Notes 

 
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---- ​START HERE​ ---- 

Lesson 1: Title 
IV. Code of Commerce Provisions on Overland Transportation 
(Unless otherwise indicated, reference is to Code of Commerce) 
A. Scope of Overland Transportation 
B. Nature of Contract, Art. 349 
C. Effect of Civil Code 
Arts. 1766, 2270, Civil Code 
D. Contract of Carriage 
1. Bill of Lading 
(a) Definition, Subject Matter, Art. 352 
(b) Form, Contents, Arts. 350, 351 
(c) Function, Art. 353 
2. Refusal to Transport, Art. 356 
3. Doubtful declaration of contents, Art. 357 
4. No Bill of Lading, Art. 354, 51 
E. Responsibility of the Carrier 
1. When it commences, Art. 355 
2. Route, Art. 359 
3. Care of Goods, Arts. 361, 362 
Arts. 1734, 1735, Civil Code 
4. Delivery 
(a) Condition of Goods, Arts. 363 to 367 
(b) To Whom Delivery Made, Art. 368 
(c) When to be made, Arts. 370, 358 
F. Rights and Obligations or Shipper and/or Consignee 
1. Right to damages 
(a) Condition imposed on right, Arts. 366, 357 
(b) Amount of damages for loss, Art. 732, Art.1744, Civil Code 
(c) Amount of Damages for delay, Art. 371(3) 
2. Right to abandon, Arts. 371,360, 365,363 
3. Right to change consignment, Art. 360 
4. Obligation to pay transportation charges, Arts.376, Art. 2241(9),Civil Code 
1. Obligation to return bill of lading, Art. 353(2) 
G. Applicability of Provisions, Art. 379 
  
V. Admiralty and Maritime Commerce 
A. Concept of Admiralty; Jurisdiction over admiralty cases 
  
#1 Batas Pambansa Blg 129, Sec. 19 (3), Sec. 33(1), as amended by R.A. 7691 (MONCADA) 
 
Section 19. ​Jurisdiction in civil cases. ​– Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original 
jurisdiction: ... 
 
(3) In all actions in admiralty and maritime jurisdiction where he demand or claim exceeds One 
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or , in Metro Manila, where such demand or claim exceeds 
Two hundred thousand pesos (200,000.00); 
 
Section 33.​ J​ urisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit 
Trial Courts in civil cases. ​– Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit 
Trial Courts shall exercise: 
 
(1) Exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions and probate proceedings, testate and intestate, 
including the grant of provisional remedies in proper cases, where the value of the personal 
property, estate, or amount of the demand does not exceed One hundred thousand pesos 
(P100,000.00) or, in Metro Manila where such personal property, estate, or amount of the demand 
does not exceed Two hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00) exclusive of interest damages of 
whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses, and costs, the amount of which must be 
specifically alleged: Provided, That where there are several claims or causes of action between the 
same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the 
totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose 
out of the same or different transactions; 
 
 
#2 International Harvester v. Aragon, 84 Phil 363 (PELAYO) 
  
B. Vessels 
1. Meaning 
  
#3 Lopez v. Duruelo, 52 Phil 229 (RAMORAN) 
  
E. Nature and acquisition of 
2.Arts. 573, 573, 583, Art. 712, Civil Code 
F. Registration; certificates issued; distinctions 
3. Republic Act 9295 Section 10(1) 
4. Significance of registration of transactions affecting vessels 
  
#4 Arroyo v. Yu, 54 Phil 511 (REY) 
#5 Rubiso v. Rivera, 37 Phil 72. (SANTOS) 
G.R. No. L-11407, October 30, 1917 
  
FACTS: 
  On  April  10,  1915,  counsel  for  plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint 
that his clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina; that the defendant Florentino E. 
Rivera  took  charge  or  possession  of  said  vessel  without  the  knowledge  or  consent  of  the plaintiffs 
and  refused  to  deliver  it  to  them,  under  claim  that  he was the owner thereof; that such act on the 
defendant's  part  cause  the  plaintiffs  to  suffer  damages,  not  only  because  they  could  not  proceed 
to  repair  the  vessel,  but  also because they were unable to derive profit from the voyages for which 
said pilot boat was customarily used. 
  
  The  record  shows  that  Bonifacio  Gelito  sold  his  share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting 
of  a  two-thirds  interest  therein,  to  the  Chinaman  Sy  Qui,  the  co-owner  of  the  other  one-third 
interest  in  said  vessel.  The  whole  ownership  in  the  vessel  having been consolidated in behalf of the 
Chinaman  Sy  Qui,  in  the  use  of  his  right  as  the  sole  owner  of  the  Valentina,  sold  this  boat  to 
Florentino  E.  Rivera  by  a  deed.  This  document  was  registered  in  the  Bureau  of  Customs  on  March 
17th 1915. 
  
  After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, a suit was filed against the Chinaman Sy 
Qui  to  enforce  payment  of  debt,  the  latter's  creditor  Fausto Rubiso, the herein plaintiff, acquired 
said  vessel  at  a  public  auction  sale.  ​The  certificate  of  sale  and  adjudication  of  the  boat  in 
question  was  issued  by  the  sheriff  on  behalf  of  Fausto  Rubiso,  on  January  27  of  the  same 
year and was also entered in the commercial registry on March 4, 1915. 
  
ISSUE: 
  Who has a better right between the parties. 
  
HELD: 
  Rubiso  has  the  better  right.  It  is  undeniable  that  the  defendant  Florentino  E.  Rivera's 
rights  cannot  prevail  over  those  acquired  by  Fausto  Rubiso  in  the  ownership  of  the  pilot  boat 
Valentina,  inasmuch  as,  though  the  latter's  acquisition  of  the  vessel  at  public  auction,  on  January 
23,  1915,  was  subsequent  to  its  purchase  by  the  defendant  Rivera,  nevertheless  said  sale at public 
auction  was  antecedently  recorded  in  the  office  of  the  Collector  of  Customs,  on  January  27,  and 
entered  in  the  commercial  registry.  —  An  unnecessary  proceeding-on  March  4th;  while  the  private 
and  voluntary  purchase  made  by  Rivera  on  a  prior  date  was  not  recorded  in  the  office  of  the 
Collector of Customs until many days afterwards, that is, not until March 17, 1915. 
  
  Article 573 of the Code of Commerce provides, in its first paragraph: 
  
  "Merchant  vessels constitute property which may be acquired and transferred by any of the 
means  recognized  by  law.  ​The  acquisition  of  a  vessel  must  be  included  in  a  written  instrument, 
which  shall  not  produce  any  effect  with  regard  to  third  persons  if  not  recorded  in  the 
commercial registry.​" 
  
  Inscription  in  the  commercial  registry  was  indispensable,  in  order  that  said  acquisition 
might affect, and produce consequences with respect to third persons. 
  
  The  requisite  of  registration  in  the  registry  of  the  purchase  of  a  vessel  is  necessary  and 
indispensable  in order that the purchaser's rights may be maintained against a claim filed by a third 
person;  pursuant  to  article  573  of  the  Code  of  Commerce  in  connection  with  section  2  of  Act  No. 
1900,  which  Act,  amending  said  article,  provides  that  such  registration,  instead  of  being  made  in 
the  commercial  registry,  shall  be  entered  in  the  registry  of  the  Insular Collector of Customs, who, 
since May 18 1909, has been performing the duties of commercial register. 
  
  The  purchaser  at  public  auction,  Fausto  Rubiso,  who  was  careful  to  record  his 
acquisition,  opportunely  and  on  prior  date,  has,  according  to  the  law,  a  better right than the 
defendant  Rivera  who  subsequently  recorded  his  purchase.  The  latter  is a third person, who was 
directly affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of the acquisition. 
  
 
  
C. Persons Participating in Maritime Commerce 
1. Shipowners and shipagents 
Arts. 586 to 608; 618 
  
#6 Standard Oil v. Castelo, 42 Phil 256 (TULIAO) 
  
  
(a) Responsibilities and liabilities 
  
#7 Yu Con v. Ipil, 41 Phil 770 (USON) 
 
FACTS: 
Yu  Con  contracted  with  Narciso  Lauron  for  the  transportation  of  certain  merchandise  and 
some  money  from the port of Cebu to Catmon. Yu Con chartered the banca “Maria” with Glicerio Ipil 
as  master  and  Justo  Sulamo  as  supercargo  for  the  said  purpose.  They had several times chartered 
before.  On  the  afternoon  of  October  18,  1911,  ​Yu  Con  delivered  a  trunk  containing  P450​,  which 
was  to  be  delivered  to  Yu  Con’s  shop  in  Catmon  for  the  purchase  of  corn.  Allegedly  because  there 
was  no  more  room  for  Yu  Con’s  trunk,  Ipil  and  Solamo  transferred  the  money  to  their own trunk in 
the stateroom.  
That  same  night,  ​the  trunk  was  lost  and  the  thief  was  not  identified  despite  investigations.  Yu 
Con filed a complaint to recover the sum of P450 while the defendants filed a counterclaim.  
 
Ipil and Solamo, along with Lauron were held by the Court of First Instance to be jointly and 
severally  liable  to  Yu  Con  for  the  amount  of  money  lost  and  ordered  defendants  to  pay  Yu  Con 
jointly  and  severally  for  the  sum  of  P450,  with  interest  at  6%  per  annum.  Thus,  this  appeal  to  the 
Supreme Court. 
 
ISSUE: 
Whether or not defendants are jointly and severally liable for the loss of the shipment. 
 
RULING: 
Yes.  ​It  is  therefore  beyond  all  doubt  that  the  loss  of the money occurred through the 
manifest  fault  and  negligence  of  Ipil  and  Solamo​.  They  failed  to  take  the  necessary precautions 
in  order  that  the  stateroom  containing  the  trunk  in  which  they  kept  the  money  should  be  properly 
guarded  by  members  of  the  crew  and  they  also  did  not  expressly  station  some  person  inside  the 
stateroom  for  the  guarding  and  safe-keeping  of  the  trunk.  All  of  these  circumstances,  together 
with  that  of  its  having  been  impossible  to  know  who  took  the  trunk  and  the  money,  make  the 
conduct  of  Ipil,  Solamo,  and  the  other  crew  members  eminently  supicious  and  ​prevent  the  holding 
that the disappearance or loss of the money was due to a fortuitous event, to force majeure. 
Ipil  and  Solamo  were  ​depositaries  of  the  sum  in  question  and,  having  ​failed  to  exercise 
the  diligence  required  by the nature of the obligation of safe-keeping assumed by them and by 
the  circumstances  of  the  time  and  the  place,  it  is  evident  that  they  are  liable  for  its  loss  or 
misplacement  pursuant  to  Arts.  1601  &  1602,  in  rel.  to  1738  &  1784,  as  prescribed  by  1770  of  the 
CC. 

With  respect  to  Lauron,  he  is  also liable in accordance with the provisions of the Code of 

Commerce  in  force  because,  a​s  the  proprietor  and owner of the vessel who executed a contract 
of  carriage  with  Yu  Con​,  there  occurred  the  loss,  theft,  or  robbery  of the P450 that belonged to 
Yu  Con  through  the  negligence  of  Ipil  a  nd  Solamo  and  which  theft  does  not  appear  to  have  been 
committed by a person not belonging to the craft.  

The  old  Code  of  Commerce  absolved  the  shipowner  from  liability  for  the  negligence  of  the 
captain  and  its  crew  but,  in  the  light  of  the  principles  of  modern  law,  ​this  doctrine  on  the 
non-liability  of  the  shipowner  for  the  unlawful  acts,  crimes  or  quasi  crimes,  committed  by  the 
captain  and  the  crew  ​can  ​no  longer  be  maintained  in  its  absolute  and  categorical  terms​.  In 
maritime commerce, the shippers and passengers in making contracts with the captain do so through 
the  confidence  they  have  in  the  shipowner who appointed him; they presume that the owner made a 
most  careful  investigation before appointing him, and, above all, they themselves are unable to make 
such  an  investigation,  and  even  though  they  should  do  so,  they  could  not  obtain  complete  security, 
inasmuch  as  the  shipowner  can,  whenever  he  sees  fit,  appoint  another  captain  instead.  ​If  the 
shipowner  derives  profits from the results of the choice of the captain and the crew​, when the 
choice  turns  out  successful,  i​t  is  also  just  that  he  should  suffer  the  consequences  of  an 
unsuccessful  appointment​,  by  application  of  the  rule  of  natural  law  contained  in  the  Partidas,  viz., 
that  he  who  enjoys  the  benefits  derived  from  a  thing  must  likewise  suffer  the  losses  that  ensue 
therefrom. Thus, it is only proper that the shipowner should be made liable. 

 
#8 Manila Streamship v. Abdulhaman, 100 Phil 32 (VALENZUELA) 
 
#9 Wing Kee Compradoring Co. v. Bark "Mononhaela", 44 Phil.464 (ABUYUAN) 

Facts: 

The plaintiff in this case, Wing Kee Compradoring Company, seeks to recover from the defendants, 
principally the Admiral Line, as agent for the Bark Monongahela, the sum of P17,675.64, with 
interest and costs, on account of goods, wares, and merchandise sold and delivered by the plaintiff 
to the defendants for the use of the crew of the Bark Monongahela. 

Beginning with March 16, 1921, and ending with August 16,1921, various supplies were furnished the 
Bark Monongahela by Wing Kee Compradoring Company. Most of the bills for these goods are made 
out against the "Admiral Line, S. S. Monongahela." All are countersigned by the master and the first 
steward. It appears, therefore, that the plaintiff was looking to the Admiral Line for payment. The 
first requisitions for supplies are on forms headed"The Admiral Line." Then follows Manila, the 
date, and the name, "Wing Kee Compradoring Co." Next is the order, reading: "Please deliver to S. 
S. Monongahela now lying at Bay, the following goods and send bills to the Admiral Line:". After this 
the goods are named. At the foot is found, "United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet 
Corporation," although these words are erased in a few of the requisitions, "The Admiral Line 
(Pacific Steamship Co.) Operating Agents. By J. J. Armstrong." On the side of the requisitions in 
red ink is the following: "Note: This requisition must be receipted by either Chief Officer, Chief 
Steward or Chief Engineer and returned to the Admiral Line, with six copies of invoice immediately 
after delivery of goods." After May 4, 1921, the requisitions seem to have been made out by the 
steward and the master. We deduce from these documents that the Admiral Line was the operating 
agent for the Monongahela, and was responsible as such until the agency was terminated. 

In the Manila Daily Bulletin for August 2, 1921,appeared the following: "Notice—Bark 
Monongahela—The undersigned hereby give notice that they are not responsible in any manner 
whatsoever for any indebtedness incurred by the Bark Monongahela, its Master and/or Crew—The 
Admiral Line." The trial judge found as a fact that on or before August 4, 1921, the Admiral Line 
had ceased to act as agent for the Monongahela. Nevertheless, supplies were furnished the 
Monongahela after these dates by the plaintiff. 

Issue: 

Whether or not Admiral Line, agent, is liable 

Ruling: 

Yes. The Court ruled that Admiral Line, a ship agent, is liable 

Article 586 of the Code of Commerce provides, "the owner of a vessel and the agent shall be civilly 
liable for the acts of the captain and for the obligations contracted by the latter to repair, equip, 
and provision the vessel, provided the creditor proves that the amount claimed was invested 
therein." "By agent is understood the person in trusted with the provisioning of a vessel, or who 
represents her in the port in which she happens to be." 
 When the agents buy in their own names, but really for the account of their principal, the seller 
has an option to look to either for payment, unless (1) he trusted the agent exclusively; or (2) by 
the usage and understanding of the business the agent only is held; or (3)unless the special 
circumstances of the case show that only the agent was intended to be bound and the seller knew it 
or was chargeable with knowledge of it. 

Applying more directly the law to the pleadings and the facts, it is first to be noted that the 
plaintiff has not followed out its allegation that it has a claim against the Bark Monongahela, and 
might not have prospered anyway, considering the rather dubious doctrine announced in the case of 
Heath vs. Steamer San Nicolas ([1907], 7 Phil.,532). Not only this, but the plaintiff has made no 
effort to bring the owner of the bark into the case and has pushed with no enthusiasm its case 
against the captain of the boat. What apparently the plaintiff wants is for the Admiral Line, as the 
agent for the Bark Monongahela, to pay the claim, leaving the latter to reimburse itself, if it sees 
fit, from the owners. To all this appellee answers that as the agency has ceased, action cannot be 
brought against the Admiral Line. To our minds this is a rather far-fetched argument, for, pursued 
to its logical conclusion, every agent for a vessel could thus avoid responsibility pursuant to article 
586 of the Code of Commerce, by giving up its agency when threatened with suit to enforce the 
obligations of third parties. Moreover, the bills were presented when the Admiral Line was yet the 
agent. 

In résumé, therefore, we are of opinion and so hold that the Admiral Line, as agent for the Bark 
Monongahela, is liable to the plaintiff for supplies furnished the Monongahela between March 16, 
1921 and August 2, 1921,but is not responsible for supplies furnished after that date. The 
mathematical additions show that the debt of the Admiral Line to the plaintiff amounts to 
P16,526.29. 

 
 
#10 National Development Company v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.L-49407, August 19, 1988 
(ALCANTARA) 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, petitioner-appellant, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS 
and DEVELOPMENT INSURANCE & SURETY CORPORATION, respondents-appellees. 
 
FACTS: 
In  accordance  with  a  memorandum  agreement  entered  into  between  National  Development 
Corporation  (NDC)  and  Maritime  Corporation  of  the  Philippines  Inc.  (MCP)  on  13  September  1962, 
NDC  as  the  first  preferred  mortgagee  of  three  ocean  going  vessels  including  one  with  the  name 
‘Doña  Nati’  appointed  MCP  as  its  agent  to  manage  and  operate  said  vessel  for  and  in  its behalf and 
account.  Thus,  on  28  February  1964  the  E.  Philipp  Corporation  of  New  York  loaded  on  board  the 
vessel  ‘Doña  Nati’  at  San  Francisco,  California,  a  total  of  1,200  bales  of  American  raw  cotton 
consigned  to  the  order  of  Manila  Banking  Corporation,  Manila  and  the  People’s  Bank  and  Trust 
Company  acting  for  and  in  behalf  of  the  Pan  Asiatic  Commercial  Company,  Inc.,  who  represents 
Riverside  Mills  Corporation.  Also  loaded  on  the  same  vessel  at  Tokyo,  Japan,  were  the  cargo  of 
Kyokuto  Boekui,  Kaisa,  Ltd.,  consigned  to  the  order of Manila Banking Corporation consisting of 200 
cartons  of  sodium  lauryl  sulfate  and  10  cases  of  aluminum  foil.  En  route  to  Manila  the  vessel  Doña 
Nati  figured  in  a collision at 6:04 a.m. on 15 April 1964 at Ise Bay, Japan with a Japanese vessel ‘SS 
Yasushima Maru’ as a result of which 550 bales of aforesaid cargo of American raw cotton were lost 
and/or  destroyed,  of  which  535  bales  as  damaged  were  landed  and  sold  on  the  authority  of  the 
General  Average  Surveyor  for  Y6,045,500  and  15  bales  were  not  landed  and  deemed  lost.  The 
damaged  and  lost  cargoes  was  worth  P344,977.86  which  amount,  the  Development  Insurance  and 
Surety  Corporation  (DISC)  as  insurer,  paid  to  the  Riverside  Mills  Corporation  as  holder  of  the 
negotiable  bills  of  lading  duly endorsed. Also considered totally lost were the aforesaid shipment of 
Kyokuto,  Boekui, Kaisa Ltd., consigned to the order of Manila Banking Corporation, Manila, acting for 
Guilcon,  Manila.  The  total  loss  was  P19,938.00  which  DISC  as  insurer  paid  to  Guilcon  as  holder  of 
the  duly  endorsed  bill  of  lading.  Thus,  DISC had paid as insurer the total amount of P364,915.86 to 
the consignees or their successors-in-interest, for the said lost or damaged cargoes.  
 
On  22  April  1965,  DISC  filed  before  the  then  Court  of  First  Instance  of  Manila  an  action  for the 
recovery  of  the sum of P364,915.86 plus attorney’s fees of P10,000.00 against NDC and MCP. On 12 
November  1969,  after DISC and MCP presented their respective evidence, the trial court rendered 
a  decision  ordering  MCP  and  NDC  to  pay  jointly  and  solidarily to DISC the sum of P364,915.86 plus 
the  legal  rate  of  interest  to  be  computed  from  the  filing  of  the  complaint  on  22  April  1965,  until 
fully  paid and attorney’s fees of P10,000.00. Likewise, in said decision, the trial court granted MCP’s 
cross-claim against NDC.  
 
MCP  interposed  its  appeal  on  20  December  1969,  while  NDC  filed  its  appeal  on  17  February  1970 
after  its  motion  to  set  aside  the  decision  was  denied  by  the  trial  court  in  its  order  dated  13 
February  1970.  On  17  November  1978,  the  Court  of  Appeals  promulgated  its  decision  affirming  in 
toto  the decision of the trial court. Hence, the appeals by certiorari. On 25 July 1979, the Supreme 
Court ordered the consolidation of the above cases.  
 
ISSUE:  
1. Which  laws  govern  the  loss  and  destruction  of  goods  due  to  collision  of  vessels  outside 
Philippine waters? 
2. What is the extent of liability, as well as the rules of prescription provided thereunder? 
 
RULING: 
1. This  issue  has  already  been  laid  to  rest  by  this  Court  of  Eastern Shipping Lines Inc. v. IAC 
(1  50  SCRA  469-470  [1987])  where  it  was  held  under  similar  circumstance "that the law of 
the  country  to  which  the  goods  are  to  be  transported  governs  the  liability  of  the  common 
carrier  in  case  of  their  loss,  destruction  or  deterioration"  (Article  1753,  Civil  Code).  Thus, 
the  rule  was  specifically  laid  down  that  for  cargoes  transported  from  Japan  to  the 
Philippines,  the  liability  of  the  carrier  is  governed  primarily  by  the  Civil  Code  and  in  all 
matters  not  regulated  by  said  Code,  the  rights  and  obligations  of  common  carrier  shall  be 
governed  by  the  Code  of  commerce  and  by  laws  (Article  1766,  Civil  Code).  Hence,  the 
Carriage of Goods by Sea Act, a special law, is merely suppletory to the provision of the Civil 
Code.  
 
In  the  case  at  bar,  it  has  been established that the goods in question are transported from 
San  Francisco,  California  and  Tokyo,  Japan  to the Philippines and that they were lost or due 
to  a  collision  which  was  found  to  have  been  caused  by  the  negligence  or  fault  of  both 
captains  of  the  colliding  vessels.  Under  the  above  ruling,  it  is  evident  that  the  laws  of  the 
 Philippines  will  apply,  and  it  is  immaterial  that  the  collision  actually  occurred  in  foreign 
waters, such as Ise Bay, Japan.  
 
Under  Article  1733  of  the  Civil  Code,  common  carriers  from  the  nature  of  their  business 
and for reasons of public policy are bound to observe extraordinary diligence in the vigilance 
over  the  goods  and  for  the  safety  of  the  passengers  transported  by  them  according  to  all 
circumstances  of  each  case.  Accordingly,  under  Article  1735  of  the  same  Code,  in all other 
than  those  mentioned  is  Article  1734  thereof,  the  common  carrier  shall  be  presumed  to 
have  been  at  fault  or  to  have  acted  negligently,  unless  it  proves  that  it  has  observed  the 
extraordinary diligence required by law.  
 
It appears, however, that collision falls among matters not specifically regulated by the Civil 
Code,  so  that  no reversible error can be found in respondent courses application to the case 
at  bar  of  Articles  826  to  839, Book Three of the Code of Commerce, which deal exclusively 
with collision of vessels.  
 
More  specifically,  Article  826  of  the  Code  of  Commerce  provides  that  where  collision  is 
imputable  to  the  personnel  of  a  vessel,  the  owner of the vessel at fault, shall indemnify the 
losses  and  damages  incurred  after an expert appraisal. But more in point to the instant case 
is  Article  827  of  the  same  Code,  which  provides  that  if  the  collision  is  imputable  to  both 
vessels,  each  one  shall  suffer  its  own  damages  and  both  shall  be  solidarily  responsible  for 
the losses and damages suffered by their cargoes.  
 
Significantly,  under  the  provisions  of  the  Code  of  Commerce,  particularly  Articles  826  to 
839, the shipowner or carrier, is not exempt from liability for damages arising from collision 
due  to  the  fault  or  negligence  of  the  captain.  Primary  liability  is  imposed  on  the  shipowner 
or  carrier  in recognition of the universally accepted doctrine that the shipmaster or captain 
is  merely  the  representative  of  the  owner  who  has  the  actual  or  constructive  control  over 
the conduct of the voyage.  
 
There  is,  therefore,  no  room  for  NDC's  interpretation  that  the  Code  of  Commerce  should 
apply  only  to  domestic  trade  and  not  to  foreign  trade.  Aside  from  the  fact  that  the 
Carriage  of  Goods  by  Sea  Act  (Com.  Act  No.  65)  does  not  specifically  provide  for  the 
subject  of  collision,  said Act in no uncertain terms, restricts its application "to all contracts 
for  the  carriage  of  goods  by  sea  to  and  from  Philippine  ports  in  foreign  trade."  Under 
Section  I  thereof,  it  is  explicitly  provided  that  "nothing  in  this  Act  shall  be  construed  as 
repealing  any  existing  provision  of  the  Code  of  Commerce  which  is  now  in  force,  or  as 
limiting  its  application."  By  such  incorporation, it is obvious that said law not only recognizes 
the  existence  of  the  Code  of  Commerce,  but  more  importantly  does  not  repeal nor limit its 
application. 
 
2. MCP  next  contends  that  it  cannot  be  liable  solidarity  with  NDC  because  it  is  merely  the 
manager  and  operator  of  the  vessel  Dona  Nati  not  a  ship  agent.  As  the  general  managing 
agent,  according  to  MCP,  it  can  only  be liable if it acted in excess of its authority. As found 
by  the  trial  court  and  by  the  Court  of  Appeals,  the Memorandum Agreement of September 
13,  1962  (Exhibit  6,  Maritime)  shows  that  NDC  appointed  MCP  as  Agent,  a  term  broad 
enough  to  include  the  concept  of  Ship-agent  in  Maritime  Law.  In  fact,  MCP  was  even 
conferred  all  the  powers  of  the  owner  of  the  vessel,  including  the power to contract in the 
name  of  the  NDC  (Decision,  CA  G.R.  No.  46513,  p.  12;  Rollo,  p.  40).  Consequently, under the 
circumstances, MCP cannot escape liability.  
 
It  is  well  settled  that  both  the  owner  and  agent  of  the  offending  vessel  are  liable  for  the 
damage  done  where  both  are  impleaded  that  in  case  of  collision,  both  the  owner  and  the 
agent  are  civilly  responsible  for  the  acts  of  the  captain;  that  while  it  is  true  that  the 
liability  of  the  naviero  in  the  sense  of  charterer  or  agent,  is  not  expressly  provided  in 
Article  826  of  the  Code  of  Commerce,  it  is  clearly  deducible  from  the  general  doctrine  of 
jurisprudence  under  the  Civil  Code  but  more  specially  as  regards  contractual  obligations  in 
Article 586 of the Code of Commerce.  
 
Moreover,  the  Court  held  that  both  the  owner  and  agent  (Naviero)  should  be  declared 
jointly  and  severally  liable,  since  the  obligation  which  is  the  subject  of  the  action  had  its 
origin  in  a  tortious  act  and  did  not  arise  from  contract.  Consequently,  the  agent,  even 
though  he  may  not  be  the  owner  of  the  vessel,  is  liable  to  the  shippers  and  owners  of  the 
cargo  transported  by  it,  for  losses  and  damages  occasioned  to  such  cargo,  without 
prejudice,  however,  to  his  rights  against  the  owner  of  the  ship,  to  the  extent  of  the  value 
of the vessel, its equipment, and the freight.  
 
As  to  the  extent  of  their  liability,  MCP  insists  that  their  liability  should  be  limited  to 
P200.00  per  package  or  per  bale  of  raw  cotton  as  stated  in  paragraph  17  of  the  bills  of 
lading.  Also  the  MCP  argues  that  the  law  on  averages should be applied in determining their 
liability.  MCP's  contention  is  devoid  of  merit.  The declared value of the goods was stated in 
the  bills  of  lading  and  corroborated  no  less  by  invoices  offered  as  evidence  '  during  the 
trial.  Besides,  common  carriers,  in  the  language  of  the  court  in  Juan  Ysmael  &  Co.,  Inc.  v. 
Barrette  et  al.,  (51  Phil.  90  [1927])  "cannot  limit  its  liability  for  injury  to  a  loss  of  goods 
where  such  injury  or  loss  was  caused  by  its  own  negligence."  Negligence  of  the  captains  of 
the  colliding  vessel  being  the  cause  of  the  collision, and the cargoes not being jettisoned to 
save  some  of  the  cargoes  and  the  vessel,  the  trial  court  and  the  Court  of  Appeals  acted 
correctly in not applying the law on averages (Articles 806 to 818, Code of Commerce).  
 
Finally  on  the  issue  of  prescription,  the  trial  court  correctly  found  that  the  bills  of  lading 
issued  allow  trans-shipment of the cargo, which simply means that the date of arrival of the 
ship  Dona  Nati  on  April  18,1964  was  merely  tentative  to  give  allowances  for  such 
contingencies  that  said  vessel  might  not  arrive  on  schedule  at  Manila  and  therefore,  would 
necessitate  the  trans-shipment  of  cargo,  resulting  in  consequent  delay  of  their  arrival.  In 
fact,  because  of  the  collision,  the  cargo  which  was  supposed  to  arrive in Manila on April 18, 
1964  arrived  only  on  June  12,  13,  18,  20  and  July  10,  13  and  15,  1964.  Hence,  had  the 
cargoes  in  question  been  saved,  they  could  have  arrived  in  Manila  on  the  above-mentioned 
dates.  Accordingly,  the  complaint  in  the  instant  case  was  filed  on  April  22,  1965,  that  is, 
long  before  the  lapse  of  one  (1)  year  from  the date the lost or damaged cargo "should have 
been  delivered" in the light of Section 3, sub-paragraph (6) of the Carriage of Goods by Sea 
Act.  
 
(b) The doctrine of limited liability, Art. 587 
  
#11 Manila Steamship v. Abdulhaman, supra (BERNARDO) 
 
#12 Yangco v. Laserna, 73 Phil 330 (BUENCONSEJO) 
 
 
Facts:

S.S. Negros, belonging to petitioner, Teodoro Yangco, left the port of Romblon on its return trip to
Manila. Typhoon signal No. 2 was then up, of which fact the captain was duly advised and his attention
thereto called by the passengers themselves before the vessel set sail. The boat was overloaded as
indicated by the loadline which was 6 to 7 inches below the surface of the water. The passengers,
numbering about 180, were overcrowded, the vessel's capacity being limited to only 123 passengers.
After two hours of sailing, the boat encountered strong winds and rough seas between the islands of
Banton and Simara. As the sea became increasingly violent, the captain ordered the vessel to turn left,
evidently to return to port, but in the maneuver, the vessel was caught sidewise by a big wave which
caused it to capsize and sink. Many of the passengers died in the mishap. The respondents instituted
separate civil actions against petitioner here to recover damages for the death of the passengers. The
court was in favour of respondents. After the rendition of the judgment to this effect, petitioner, by a
verified pleading, sought to abandon the vessel to the plaintiffs in the three cases, together with all its
equipments, without prejudice to his right to appeal. The abandonment having been denied, an appeal
was taken to the Court of Appeals, wherein all the judgments were affirmed.

Issue:
May the shipowner or agent, notwithstanding the total loss of the vessel as a result of the
negligence of its captain, be properly held liable in damages for the consequent death of its passengers?

Held:
The petitioner is not liable.

The question is controlled by the provision of article 587 of the Code of Commerce.

"The agent shall also be civilly liable for the indemnities in favor of third persons which arise from
the conduct of the captain in the care of the goods which the vessel carried; but he may exempt himself
therefrom by abandoning the vessel with all her equipments and the freight he may have earned during
the voyage."

​The provision accords a shipowner or agent the right of abandonment; and by

necessary implication, his liability is confined to that which he is entitled as of right to abandon -
"the vessel with all her equipments and the freight it may have earned during the voyage." It
applies in all cases wherein the shipowner or agent may properly be held liable for the negligent
or illicit acts of the captain.

If the shipowner or agent may in any way be held civilly liable at all for injury to or death
of passengers arising from the negligence of the captain in cases of collisions or shipwrecks, his
liability is merely co-extensive with his interest in the vessel such that a total loss thereof results
in its extinction. In arriving at this conclusion, the fact is not ignored that the ill-fated S. S.
Negros, as a vessel engaged in interisland trade, is a common carrier, and that the relationship
between the petitioner and the passengers who died in the mishap rests on a contract of
carriage. But assuming that petitioner is liable for a breach of contract of carriage, the
exclusively "real and hypothecary nature" of maritime law operates to limit such liability to the
value of the vessel, or to the insurance thereon, if any. In the instant case it does not appear
that the vessel was insured.
 
 
 
#13 Abueg v. San Diego, 77 Phil 730 (CANENCIA) 
#14 Aboitiz Shipping v. General Accident Fire and Lite Assurance Corporation, Ltd., 217 
SCRA 359 (CRUZ) 
  
(c) Specific rights and prerogatives 
Arts. 575, 593, 594, 596, 601 
  
2. Captains and Master 
  
(a) Qualifications and licensing 
Rep. Act 5173, Sec. 3 
Art. 609 
(b) Powers and Duties 
Arts. 610, 611, 612, 622, 624, 625 
  
#15 Inter Orient v. NLRC, 235 SCRA 269 (DATAN) 
 

Maritime Law; The captain of a vessel is a confidential and managerial employee.. A

master or captain, for purposes of maritime commerce, is one who has command of a
vessel. A captain commonly performs three (3) distinct roles: (1) he is a general agent of the
shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of the vessel; and (3) he is a
representative of the country under whose flag he navigates. In his role as general agent of
the shipowner, the captain has authority to sign bills of lading, carry goods aboard and
deal with the freight earned, agree upon rates and decide whether to take cargo. The ship
captain, as agent of the shipowner, has legal authority to enter into contracts with respect
to the vessel and the trading of the vessel, subject to applicable limitations established by
statute, contract or instructions and regulations of the shipowner. To the captain is
committed the governance, care and management of the vessel. Clearly, the captain is
vested with both management and fiduciary functions.

Maritime Law; The applicable principle is that the captain has control of all departments
of service in the vessel, and reasonable discretion as to its navigation.— a ship’s captain
must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary authority to decide what the safety
of the ship and of its crew and cargo specifically requires on a stipulated ocean voyage. The
captain is held responsible, and properly so, for such safety. He is right there on the vessel,
in command of it and (it must be presumed) knowledgeable as to the specific requirements
of seaworthiness and the particular risks and perils of the voyage he is to embark upon.
Indeed, if the ship captain is convinced, as a reasonably prudent and competent mariner
acting in good faith that the shipowner’s or ship agent’s instructions (insisted upon by
radio or telefax from their offices thousands of miles away) will result, in the very specific
circumstances facing him, in imposing unacceptable risks of loss or serious danger to ship
or crew, ​he cannot casually seek absolution from his responsibility​, if a marine casualty
occurs,

FACTS:

Private respondent Captain Rizalino Tayong, a licensed Master Mariner with experience in
commanding ocean-going vessels, was employed by Inter-Orient Maritime Enterprises, Inc.
as Master of the M/V.

Tayong assumed command of petitioners' vessel at the port of Hongkong. while at the Port
of Hongkong and in the process of unloading cargo, Captain Tayong received a weather
report that a storm named "Gordon" would shortly hit Hongkong. Precautionary
measures were taken to secure the safety of the vessel, as well as its crew, considering that
the vessel's turbo-charger was leaking and the vessel was fourteen (14) years old.

Captain Tayong reported that the vessel had stopped in mid-ocean due to a leaking
economizer. He called the shipowner and informed them that the departure of the vessel
may be affected because of the delay in the delivery of the oxygen and acetylene supplies 
for the leaking economizer. 

When the vessel arrived at the port of Richard Bay, South Africa Captain Tayong was
instructed to turn-over his post to the new captain. He was thereafter repatriated to the
Philippines, He instituted a complaint for illegal dismissal before the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration ("POEA"), claiming his unpaid salary for the unexpired
portion of the written employment contract.

POEA dismissed Captain Tayong's complaint and held that there was valid cause for his
untimely repatriation. On the ground that Tayong had unreasonably refused to follow the
instructions of the shipownere and their representative, despite petitioners' firm assurances
that the vessel was seaworthy for the voyage to South Africa.

NLRC reversed the decision of the POEA on the ground that Tayong was not given
opportunity to be heard.

ISSUES:

(1) WON captain Tayong dismissal is reasonable.

(2) WON Captain Tayong had reasonable grounds to believe that the safety of the vessel
and the crew under his command.
HELD:

(1) Not reasonable. - Captain Tayong was denied any opportunity to defend himself, he was
dismissed from his command and summarily ordered his repatriation to the Philippines
without informing him of the charge or charges against him, and much less giving him a
chance to refute any such charges.

(2) YES. The applicable principle is that the captain has control of all departments of
service in the vessel, and reasonable discretion as to its navigation.—More importantly, a
ship’s captain must be accorded a reasonable measure of discretionary authority to decide
what the safety of the ship and of its crew and cargo. For purposes of maritime commerce,
A ship captain, is one who has command of a vessel, performs three (3) distinct roles: (1)
he is a general agent of the shipowner; (2) he is also commander and technical director of
the vessel; and (3) he is a representative of the country under whose flag he navigates.

 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
(c) Prohibited acts and transactions 
Arts. 613, 614,615, 617, 621, 583 
  
3.Other Officers and Crew 
  
(a) Contracts and formalities, Art. 634 
(b) Duties and liabilities, Art. 635 
(c) Rights, Arts.636 to 647 
 
#16 Smith Bel and Company v Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 56294, 
May 20, 1991 (DIMAUKOM) 

SMITH BELL AND COMPANY (PHILIPPINES), INC. and TOKYO MARINE AND FIRE 
INSURANCE CO., INC., petitioners, 

vs. 

THE COURT OF APPEALS and CARLOS A. GO THONG AND CO., respondents. 

G. R. No. L-56294 May 20, 1991 

Facts: 

M/V  “​Don  Carlos​,”  an  inter-island  vessel  owned  and  operated  by  private  respondent  Go  Thong  was 
sailing  south  bound  for  Cebu,  when  it  collided  with  M/S  “​Yotai  Maru​,”  a  merchant  vessel  of 
Japanese registry which was approaching the port of Manila coming in from Kobe, Japan. The bow of 
the  “​Don  Carlos​”  rammed  the  left  side  of  the  “​Yotai  Maru​”  inflicting  a  gaping  hole  through  which 
seawater  rushed in and flooded the hatch, damaging all the cargo stowed therein. The consignees of 
the  damaged  cargo  having  been  paid  by  their  insurance  companies,  the  latter  in  turn  commenced 
actions  against  private  respondent  Go  Thong  for  damages  sustained  by  the  various  shipments.  2 
cases  were  filed  before  the  RTC.  The  first  case  (Smith  Bell  and  Sumitomo  Insurance  v. Go Thong) 
reached  the  SC  which  ruled  in  finality  that  negligence  was  with  the  officers  and  crew  of  “Don 
Carlos.” On the contrary, the second case (Smith Bell and Tokyo Insurance v. Go Thong) was decided 
by  the  CA  holding  the  officers  and crew of “Yotai Maru” at fault in the collision. Hence the present 
petition. 

Issue: 

Whether or not inscrutable fault is present in said collision. 

Ruling:​ NO. 

The  Court  believes  that  there  are  three  (3)  principal  factors  which  are  constitutive  of  negligence 
on the part of the “​Don Carlos​,” which negligence was the proximate cause of the collision. 

(1)  The  first  of  these  factors  was  the  failure  of  the  “Don  Carlos” to comply with the requirements 
of  Rule  18  (a)  of  the  International  Rules  of  the  Road  which  provides  as  follows:  (a)  When  two 
power-driven  vessels  are  meeting  end  on,  or  nearly  end  on,  so  as  to  involve  risk  of  collision,  each 
shall  alter  her  course  to  starboard,  so  that  each  may  pass  on  the  port  side  of  the  other.  The 
evidence  on  this  factor  state  that  “Don  Carlos”  altered  its  course  by  five  degrees  to  the  left 
instead  of  to  the  right  which  maneuver  was  the  error  that  caused  the  collision  in  question.  Why it 
did  so  is  because  “Don  Carlos”  was  overtaking  another  vessel,  the  “Don  Francisco”,  and was then at 
the  right  side  of  the  aforesaid  vessel.  It  was  in  the  process  of  overtaking  “Don  Francisco”  that 
“Don  Carlos”  was  finally  brought  into  a  situation  where  he  was  meeting  end-on  or  nearly  end-on 
“Yotai Maru, thus involving risk of collision. 

(2)  The  second  circumstance  constitutive  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  “​Don  Carlos​”  was  its 
failure  to  have  on  board  that  night  a  “proper  look-out”  as  required  by  Rule  I  (B)  Under  Rule  29  of 
the  same  set  of  Rules,  all  consequences  arising  from  the  failure  of  the  “​Don  Carlos​”  to  keep  a 
“proper  look-out”  must  be  borne  by  the  “​Don  Carlos​.”  In  the  case  at  bar,  the  failure  of  the  “​Don 
Carlos​”  to  recognize  in  a  timely  manner  the  risk  of  collision  with  the  “​Yotai  Maru​”  coming  in  from 
the  opposite  direction,  was  at  least  in  part  due  to  the  failure  of  the  “​Don  Carlos​”  to  maintain  a 
proper look-out. 

(3)  The  third  factor  constitutive  of  negligence  on  the  part  of  the  “​Don  Carlos​”  relates to the fact 
that  Second  Mate  Benito  German  was,  immediately  before  and  during  the  collision,  in  command  of 
the  “​Don  Carlos​.”  Second  Mate  German  simply  did  not  have  the  level  of  experience,  judgment  and 
skill  essential  for  recognizing  and  coping  with  the  risk  of  collision  as  it  presented  itself  that  early 
morning  when  the  “​Don  Carlos​,”  running  at  maximum  speed  and  having  just  overtaken  the  “Don 
Francisco”  then  approximately  one  mile  behind  to  the  right  side  of  the  “​Don  Carlos​,”  found  itself 
head-on  or  nearly  head  on  v​ is-a-vis  ​the  “​Yotai  Maru. ”​  It is essential to point out that this situation 
was created by the “​Don Carlos​” itself. 

FOR  ALL  THE  FOREGOING,  the  Decision  of  the  Court  of  Appeals  is  hereby  REVERSED  and  SET 
ASIDE. 

Inscrutable  Fault  –  where  it  cannot  be determined which of the 2 vessels caused the collision, 

each  vessel  shall  suffer  its  own  damages,  and  both  shall  be  solidarily  responsible  for  the 
losses and damages occasioned to their cargoes. 

 
  
4. Supercargoes, Arts. 649-651 
5 Pilots 
  
#17 Wildvalley v. Court of Appeals, 342 SCRA 213 (2000) (DYSANGCO) 
 
WILDVALLEY SHIPPING CO, LTD, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and 
PHILIPPINE PRESIDENT LINES, INC, respondents. 
  
FACTS 
  
Philippine Roxas, a vessel owned by Philippine President Lines, Inc., (PPL) the 
private respondent, arrived in Puerto Ordaz, Venezuela, to load iron ore. When the 
vessel was ready to leave port, Mr. Ezzar del Valle Solarzano Vasquez, an official 
pilot of Venezuela, was designated by the harbour authorities in Puerto Ordaz to 
navigate the Philippine Roxas through the Orinoco River. The Orinoco River in 
Puerto Ordaz is a compulsory pilotage channel. 
  
The Philippine Roxas experienced some vibrations when it entered the San Roque 
Channel. The vessel proceeded on its way, with the pilot assuring the watch officer 
that the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel. At 4:12 am, the 
vessel again experienced some vibrations, so the master went to confirm the 
position of the vessel and ordered the chief officer to check all the double bottom 
tanks. 
  
Afterwards, Philippine Roxas ran aground in the Orinoco River, thus obstructing 
the ingress and egress of vessels. As a result of the blockage, the Malandrinon, a 
vessel owned by herein petitioner Wildvalley Shipping Company, Ltd., was unable to 
sail out of Puerto Ordaz on that day. 
  
Subsequently, Wildvalley filed a suit with the RTC of Manila against PPL. ​At the time
of the incident, Philippine Roxas, was under the command of the pilot Ezzar Solarzano, assigned
by the government thereat, but plaintiff claims that it is under the command of the master
  
RTC rendered its decision in favor of Wildvalley. 
  
Both parties appealed to CA which reversed the decision of RTC and ordered 
Wildvalley to pay PPL the amount of P323,042.53 as attorney’s fees plus cost of 
suit. 
  
Hence, this petition. 
  
  
ISSUE 
  
1.​ ​Whether or not fault can be attributed to the pilot for the grounding of said vessel. 
2.​ ​Whether or not there was negligence on the p art of private respondent that would 
warrant the award of damages. 
3.​ ​Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitor is applicable in this case. 
  
RULING 
  
1.​ ​Yes.The Orinoco River being a compulsory pilotage channel necessitated the engaging of a 
pilot who was presumed to be knowledgeable of every shoal, bank, deep and shallow ends of 
the river. In his deposition, pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez testified that he is an official 
 pilot in the Harbour at Port Ordaz, Venezuela, and that he had been a pilot for twelve (12) 
years. He also had experience in navigating the waters of the Orinoco River. 
  
The law does provide that the master can countermand or overrule the order 
or command of the harbor pilot on board. The master of the Philippine Roxas 
deemed it best not to order him (the pilot) to stop the vessel, mayhap, because 
the latter had assured him that they were navigating normally before the 
grounding of the vessel. Moreover, the pilot had admitted that on account of 
his experience he was very familiar with the configuration of the river as well 
as the course headings, and that he does not even refer to river charts when 
navigating the Orinoco River. 
  
Based on these declarations, it comes as no surprise to us that the master 
chose not to regain control of the ship. Admitting his limited knowledge of the 
Orinoco River, Captain Colon relied on the knowledge and experience of pilot 
Vasquez to guide the vessel safely. 
  
We find that the grounding of the vessel is attributable to the pilot. When the 
vibrations were first felt the watch officer asked him what was going on, and 
pilot Vasquez replied that “(they) were in the middle of the channel and that 
the vibration was a result of the shallowness of the channel.” 
  
Pilot Ezzar Solarzano Vasquez was assigned to pilot the vessel Philippine Roxas 
as well as other vessels on the Orinoco River due to his knowledge of the same. 
In his experience as a pilot, he should have been aware of the portions which 
are shallow and which are not. His failure to determine the depth of the said 
river and his decision to plod on his set course, in all probability, caused damage 
to the vessel. Thus, we hold him as negligent and liable for its grounding. 
  
Section 11 of AO No. 03-85 provides that: 
  
“Sec. 11. Control of Vessels and Liability for Damage.—On compulsory pilotage grounds, the Harbor Pilot providing the 
service to a vessel shall be responsible for the damage caused to a vessel or to life and property at ports due to his 
negligence or fault. He can be absolved from liability if the accident is caused by force majeure or natural calamities 
provided he has exercised prudence and extra diligence to prevent or minimize the damage. 
  
“The Master shall retain overall command of the vessel even on pilotage grounds whereby he can countermand or 
overrule the order or command of the Harbor Pilot on board. In such event, any damage caused to a vessel or to life 
and property at ports by reason of the fault or negligence of the Master shall be the responsibility and liability of the 
registered owner of the vessel concerned without prejudice to recourse against said Master. 
  
"Such liability of the owner or Master of the vessel or its pilots shall be determined by competent authority in appropriate proceedings in
the light of the facts and circumstances of each particular case.
  
 Section 8 of the same AO, provides: 
  
“Sec. 8. Compulsory Pilotage Service—For entering a harbor and anchoring thereat, or passing through rivers or straits 
within a pilotage district, as well as docking and undocking at any pier/wharf, or shifting from one berth or another, 
every vessel engaged in coastwise and foreign trade shall be under compulsory pilotage. 
  
  
2.​ N
​ o. ​There being no contractual obligation, the private respondent is obliged to give only the diligence
required of a good father of a family in accordance with the provisions of Article 1173 of the New Civil
Code.
  
The diligence of a good father of a family requires only that diligence which an ordinary prudent
man would exercise with regard to his own property. The Court found private respondent to have
exercised diligence of a good father of a family when the vessel sailed only after the “main engine,
machineries, and other auxiliaries” were checked and found to be in good running condition; when
the master left a competent officer, the officer on watch on the bridge with a pilot who is experienced
in navigating the Orinoco River; when the master ordered the inspection of the vessel’s double
bottom tanks when the vibrations occurred anew.

3.​ ​No. The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to the case at bar because the circumstances
surrounding the injury do not clearly indicate negligence on the part of the private respondent.
For the said doctrine to apply, the following conditions must be met: (1) the accident was of
such character as to warrant an inference that it would not have happened except for defendant’s
negligence; (2) the accident must have been caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive management or control of the person charged with the negligence complained of; and
(3) the accident must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the
person injured.

In this case, there was a temporary shift of control over the ship from the master of the vessel to the
pilot on a compulsory pilotage channel. Thus, two of the requisites necessary for the doctrine to
apply, i.e., negligence and control, to render the respondent liable, are absent.