ANNUAL OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES AT CEU

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VOL. 24

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2018
ANNUAL OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES AT CEU

VOL. 24 2018

Central European University

Budapest
ANNUAL OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES
AT CEU

VOL. 24 2018

Edited by
Gerhard Jaritz, Kyra Lyublyanovics, Ágnes Drosztmér

Central European University

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Department of Medieval Studies
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 TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editors’ Preface.............................................................................................................. 5
I. ARTICLES AND STUDIES .............................................................................. 7
Anna Aklan
The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek
and Indian Philosophy ........................................................................................ 9
Viktoriia Krivoshchekova
Bishops at Ordination in Early Christian Ireland:
The Thought World of a Ritual ....................................................................... 26
Aglaia Iankovskaia
Travelers and Compilers: Arabic Accounts
of Maritime Southeast Asia (850–1450) ......................................................... 40
Mihaela Vučić
The Apocalyptic Aspect of St. Michael’s Cult in Eleventh-Century Istria........... 50
Stephen Pow
Evolving Identities: A Connection between
Royal Patronage of Dynastic Saints’ Cults and
Arthurian Literature in the Twelfth Century ..................................................... 65
Eszter Tarján
Foreign Lions in England .................................................................................. 75
Aron Rimanyi
Closing the Steppe Highway: A New Perspective
on the Travels of Friar Julian of Hungary ........................................................ 99
Virág Somogyvári
“Laugh, My Love, Laugh:” Mottos, Proverbs and Love Inscriptions
on Late Medieval Bone Saddles ........................................................................ 113
Eszter Nagy
A Myth in the Margin: Interpreting the Judgment of Paris Scene
in Rouen Books of Hours ............................................................................... 129
Patrik Pastrnak
The Bridal Journey of Bona Sforza ................................................................. 145
Iurii Rudnev
Benvenuto Cellini’s Vita: An Attempt at Reinstatement
to the Florentine Academy? .............................................................................. 157
 Felicitas Schmieder
Representations of Global History in the Later Middle Ages –
and What We Can Learn from It Today ........................................................ 168
II. REPORT ON THE YEAR ............................................................................ 182
Katalin Szende
Report of the Academic Year 2016–17 .......................................................... 185
Abstracts of MA Theses Defended in 2017 ................................................. 193
PhD Defenses in the Academic Year 2016–17 ............................................ 211
 THE SNAKE AND ROPE ANALOGY IN GREEK
AND INDIAN PHILOSOPHY1

Anna Aklan

Abstract

This article is concerned with the writings of Sextus Empiricus (second century
CE), a Sceptic philosopher whose works show a remarkable plenitude of similar
elements that occur frequently within various Indian philosophies. Following
Aram M. Frenkian’s investigation, this study re-examines one of the three
elements identified by Frenkian as Indian influences on Sextus’ oeuvre: the smoke-
fire illustration, the snake-rope analogy, and the quadrilemma. The same elements,
among others, were identified by Thomas McEvilley as evidence of Greek influence
on Madhyamaka Buddhism. After inspecting the supposedly earliest occurrences
in both Greek and Indian philosophy and literature, we must acknowledge, at
least until other evidence arises, that these three elements are not indicators of
direct borrowing. The presence of the same similes and verbal expression in both
Indian and Greek philosophical contexts, however, is most probably an indicator
of intellectual exchange, even if this is not due to direct influence out of textual
contact but more likely arising from verbal communication. It seems practical
to postulate a “common pool” of philosophical expressions, a certain distinct
philosophical language, which was available to philosophers of both cultures.
Various authors used these similes as building blocks in the expression of their
theories, and they used them as it best suited their purposes.

Keywords

Sextus Empiricus; snake-and-rope; comparative philosophy; Pyrrhonism; Indian

influence

1
This article is a shortened version of a subchapter of my doctoral dissertation currently
in preparation. I would like to express my gratitude to Ferenc Ruzsa for his valuable help and
comments. I am also grateful to the École française d’Extrême Orient, and its Pondicherry Centre,
for supporting this research.

9
Anna Aklan

Introduction

Parallels between the writings of Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210 CE) and stock
examples of Indian philosophy were first published by Aram M. Frenkian.2 He
studied three similarities present in both contexts: 1) the smoke and fire example
used to illustrate inference in logical deductions; 2) the snake and rope example,
attributed to Carneades (214–128 BCE), and used to illustrate mistakes in
perception; 3) the usage of a logical device called quadrilemma or tetralemma
in ancient philosophy and catus. kot. i in Indian literature. Frenkian’s overarching
conclusion, based on the investigation of these three similarities, was that
Indian thought exercised influence over Greek philosophy through the channel
of Greek Scepticism. It started with the founder of the Sceptic school, Pyrrho
(360–270 BCE), who lived in India and learned from Indian sages. According to
Diogenes Laertius and other sources, Pyrrho acquired the core of his philosophy,
later known as Pyrrhonism or Scepticism, from the “naked Indian sages” – the
gymnosophists. The Indian influence on Pyrrho’s thought was also corroborated
by Everard Flintoff ’s seminal study.3 Sextus Empiricus is the most well-known
figure of ancient Pyrrhonism, who lived several centuries after Pyrrho, and
the only ancient Sceptic who left voluminous works on Scepticism. According
to Frenkian’s hypothesis, there was, after Pyrrho, another instance of Indian
influence through Carneades, as is shown by the snake and rope analogy.
In his detailed article about the Aristotelian and Indian inferences, Ferenc
Ruzsa4 also tackles the question of Indian influence on Sextus’ writings. Citing
Flintoff on the Indian influence on Pyrrho, and referring to Frenkian, he similarly
supports the view of Indian influence over Sextus through the mediation of the
founding figure of Greek Scepticism, Pyrrho.
Contrary to Frenkian and Ruzsa, but based on the same three philosophical
similarities, Thomas McEvilley5 in his groundbreaking and monumental volume
on Indo-Greek philosophical relations, The Shape of Ancient Thought, postulates an
opposite direction of influence, namely, from Greece to India. While the former

2
Aram M. Frenkian, “Sextus Empiricus and Indian Logic,” Philosophical Quarterly (India) 30 (1957):
115–26. Aram M. Frenkian, Scepticismul Grec (Bucharest: Editura Academiei Republicii Populare
Romîne, 1996).
3
E. Flintoff, “Pyrrho and India,” Phronesis 25,1 (1980): 88–108.
4
Ferenc Ruzsa, “A szerszám és a módszer” [The tool and the method], in Töredékes Hagyomány.
Steiger Kornélnak. [Fragmentary tradition. For Kornel Steiger], 239–70 (Budapest: Akadémiai Kiadó,
2007), 240–41.
5
Thomas McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought (New York: Allworth Press, 2002), 498–499.

10
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

two scholars, a Classical Philologist and an Indologist respectively, maintain that

despite the chronological difficulties regarding the available texts, the examples
are the natives of India as opposed to Greek philosophy, McEvilley insists
on emphasizing chronology. He concludes that Buddhism and especially “the
Mādhyamika dialectic somehow came from Greece,” arguing that Nāgārjuna, the
great Buddhist philosopher and founder of the Buddhist school called the Middle
Path (Madhyamaka), was directly influenced by Greek dialectic.6
As is clear from this summary, the three major similarities present in
Sextus’ text and in Indian philosophical writings (smoke-fire, snake-rope, and
quadrilemma) inspired serious scholars to postulate influence from one culture
to the other, partly based on the question of chronology. Karl Potter, however,
the editor of the ongoing project, the Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies (now in its
thick twenty-second volume), opined on Frenkian’s hypothesis in the following
way: “All in all, we must be sober in our judgments on this exciting possibility of
mutual East-West influence; repeated efforts by reputable scholars have found
precious little to show any conscious borrowing.”7
In the present article, the snake-rope analogy is discussed in both Greek and
Indian cultural contexts.8 We study texts which have not been hitherto studied
in the scope of enquiry about Sextus’ hypothetical Indian connection, in order
to revisit the propositions of earlier scholars and to conduct thorough research
involving all available texts, facilitating our understanding on whether there is any
pattern we can conclusively recognize in the available data.9 Finally, we are going
to place our results in the context of all three similarities. While the other two are
not described in their detailed study in the present article, the results about them
will be summarized in order to give an overall picture on the question of Sextus’
Indian connections.

6
Ibid., 503.
. .
7
Karl Potter, ed., Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies. Vol. 2, The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśes ika up to Gan
geśa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977), 17.
8
In my dissertation, I study all three similarities separately.
9
We must stress the difficulty of available texts on both the Greek and the Indian side. Many texts
have been lost or are fragmentary on the Greek side. On the Indian side, the primacy of verbal
teaching versus written tradition must be remembered especially when dealing with early phases
of philosophy. Chronological difficulties are omnipresent. Additionally, many early Buddhist texts
exist only in Tibetan or Chinese translations. Furthermore, due to the vast material, it is possible
that some occurrences of the similarities simply escape our attention. New evidence in the form of
papyrus, manuscript or epigraphical discoveries might always come to light. In the article we give an
exhaustive picture of the data that is available to us presently, but these precautions must be born
in mind.

11
Anna Aklan

The snake and rope analogy

The snake and rope analogy, i.e. mistaking a rope for a snake in a dark room, appears
in Sextus Empiricus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Pyrrhoneae Hypotyposes, PH I. 227–228)
and in his Against the Logicians (Adversus Mathematicos, M VII. 187–188) to illustrate
the Academic Carneades’ theory of perception. In Indian philosophical writings, the
image is an omnipresent stock example as a metaphor for the erroneous perception
of metaphysical reality, first appearing in Buddhist writings but becoming especially
popular through Vedānta. The image compares a person stepping into a dark
room and mistaking a coiled rope for a snake to an ignorant person who does
not know the real nature of the world. The content of this “real nature” differs
from school to school: for some Buddhist schools, it is emptiness (śūnyatā), and
for the Yogācāra Buddhist school, it is consciousness-only (vijñapti-mātra); for the
orthodox school Advaita Vedānta, it is Brahman. All schools, however, use this
analogy to illustrate the error in the perception of metaphysical reality. Additionally,
the different schools in Indian philosophies all developed epistemological theories,
together with often elaborate theories of perception, where they also enumerated
various defects of perception.10 It is curious, however, that we have found only one
instance11 where the analogy appears in a purely epistemological context, remaining
far more frequent in metaphysical discussions on the Indian side.

Greek texts

In the Greek context, two occurrences that resemble the analogy are present
in texts before Sextus: in Aesop’s Proverbia 132 (c. third century BCE)12, and in
Demetrius’ De elocutione §159 (c. second century BCE). 13 The first occurrence of
something resembling the snake-rope analogy is the following: “The one who has
been bitten by the snake is scared even of the rope.”14
Although Aesop is generally dated to the sixth century BCE, he is more a
legendary character than a historical author and the fables and proverbs extant
under his name cannot be dated with certainty. It is probable that the collection

10
For an exhaustive survey, see Jadunath Sinha, Indian Psychology (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner & Co. Ltd., 1934).
11
On the writings of the seventh-century Buddhist commentator Dharmakīrti, see below.
12
Ruzsa, “A szerszám és a módszer.” Ruzsa calls the metaphor the most spectacular Indian motif
in Sextus.
13
Frenkian, “Sextus Empiricus and Indian Logic,” 123.
14
Ὁ δηχθεὶς ὑπὸ ὄφεως καὶ τὸ σχοινίον φοβεῖται. Aesop, Proverbia, 132. B. E. Perry, “Aesop. Proverbia,”
in Aesopica (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1952), 265–91. My translation is provided here.

12
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

of the proverbs dates to the second half of the first millennium BCE. It is also
noteworthy that the transmission of Aesopian fables is due to Demetrius of
Phalerum (third century BCE),15 the author to whom our second occurrence of
the snake-rope example is attributed. The second occurrence of the analogy is
not identical to what we find in Sextus in phrasing – but it is so in imagery:
Release from fear is also often a source of charm, for example a man
needlessly afraid, mistaking a strip of leather for a snake or [an earthen
vessel]16 for a gaping hole in the ground – mistakes which are rather
comic in themselves.17
This text is attributed to Demetrius of Phalerum (c. 350–283 BCE),18
statesman and Peripatetic philosopher. The scholarly consensus denies the
possibility of this attribution and many agree that the text was written in about
the second century BCE, with attributions ranging from 270 BCE to the first
century CE.19 Regarding our main investigation, it suffices to determine that the
text is definitely pre-Sextian.
The author of the treatise on style and rhetoric uses this illustration in a
description about different topics for charm (charis) (156–162§), where the subjects
of the elegant style are enumerated: “proverb, fable, groundless fear, comparison
and hyperbole.”20 The occurrence of the snake-rope analogy in a context
clearly related to the Aesopean genre strengthens the previous observation: the
misperception of a rope or a strap as a snake could have been present in everyday
Greek experience without relation to Indian philosophy.

15
H. J. Blackham, “The Fable in Literature,” in The Fable as Literature, 1–33 (London: Bloomsbury
Academic, 1985), 7.
16
Innes’ translation “a bread oven” is correct inasmuch as κρίβανος is used for baking bread, but it
is actually an earthenware vessel. See Liddell-Scott-Jones: “covered earthen vessel, wider at bottom
than at top, wherein bread was baked by putting hot embers round it.” The Online Liddell-Scott-Jones,
http://stephanus.tlg.uci.edu/lsj/#eid=1&context=lsj [Accessed April, 2018].
17
Πολλάκις δὲ καὶ ἐ κ φόβου ἀ λλασσομένου γίνεται χάρις, ὅ ταν διακενῆ ς τις φοβηθῇ , οἷ ον τὸν
ἱμάντα ὡς ὄφιν ἢ τὸν κρίβανον ὡ ς χάσμα τῆ ς γῆ ς, ἅ περ καὶ αὐ τὰ κωμῳδικώτερά ἐστιν. Demetrius,
De elocutione, 159. §, transl. by Doreen Innes in Demetrius, “On Style,” in Aristotle: Poetics. Longinus:
On the Sublime. Demetrius: On Style, ed. Doreen Innes (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1995), 307–523.
18
Tiziano Dorandi, “Chronology,” in The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, ed. Keimpe
Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcolm Schofield (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999), 49–50.
19
Demetrius, “On Style,” 311.
20
Demetrius, “On Style,” 335.

13
Anna Aklan

These early occurrences, although not identical with the later appearance
of the analogy, allude to mistaking a rope for a snake based on their similar
properties. Its attribution to Aesop, the representative of everyday wit as opposed
to high standards of literary or philosophical traditions, and also its appearance in
comedy, alludes to the presence of the potential for mistaken perception of the
two objects within common, indigenous Greek experience.
In Sextus Empiricus’ works, the illustration is brought up to illuminate
the position of the New Academy about impressions (phantasia). Impressions
themselves are discussed within the wider context of the criterium: whether anything
that can be applied as a criterium for truth exists. The head (scholarch) of the
Academy, Arcesilaus, who became head in 264 BCE, led the school into its Sceptic
phase. He maintained that there is no criterion of truth, and thus all knowledge is
impossible.21 The next scholarch, Carneades (214–129 BCE),22 developed this idea
and admitted grounds for action on the basis that subjective impressions arising
from sense-perception can be regarded as apparently true (phainomenē alēthē),23 and
thus can provide a basis for action in everyday life.24 This type of impression has
to fulfil three requirements: it must be plausible, probable or persuasive (pithanē),
unobstructed (aperispastos)25, and thoroughly tested (perihōdeumenē or diexhōdeumenē).26

21
R. G. Bury, Sextus Empiricus. Outlines of Pyrrhonism (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1933), xxxii–xxxiii.
22
Dorandi, “Chronology,” 48–9.
23
M VII, 166.
24
Bury, Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, xxxvi.
25
Both Bury’s “irreversible” and Bett’s “not turned away” for phantasia aperispastos seem to be
lacking. Bett is right that etymologically the literal meaning of the word is “not turned away.” This
literal translation, however, does not yield the real meaning and the genre of the technical term
in the passage. Bury’s “irreversible,” while also retaining the etymology, does not help the reader
to understand what the concept means: the impression, in order to reach the mind and provide
grounds for further action, cannot be turned back from the mind of the perceiver on the grounds
that there is already another cognition which is contrary to the new perception. Sextus gives two
similar examples to this. In PH I., 228–9, Admestus would not believe that he saw Alcestis alive
due to his previous knowledge that she had died. In M VII., 180, Menelaus does not believe that
he sees Helen on the island of Pharos due to his previous knowledge that he had left Helen on his
own ship (and the Helen on the ship in reality was only a phantom). In both cases, the previous
knowledge turns the new cognition away. It does not let the new cognition be recognized by the
perceiver. Due to the lack of a proper English word for the term, I tentatively accept Péter Lautner’s
Hungarian version, “unobstructed impression,” and provide it in English to yield a rough equivalent
of the term phantasia aperispastos. Péter Lautner, “Sextus Empiricus: A pürrhonizmus alapvonalai
[Sextus Empiricus: The basics of Pyrrhonism],” in Antik szkepticizmus [Antique skepticism], ed.
Gábor Kendeffy (Budapest: Atlantisz, 1998), 228.
26
M VII, 176–82.

14
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

The example of the snake and the rope appears as an illustration to the probable
and thoroughly tested impression. As is usual with Sextus’ Outlines of Pyrrhonism
and Against the Logicians, similar explanations are given in the two works, except
for the one in the latter is more elaborate. Here, just as in PH,27 the example is
used to illustrate the plausible and tested impression.
M VII. 187–188. For example, someone observing a coil of rope in an
unlit room immediately jumps over it, supposing it to be in fact a snake.
But after this he turns round and examines what is true, and finding it
motionless he already has in his thinking an inclination towards its not
being a snake. Still, figuring that snakes are sometimes motionless when
they go stiff from winter cold, he pokes the coil with a stick, and then,
after thus exploring from all angles the appearance that strikes him, he
assents to its being false that the body made apparent to him is a snake.28
The example fits the theory perfectly well: an epistemological mistake which
can be corrected due to close inspection. It seems to be an everyday-life example
that illustrates the theoretical concept appropriately.
Sextus places the example in the theory of impressions developed by
Carneades. Was it the latter who used the snake-rope analogy originally or is it
simply an addition on Sextus’ part?29 Unfortunately, we lack evidence to state

27
PH I, 227–28.
28
οἷον ἐν ἀλαμπεῖ οἰ κήματι εἵ λημα σχοινίου θεασάμενός τις παραυτίκα μὲν ὄ φιν ὑ πολαβὼν τυγχάνειν
ὑπερήλατο, τὸ δὲ μετὰ τοῦ το ὑ ποστρέψας ἐ ξετάζει τἀ ληθές, καὶ εὑ ρὼν ἀ κίνητον ἤ δη μὲν εἰ ς τὸ
μὴ εἶναι ὄφιν ῥ οπὴ ν ἴ σχει κατὰ τὴ ν διάνοιαν, ὅ μως δὲ λογιζόμενος ὅ τι καὶ ὄ φεις ποτὲ ἀ κινητοῦ σι
χειμερινῷ κρύει παγέντες, βακτηρίᾳ καθικνεῖ ται τοῦ σπειράματος, καὶ τότε οὕ τως ἐ κπεριοδεύσας τὴ ν
προσπίπτουσαν φαντασίαν συγκατατίθεται τῷ ψεῦ δος εἶναι τὸ ὄ φιν ὑ πάρχειν τὸ φαντασθὲν αὐ τῷ
σῶμα. M VII, 187.4–188.5, transl. Richard Bett, Sextus Empiricus. Against the Logicians (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005).
29
Karl Potter quotes Frenkian in the following way: “The image of the coiled rope taken for a
snake was used as illustration of the doctrine of Carneades in the 2nd century BC” (see Potter,
Encyclopaedia 2, 19). This can be understood, and has been understood by numerous scholars, to
mean that it was Carneades who first used this example to illustrate his theory about perception
(see, for example, Suzanne Obdrzalek, “Carneades’ Pithanon and Its Relation to Epoche and
Apraxia,” The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter 354 (2002), or Alfred Schutz, “The Problem
of Carneades; Variations on a Theme,” in Collected Papers V. Phenomenology and the Social Sciences, ed.
Lester Embree, [Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), 101–23].) They base this assumption solely on Sextus
M 182–188, where Sextus gives a summary of the explicitly Carneadean theory of perception. When
moving on to examples, however, his parlance changes to a rather loquacious style and there is no
hint that he is retelling an earlier example. Besides the snake-rope example, he also gives further
illustrations to the theory, e.g., the notion of the unobstructed impression with the examples of
Menelaus and Helene and Alcestis and Admetus (M VII.180, 186.) Were these all original examples

15
Anna Aklan

anything conclusive on this question. Besides Sextus, the other main source of
information about Carneades’ teachings are the writings of Cicero which are silent
about this illustration. It seems equally possible that it was either Carneades who
used this metaphor or that it was Sextus who invented the metaphor to illustrate
the Carneadian theory. From the lack of the example in Cicero, the probability of
Sextus’ invention seems greater.

Indian texts

On the Indian side, the picture is more complex. Surprisingly, the example is not
present in Sanskrit texts before the second century CE. This is truly astonishing
because in subsequent philosophical works the image of the snake-rope mistake
becomes widespread. Potter is definitely right when, commenting on Frenkian’s
theory, he states that “the first two of these characteristically Indian allusions – the
rope-snake illusion and the quadrilemma – are more Buddhist than Hindu, at least in
those early days of which Frenkian speaks.”30 The earliest instances originate from
the early centuries of the Christian era, and from a decidedly Buddhist context.
The greatest result of our research31 has been to locate the very first
occurrence of the analogy in a Buddhist compendium entitled Mahāvibhās. ā,
“a massive sourcebook of Sarvastivadin doctrine,”32 which consists of three
texts. The analogy appears in the Abhidharma-vibhās. ā-śāstra, which was composed
around 150 CE,33 and is extant only in Chinese translation:34

by Carneades or did Sextus supply his own set of examples? Malcolm Schofield in his discussion
about Carneades’ epistemology also differentiates between the theory of the Academic philosopher
and Sextus’ illustration. (Malcolm Schofield, “Academic Epistemology,” in The Cambridge History of
Hellenistic Philosophy, Keimpe Malcolma Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfield and Schofield, eds.,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 349.) Regarding the smoke-fire example, however,
we find that the Stoic-Epicurean context in Sextus is corroborated by the evidence found in the
writings of the Epicurean Philodemus. Here also it might be the case that the example was really used
by the Academic philosopher first, and was simply retold by Sextus. Cicero, the other main preserver
of Carneadean thought does not refer to the snake-rope example.
30
Potter, Encyclopaedia 2, 19.
31
I would like to express my gratitude to Mónika Szegedi, a Tibetologist, who has drawn my
attention to the Vasubandhu-text, which in turn led to the Mahāvibhās. ā. I would also like to thank
Melinda Pap, Sinologist, for the translation of the Chinese text.
32
Potter, Encyclopaedia 7, 123.
33
Potter, Encyclopaedia 7, 511.
34
One difficulty with this work is that it is uncertain whether the Chinese translator Hsüan-tsang
added his own interpretation or whether he gave a faithful account of the Sanskrit original when he
made the translation in 659.

16
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

It is like when the person sees a rope and takes it for a snake, or when
he sees a tree trunk and takes it for a man, etc. To take a rope or a tree
trunk as a snake or a man is mistaking phenomena and forms, and not
lacking reason.35
The next record we could find is attributed, albeit not unanimously, to
Āryadeva,36 a Buddhist thinker of the third century CE. The early authors who use
.
the example are similarly Buddhists: Vasubandhu37 and Asan ga38 (fourth century),
Dignāga39 (fifth century), Bahvya and Sthiramati (sixth century) and Candrakīrti40
(seventh century).41 The first non-Buddhist author is Candrakīrti’s contemporary,
Gaud. apāda,42 an early representative of Advaita Vedānta. The analogy becomes
popular in the Buddhist exegetical literature from the fifth century onwards, but
it reached widespread popularity in the Vedānta school, especially due to the
.
writings of Śankara43 (c. eighth century), the most influential systematizer of
Advaita Vedānta. Below, we will explore some early examples.
The first firmly attributable text applying the snake-rope analogy is found
in the work of Vasubandhu (fourth century CE), who is credited with the
foundation of the Yogācāra school and was one of the most influential Buddhist
philosophers. He was probably born around 316 CE and might have written
the Abhidharmakośa around 350 CE.44 He applies the snake-rope analogy in his
autocommentary to the Abhidharmakośa, the Abhidharmakośa-bhās. ya (VI.58b):

35
Abhidharma-vibhās. ā-śāstra 1545 [0036a10], transl. to Hungarian by Melinda Pap (personal
communication).
36
Āryadeva. Cittaviśuddhiprakaran. a 67–68. and Hastavālanāmaprakaran. avr. tti 1–2.
37
Vasubandhu. Abhidharmakośa-bhās. ya VI.58b. I would like to express my gratitude to Mónika
Szegedi, who has discovered the employment of the snake-rope analogy in this locus and has
provided me with the references.
. .
38
Asanga, Mahāyānasam graha (MSG), 3.8.
39
Dignāga, Pramān. a-samuccaya Ch. 1. This work is extant only in Tibetan translation.
40
Candrakīrti, Prasannapadā Ch. 25.3.
41
Dates are indicated mainly on the basis of the chronology given in various volumes of the
Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. More details about the chronologies are given under the discussion
of the individual texts. Dignāga’s A Collection on the Means of Valid Knowledge (Pramān. asamuccaya,
PS) is also enumerated by Frenkian and McEvilley as using the example, but they were following
secondary literature on the fifth-century Buddhist philosopher. I could not locate the example in
his writing they refer to. The example, however, is present in a commentary to Dignāga’s work by
the seventh-century author Dharmakīrti’s Commentary to the Means of Valid Knowledge (Pramān. avārttikā,
PV) ad PS Section 3. Bb.
42
Gaud. apāda, Mān. d. ūkya-kārikā 2, 17–18.
43
Passim in his works.
44
Potter, Encyclopaedia 8, 483.

17
Anna Aklan

Another point: Among the Āryans (= the Śaiks. as) who do not reflect,
the defilements which are abandoned by Meditation can arise by reason
of the weakness of mindfulness; these defilements do not arise among
the Āryans who reflect. In the same way that one thinks a rope is a
snake if one does not observe it carefully (Vibhās. ā, TD 27, p. 36a20);
[so too when one’s attention is lacking, one forgets its metaphysical
characteristics, the impermanence of the pleasant, etc.] but the error
of personalism (ātmadr. s. t. i) cannot arise among Āryans who do not
reflect, because this error is a product of reflection.45
Here, as in other early Buddhist occurrences, the analogy is used to illustrate
the erroneous perception of reality. It is a characteristic example of the usage of
the illustration, inasmuch as it does not stop at the level of perception, but it is
used as a simile for the contradiction between the perceived experiential word
and the underlying reality which is different from it. What this underlying reality
consists in varies with the different schools: it can be voidness,46 or for others
it can be consciousness-only.47 For Vedānta, it is Brahma, but the point is the
same: contrary to everyday experience, there exists some underlying metaphysical
reality, and the perception of this twofold phenomenon is similar to the mistaken
perception of a rope as a snake. In other words, in the Indian context, perception
and the epistemological errors are closely related to metaphysical and ontological
considerations, and very often, this also implies soteriological aspects.

45
… api khalv āryasyânupanidhyāyatah. smr. tisam. pramos. āt kleśa utpadyate nopanidhyāyato rajjvām iva sarpa
sam. jñā / na cânupanidhyāyata ātmadr. s. t. yādīnām upapattir yujyate santīrakatvāditi nâsti darśanaheyakleśa
prahān. ātparihān. ih. ; Vasubandhu, Abhidharmakośa-bhās. ya, VI.58b [375|09–375|10]– [375|10–375|12]
GRETIL text. Based on the editions of: (1) P. Pradhan, ed., Abhidharmakośabhās. yam of Vasubandhu
(rev. 2nd ed.) (Patna: K.P. Jayaswal Research Center, 1975); (2) Swami Dwarikadas Shastri, ed.,
Abhidharmakosa & Bhasya of Acarya Vasubandhu with Sphutartha Commentary of Acarya Yasomittra(2 vols.)
(Varanasi: Bauddha Bharati, 1998); Translation from Leo M. Pruden, Abhidharmakośabhās. yam of
Vasubandhu, vol. 3, transl. into French by Louis de La Vallée Poussin. English Version by Leo
M. Pruden (Berkeley: Asian Humanities Press, 1988–1990), 1005; The same passage in Sangpo’s
translation: “Another point. In the noble ones (= those in training) who do not reflect (upanidhyāyati
.
= samtīrayati), the defilements abandoned by cultivation can arise due to a “lapse of mindfulness”
.
(smr. tisampramos. a); {4b}these defilements do not arise in perfected beings who reflect. Just as one
takes a rope (rajju) for a snake (sarpa) if one does not pay attention (MVŚ, 36a20); (likewise, when
attention is absent, one forgets the metaphysical characteristic, the impermanence of the agreeable,
etc.). (…)” In: Sangpo, Gelong Lodrö, Abhidharmakośa-Bhās. ya. The Treasury of the Abhidharma and its
(Auto)commentary by Vasubandhu, vol. 4 (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2012).
46
As in the Treatise on the Hair on the Hand (Hastavālanāmaprakaran. avr. tti).
.
47
In the Summary of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasam graha).

18
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

There is another very interesting aspect of the early Buddhist usage of the
example. In two instances,48 the analogy is further developed: it is not enough that
what has been mistakenly perceived as a snake is in reality a rope, but the rope itself
is mistakenly perceived as an independent entity while in reality, it is a compound
unit consisting of further components. When one analyzes the rope itself, one
will find that in reality nothing like the “rope” exists. Both instances are from the
earliest phase of the analogy in the third and fourth centuries. Let us quote the
Commentary to the Treatise Named the Hair on the Hand (Hastavālanāmaprakaran. avr. tti,
H) 1.c–d:
1.c–d. W hen its parts (i.e. the parts of the rope) are seen, also
the cognition concerning that (rope) is illusory, as (the
cognition of) the snake.
Commentary: If one examines also that rope, after having divided it into
its parts, the existence in itself of the rope is not perceived. Since this
(existence in itself of the rope) is not perceived, also the perception of
the rope, like the thought of “a snake,” is only a mere illusion, nothing
else. Further, just as the cognition of the rope is an illusion, in the same
way, (in relation to) those parts (of the rope), also, when (their) fractions,
particles and so on are examined, their existence in itself (i.e. the
existence in itself of the parts of the rope) is not grasped as something
real; the thought which has the form of the perception of those (parts
of the rope), like the thought of the rope, is only a mere illusion.49
As mentioned above, the snake-rope simile can be found in a purely
epistemological context in Indian philosophy, too, but compared to the sources
listed above, this has a rather late provenance. The only source is Dharmakīrti’s
Commentary to the Means of Valid Knowledge (Pramān. avārttikā, PV):50

.
48
Asan· ga, Summary of the Great Vehicle (Mahāyānasam graha, MSG) 3.8; and in the Commentary to the
Treatise Named the Hair on the Hand (Hastavālanāmaprakaran. avr. tti, H) 1.c–d, attributed to Āryadeva.
In H, the recognition of the non-existence of essential nature (asvabhāva) is due to a simpler whole-
part analysis, while in MSG the specific characteristics (laks.an. a) serve as the grounds for the analysis
of the rope and the consequence of the notion of consciousness-only (vijñaptimātratā).
49
Carmen Dragonetti and Fernando Tola, “The Hastavālanāmaprakaran. avr. tti,” Journal of Religious
Studies 8, no. 1 (1980): 18–31, 24–5.
50
PV III. 297, Commentary to Dignāga’s A Collection on the Means of Valid Knowledge (Pramān. asamuccaya,
PS) ad Section 3. Bb, written in the fifth century CE.

19
Anna Aklan

If the erroneous perception of dvi-candra [the double-moon] were held

to be caused by the manas [mind], this would involve the following
absurd conclusions: (1) it would be removed even when the defect
of the indriya [sense-organ] is not cured, as the erroneous mental
cognition of a snake of what is really a rope is removed simply by the
close examination of the object.51 ... PV III. 297
Here we see an epistemological usage of the simile resembling Sextus’
illustration, without any metaphysical allusions. The context is different, however.
By this time, a complex theory of epistemological errors (bhrānti) had developed
and Indian philosophers had been debating about what kinds of errors exist, e.g.,
those due to mental misrepresentations or defects of the senses. Dharmakīrti
was definitely familiar with this discourse. Despite that, however, this example
is not generally discussed in literature dealing with perceptual errors, e.g., it is
missing from Man. d. ana Miśra’s eighth-century work, Vibhramaviveka.52 This can be
regarded as a sign that the analogy was not an epistemological example used for
perceptual error in Indian literature but rather it was used metaphysically.
The first non-Buddhist occurrence of the analogy is present in Gaud. apāda’s
Mān. d. ūkyakārikā, an obviously Advaita Vedāntin text. This fact supports the
hypothesis of Buddhist influence on the Advaita school. Following this Vedānta
usage, and especially due to the influence of the works of Gaud. apāda’s disciple
Śan. kara, the analogy gained widespread popularity in Hindu philosophical texts
as an expression of the misperceived metaphysical reality, bearing the promise of
liberation attainable through correct knowledge, thus representing epistemological
soteriology.

Mythology

While snakes are and were present in the Greek-speaking world, most probably
it would be India that has and had larger and more spectacular species, including
those with lethal venom. This zoological fact in itself is not sufficient to reach
confirmation about the primacy of the snake-rope image. In order to examine if
the analogy is “more natural” for Indian than for Greek philosophical usage, let
us have a brief overview of the mythological layer, which generally pre-dates the
appearance of philosophical speculation.

51
Sarpâdi-bhrāntivac câsyāh. syād aks. a-vikr. tāv api. Dharmakīrti. Pramān. avr. tti III. 297. Paraphrased by
Dignāga Hattori, On Perception, transl. by Masaaki Hattori. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1968), 96.
52
Lambert Schmithausen, Man. d. anamiśra’ Vibhramavivekah. (Vienna: Hermann Böhlaus Nachf.), 1965.

20
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

Snakes are definitely present in Greek mythology and are regarded (similarly
to the universal symbolism of serpents) in two aspects, one as a fearful and
ferocious image, while the other, mainly in the Asclepius-mythology, as a helpful
animal associated with healing. For the fearful image, numerous examples could
be cited from the archaic layers of Greek mythology,53 let us just refer to Ophion,
Gorgon, Chimaera, etc. From a later phase, the example of the child Heracles
might be recalled, who strangled two serpents in his cradle with his own hands.
While in these examples the mythological snakes, though dangerous and fearful,
are of smaller size, in one of the most well-known myths, explicitly large species
are depicted in the case of Laocoon and his sons.54
It seems that on mythological basis, the possibility of mistaking a snake for
a rope and that such an event is capable of causing fear is definitely present – but
we must emphasize that while the possibility is present, no such incident is found
in Greek mythology.
On the other hand, one of the most fundamental Indian myths contains
exactly such an episode: the churning of the ocean (samudra-manthana),55 where the
gods, in extended warfare with demons, use the snake-king (nāgarāja) Vāsuki as a
rope to churn the Ocean of Milk in order to receive the nectar of immortality (amr. ta).
This mythological episode can be treated as the proto-image of the snake-rope
analogy – thus its Indian primacy, at least regarding mythology, can be accepted.

Comparison

Conceptually, the two cultures use the image in two distinct ways. While Sextus
is confined to perception only, and that also in a very distinctly and elaborately
detailed epistemological system of perception and cognition developed by
Carneades, without any far-reaching conclusion about metaphysics, in most Indian
occurrences, the relevance of the snake-rope image lies in the metaphysical and
soteriological aspects. Sextus uses the snake-rope image as an example for erroneous
perception in epistemological context while in the Indian occurrences it is applied
primarily as an analogy for the erroneous perception of the metaphysical reality.

53
From the pre-Greek layer, we can refer to the Minoan Snake Goddess figurines, dated to c. 1600
BCE.
54
In the Homeric epics, the episode is not present. Sophocles wrote a tragedy about Laocoon in the
fifth century BCE.
55
The credit of bringing this myth in connection with the philosophical usage of the snake-rope
analogy goes to Ferenc Ruzsa. The myth is found in the Mahābhārata (I.18), the Rāmāyan. a (45.),
the Viśn. u-purān. a (I.9), and the Bhāgavata-purān. a. The earliest texts date to about the fifth to fourth
century BCE, with parts originating perhaps earlier.

21
Anna Aklan

Any similar idea is missing on the Greek side. Some of the earliest appearances of
the image differ from later occurrences in that they represent a two-step mental
process where in the second step even the rope is realized as a non-entity. In later
usage, this second step is omitted.
Chronologically, we face several difficulties on both sides, mainly due to
the lack of numerous sources. As for the Greek text, the question is whether
the example was first used by Carneades, or whether it was Sextus who used
the example on his own. It seems to me that from the lack of other sources on
Carneades’ theory of perception, we can postulate that the example originates
with Sextus. If this is the case, the primacy in the philosophical application of
the image belongs to the Indian context, but the time of the respective first
occurrences are very close: the Mahāvibhās. ā is dated around 150 CE, while the
dates attributed to Sextus are traditionally 150–250 CE. Still, as we can see, the
very first occurrences originate from about the third or second centuries BCE in
the Greek world from a context that is rooted in everyday experience and appear
in proverbial usage (Aesop, Demetrius).56 Regarding Frenkian’s observation that
snakes are more characteristic of India than the Greek ecological environment,
we have referred to the widespread presence of snake or serpent imagery in Greek
mythology. The strong presence of snake-cult in Greek mythology together with
the occurrence at a proverbial and comical level would question the hypothesis of
Indian origin of the example in Sextus. The employment of a snake as a rope in
Indian mythology gives the primacy of the image to the Indian context.
The scarcity of the example within Greek philosophical context must also
be emphasized. Besides Sextus’ works, and there solely in connection with the
Carneadean theory, the motif is completely missing. In Indian texts, on the other
hand, especially after the fourth century, it gained a widespread application.

Conclusion

Regarding the theories of influence, the following observations can be made.

Interestingly, we have found that the first occurrences of philosophical applications
of the example arose at approximately the same time, the second to third century
CE. This closeness in time may allude to actual exchange.

It must be admitted, however, that the presence of the example in the Demetrius-text, which is
56

dated to the second century BCE, is contemporaneous with Carneades – something which could
be an argument for the earlier presence of the analogy in the philosophical field. Nonetheless, until
other evidence is found, I regard the analogy as first applied by Sextus.

22
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

Regarding Frenkian’s original hypothesis that the image would have arrived
directly from India either through Pyrrho or through Carneades, we have found
no evidence as the first occurrence of the written analogy in Indian works dates
to the second century CE or later, which postdates both Greek philosophers.57
Regarding the other direction of influence, from Greece to India, as proposed
by McEvilley, the newly found evidence in the second-century Vibhās. ā rules out
this possibility. Concerning McEvilley’s hypothesis regarding the influence Sextus
could have exerted on the Mādhyamika school, there is an undeniable similarity
regarding the overall polemical aim of both Sextus and Nāgārjuna58 in the listing
and refuting of all philosophical tenets around them. There are no clear dates
for Nāgārjuna, but the widest time frame assigned to him is about 150–250 CE –
slightly later than Sextus. The hypothetical location of his activities in the second
half of his life to South India also makes it possible that he might have met
some teachings of Greek philosophy as there had been undeniable Mediterranean
cultural presence in the period on the southern coasts, especially around the ports
of Musiris and Podukē (near present-day Thrissur and Pondicherry respectively).
Despite all these general circumstances, which are favorable for the
theory of influence from the Greek side to the Indian, especially regarding
Buddhist philosophy, textually we could not find enough convincing evidence.
Furthermore, as this specific image of the snake and rope analogy is missing in
Nāgārjuna’s works, this cannot be used as evidence to support such a hypothesis,
especially not in the form which McEvilley postulates that whole compendia
of Greek philosophy could have exerted literary influence (“possibly in the
form of a Sceptical handbook which brought the forms of Greek dialectic”).59
It is imaginable that some kind of verbal interaction took place and had some
influence – but this could have provided inspiration and furnished building blocks
of expressions rather than proving to be literal borrowings.
Turning back to the original three similarities observed by Frenkian, Ruzsa
and McEvilley, in the case of the smoke-fire example, conceptual agreements are
also found together with the application of the illustration. Regarding the subject
of our present inquiry, on the other hand, only the imagery is the same but the
concept for which the image is used is different. Potter’s statement about the

57
It is possible that the image was already present in the spoken tradition, but its absence from the
earliest Buddhist compendium, the voluminous and extensive Pali Canon, or the second-century
BCE Questions of King Milinda, raises questions about the presence of the motif in the spoken
tradition.
58
Potter, Encyclopaedia 8, 13.
59
McEvilley, The Shape of Ancient Thought, 499.

23
Anna Aklan

snake-rope analogy being a “characteristically Indian allusion”60 must be modified:

chronologically the image appears first in Greek writings. What is characteristically
Indian about it is its mythical, metaphysical and soteriological application.
Even if there was any kind of influence, it must have been in the form of
spoken exchange of ideas, and in this case, maybe not even at a philosophical level
but only at a colloquial level of a proverbial usage.61 Then the proverb became
utterly transformed and was used as a building block to express the various
theories of the different schools.
Returning to the proposal of Frenkian, Ruzsa and McEvilley regarding the
three similar elements in Sextus Empiricus’ writings and Indian philosophy, the
following conclusion can be drawn. It has been found that the very first proto-
image of the snake and rope analogy, is found in Indian mythology, in the episode
of the churning of the ocean where a snake was used as a rope. In written form,
the example of mistaking a rope for a snake first appears in Greek texts. Contrary
to the smoke-fire motif, here no conceptual similarity is found: while in the Greek
context, the image is used for an epistemological theory, from the very first
occurrence in Indian discourse, the image is used as an analogy for metaphysical
purposes, an aspect completely missing from the Greek context.
To make a cautious conclusion, we might state that both images were present
and were more natural in Indian everyday reality, mythology and epics as a first
step. But as we could see, the first philosophical usage of these images is found
recorded in Greek texts and it has subsequent provenances only in later layers of
Indian philosophy.
A somewhat different pattern has been outlined regarding a third element,
the tetralemma. It became frequently used already in the time of the Buddha,
mainly in Sceptic, and then in several Buddhist schools also. Although there are

60
Potter, Encyclopaedia 2, 19.
61
Let me refer here cursorily to another similarity at the proverbial level. There is an Indian maxim
current in literature about frogs referred to as kūpa-man. d. ūkya-nyāya, “the maxim of a frog in the well”
by Jacob, who explains: “it is applied to an inexperienced person brought up in the narrow circle of
home and ignorant of public life and mankind.” One immediately remembers Plato’s similar image
in Phaedo 109 when he compares the peoples of the Mediterranean to “ants or frogs about a pond,”
(ὥ σπερ περὶ τέλμα μύρμηκας ἢ βατράχους) with limited knowledge about the wider or “real” world. G.
A. Jakob, Laukikanyāyāñjalih. . A Handful of Popular Maxims (Bombay: Nirn. aya-Sāgar Press, 1907), 20.;
Plato, Platonis Opera, ed. John Burnet (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1903). Should one postulate
influence in this case? If any, it must have been at the colloquial level of exchanged or widespread
proverbs that became used as building blocks furnishing illustrations for different concepts. Here
again, the scarcity of the simile in the Greek philosophical and literary tradition gives way to the
hypothesis of intellectual exchange.

24
 The Snake and Rope Analogy in Greek and Indian Philosophy

some similar cases in pre-Pyrrhonean Greek philosophy, namely one classical

tetralemma in Plato,62 one tetralemma-like occurrence in Parmenides,63 and one in
Aristotle’s writings,64 it is Pyrrho who is credited with making it the focal point of
his philosophy. In addition to Diogenes Laertius’ and others’ reports of Pyrrho’s
travels to India and his encounter with and learning from Indian Gymnosophists
there,65 Flintoff ’s reasoning regarding Indian influences on Pyrrho are very
convincing.66 Furthermore, it seems that besides the above enlisted occurrences,
i.e. after Pyrrho, it was only Sextus, a representative of the Greek Sceptical school,
who applied this fourfold method – so in the case of the tetralemma, I am inclined
to accept the theory of direct Indian influence on Pyrrho.
It is important to point out that Sextus’ works are not his own philosophical
achievements exclusively or primarily, but rather, he provides a compendium of
all preceding philosophical schools and their tenets to refute them. Thus, the
similarities that are present in his oeuvre are not necessarily proofs of Indian
influences on Sextus but they show the elements that Greek philosophy had in
common with the Indian side.
One can question the necessity to postulate interaction instead of
independent development. Given the historical relations, and the allusions to
cultural interconnection, however, it seems highly probable that these elements
were “travelling” in the area of the Oikumene. This does not mean servile
borrowing. Rather on the contrary, as our examples show, the raw material was
modified to fit the purposes of those who found them expressive of their own
tenets. These images, metaphors, linguistic expressions were taken up, twisted and
shaped to become building blocks to fit the context of the given school.

62
Plato, Republic 5, 479c.
63
Parmenides, Fr. 6, Simplicius, Phys. 1 1 7, 4.
64
Aristotle, Metaphysics IV 4, lO08a 30–35.
65
Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers IX. 11. 61.
66
Flintoff, “Pyrrho and India.”

25
 ANNUAL OF MEDIEVAL STUDIES AT CEU
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VOL. 24

Central European University

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