General Subjects Section

ACADEMIC DEPARTMENT
THE INFANTRY SCHOOL
Fort Benning, Georgia

ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS COURSE

1948 - 1949

THE OPERATIONS OF THE 3jlST INFANTRY (91ST INFANTRY

DIVISION) AT LIVERGNAND, ITALY, 10-13 OCTOBER 1944
(NORTH APENNINES CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience of a Company Commander)

Type of operation described: INFANTRY REGIMENT AT-

TACKING IN MOUNTAINOUS TERRAIN

Captain Arthur w. Hackwood, Infantry

ADVANCED INFANTRY OFFICERS CLASS NO I
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
Index • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 1
Bibliography. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 2
Introduction. • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 3
The General Situation 10 October 1944 • • • • • • 4
91st Division Situation •• • • • • • • • • • • • 6
361st Regiment Situation •• • • • • • • • • • • • 6
10 october 1944 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 9

11 october 1944 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 13
12 October 1944 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 16
13 OCtober 1944 • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 19
Analysis and Criticism •• • • • • • • • • • • • • 21
Lessons • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 24

Map A- Italy
Map B - General Situation, Fifth Army
Map c - 361st Infantry Situation - 10 OCtober 1944
Map D - 361st Infantry Situation -11 OCtober 1944
Map E - 361st Infantry Situation - 12 October 1944
Map F - 361st Infantry Situation - 13 october 1944

1
 BIBLIOGRAPHY

A-1 Fifth ~ History Volume VII

U S Ar.my, Fifth ~
(TIS Library}
A-2 Operations in Sicily and Italy (July 1943 to May 1945}
Department of Military Art and Engineering US Military
Academy, West Point, 1945
(TIS Library}
A-3 ~ad to Rome U S Army Fifth Army
(Personal possession of author}
A-4 The 9lst Infantry Division in World War II
By Major Robert A. Robbins
(TIS Library}

Note: There are very few times when references are

made to any written history as it is my belief that the action
of the 36lst Infantry during the period 10-13 October 1944 is
incorrectly reported. The action as reported in this monograph
is from personal observation and by talking with Captain c.
Sigman of Company K, Captain Christ Hald of Company I, S/Sgt.
J. Walrave~ and S/Sgt. C. Palmer of Hq Co, 36lst Infantry.

2
 THE OPERATIONS OF THE 36lST INFANTRY (9lST INFANTRY
DIVISION) AT LIVERGNAND, ITALY, 10-13 OCTOBER 1944
(NORTH APENNINES CAMPAIGN)
(Personal Experience or a Company Commander)
INTRODUCTION

This monograph is the operation or the 36lst Inrantry,

)
9lst U. S. Division, at Livergnano, Italy, 10-13 October,
J
1944, during the North jppennines Campaign.
In order that the reader can better orient himself, it

is well to remember some of the major events which preceeded

this action.
/
The American Fifth and British Eigth Ar.mies had success-
fUlly landed in Italy during the fall of 1943: (1) had
taught their way north against heavy resistance to capture
v.--<.'',£.-
the city of Naples on 1 October: (2) then,to be held for months
of bitter winter fighting south of Cassino. (3) It was dur-
ing this winter campaign that the Fifth Anriy tried to alleviate
the stalemate by landing at Anzio on 22 January 1944 (4) only
to be held by strong German positions until ll May when the
new offensive operation began. (5) Not until 25 May did the
forces of the Fifth Armies join near the town of Borgo Grappa.
{6) Again the Fifth Army as a single unit feught its way
north against a fanatic enemy to liberate the first capitol
of an Axis dominated country when Rome was freed by American
troops on 4 June 1944. (7) (See Map "A0 )
From Rome, north to the Arno River, which was reached by
elements of the 1st Armored Regiment and riflemen from the
36lst Infantry on 16 July, (8) the American Fifth Army fought

(1) A-3, P• 1; {2) A-2, p. 44; {3) A-3, P• 25; {4) A-3,
p. 27; (5) A-3, p. 37; {6) A-3, p. 45; (7) A-3, P• 49;
(8) A-4, P• 70.
3
against a strong German delaying action. But to the north of
the Arno lay the towering Apennines and the Gothic Line. As

is stated in the Fifth Army History "until the Allied troops

could break through the Gothic Line and reach the Po Valley,
the German position in Italy was as strong as any previous
time in the Italian Sampaign." In September the Gothic Line

was breached by both the Fifth and Eighth Armies. (9) In

the Fifth Army sector the 9lst Division had pierced the strong-
est defenses by the capture of Futa Pass on 22 September.
(10) Futa Pass was the key position on the vital supply line
from Florence to the north. The taking of Futa Pass and the
Gothic Line had been costly for the 9lst Division who had
lost 1,247 of its fighting strength in a period 13-18 Septem-
ber inclusive. (11) From 22 September until 5 October In-
fantrymen of the Fifth Army moved from one mountain ridge to
the next in what seemed to be an endless succession of forti-
fied positions manned by some of the strongest of Hitlers
forces. (12) (See Map ";s")
From 5-9 October only short advances were made. (13)
Each mile being paid for in loss of the fighting strength of
the Division. Not only the enemy, but rain, fog, cold
weather and the endless sea of mountains were slowing the In-
fantryman in their attempt to reach the Po Valley.
THE GENERAL SITUATION 10 OCTOBER 1944
The main thrust of the Fifth Army in its effort to get
out of the mountains and into the Po Valley before the heavy

(9) A-1, P• 108; (10) A-1, P• 68; (11) A-1, P• 87;

(12) A-2, P• 122; (13) A-2, p. 122.

4
winter set in would fall to the II Corps. (14)
In front of the II Corps was the strongest natural de-

fensive line yet encountered. (15) Fram west to east: the

34th Division was facing the _Mont_erumici hill mass, the 9lst
Division would have to cross the e~scarpments at Livergnano.
In the 85th Division zone was bald topped Mount delle Formiche,
and the Monterenzio hill mass. On the Corps right flank the
88th Division was facing MoUI1_t__iieUe-Tombe and the ~e~-~~-l'id~_e.

(16) Each of these mountains and ridges was fortified and

manned by the best troops that the Germans could muster.
Mount delle Formecci was held by elements of the 267th Grena-
dier Regiment, 956th Grenadier Regiment and the 362nd Fuselur
and Anti-tank Sattalions. Elements of the 1060th Regiment
were in reserve. Facing the 88th Division were elements of
the 98th Grenadier Division, elements of the 44th Grenadier
Division, and part of the 362nd Grenadier Division. The 34th
Division was confronted with elements of the 16th SS Panzer
Grenadier Division and the 4th Paratroop Division. Only 1n
the 9lst Division zone was there an enemy order of battle
organized into a single command of comparitively fresh troops.
The 9lst Division was confronted with the 65th Grenadier Divi-
sion reinforced with the lOth ParachUte Regiment and .n un-
known amount of armor. (17) The plan, or third phase of the
APPeriine Gempaign, was to have the 85th Division make the main
effort. (18) The 9lst Division was to assist in the capture
of Mount delle Formeche and the 88th Division to clear the

(14) A-2, p~ 123; (15) A-2, P• 131; {16) A-2, p. 131;

(17) A-2, p. 132-139; (18) A-2, P• 123.

5
Santerno Valley. The veteran 34th Division was to maintain
constant pressure aruiprovide rlank protection. to the west of
~
Highway 65. Two regiments of the 34th Division were to move
to the east of the 9lst Division to relieve elements of the
85th Division. In accordance with this plan the artillery
of the II Corps had thrown the greater part of its strength
behind the 85th and 88th Division. (19)

91ST DIVISION SITUATION

During the night 9 - 10 OCtober the 9lst Division had:

the 363d Infantry committed on the right flank of the divi-
sion sector with the objectives ~as~-~ries~~· Hill 37? and
Hill 3~7, and to aid in the advance of the 85th Division. (20)
The 362d Infantry was continuing its advance towards
Villanova, Hill 518 and.Le Fosse. (21)
The 36lst Infantry had reached the escarpments and one
company had entered the town of Livergnano. (22)

36lST REGIMENT SITUATION

(See Map "c")

The situation of the 36lst Infantry Regiment on the

morning of 10 october was rar from being sound from a tactical
view point. The regiment was far in advance ot ~its on
i_tLl.9.!:Land right. Mount dell1 Formeche
.. ' in the 85th Divi-
___:.:_~=-=--·-

sion sector was still controlled by the Germans. It offered

excellent observation for the placing or enemy rire, not
only on the 36lst Regiment's front but its flanks and rear
as well.

(19) A-2, P• 123;

-----
On the left Mt. Adone afforded the Germans ex-

(20) A-4, p. 164; (21) A-4, P• 156;

(22) A-4, p.l57.

6
cellent observation for placing artillery and self propelled
fire into the regtment•s supply line and its routes of
col!llm.Ulication.
Nature had also played its part on helping the enemy.
First, the rains had made the country side a sea of mud and
tiny streams. The fog which had shrouded the country tor
the last few days had allowed the regiment to manaaver up
and onto the escarpments, but had also aided the enemy to
withdraw his outpost and consolidate his positions without
the observation of our liaison planes. The 36lst Infantry
knew they must advance across the escarpments and did so
under the cover of the fog. What the 36lst Infantry did
not know was where the enemy positions and strong points
were. The Germans had fortified all likely avenues of ap-
proach an4under the cover of the fog the 36lst Infantry had
moved into those strongly defended areas. (23)
It is hard to picture the movement of the 36lst Infantry
as a regiment, instead it is best to remember that through
the rugged terrain each company had manaavered individually
under the cover of the fog. When the fog lifted:
A Company was consolidating its position on Hill 409.
Casualties had been moderate in the enlisted ranks but heavy
among the commissioned personnel.
B Company had flushed the enemy from Prato di Magnano
and had supposedly moved into position just south of Liver-
gnano.
C Company after a brief fire fight near Le Trece had

(23) Personal knowledge.

manuevered into position southwest of Livergnano.
E, F and G Companies through excellent command by both
the 2P. Battalion Commander and the company coi!Jilanders had
/,~ '\ Jd''
kept its tactical unity and had foughto1ts way to the top
of the escarpments only to find that once on the top they
were completely surrounded by the enemy. (24)
'7
I Company who had been so successful 1n moving ·troops
to the vicinity of La For.tuna earlier was to remain in posi-
tion and protect the rear and left flank of the regiment.
K Company was in Livergnano. The company had enftered
the town under cover of the fog only to be met with heavy
machine gun and SP fire. Captain Sigman, K Company Command-
er, had entered this town with his lead troops and had found
sui table shelter in a large stone house from which he could 1

control the movement of his company. Captain Anderson, Com-/ 1

mander of B Company. had entered the town with Captain Sig- ,

man in order to better engage his troops as they entered town.
The lst Battalion Commander had (according to Captain Sigman)
informed h1m he would move B Company up Highway 65 until it
reached the first group of buildings on the south slope of
Livergnano, at which time Captain Anderson was to take tact-/ . Q.
u..v-
ical co-ft•d.'
"""""'" in collaboration with the K Comp,.nv
......., Commander · / II·,
in the securing of Livergnano. (25)
L Company had entered Cant via the high ground to the
rear of the town. The company had been heavily counterattack-
ed from the exposed flank to the west and had lost, through
casualties or capture, at least half of its strength. After

(24) Personal knowledge; (25) Statement of Capt. Sigman;

Personal knowledge.

8
successfUlly beating ott the counterattack the remainder
of the company had fOught its way forward until one pla-
toon had reached Predosa. (26)

10 OCTOBER 1944

Thus on 10 October 1944 as the fog lifted over the valley

and the escarpments, Colonel R. w. Broedlow, CQMmander of the
36lst Infantry, was ordered to press the attack with every-
thing he had under his command. (27)
/ ' Colonel Broedlow
From a vantage point at La Geardia
was able to see across the valley, along the edge of the
escarpment and~·.1nto the edge of Livergnano. He had com-
munie ations with all battalion eQMmanders and through radio
he could contact the greater part of his companies. Had it
not been for the quick thinking and accurate and timely
ordering of movement by the regimental commander the loss
of the regiment would have been certain.
K Company was under constant mortar and tank fire.
The troops were hungry and tired, the platoon leaders were
.;.e_
inexpressieBed. All were looking to Captain Sigman for
moral support, but Captain Sigman was even more tired than
they. Two nights previous while in Barborola the surgeon
·had talked to h1m and had recommended that he take a rest,
as months of battle were playing havoc with his nerves,
but Captain Sigman had requested he be allowed to remain
with his company until this phase of the battle was over.
All of K Company, except for ten men, had entered the same
house and Captain Sigman had eighty men looking to h1m for

(26) Personal knowledge; (27) Personal knowledge; State-

ment of Colonel Broedlow.

9
the leadership he was too tired to give. Captain Sigman
and Captain Anderson were still waiting for B Company to
move into town, when, at 1000 hours the Germans started
shelling the house with fire from two tanks and a battery
of 120 mm mortars. Little by little the house began to
crumble and fall until there were few men ramaining alive.
Captain Sigman having received no assistance from B Company
changed his radio channel to the regiment net and requested
assiatance from the regimental commander. This was the
first Colonel Broedlow knew of the plight of K Company. He
immediately ordered the lst Battalion Commander to move B
Company into support of K Company and at the same time re-
quested and received artillery support from one battalion
of 105,..-and one battalion of 155..,.~witzers. His plan was to
seal the north sector of town with a ring of artillery fire
and move another company of Infantry into town. But the
1st Battalion Commander had moved B Company to the foot of
Hill 603 and was unable to disengage them from the fight.
All other troops were either in fire fights or too far away
to assist. Then Colonel Broedlow hear.d Captain Sigman say,
"Here they come, if help doesn•t get here soon we will either
have to surrender or all be killed". Suddenly the firing in
Livergnano ceased and Colonel Broedlow knew he was left with-
out a K Company.
In the meantime the 2d Battalion on the escarpments was

withstanding constant mortar and artillery fire. The casualty

problem was holding first priority and ammunition was running
low. Colonel Broedlow, seeing that advance by the 2d Battalion
was impossible, and that relief by the 363d Infantry was in

10
 ': l' -,
l \_
\
/,-\~
''
progress, directed the companies on the escarpments to
hold their positions with F Company turning to the rear
and reopening the route of supply and evacuation. The
move was successfUl with E and G Companies holding a so
called front line and F Company protecting the rear. Even
with the supply line open it took from 12 to 17 hours for
the evacuation of the wounded to the battalion aid station.
Colonel Broedlowrs orders were fast, but the movement
of the troops was slow. Rugged terrain with enemy artillery
_and mortar )ire made it almost impossible to move more than

a few men at a time.

His orders to his companies were short and positive.
The company commanders man-..vered by his guidance:
A Company was moved from Hill 409 until it reached I
Company which was to stay at La Fortuna and protect the
flank and front until such time as other troops could reach
positions so that a second attempt could be made in breach-
ing the German defenses at Livergnano.
B Company was to manuevar into a position at the base
of Hill 603.
C Company was to consolidate its positions for an at-
tack to the north and wast to clear the enemy from ~olinetto.

L Company which had fought its way to Predosa was to

move north along the west side or_ Highway 65.
•
r·.. • • lt'
\"'\J_II. . .
At one time the company was held to position for 70
minutes under a constant barrage of mortar fire, only to
move forward into a mine field. By midnight of the lOth
L Company r s fighting strength had bean reduced •to twenty-

11
eight men. (28)
During the late hours of the lOth the new K Company was
being fo~ed in the Service Company area.
Prom midnight 10 october until the early hours of the
11th the action in the regimental zone was limited to re-
supply, evacuation of the wounded and getting replacements
to the rifle companies. Colonel Broedlow knew that the task
before him was not an easy one. Battle casualties within
the regiment were moderate, but replacements were slow in
coming and all companies were greatly understrength. NonJ
battle casualties had been fairly high as many men had fallen
from the escarpments in an attempt to reach safer positions.
Morale was low and competent leaders within some of the
companies were nil. A Company had lost all but one officer
and there were no qualified N.C.O.'s to do the missions
which were to befall this company. Colonel Broedlow re-
cognized this situation and immediately screened the Regi-
mental Headquarters Company for officers and N.C.O.'s. To
A Company he sent a Captain and two Staff Sergeants. In

the action that was to follow one of these Staff Sergeants

actually col!llllanded A Company and was able to lead it out of
a trap. The other , Staff Sergeant John Whalraven, w1 th his
commanding officer, withstood one assault by the enemy and
allowed the company to withdraw to a safer position.
The plans made during the night were as follows:
Move Company A, 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion into
hull de.f~lade position to the rear of La Guardia so that

(28) Personal knowledge.

12
direct fire could be placed into the caves on Hill 603. A$

it was estimated that Hill 603 was the key to the control of
Livergnano.
A Company would be given the responsibility of divert-
ing the enemy by attacking Hill 554.
B Company was assigned the mission of assaulting and
occupying Hill 603.
C Company would continue the attack to the north and
west and secure Hill 433 until such time as the 3d Battalion
could be regrouped to take over that sector.
The 2d Battalion on the escarpments would continue the
attack against Hill 592 and Hill 504.
The 3d Battalion would move into position to prepare to
attack to the west and north to secure the left flank of the
regiment.

11 OCTOBER 1944
(See Map 0 D 0 )

In the 2d Battalion zone on the escarpments the situ-

ation had become grave. Companies E and G were being held
undft" constant artillery and mortar fire coming from the
east. (It was at this time that General Clark ordered the
9lst Division Commanders to commit the complete 363d Infan-
try in the 2d Battalion, 361st Infantry sector.) The 2d
Battalion was unable to move.
At 0735 hours 11 October B Company attempted to ad-
vance one platoon against Hill 603 and send one platoon
into the eastern "gde of Livergnano. Both platoons were
driven back under heavy mortar and small arms fire. It was

13
later estimated that these two platoons had received the
fires from a platoon of mortars, artillery fire from three
tanks and rifle and machine gun fire from one reinforced
rifle company.
Companies A and C had been unable to move during the
daylight hours due to the direct tank and artillery fire
coming from the Mt. Adone and Hill 554. At approximately
1400 hours Colonel Broedlow ordered the 1st Battalion Com-
mander to hold both companies in position and attempt a
night attack to seize Hill 554 and cut Highway 65 north of'
Livergnano.
The 3d Battalion was somewhat successful in regrouping
and by nightfall had started the movement into the left
flank sector.
The greater part of 11 October was spent in regrouping
and feeling out the enemy positions.
Highlights of the day were not all within the regimental
zone but many things which would play a leading role in the
fighting during the days to come had occurred; they were:
1. On the right, the 85th Division had reached the
crest of Mt. delle Formeche.
2. General Clark had ordered the commitment of the
363d Infantry to relieve the 2d Battalion of the
36lst Infantry.
3. The Commanding General of the 9lst Division had
requested and received priority for air missions
over the 36lst Infantry Regiment's sector.
4. Companies A and B or the 804th Tank Destroyer Bat-
talion were in position to give direct fire support

14
 to the front.
5. Word had reached the troops of the 36lst that
elements of the 34th Division would be on both
flanks of the present regimental zone. This was
good for the morale of the men in the 36lst, as
many of the old timers knew that General Bolte
would do everything possible to keep the flanks
closed up. (Actually the left sector or 362d
Infantry was relieved by the 135th lnfantry, 34th
Division at 2400 hours 12 October, but the 85th
Division was not relieved until 15 October.)
At midnight, Companies A and C started their attack.
Both companies used every means of concealment and with the
complete darkness of the night were able to move forward in
a column of platoons.
C Company was very successful and moved one platoon
into Molinetto and the remainder of the company onto Hill
433, just to the east. Opposition was light and few casu-
alties were sustained. By 0800 hours 12 October, C Company
had consolidated its position and was ready to continue the
attack.
The attack of A Company was somewhat different. Al-
t
though the history book~ do not record this; A Company re-
fused to move because of lack of reinforcements. It was
Captain Mohler and Staff Sergeant Walraven who led the
company forward. Both were armed with BAR's and both were
ready to take Hill 554 by themselves if necessary. A Com-
\ ' \'

pany, all fo~ty od~, followed close behind, but there was

15
little fight in A Company and the flank patrols were soon
back with the main body of the company. Little is known of
just what happened but it is believed that Captain Mohler
and Staff Sargeant Walraven reached the crest of Hill 554
only to find that the company had been caught between a
murderous cross fire tram machine guns and under a heavy
concentration of mortar fire. Captain Mohler was wounded
and later that morning killed. Staff Sergeant Walraven was
attacked by a German platoon, but by using the rapid fire of
two BAR's was successful in causing the enemy to pause long
enough for him to pick up the commanding officer and try to
carry him back to the company area. It was while this was
taking place that A Company started to break under the strain.
The quick thinking of Staff Sergeant Palmer, who had joined
from Regimental Headquarters Company, was all that held the
company together. He issued orders and the men obeyed him.
A Company was saved, but they had failed to take Hill 554.
Colonel Broedlow ordered the 2d Platoon of C Company at Hill
433 to take over A Company's mission. C Company fought
bravely and reached the crest of the hill only to be beaten
ott by direct fire from two 88 SP guns. (29)

12 OCTOBER 1944
(See Map "E")

In the early morning B Company had launched an attack

against Hill 603. Attack formations were hard to visualize,
rather it was a mission of aquads climbing a cliff against

(29) Personal knowledge; Statement of S/Sgt c. Palmer.

16
 grenades and small arms fire. Colonel Broedlow knew that
Hill 603 was the key to Li vergnano and knew the B Company's
mission was to be strenuous. He ordered that all possible
support be afforded them. Company A# 804th T~ Destroyer
Battalion fired 300 rounds into the caves on the hill. Air
strikes were made by fighter bombers# some landing within 350
yards of the fighting troops. (30) The supporting artillery
fired approximately a,ooo rounds# all landing within the
Livergnano area. Company B started up the hill while the
first shock of the fires were being felt by the enemy. Hill
603 became a picture of fire -- the men of Company B were
pitted against the escarpment and that fire.·\,\ f\,.,, :I

Squad leaders led their men from the foot of the hill
and started to crawl up the escarpment. Slowl:t the men
moved up against the enemy before them, only to find that
they were moving into the striking zone of the machine gun
fire from Hill 481. Colonel Broedlow shifted the fires of
-c the Tank Destroyer Battalion from Hill 603 to Hill 481, the
machine guns were silenced but the enemy took advantage of
the shift in fires and met Dompany B with grenades and rifle
fire. Men fell, some from the enemy fire and even more from
the lack of footing on the escarpment. Hill 603 became a
battle of squad and platoon sergeants trying to maneuver
their men into position from which they could assault the
caves. At last came the fire from the Tank Destroyers again,
and the enemy was unable to stay at the mouths of the caves.
Company B moved in and the Germans were willing to give up.
l.
~ After the caves, the escarpment flattens out into a small
(30) Personal knowledge.
ledge then starts up again. Across this :f'lat the squad
I
leaders must move the men. The enemy hadplaced heavy mor-
tar and bands of machine gun fire on this ledge and even
though it was just a few feet of flat ground it took al-
most super human effort to get the men to cross. Once
again it was the squad leaders who encouraged the men, by
crossing first and then signaling the men one by one to
follow. (31)
By night fall, although they had not reached the crest
of the hill, Company B was in a good position for the attack
at daylight of the 13th. During the night 12 - 13 October
Company B was counterattacked by the enemy who used flame
.. ; '

throwers and grenades. ·1" ·,..' \~cd '.

l·l
The day of the 12th found little change in the position
of the 2d Battalion as no gains were made. One platoon of
Company F, reinforced by a platoon of Company .. had attempted
to move against Hill 592 but were forced to withdraw after
receiving heavy casualties. (The platoon fromH Company,
which was a machine gun platoon, was cut off from the rifle
platoon of F Company and was overrun before they could get
their machine guns into action. It is well to note tl:at the
men of the Heavy Weapons Company had, almost to. the last man,
replaced their rifles and carbines with pistols. (32)
The 3d Battalion had spent the full day of 12 October
in an attempt to maneuver into a position from which it could
launch an attack to the known enemy positions to the north

(31) (32) Personal knowledge.

18
and west. The use of the word maneuver is in the broadest
sense of the word, as it was a maneuver through mine fields
and under heavy concentrations of enemy mortar and artillery
fire.
13 OCTOBER 1944
(See Map 11 F 11 )

During the night of 12 - 13 October, Companies A and C

changed missions. Company A would again attack Hill 554 and
Company C was told to hold the position at the foot of the
hill and protect the flanks until such time as the 3d Bat-
. I \ .,, .
/, .. "

talion was able to move into its newly assigned sect!Jr. It

was a busy night for the supply and medical men of the regi-
ment. Casualties were evacuated fram every sector of the
battlefield, men who carried supplies forward carried the
wounded to the rear. (The men used to supply and evacuate
the forward areas came from Service and Anti-Tank Companies
as well as the Regimental and Battalion Headquarters Companies.~

(33)
At daybreak of 13 October Company A made its assault
on Hill 554 and almost reached the crest of the hill before
it was thrown back by heavy mortar fire and the direct fire
from two German tanks which had been hidden in the church
at the top of the hill.
Company B launched its attack at dawn, and again it
was the small unit leaders who directed the action. In a

series of short assaults, through machine gun fire and

against a well entrenched enemy the company moved forward

(33) Personal knowledge.

19
until it reached the top or the hill at 1200 hours. It
was the action or such men as Platoon Sergeant John Sump-
ter rrom Bakersfield, Calirornia who deserve the credit
for taking Hill 603, he was the first man to reach the top
of the hill and had actually led his men all the way.
In the 2d Battalion zone things were also brighter, as
the attack of the 363d Inrantry had cleared the enemy from
much of the high ground on the escarpmert s. E and G Compan-
'1
ies were able to move into Casola by using the old-Infantry
tactics of one company laying a base of fire while the others
maneuvered. In the case of Casola, E Company did the firing
while G Company moved against the strong points. So fast was
the maneuver that 57 enlisted men and one German officer were
taken prisoner. This was almost the combined strength or
E and G Companies at that time. Company F had used !ndian
tactics in maneuvering mnto Hill 592 and with a quick co-
ordinated attack was able to capture the hill. By mid after-
noon the 2d Battalion had reorganized and was moving to the
west to cut Highway 65.
In the Third Battalion sector, I and L Companies had
assaulted the strong points of Lagla and Hill 345 with great
success. Company K was held in regimental reserve near the
rear elements of I Company so that the men could get somewhat
adjusted to the life of a combat soldier.
By nightfall 13 october, Hill 603 was controlled by B
Company. The escarpments had been breached by the 2d Battalion
and the Germans were in danger of being cut off from the rear.
------
The Third Battalion had secured and anchored on the left flank.

20
Only Company A had failed to reach its objective, but dur-
ing the night of the 13th the enemy on Hill 554 and in Liver-
gnano fired their last round at the 36lst Infantry and pulled
out. The next day, 14 OCtober, the new K Company entered
Livergnano, and as Jack Bell, Associated Press writer wrote,
"they went into a city battered by American big guns, dive
bombers and after we got there, by German artillery. They
carried out the GenersJ.•s order to take Livergnano •at sJ.l
cost•".
ANALYSIS AND CRITICISM

To make a fair analysis of this operation it is well to

remember the mission of the Armies in Italy. Although it
has been said that Italy was only a diversionary campaign
the orders still read "defeat the enemy." such was the or-
der of the 36lst Infantry Regiment in its fight across the
escarpments at Livergnano.
The fight for Livergnano was centered on the taking of
the high ground that dominated the village and its roads to
the north and south. To do this Colonel Broedlow had few
alternatives, as the terrain greatly limited any movement
of men within the area near the village itself. For some
2 1 500 yards to the east of Livergnano the escarpment could
be sealed in only three or four places and then the men
would have to move up in single file. To the west of Liver-
gnano the escarpments turned to the north and to flank the
escarpment the troops would have had to move into the valley
of the Rino River and directly under the fires from Mount
Adona. Only at Livergnano was there a pass through the

21
escarpments and this was heavily armed.
The first criticism is that the 36lst Infantry was given
the mission that belonged to two regiments rather than one
combat team. If the early planning of the third phase had
shown that the 36lst Inf'antry was to be committed alone again-
st these escarpments the regiment should have been allowed
to have had a period of' rest and been reinf'orced, or at least
been brought up to f'ighting strength. As it was committed
f'ive days earlier in a place where resistance was strong and
the terrain was against them, the regiment was f'ar below its
peak of' ability when it reached the escarpments.
The 85th Division was slow in taking Mount della Pormeche
and it was two days bef'ore the right flank of' the 36lst In-
f'antry was f'ree from fire on its f'lsnk and rear. It is hard
to realize why Fifth Army Staff should have made its main ef-
f'ort in the sector to the right of' Highway 65, and even hard-
er to realize why the 85th Division, instead of the 34th or
88th Divisions were not committed in that sector. The right
f'lank of' the 36lst Inf'antry was always in danger until such
time as the 34th Inf'antry Division had replaced the 85th In-
fantry Division. On the left the 362d Inf'antry knowing it
was to be pinched out by the 36lst Infantry had failed to
press the attack •. Hence the 36lst Infantry was with both
flanks subject to enemy f'ire.
Within the regimental zone the weather and terrain
had forced the regimental commander to decentralize his
command. Most companies were actually fighting for object-
ives which were in no way in contact with another company.

22
Colllpany I, who according to history so gallantly cut H1gh-
we;y 65 at La Fortuna, had lost contact with B and C Colllpanies
who were within yards of them. What history does not tell
is that Company I did cut the highway only to remain very
quiet while the enemy passed through them. History says
that Company I forced the withdrawal of 300 soldiers and six
Tiger tanks. Had Company I kept contact with C and B Com-
panies it is believed that they might have challenged the
withdrawal and fewer troops and less armor would have been
present to defend Livergnano the next day.
There is no end of credit due the 2d Battalion, 36lst
Infantry in its gallant fight on the escarpments to the east
of Livergnsno. At no time did they ever fall back and even
when completely surrounded by the enemy the troops responded
to a cozmnand to open an avenue of evacuation and supply.
The writer is in no position to know why the 363d Infantry
was so slow in reaching the escarpments, but does know it
was not until General Clark ordered the relief of the 2d
Battalion, 36lst Infantry, that the attack of the 363d Infan-
try was pressed with any vigor. Had the relief been made on
the lOth of October when it was ordered to the battle of
Livergnano would not have been so costly.
The loss of Company K in Livergnano on 10 October was
due to two things. First, Captain Sigman should never have
been allowed to resume command of his company after he had
been challenged by the surgeon. He was neither physically
or mentall~capable of standing another day of hard combat.
Second and mainly, the commander of 1st Battalion failed to
carry out his initial plan and changed the objective of B

23
 Company without informing anyone of his action.
The success of the battle is greatly due to the timely
shifting of supporting fires and the first hand issuance of
orders by the regimental commander. The assault on Hill 603
though connnanded by individual squad leaders was under the '/
personal direction of the regimental connnander at' all times/
The success of the 36lst Infantry in driving the.Ger-
mans from Livergnano and the escarpments was of little tac- -
tical value to the Fifth Army,as the key to the Po Valley
lay not in Livergnano, but the towering height of Mount Adone.
In connnitting the 65th Grenadier Division against the
36lst Infantry, the Germans had used their last full strength
division in Italy and was forced to withdraw the 29th Panzer
Grenadier Division from the 8th Army sector in order to halt
the drive along Highway 65 into the Po Valley.

LESSONS

Those lessons that were emphasized during the operation

are:
'7
, ,., .:-· 1. Tactical unity of command in battalions i'f most
b.~- ··. ;~·~- . .-..
\v
\\~~-- ~-\'im
' ~
\;
~<--'~ \~'··-...:__ por an •
_'- . . ···J·
t t Only in the 2d Battalion did the battalion com-
·.\.-' ~,;, mander have a force w1 th which he could maneuver his troops.
Armored support, even in mo~tainous ~err ain
7 _i__s of .
2. 1 ..
vrt.,._~ i• hr\,o.,IO.." lt,U. ~- (W...r•-'~. ~ '• '· l ' .. -· Mcc I.JAA''- 1.
great value when properly usedJ Without the direct fire of

,_ .
the 804th Tank Destroyer Battalion it woUld have been al-
most impossible for B Company to have taken Hill 603.
3. Battle weary commanders should be replaced before
~

they became a liability. K Company under proper command

might have withstood the first assault on their position

24
 had its commander thought faster and moved the bulk of his
men from one building.

1,,.·,. 4. The use of fire by one company onto a position

...
While another company maneuvers against that position's
flank is still the quickest and cheapest way to gain an
objective.
'.

! .. 5. Small unit commands closely coordinated into a

. t'
' I\ -
single objective is most likely to succeed if properly
~)
executed.
6. Commanding officers should always keep their sub-
'~ ordinates, as well as their superiors informed as to their
!U

plans and changes of plans. (The writer believes that the

failure of the 1st Battalion Co111111ander to carry out his
original plan to move B Company into Livergnano behind K
Company not only abetted in the loss of K Company but also
lost the initial surprise of the attack.)
?• A good communication system is all important where
(:
companies are fighting for a single objective.
a. The men armed with rifles or carbines should not
be allowed to replace those weapons with pistols. The pistol
may be a good personal protective weapon, but is practically
useless against an infantry attack.
9. Air strikes are of great value in close support of
attacking infantry and if properly guided, they can neutral-
ize close support weapons of the enemy.

25