CRIM LINAL LAW 2 CASE DIGEST

(ART. 246-250)

BAGAYAS, JAY CARLO S.

1 - Al-Farabi
August 6, 2020

People of the Philippines vs. Manuel Macal

G.R. No. 211062, January 13, 2016

FACTS:
Manuel Macal killed his wife Auria Ytac (Auria). The killing was started when
Manuel arrived in Tacloban City from Manila on February 12, 2003. Before Manuel
could reach their bedroom, his brother-in-law, Alvin stopped him because Auria was
with a man. However, Manuel persisted. Upon entering the bedroom, Manuel saw Auria
conversing with a man who was situated in another side of the room. Angered. Manuel
delivered a stab blow towards the man but Auria shielded the latter. Instead, Auria got
hit on her chest.
The man eventually ran and got away from the area. Out of Manuel’s frustration,
he wounded himself and ran out of the house. Auria was rushed to the hospital but was
pronounced dead on arrival.

ISSUE:
Does the crime committed qualify under Art. 247 instead of Art. 246 of the
Revised Penal Code ?

RULING:
No, it does not.
The most important element of Art. 247 is the killing of a spouse and a paramour
in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.
In this case, Auria and the man inside the bedroom vwas not engaged in any
sexual activity upon the discovery of Manuel. Thus, the crime committed of the
accused-appellant is parricide which is under Art. 246 of the Revised Penal Code.
 PEOPLE V. JUGUETA

G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016

FACTS:

Evidence adduced show that the family of Norberto Divina were all lying down
side by side about to sleep on June 6, 2002 at around 9:00 o’clock in the evening, when
suddenly their wall made of sack was stripped off by appellant and his
companions.They ordered him to go out of their house and when he refused despite his
plea for mercy, they fired at them successively and indiscriminately, having hit and killed
his two daughters, Mary Grace Divina and Claudine who were 13 years old and 3 ½
years old respectively. In Criminal Case No. 7698-G, appellant was charged with
Double Murder, defined and penalized under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. In
Criminal Case No. 7702-G, appellant, together with Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel, was charged with Multiple Attempted Murder.

However, based on the sworn statement of one Danilo Fajarillo, the Provincial
Prosecutor found no prima facie case against Gilbert Estores and Roger San
Miguel.Appellant was then convicted by the trial court of Double Murder and Multiple
Attempted Murder.Aggrieved by the trial court’s judgments, appellant appealed to the
CA, which rendered a Decision affirming appellant’s conviction for the crimes charged.

 ISSUE:

Whether the appellant is guilty of the crimes charged.

RULING:

Murder is defined under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code as the unlawful
killing of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, attended by circumstances such
as treachery or evident premeditation. The trial court correctly ruled that appellant is
liable for murder because treachery attended the killing of Norberto’s two children.
Minor children, who by reason of their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a
defense. When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery exists.

In this case, the prosecution has clearly established the intent to kill on the part of
appellant as shown by the use of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the
manner of, the commission of the crime. The Court quoted with approval the trial court’s
finding that appellant is liable for attempted murder.In view of the attendant ordinary
aggravating circumstance, the Court must modify the penalties imposed on appellant.
 Etino v. People
G.R. No. 206632, 14 February 2018

FACTS:
Petitioner was charged with the crime of frustrated homicide in an Information
dated 19 June 2003. During the trial, Leyble testified that, "at about 4:30 o'clock in the
afternoon of 5 November 2001, while he and his companions[,] Isidro Maldecir nnd
Richard Magno, were walking on their way home to Bgy. [sic] Pispis, Maasin, Iloilo, he
was shot with a 12 gauge shotgun by the [petitioner,] Eden Etino, hitting the back
portion of his right shoulder and other parts of his body." The RTC found petitioner guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of frustrated homicide.
ISSUE:
Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that his guilt for the charged crime
of frustrated homicide was proven beyond reasonable doubt, since the physician who
examined the victim was not presented in court.
RULING:
It is settled that "where there is nothing in the evidence to show that the wound
would be fatal if not medically attended to, the character of the wound is doubtful," and
such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused. In this case, we find that the
prosecution failed to present evidence to prove that the victim would have died from his
wound without timely medical assistance, as his Medical Certificate 35 alone, absent
the testimony of the physician who diagnosed and treated him, or any physician for that
matter, is insufficient proof of the nature and extent of his injury. This is especially true,
given that said Medical Certificate merely stated the victim's period of confinement at
the hospital, the location of the gunshot wounds, the treatments he received, and his
period of healing, Without such proof, the character of the gunshot wounds that the
victim sustained enters the realm of doubt, which the Court must necessarily resolve in
favor of petitioner
 Guillermo Wacoy v. People of the Philippines
G.R. No. 213792, June 22, 2015

Facts:

Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide... he saw Wacoy
kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at Aro but was
restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him... on the stomach,
causing him to collapse and cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.

Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the
jejunum... he sustained a perforation on his ileum... that... caused intestinal bleeding,
and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid contents from the
bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was
revived through cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the...
operation... ue to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the
doctor's orders and eventually, died the next day.

Issues:

Whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide?

Ruling:

The petition is without merit.

There was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died. On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2)
persons, Wacoy and Quibac, who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and
attacked... him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks on the poor
victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a
reciprocal aggression in that fateful incident.

if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.[30] In such... case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is
Homicide because with respect to crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks
particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the aggressor
responsible for all the consequences... thereof.
 People of the Philippines v. Edgar Jumawan
G.R. No. 187495, April 21, 2014

FACTS:

           Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children. Edgar
would tend to driving and deliveries while KKK would dwell into dealerships for their
business. With the success of their business, they were able to buy a lot and built a
house in Cagayan De Oro City. KKK would go to Bukidnon some days a week to
procure supplies for their business and return to Cagayan on the same day.
In 1998, Edgar and KKK would start quarrelling usually upon his complaint that
she failed to attend to him. On October 16 of the same year, KKK and her children went
about in their nightly routine. KKK and Edgar would proceed to their conjugal room. KKK
changed into a daster and fixed their beds but she insisted to stay on the cot and
explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to her forthcoming
menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from the
bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified,
KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed. After
which, Edgar showed his interest by taping KKK’s lap but the latter warded him off.
Edgar persisted despite KKK’s rejection and forcefully pulled her panties. Edgar got his
way with KKK. Same thing happened on the next day, only this occurred in their
children’s bedroom and with much greater force.
Their children expressed their worry towards their mother and convinced KKK to
file a case towards Edgar, her husband, for two separate charges of rape. However, in
an appeal, Edgar claims that this case should be viewed and treated differently from
ordinary rape cases and that the standards for determining the presence of consent or
lack thereof must be adjusted on the ground that sexual community is a mutual right
and obligation between husband and wife.

ISSUE:

                Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

RULING:

                Yes. The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over
their wives’ bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not
consensual, is rape.
 According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual
violence, exists within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or
against her will commits sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines,

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff-Appellee,-versus-BERNIE

CONCEPCION,Accused-Appellant.G.R. No. 214886,

FACTS:

On February 17, 2001, at around 5:00 p.m., AAA arrived home in a tricycle,
bringing with her a sack of rice. Concepcion was at the gate of the house, drunk, when
AAA arrived. She went inside the house to place her lunchbox and to find someone to
help her carry the sack of rice. Concepcion intercepted her at the garage area. He held
a knife to her back and dragged her to his room. Then he locked his room and blocked
its door using his bed. Concepcion then pulled AAA to the bed and told her to undress.
She begged Concepcion not to rape her. He undressed her, pulled down his pants, cut
her underwear using his knife, and then inserted his hand in her vagina. AAA felt pain
and struggled. Then, Concepcion inserted his penis into her vagina. The Regional Trial
Court found Concepcion guilty of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. The
Court of Appeals also found that the prosecution established the elements of abduction.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that the crime of rape absorbed the forcible
abduction, considering that it was established that the forcible abduction of AAA was for
the purpose of raping her.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the accused may be convicted of a separate crime of other than
rape.

RULING:

Yes. The facts as found by the Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals
show that after raping AAA, accused-appellant continued to detain her and refused to
release her even after raping her. Thus, although the initial abduction of AAA may have
been absorbed by the crime of rape, the continued detention of AAA after the rape
cannot be deemed absorbed in it. Likewise, since the detention continued after the rape
had been completed, it cannot be deemed a necessary means for the crime of rape.
The felony of slight illegal detention has four (4) elements:1.That the offender is a
private individual.2.That he kidnaps or detains another, or m any other manner deprives
him of hisliberty.3.That the act of kidnapping or detention isillegal.4.That the crime is
committed without the attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in Art. 267.
The elements of slight illegal detention are all present here. Accused-appellant is a
private individual. The Court of Appeals found that after raping AAA, accused-appellant
continued to detain her and to deprive her of her liberty. It also appreciated AAA's
testimony that accused-appellant placed electrical wires around the room to electrocute
anyone who might attempt to enter it. He refused to release AAA even after his
supposed demands were met. The detention was illegal and not attended by the
circumstances that would render it serious illegal detention. Thus, this Court finds
accused-appellant guilty of the crime of slight illegal detention.

People of the Philippines vs. Aaron Flores

G.R. No. 116488, May 31, 2001

Facts:
On the night of September 29, 1992, the victim, Samson Sayam, was
drinking beer at the store where the defendants are also drinking beer. Sayam
joined the accused at their table and after sometine they left the store and walked
towardss the direction of the military detachment headquarters. After the accused
left the store with Samson Sayam, witnesses heard a single gunshot followed by
rapid firing coming from the direction of the detachment headquarters. That was
the last time Samson Sayam was seen, and despite diligent efforts of Sayam’s
mother and relatives, he has not been found.
The trial court held that the four accused were responsible for Sayam’s
disappearance since Sayam has not been seen or heard since then. All the
accused vehemently denied committing the acts charged.

Issue:
Is Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code violated by the accused?

Ruling:
No, the accused did not violate Art. 267 of The Revised Penal Code.
Article 267 of The Revised Penal Code states that “Kidnapping and
serious illegal detention. – Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain
another, or in any manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death.”
In this case, accused-appellants cannot be charged with or convicted of
the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, since the first element of
the said crime is that the offender must be a private individual. Accused-
appellants were members of the local CAFGU at the time the alleged crime was
committed.
 People of the Philippines vs. Jerry Pepino, et. Al.
G.R. No. 174471, January 12, 2016

Facts:
Jerry Pepino with his two companions entered the office of Edward Tan
then handcuffed and forced him to go with them. Edward Tan’s wife, Jocelyn
Tan, saw Pepino take her husband away. They then negotiated Jocelyn Tan who
agreed to give a ransom money worth Php 700,000.00. After having the ransom
money, they released Edward Tan at the UP Diliman Campus inside his own car.
He was instructed to remove his blindfold 5 after 5 minutes. The NBI
apprehended some suspects, Pepino, Gomez, and Mario Galgo and were
positively identified by Edward Tan.

Issue:
Are the accused in violation of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code?

Ruling:
Yes, the accused violated Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
The elements of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention are as follows: (1) that the offender is a private
individual; (2) that he kidnaps or detains another or in any other manner deprives
the latter of his liberty; (3) that the act of detention or kidnapping must be illegal;
and (4) that in the commission of the offense, any of the following circumstances
is present: (a) that the kidnapping or detention lasts for more than three (3) days;
or (b) that it is committed by simulating public authority; or (c) that any serious
physical injuries are inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained or threats to
kill him are made; or (d) that the person kidnapped or detained is a minor,
female, or a public officer.
In this case, all the elements have been established by the prosecution.
Edward Tan also positively identified Gomez and Pepino. They also not only
demanded but received ransom for Edward’s release. Hence, the accused are
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime kidnapping and serious illegal
detention under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code.
 People of the Philippines vs. Paera; May 30, 2011

FACTS:

As punong barangay, Santiago allocated his constituent’s use of communal

water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of his
contituents. Despite Santiago’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the
tank. Santiago reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and
cut Indalecios access.

The following day, Santiago inspected the tank after constituents complained of
water supply interruption. Santiago discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly
disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, Santiago, using a borrowed
bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. Santiago then,
without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio,
shouting Patyon tikaw! (I will kill you!). Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the
way, Diosetea. Upon seeing Santiago, Diosetea inquired what the matterwas.

Instead of replying, Santiago shouted

“Wala koy gipili, bisag babaye ka, patyon tikaw!” (I dont spare anyone, even if you are a
woman, I will kill you!). Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house
of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, Santiago turned his attention back to Indalecio. As
Santiago chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust
his bolo towards him, shouting “Bisag gulang ka, buk-on nako imo ulo!” (Even if you are old,
I will crack open your skull!).

Santiago was charged for three (3) counts of Grave Threats.

Santiago claimed that he can only be charged for a single count of the continued
complex crime of Grave Threats. He argued that there is a single crime committed through
series of acts arising from one criminal intent. 

ISSUE:

Whether Santiago is guilty of three counts of Grave Threats.

RULING:

Yes.Santiago is liable for three counts of Grave Threats.

Article 282 of the RPC holds liable for Grave Threats any person who shall
threaten another with the infliction upon the person x x x of the latter or his family of any
wrong amounting to a crime. This felony is consummated as soon as the threats come
to the knowledge of the person threatened.

Applying these parameters, it is clear that Santiago’s threat to kill  Indalecio and
Diosetea and crack open Vicentes skull are wrongs on the person amounting to (at the
very least) homicide and serious physical injuries as penalized under the RPC. These
threats were consummated as soon as Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente heard Santiago
utter his threatening remarks. Having spoken the threats at different points in time to
these three individuals, albeit in rapid succession, Santiago incurred three separate
criminal liabilities.

Santiago’s theory fusing his liability to one count of Grave Threats because he
only had a single mental resolution, a single impulse, and single intent to threaten
Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente assumes a vital fact: that he had foreknowledge
of Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicentes presence near the water tank. The facts, however,
belie this assumption. Thus, in the case of Indalecio, Santiago was as much surprised
to see Indalecio as the latter was in seeing Santiago when they chanced upon each
other near the water tank. Similarly, Santiago came across Diosetea as he was
chasing Indalecio who had scampered for safety. Lastly, Santiago crossed paths with
Vicente while running after Indalecio. Indeed, Santiago went to the water tank not to
execute his single intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente but to investigate
a suspected water tap. Not having known in advance of Indalecio, Diosetea, and
Vicente’s presence near the water tank at the time in question, Santiago could not have
formed any intent to threaten any of them until shortly before he inadvertently came
across each of them.

Santiago’s intent to threaten Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente with bodily harm

arose only when he chanced upon each of his victims.

Indeed, Santiagos theory holds water only if the facts are altered that is, he
threatened Indalecio, Diosetea, and Vicente at the same place and at the same time.
Had this been true, then Santiagos liability for one count of Grave Threats.
 Escolano vs. People of the Philippines

G.R. No. 226991, December 10, 2018

Facts:
A sibling and AAA was playing paper planes from the 3 rd floor of their
house when the plane landed in front of the house of Perlin, the daughter of the
petitioner. Perlin uttered “putang ina” directed at AAA’s brother.
The following day, the siblings saw Perlin in front of their house and threw
ketchup sachets at her however it was the Petitionier who was hit by the sachets.
Petitioner exclaimed “ Putang ina niyo” and other insults and invectives at them.
DDD, the mother of AAA confronted the petitioner who went inside her
house, came out with a bolo and threatened DDD to kill them. Petitioner was
charged with violation of Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 by the RTC and affirmed by
the CA. Petitioner pleaded not guilty to the offense charged.

Issue:
Is the petitioner violative of Sec. 10(a) of R.A No. 7610?

Ruling:
No, the petitioner did not violate Sec. 10(a) of R.A No. 7610
Sec. 10(a) of R.A. No. 7610 requires an intent to debase, degrade, or
demean the intrinsic worth of a child victim.
In this case, the Court finds that the act of petitioner in shouting invectives
does not constitute child abuse. It was rather an act carelessly done out of anger.
Also, the alleged hacking gestures and the expression “putang ina mo” were not
specifically directed to the children; rather, these were made against their
mother. Given the surrounding circumstances, the offense committed falls under
Art. 285, par. 2 of the RPC since the threat does not amount to a crime and the
prosecution did not establish that petitioner persisted in the idea involved in her
threat.