G.R. No. 148597.

 October 24, 2003.* Same; Same; Same; Same; A probate court may not decide a question of title of
GRACE F. MUNSAYAC-DE VILLA, LILY F. MUNSAYACSUNGA and ROY MUNSAYAC, ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs, or the question is one of
petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS; Judge ANTONIO C. REYES, Presiding Judge of the collation or advancement, or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 61; NORA F. MUNSAYAC-VISPERAS rights of third parties are not impaired.—In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently
(Represented by Her Heirs); and GELACIO F. MUNSAYAC, JR., respondents. enunciated this settled, corollary principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a
question of title or ownership, but it may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the
Actions; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules question is one of collation or advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of
of Court—as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a criminal case in which the whole jurisdiction and the rights of third parties are not impaired. These principles, however, have
case is opened for review—the appeal is limited to the error assigned by petitioner; No no more application in this case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the
affirmative relief can be given to one who did not contest the lower court’s decision .—In a intestate estate of the deceased couple have already been decided and terminated.
petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as distinguished from an ordinary appeal of a Indeed, every litigation must come to an end.
criminal case in which the whole case is opened for review—the appeal is limited to the Same; Same; Judgments; It is already an accepted rule of procedure for the
errors assigned by petitioner. Since respondents did not contest the Decision of the CA, no Supreme Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no
affirmative relief can be sought by or given to them. Thus, not all the issues raised before root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation .—In view of the above ruling, we deem
the appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole issue in the present it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to
Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge. order the release of any property deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule
Same; Courts; Judges; Inhibition of Judges; Once case has been decided with of procedure for this Court to strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding,
finality, a petition for inhibition of the judge is rendered moot and academic .—After the CA leaving no root or branch to bear the seeds of future litigation. To achieve that end and to
terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no more reason why the inhibition of expedite the case in the interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the
Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition therefor has already become moot and freeze order and release the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable.
academic in view of the termination of the main case. How can he be inhibited from a case
that has already been decided with finality? It should be clear that the CA Decision PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition
executed by all the parties was the “final, complete and absolute settlement of their The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
respective shares and claims as heirs of deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and      Ismael M. Estella for petitioners.
Vicenta Munsayac.” As such, any and all incidents relating to the special proceedings      Tenefrancia, Agranzamendez, Liceralde & Associates for private respondent.
should also be deemed to have been terminated.
Same; Same; Probate Proceedings; Jurisdiction; The determination of whether a PANGANIBAN, J.:
property should be included in the inventory is within the jurisdiction of a probate court .—
Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property previously Once a case has been decided with finality, a petition for the inhibition of the judge
deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to decide therefrom becomes moot and academic.
whether the amounts and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any
The Case
standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court
assailing the March 2, 2001 Decision 2 and the June 21, 2001 Resolution 3 of the Court of
exercises limited jurisdiction. However, the determination of whether a property should be
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 60914. The decretal portion of the Decision reads as
included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only
follows:
provisional—not conclusive—in character and subject to the final decision in a separate
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition is
action that may be instituted by the parties.
hereby GRANTED only insofar as nullifying and setting aside the order of arrest  contained

1
in Respondent Judge Antonio C. Reyes’ Orders dated June 22, 2000 and August 28, 2000 of DE VILLA by about 4:00 p.m. in the afternoon of the same date, for failure to produce
in Special Proceedings 704-R, entitled ‘In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late the said bank certificates/documents. Pending the resolution of CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193,
Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsayac.’ petitioners filed an administrative case dated July 11, 2000 before the Supreme Court,
“No pronouncement as to costs.”4 docketed as OCA IPI NO. 00-989-RTJ, which not only prayed for respondent Judge’s
suspension but also his permanent removal from office on grounds of grave misconduct
The assailed Resolution denied both petitioners’ Partial Motion for Reconsideration 5 and and serious inefficiency.
private respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration.6
“Acting on the Omnibus Motion dated April 24, 2000 which was filed by the
The Facts administrator of the intestate estate, respondent Judge issued the Order dated May 4,
The facts of the case were summarized by the CA in this wise: 2000, which underscored the order to surrender, under pain of contempt, (a) the amount of
“A recapitulation of facts shows that the present controversy before [u]s stems from Special the bank investment discovered in the names of the late VICENTA, DE VILLA and SUNGA
Proceeding Case No. 704-R, entitled ‘ In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Late made with the United Coconut Planter’s Bank, Baguio City (‘UCPB’) under Investment
Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and the Late Vicenta Munsayac ’ and pending before Branch 61 of Confirmation No. 0666 worth P13,506,343.33, and which amount was not disclosed by the
the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. The said special proceeding case was filed petitioners in the estate return tax, (b) as well as the surrender of all the pieces of jewelry
on November 17, 1998 by Grace F. Munsaya-De Villa (‘DE VILLA’), Lily F. Munsayac- given by the late VICENTA to DE VILLA and SUNGA, subject of the ‘freeze order’ with the
Sunga (‘Sunga’) and Roy Peter F. Munsayac (‘ROY’)—three (3) of the five (5) children of China Banking Corporation.
the late Spouses GELACIO and VICENTA MUNSAYAC—for letters of administration “The Court a quo substantially reiterated the import of the Order dated May 4, 2000, by
nominating DE VILLA as administratrix of the intestate estate of their parents. DE VILLA’s issuing the Order dated May 24, 2000 and, on the account of petitioners’ failure to faithfully
nomination was opposed by the two (2) other children of the late Munsayac Spouse, comply therewith, issued the Order dated June 22, 2000, which contained the following
namely, Gelacio F. Munsayac, Jr. (‘MUNSAYAC, JR.’) and the late Nora F. Munsayac- decretal portion—
Visperas (‘VISPERAS’), who nominated MUNSAYAC, JR. as administrator of the late WHEREFORE, for their failure to comply with the Order of this Court dated May 24, 2000,
Munsayac Couple’s intestate estate. the petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are hereby ordered
“MUNSAYAC, JR. was eventually appointed administrator pursuant to respondent ARRESTED in accordance with Section 8, Rule 71, of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure,
Judge’s Order dated MARCH 22, 2000, replacing Lawyer Ceasar G. Oracion as special until their compliance to immediately surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the
administrator of the said intestate estate, pursuant to the Order dated April 27, 1998. Special Administrator the amount of P13,506,343.33 plus the legal interest of 12% per
“Despite the approved 60-day suspension of the proceedings to enable the parties to annum compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied with or a total amount of
discuss an amicable settlement, the protracted exchange of pleadings between the P23,802,788.00 more or less, as of May, 2000.
opposing siblings in Special Proceeding Case No. 704-R was of no help in the immediate ‘The petitioners Grace de Villa, Lily Sunga and Peter Roy Munsayac are likewise
settlement of the intestate estate of the late Munsayac Couple. ORDERED to surrender in custodia legis to this Court for the Special Administrator the
“Even the efforts of the petitioners to inhibit respondent Judge further complicated the amount of P15,298,835.95 and P3,010,822.02 plus the legal interest of 12% per annum
intestate proceedings. Thus, there was the Request for Inhibition dated September 28, compounded annually, from May 1995 until fully complied with or a total amount of
1999, which was filed by DE VILLA and SUNGA. Barely a week after the P32,267,868.00, more or less, as of May 2000, within fifteen (15) days from receipt of this
aforesaid Request for Inhibition was filed and before respondent Judge could act on it, Order.
petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus  which was received by ‘SO ORDERED.’
this Court on October 4, 1999, docketed as CA-G.R. SP NO. 55193 which has for its
and the Order dated August 28, 2000, the pertinent portion of which reads—
petitioners and respondents the same respective parties involved in the present petition
‘The order for the petitioners to surrender the amounts stated in this Court’s order dated
before [u]s, and questions, among others, respondent Judge’s Order in open court dated
June 22, 2000 shall stand and the order for the petitioners’ arrest shall not be lifted until
September 29, 1999 directing/ordering DE VILLA to produce by 2:00 p.m. in the afternoon
their full and faithful compliance with the order to place the said money in the legal custody
of the same date certain bank time deposit certificates/documents; and the order of arrest

2
of either the special administrator or this Court. The motion for reconsideration on the In a petition under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court—as distinguished from an ordinary
matter of petitioners’ standing order of arrest is therefore DENIED. appeal of a criminal case in which the whole case is opened for review—the appeal is
limited to the errors assigned by petitioner.14 Since respondents did not contest the
‘SO ORDERED.’ Decision of the CA, no affirmative relief can be sought by or given to them. 15 Thus, not all
were issued by respondent Judge and are now both subject of this present petition x x the issues raised before the appellate court need to be considered by this Court. The sole
x.”7 issue in the present Petition is the question of inhibition of respondent judge.
We emphasize at the outset that the main case from which this Petition arose has
Ruling of the Court of Appeals already been decided by the CA. The Decision is now final and executory. 16 Already
In nullifying the arrest order issued by Judge Reyes, the CA ruled that he had summarily terminated in that main case was Special Proceedings No. 704-R, which had given rise to
ordered the arrest of petitioners without any written charge filed against them or any a number of incidents and petitions including the herein matter. In CA-G.R. SP No. 64025,
hearing conducted thereon. According to the appellate court, “there is nothing in Rule 71 the CA found that Judge Reyes had gravely abused his discretion when he disallowed the
which explicitly allows that the requirements of filing a written charge and hearing in indirect Extrajudicial Partition17 executed by the heirs of the Munsayac spouses. Thus, the
contempt cases may be dispensed with.” 8 It thus set aside the Order of Arrest issued by appellate court disposed as follows:
respondent judge. “WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant special civil action is
Ruling on the request for inhibition filed by petitioners, the CA, however, held that there hereby GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed Orders dated March 1, 2001 and March 21,
was no convincing proof that the demeanor of the trial judge had put him under suspicion, 2001 are hereby NULLIFIED and SET ASIDE, and a new one ENTERED approving the
especially in the light of their clear display of contumacious behavior toward the court. 9 It Extrajudicial Partition between the Heirs of the Spouses Gelacio J. Munsayac, Sr. and
further held that their request for inhibition was unacceptable, because they had come to Vicenta F. Munsayac, and terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R pending before
the court with “unclean hands.”10 respondent Court[.] The parties are hereby ENJOINED to abide by the same.” 18
Hence, this Petition.11 Petitioners, however, argue that since there are still matters pending before the trial judge,
The Issue such as the withdrawal/release of money deposited in custodia legis and the lifting of a
In their Memorandum,12 petitioners submit this sole issue for our consideration: freeze order on certain jewelry, his inhibition is still needed. 19
“With due respect, the Respondent Court of Appeals erred as a matter of law in not We disagree. After the CA terminated Special Proceedings No. 704-R, we see no
ordering the inhibition of the respondent presiding judge WHO, as shown in all his more reason why the inhibition of Judge Reyes should still be an issue. The Petition
actuations and orders, [has] demonstrated vindictiveness, arbitrariness, prejudice and bias therefor has already become moot and academic in view of the termination of the main
against petitioners and partiality in favor of private respondents thereby denying petitioners’ case. How can he be inhibited from a case that has already been decided with finality?
fundamental right to be entitled to an impartial tribunal.” 13 It should be clear that the CA Decision 20 terminating Special Proceedings No. 704-R
found that the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition executed by all the parties was the “final,
The Court’s Ruling complete and absolute settlement of their respective shares and claims as heirs of
The Petition for inhibition has no merit, but the trial judge must lift the freeze order and deceased spouses Gelacio Munsayac, Sr. and Vicenta Munsayac.” 21 As such, any and all
cause the return of property or money still in custodia legis. incidents relating to the special proceedings should also be deemed to have been
Sole Issue: terminated.
Inhibition When Judge Reyes issued his Orders commanding the bank manager of the China
Before delving into the issue of inhibition, we note that the CA Decision nullified and set Bank branch in Baguio City to freeze the safety deposit box of petitioners 22 and to deposit
aside the Order of Arrest issued by Judge Reyes against petitioners. Consequently, the certain amounts in custodia legis,23 he did so as the presiding judge in the probate court
propriety of the Order was no longer raised in this Petition. Neither was it raised by that was hearing Special Proceedings No. 704-R. Now that the case has finally been
respondents. terminated, it follows that neither he nor his court has any more right to hold the properties
that were the subject of his Orders in the special proceedings.

3
 Needless to say, the lifting of any freeze order and the return of any property ORDERED to cause the return of any amount or property originally deposited by
previously deposited with the court should be effected. The judge had no more discretion to petitioners in custodia legis. No pronouncement as to costs.
decide whether the amounts and the property deposited should be released. Likewise, any SO ORDERED.
standing order on any property in relation to the special proceedings should be lifted. This      
ruling reiterates the long-standing principle that a tribunal acting as a probate court
exercises limited jurisdiction.24 However, the determination of whether a property should be
included in the inventory is within its probate jurisdiction. Such determination is only
provisional—not conclusive—in character and subject to the final decision in a separate
action that may be instituted by the parties.25
Neither are we unmindful of the rule that questions on an advance made or allegedly
made by the deceased to any heir may be heard and determined by the court that has
jurisdiction over the estate proceedings; and that the final order of the court thereon shall
be binding on the person raising the questions and on the heirs. 26
In a train of decisions, this Court has consistently enunciated this settled, corollary
principle: generally, a probate court may not decide a question of title or ownership, but it
may do so if the interested parties are all heirs; or the question is one of collation or
advancement; or the parties consent to its assumption of jurisdiction and the rights of third
parties are not impaired.27 These principles, however, have no more application in this
case, since the main proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estate of the deceased
couple have already been decided and terminated. Indeed, every litigation must come to
an end.28
To be sure, this Court is not tasked to look into the ownership of the properties
deposited with or ordered frozen by the lower court during the progress of the special
proceedings. Neither can Judge Reyes do so now. Whether those properties should have
been adjudicated by the legal heirs of the Munsayac spouses is beside the point at this
time. The former have already entered into an Extrajudicial Partition representing the final,
complete and absolute settlement of their shares as heirs of the latter. What is left to be
done is simply the lifting of any freeze order and the release of any property originally
deposited by petitioners in custodia legis.
In view of the above ruling, we deem it necessary to direct Judge Reyes to
immediately lift any freeze order still pending and to order the release of any property
deposited in custodia legis. It is already an accepted rule of procedure for this Court to
strive to settle the entire controversy in a single proceeding, leaving no root or branch to
bear the seeds of future litigation. 29 To achieve that end and to expedite the case in the
interest of substantial justice, a directive to the trial judge to lift the freeze order and release
the property deposited with the court becomes indispensable. 30
WHEREFORE, the prayer for the inhibition of Judge Antonio C. Reyes is hereby
DENIED for being moot and academic. However, he is DIRECTED to immediately lift any
order he made on properties relative to Special Proceedings No. 704-R. He is further