PEREZ, LINDA MERCEDES A.

TORTS AND DAMAGES

I. The doctrine of last clear chance provides that where both parties are negligent but
the negligent act of one is appreciably later in point of time than that of the other, or where it
is impossible to determine whose fault or negligence brought about the occurrence of the
incident, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the impending harm but failed
to do so, is chargeable with the consequences arising therefrom.

II. PICART V. SMITH

FACTS: 
On the Carlatan Bridge in La Union. Picart was riding on his pony over said bridge. Before
he had gotten half way across, Smith approached from the opposite direction in an
automobile. As the defendant neared the bridge he saw a horseman on it and blew his horn
to give warning of his approach. He continued his course and after he had taken the bridge
he gave two more successive blasts, as it appeared to him that the man on horseback before
him was not observing the rule of the road.

Picart saw the automobile coming and heard the warning signals. However, being perturbed
by the novelty of the apparition or the rapidity of the approach, he pulled the pony closely
up against the railing on the right side of the bridge instead of going to the left. He says that
the reason he did this was that he thought he did not have sufficient time to get over to the
other side. As the automobile approached, Smith guided it toward his left, that being the
proper side of the road for the machine. In so doing the defendant assumed that the
horseman would move to the other side. Seeing that the pony was apparently quiet, the
defendant, instead of veering to the right while yet some distance away or slowing down,
continued to approach directly toward the horse without diminution of speed. When he had
gotten quite near, there being then no possibility of the horse getting across to the other side,
the defendant quickly turned his car sufficiently to the right to escape hitting the horse; but
in so doing the automobile passed in such close proximity to the animal that it became
frightened and turned its body across the bridge, got hit by the car and the limb was broken.
The horse fell and its rider was thrown off with some violence. As a result of its injuries the
horse died. The plaintiff received contusions which caused temporary unconsciousness and
required medical attention for several days. From a judgment of the CFI of La Union
absolving Smith from liability Picart has appealed.

ISSUE: WON Smith was guilty of negligence such as gives rise to a civil obligation to repair
the damage done.

HELD: 
The test by which to determine the existence of negligence in a particular case may be stated
as follows: Did the defendant in doing the alleged negligent act use that person would have
used in the same situation? If not, then he is guilty of negligence. The existence of negligence
in a given case is not determined by reference to the personal judgment of the actor in the
situation before him. The law considers what would be reckless, blameworthy, or negligent
in the man of ordinary intelligence and prudence and determines liability by that. The
question as to what would constitute the conduct of a prudent man in a given situation must
of course be always determined in the light of human experience and in view of the facts
involved in the particular case.
Applying this test to the conduct of the defendant in the present case we think that
negligence is clearly established. A prudent man, placed in the position of the defendant,
would in our opinion, have recognized that the course which he was pursuing was fraught
with risk, and would therefore have foreseen harm to the horse and the rider as reasonable
PEREZ, LINDA MERCEDES A. TORTS AND DAMAGES

consequence of that course. Under these circumstances the law imposed on the Smith the
duty to guard against the threatened harm.

It goes without saying that the plaintiff himself was not free from fault, for he was guilty of
antecedent negligence in planting himself on the wrong side of the road. But as we have
already stated, Smith was also negligent; and in such case the problem always is to discover
which agent is immediately and directly responsible. It will be noted that the negligent acts
of the two parties were not contemporaneous, since the negligence of the defendant
succeeded the negligence of the plaintiff by an appreciable interval. Under these
circumstances the law is that the person who has the last fair chance to avoid the impending
harm and fails to do so is chargeable with the consequences, without reference to the prior
negligence of the other party.

III. The following cases are instances when moral damages may be rewarded under
Article 2217 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

a. Wounded Feelings
Hurtful remarks can even destroy a person's reputation and it will take time to heal a
wounded soul. This is why some people who have experienced serious anxiety, social
humiliation and fright because of moral damages choose to take matters to court. You will
only be awarded moral damages if such claims are supported by evidence. It is imperative
for the claimant to establish the factual basis for claims to be considered valid.

b. Labor Cases
Moral damages are awarded to compensate an employee for mental distress that has been
caused by the bad faith manner by which they were treated by their employer in relation to
their labor claims. The employee is entitled to moral damages when the employer acted (a)
in bad faith or fraud; (b) in a manner oppressive to labor; or (c)   in a manner contrary to
morals, good customs, or public policy.

c. Social humiliation
A plaintiff who is well-known in the society and has a good reputation may sue the
defendant for damages if the latter commits an act or negligence causing the plaintiff social
humiliation which may be proven in court.

IV. CANGCO V. MANILA RAILROAD CO.

FACTS:
January 20, 1915 around 7 to 8 p.m.: Jose Cangco arose from his seat in the 2nd class-car
where he was riding and, making, his exit through the door, took his position upon the steps
of the coach, seizing the upright guardrail with his right hand for support. As the train
slowed down another passenger and also an employee of the railroad company Emilio
Zuñiga got off the same car alighting safely at the point where the platform begins to rise
from the level of the ground. When the train had proceeded a little farther Cangco stepped
off but 1 or both of his feet came in contact with a sack of watermelons so his feet slipped
from under him and he fell violently on the platform. His body rolled from the platform and
was drawn under the moving car, where his right arm was badly crushed and lacerated. The
car moved forward possibly 6 meters before it came to a full stop. He was bought to the
hospital in the city of Manila where an examination was made and his arm was amputated .
The operation was unsatisfactory so he had second operation at another hospital was
PEREZ, LINDA MERCEDES A. TORTS AND DAMAGES

performed and the member was again amputated higher up near the shoulder expending a
total of P790.25 

ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Railroad Co. should be held liable.

HELD:
YES. The decision of the lower court is reversed, and judgment is hereby rendered plaintiff
for the sum of P3,290.25.

It cannot be doubted that the employees of the railroad company were guilty of negligence.
It necessarily follows that the defendant company is liable for the damage thereby
occasioned unless recovery is barred by the plaintiff's own contributory negligence. In
resolving this problem it is necessary that each of these conceptions of liability, to-wit, the
primary responsibility of the defendant company and the contributory negligence of the
plaintiff should be separately examined. Article 1903 of the Civil Code is not applicable to
obligations arising ex contractu, but only to extra-contractual obligations — or to use the
technical form of expression, that article relates only to culpa aquiliana and not to culpa
contractual

Two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is caused by the negligence of a servant or
employee there instantly arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part
of the master or employer either in selection of the servant or employee, or in supervision
over him after the selection, or both; and (2) that that presumption is juris tantum and
not juris et de jure, and consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and supervision he has
exercised the care and diligence of a good father of a family, the presumption is overcome
and he is relieved from liability.
The test by which to determine whether the passenger has been guilty of negligence in
attempting to alight from a moving railway train, is that of ordinary or reasonable care. It is
to be considered whether an ordinarily prudent person, of the age, sex and condition of the
passenger, would have acted as the passenger acted under the circumstances disclosed by
the evidence. This care has been defined to be, not the care which may or should be used by
the prudent man generally, but the care which a man of ordinary prudence would use under
similar circumstances, to avoid injury.

At the time of the accident, was earning P25 a month as a copyist clerk, and that the injuries
he has suffered have permanently disabled him from continuing that
employment. Defendant has not shown that any other gainful occupation is open to
plaintiff. His expectancy of life, according to the standard mortality tables, is approximately
thirty-three years. We are of the opinion that a fair compensation for the damage suffered by
him for his permanent disability is the sum of P2,500 and that he is also entitled to recover of
defendant the additional sum of P790.25 for medical attention, hospital services, and other
incidental expenditures connected with the treatment of his injuries.

V. ALEKO E. LILIUS, ET AL., vs. THE MANILA RAILROAD COMPANY

FACTS:
Lilius was driving with his wife and daughter for sightseeing in Pagsanjan Laguna. It was
his first time in the area and he was entirely unacquainted with the conditions of the road
and had no knowledge of the existence of a railroad crossing. Before reaching the crossing in
question, there was nothing to indicate its existence and, it was impossible to see an
approaching train. At about seven or eight meters from the crossing the plaintiff saw an
PEREZ, LINDA MERCEDES A. TORTS AND DAMAGES

autotruck parked on the left side of the road. Several people, who seemed to have alighted
from the said truck, were walking on the opposite side. He slowed down and sounded his
horn for the people to get out of the way. With his attention thus occupied, he did not see
the crossing but he heard two short whistles. Immediately afterwards, he saw a huge black
mass fling itself upon him, which turned out to be locomotive No. 713 of the MRC’s train.
The locomotive struck the plaintiff’s car right in the center. The 3 victims were injured and
were hospitalized. Lilus filed a case against MRC in the CFI. Answering the complaint, it
denies each and every allegation thereof and, by way of special defense, alleges that the
Lilius, with the cooperation of his wife and coplaintiff, negligently and recklessly drove his
car, and prays that it be absolved from the complaint. The CFI decided in favor of Lilius. The
2 parties appealed said decision, each assigning error on said judgement.

ISSUE: WON Manila Railroad Company is liable for damages.

HELD:
YES. Upon examination of the oral as well as of the documentary evidence, this court is of
the opinion that the accident was due to negligence on the part of the defendant-appellant
company alone, for not having had on that occasion any semaphore at the crossing to serve
as a warning to passers-by of its existence in order that they might take the necessary
precautions before crossing the railroad; and, on the part of its employees — the flagman
and switchman, for not having remained at his post at the crossing in question to warn
passers-by of the approaching train Although it is probable that the defendant-appellant
entity employed the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting its aforesaid
employees, however, it did not employ such diligence in supervising their work and the
discharge of their duties. The diligence of a good father of a family, which the law requires
in order to avoid damage, is not confined to the careful and prudent selection of
subordinates or employees but includes inspection of their work and supervision of the
discharge of their duties.