GASPAR, LERRE FEIGH C.

18-108657
BSLM 3C
INTRO TO CIVIL PROCEDURE
CASE DIGEST

G.R. NO. 187583 NOVEMBER 26, 2014

FACTS:

 On March 25, 1998, the City of Lapu-Lapu, through the Office of the Treasurer,
demanded from the PEZA ₱32,912,350.08 in real property taxes for the period from
1992 to 1998 on the PEZA’s properties located in the Mactan Economic Zone.
 On May 21, 1998, The city reiterated its demand on the letter. It cited Sections 193 and
234 of the Local Government Code of 1991 that withdrew the real property tax
exemptions previously granted to or presently enjoyed by all persons. The City pointed
out that no provision in the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995 specifically exempted
the PEZA from payment of real property taxes, unlike Section 21 of Presidential Decree
No. 66 that explicitly provided for EPZA’s exemption.
 On May 13, 2002, The city assessed PEZA as real property taxes for the period from
1992 to 2002.
 On September 11, 2002, the PEZA filed a petition for declaratory relief with the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City, praying that the trial court declare it exempt from payment of
real property taxes.
 the City cited a legal opinion dated September 6, 1999 issued by the Department of
Justice, which stated that the PEZA is not exempt from payment of real property taxes.
The Department of Justice based its opinion on Sections 193 and 234 of the Local
Government Code that withdrew the tax exemptions, including real property tax
exemptions, previously granted to all persons.
 the PEZA argues that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to hear its petition for
certiorari since the issue was whether the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion
in denying its petition for injunction. The PEZA maintains that it is exempt from payment
of real property taxes under Section 21 of Presidential Decree No. 66 and Section 51 of
the Special Economic Zone Act of 1995.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the City of Lapu-Lapu’s appeal
for raising pure questions of law;
2. Whether or not the Regional Trial Court, Branch 111, Pasay City had jurisdiction to hear,
try, and decide the City of Lapu-Lapu’s petition for declaratory relief

HELD:
1. No. Under the Rules of Court, there are three modes of appeal from Regional Trial Court
decisions. The first mode is through an ordinary appeal before the Court of Appeals
where the decision assailed was rendered in the exercise of the Regional Trial Court’s
original jurisdiction. Ordinary appeals are governed by Rule 41, Sections 3 to 13 of the
Rules of Court. In ordinary appeals, questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law
may be raised.

The second mode is through a petition for review before the Court of Appeals where the
decision assailed was rendered by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction. Rule 42 of the Rules of Court governs petitions for review before
the Court of Appeals. In petitions for review under Rule 42, questions of fact, of law, or
mixed questions of fact and law may be raised.

The third mode is through an appeal by certiorari before this court under Rule 45 where
only questions of law shall be raised. A question of fact exists when there is doubt as to
the truth or falsity of the alleged facts. On the other hand, there is a question of law if the
appeal raises doubt as to the applicable law on a certain set of facts.

We agree that the City availed itself of the wrong mode of appeal before the Court of
Appeals. The City raised pure questions of law in its appeal. The Court of Appeals,
therefore, did not err in dismissing the City’s appeal pursuant to Rule 50, Section 2 of the
Rules of Court.

2. No. The issue of whether the Regional Trial Court of Pasay had jurisdiction over the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief is a question of law, jurisdiction being a matter of
law. The Regional Trial Court of Pasay had no jurisdiction to hear, try, and decide the
PEZA’s petition for declaratory relief against the City of Lapu-Lapu. The court with
jurisdiction over petitions for declaratory relief is the Regional Trial Court, the subject
matter of litigation in an action for declaratory relief being incapable of pecuniary
estimation, According to the Section 19 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980.
 G.R. NO. 187349 AUGUST 17, 2016

BARANGAY MAYAMOT, ANTIPOLO CITY, Petitioner, v. ANTIPOLO CITY, SANGGUNIANG

FACTS:
In 1984, Batas Pambansa Bilang (BP Blg.) 787 to 794 were passed creating eight (8) new
barangays in the then Municipality of Antipolo. Each law creating the new barangay contained
provisions regarding the sitios comprising it, its boundaries, and mechanism for ratification of
the law. Antipolo became composed of sixteen (16) barangays.
In order to integrate the territorial jurisdiction of the sixteen (16) barangays into the map of
Antipolo, the Sangguniang Bayan of Antipolo passed Resolution No. 97-80, commissioning the
City Assessor to plot and delineate the territorial boundaries of the sixteen (16) barangays
pursuant to the Bureau of Lands Cadastral Survey No. 29-047 and the provisions of BP Blg. 787
to 794
On September 21, 1999, Barangay Mayamot filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity and/or
Annulment of Resolution No. 97-89 and Injunction against Antipolo City, Sangguniang Pang
lungsod of Antipolo, Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and Mambugan, the City
Assessor and the City Treasurer before the RTC of Antipolo City.
Barangay Mayamot claimed that while BP Blg. 787 to 794 did not require Barangay Mayamot to
part with any of its territory, the adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 reduced its territory to one-half
of its original area and was apportioned to Barangays Sta. Cruz, Bagong Nayon, Cupang, and
Mambugan. It also claimed that the City Assessor's preparation of the plan and the
Sangguniang Panglungsod's adoption of Resolution No. 97-89 were not preceded by any
consultation nor any public hearing. RTC rendered its Decision dismissing the petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the Resolution 97-89 have any legal basis and conform to its actual and existing
territorial jurisdiction

HELD:
No. There is a boundary dispute when a portion or the whole of the territorial area of a Local
Government Unit (LGU) is claimed by two (2) or more LGUs. Here, Barangay Mayamot is
claiming a portion of the territory of Barangays Bagong Nayon, Sta. Cruz, Cupang and
Mambugan. Unfortunately for petitioner, the resolution of a boundary dispute is outside the
jurisdiction of the RTC.
 G.R. NO. 132601 January 19, 1999
LEO ECHEGARAY, petitioner,
vs.
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL., respondents.

FACTS:
On January 14, 1999, the respondents' Urgent Motion for Reconsideration filed for the
Resolution of this court temporarily restraining the execution of petitioner and Supplemental
Motion to Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. In their Supplemental Motion to Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration, public respondents attached a copy of House Resolution No. 629 introduced
by Congressman Golez entitled "Resolution expressing the sense of the House of
Representative to reject any move to review Republic Act No. 7659 which provided for the re-
imposition of death penalty, notifying the Senate, the Judiciary and the Executive Department of
the position of the House of Representative on this matter, and urging the President to exhaust
all means under the law to immediately implement the death penalty law." The Resolution was
concurred in by one hundred thirteen (113) congressman.
On June 25, 1996, petitioner was convicted for the rape of his common law spouse’s ten year
old daughter and was sentenced to death penalty. The motions were denied with the court
finding no reason to declare it unconstitutional and pronouncing Congress compliant with the
requirements for its imposition. RA 8177 was passed amending Art. 8 of the RPC as amended
by Sec. 24 of RA 7659. The mode of execution was changed from electrocution to lethal
injection. The Secretary of Justice promulgated the rules and regulations to implement R.A 8177
and directed the Director of Bureau of Corrections to prepare the Lethal Injection Manual.
On March 3, 1998 , the court required respondents to comment and mandated the parties to
mantain status quo . Petitioner filed a very urgent motion to clarify status quo and to request for
TRO until resolution of the petition. Petitioner filed a reply stating that lethal injection is cruel,
degrading , inhuman and violative of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.

ISSUE:
Whether or not R.A. 8117 and its implementing rules pass constitutional muster for being an
undue delegation of legislative power

HELD:
NO. There is no undue delegation of legislative power in R.A. NO. 8177 to the secretary of
Justice and the director of the bureau of corrections, but section 19 of the rules and regulations
to implement R.A. NO. 8177 is invalid. RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define
the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out its boundaries, and specify the public agencies
which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances under which the legislative purpose may be
carried out.
 G.R. NO. 141524 SEPTEMBER 14, 2005
DOMINGO NEYPES, ET AL. Petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, ET AL., Respondents

FACTS:
Petitioners filed an action for annulment of judgment and titles of land and/or reconveyance
and/or reversion with preliminary injunction before the RTC against the private respondents.
The petitioner filed a petition motion to declare the respondent heirs, the Bureau of Lands and
the Bureau of Forest Development in default. On August 4, 1998, the court a quo denied the
notice of appeal, holding that it was filed eight days late. This was received by petitioners on
July 31, 1998. Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but this too was denied in an order
dated September 3, 1998. Via a petition for certiorari and mandamus under Rule 65, petitioners
assailed the dismissal of the notice of appeal before the CA. On September 16, 1999, the CA
dismissed the petition. It ruled that the 15-day period to appeal should have been reckoned from
March 3, 1998 or the day they received the February 12, 1998 order dismissing their complaint.
According to the appellate court, the order was the “final order” appealable under the Rules.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not receipt of a final order triggers the start of the 15-day reglmentary period
to appeal, the February 12, 1998 order dismissing the complaint or the July 1, 1998
order dismissing the Motion for Reconsideration.
2. Whether or not petitioners file their notice of appeal on time

HELD:
1. Yes. When the omnibus motion was filed, 12 days of the 15-day period to appeal the
order had lapsed. He later on received another order, this time dismissing his omnibus
motion. He then filed his notice of appeal. But this was likewise dismissed ― for having
been filed out of time. Based on the aforementioned cases, the SC sustained petitioners’
view that the order dated July 1, 1998 denying their motion for reconsideration was the
final order contemplated in the Rules.
2. Yes. To standardize the appeal periods provided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair
opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of
15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the RTC, counted from receipt of the
order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration.