EN BANC

G.R. No. 246816 - ANGKLA: ANG PARTIDO NG MGA MARINONG

PILIPINO, INC. (ANGKLA), and SERBIYSO SA BAYAN PARTY
(SBP), petitioners, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (sitting as the
National Board of Canvassers), CHAIRMAN SHERIFF M. ABAS,
! '
COMMISSIONER AL A. PARRENO. COMMISSIONER LUIE TITO
G. GUIA, COMMISSIONER MA. ROWENA AMELIA V. GUANZON,
COMMISSIONER SOCCORRO B. INTING, COMMISSIONER
MARLON S. CASQUEJO, AND COMMISSIONER ANTONIO T.
KHO, JR., respondent.
AKSYON MAGS.A.SAKA - TINIG PARTIDO NG MASA (AKMA-
PTM), petitioner-in-intervention.

Promulgated:
Sept€mber 15, 2020
x------------------------------------------ ------------- --------------------------------x

CONCURRING OPINION

LEONEN,J.:

I concur vvith Associate Justice Amy C. Lazaro Javier's (Justice

Lazaro-Javier) ponencia denying the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
-filed by petitioners Ang Partido ng Marinong Filipino, Inc. (ANGKLA) and
Serbisyo sa Bayan Party (SBP), and sustaining National Board of
Canvassers Resolution No. 004-19, which declared the wim1ing party-list,
groups in the May 13, 2019 elections.

In addition, I invite attention · to prevailing parameters that

operationalize the party-list system. I reiterate a position that I initially
aiticulated · in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Commission on Elections, 1 that this
Court's effort.at ·shaping understanding of how the party-list system should
be operationa.lize(l to carry' out the Constitution's objectives should not be'
limited to calibrating numerical f?nnulation to identify. winners.

The party-list system, as -provided fr.Jr in Article VI, Section 5 of the /

1987 Constitution, 2 is the domestic iteration of proportional representatipn,

707 Phil..454 (20U) [Per J, Carpio, En Banc].

2
CONST., art. VI, sec. 5 provides:
SECT10N 5. ·U) The. House of Repre,cnta'.ives-shall be composed of not more. than tW(' hundred
and fifty member~; unlesil 0therw1se fxed by lav\, who shall be dectcd fh:m1 legislative district~.
apportioned among tbe provincl"s, cities, and t.ht> Ivietropolitan Mani!i:l ar1:·a in accordance with the
number of their re~pective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform and progressive ratio, and those

,I i

I I
 ..• .,
Concurring Opinion 2 G.R. No. 2468 6

an electoral system that has long existed in other jurisdictions and whioh
currently exists in a· multiplicity of jurisdictions. 3
. ' .

Our election of party-list representatives stands out in domestic

elections domin~ted by the "first past the post" 4 system. In a first past tlie
post system, .candidates win or are elected on the basis of a simple pluralify.
. I

"The winning candidate is simply the person who wins the most votes; ~n
theory he or she could be elected with two votes, if every other candidate
only secured a single vote." 5 This applies to our elections for Preside~t,
Vice President, provincial governors and vice governors, city or municipfl
mayors and vice mayors, as well as barangay chairpersons. For these
positions, wtnning candidates are simply candidates who outvote all othfr
candidates. The. same is true for the election of members of the House of
Representatives representing legislative districts. The first past the post :
system similarly governs the election of senators and members of the
sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panglungsod, sangguniang baya1:,
and sangguniang barangay. In these collegial bodies however, multiple
vacancies are simultaneously contested. Therefore, several individuals-~s
many as there are vacancies to be filled-,are simultaneously elected, i.e., tlie
highest ranki,ng candidates corresponding to the number of vacancies.
I
• . I .

Unlike the winning candidates for other elective public position~,

members of the House of Representatives under the party-list system ate I I
I
I
elected through a system of proportional representation. In proportion~! I !

representation, seats are allocated in accordance with the proportion of ttle

electorate that supports a political party, organization, or coalition. Winniri~ I.

an election, therefore, does not hinge on outranking competing candidates,

but on securing proportional thresholds instead.
;_' .

As the unique, domestic iteration of a conceptual electoral mechanism

shared with many jurisdictions,. the Philippine party-list system is created By
Article _YI_, ?~ction 5 _ofthe_ 1~87 Consti~utio1:1 . --~~e__ ~ame provis~o~-i, w~ll ~s :\':
! .

as Article YI~ Section 6, · spell out the party-list· system's basic arid
immutable parameters: \
who, as provided by law, shall be elected through a party-list system of registered national, regional, .!
and sectoral parties or organizations. I
I ,

I
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total munber of I .
representatives incl'uding those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification br
this Constitution,. one-half o~ the seats allocated to party-list represen~at~~es shall be filled, as pro~i~fd
by law, by select10n or election from the labor, pt!asant, urban poor, rnmgenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and siich other sectors ar. n ,a:y be provided by law, except the religious sector. ·j
. (3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as pr~cticable, cqntiguous, compact and adjacdnt
territory. Each city with a 'population. of at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shll 11
have at least.one representative. . · · . . .
(4) Within three _years follovving the return of every census, the Conf;Tess shall make a
reapportionment of legislative districts based on the standards provided in this section. ·
See Electoral Systems, THE ELECTORAL KNO'NLEDGE NETWORK, <http://aceproject.org/epl·c-
en/CDTable?question=ES005&view=country&set_1anguage=en> (last accessed on September. I. 5,
2020). . · · · .
4
See Electoral Systems, ·. THE ELE.CTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, <http://aceproject.org/a e-
en/topics/esiesd/esd0l/esd01 a/default> (last accessed on September 15, 2020). I
Id.
 I •

Concurring Opinion G.R. No. 246816

SECTION 5. (1) The H<;mse of Representative~ shal~ be composed

i: , of not more than two hundred and 1fty members, unless otherwise ,fixed
I':
I I
I I by law, who shall be :elected from l gislative districts apportioned among
I, I
i': the provinces, cities,. and the Metropolitan Manila area in accordance with
the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis of a uniform
and progressive ratio, and those who, as provided by law, shall be elected
through a party-list system of registered national, regional, and sectoral
i I
parties or organizations.
,!.1
I
! : (2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per
centum of the total number of representatives including those under the
party list. For three consecutive terms after the ratification of this
Constitution,. one-ha([ of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be filled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and
such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector.

(3) Each legislative district shall comprise, as far as practicable,

contiguous, compact and adjacent territory. Each city with a population of
at least two hundred fifty thousand, or each province, shall have at least
one representative.

(4) Within three years following the return of every census, the
Congress shall make a reapportionment of legislative districts based on the
standards provided in this section.

SECTION 6. No person shall be a Member of the House of

Representatives unless he is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines and,
on the day of the election, is at least twenty-five years of age, able to read
and write, and, except the party-list representatives, a registered voter in
the district in which he shall be elected, and a resident thereof for a period
of not less than one year immediately preceding the day of the election.
(Emphasis supplied)

\
Thus, the party-list system is open to "registered national, regional,
and sectoral parties or organizations." Further, party-~ist representatives
shall "constitute twenty per centum of the tot_al number of representatives
including those under the party list:" A transitory mam1er of filling party-list
seats "[f]or three. consecutive terms after the ratification of th[e]
Constitution" is also provided. Likewise, a party-list representative must be
"a natural-bon1 citizen of the Philippines and, on the day of the election, is at ,
least twenty-five years of age, [and] able to read and write." Apart from
:
these, Article VI, Section 5 stipulates that election to the party•-list system
I , shall be "provided by law."
i I

I
I
It is in keeping with Articl~ Vl, Section 5 's ~njunction that Republic /
Act No. 7941 or tl!e Party~List System Act, was passed in 1995.
Concurring Opip.ion . 4 G.R. No. 246816

Section 10 of the Party-List System Act provides for the manner 1f

voting party-list representatives. Sections 11 and 12 concern the allocatio
of party-list seats:

SECTION 10. Manner of Voting. - Every voter shall be entitled to two

(2) votes: the first is a vote for candidate for member of the House of
Representati~es in his legislative district, and the second, a vote for the
party, organization, or coalition he wants represented in the house of
Representatives: Provided, That a vote cast for a party, sectoral
organization, or coalition not entitled to be voted for shall not be counted:
Provided, finally, That the first election under the party-list system shall
be held in May 1998.

The COMELEC shall undertake the necessary information

campaign for purposes of educating the electorate on the matter of the
party-list system. ·

SECTION 11. Number of Party-List Representatives. - The

party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum (20%) of the
total number of the members of the House of Representatives including
those under the party.:list.
.. 1

For purposes of the May 1998 elections, the first five (5) major political
parties on the basis of party representation in the House of Representatives
at the start of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines shall not be entitled to
participate in the party-list system.

In determining the allocation of seats for the seconc;l vote, the

following procedure shall be observed:

(a) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections.

(b) T!1e ·parties, organizations,· and coalitions receiving at least two

percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system
shall be entitled to one seat each: Provided, That those
garnering more than two percent (2%) of the votes shall be
entitled to additional seats in the [sic] proportion to their total
number of votes: Provided, finally, That · each party,
organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more than
three (3) seats .

. SECTION 12. Procedure in Allocating Seats for Party-List

··Representatives.·~. The COMELEC shall tally all the votes for the patties,· .
organizations,. or coalitions on a nationwide basis, rank them according to
the number. ;of votes received and allocate party-list representatives
proportionately according to the percentage of votes obtained by each
party, organization, or coalition as against the total na:tio~wide votes cast
for the party-fist system.

Thus, according to Section 11, the initial threshold is two perce It

!
(2% _of the t?t~1 ··votes cast for ,the sy~tem. Every party, organization, _9r
coaht1on obtammg two percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-hr
 Concurring Opinion 5 G.R. No. 246816

system shall be· ehtitled to one (1 )'seat each. Thereafter, ·"those garnering '
more than two percent (2%) of ~he votes shall be entitled to additional seats .
in the [sic] proportion to their total number of votes[.}" Regardless of
potentially much larger proportions obtained by parties, organizations or
coalitions, however, "each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled
to not more than three (3) seats."

While ranking is involved, winning seats in the party-list system does

not ultimately or exclusively depend on an ordinal system as winning seats
in first past the post elections does. Rather, it relies on the extent of
proportionate shares vis-a-vis a total figure that varies from one election to
another, that is, the total number of votes cast for the party-list system in a
given election.
I,
I
I

II

The party-list system is fundamentally a mechanism of proportional

representation where proportions are reckoned in relation to the total number
of votes cast for the party-list system in a given election, and where groups
that obtain larger proportions of votes are naturally and logically placed at
an advantage over those who obtain less. This basic nature is expressed in 1

Section 12 of the Party-List System Act: "The COMELEC shall tally all the
votes ... on a nationwide basis, rank them according to the number of votes
received and allocate party-list representatives proportionately according to
the percentage of votes obtained ... as against the total nationwide votes cast
for the party-list system."

This same basic nature 'renders absurd and unacceptable petitioners' ,

contention that, after seats are allotted to those groups that hurdled the two-
percent-threshold, "[v]otes amounting to two percent (2%) ... obtained by
·i
each of the participating parties. . . should then be deducted from the total
yotes of each of these party-list groups that have been entitled to and given
guaranteed seats[,]" 6 and that, "[t]he remaining party-list seats ... sh[ould]
then be distributed in proportion to the recomputed number ofvotes[.]" 7

Ignoring votes in the reckoning of proportions run~. afoul of a party-

list election as a race contested by the entire roster of candidates and won in
consideration of all the votes cast by the electorate. Reckoning on the basis
of a "recomputed number of votes" 8 artificiaily redraws the electoral terrain.
It results in the distribution of remaining party-list seats based on an altered
field of contestants and dimini~hed number of votes. _This undoes the logical ,· f
advantage properly earned by those· that hurdled the two-percent-threshold

6
Ponencia, p. 3.
7
Id.
8
Id.
I
! !
 i

Concurring Opinion 6 G.R. No. 2468I:6

I
I
·'

and enables the election of gro~ps, even if their performance was. manifestly
worse off than those who ha~e hurdled the basic threshold. . .. i
, I

• I
• . ; I
I i
To concede petitioners' plea would be to negate the valid and sensibI:e I

distinction between those that hurdled the threshold and th~se that did not!'I
Ultimately, it violates the party-list system's fundamental objective qf
enabling "meaningful representation [secured through] ... the mandate of !{
sufficient number of people." 9 '

Justice Lazaro-Javier's illustration of the sheer absurdity, not to

mention, injustice and mockery of the totality of the electoral exercise whic:
shall be induced by favorable action on petitioners' plea is well-taken:

For better appreciation, assume that party-list X garnered exactly

2% of the votes cast for the party-list system. Indubitably, it is guaranteed
a seat in the first round of allocation. For the second round, its 2% vote
will still be intact and will serve as the multiplier to the remaining number
of seats after the first round of distribution.

In petitioners' proposal, however, a 2% deduction will be imposed

against party~list X's before proceeding to the second round. This would
result in X falling to the bottom of the ranking with zero percent (0%)
vote, dimming its chances, if not disqualifying it altogether, for the second
round. This is contrary to the language of the statute which points to
proportionality in relation to the TOTAL number of votes received by a
party, organization or coalition in the party-list election, and the intention
behind the law to acknowledge the two-percenters' right to participate in
the second round of seat allocation for the additional seats. 10

It does not help petitioners' position, as the ponencia points out, 11 that
petitioners asserted an alternative method of allocating party-list seats only
in the wake of their defeat in the 2019 elections. They found nothing wrong
with the method that is currently in place when they. were benefitting froni
and, on the basis of it, proclaimed winners in previous elections. An
electoral system is meant to b~ an qbjec~ive and dispassionate means f<lr
··aetermining·.wimiers in 'an election .. For it.to be
upheld. af one instance add !

assailed at another based· on how one fares is to undermine an electoral

system?s requisite neutrality and to subvert meaningful democradc
representation. I

III

To facilitate the objectives of proportjonal representation as

supplement to the dominant electoral system, the Constitution and the Party-
l
[i
9
Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 441 (2000) (Per J. Panganiba , i[
En Banc].
0
' Ponencia, pp. 27-28.
11
Id. at 10-11.
 I -

Concurring Opinion 7 G.R. No. 246816

List System Act prescribe parameters that operationalize our umque,

domestic mode ofproportional representation.

Jurisprudence has, m tum, interpreted relevant ,constitutional and

statutory prov1s10ns in a manner that will give effect to the party-list
system's lofty objectives. Of particular note is Barangay Association for
National Advancement and Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on
Elections, 12 where this Court clarified the rules for allocating party-list seats:

In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

under Section 11 of [Republic Act] No. 7941, the following procedure
shall be observed:

1. The paiiies, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from the

highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they garnered
during the elections .
. I

I
2. The parties, organizations, and coalitions receiving at least two
I
percent (2%) of the total votes cast for the party-list system shall
be entitled to one guaranteed seat each.

3. Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to the

ranking in paragraph l, shall be entitled to additional seats in
propmiion to tl1eir total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated.

4. Each party, organization, or coalition shall be entitled to not more

than three (3) seats. 13 "

The Party-List System Act's stipulation of an initial two-percent (2%)

threshold serves a vital interest by filtering party-list representation to those
groups that have secured_ the support of a sufficiently significant portion of :
the electorate. · ·

Our elections for the House of Representati~es is akin to elections for

the German Bundestag (federal parliament) where voters similarly cast a
first vote or "Erststimme" for district representative (which follows a first
past the post system), and a second vote or "Zweitstimme" for a political
party. 14 For a party to occupy seats, it must secure a five percent (51%)
threshold (n.b., more than doubly higher than our standard). This threshold
"excludes very small parties from parliamentary f~pres~ntation[.]" 15 This
exclusionary effect is deliberate and far from an inadvertent consequence:
"[t]his system was put in place to prevent smaller splinter parties - like those

12
604 Phil. 131 (2009). [Per J. Carpio, En Banc]. ,
!
13
Id. at 162.
I 14
; . See Michael Krenner-ich, Germany: The Original Mixed Member Proportional System, THE
I' I
I ELECTORAL KNOWLEDGE NETWORK, <http://aceproject.orgiregions-en/countries-and-
I I
territories/DEicase-studies/germany-the-original-mi:xed-membcr-proportional-system> (last accessed
on September 15, 2020).
15 Id.
 , I]
i

., !
!

Concurring Opinion 8 G.R. No. 246816

that -bogged down the Weimar Republic m the 1920s from entering
parliament." 16 -

Accordingly, it has long been settled by this Court that the twp
percent (2%) threshold is a valid standard that furthers the interest of robust
democratic representation. From this, it follows that the Party-List Systerl:i
Act validly ,distinguishes between those groups that meet the two percent
(2%) threshold, and those that fail to do so: i
I

The two percent threshold is consistent not only with the intent of
the framers of the Constitution and the law, but with the very essence of
"representation." Under a republican or representative state, all
government authority emanates from the people, but is exercised by
represelitatives chosen by them. But to have meaningful representation,
the elected persons must have the mandate of a sufficient number of
people. Otherwise, in a legislature features the party-list system, the result
might be the proliferation of small groups which are incapable of
contributing significant legislation, and which might even pose a threat to
the stability of Congress. Thus, even legislative districts are apportioned
according to "the number of their respective inhabitants, and on the basis
of a uniform and progressive ratio" to ensure meaningful local
representati01~. 17

IV

As an alternative to the predominant electoral system, the party-Ii. t

system is principaJly concerned with advancing democratic representatiob.
It endeavors to make up for the shortcomings of traditional elections through
simple plurality. This is a particularly acute concern in the experience Jf
Philippine electoral politics. A$. I have previously explained in my Separate
Opinion in Atong Paglaum, Inc. v. Co~mission on Ele~ti01;1s: 18 - . ·_ - ·t
- ---
.- - I

The core principle that defines the relationship between our

government and those that it governs is captured in the constitutional
phrase that ours is a "democratic and republican state". A democratic and
republican state is founded on effective representation. It is also founded
on the idea that it is the electorate's choices that must be given full
consideration, -

The party list system is an attempt to introduce a new system of

politics. in our country, one ·where voters choose platforms and principles
primarily and candidate-nominees secondarily. As provided in the
Constitution, the party list system's intentions are broader than simply to

16
How does the German general election work?, DW, <https://www.dw.com/en/how--does-the-germah-
general-election~wtlrk/a-37805756> (last accessed on September 15, 2020). i
17
Veterans Federation Party v. Commission on Elections, 396 Phil. 419, 441 (2000) lPer J. Panganiban,
En Banc].
18
707 Phil. 454 (2013) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc].
 I '
I· I

Concurring Opinion 9 G.R. No. 246816

I "ensure that those who are marginalized and represented become

lawmakers themselves''.

Historically, our electoral exercises privileged the popular and,

perhaps, pedigreed individual candidate over platforms and political
programs. Political parties were convenient amalgamation[ s] of electoral
candidates from the national to the local level that gravitated towards a
few of its leaders who could marshall the resources to supplement the
electoral campaigns of their members. Most elections were choices
between competing personalities often with very little discernible
differences in their interpretation and solutions for contemporary issues.
The electorate chose on the bases of personality and popularity; only after
the candidates were elected to public offices will they later find out the
concrete political programs that the candidate will execute. Our history is
replete with instances where the programs that were executed lacked
cohesion on the basis of principle. In a sense, our electoral politics
alienated and marginalized large parts of our population.
I
1!
The party list system was introduced to challenge the status quo. It
could not have been intended to enhance and further entrench the same
system. It is the party or the organization that is elected. It is the party list
group that authorizes, hopefully through a democratic process, a priority
list of its nominees. It is also the party list group that can delist or remove
their nominees, and hence replace him· or her, should he or she act
I !
inconsistently with the avowed principles and platforms of governance of
their organization. In short, the party list system assists genuine political
i I parties to evolve. Genuine political parties enable true representation, and
I .
I
!
'
!
hence, provide the potential for us to realize a "democratic and republican
state". 19 (Citations omitted)

Even as it aims to challenge dominant ways in politics, the party-list

system remains, at its core, an alternative electoral system,. It is not a
I
mechanism for affirmative action per se where predetermined
underrepresented or marginalized groups are given exclu~ive access to seats
I ;
. ~ I
in Congress. Thus, though enabling sectoral -representation, the party-list
I I
system is also open to national and regional parties or organizations. It
facilitates representation by drawing the focus away from personalities,
popularity, and patronage; to programs, principles, and policies. It does not
do so by extending extraordinary benefits to select sectors. It challenges ,
voters to see beyond what the dominant electoral system sustains, as well as
candidates and political parties to consolidate on considerations other than'
I !
I
what may suffice in personality-affirming races won by simple plurality. It
allows the forging of organizations . and coalitions, and facilitates
representation on the basis of ideologies, causes, and ideals that go beyond
strict sectoral liries:

In a . sense, challenging the politics of personality by

constitutionally entrenching tl:le ability of politicaf parties and
organizations to instill party discipline can redound to the benefit of those
who have been marginalized and underrepresented in the past. It makes it
possible for nominees to be chosen o.n the basis of their loyalty to I
19
Id. at 738-:--741.
Concurring Opinion: 10 G.R. No. 2468 ,·

principle and platform .rath~i than their family, affiliation .. It encourages

more collective action by the membership of the party and hence will
a
reduce the possibility that the party be controlled only by select few.

Thus, it is not only "for the marginalized and underrepresented in

our midst ... who wallow in poverty, destitution and infirmity" that the
party list system was enacted. Rather, it was for everyone in so far as !
,..i
attempting a reform in our politics. I
I

But, based on our recent experiences, requiring "national, regional

and sectoral parties and organizations" that participate in the party list
system to be representatives of the "marginalized and underrepresented
sector" and be "marginalized and underrepresented themselves" is to
engage in an ambiguous and dangerous fiction that undermines . the
possibility for vibrant party politics in our country. This requirement, in
fact, was the very requirement that "gut the substance of the party list
system".

Worse, contrary to the text of the constitution, it fails to appreciate

the true context of the party list system.

.1

It is inconceivable that the party· list system framed in our

Constitution make it impossible to accommodate green or ecological
parties of various political persuasions.

· Environmental causes do not have as their constituency only those

who are marginalized or underrepresented. Neither do they only have for
their constituency those "who wallow in poverty, destitution and
infirmity". In truth, all of us, regardless of economic class, are
constituents of ecological advocacies.

·Also, political parties organized along ideological lines - the

socialist or even right wing political parties - are groups motivated by a
their o~n narratives of our history, a vision of what society can be and
how it can get there. There is no limit to the economic class that can be
gripped by the cogency of their philosophies and the resulting political
platform_s. Allowing them space in the House of Representatives if they
have the cm{stituency that can win them a seat will enrich the deliberations
in that legislative chamber. Having them voice out opinions - whether
true or false -- should make the choices of our representatives richer. It
will make the. choices of our representatives more deniocratic. ·

Ideologically oriented parties work for the benefit of those who are
marginalized and underrepresented, but they do not necessarily come
mainly from that economic class. Just a glance at the history of strong
political parties in different. jurisdictions will show that it will be the
public intellectuals within these parties who vvill provide their' rationale
and continuaily guide their membership in the inteq)retation of events and,
thus, inform their movement forward. · .· ·

Political ideologies have people with lr...indred ideas as their

constituents. They may care for the marginalized and underrepresented,
I
but they are not themselves - nor for their effectivlty in the House of I
 I-:
I •
Concurring Opinion 11 G.R. No. 246816

Representatives should we require· that they :can. only coni~ from that
class. 20 (Citations omitted) ·

In keeping with these, I -have articulated, and continue to maintain,

that participation in the party-list system should be in keeping with the
following benchmarks:

First, the party list system includes national, regional and sectoral
parties and organizations;

Second, there is no need to show that they ,represent the

"marginalized and underrepresented". However, they will have to clearly
show how their plans will impact on the "marginalized and
underrepresented". Should the party list group prefer to represent a sector,
then our rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani and BAlvAT will apply to them;

Third, the parties or organizations that participate in the party list

system must not also be a participant in the election of representatives for
the legislative districts. In other words, political parties that field
candidates for legislative districts cannot also participate in the party list
system;

,·1 Fourth, the parties or organizations must have political platforms

' I
I .
guided by a vision of society, an understanding of history, a statement of
their philosophies and how this translates into realistic political platforms;

I Fifth, the parties or organizations - not only the nominees -

' I
I: must have concrete and verifiable track record of political' participation
I showing their translation of their political platfonns into action;
l
Sixth, the parties or organizations that apply for registration must
be organized solely for the purpose of participating in electoral exercises;

Seventh, they must have existed for a considerable period, such as

three (3) years, prior to their registration. · Within that pe.r;iod they should
be able to show concrete actiyities that are in line with their political
platforms;

Eighth, they must have such numbers in their actual active

membership roster so as to be able to mount a credible campaign for
purpose of enticing their audience (national, regional or sectoral) for their
election;

Ninth, a substantial number of these members must have

participated in the political activities of the organization;

Tenth, the party list group must have a govemir1g structure that is
not only democratically elected but also one which is not dominated by the
nominees themselves;

I.
r

!
I
[
Eleventh, the nomine~s of the political party' mµst be selected
through a transparent and de~ocratic proce~s; I
I I
, I

20
Id. at 741-744.
 ' ..
I

Concurring Opinion 12 G.R. No. 24681

1 f

Twelfth, the source of the funding and other.resources used by the

party or organization inust be-clear and should not point to a few dominant
contributors specifically of· individuals · with families that are or have
participated in the elections for representatives oflegisfative districts;
. '
Thirteenth, the political party or party list ·organization must be
able to win within the two elections subsequent to their registration;

Fourteenth, they must not espouse violence; and

i

I
Fifteenth, the party list group is not a religious organization. 21
(Citations omitted)

Without these considerations, the party-list system will become ~

farce, an avenue that will be dominated by the moneyed elite; furth/-
marginalizing truly ideological, as opposed to merely personal, politics.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote that the present Petition for Certiorari an,

Prohibition and Petition-in-Intervention be DISMISSED.

/
Associate Justice I

1-

' '

i 'i

CERTIFIED TRUE COPY

21
Id. at 751--753.
~"""".......,.R 0. ARICHETA
Clerk of Court En Banc
Supreme Court