directional
signs;
l determine the possibility of safe conveyance and list appropriate
actions in support;
l prepare charts and technical descriptions of individual obstacles
as well as the water routes as a whole;
l do a time study of the rafting, including surmounting difficult-to-
traverse obstacles (individually);
l inspect the shoreline and riverside in the staging area and at
destinations and intermediate points to identify minefields, loading and
offloading conditions, and the possibility of using machinery for loading
and offloading supplies from undeveloped banks;
l work up proposals and recommendations for camouflage, com-
munication (signaling), engineer and other types of combat support of
transport, and for the possibility of nighttime transport.
The scope and complex nature of hydrologic reconnaissance
dictates the need to form reconnaissance groups from different services
and specialties: rear services, hydro-meteorologists, engineers, com-
munications, and chemical defense specialists. There could also
be a need for hydrologists; glaciologists; camouflage specialists;
demolitions experts; fork-lift transport vehicles and machinery experts;
field fortification experts; and sappers. The size and composition of
hydrologic reconnaissance groups are not fixed and will vary widely
depending on the scope and nature of the information required.
The chief methods of obtaining information about a river are:
large scale topographic maps, global positioning system readings;
instrument and visual observation; ground and aerial photography;
video recordings; and direct inspection of obstacles, shore lines and
riversides, paying particular attention to planned intermediate mooring
sites for stage-by-stage and segment conveyance. It is also necessary
to thoroughly inspect the riverside in the staging area and at the supply
destinations, whatever the means of transport.
When gathering information on a river, it is vital to familiarize oneself
with its technical description and charts, reference and special literature,
and the military-geographic description of the theater of operations.
The author believes that it would be a good idea to print large-scale
topographic maps with river characteristics annotated on them. The
data would be derived from trekking reports. These brief characteristics
of rafting conditions would be a great addition to the written information
on the reverse side of the map.
Charts make transport much easier, quicker and safer by making it
possible to take one’s bearings in a river setting and make appropriate
decisions. The charts enable detachments to move and make supply
deliveries more rapidly. Figure 1 shows navigational directions for a
section of a mountain river that the author drew up for a difficult trek.
Charts and technical descriptions compiled back in peacetime can
certainly be used for military transport, but the information they contain
could be outdated by changing terrain factors (landslides, avalanches,
rock falls, and so on) and the impact of manmade activities on the
environment. Charts could become rapidly outdated in wartime when
Corresponds to River Current Current Speed,

Navigability
Class (Section) Character meters/sec
Easy Navigable One Still Up to 2
Moderately Navigable Two Rapid 2-4
Difficult to Navigate Three Stormy 4-6
Non-Navigable Four Very Stormy Over 6
Figure 1. Chart of a
mountain river stretch.
heavy use of artillery and aviation, and of armored formations and units
in areas accessible to tanks, cause a certain degree of terrain changes
in mountain river valleys, on hill sides as well as in the riverbeds
themselves. Furthermore, explosions and blasts could result in the
appearance of new micro-relief features –– rapids, shallow rocky rapids,
waterfalls, and rock dams, and where there is snow cover and in high
mountains –– snow bridges and tunnels caused by rock falls and snow
slides. The latter could sweep debris in its wake, often reaching the
opposite slopes of a valley (gorge). Such obstacles can also appear
in mountain rivers during fortification of strongholds, firing positions,
command posts, and supply dumps. These terrain changes cannot, of
course, obliterate water routes, but by making rafting conditions more
difficult, they will have direct impact on water craft and transport.
Charts play a substantial role for military transport using mountain
rivers because they provide essential information on rafting conditions
and guide selection of tactical rafting options. An expertise in chart
reading and chart drawing is a key component of water assault training.
Experience shows that when drawing a chart, it is a good idea to
trace the river line and its adjacent terrain from a topographic map with
a scale of 1:100, 000 or 1:50,000. For correct orientation when rafting, the
tracing must be marked with the mouths and names of rivers and creeks
that join the water route, elevations, canyons, bluffs, waterfalls, hydro-
stations, cableways, ferry sites, and trails running alongside the river
(figure 1).
During hydrologic reconnaissance, all obstacles and their char-
acteristics, and the recommended methods for clearing them are
promptly marked on the traced river line. Information should not be
entered after reconnaissance as this could result in distortion. Rafters
may mark the information immediately on the mapsheet, but it may end
up being very crowded because of the large volume of river data.
The diagrams should use a legend, for which the author offers some
suggestions (figure 2), and it is a good idea to note the obstacle name
(number), location and difficulty as appropriate, for example, 2EN,
5DN, 9NN, and 17MN. Here, the numbers “2, 5, 9, and 17” indicate the
sequence number of the obstacle from the staging area, and “EN, DN,
NN and MN” indicate the degree of difficulty. In this instance, the second
obstacle is easily navigable, the fifth is difficult to navigate, the ninth is
non-navigable, and the seventh is moderately navigable.
Remember that on mountain rivers which might flood after rain or
which have some form of controlled flow there could be significant daily
fluctuations in water level, causing obstacles to be partially submerged
or to appear in other places where current charts indicate that there are
Figure 2. Examples of legends for charted obstacles

1. Above-water rock. 12. Log barrier (solid).
2. Rock partially submerged at a shallow 13. Navigable channel on some river
depth. stretches.
3. Submerged rock that could impact craft 14a. Whirlpool.
position if traversed. 14b. Swirl.
4. Eddy (section of a channel with reverse 15. “Mushroom” water cushion, usually
current). pulsating.
5. “Pin spots” where the current may pin
rafts against the shore (forms at a concave Recommended legend for charting
bank). navigability
6. Rock (bluff bank). EN – Easily navigable.
7. Riverside rocks (rock debris, detritus). MN – Moderately navigable.
8. Vertical rises. DN – Difficult to navigate.
9. Slanting rises. NN – Non-navigable.
10. Riverside shoal (forms at a convex bank). NWR – Navigable without reconnaissance but
11. Log barrier (riverside). reconnaissance would be useful.
none. Obstacles can also emerge when a mud flow carries debris from
lateral gorges (at both low and high altitudes) during glacial mudflows.
Therefore, the numbering of rapids marked on old charts should
be checked against the location of lateral flows. And if an obstacle
is by the mouth of a lateral flow, it is a good idea to add a geographic
name to the numbering, for example, “Aksai Rap. 25 NN.” This means
that the rapids are located at the mouth of the Aksai stream and is
non-navigable for transport purposes. “Sarykamyshsky Rap. 20 DN”
means difficult to navigate rapids at the mouth of the Sarykamyshsky
stream. Rapids should be numbered sequentially only if there are few
geographic features or conspicuous landmarks on the route and they are
considerably far apart.
Regardless of whether a technical description of a rafting route
is available, all hydrologic reconnaissance data should be entered in
Figure 3.
a log that specifies the type, length, density, and distinctive features of
the obstacles; corresponding landmarks; the recommended line of
movement; opportunities for mooring enroute and size of eddies; and
trail quality and height above the water level. For example, “Krutoi
Rapids 27 DN –– abrupt riverbed narrowing; 2 meters drop behind the
first (left) turn; many flooded rocks, ‘tight barrels’; water slams heavily
against right bank cliffs at the exit from the rapids. Conclusions: portage
loads and watercraft along left bank trail.” Example two: “Calm 28 km
stretch, river width –– 40–50 m, no above-water rocks or log barriers,
depth –– 1.5–2 m, average current speed –– 2–2.3 m/sec, swell –– not more
than 0.5 m. Conclusions: these characteristics, as well as the smooth
turns, no pin spots or rocky banks make possible through conveyance in
either piloted vessels or by unmanned raft.”
Completeness should be a consideration when assessing the quality
of mountain trails that might be used for stage-by-stage and segment
conveyance. It often happens that these primitive transportation
lines marked on a map are virtually nonexistent in some stretches.
Landslides, mudslides, runoff on slopes, and grass and shrub overgrowth
gradually remove these land supply lines. The sharp drop in tourists in
mountainous areas over the last 16 years has had a negative impact on
trails and their proper maintenance.
If time allows, it is a good idea to diagram rapids on a 1:1000 scale,
marking only those rocks, cliffs, currents and whirlpools that could affect
passage. A diagram of rapids should show the recommended line of
movement for vessels and mooring sites for offloading or transferring
supplies to pack loads if the river route cannot be followed further. Trails
Photo 1. Bird’s eye view of a mountain river’s channel and flood plain.
on which the load and watercraft can be portaged past the rapids to
continue the trip should be indicated.The broken line in Figure 3 shows
the safest rafting route in very difficult rapids. The vessel in the right turn
of the river moves rightward early to avoid being pinned against left bank
cliff at 3. The steeper river gradient drastically increases current speed
from location 2. In order to avoid eddy 4 when going from one end of
the rapids to another, the crew rows vigorously to the left immediately
after pin spot 3 and keeps as close as possible to the left bank, avoiding
the tangle of submerged and flooded rocks 5. Making allowance for
the fact that the river again makes a right turn and that the water slams
heavily against the concave (left) bank, and that there is the danger of the
craft striking above-water cliffs 6, and then 7, which are aligned, the crew
makes every effort to go rightward and passes close to the right bank.
Having cleared the final stretch, the raft crosses the current and moors at
sandbar 8 on the left (convex) bank.
Watercraft (catamarans, inflatable boats, flotation rafts and kayaks),
helicopters, ground vehicles (motor vehicles, armored personnel
carriers, motorcycles, mountain bikes, and mountable animals, best
of all horses), as well as paragliders and hang gliders can be used for
hydrologic reconnaissance and data gathering. But helicopters and
catamarans should be regarded as the most efficient of all the transport
and reconnaissance assets listed because they are particularly mobile
(photo 1). The catamarans’ maneuverability and speed make it cheaper
to study a body of water on the spot. Helicopters make it possible
to survey a large part of a river valley in a short time, identify difficult
spots, and pass on the information to crews reconnoitering on the
water. Immediate and extensive information on rafting conditions
obtained from air reconnaissance enables staffs to process information
and make an appropriate decision more speedily. There is also the
option of combining these transport assets with a catamaran crew
surveying obstacle-free stretches of a river from a helicopter, and
using their watercraft to survey the stretches with rapids.
Open military source reports which state that helicopter recon-
naissance can be carried out at an absolute altitude of no more than
2,500 meters significantly understate these aircraft’s capabilities in
mountainous terrain. Experience shows that helicopters can fly to
altitudes over 5,000 meters and land and take off at 4,000 meters altitude
in hard-to-reach areas. For example, MI-4 helicopters delivered supplies
(construction materials, equipment, diesel engines and other machinery)
to an altitude of 3,800 meters above sea level during construction
of the Lednik Abramova (Abramov Glacier) high mountain hydro-
meteorologic station. Furthermore, the tactical radius for deliveries was
50 kilometers, and the cargo weight was 0.7–0.8 tons. Numerous drops
to mountain climbing expeditions in Central Tyan-Shan and Pamir, as
well as glaciologic research in other high mountain areas of Central Asia
confirm the considerable high altitude capabilities of the helicopters
(MI-8MTV).
Hydrologic reconnaissance would be incomplete if it were confined
to gathering information about the water transport route and the
riverside area where supply dumps are to be set up, supplies loaded and
offloaded, and loads and watercraft portaged –– for segment and step-
by-step transport. Hydrologic reconnaissance is especially important
for enhancing the ability of troops and logistic services units to survive
in high mountain areas and must thoroughly and regularly survey the
man-made (dammed) and glacial (ice-dammed) lakes that abound in
the basins of rivers with glaciers and a lot of erosion terrain formation
(photo 2). Some glacial lakes break out regularly. The break-out of the
well-known Mertsbakher ice-dammed lake in Central Tyan-Shan can, to
some extent, be forecast since it takes place annually (from late July to
mid-October, and most often in August-September) causing powerful
floods on the Inylchek and Sarydzhaz Rivers with a peak discharge of
1,000–2,000 cubic meters per second. Still, it is impossible to forecast
the break out of the enormous number of small lakes that form on the
surface and in the moraine deposits of glaciers.
Consequently, helicopter survey of the high mountain area of
river basins is important where there is combat and logistics support
Photo 2. Erosion terrain formation. Photo 3. Glacial mudflow.
activity. It makes sense to land observers with radios and safety and
survival gear at the most potentially dangerous high mountain lakes to
study and analyze the processes underway at the site, record the level
of the water accumulating on the surface and in the moraine deposits of
glaciers, as well as to preempt attempts by the enemy’s sabotage and
reconnaissance groups to blow up the glacial (rock) dams to deliberately
flood the locality.
As regards the need for aerial hydrological reconnaissance of
high mountains (snowcap region), mention should be made of the
SARNIGMI hydrographic party’s many years of experience conducting
such observations back in Soviet times. Unfortunately, the economic
hardships that set in after 1991 sharply reduced the scope of aerial
and ground hydro-meteorologic observations. The disastrous July
1998 glacial mudflow in the Shakhimardan River valley resulted from
the melting of glacial dams, followed by water discharge from a small
lake that had formed in the terminal moraine deposits of the Archa-
Bashi glacier (Alai Mountain Range, photo 3). This vividly disclosed the
severity of the current challenge of ensuring the safety of the whole area.
Later overflights of the Pamir-Alai and Western Tyan-Shan moun-
tain ranges identified lakes whose parameters were determined
visually: length, width, shape, surface area, shore line configuration,
and approximate water volume. The surface of each glacial basin
was surveyed. When a body of water was found, the helicopter would
pass over the site several times until all information, including the
exact time and location, were logged. Relevant notes were also made
on topographic maps. Special reference books and catalogs of USSR
glaciers were used in the aerial survey. Republic of Uzbekistan Ministry
of Emergency Situations hydro-meteorologic service detachments
landed on lakes that were potentially dangerous.
Lakes that emerge from the ice twitches [the sudden downstream
movement of the ice cover of a glacier] of glaciers formed in lateral
gorges to the river can block the principal riverbeds and present a
major danger to troops and logistics units. Some glacial dams can be
200 meters high. If they burst, they will cause catastrophic flooding
of mountain rivers, destroying transport supply lines and towns. The
Voyenno-Gruzinsky road has, on more than one occasion, been put out
of commission by mudrock flows on the Kabakhi River and then on the
Terek River. Transport supply lines in Alaska, including Stikine River
traffic, are currently threatened by at least six glacial lakes. The torrential
flooding that occurred on the Rio Plomo and then on the Mendoza River
in January 1934 wiped out seven bridges and 13 kilometers of the Trans-
Andean Railway along the Mendoza gorge and through the Cumbre
Tunnel from Argentina to Chile. It took 10 years to rebuild the railway.
In Karakorum, the world’s largest mountain range, there have been at
least 50 glacial lake bursts over the last 150 years, spawning colossal
floods. The water level in some rivers rose by more than 20 meters, and
the discharge reached 19,200 cubic meters per second with a water
flow of 30–40 kilometers per hour. During one such flood on the Shyok
River, a large right tributary of the Indus, villages on the lower terraces
were damaged while those high (60–90 meters) above the river were
not affected by the flood wave, even though it reached 15 meters (Yu.B.
Vinogradov. “Etyudy o selevykh potokakh” (“Sill Flow Etudes”), L., 1980).
These phenomena and the scale of the destruction they wreaked
show how vital it is to ensure the safety of the troops and logistics units
and agencies, to which end personnel, weapons, vehicles, supplies, and
command posts should be located out of the reach of flood waves and sill
flows.
Hydrologic reconnaissance groups may use the suggested classi-
fication of natural obstacles by navigability and the table data to assess
a water surface and issue recommendations for using mountain rivers as
military supply lines (transport and evacuation routes).
Easily navigable obstacles. They may take the form of single rocks,
several sandbars, small waves, weak pin spots, straight slightly sloping
flows and rapid flows (photo 4).
All types of watercraft with maximum supply loads may be used with
such obstacles. The vessels’ line of movement is determined by reading
the water. Belay can be used. The vessels could also be joined onto
more powerful watercraft or separate sections of a pontoon bridge could
be used as unmanned rafts to be

intercepted later at the offloading
site. Positive velocity (strokes
with oars forward) can be used
to increase speed on rowed rafts,
and especially on oar-propelled
vessels (catamarans, flotation rafts,
and inflatable boats). Stretches
with easily navigable obstacles
are convenient for refining tech- Photo 4. Easily navigable obstacles.
nical and tactical rafting tech-
niques such as spacing between
vessels and maintaining contact,
crew belay, reading the water to
determine the line of movement
and following it.
Moderately navigable obsta-
cles. They allow a trained crew
to move loaded watercraft. This
obstacle category includes sim-
Photo 5. Moderately navigable water
ple rapids and shallow rocky obstacles.
rapids, some rock groups, slight
rises, stronger pin spots and rapid
flows (photo 5). These obstacles
can be traversed by all types of
watercraft with belay. In some
cases there may be a slight drop
in speed when obstacles are re-
connoitered from shore and belay
is organized from the water. The
commander of the rafting detach-
Photo 6. Difficult-to-navigate obstacles.
ments determines the distance
between crews based on the situ-
ation and the character of the river.
Rafting experience shows that
vessels should be spaced approx-
imately 30–100 meters apart to
avoid collisions while moving and
ensure crew safety during belay.
The vessels’ line of movement
in most cases is determined by
reading the water. Photo 7. Non-navigable obstacles.
Difficult to navigate obstacles. These are characterized by rapid
currents and great difficulty – powerful rapids and pin spots, slanting and
pulsating rises with reversed crests, foamy holes (“kettles,” “barrels”),
powerful whirlpools, tight vortexes, current disturbances, swirls, abrupt
discharges, and rocky pockets. It takes a lot of courage to clear these
obstacles. If they follow one another in quick succession, plan on making
the trip in vessels that have a lightened load or have been completely
unloaded (photo 6). The distance between the crews should be
increased but should not exceed 100 meters. In some cases, belay is
completely eliminated during movement and each crew is on its own.
Load and watercraft portage is not ruled out. Obstacles in this category
can be successfully cleared in maneuverable vessels that are stable and
fairly buoyant. If there are enough forces and assets, it is a good idea
to plan to belay from the water downstream of the rapids. Difficult-to-
navigate obstacles on transport and evacuation routes can significantly
slow supply delivery and evacuation of the wounded. In some cases it
will take two-three times longer than a trip on easy stretches of the same
length, which is based on just travel time. It may take as long to make
the first trips on unexplored routes and when there are insufficient forces
and assets for safety.
Non-navigable obstacles. It is impossible to clear them on any
type of watercraft, even unloaded, or with a highly trained crew (photo
7). Mooring teams must be dispatched beforehand to help crews when
such obstacles are present on a conveyance and evacuation route. This is
all the more necessary in cases where watercraft mooring is compulsory
and unmanned flotation rafts, separate sections of a pontoon bridge and
other rafts on the mountain river have to be intercepted. Examples of this
group of obstacles are waterfalls, rock and log barriers, and rapids with
macro-fragmental jams where narrow passages make rafting impossible.
With engineer support, some types of these obstacles, for example solid
log barriers, can be removed to provide an unobstructed passage and
evacuation route.
The suggested organization of hydro-meteorologic support for
military transport on mountain rivers, and the classification of natural
obstacles by navigability, make it possible to use water routes very
efficiently and safely as military supply lines in hard-to-reach localities.
The foregoing recommendations may be useful for the staffs and logistics
services of formations and task forces when suddenly called upon to
provide uninterrupted supplies to troops, move military contingents, and
provide material and transport support for combat and operations in
special conditions.
________________________________________
Mountain logistics is tough and requires ingenuity and some ancient

skills to succeed. It is apparent that:
1. Mountain artillery support is a function of how far forward artillery
ammunition can be delivered.
2. 155mm artillery systems are hard to get out of valley plains and
smaller, direct-fire artillery or rocket launchers that can be broken down
into transportable pieces are optimum (75mm or thereabouts).
3. Mortars are great, but like aircraft, give the enemy time to react to
incoming fire. Mortar ammunition above 81mm is hard to manpack.
4. Most soldiers do not know how to care for, load and lead pack
animals, but this can be a vital skill.
5. Just because its water does not mean it is a job for the US Navy.
6. Transportation units need to be capable of self defense.
7. Helicopter supply is a limited option.
8. Transportation units need mountain and river training just as much
as maneuver forces. –– Editors
What a Water Transport Company Should

Be: The Need for Special Supply Delivery
Transport Units in Mountain Areas
Vladimir Shiryayev in Armeisky Sbornik, August 2008*
T he challenging geography and physical conditions in mountainous

regions greatly affects soldiers’ combat and all types of logistics
support. Material and transport support and the techniques and methods
of supply delivery require an improved logistics support system,
redundant delivery supply routes, and, most importantly, new specialized
transport units.
The training of military units using the proposed TO&Es shows that
shows that a separate water transport company (mountain) --- SWTC(M)
meets all the requirements for mountain operations and is best suited for
this purpose. The company should include the prescribed number of
water transport platoons and squads, as well as other combat, logistical
and technical support units (figure 1).
The suggested mountain water transport company’s TO&E structure
will meet the daily requirements of a mountain battalion using up to a
class three river with severe rafting conditions and a five-fold buoyancy
(figure 2). A 38-man water transport platoon is best suited as the
mountain water transport company base unit. Comprised of three water
transport squads, it has a 52.5 ton maximum carrying capacity (the
capacity of all inflatable elements).
The optimum number of men for a water transport squad is twelve.
The crew may have two, three, four and sometimes six people, depending
on rafting conditions. A squad can deliver a mountain platoon’s daily
material requirements in one trip.
It makes sense to use the wire-framed inflatable rafts on transverse
gondolas and catamarans as the separate mountain water transport
company’s primary regular watercraft. Each has a maximum carrying
capacity of 7.5 and 2.5 metric tons, respectively.
Figure 3 shows the carrying capacity and minimum number of
recommended watercraft (one set) needed to perform the tasks of a
separate mountain. With 4-5-fold buoyancy, it is seemingly inadvisable
to use catamarans for cargo transport since their carrying capability is
considerably less than rafts.
Counting the weight of the crew and weapons (400 kilograms), their
useful carrying capacity is just 230 and 100 kilograms, respectively. But
even under such conditions (technically difficult rapids), a mountain
water transport company can carry 32.5 metric tons and deliver 20
* Vladimir Shiryayev, “Kakoy byt’vodno-transportnoy rote?” (“What a Water Transport
Company Should Be”), in Armeisky Sbornik (Army Digest), August 2008. Shiryayev is a
military mountaineering instructor in Tashkent, Uzbekistan.
Mountain Transport Companies 159
swtc (m)
COMMAND
8swtc
pers.,
(m)2
catamarans
COMMAND
Figure 1. TO&E of a Separate Mountain
8 pers., 2 Water Transport Company, SWTC(M).
catamarans
Main Units Supply Units

114 pers. 100 pers.
Main Units Supply Units
114 pers. 100 pers.
Water Transport Combat Support Vehicular Supply Platoon

Platoon Platoon Platoon 38 pers., 6 WIR,
38x3Transport
Water pers. 38 pers.,
Combat 9
Support KamAZ-43105-
Vehicular 3 catamarans
Supply Platoon
18 WIR
Platoon catamarans
Platoon 17
Platoon 38 pers., 6 WIR,
9 38x3
Catamarans
pers. 38 pers., 9 KamAZ-43105- 3 catamarans
18 WIR catamarans 17
9 Catamarans
Water Transport Recon. Squad Pers. Transport Administration

Squad 12 pers., 3 Squad Squad
12x9Transport
Water pers. catamarans
Recon. Squad KamAZ-43105-8
Pers. Transport 12x2 pers.,
Administration
(2 watercraft
Squad + 1 12 pers., 3 Squad 4 Squad
WIR, 2
catamaran)x9
12x9 pers. catamarans KamAZ-43105-8 catamarans
12x2 pers.,
(2 watercraft + 1 4 WIR, 2
catamaran)x9 catamarans
Total personnel -- 220 Engineer Squad Watercraft, Food Watercraft Repair
Maximum carrying capacity (Cmax) 12 pers., 3 and Equipment and Assembly
– 237.5 metric tons catamarans
Engineer Squad Transport Squad
Watercraft, Food SquadRepair
Watercraft
12 pers., 3 and Equipment and12Assembly
pers.,
Primary units, including company catamarans Transport Squad 2 Squad
WIR , 1
command (18 rafts (WIR), 11 12 pers.,
catamarans) – 162.5 metric tons 2 WIR , 1
(122 personnel).
Communication Technical
Support Units (6 rafts, 12 Squad Support Squad
catamarans) – 75 metric tons 12 pers., 3
Communication KamAZ-43105-1
Technical
(100 personnel). catamarans
Squad Support Squad
12 pers., 3 KamAZ-43105-1
catamarans
metric tons of useful cargo to fill a mountain unit’s daily material re-
quirements.
NOTE: The author proposes using this company for both upstream and
downstream transport. Upstream transport will require rowing, belaying,
or towing from the banks. Where this is impossible, he envisions use of
--------- River Rafting Classifications and Bouyancy --------

Class 1: Smooth river with only small rough areas that might require some maneuvering.
(Skill Level: Very Basic)
Class 2: Some rough water, perhaps with some rocks that might require some maneuvering.
(Skill Level: Basic)
Class 3: Whitewater with small waves and perhaps maybe a small drop, but no real danger.
It might require significant maneuvering. (Skill Level: Experienced)
Class 4: Whitewater with medium waves, perhaps with rocks and a considerable drop
requiring sharp maneuvering. (Skill Level: Experienced)
Class 5: Whitewater with large waves, fast water, probably including large rocks and
hazards and a large drop that requires skilled maneuvering. (Skill Level: Advanced)
Class 6: Not navigable due to substantial whitewater, large waves, rocks and hazards, plus
substantial drops that may destroy water craft.
Four or five-fold buoyancy refers to a water craft’s ability to carry four to five times its weight.
Information extracted from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rafting assessed on July 15, 2010.
Figure 2.
Figure 3. Carrying capacity and minimum number of watercraft needed for a
Separate Water Transportation Company (Mountain), SWTC(M), minus support units.
Class Rivers
∑Γ
No. of max’
Water (Tons) Carrying Capacity
No. of Rafts Cmax’ No. of Cmax’
Transport Water (when River Class)
Personnel on (Tons) Catamarans (Tons)
Units Transport
Gondolas
Units 3 4 5
Crew 4 1 7.5 1 2.5 7.5:2.5 2.5;0.83 1.88;0.63 1.5;0.5

Squad 12 2 15 1 2.5 17.5 5.83 4.4 3.5
Platoon 38 6 45 3 7.5 52.5 17.5 13.1 10.5
Company
8 – – 2 5.0 5.0 1.67 1.25 1.0
Command
Company 122 18 135 11 27.5 27.5 54.17 40.63 32.5
Total of 29 watercraft in a set: 18 rafts; 11 catamarans.
vehicles and pack animals to bridge the gap in moving supplies and
disassembled watercraft upstream.
________________________________________
Inclusion of catamarans in platoons and squads ensures crew
safety since they are more reliable for belaying large watercraft and
intercepting crews undergoing some emergency.
One of the best separate mountain water transport company
manpower distribution options on watercraft is as follows: 44 servicemen,
including the company command, carry supplies on catamarans, while
78 carry them on rafts. There are 12 four-man raft crews and the rest are
made up of five-six men. This manpower distribution on the rafts has to
do with the disposition of platoon commanders and their deputies. There
are other possible crew configurations, depending on rafting conditions.
Platoon commanders should be appointed from among officers who
have been trained in combat rafting, and their deputies, as well as squad
and crew commanders should be appointed from among the chief
warrant officers, sergeants and privates who are best trained in mountain
river rafting.
During rafting, the platoon and squad movement columns are to be
formed in such a way that a catamaran crew is at the head of each unit
pointing out the route as well as dangerous local obstructions and, if
necessary, berthing sites.
A drawback of this military unit model is that the separate mountain
water transport company is outfitted with rigid-frame watercraft, which
means that a lot of time and materials are spent making them. In
southern regions and the Thule, where there is no forest cover, watercraft
frames have to be made from dural (titanium) tubes, making them more
expensive.
Figure 4. Second model Separate Water Transport Company (Mountain),

SWTC(M), supply carrying capability.
Mountain Rivers
Class One Class Two
Water
Transport Unit No. of Carrying Capacity Unit No. of Carrying Capacity
Unit Composition Rafts (Tons) Composition Rafts (Tons)
(Men) (Men)
Max Class Max Class 2 Class 3
1.5
Crew 2 1 7.5 5.0 4 1 7.5 3.75 2.5
Squad 12 6 45.0 30.0 12 3 22.5 11.25 7.5
Platoon 38 18 135.0 90.0 38 9 67.5 33.75 22.5
Company
8 4 30.0 20.0 8 2 15.0 7.5 5.0
Command
Company 122 58 435.0 290.0 122 29 217.5 108.75 72.5
This drawback is compensated for by the long useful life of

watercraft frames made from these metals (ten years or more based on
the experience of sport rafting). These watercraft can be disassembled
into pieces weighing no more than 8 kilograms each, making it possible
for the equipment bearers (the very same rafts-men) to carry them to
the staging area (SA) after the trip. Since the catamarans have adjustable
crossbars, it is possible to change the width of the watercraft so that they
can negotiate the narrowest waterways and to arrange and brace the
supplies conveniently and securely.
A separate mountain water transport company should have a second
and even third set of watercraft in order to reduce the time between trips.
They could also serve as company reserves in the event that craft are lost,
and to replace craft that are temporarily out of commission. Additional
sets will greatly speed up supply delivery. For example, a second
catamaran is prepared to leave while the first is transporting a load.
The physical and geographical differences of a mountain region
dictate the specific approach to the structure, composition and equipping
of the water transport units. Another separate mountain water transport
company model option is also possible. Without changing the TO&E, the
its supply delivery capability can be increased by 55 metric tons if all
water transport craft are switched to wire-framed inflatable rafts, getting
rid of the catamarans (which carry 66.7% less than rafts). This model can
used on high mountain rivers, as well as for class two rivers on which
there are no difficult obstacles. Figure 4 shows the parameters that
will determine a separate mountain water transport company’s supply
carrying capability in the second option.
On class one rivers, therefore, with the same number of personnel,
the number of raft crews can be doubled by reducing them to two men,
making it possible to increase the number of rafts to 58, with a total
maximum carrying capacity of 435 metric tons, which is equivalent to
two sets of such watercraft.
As is apparent from figures 3 and 4, the optimum composition of
men, equipment, TOE, and their watercraft and carrying capacity are not
a constant. The amount of military cargo that can be delivered depends
on the class of the mountain river, watercraft specifications (number, type
and volume of inflatable elements in their construction), and the rafts-
men’s technical and physical training.
The amount of cargo carried on mountain rivers may change even
within the limits of a single operational area that encompasses mountain
regions with varied physical and geographical conditions. For example,
the rivers of East Pamir are level while those in West Pamir, which may
run the same direction, are mostly whitewater and full of rapids. This
affects the water transport units, whose thresholds (class 5) are laid out in
the first Separate Water Transport Company (Mountain) model, figure 3.
The fact that the mountain forces and military units operate in
varying directions and within the task forces’ main advance makes
another military formation transport model possible, Depending on
transport volume, logistical factors and physical and geographical
conditions, it could include: one-two water transport companies, one-
two pack transport companies, a company of carriers, and combat,
logistics and technical support units. Its three or five company (650 to 900
men) composition makes the military unit an independent tactical unit
capable of delivering cargo and protecting, defending and safeguarding
its assets without diverting combat formations from their primary tasks.
The separate mountain transport battalion organization and staffing
structure is based on a modular structure in which a water transport
company (any of the models or a combination thereof depending on
logistical and physical and geographical factors) and a company of
carriers are separate modules.
The entire separate mountain transport battalion or, depending on
operational and logistical factors, separate detachments (modules) may
deliver supplies, making it possible to maintain the transport capability of
the other separate mountain transport battalion detachments (modules).
Figure 5 shows an alternative way for separate mountain transport
battalion/detachments to deliver supplies.
The separate mountain transport battalion should include pack
transport units to carry loads across passes that are inaccessible to
vehicles. Their tasks will be: to deliver supplies from a higher rear
echelon to the supply units of mountain forces and detachments or
directly to their combat formations; and to transport supplies to final or
Military Vehicular Road Command
KBAD
WTC(m)
Ca Supply Bge Cmd
rri
er
co PTC-1
m
pa Pack Transport Company - One
ny
A)
(S
PT a
re
C-
2 gA
agin
St
PTC-2
(Pack Transpo
rt Company - Tw
o)
Figure 5. Separate Mountain Transport Battalion unit supply delivery methods.
halfway delivery points from the helicopter pads and airfield landing
strips of military transport aircraft. That and to deliver supplies from a
higher rear echelon to the staging area for further transport by water;
deliver loads from the river (at the destinations) to where the brigade
(regiment) or battalion is deployed; return the watercraft to the staging
area after the trip; reinforce the water transport units to carry loads
and watercraft by land when impassable rapids appear on the route
during stage-by-stage transport; if the situation changes, maneuver the
watercraft into lateral or adjacent gorges (new directions).
Unlike the separate pack transport company (SPTC) that existed in
the Turkestan Military District prior to 1991, the structural model of the
proposed separate mountain water transport battalion’s pack transport
company (PTC) requires supply platoons to switch to pack animal
squads. This is primarily because of the nature of the mountain terrain
and the limited capability of pack animal squads to move across rugged
terrain. If necessary, a company’s supply platoon can be reinforced,
for example with a third squad of a third pack transport platoon. In this
way, while maintaining the general parameters of the organizational
staffing structure, a separate pack transport company becomes a military
formation with much better capability thanks to internal structural
changes.
Loads can be delivered to the river by pack from the field ware-
houses of formations (corps, army) located behind a pass, airfield
landing strips and helicopter pads by placing the supplies on the ground
or alternatively in watercraft.
Operational planning and execution need to correlate the capa-
bilities of pack transport and water transport formations. For example,
a pack transport company (PTC) that is part of an separate mountain
transport battalion (213 pack horses that can deliver 17 to 20 metric
tons of supplies depending on the elevation of the terrain and the lay
of the land) roughly corresponds to the capabilities of a water transport
company (WTC) on a class 5 river. This is 20 metric tons of useful load,
not counting the weight of the crew, weapons and watercraft frames
(figure 3). But on class one rivers, where a water transport company’s
capabilities increase sharply and can be 270-290 metric tons per trip
(depending on the conveyance method --- in piloted vessels or by raft),
pack transport is less efficient than water transport by a multiple of 14 to
17, assuming parity of personnel.
This considerable disparity between a pack transport company
and a water transport company capabilities in high mountain conditions
reduces water conveyance volume to a minimum. In order for the units
to be at par with each other, it will be necessary to use 3,600-3,870 pack
animals whose maintenance at elevations above 3,500-4,000 meters, far
from supply bases and with a constant need for fodder resupply, will
cause additional difficulties and is, in our view, problematic.
At the same time, one should consider coordination between these
military formations since pack transport can be used to the maximum
in the preparatory period of an operation (battle) to stockpile supplies
on the ground in the staging areas. By using a shuttle method and given
a reserve of time, the number of service animals can be reduced to a
single pack transport company. It will take six to 35 days to deliver the
loads to the staging area at the specified volume (290 metric tons), with
one-three trips per day, depending on the distance (5-30 kilometers).
An expert might question the use of pack animals and military
rafting when there is modern technology such as helicopters. However,
practice shows that it is difficult to use MI-8 MTV transport helicopters
above 3,500 meters because of the thin air, which greatly reduces their
cargo capacity. Their useful cargo capacity does not exceed 0.5-0.8
metric tons even at a minimum tactical radius of 50 kilometers and an
ambient air temperature of up to 20°C. It is estimated that it will take
340 to 580 helicopter flights to deliver the load of the watercraft of a
second model water transport company (58 rafts) when the river class
is between 1 and 2. Even with drops (airborne delivery) or helicopters
hovering at minimal height with no landing, it will take 290 helicopter
flights. A comparison of these statistics casts doubt on these helicopters’
ability to collaborate effectively with water transport formations on high
mountain plains.
In order to resolve the challenges of delivering supplies to high
mountain plateaus, military transport aircraft can be used in the assembly
areas of water transport military units and detachments at the staging

areas. These aircraft could deliver supplies from frontline or center
depots, thereby avoiding intermediary logistical channels --- army and
corps logistics --- and possibly frontline logistics as well.
Military transport aircraft can deliver supplies to high mountain
plains by landing (without turning off the aircraft engines) on unpaved
air strips or by parachute. This experience was gained back in Soviet
times, when East Pamir had the USSR’s highest altitude airfield in Murgab
with an elevation of over 3,600 meters. Transport aircraft flights have
currently been resumed to hard-to-reach areas of the Pamir, specifically
Murgab, in AN-26 aircraft, whose flying specifications make it possible to
deliver up to a five-metric-ton load to such elevations over a distance of
more than 700 kilometers.
The use of water transport formations in mountain and coastal areas
will enable all logistical elements to meet another serious challenge –
ferrying supplies, vehicles and pack transport across the numerous
mountain rivers. After all, in a combat situation a retreating opponent or
his special operations groups operating in the rear of our formations and
military units are going to blow up bridges, which is why water transport
formations make the military units and logistical elements more mobile
since the watercraft used on mountain rivers make it possible to set up
pontoon bridges, and assault and ferry crossings.
Let us look as an example at the exercises in which the Republic of
Uzbekistan’s Ministry of Defense special operations units participated.
The units demonstrated how to set up a pontoon bridge from catamarans
that took part in operational rafting during the exercises. It took 45
minutes to assemble, set up and secure a 15-meter long bridge to move
the pack transport across a mountain river gorge.
The proposed water transport formations (mountain) can also be
used to maneuver pack transport units on class one mountain rivers by
placing the animals on wire-framed inflatable rafts (WIR) with appro-
priate area (deck) setup. This can greatly reduce the energy used
by the pack animals as compared what they would use if they had to
cover those distances over the mountains on foot. There have been
instances of equipment and large domestic animals being transported
considerable distances --- 200-250 kilometers --- on rafts along mountain
taiga [subarctic forest] rivers. The deck area of a 3x7.5 meters WIR raft
can hold up to six pack horses, that is, as much as a KamAZ-4310 truck.
The difficult mountain terrain and numerous rock projections
and rock falls make it hard or impossible to deliver supplies by pack
transport. This is why a separate mountain transport battalion needs a
carrier company that can carry 3-3.5 metric tons of supplies. Its purpose
is not just to take loads from the river up to where the supply companies
of the mountain forces and military units are deployed or at times to
the supply platoons and firing positions of mountain battalions. This
separate mountain transport battalion has much broader functions, first
and foremost to reinforce water transport units when supplies are being
prepared for military rafting --- to waterproof the loads and take them
from the packing site to the river in the staging area.
It also has to provide stage-by-stage and area-by-area transport that
could require additional forces to carry supplies around impassable
rapids, and to do the same with watercraft during stage-by-stage
transport in order to expedite delivery.
It also has to return the watercraft to the staging area when there is
no other way to transport them such as during area-by-area transport
when one set of watercraft is being returned to the loading point while
another is transporting supplies further to the offloading sites.
It also has to perform search and rescue for loads and watercraft that
were sent unmanned and did not reach their destination at the expected
time (grounded, stuck on an obstacle, caught in a vortex, etc.). It also
carries out the orders of the senior officer as the logistical situation
unfolds.
A separate mountain water transport company and a separate
mountain transport battalion should have regular vehicle units in order
to make them more mobile and autonomous. For example, a company
has a vehicular platoon made up of a personnel transportation squad,
a transportation squad (mixed) for food, materiel, petroleum, oil and
lubricants (POL), and a maintenance and repair squad –– a total of 17
to 20 vehicles. And a separate mountain transport battalion includes
a vehicle company made up of personnel and service animals trans-
portation platoons, as well as two-three squads to transport food, materiel
(one-two squads) and POL. The number of vehicles could vary widely
depending on the number of major units. For example, the fleet could
number 95 to 100 vehicles for a regular three company strength (water
transport company, pack transport company, and motor vehicle transport
company).
Given the nature of modern military operations, it is a priority to
make logistics support and its structural elements more robust and
viable. This also fully applies to the proposed water transport and
mountain transport detachments and military units. It is important
to equip them with armored personnel carriers, portable anti-tank
rocket launchers and anti-aircraft rocket launchers, communication and
reconnaissance assets, and engineer explosives. It follows from this
that a separate mountain transport battalion should have a company to
protect, defend and safeguard the battalion, which would include the
combat support platoons.
Thus, despite its seemingly unwieldy organizational structure, a
separate mountain transport battalion is a universal transport formation
that can take supplies to the most remote and hard-to-reach mountain
regions. It is also universal because the units are capable of maneuvering
independently and protecting and defending its forces and assets, often
without having to be reinforced by other logistics and combined arms
units and detachments. With their own vehicles and tanker trucks, water
and pack transport companies and motor vehicle units can cover large
distances of 1,000-1,500 kilometers in the mountains with two-three
fuel loads (in fuel tanks, the tanker trucks and additional containers
in the cargo area). After the work is completed, the same vehicles
can be used to transport supplies from the depots of task forces, and
sometimes combined forces, to water transportation companies and
pack transportation companies for further transport. If necessary, pack
transport can redeploy water transport units into cut-off rafting areas
while livestock rafts enable pack transport units to maneuver around
difficult mountain passes.
Let us cite for comparison purposes the size of the tactical military
formations of foreign armies as we consider how to optimize the
composition of the proposed separate mountain transport battalion. In
Germany’s ground forces, mountain-infantry, transport, supply battalions
number up to 900 men. Medical transport battilions have more than
1,000, while pontoon battalions have roughly 800 personnel.
The above demonstrates that corps (army) logistics needs to have
two-three regular separate mountain water transport company or
separate mountain transport battalions in the areas of operation of first
echelon forces and military units of the army corps (army) that are
operating in mountain districts and regions with a developed hydro-
graphic network that allows use of water transport units. Depending on
the length and classification of the mountain rivers and the delivery
amount and deadline, these forces and assets could be sent to reinforce
the rear of a first echelon motorized rifle division or motorized rifle
brigade (mountain) in order to make them autonomous (Armed Forces of
the Main Capitalist Countries, M., Voyenizdat, 1988, pp. 163, 172).
France’s alpine ground forces infantry battalion has roughly 900 men
and up to 130 vehicles (ibid., pp. 213, 217). Italy’s separate alpine ground
forces brigade numbers 5,777 men, and an alpine battalion, 950 (Ground
Forces of the Capitalist Countries, M., Voyenizdat, 1980, p. 400).
Given the tasks of the military units and detachments (deliver
supplies; maneuver supplies, forces and assets; evacuate the sick and
wounded, damaged weapons and materiel; and arrange mountain
river crossings), separate mountain water transport company and
separate mountain transport battalion functions should be regarded as
a key task of logistical rather than material support. The transportation
departments of the task forces’ logistics administrations (corps, army,
front) need to set up mountain transport offices to coordinate the actions
of these specialized transport formations in order to strengthen the
logistics groups and increase their capability to provide timely and
comprehensive support for combat in hard to reach and isolated theaters
of operation.
The deputy commanders in chief (commanding officers) of logistics
task forces must have a reserve of mountain water transport formations
to make rapid supply deliveries to troops in theaters of operation with a
developed hydrographic network.
Given the large spatial scope and depth of present-day operations
in mountain regions, there may be a need for mountain transport
brigades (MTB) that could include the proposed separate mountain
transport battalion forces and assets for operational, logistical and
technical support, as well as a helicopter assault squadron with airfield
maintenance units. Based on the modular principle, being highly mobile
and with a high degree of tactical independence, these specialized
mountain transport forces could consistently deliver supplies in isolated
theaters of operation, reacting flexibly to a rapidly changing situation.
Final conclusions as to the advisability of the proposals made in this
article can be drawn following special military research and operational
command and staff exercises in a mountain area.
Communications in the Mountains 169
Mountain Combat:
Hard to Move,
Hard to Shoot
--- Even Harder to
Communicate
and Lieutenant Jason Falivene USMC
Originally published in The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, September 2006.
C ommunicating in mountains is a challenge since there are few

ideal spots for communication. FM radios, which are line of sight
systems, frequently cannot communicate because their signals are
absorbed by terrain folds and features. If all the force is on the same
side of the mountain and the mountain forms a bowl, FM communications
are usually possible. However, radios located on the same side of the
mountain at different altitudes have difficulty communicating because
of intervening terrain and communications dead space. If the force is
deployed on the same side of a mountain which curves out, commu-
nications are especially difficult. Even FM radios located on the summit
of the mountain have difficulty communicating with radios located further
down the mountain slope due to dead space. Communications sites
must be carefully selected --- and often become key terrain. When line-
of-sight communications in mountains are possible, communications are
excellent, but there are few sites where line-of sight is possible to all other
elements in the net. There are often only three solutions–either move the
radio to where it can communicate, set up a radio retransmission site, or
relay messages across the net.
Radio retransmission sites are expensive in terms of personnel and
equipment. TO&Es normally do not provide adequate personnel and
equipment to provide several retransmission sites. Further, since the
retransmission team must work away from the main body, it must have
enough personnel to protect itself and haul all its gear to the retrans-
mission location. Batteries, antennas, guy wires, rations, water, weapons,
ammunition, and personnel gear are heavy. Moving a site is labor in-
tense. Maintaining a site is also a chore. Fresh batteries, chow, and water
Figure 1: Deploying radios to direct the transmission over a narrow mountain

peak (both radio operators must be able to see the mountain peak).
have to be carried to the site and personnel rotated. If the mission is not
static defense, the retransmission site has to constantly shift to yet another
site where it can adequately support its unit. Such sites are not easy to
find --- or reach --- yet the communications teams must keep up with the
advancing force which is usually moving along easier terrain.
The Soviets in the mountains of Afghanistan

During the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet forces often entered the
massive Hindu Kush mountain chain or the imposing Sulieman range.
Radio retransmission sites were essential. The Soviets often used Mi-9
VZPU command and control helicopters or other helicopters to conduct
retransmission support during movement.1 Often, the Soviets lacked
sufficient personnel and equipment to establish enough ground-
based retransmission stations. Then, the Soviets had to resort to radio
relay–a long, tedious process involving relaying the message to various
stations until it eventually reaches the intended recipients. At first,
communications troops made errors during radio relays. The Soviets
solved this problem by requiring their communicators to physically
record all messages prior to relaying them. Then they trained their
communicators to write clearly and quickly on standard forms using
capital letters while never lifting the pencil from the paper. The
communicators would repeatedly listen to various transmissions and
record them to gain proficiency. Over time, these simple drills improved
their accuracy and relay time significantly.2
UHF radios also present problems in the mountains. Like FM, UHF
signals are absorbed by intervening terrain, yet UHF are not restricted
to line-of-sight and can bend somewhat over mountain tops. The Soviet
tactical UHF radios were normally able to communicate out to 100
kilometers over open ground. They could also communicate out to 100
Mountain Peak
No reception
“Silent zone”
Commo
reception
Figure 2.
kilometers with an intervening mountain as long as the transmitting and

receiving stations were on high ground and the intervening mountain
was midway and no higher than 200 meters above the stations. Taller
mountains and multiple peaks interfered with UHF communications. A
single, closer, yet lower, peak cut transmissions to 20-22 kilometers and
that was only if the mountain crest was narrow and both stations were
aimed at the sharp peak. UHF communications distance was cut to 10-
12 kilometers if the intervening peak rose up to 100 meters higher than
the stations. If there were a series of 200 to 400 meter peaks between
stations, transmission distance was cut to 9-10 kilometers–and only if
both stations were far enough away from the mountain bases and used
whip antennae. Large, domed mountains cut UHF transmissions to
5-6 kilometers, while cut-up rugged mountain terrain further limited
transmissions to 4-5 kilometers. UHF communications were frequently
lost while moving along mountain roads or in the “silent zone” on the far
side of mountains.3
The Soviets took various measures to support UHF communications
in the mountains. These measures included:
1. Select communications sites that have a narrow single mountain
crest between them. Aim the transmissions at the highest peak. Keep
the sites away from the mountain base (figure 1).
2. Deploy radios away from the mountain base to a distance at least
equal to the distance of the slope between the base and mountain crest.
(figure 2).
Figure 3: Deploying radios to direct the transmission over a domed

mountain (most of the transmission is lost in the air).
3. Deploy radios to commanding heights to improve their line-of-

sight to the top of the intervening mountain.
4. Deploy the radios where they can communicate over a single
mountain rather than a series of peaks and defiles.
5. When confronted with a large, domed mountain, deploy the radios
away from the base of the mountain and on high ground (figure 3).4
There are other problems in establishing radio communications
in the mountains. Erecting antennae is one of them. The hard stony
ground makes it difficult to pound in stakes for ground wires and guy
wires. Winds and slope make it hard to aim and tune antennae. Winds
frequently tear down antennae. Another problem is that the optimum
communications site may not be the optimum tactical location. Signal
sites are often deployed separately from their main body. These sites
are attractive targets that do not have a lot of combat power. Weather is
another problem. Mountains get more than their fair share of thunder-
storms, ice storms, and snow. Antennae attract lightning. Antennae ice
over rapidly and the ice decreases the transmission power significantly.
Ice has to be removed, but this is not easy to do on a long antenna on
a mountain during a snowstorm. Diesel engines do not run very well
at high altitude, yet most communications generators are diesel-fueled.
Standard radio batteries do not handle cold well and therefore the more-
expensive lithium batteries are necessary in the high mountains. Finally,
communications personnel need to be relieved, rotated and rested
regularly in order to maintain good communications.
The US Army in the mountains of Afghanistan
The US Army experienced the difficulties of communicating in the
mountains of Afghanistan. Although the it has far more satellite com-
munications radios (SATCOM) than the Soviets did during the Soviet-
Afghan War, the Army experienced many of the same difficulties. During
operation Anaconda, 101st Air Assault and 10th Mountain Division units
formed a single brigade --- Task Force Rakkasans. TF Rakkasans found
communications a challenge, but they were able to make them work.5
The base radio for the ground forces was the SINCGARS family of
FM radios. Since the force landed inside a mountain bowl and the range
of the battlefield was not too great, the FM radios worked surprisingly
well, however, terrain folds frequently absorbed signals. “If you can’t
talk, move” was the working solution, although some wags observed
that “communications drives maneuver.” The fire direction net, brigade
command net and battalion internal nets were all on FM radio. The
task force did not use the frequency hopping option on the SINGARS
since they also talked to neighboring special operations forces (SOF)
on FM on a single frequency. During the two-week operation, the task
force changed its frequency only once — and this was due to constant
interference and bleed over from another net. A major advantage of FM
radio was that ground forces could communicate with helicopter aviation
once they were flying in the bowl. However, once the helicopter cleared
the crest of the bowl, FM communication was lost.
The helicopters talked to each other on UHF radio. The ground
forces had little luck with UHF radio. Unlike SINCGARS, UHF traffic was
plain text. The pilots could talk to the main headquarters at Bagram (over
100 miles away) on UHF. TF Rakkasans had little confidence or success
using UHF on the battlefield, nor did they use HF radio. Canadian
forces and SOF used HF radio to send scheduled reports, but not for
combat. The ground forces did not bother taking VHF radios since they
considered VHF as “unreliable and too complicated”, and “big and
bulky and useless.” Indeed the 60-pound weight of the issue VHF radio
is prohibitive on any terrain.
The AN/PSC-5 TACSAT radio was the primary means of com-
munications beyond the mountain bowl during Operation Anaconda.
Encrypted satellite communications were reliable, but the narrow-band
width assigned to ground forces by the DAMA (demand assigned
multiple access) system made communications very slow and hard
to understand. Three battalions and the brigade had to share one 25
kilohertz channel! Further, the brigade’s TACSATs were not data capable
which frustrated speed of communications and accuracy. The USAF
and SOF, on the other hand had broadband TACSAT and enjoyed good
communications. If no helicopters were in the bowl, TF Rakkasans had
to contact the AWACs aircraft by TACSAT. Since AWACS lacks TACSAT
retransmission capability to helicopters, AWACs would manually relay
messages to the helicopters.
Other means of communication were Iridium satellite telephones.
Although they are difficult to encrypt, they provided excellent emergency
communications and allowed the brigade to enter SIPERNET through
laptop computers. Much necessary communication was done on the
Internet through the SIPERNET-Iridium connection. Further, the Iridium
net transmitted and received at normal speed while the TACSAT net was
very slow and hard to understand. No wire communications were used,
since wire is heavy and the brigade had limited lift capability. Radio
batteries lasted about a day and fresh batteries were a key logistics
concern.
Task Force Rakkasans had two TACSAT narrow-band nets (one each
from the 101st and 10th divisions), a USAF broad-band TACSAT net used
by the Air Liaison Officer (ALO) to talk to supporting high-performance
aircraft, an FM fire direction net and a FM command net. There were
no brigade administrative and logistics or intelligence nets due to the
limited number of TACSAT nets available. In order to save time and
insure accuracy, when the brigade commander spoke, he spoke only to
his commanders and everyone else stayed off the net. Due to the heavy
fighting, there was no command and control helicopter over-flying the
battlefield. The brigade staff worked out of Bagram where they had
access to the Predator UAV feed coming into the 10th Mountain Division
Headquarters. Each battalion had two TACSAT radios and the normal
compliment of FM radios. Battalions were on the brigade TACSAT
command net, the brigade FM command net, the brigade fire direction
net and internal command net.
Special Operations Forces had quality FM, UHF and wide-band
TACSAT radios which provided good communications throughout the
operation. Air Liaison Officers had good communications with their
wide-band TACSAT radios throughout the operation.
Operation Anaconda highlighted the problems with DAMA
and demonstrated the need to issue broad-band TACSAT radios to
conventional forces. It further demonstrated the need for data-capable
TACSAT radios and more satellite coverage. It also showed the need for
TACSAT radios in helicopters.
Roger. Out.
Despite dramatic advances in communications technology, com-
municating in mountains remains a problem. Satellite communications
systems provide greater capability, but they have problems operating
around terrain folds as well. Bandwidth and lack of data capability
are further serious drawbacks. There is a role for FM and UHF. Iridium
phones with computer data link are particularly valuable. Much of the
staff work and battle management was accomplished in secure chat
rooms. The problem with chat rooms, however, is that anyone with ac-
cess can join in. The siren call to participate in an operation, even
remotely, brought a lot of strap-hangers and time-wasters into the chat

room.
Operation Anaconda demonstrated the need to have over-the-
horizon communications with aircraft and the main headquarters.
Further, the operation demonstrated the need for a survivable command
and control aircraft. Data burst technology was not available.
Communications in the mountains is possible but requires planning,
training and experience. It also requires better equipment and improved
bandwidth.
________________________________________
1. The Russian General Staff (translated and edited by Lester W. Grau and Michael A.
Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Kansas University
Press, 2001, 210-221.
2. Yu. Kuzimichev and S. Ponomarev, “Perepriem i retranslyatsiya v gorakh” (“Relay and
Retransmission in Mountains”), Voyenniyy vestnik (Military Journal), December 1986, 74.
3. “Radiosvyaz’ na YKB-stantsiyakh v gorakh” (“UHF Radio Communications in
Mountains”), Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest), February 1997, 44-45.
4. Ibid, 45.
5. This section based on an interview with Captain James Riley, Signal Officer, 3d
Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division at Kandahar, Afghanistan on May 13, 2002 and an
interview with Captain Francisco Ranero, Signal Officer of 1-87th Infantry Battalion, 10th
Mountain Division at Fort Drum, New York on June 11, 2002.
Medical Implications
of High Altitude
Combat
LTC Lester W. Grau (ret.)
and William A. Jorgensen, DO MC USAR
Originally published in the US Army Medical Department Journal, April-June 2003.
T he fact that a piece of land is inaccessible, uninhabitable or of

little practical value is no guarantee that nations will not fight
over it. Long, bloody wars have been fought and are being fought for
inhospitable mountain real estate located between 10,000 and 23,000
feet [3,050 and 7,015 meters] in elevation. Examples of such high altitude
combat include the 1953-1974 Chinese invasion of Tibet and subsequent
guerrilla war, the 1953-1958 Mau-Mau rebellion where British troops
fought rebels in the Aberdares mountains of Kenya, the 1962 Sino-Indian
War in the Himalayan mountains bordering Bhutan and Tibet, Soviet-
Mujahideen combat in Afghanistan’s Hindu Kush mountains from 1979
to 1989, the Peruvian government’s clashes with Sendero Luminoso
guerrillas in the Andes throughout the 1980s and the Indo-Pakistan
continuing conflict over the ownership of the Siachen glacier which
began in April 1984. Recent (1999) Indo-Pakistani clashes in the Kargil
area of disputed Kashmir again demonstrate that high altitude combat
is often contemporary combat. Tens of thousands of combatants have
perished in inhospitable ice, snow and rock while battling for national
prestige, water rights, survival or geographic positioning.
The United States Army has not had to fight at such altitudes, but with
the war on terror, the possibility of United States military commitment
to such areas is not all that remote. Operation Anaconda in Afghanistan
is the highest altitude ground fight [10,500 feet] in US history. Since the
Army is still inexperienced fighting at these altitudes, it should draw from
the experience of others. There are some distinct medical problems
that medical personnel should plan for in the event of a high-altitude
contingency operation.
High-Altitude Medical Considerations

The world’s highest mountains are in the Himalayan and Karakoram
mountain chains of Asia. The Himalayan Mount Everest towers at 29,028
feet [8,853.5 meters] whereas the highest point in the United States, Mount
Medical Considerations 177
McKinley in Alaska, is 20,320 feet [6,197.6 meters]. The highest point in

the Colorado Rockies is Mount Elbert at 14,433 feet [4,402.1 meters].The
highest point in the European Alps is Mont Blanc at 15,771 feet [4,810.2
meters].1 Man is not naturally designed to live and work at these high
altitudes. Any time a person travels to an altitude of 8,000-10,000 feet
[2440-3050 meters] or higher, the atmospheric changes in pressure and
available oxygen cause physiological changes which attempt to insure
that the body gets enough oxygen.2 These physiological changes are
pronounced among mountain peoples, who have lived in the cold and
higher altitudes for generations. Their bodies are short, squat, stocky
and barrel-chested when compared to those of lowlanders, Their hands
and feet are stubby. Their hearts are bigger and their bodies contain
20-percent more red blood cells. Their red blood cells are larger than
those of lowlanders. Their heartbeat is slower and their capillaries are
wider. The alveoli in their lungs are more open for oxygen absorption.
Many develop a fatty epithelial pouch around the eyes to counteract
cataract and snow blindness.3
High altitudes are characterized by extreme cold, strong winds,“thin”
air, intense solar and ultra-violet radiation, and rapidly changing weather
including severe storms which can cut off contact for a week or longer.
Personnel should be screened and acclimatized before deploying to
high altitudes since these conditions at high altitude are usually more
dangerous than enemy fire. Medical personnel should prepare for the
special demands of high altitude treatment and care. Bullet and shrapnel
wounds, which normally are not serious, can quickly prove fatal at
altitude. Movement in the high mountains often results in broken bones,
severe lacerations and contusions and internal injuries caused by falls
and falling rock. Frostbite and hypothermia are a constant danger. Acute
mountain sickness, high altitude pulmonary edema, and cerebral edema
are frequently fatal consequences of working at high altitude. Mental
and physical abilities decrease at high altitude and high altitude also
induces personality disorders. Sudden weight loss is often a problem.
The rarefied atmosphere permits increased ultra violet ray exposure
which create problems with sunburn and snow blindness. High-altitude
shelter heating is often by unvented kerosene stoves, which means that
personnel breathe air which is thick with soot.
Medical personnel will be exposed to the same dangers of working
in high altitudes and much of their normal medical equipment will not
function, or function effectively, at high altitudes. For example, hospital
generators and vehicles are often diesel-powered. Diesel engines lose
efficiency at 10,000 feet [3,050 meters] and eventually do not work at all
due to the thinness of oxygen at higher elevations. Helicopters cannot
haul heavy loads over 13,000 feet [3,965 meters] as their rotors lack thick
enough air to “bite” into. Altitude requires additional animal or gasoline-
fueled overland transport which adds to the physical demands and
logistic requirements of medical support in this environment.
Screening and Acclimatization

At high altitude, there is less oxygen and atmospheric pressure. The
soldiers selected for high-altitude duty should be screened for their
ability to function in this environment. Soldiers should be in excellent
physical condition and have sound hearts and lungs. Short, wiry soldiers
are preferable to tall, over-muscled soldiers. Selected soldiers should
possess a higher level of intelligence in order to allow them to more-
readily adapt to the trying terrain.4 Personnel who have had radial
keratotomy (RK) corrective eye surgery should not go “to altitude”
as their vision may permanently cloud. Personnel records should be
screened for previous high-altitude sickness. Some personnel can be
administered acetazolamide (diamox) prophylaxis, however, personnel
with sulfa allergy or G6PD deficiency cannot use acetazolamide.
Personnel with the sickle cell trait should be excluded since rapid
exposure and dehydration could set them up for splenic syndrome.
Further, certain medications (i.e. any benzodiazepine such as valium)
inhibit acclimatization and personnel using these should be carefully
evaluated.5
All personnel should undergo an acclimatization program to ac-
custom them to their new environment and to improve their respiratory
and cardio-vascular systems. A physically-fit soldier can adapt to the
cold in about three weeks.6 Experience shows that the body normally
adapts to a new altitude in about two weeks time. During the accli-
matization phase, the body accumulates additional red blood cells which
help transport needed oxygen.7 The Pakistani Army acclimatizes their
personnel over a seven-week cycle. They begin with a three week stay at
10,000 feet [3,050 meters], where personnel acclimate to the cold while
they undergo daily physical conditioning, and learn mountaineering,
rock climbing, rope rappelling and mountain survival. During the final
four weeks, the soldiers learn advanced mountaineering techniques,
trek to 14,000 feet [4,270 meters], return and trek to 17,000 feet [5185
meters] and then return and finally trek to 19,135 feet [5,836 meters].8
Despite all training and efforts, acclimatization is not possible at heights
over 18,000 feet [5,418 meters], so personnel exposure at these heights
must be limited and closely supervised.9
Medical personnel should advise logisticians and planners on
special considerations for high altitude combat. For example, light-
weight, pre-cooked, high-caloric rations that are high on carbohydrates
are essential and aid acclimatization. Supplementary candy and soups
will help off-set the inevitable loss of appetite at altitude. Boiling water
from snow for purification takes an unwarranted amount of fuel and
so provisions have to be made to provide water or water purification
equipment to the soldiers “at altitude” where dehydration is a constant
threat. NCOs need to “push water” to compensate for the diuretic effects
of acclimatization. Troops working above 15,000 feet should be issued
pressurized sleeping bags. These bags, which are inflated with a foot
pump, have been tested to provide equivalent pressure of 8,370 feet
[2,550 meters] while at 13,600 feet [4,150 meters].10 Medical personnel
should further recommend a rotation program where highest-altitude
exposure is limited to ten to fourteen day increments.
During the Soviet-Afghan War, Soviet doctors and physicians’
assistants often accompanied small units on high-altitude missions, since
the patients required immediate medical care and evacuation (medevac)
took too long to save many patients.11 Limited medical staffing in the
US Army will prevent many doctors and physicians assistants from
accompanying the high-altitude patrols. Therefore, the brunt of the
responsibility for saving injured and sick soldiers will fall on the combat
medic. In addition to the medic’s normal skills, he will need to be trained
in mountain rescue techniques, treatment of altitude-specific medical
problems and high-altitude medevac procedures. The medic should
accompany the unit during the acclimatization process and rotate in and
out of the high-altitude area with the unit.
In an emergency, diamox can be given to nonacclimated personnel
(125mg twice a day) starting the day before ascent and up to two days
after ascent. However, this is an emergency measure that should only
be used for a forced ascent to over 10,000 feet in one day. Normal
acclimatization is preferable. There are side effects to diamox, such as
peripheral paresthesias (numbness in the extremities) and bone marrow
suppression. The possibility of bone marrow suppression is relatively
rare, but cannot be ignored.12
Frostbite
Frostbite is the most common injury at altitude. Frostbite is a
continual danger, but especially so following any exertion. Sweat
rapidly freezes around the toes and fingers. Frost bite may be classified
as frostnip, superficial frostbite, or deep frostbite, depending on the
severity of the case. Frostnip usually occurs on the tips of the ears, nose,
fingers, toes and cheeks and it noticeable as a whitening of the skin.
Simple warming of the area is usually sufficient treatment. If it advances
to superficial frostbite, the affected areas will be firm and have a white
waxy appearance. Warming and gentle massaging of the area are the
necessary treatment. As the area rewarms, it may turn a mottled blue
or purple and swell. Nerve damage may also accompany superficial
frostbite. In case of deep frostbite, major areas of tissue are frozen and
killed. The areas are cold, pale solid and hard. Infection and amputation
often result. The patient must be evacuated.
Medics should be cautioned that once the frozen area is thawed, do
not allow it to refreeze and do not to thaw unless continual warmth and
litter evacuation are available. It may be necessary to prevent thawing
in order for the injured soldier to walk out. Once thawing occurs, the
severe pain prevents the patient from walking out, although codeine,
aspirin or morphine should help the patient.13 Evacuation at altitude is
often difficult. Weather or weight limitations may prevent a helicopter
from flying to the patient. Often, patients must be carried on stretchers
to lower elevations where the helicopters can fly to. Soviet experience
fighting in the mountains of Afghanistan proved that 13 to 15 men might
be involved in carrying out one patient. Exertion at altitude is difficult
and the stretcher party had to provide its own security as well.14
Hypothermia
Hypothermia is the result of the body losing heat faster than it
can produce it. The body’s core temperature begins to drop and the
patient shivers violently, has trouble using his hands and is generally
clumsy. When the core temperature falls to 90o-95o Fahrenheit [35o-32o
Centigrade], the patient becomes uncoordinated, has difficulty
speaking and is disoriented and apathetic. As the core temperature
continue to lower, the patient becomes more irrational, lapses into semi-
consciousness and eventually unconsciousness and cardiac arrest. If the
patient cannot be re-warmed on site, the patient needs to be evacuated.
Medics should be equipped with the mountaineering “hydraulic sarong,”
a re-warming device that wraps around the patient and circulates a
warmed liquid from a camp stove or catalytic generator around the
patient’s body. “Hot oxygen” breathing units, which use a soda lime
and CO2 reaction to warm oxygen, can also aid in re-warming the body
core.15 When a hypothermia casualty’s body core temperature drops
below 90o, when he stops shivering or when he passes out, extra care
must be given to handling him or he may develop cardiac arrhythmia
and sudden death.16
Falls and Climbing Injuries

Fractures, severe lacerations and contusions or internal injuries often
result from falls or by being hit by falling rock. The ABCD’s of trauma
should be followed, and the patient examined for spinal injury as one
of the first checks. Medics should not hesitate to put a cervical collar
on fall victims with suspected cervical spine injuries, particularly since
these can usually be cleared in the field, avoiding an unnecessary/
hazardous medevac.17 Field splinting and immobilization should also
be done before the patient is moved. The spleen, liver and kidneys are
the most likely organs to rupture and bleed internally from a fall. A torn
diaphragm or intestine is also a possibility in falls and climbing injuries.18
Mountain Sickness, High Altitude Pulmonary Edema,

and Cerebral Edema
Mountain sickness or altitude sickness normally begins as a
headache and may include insomnia, loss of appetite, vomiting, cough,
shortness of breath, irregular breathing, tightness in the chest, loss of
coordination, swelling around the eyes and face, general weakness and
reduction in the volume of urine produced. The patient will lose physical
coordination and mental acuity and tire quickly after mild activity.
Mountain sickness normally takes at least 24 hours to develop but non-
acclimated personnel often develop the symptoms within 6 to 12 hours
(if they are quickly transported to elevations at 11,475-14,750 feet [3,500-
4,500 meters]). Treatment involves awareness of potential problems, rest,
sleep and a good meal. Should that fail, the patient should descend to a
lower altitude for a few days rest until he improves.19
Moderate mountain sickness involves the same symptoms, but their
intensity increases and urine output is often more reduced. If a day of
rest does not help the patient, he should be brought down immediately.
Usually, an early descent means an early recovery.20
Severe mountain sickness occurs in about 2-3-percent of mountain
sickness cases and involves high altitude pulmonary edema and/or
cerebral edema. Twenty percent of acute severe mountain sickness
cases prove fatal. Signs and symptoms of high altitude pulmonary
edema, the collection of fluid in the lungs, include persistent cough,
gurgling chest sounds, red frothy sputum, breathlessness, and tachypnea
and tachycardia. Younger soldiers (under age 25) and soldiers with
a history of pneumonia or other respiratory illness are prone to high
altitude pulmonary edema. The symptoms of cerebral edema, swelling
of the brain due to fluid, include headache, difficulty in balance, loss
of coordination and labored breathing. Severe mountain sickness
may prove fatal within a few hours. Proficient medics may administer
nifedipine and dexamethsone and, if available, administer oxygen or
use a Gammow bag (pressurized bag also known as a certic bag).21 The
patient still needs to be brought down. Oxygen, Diamox, Tylenol, aspirin,
codeine, Decadron, Valium, Lasix, Phenergan, or morphine have all been
used to help the patient during descent.22
The best prevention of mountain sickness is a gradual ascent with
plenty of fluids and food provided to the soldiers. Climbing soldiers
need to avoid overexertion. The worst approach is to drive or fly the
soldiers from low to high altitude and then let them out to finish the
ascent.23
Combined Physician’s Curriculum for

Mountain Rescue and Combat
COMBINED PHYSICIAN’S CURRICULUM FOR MOUNTAIN RESCUE AND COMBAT
28
Practical
Topic Lecture
Exercise
Introduction to goals, missions and content of high altitude medicine. 2 2

Special features of high-altitude physiology. Acclimatization to high altitude: Short
term and long term. Mountain pathology.
Acute mountain sickness: etiology, pathogenesis, clinical picture, treatment and 2 2
prevention. Pulmonary edema.
Effects of high altitude on the nervous system, heart vessels, excretory system, 2 2
gastro-intestinal tract, and circulatory system. Diagnosis, treatment and prevention.
Peculiarities of the course of “normal” illnesses at high altitude 2 2
Directing an acclimatization program. Personnel selection and prognosis of their 2 2
health in the mountains. Medical oversight and preventive medical examinations.
Examination — 2
Special features of mountain trauma. First aid for accidents — 2
Diagnosis of trauma, broken bones of the extremities, methods of moving immobile 2 4
patients
Evacuating patients in the mountains — 4
Wounds, methods of stopping hemorrhage, bandaging 2 6
Depression 4 4
Traumatic shock, ﬁrst aid for shock from mountain accidents and trauma 2 4
Emergency medical service and transport of patients with trauma to the head, spine, 2 6
chest, stomach and pelvis
Special features of medical treatment of freezing, frost bite and snow blindness 2 —
Emergency medical service for drowning victims 2 —
Examination — 2
Special aspects of organizing medical support for forces in the mountains 2 —
Rigging medical gear for evacuation and treatment in the mountains 2 2
Screening soldiers for service in the mountains 2 4
Oxygen equipment and its use 2 4
Training drills for high-altitude treatment — 20
TOTAL 34 74
“Siachen Syndrome”
The change in barometric pressure and reduced quantity of oxygen
at high altitude leads to mental status changes as well as physiological
and psychosomatic changes. The Pakistani Army has noted that for
every rise in a thousand feet, a person’s temperament may change. A
good-natured soldier at 19,000 feet may become irrational and selfish
at 20,000 feet, introverted at 21,000 feet and unhinged at 22,000.24
Although not recognized as a disease, the so-called Siachen syndrome

has been noted among veterans of fighting on the Siachen glacier. Its
symptoms include disorientation and different psychological disorders.
The experience has resulted in psychiatric treatment for some of the
veterans.25 Team-building, discipline and productive activity help prevent
the apathy which leads to Siachen syndrome.26
Training the Medical Force for High-Altitude

The Soviet Union had a special course to train doctors to function
effectively at high altitude. The course was founded in 1987, the seventh
year of the Soviet-Afghan War, and was taught at the Kirghizistan medical
institute alongside normal medical courses and prepared military
and civilian doctors for mountain rescue and high-altitude treatment
duties. (see figure). The course met twice monthly in hour-and-a-half
sessions. The course devoted 34 lecture hours and 74 hours of practical
application to medical topics. Another 792 hours were devoted to
mountaineering training, of which 47 were lecture and the remainder
practical application.27 Although it would be difficult to find the time
to train US military medical doctors to the same standard, the medical
topics taught at the course may prove of value when planning a training
course for medical personnel who may serve at high altitudes.
Medic’s training for high altitude combat will necessarily involve
many of the same skills needed in mountain search and rescue units.
Medics will have to know how to rig patients and litters for evacuation
from precarious positions. The search and rescue community has a
wealth of information that can be tapped for military medical use. Search
and rescue personnel in the Yosemite National Park region developed
a field medical kit for use by EMT personnel. It can be carried in a
single medium sized pack with an internal frame or carried by several
members of the unit since the kit is divided into modules. This kit
provides a starting point for planning a high-altitude medic’s kit.29
DIAGNOSTIC MODULE SIGNAL & SURVIVAL MODULE

Scissors Flare gun and three flares
Blood pressure cuff Orange hand-held smoke flare
Stethoscope Signal mirror
Watch with sweep second hand Whistle
Penlight Compass
Hemostat Knife
Two thermometers (clinical and Matches
hypothermia) Pencil and pad
Two pair tweezers Yellow plastic tube tent
Three airways (adult, child and pedi) Two space blankets
One syringe bulb Maps
One 50 cc suction syringe and catheter Toilet paper
INTRAVENOUS MODULE DRUG MODULE
Two 1000 cc bags lactated Ringer’s Injectable:
One 500 cc bag 5% dextrose in water Two Meperidine HCL (Demerol)
Two Macro solution sets 100 mg
One Pedi solution set One Benadryl 50 mg
Two 20-gauge catheter needles One Xylocaine (Lidocaine) 100 mg
Two 18-gauge catheter needles
Two Narlozone (Narcan) 0.4 mg
Two 16-gauge catheter needles
Two 14 gauge catheter needles Two Epinephrine (adrenalin)
Two 19 gauge butterfly needles 1:1000 1 mg
Two 21 gauge butterfly needles One Valium 10 mg
One roll 13mm tape One 25g. Dextrose in 50 cc
Five gauze pads, 5x5mm preloaded syringe
Ten Band-Aids Two bicarbonate preload
Ten alcohol swabs Topical Neosporin ointment
Four towelettes Syringes & needles
Three tourniquets Three 3 cc with needles
Two 1 cc with needles
TRAUMA & DRESSING Five alcohol swabs
MODULE Oral:
Two triangular bandages 15 aspirin tablets
Two Kerlix
10 Seconal tablets, 100 mg
Four Kling
Six Surgipads, 20x19 cm 10 Dexadrine tablets, 5 mg
Three rolls of tape 10 Codeine tablets
One Ace bandage 20 Salt tablets
One Betadine scrub 20 Lomotil tablets
Three swabs Syrup of Ipecac
Six towelettes Activated charcoal
Ten gauze pads, 10x10mm
Ten Band-Aids
Two Steri-strips, 13mmx100mm SPLINTS MODULE
Two Steri-strips, 6x75mm Two full-leg air splints
One pair bandage scissors One arm air splint
Ten ammonia inhalents One ankle air splint
One 25X75 cm large trauma dressing One wrist air splint
One wire ladder splint
OXYGEN MODULE One cervical collar
One D tank of oxygen One towel for cervical collar
Oxygen mask and nasal cannula Trauma dressing
Two oxygen bottles
Thinking lofty thoughts

The United States military is faced with a variety of challenges as it
converts from a forward-deployed to an expeditionary force. Part of
being an expeditionary force is planning and preparing for contingency
missions in various regions. One possible contingency is deployment
to a high-altitude region. US Army regular and National Guard units that
currently train in the mountains and Alaska are already aware of some
of the problems involved in working at altitude and in the cold. They
know that such a contingency mission would be difficult, but with proper
foresight and preparation, medical personnel can meet the challenge

and protect the force.
________________________________________
1. The Houghton Mifflin Dictionary of Geography: Places and Peoples of the World,
Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1997, 48 and 450.
2. Tim J. Setnicka, Wilderness Search and Rescue, Boston: Appalachian Mountain Club,
1980, 620.
3. Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice: The Story of Siachen, Rawalpindi: Pak American Com-
mercial PVT) Ltd., 1991, 15-16 and 110-111.
4. Salman Beg Punjab, “Operations in Glaciated Areas,” Pakistan Army Journal, Vol.
XXXV, No. 1, Spring 1994, 5.
5. Comments of Lt. Keith E. Thompson, USMC Mountain Warfare Training Center,
Bridgeport California, in December 2002.
6. Punjab.
7. Setnika, 623.
8. Ali, 16-17 and Punjab, 5-6.
9. Pravin Sawhnee, “Kashmir’s Cold War,” Jane’s International Defense Review,
December 1997, 59.
10. Punjab, 5 and Thompson.
11. Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat Tactics in
Afghanistan, London: Frank Cass Publishers, 1999, 193-196.
12. Thompson.
13. Setnicka, 618-619.
14. Boris Gromov, Ogranichennyy kontingent (Limited Contingent), Moscow: Progress
Publishers, 194, 186.
15. Setnicka, 612-618.
16. Thompson.
17. Ibid.
18. Setnika, 609-612.
19. Setnika, 621-623; and V B. Malkin and V. V. Litovchenko, “O profilaktike gornoy
bolezni” (“Prevention of Mountain Sickness”), Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (Military-
Medical Journal), September 1982, 38.
20. Setnika, 621-623.
21. Thompson.
22. Setnika, 621-623; Malkin and Litovchenko, 38; and A. M Murzaliev and P. N. Gol’dberg,
“Lechebno-evakuatsionnye meropriyatiya pri ostrykh narysheniyakh mozgovogo
krovoobrashcheniya v gorakh” (“Treatment and Evacuation Measures for Acute Disruption
of Blood Circulation to the Brain in the Mountains]”) Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (Military-
Medical Journal), December 1991, 19. Also, see Dennis La Ravia, Uzvaiantha Ganji,
Robert Lahasky, and Lynn Pittman-Cooley, “Review of Cerebral Edema: High Altitude
Illness,” US Army Medical Department Journal, January-February 2000.
23. Setnika, 623.
24. Ali, 12.
25. Pravin Sawhnee, “Kashmir’s Cold War,” Jane’s International Defense Review, Decem-
ber 1997, 60.
26. Ali, 13.
27. A. V. Dergunov and V. M Didichenko, “O podgotovke vrachey-gornospasateley” (“Pre-
paring Physician Mountain Rescuers”), Voenno-meditsinskiy zhurnal (Military-Medical
Journal), May 1991, 16.
28. Dergunov and Didichenko, 16-17.
29. Setnika, 599-602.
Helicopter Landings
in the Mountains:
Lessons From the
Soviet-Afghan War
LTC (Ret) Lester W. Grau, CW4 Anthony Reed,
and CW3 James W. Grau
Flying helicopters in Afghanistan is a challenge. Its difficulty and danger

are usually underestimated by aviators who have not experienced it first-
hand. Most airfields and heliports are located from 1,000 to 1,800 meters
(3,000 to 6,000 feet) above sea level. The omnipresent abrasive dust eats
rotor blades and engines. In the summer, in the south, temperatures reach
45° to 52° Celsius (113° to 126° Fahrenheit). In the north, the summer
temperatures reach 40° to 45° Celsius (104° to 113° Fahrenheit). Strong
winds are common in the afternoons and evenings, especially in the central
and western parts of Afghanistan. These winds reduce visibility and create
dust storms. The average mountain range is some 3,000 to 4,000 meters
(10,000 to 13,000 feet) high. These flying conditions reduce engine power
and lift capacity, lower the flight ceiling, complicate takeoff and landing, and
decrease the reliability of the aircraft.1
At the peak of the Soviet-Afghan War, the Soviets deployed three
helicopter regiments, seven separate helicopter squadrons, and one
helicopter detachment to Afghanistan.2 The deployed helicopters were the
Mi-24 helicopter gunship, the Mi-8MT armed transport helicopter, the Mi-6
heavy transport helicopter, and the Mi-9VZPU airborne command post.3
During the nine-plus years that the Soviets were in Afghanistan, they lost 329
helicopters (127 Mi-24, 174 Mi-8MT and 28 Mi-6). Part of the reason for the
loss was pilot fatigue. The sortie rate for pilots reached six to eight flights in
a 24-hour period. This worked out to 600-800 flights a year with over 1,000
hours flying time (US aircrews are currently meeting the same amount of
hours on deployments). The tour of duty for pilots was two years.4 Pilot
fatigue was not the only problem. The enemy, the special flying conditions
and the pre-tour training all contributed to the problem. It took time and
experience flying in the mountains for bold pilots to have a chance at
becoming old pilots.
Flying in mountains adds additional demands on the pilot. The
Russian publication, Army Digest, recently published the following article
about their experiences of flying and landing helicopters in Afghanistan’s
mountains.5 The authors hope that this information will be useful to our own
rotary wing community when flying in Afghanistan’s mountains or in any
other high altitude environment.
Helicopter Operations 187
Landing a Helicopter in the Mountains

Colonel D. B. Zipir in Armeisky sbornik, January 2010
T he helicopter’s ability to land on small mountain sites makes it an

indispensable system for combat and special missions. Training for
a mountain landing is one of the basic and yet most complicated forms of
training. It demands thorough training and the consideration of a whole
range of conditions by the crew. Among these are weather conditions;
actual helicopter takeoff weight; the site’s suitability for landing and
takeoff; the tactical situation; and the enemy’s air defense capabilities. At
the same time, there must be close coordination among the crew, within
the tactical team and also with the forces for whom the flight is being
conducted. Statistics emphasize the difficulty of this type of flying: the
largest number of serious incidents, accidents and catastrophes occur
during the approaches, landings and takeoffs at these sites.
This article is based on the experience of flights and landings at
small sites away from an airfield. Its purpose is to inform commanders
and flight personnel about the special conditions encountered when
landing helicopters in the mountains.
Site Elevation Site Dimensions (Meters)
(Meters) Mi-8 Mi-24 Mi-26 Ka-50 Ka-27 Mi-2
0 — — 65x80 50x130 50x130 75x200
up to 500 — 50x130 65x250 50x130 50x130 75x240
up to 1,500 55x120 50x175 65x285 50x150 50x150 75x280
up to 2,000 55x165 50x240 65x300 50x180 50x180 75x320
up to 3,000 55x255 50x270 65x315 50x300 50x300 —
up to 3,500 55x300 50x340 65x350 — — —
up to 4,000 55x345 — 65x365 — — —
Figure 1. Minimum dimensions for a helicopter landing site at different elevations. These
values are figured for sites with bordering obstacles of a height of AH≤15 meters, [AH being
the equivalent of “Above Touchdown Level.”]
Special features of landing site selection from the air.

Evaluate a site’s suitability for landing by flying over it at a speed
and flight altitude close to the minimum allowed [Effective Translational
Lift], since this is optimal for inspecting landing conditions. As a
rule, evaluate the overall landing zone characteristics during the first
pass. Make a second pass to drop a smoke canister and make a more
detailed inspection of the site’s surface and obstacles on this and other
approaches.
When it is necessary to select a site in a canyon, fly over the canyon
at an altitude and speed that allow executing a turning maneuver to the
necessary heading for continued flight in the canyon and for a 180° turn
for an inspection approach to the site and to drop a smoke canister.
The minimum dimensions of helicopter landing sites at different
elevations are listed in Figure 1. These landing sites are restricted by
bordering obstacles of a height of AH≤15 meters.
Usually the obstacles at
the edges of mountain land-
ing sites are natural. They are
hillsides, large stones and
sometimes trees. It is neces-
sary to evaluate the obstacles
both in terms of flying over
them with a ∆H>10 meters
[altitude correction greater
than 10 meters]6 during a
landing approach and taking Figure 2.
off from them, as well as in
terms of their influence on
rotor lift while hovering. Re-
member that, when flying
by a hillside, the main rotor
axial airflow flow conditions
will be similar to a “vortex
ring state,” and crevasses at
the edge of a landing site
decrease the effect of the in
ground effect “air cushion.” Figure 3. Main rotor flow characteristics
while hovering over a crevasse.
Main rotor lift decreases in
both cases (figures 2-3). In most cases, one cannot count on the use of
the in ground effect cushion at mountain landing sites.
Hovering close to any restricting surface imposes peculiarities on a
helicopter’s behavior and the piloting technique. If the angle of a surface
slope changes, then the influence of this surface from 0° to a slope angle
of 45° will have an impact, on the “air cushion effect” — from 45° to
135° as a “vertical face effect” (figure 4), and from 135° to 180° as a
“ceiling effect” (figure 5).
The special feature of evaluating slopes is the fact that only from H<5
meters [H (height) is less than 5 meters] can one evaluate a gradient with
sufficient precision, and consequently, determine a site’s suitability. It
might seem readily apparent from H=100 meters, that a site is suitable
for landing a squadron of helicopters, yet from H=50 meters it becomes
apparent that it will only handle a flight [two helicopters], while at H=3
meters, it is clear that it will be difficult to select a relatively flat place for
one helicopter. Be ready for this.
Slopes also create a problem during hovering. First, a gradient
greater than 5° significantly reduces the effect of the “aircushion”
influence; second, a peculiarity of the “air cushion” effect is that to
maintain a hover, one must bank in the direction of the slope equal to the
gradient while hovering near the ground. With gradients greater than 3°,
it is necessary to move over the site using hover taxiing.
In some cases, one can deter-

mine the condition of the site’s sur-
face only after the flight engineer
exits the aircraft.
While hovering over the edge
of a crevasse, only part of the main
rotor operates with the in-ground
effect. At the same time, this creates a
tipping moment in the direction of the
crevasse (figure 3). Adjust the cyclic
in the direction opposite the crevasse
to compensate. Take this special
feature into account, especially at Figure 4.
maximum CG (center of gravity) or
gross takeoff weight values.
When hovering a helicopter near a vertical face, the so-called
“nozzle effect” occurs. Flow at the face distorts and vertical speed
components increase in the plane of the blade’s rotation, which leads
to a decrease of local angles of attack and aerodynamic loading on
the blades passing close to the vertical face. As a result, a moment
emerges directed toward the face. The moment’s magnitude increases
and renders a strong influence from a distance of 0.6-0.7 Ø NV [0.6 to 0.7
diameter of the main rotor blade].7 To counteract the moment, the pilot
must adjust the cyclic in a direction away from the face (figure 4). During
certain circumstances (high mountains, site location near a vertical wall,
maximum loading, a weak power plant, etc.), there may not be enough
power to overcome this moment.
Sometimes a helicopter has to hover under a surface (for example, an
overhanging rock ledge, creating the so called “ceiling effect” (figure 5).
The ceiling effect deforms the inductive velocity fields in the plane
of rotation, due to the characteristic flow. Inductive velocity decreases
because of the change of the flow’s direction absorbed by the blade. The
angles of attack on the blades increase, and, consequently, the main rotor
lift grows. The helicopter tends to “adhere” to the overhanging surface.
The landing site’s surface should allow landing or hovering over it at
a set altitude. The nature of a site’s surface influences the conditions of
Figure 5.
the “air cushion” formation.
Gradients close to maxi-
mum values significantly
reduce the influence of the
“air cushion” effect. Rocks
measuring more than 15-20
centimeters erode the “air
cushion,” create problems
in selecting a landing site,
and require hovering the
helicopter at H>1 meter
with subsequent deviations Figure 6.
(figure 6).
Operator’s Manuals for all types of helicopters limit the permissible
wind velocity for landings and takeoffs from sites with gradients. It is
5 meters-per-second for takeoff and landing in any direction. At U>5
meters-per-second [Wind velocity is greater than five meters-per-
second], takeoff and landing must be made only into the wind.
It is important to evaluate the surface of a landing site for the
possibility of formation of dust vortices during hovering (brown out).
Features of crew actions at the landing site selection stage.

Aircraft commander (Pilot in Command) --- Conduct the approach
to inspect the site and drop a smoke canister in accordance with the
heading, taking into account the direction and velocity of the wind and
the terrain. At the same time, the estimated lateral wind component
should not exceed those limitations established by the Operator’s
Manual for hovering.
Co-pilot —During flight over the landing site, in accordance with the
true altitude reported by the flight engineer and according to readouts of
the barometric altimeter, calculate and report to the aircrew commander
the “zero” landing site altitude according to the barometric altimeter.
Calculation formula:
Ho =Hbar, -Hi , where
Ho — site “zero” altitude;
Hbar —barometric altimeter readouts;
Hi — radar altimeter readouts.
Flight engineer --- At the moment of passing the landing site,
determine the true flight altitude according to the radar altimeter and
report it to the pilot-navigator (navigator, co-pilot).
Features of approaching and landing at a site.

For safety purposes, make two passes and two approaches to the site.
l on the first pass, after finding the site, pass over it with a speed
reduced to 80-100 kilometers-per-hour [40 to 50 knots], and determine
the dimensions of the landing site, any obstacles in the direction of the
expected approach and takeoff, and the condition of the landing site
surface;
l on the second turn, after determining that the landing site is
suitable, make an approach to drop a smoke canister and conduct a
detailed inspection of the site;
l on the third turn, conduct a pass to determine the direction and
velocity of the wind according to the smoke trail;
l and on the fourth turn, conduct the landing approach.
Approach parameters for all turns are the same as those described
for the first pass. Decrease the flight altitude and speed on the approach
glide slope for inspecting and dropping the smoke canister to the
minimum values allowed for the landing site conditions.
Drop a smoke canister on each potential landing site, but insure that
they are not located close to each other. When using the NSP canister,
your time is severely limited for determining the direction and velocity of
the wind since it has a short burn time.8 If you use the PSh-type canister,
use black or orange smoke.9 Poke no fewer than four holes into each
PSh canister (if there are less, the canister may not ignite because of
insufficient oxygen at those landing sites with an elevation greater than
2,000 meters [6,500 feet]) and loosen the contents of the canisters in the
openings that you made.
Select the approach direction, if possible, along ridges and canyons,
and over terrain with fewer fractures but with the same lighting.
After passing over the site and determining that it is a potential
landing site, make an approach to drop the canister.
Climb to 50-100 meters after dropping the canister, then turn back
to the site to determine the wind conditions from the smoke trail. At
H=150 meters relative to the site, bring the helicopter into level flight.
There is sufficient time while you climb and turn back to the site for the
canister to ignite and to form a smoke trail (figure 7). After determining
the wind according to the smoke trail, make your landing approach by
one of four methods depending on the wind (figure 8). During your next
pass, evaluate any obstacles on the approach and during a takeoff into
Figure 7.
Figure 8. Methods of approach to a site depending on wind direction.
With two 180-degree turns

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15
Ф=15 50 38 31 26 19 10
80
tgp, sec
Ф=10 50 35 27 20 11 0
Ф=15 40 31 25 20 14 5
100
Ф=10 40 28 20 17 0 0
Small Box Pattern

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15
Ф=15 41 32 27 23 17 10
80
tgp, sec
Ф=10 37 26 20 15 9 0
Ф=15 30 23 19 15 10 0
100
Ф=10 25 16 10 6 0 0
Tear Drop Turn

V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15
Ф=15 CA 21 23 24 26 28 33
tgp,s 50 41 37 32 27 20
80
Ф=10 CA 30 33 37 41 49 63
tgp,s 50 40 34 29 22 13
Ф=15 CA 30 32 33 35 38 44
tgp,s 40 34 30 26 22 15
100
Ф=10 CA 42 45 50 55 63 78
tgp,s 40 32 27 22 16 7
Standard Turn
V, kph U, m/s 0 3 5 7 10 15
Ф=15 33 23 18 13 7 0
80
tgp, sec
Ф=10 24 12 6 0 0 0
Ф=15 20 12 7 0 0 0
100
Ф=10 9 0 0 0 0 0
the wind. While making approaches at V=80 kilometers-per-hour [40
knots] to sites with an elevation greater than 2,000 meters, one must be
guided by tgp10 for V=100 kilometers-per-hour [50 knots] because of
adjustments to instrument speed.
In mountainous terrain, it is impossible, in the majority of cases, to
maintain a stationary hover while viewing the ground just ahead from the
left side of the helicopter. This is due to the limited dimensions of the
landing sites — and the location of the helicopter’s “wheel mounting.”
This may occur at convex or concave landing sites, and also at sites
constrained by obstacles. Therefore, it is necessary to hover and maintain
a stationary hover relative to a reference point.
Consider the helicopter’s sluggishness during a landing approach —
the increased pilot response and reaction times required for unforeseen
changes in flight parameters. Here, a pilot should expect a longer
time in changing aircraft speed after changing his angle of pitch, than
when flying at lower altitudes. The greater the flight altitude, the more
sluggishly the helicopter performs. Altitude affects a pilot’s perceptions
and sensations. When flying at H=1,500 meters [4,920 feet] in calm
weather, it feels like the approach is being made with a tail wind of U≈3
meters-per-second and at H=2,500 meters [8,200 feet], with a tail wind of
U≈5 mps (deduct this accordingly from the speed of a head wind).
A relatively steep glide path allows approaches with less collective
pitch applied, but this profile requires larger pitch angle changes to
adjust forward speed, and therefore larger engine control inputs. This
causes difficulties if the pilot does not have the required skills.
It is necessary to maintain forward airspeed at or below V=50
kilometers-per-hour indicated [27 knots], bearing in mind the increase
between your indicated and true air speeds, above V=50 kilometers-
per-hour — according to the Doppler and drift-angle UMS.11 Maintain
the approach angle by keeping the intended landing site in the cockpit
window. Also evaluate the helicopter’s position according to the artificial
horizon indicator during the third approach. Check main rotor RPM
during transition to in ground effect airflow. It is easier during landing
when the helicopter’s nose is heavy: speed is decreased in the smaller
angles of approach, and the field of view of the landing area becomes
better.
The habit of correlating the helicopter’s speed using visual cues
from the ground’s movement as seen through the side windows is
inapplicable in the mountains — the approach, as a rule, is executed via
a chasm or along a slope. One must control the speed according to the
instruments. Knowing how to assess a helicopter’s speed and observe its
rate of change only by approach rate toward the landing markers— is an
indicator of developing good habits in the accomplishment of approach
planning.
Problems often occur when removing the throttle control from

the stops. The need to switch on the augmented power (AP) (for
Mi-8 helicopters with TVZ-117MT engines) usually occurs at the final
stage of deceleration — the most intensive and demanding stage for
the pilot. In order to decrease the reaction time required, remove the
throttle from the stops and shift it upwards a little before approaching
a site with LN>1,760 meters [Line = 5,775 feet]. Take into account
that a small shift of the throttle upwards, even without the blinking of
the AUGMENTATION ON advisory light, augments the power plant’s
power. If the pilot forgets afterward to return the throttle control to the
stops, then he will have increased fuel consumption. Bear in mind that
even the TVZ-117VM and TVZ-117V engines (Mi-24), for the most part,
also react with an increase of power at the movement of the throttle
upwards, even though power is supposed to be exclusively controlled
by the “automatic device.”
Know how to use the following feature when necessary. A move-
able stop control system is supposed to allow shifting the angle
control rod of the tail rotor system through its entire range. However,
a malfunction of the “automatic device,” an error of the air pressure
sensor caused by the “air cushion” while hovering, or the incorrect
regulation of directional control inputs are possible. In critical cases
such as these, switch off the moveable stop control system by pulling
the circuit breaker on the pilot’s electrical panel. Doing so locks the
position into the upper limit.
During an approach, the helicopter may encounter a downdraft,
or, due to an abrupt wind decrease or downward force by the wind,
the helicopter may encounter main rotor axial airflow that skews its
behavior. This requires a hard pull on the collective pitch combined with
a hard right pedal. If, at the same time, the main rotor RPM falls below
92-percent, or the right pedal reaches its stop, cease pulling pitch and
use the reserve altitude available to gain speed and perform a go-around
for a repeated approach. Banking right with the right pedal at the stop
gives a short-term effect of cessation of the turn with a subsequent sharp
increase of the angular velocity. This occurs during a decelerating turn
as a result of the need to increase collective pitch due to the decrease
of lift (Tu) during the bank and to maintain glide trajectory. You should
perform a go-around, if possible, by turning away to the left and
decreasing collective pitch.
In the other case, if the helicopter gets into an updraft or the winds
increase, there is an increase of main rotor lift, the helicopter gains altitude
(decreases vertical descent speed), and, to preserve the glide slope, one
must vigorously decrease collective pitch. The correct reaction in this
case, after passing L=250 meters to the site, is to go around for another
approach.
During a landing approach using maximum power or with an
inaccurate assessment of the power plant’s capabilities, there is a certain
“point of no return” on the glide slope. Once this is crossed, the pilot
loses the ability to correct the situation by terminating the approach with
a go around. One can get into this situation in mountains not only for
subjective reasons — errors in the pilot’s technique and assessment of
available engine power — but also for reasons independent of the pilot.
For example, the winds at the final stage of the approach allow sustaining
glide slope parameters, but then the winds drop sharply before the
helicopter has reached the site ground effect. The helicopter is in a
flight profile with no surplus power. The pilot’s instinctive reaction is to
increase collective pitch, trying to sustain the glide slope. This leads to
main rotor droop, an increase of the vertical descent speed or pushing
the right pedal to the floor and changing the helicopter’s heading.
When unable to increase speed or to turn away, “disrupt” the main rotor,
creating an angle of pitch that will allow a landing with a forward and
vertical speed close to zero. In this case, the relatively steep glide path
increases the chance of a successful outcome of the flight.
Maintaining a hover in winter conditions, and also at a high-mountain
landing site covered with ice is difficult, even if hovering over the site
does not create a snow cloud of powdered snow. The whiteness of the
snow, the absence of a level natural horizon line and sunny weather all
create difficulty in controlling the spatial position of the helicopter, even
with a high-contrast reference point. The presence of several contrasting
reference points at the site eases the situation. When needed, an
automobile tire or another contrasting object should be thrown onto the
snow when passing over the site.
Select the landing location after a moving hover at a minimum
altitude (down to one meter). When needed, disembark the flight
engineer and “set the wheels” according to his commands.
It is permissible to land and take off with a snow cover thickness of 50
centimeters and 15 centimeters for a running takeoff (10 centimeters for
the Mi-24). Taxiing along a snow-covered (dust-covered) site during the
absence of horizontal visibility is permitted at Vw<10kph [wind velocity
is less than 10 kilometers per hour], turns are permitted while taxiing at
Vw<5kph, but turns in place are prohibited.
An AI12 start is guaranteed only up to H=3,000 meters [9843 feet
MSL] because the decreased pressure in the AI air system is lower than
that minimally required for start up. Do not switch off the engines after
landing above this altitude.
Features of crew actions at landing approach and landing stage.

Aircraft commander — Depending on winds, make an approach
to drop a smoke canister. Use an appropriate approach method from
figure 8. After coming out of the 4th turn, order the flight engineer
into the cargo hold to prepare to drop the canister. Glide to the site to
Hi=15meters, decreasing air speed to the minimum allowed. After the
flight engineer’s report that he is ready, at the calculated glide slope
points, give the command: “Ignite it” and “Drop.” Remember the
barometric flight altitude during this pass over the site. After the canister
has been dropped, put the helicopter into a climb to an altitude 135
meters [443 feet] above the altitude used to pass over the landing site
and increase speed to 80 kilometers per hour [40 knots]. After reaching
H=50-100 meters, turn back to the site; evaluate the direction and strength
of the winds according to the smoke trail; evaluate obstacles along the
specified landing and takeoff heading; make a pass over the site; and
make the landing approach using one of the methods depending on the
winds.
Co-pilot --- After defining the winds according to the smoke trail, set
the approach heading on the Doppler meter and report the heading and
approach method to the aircrew commander. Turn on the coordinates’
meter during a pass over the site.
Flight engineer --- Upon receipt of the command, “Prepare to drop
the canister,” go into the cargo hold, put on the safety belt, hook it to the
cable, prepare the canister for lighting, slightly open the cargo hold door
and report readiness to the aircrew commander. After receiving the
command, light the canister fuse and report to the aircrew commander.
After receiving the command for dropping the canister, drop it out, close
the door, report to the aircrew commander, remove the safety belt and
return to your workstation. Monitor engine operating power and report:
“Operating power nominal,” “Flight state takeoff,” etc. Upon the gas
temperatures approaching the maximum value, count backwards: “To
maximum temperature 30°..., 20°.., maximum temperature.” After the
hover, go into the cargo hold on the aircrew commander’s order, examine
the rear hemisphere in the blisters and look for any obstacles beneath
the wheels. Report the results to the aircrew commander. On the aircrew
commander’s order, disembark from the helicopter, move around to the
aircrew commander’s field of view, evaluate the underlying surface, and
with gestures assist the aircrew commander about the direction of the
displacement and the landing location. Always remain in the aircrew
commander’s field of view throughout the process.
Features of approaching and landing at a site in a canyon.

Approaching and landing at a site in a canyon is distinguished
from the approach and landing at a site on a flat plain or elevation. The
distinctions are connected with the fact that approaches to the site always
are made along the length of the canyon. The bottoms of canyons, as a
rule, slope and the mountain slopes descend to the bottom of the canyon
Figure 9.
at different angles. The angle of the approach may be variable and the
flight path to the approach may be crooked (figure 9).
After finding a site in a canyon, it is necessary during the initial pass
over it to evaluate the flight altitude relative to the site according to the
two-pointer altimeter (according to the difference of the radio altimeter
and two-pointer altimeter readings).
W Turn R Turn Gorge
Ф Pull the helicopter into a climb, set
(kph) (m) (m) width (m)
V=80 kilometers per hour, “press in
80 138 276 380
20º tight” to one of the canyon faces (for
100 216 432 540
80 87 174 280
the Mi-8 and Mi-26, the right
30º wall is preferable). After attaining
100 136 272 380
80 60 120 220
an altitude that allows a 180° turn
40º
100 94 188 290 according to the width of the canyon
(figure 10, bring the helicopter into
Figure 10.
level flight and make the 180° turn. The
width of the canyon is the distance from the helicopter to the canyon
wall in which the turn is being
V at Point of Vy of Descent (mps) from D=1km
made. Add 100 meters for error Beginning of From From From
in determining the distance and Descent (kph) H=100m H=150m H=200m
to compensate for turbulence dur-
120 3.3 5.0 6.7
ing the turn.
110 3.0 4.6 6.1
Calculate your approach so 100 2.8 4.2 5.5
that you can pull out of the fourth 90 2.5 3.8 5.0
turn at a distance that allows 80 2.2 3.3 4.4
your descent in accordance with 70 1.9 2.9 3.9
the parameters of the “low speed” 60 1.7 2.5 3.3
glide slope (depending on flight 50 1.4 2.0 2.8
altitude relative to the landing site). 40 1.1 1.7 2.2
Figure 11 shows the dependence 30 0.8 1.2 1.7
of vertical speed on the speed 20 0.6 0.8 1.1
and altitude relative to the landing 10 0.3 0.4 0.6
site. Figure 11.
Figure 12.
Remember that during visual valuation of the distance and elevation

of the landing site, flight illusion occurs at a lower altitude and shorter
distance relative to the site because of the proximity of the ground’s
surface and large rocks.
Estimate the flight altitude relative to the site according to the two-
pointer altimeter and the distance to the site according to the Doppler
indicator. Fly 15 meters over the site, if possible, at the minimum speed
for the conditions. Drop the canister and put the helicopter into a climb
at V=80 kilometers-per-hour [43 knots] (figure 12).
Pay special attention to maintaining control of the flight during the
approach. Flights over inclines or obstacles on mountain slopes are
executed with ΔH≥10 m [altitude correction is equal to or greater than
10 meters]. At the same
time, the low point of
the helicopter, in the
majority of cases, is the
tail rotor (figure 13).
After a 180° turn, if
needed,move to the cen-
ter of the canyon, deter_ Figure 13.
mine the direction and
speed of the wind at the ground in accordance with the smoke trail and
execute an approach maneuver for landing into the wind.
During approach to a “bowl” type canyon landing site, mark out
in advance the slope, abeam the hovering location and a readily
identifiable reference point. (figure 14). With large angles of closing onto
the landing site, do not use a steep glide slope for the approach where
V<60kph [velocity is less than 60 kilometers per hour— 32 knots] and
Vy>3m [vertical speed is greater than three meters per second].
Figure 14.
In “box” canyons (those having an approach only from one direction),

make the approach for the canister drop at an altitude that allows
turning back at V=80 kilometers per hour [43 knots] and maneuver
room for a second approach. Evaluate the direction and speed of the
wind according to the smoke trail and land. The landing and takeoff
are executed with opposite headings (figure 15); therefore, pay special
attention to the direction and speed of the wind. Do not approach and
land with U>5m [wind velocity is greater than five meters per second].
Adjust the approach and vertical speed to approximate the par-
ameters of a “low speed” glide slope. Where needed, change of flight
direction while following the center of the canyon (figure 14).
The nature of the main rotor’s flow in the presence of axial airflow
(figure 16) during hovering over a site of limited size at the bottom of a
Figure 15.
canyon causes a decrease of

main rotor lift,which must be con-
sidered while evaluating possi-
ble landing sites and making
landing calculations.
Features of taking
off from a site.
Take off from a site verti-
Figure 16.
cally, if the helicopter hovers
at H>3 m, or with a running takeoff where Hh>1 m [hover altitude is
greater than one meter]. Where possible and needed, make a down
slope takeoff while increasing speed in the descent.
For takeoff, after the helicopter breaks away from the ground, create
an angle of pitch with the cyclic that provides increased speed without
the helicopter’s descent. Increase the collective pitch until the engines
have reached their peak, not allowing the main rotor RPM to be less than
92 percent.
Use augmented power (emergency power) for landing and takeoff
with the Mi-8 helicopter.
Mi-8MT helicopters have TVZ-117MT engines, the maximum power
of which is augmented power (AP) that assumes manipulation using
the engine controller. Mi-8MTV helicopters have TVZ-117VM engines,
the maximum power of which is emergency (EP), and the engines are
supposed to reach it automatically.
For an approach using augmented power, after lining up on the
landing path, move the throttle upwards until the AUGMENTATION
ON warning begins to blink, while not allowing the main rotor RPM
to decrease less than 94-percent or increase more than 98-percent.
Remember that while augmentation power is on, with collective pitch
greater than 8°, there is an automatic correction to the left. This correction
must be manually adjusted to the right and checked periodically to
insure that it is in the extreme right position.
The throttle must be moved upwards until the AUGMENTATION ON
warning blinks for takeoff in augmented power while not allowing main
rotor RPM >101%-percent Increase the collective pitch smoothly during
takeoff, now allowing the main rotor RPM to fall <94-percent. At collective
pitch >7°, the warnings are constantly lit and reversing your correction is
possible. After a climb to H=100 meters, make certain that the correction
is to the right, in turn bring the throttles to the center position to the lock,
and make certain the warning lights go out.
With a “light” main rotor and incorrect engine control adjustment,
turning on augmented power may lead to a main rotor RPM increase
>101%, and it is necessary to turn off the augmented power. In this
case, to use the augmented power, after entering the landing path,
remove the throttles from their stops and slightly shift them upwards,
and with main rotor transition to axial airflow (V≈35 kph), move it
closer until the AUGMENTATION ON warning blinks. During takeoff in
augmented power on such a helicopter, immediately after the transition
to axial airflow, while not allowing an RPM increase >101-percent, make a
correction to the right until it stops and set the throttles at the stops. This
all occurs at the stage of the aircrew commander’s most intense work in
piloting the helicopter. One must be ready for it.
Experience in the use of helicopters with TVZ-117VM engines shows
that in the majority of helicopters, moving the throttles upwards also
increases engine power, while in the flight manual states that it operates
automatically with the augmented power on and there is no need to
move the throttles. An increase of main rotor RPM leads to the very same
effect on some helicopters with the readjustment. In any case, the pilot
must competently use the equipment, know the special features and use
all the capabilities for a safe flight.
Evaluation of a helicopter’s capabilities in accordance

with a power plant’s margin of power.
This characteristic is most important for the flight’s outcome and
is difficult for evaluation. It occurs because the existing theoretical
methodology does not allow taking into account fully the special features
of a specific helicopter and the actual conditions of the approach and
landing. In the flight manual, the only correction for wear of the blades
during the first compressor stage is turning on the anti-icing system and
the dust protection system, which is insufficient in real conditions. Real
power plant power and adjustment of automatic fuel controls depend on
wear and a number of parameters subject both to change while flying
the helicopter and making adjustments. That leads to the fact that the
power plant’s operational parameters, in a number of cases, do not
correspond to the maintenance instructions and are in conflict with the
expected results.
Analysis shows that the primary reason for such a situation is
inexperience in using the automatic fuel controls. There are no
consequences when flying level terrain because of the relatively large
power reserve of the power plant. Indeed, it is against regulations to all
of the helicopter’s power plant and main rotor capabilities in making
flights in mountainous terrain and during execution of combat missions.
Often during flights in the mountains, the possibility or impossibility
of landing at a site must be evaluated beforehand. The following
method is used in this case. If the flight engineer cannot say precisely
the maximum temperature of the gases generated by each engine (with
a precision to 10° Celsius), then at the site altitude at which the landing
will be made, check the augmented power (emergency power) of the
engines in flight.
The purpose of the check is to determine the maximum temperature

of the gases. The temperature of the gases is the most objective indicator
of the reserve power of the engines. Cessation of gas temperature
increase always means that the engine has “yielded” all possible power.
It is necessary to set V=100-120 kph in level flight for the check, while
moving the engine throttles downward, increasing speed in level flight
by removing collective pitch until the moment the gas temperature
no longer rises or the main rotor RPM has decreased to 92-percent.
Remember this maximum temperature obtained from both engines (in
practice they almost never are “log book”).
During the landing approach, the flight engineer, knowing the
maximum temperatures of the gases, indicates to the aircrew commander
according to the weaker engine the difference between the actual and
maximum values. The aircrew commander, at the same time, must take
into consideration that if the gas temperatures have reached maximum,
further collective pitch increase will lead to a loss of main rotor RPM
or the placement of the right pedal at the stop. This will allow making
a decision to land or break-off of the approach in time. One must pay
attention to the nature of the change of the power and reserve power
required in a hover depending on the elevations of sites and the takeoff
weight of the helicopters.
Conclusion
This is an interesting read on mountain approaches and shows that
the Russian helicopter pilot still does a lot of “stubby pencil” calculations
during flight. US aviators use their Performance Planning Card or PERF
page (in glass cockpits) to the same effect. The procedures in the article
may also strike the US aviator as overly cautious and time-consuming. The
entire article is about approaches and no US aviator is going to routinely
make three passes before landing. Aviators can save this precious time
during the mission by expending it in extensive training before deploy-
ment. The smoke canister methods described in this article, while still
used by some of our allies, are not going to be applicable to US Aviators,
especially Apache pilots. The co-pilot/gunner is not going to carry smoke
canisters in his cockpit, nor is he going to open his crew station door while
on approach.
The challenge of high altitude and mountain flying is more than just
approaches. One of the problems Colonel Ziper does not discuss is the
frequent mountain updrafts and downdrafts that make flying in Afghanistan
quite exciting at times. The ceilings on Russian helicopters are usually
higher than ours, but the principles of flying remain the same. Even without
an enemy, mountain flying is a risky business and the ground unit that we
support will not always understand why we need to use certain headings
and profiles when coming to their assistance. Power management, properly
adapting/reacting to wind shifts, avoiding FOD and an active enemy are all
part of mountain flying. So what should aviators do to prepare for a tour in
Afghanistan’s mountains?
USAACE’s The Army Aviator’s Handbook for Maneuvering Flight and
Power Management and Chapter 3 of FM 3-04.203 Fundamentals of Flight,
are the bibles for flying in the mountains, (and every aviator deploying
to Afghanistan should study them). Afghanistan’s flying conditions are
not those of Iraq, and a unit should train for mountain flying well before
deploying there by simulating conditions during as many flights as possible,
both in the aircraft and in the simulators. Even simple traffic pattern flights
can be geared towards high altitude training by simulating a lower max
torque available. During garrison training, practice maneuvering flight
while exceeding the 30°/60° limits in order to become familiar with
aerodynamic behaviors of the aircraft such as “mushing.” But stay within the
30° / 60° limits during maneuvering flight in Afghanistan. There will seldom
be any tactical benefit, and exceeding the 30°/60° limits there can put the
crew and aircraft at unnecessary risk. Flying with smooth and slow control
movements is optimum, especially in low density altitude environments like
Afghanistan,.
Remember that the power margin and bucket speed in a mountain
environment will differ from airframe to airframe. It is not in the best
interests of CH-47 and UH-60 crews to outfly their AH-64 escort which may
have narrower power margins due to gross weights that are significantly
increased by their weapon loads. Yet it is common for CH-47s to fly a low-
level or contour profile to the base of a mountain and then climb, possibly
forgetting that the escort Apache has to start its climb earlier and may be
forced to call “heavy metal” in order to catch up and effectively perform
its escort mission. Wind direction and velocity are important factors when
flying in the mountains, and the winds will vary all the way to the top. Rotary
wing aircrews should remember that their AH-64D escort has a wind
reading capability which will provide wind heading and velocity at the AH-
64D’s current location. While other aircraft should take advantage of this
and any other available winds information before making an approach, it
does not substitute for learning good wind and terrain analysis.
There are ten rules of thumb applicable to all helicopter aviators flying
in the mountains:13
1. Slow down and perform maneuvers with less intensity for all aspects
of the machine. Aggressive left turns and aggressive forward application of
the cyclic will increase torque.
2. Always leave a way out.
3. Know where the winds are.
4. Crew coordination is critical. Make sure everyone knows what is
going on all the time and split up the duties during the entire flight and
during the approach.
5. Update performance planning throughout the flight to be aware of
power margin, bucket speed and minimum safe single engine airspeed.
6. Be aware of hypoxia and take care of your body—get plenty of rest,

watch your diet, stay physically fit and avoid tobacco.
7. Your senses and perceptions can be unreliable in the mountains—
trust your flight instruments.
8. Go-arounds are free.
9. An aircrew’s decision to abort because of adverse meteorological
conditions must be accepted by the command.
10. Self-removal of aircrew experiencing emotional stress or illness
must be encouraged and not criticized.
Of course, the enemy remains a concern. Afghanistan is one of the few
places on the planet where the air defense threat from ground forces may be
firing from above the helicopter. During the Soviet-Afghan War, Mujahideen
DShK gunners would often emplace multiple machine guns above passes
and on flight paths with the hope of downing a helicopter through blade or
transmission strike. The Mujahideen also used narrow canyons with some
sort of bait in it to draw a single helicopter down away from the support of
its wingman. Caves dug into canyon walls contained DShKs which would
fill the air with bullets — or a cable might be stretched across the narrow
canyon. Potential landing zones were covered with heavy-weapons fire and
land mines. Shoulder-fired air defense missiles were often sited at the end
of runways. Maintenance test pilots usually fly a predictable pattern in a
given area and the Mujahideen were quick to pick up on that.
Flying in Afghanistan is demanding and unforgiving. Like anything
else, training, rehearsals, common sense and a bit of caution will assist the
bold pilot in becoming an old pilot.
________________________________________
1. The Russian General Staff (translation, commentary and editing by Lester W. Grau and
Michael A. Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, Lawrence:
University Press of Kansas, 2002, 210-211.
2. Ibid, 318. Viktor Markovskiy, Zharkoe nebo Afganistana (The hot sky of Afghanistan),
Moscow: Tekhnika-Molodezhi, 2000, 101 lists four regiments and ten separate squadrons.
3. Russian General Staff, 210.
4. Ibid, 221.
5. Colonel D. B. Zipir, “Posadka vertoleta na vysokogornye ploshchadki” (“Landing a
helicopter in the mountains”), Armeyskiy sbornik (Army Digest). January 2010, 31-39.
6. It is DH>10 in the original, but is probably ∆H>10. The Cyrillic D [Д] looks similar to ∆.
7. Ø is the diameter, NV is the main rotor blade. In figure 4, ΔT is the lift or thrust
differential.
8. The NSP (Nazemnyi signal’nyi patron — ground signal cartridge) is a smoke grenade
with a fold-out “leg” base to stabilize the unit.
9. The PSh-M is a smoke pot that comes in black, orange and yellow smoke.
10. The tgp is the flight time required to achieve a horizontal plane before entering the
glide path.
11. UMS is probably the “universal multiprocessing system”.
12. AI are Aleksandr Ivchenko helicopter engines. The AI-9 is the most popular.
13. The ten rules of thumb are extracted from FM 3-04.203 Fundamentals of Flight, FM
1-202 Environmental Flight, USAACE The Army Aviator’s Handbook for Maneuvering Flight
and Power Management, AR 40-8 Temporary Flying Restrictions due to Exogenous Factors.
206 Passing It On
Conclusion
T hroughout the history of organized militaries, there has been a
tension in how best to organize forces for future combat. One school
of thought, driven by the budget and the vain hope for simplicity and
predictability, have tried to make all combat, combat support and combat
service support units the same by branch and function. They would have
the same TO&Es, same training, same equipment and, consequently,
would perform identically on the battlefield. Recent versions of this
school advocate modularity, so that the Defense Department can “plug
and play” by attaching and detaching interchangeable units for various
contingencies — sort of a national defense Lego© set. Until the current
wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the school’s credo was “if units can do
maneuver warfare well, they readily can do the “lesser forms of combat”
(mountain, counterinsurgency, jungle, urban, riverine) well. The other
school sees combat as a complex, hard-to-predict matter that requires
well-trained and equipped forces to conduct maneuver warfare plus
specially-trained, specially-equipped forces to deal with the lesser
forms of combat. In the past, this has led to the development of “elite”
forces — paratroopers, rangers, mountaineers, jungle fighters, arctic
warriors, special forces, commandos and the like.
These forces are not cheap and, during peacetime, there is often a rift
between “big army” and the specialized community. This school’s credo
is the reason for these specialized forces is that “big army” does not
have the time, resources or need to train all soldiers for all contingencies.
Of course, elite units are not usually big enough to handle a large
contingency over an extended time, so “big army” may then need to
train quickly to meet the additional demands of urban, mountain, jungle
or whatever combat.
Foreign forces that have experience fighting in the mountains re-
flect this experience in their training, organization and equipment.
Most foreign countries with serious mountains in their country or on
their borders have trained mountain units. Their mountain soldiers are
trained in far more than basic knots, rappelling, piton placement and
Conclusion 207
individual climbing skills. They are trained in unit mountain maneuver

and unit mountain tactical drills; they conduct live fire exercises in the
mountains as well as extended exercises in the mountains. Mountain
warfare is more than infantry combat and foreign mountain troops train
their gunners, sappers, drivers, medics, logisticians and aviators along
with their mountain infantry.
The Soviets/Russians have fought two recent wars in the mountains—
in Afghanistan and in Chechnya. In Afghanistan, most Soviet soldiers
were trained in one of seven mountain warfare centers prior to de-
ployment. Their airborne, air assault and special operations (Spetznaz)
forces carried the fight to the guerrillas in the mountains. In Chechnya,
the initial city fighting went against the Russians, but they rallied, gained
control of the urban and built-up areas and eventually moved into the
mountains to confront the guerrillas that they had pushed there. It has
been a long, brutal campaign, but generally the Russians now control
Chechnya and most of the Chechen guerrillas have left the country. The
Russians did not control Chechnya until they controlled the mountains.
The Russians further fought a quick, if not particularly elegant, campaign
against Georgia in the low mountains of Southern Ossetia. This campaign
was quick because the Russians understood mountain combat and the
need to control chokepoints and lines of communication in mountain
combat.
India and Pakistan arguably have the best-trained and most-
experienced mountain troops, but Chinese Mountain Brigades and Light
Infantry Divisions also have experience with insurgents in Tibet and
Xinjiang Province. The Columbian Army has a wealth of experience
with fighting in heavily-forested and jungle-covered mountains.
This book was written for the mountain training community and
for units that will actually fight in the mountains. It is not US doctrine.
It is somebody else’s idea on how to deal with common problems en-
countered in the mountains. It is offered for your consideration.
208 Passing It On
Suggestions for
Further Reading
Lt Col Syed Ishfaq Ali, Fangs of Ice (Story of Siachen), Rawalpindi: Pak
American Commercial (Pvt) Ltd, 1991. A Pakistani perspective on the
fighting Indo-Pakistani fighting in Kashmir over the Siachin glacier — the
highest battlefield in the world. Plenty of tactical detail.
Christopher Duffy and Bill Younghusband, Eagles Over the Alps:
Suvorov in Italy and Switzerland, 1799, Emperor’s Press, 1999. Russian
mountain campaigning in the Alps by one of Britain’s best historians.
A. B. Feuer and Bob Dole, Packs On: Memoirs of the 10th Mountain
Division in World War II, Mechanicsburg: Stackpole books, 2006. A good
history of the training and deployment of the US Army’s only mountain
division during World War II.
D. M. Giangreco, The Soldier from Independence: A Military Biography
of Harry Truman, Minneapolis, Zenith Press, 2009. Chapters 12-16 pro-
vide an excellent account of a battery fight in the Vosges Mountains.
Lester W. Grau, The Bear Went Over the Mountain: Soviet Combat
Tactics in Afghanistan, originally published by NDU Press in 1996, now
published by Mentor Enterprises of Huntsville, Alabama. Translation
and commentary of Soviet tactical experience of Soviet veterans that was
compiled by the Frunze Military Academy.
Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 31-27, Pack Animals in
Support of Special Operations Forces, USGOVPO, 2000. An excellent
guide to the forgotten, but still necessary, skills involved with animal
logistics transport in difficult terrain.
Martin Helprin, A Soldier of the Great War, New York: Harcourt,
Brace and Company, 1991. Novel about an Italian soldier fighting in the
mountains during World War I. Well researched and a good read.
Major General D. K. Palit, War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in
Crisis, 1962, New Delhi: Lancer International, 1991. Best single English-
language book on the 1962 Sino-Indian War in the Himalayan Mountains.
Conclusion 209
Ali Ahmed Jalali and Lester W. Grau, The Other Side of the Mountain:
Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War, originally published with
color maps by Quantico: USMC Special Study, 1998, and now by
Mentor Enterprises of Huntsville, Alabama. Like the Marine Corps
edition, Mentor’s also includes color maps which are integral to
understanding the tactics, and the reader is cautioned against Afghan
Guerrilla War and other unauthorized printings which have poor quality
black and white maps. The authors interviewed more than 100 Muja-
hideen commanders to record their tactical experience in their war
with the Soviets.
Andrew M. Roe, Waging War in Waziristan: The British Struggle in the
Land of Bin Laden, 1849-1947, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2010.
Good study of the British struggle in the Northwest Frontier Province and
Waziristan bordering Afghanistan.
Russian General Staff (translation and commentary by Lester W. Grau
and Michael Gress), The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought
and Lost, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001. An operational
overview of the Soviet mountain war in Afghanistan and the role of all the
branches.
General Sir Andrew Skeen (commentary by Lester W. Grau and
Robert H. Baer), Passing It On: Fighting the Pushtun on Afghanistan’s
Frontier, Fort Leavenworth and Fort Benning: Foreign Military Studies
Office and Maneuver Center of Excellence, 2011. Reprint of an excel-
lent 1932 guide for British lieutenants and captains fighting on the
border with Afghanistan. The terrain and enemy have not changed.
Dodge Billingsley and Lester Grau, Fangs of the Lone Wolf: Chechen
Tactics in the Russian Chechen Wars 1994-2009, Ft. Leavenworth and
Quantico: Foreign Military Studies Office and United States Marine
Corps, 2012. Chechen tactical experience based on interviews with
Chechen combatants who fought in mountain, urban and open terrain.
The book has color maps for clarity.
210 Passing It On
Conclusion 211
Index
acclimatization 3-4, 22-23, 41, 81, 178-179 offensive actions 6-7, 53-57, 58-77
avalanches 3, 80
pace of movement 6, 41
belay 54, 82, 126-131 physical fitness 15-16, 139-143
physiological changes 2, 17, 177
carabineers 42
porters 11-12
cave fighting 53-57
pressurized sleeping bags 16, 179
cerebral edema 3, 181
psychological changes 3, 182-183
classification of mountains 2, 16, 81-82
pulmonary edema 3, 181
climbing injuries 180-181
communications 5, 19, 51, 169-175 reconnaissance 32-33, 80-86
river crossing 132-138
defensive actions in the mountains 7-8
rock falls 3, 80, 82-84
diesel engines 3, 177
rope work 54, 119-125
fire support 8-9, 19-20, 87-98, 157
flanking detachment 45-52 shelter 7, 16, 25, 110-111
footwear 3, 42, 84 small-arms fire 41, 101-109
frostbite 179-180 solar radiation 3, 81
GPS 51, 86 talus 85, 117-118

grassy slopes 85, 114-117 thunderstorms 81-83
training 22-27, 112-143
helicopters 10, 36-37, 66-68, 152, 186-205 trash 418
hypothermia 3, 180
water transport 144-168
infantryman’s load 43-44-51
Jumar ascenders 42
leadership 13, 18-19, 23,43,83

logistics 4, 9-10, 21-22, 144-168
maneuver 20-21
medical evacuation 12, 180
mountain operations 58-77
mountain sickness 3, 81, 181
mules 5, 10-11

Mountain Warfare Other Lonv Problems

Uploaded by

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Document Informationclick to expand document information

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mountain Warfare Other Lonv Problems

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Mountain Warfare Other Lonv Problems

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G)

The Foreign Military Studies Office does foreign-language

1. REPORT DATE 3. DATES COVERED

6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER

7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION

11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S REPORT

12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

!54th Spclsnaz. Balla

Aitack Jt'---·· ...,_,..,.00 ~

"b ! - Battalion oonunand pos1 6 - Hdicoph:r L!Dlding Zone

Lester W. Grau & Charles K. Bartles

© 2011 United States Government, as represented by the

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is an

Foreign Military Studies Office

The mountains are fountains of men as well as

SMALL ARMS FIRE

RUSSIAN ARMY TRAINING

Conclusion - Further Readings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206

Charles Bartles is a Russian linguist and captain in the US Army

The target audience of this book is the cadre of mountain warfare

A general who allows himself to be decisively defeated in an extended

H igh mountain terrain is often inaccessible, uninhabitable or of no

thunderstorms and blizzards, heavy fog, and rapidly changing weather,

Getting There is Half the Fun

Low and Medium High

Considerably affecting 12 14 10 12 8 10 1 day

Low and Medium High

go in waves if suppressive fire is inadequate or the enemy is conducting

Fire Support at Altitude

Transport frequently determines the location of artillery and mortars

Light Vehicles Trucks 3 to 5 Tons

A Step Back in Time

Rations 1,620 kilos Assault & field rations

Mules 20 mules Machine guns and mortars

American mules require 10 pounds of grain and 14 pounds of hay

Low and Medium High

The Eternal Mountains

High 2 to 2.5 8 15 10 1 kg Every Every

Leadership is particularly important in mountain combat. The harsh

At the time of original publication, Lieutenant Colonel Herán Vázquez

M ountain Warfare is specialized combat with unique characteristics.

to understand climbing techniques, navigation, route selection, the use

inspires subordinates and raises the morale of the entire unit.

and skill is vital to the mission’s success, especially in security and

Training for Mountain Warfare

conducting routine administrative activities and route marches. Each

A key training objective in mountain training is properly using winter

bridges and roads require different considerations in the mountains.

40. Sheppe, 35.

Major Muhammad Asim Malik, Pakistan Army, received an M.M.A.S.

Forbidden Cross-Border Vendetta:

L ieutenant-Colonel Babushkin wanted revenge. The Mujahideen

the major garrisons in Afghanistan. Since the Mujahideen depended on