188 Reviews

REFERENCES: Ronald Dworkin, Justice for Hedgehogs,

Czaputowicz J., Czachór Z. (2012). Prezyden- Belknap Press, USA 2011, pp. 506.
cja w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Bilans pol-
skich doświadczeń. Materiały z konferencji. The quotation from Archilochus: “The
[online] http://www.ksap.gov.pl/ksap/ fox knows many things, but the hedgehog
file/publikacje/prezydencjaUE.pdf;
knows one big thing” is the main adage
[accessed 24.06.2014].
Kaczyński P.M. (2011). Polish Council Presi- of Ronald Dworkin’s (1931 – 2013) penul-
dency. Ambitions and Limitations, Swedish timate book1 titled: Justice for Hedgehogs
Institute for European Policy Studies. [online] (Dworkin 2011). The most famous use of
http://www.sieps.se/sites/default /file- this metaphor one can find in the context
s/2011_3op.pdf; [accessed 24.06.2014]. of political thinking that is present in Isa-
Kietz D., Perthes V. (2007). Handlungsspiel-
iah Berlin’s essay The Hedgehog and the
räume einer EU-Ratspräsidentschaft. Eine
Funktionsanalyse des deutschen Vorsitzes Fox: An Essay on Tolstoy’s View of Histo-
im ersten Halbjahr 2007. “SWP-Studie” 24. ry (Berlin 1993). Other writers who refer-
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Republic of red to above-mentioned idea are: Stephen
Poland. (2012). Przewodnictwo Polski Jay Gould (2004) and Steven Lukes (2003).
w Radzie Unii Europejskiej. Raport końcowy The author of the reviewed book focuses
z przygotowania i sprawowania prezydencji.
on a ‘thing’ hedgehogs know which is ‘one
[online] https://www.msz.gov.pl/reso-
urce/cca83422 – 8661 – 4b6e-9e32-f94 big thing’. We can read at the beginning of
e9bc3db4b:JCR; [accessed 24.06.2014]. the opus: “Value is one big thing. The truth
Polish Confederation of Private Employers about living well and being good and what
Lewiatan. (2012). Polska Prezydencja is wonderful is not only coherent but mu-
w Radzie Unii Europejskiej – oczekiwania i tually supporting: what we think about
aktywność biznesu, działania rządu RP.
any one of these must stand up, eventually,
Ocena Prezydencji. [online] http://konfe-
deracjalewiatan.pl/wydawnictwa/_files/ to any argument we find compelling abo-
publikacje/raport_.pdf; [accessed ut the rest. I try to illustrate the unity of
24.06.2014]. at least ethical and moral values: I descri-
be a theory of what living well is like and
„ Andrzej Ceglarz* what, if we want to live well, we must do
DOI: 10.15804/athena.2014.44.12 for, and not do to, other people. The idea
– that ethical and moral values depend on
* Willy Brandt Centre for German and European one another – is a creed; it proposes a way
Studies of University of Wrocław.
to live” (Dworkin 2011: 1).

1
The last book he had written is titled Religion
without God (Dworkin 2013).
 Reviews 189

The genesis of this book is connected terpretative nature. Major characteristic of

with antecedent event symposium on the Dworkin’s style is the use of the first person
content of Justice for Hedgehogs, attended plural, which underlines interpretative di-
by: Russ Shafer-Landau, Daniel Star, Michael mension of considerations – the interpreter
Smith, David Lyons, T.M. Scanlon, Amartya cannot stand out of his society’s perspecti-
Sen, Kwame Anthony Appiah, F.M. Kamm, ve; every interpretation has social character.
C. Edwin Baker, James E. Fleming, Hugh Ba- Hence, we face this kind of sentences: “Eve-
xter, Martha Minow & Joseph William Sin- ry effort we make to find a trap door out of
ger, Samuel Freeman, Frank I. Michelman, morality confirms that we do not yet un-
Robert D. Sloane, Robert G. Bone, Stephen derstand what morality is” (Dworkin 2011:
Macedo, Jeremy Waldron (“Boston Univer- 39); “We assume that the speakers we aim
sity Law Review” 2010, vol. 90, no. 2). The to understand employ the same logic as we
brainstorming and interchange of ideas and do and that their beliefs are in general true,
concepts had an important influence on the though not necessarily true in each case”
shape of the book, what is frequently under- (Dworkin 2011: 148); “We share these con-
lined by the author. cepts, as I said, not because we agree in the-
The book is structured in the following ir application once all other pertinent facts
order: first chapter, titled Baedeker, is a kind are agreed upon, but rather by manifesting
of roadmap, the remaining eighteen chap- an understanding that their correct appli-
ters are divided into five parts: Independen- cation is fixed by the best interpretation of
ce, Interpretation, Ethics, Morality, Politics; the practices in which they figure” (Dwor-
at the end we can read epilogue titled: Di- kin 2011: 160); “We are responsible (if we
gnity Indivisible. are) because what we believe is at least in
All the works of Harvard philosopher are large part fixed by how things are” (Dwor-
characterised by an argumentative appro- kin 2011: 236).
ach; a moral and political reasoning is the Justice for Hedgehogs is permeated with
core of his theory and we already can find a plethora of plots: metaphysical, epistemo-
it in his first works. In Justice for Hedgehogs logical, ethical, political and legal, so it is
he modifies his early theses. In the work ti- impossible to describe all of them in such
tled Taking Rights Seriously (Dworkin 1977) a short form like review. We are going to
he insisted on the standpoint that morali- focus on main and most interesting issu-
ty and law are two different systems, but in es of this book, namely: 1) the basic prin-
the new book he changed his mind toward ciples of the theory; 2) the relation betwe-
the thesis that there is a nexus between this en ethics and morality; 3) the critical view
two branches, andthis nexus is the inter- of the internal skepticism; 4) the meaning
pretation. The interpretation is such a me- of interpretation; 5) the role of the truth in
aningful concept because the law has an in- moral investigations.
190 Reviews

The author treats the equal concern for takes place when someone chooses immo-
fate and full respect for responsibility as ba- ral means to achieve good life’s goals. This
sic principles which constitute the core of kind of person acts wrong, because depre-
his moral theory. These principles indica- ciates responsibility. So which one of these
te proper manner of distribution, becau- principles is most important? As the author
se, according to the author, there is no di- figured out: “Which is then the more fun-
stribution which could be politically neu- damental ethical responsibility? Living well.
tral – every act of distribution is caused It is ethically irresponsible for you to live
by law and policy. It leads us to the conc- less well in order to make your life a better
lusion that policy precludes any possibili- one, and inappropriate for you to take ple-
ty to avoid values. Concern for fate and re- asure or pride in your life’s goodness when
spect for responsibility direct us to the ter- you achieved this at the cost of living badly.
ritory of ethics. We might say (using a term developed by
Ethical considerations are focused on economists that John Rawls made popular
the category of ‘good life’ which is related among philosophers) that the value of li-
to such concepts as eudaimonia, fulfilment ving well is lexically prior to the value of a
or happiness broadly construed. The main good life” (Dworkin 2011: 201).
object of this consideration is an individu- Most interesting issue from epistemolo-
al human life. It is the way which everyone gical point of view is a criticism of skepti-
should choose in his own interest. But this cism2, which was present in earlier Dwor-
is not the limit of human activities. Besides kin’s works, for instance Law’s Empire
this dimension of human life, we have to (Dworkin 1986). The Harvard philosopher
deal with the category which Dworkin na- is known as skeptic about skepticism. First
mes ‘living well’ and which is related to our of all, the author shows a typology of skep-
relationship with other people. As the effect, ticism, and subsequently shows its meaning
we face the fact that morality and ethics are for interpretation as a social practice. Tal-
strictly correlated. The connection has the king about the core of skepticism, Dwor-
interpretative character what means that kin employs the idea that there is a com-
the man who does not act right toward mon thing amongst every kind of skepti-
other people cannot achieve a ‘good life’. The cism. It is denying an ordinary view, andor-
other side of the issue is that someone can dinary view is a perspective of every man
have a bad life despite living well. This situ- possessing a moral sense. Moreover, skepti-
ation appears when someone dares greatly cists claim that there is no objective truth in
and failes, but also goodness of his life does
not depend only on his decisions. On the 2
Ronald Dworkin uses a word ‘skepticism’ which
other hand, someone has a good life while is prefered in the American English language. The
he is not living well. This kind of situation British version is ‘scepticism’.
 Reviews 191

moral reasoning. The ordinary view is ba- sume the truth of certain general moral cla-
sed on the intuition and obviousness. If we ims – “They rely on morality to denigrate
see an act of robbery, then we do not need a morality” (Dworkin 2011: 31), while the lat-
moral reasoning which gives us an evidence ter assumes Archimedean point – the exter-
of wrongness of this act. But when we can- nal perspective – “They are able to denigra-
not catch the incident by the sight, then we te moral truth, they say, without relying on
need a moral reasoning – for example, in it” (Dworkin 2011: 32). One of the subdivi-
the case of war in Iraq, citizenry of United sions is made within the external skepticism
States could not see this phenomenon, so and it leads to the ‘error skepticism’ and ‘sta-
they needed moral investigations. Ronald tus skepticism’. The former consist on value-
Dworkin, inspired by Mark Johnstone, wri- -neutral metaphysics which eliminates the
tes about the analogy between aesthetic and morality from the categories of our univer-
moral claims: “Your lover really is beauti- se. The latter claims that the ordinary view
ful, although you might have to take the ri- is not a description, but it consist in ma-
ght interest in her to see it. You do not re- sked orders – ‘Cheating is wrong’ in reali-
ason or infer her beauty. You see it the way ty means ‘Don’t cheat!’. The internal skepti-
a chessmaster sees a stalemate in three mo- cism, however, takes various forms – besi-
ves. But this cannot be, in either of those ca- des the key examples, which are cultural re-
ses, a causal kind of perception. You see that lativism, we can find the internal error skep-
the boys burning a cat are depraved, but the ticism, which Dworkin describes subsequ-
sense in which you see that provides no fur- ently: “Other people are internal error skep-
ther evidence or argument for their depra- tics about the place of morality in foreign
vity as an eyewitness’s seeing does provi- policy. They say that it makes no sense to
de further evidence of a stabbing’ (Dwor- suppose that a nation’s trade policy can be
kin 2011: 439). either morally right or wrong. They reject
The typology of the skepticism is descri- positive moral judgments that many other
bed in the following way. There are two or- people hold […]” (Dworkin 2011: 33). Ano-
ders that exist within moral philosophy. ther example of the internal skepticism is
First of them has substantive character and global internal skepticism. Only supernatu-
questions related to it concern internal di- ral power could settle down moral claims as
mension of the system of ideas, whereas se- true, so our claims cannot be universal and
cond order is constituted by metaethical qu- our acts are irrelevant in the face of univer-
estions – which means questions about the se. At this stage, the skeptical problem to-
system of ideas itself. The extension of this uches upon the investigation into deter-
distinction is a division between ‘internal minism and non-determinism. But what
skepticism’ (first order) and ‘external skep- does it mean in the context of the social
ticism’ (second order). The former must as- life? To answer this, Dworkin uses an inte-
192 Reviews

resting case ofastrology and religion. Every lues until, as I said, the argument meets it-
attempt to negate astrology or theism in it- self ” (Dworkin 2011: 163).
self is not astrological or religious assertion: The last element which we would like to
“However, if we define an astrological judg- describe in this review is the role of truth
ment as one that describes the character and in the moral reasoning. The idea of objec-
extent of planetary influence, then the sta- tivity seems to be indefensible on the phi-
tement that there is no such influence is in- losophical ground. The majority of thin-
deed an astrological judgment. If we define kers claims that objectivism is some kind
a religious position as one that presupposes of superstition. Ronald Dworkin proposes
the existence of one or more divine beings, a different approach. He recognizes truth
then atheism is not a religious position. But as a cause of moral claims and moral ar-
if we define it as one that offers an opinion guing. Hence, this category is relevant re-
about the existence or properties of divine gardless of metaphysical difficulties. He em-
beings, then atheism certainly is a religious ploys an excellent case connected with this
position” (Dworkin 2011: 40 – 41). In social thesis. He starts from Darwinism and one
terms, it means that every interpretation ta- of its thesis. The reason for condemnation
kes place within a social life context and the- of homicide is to keep the gene pool (1).
re is no such thing like Archimedean point. This is the reason for which this condem-
The only version of skepticism that makes nation was spread to the whole world (2).
sense is the internal skepticism understood This anthropological thesis leads us to the
as critical approach to the functioning mo- conclusion that homicide is wrong – and it
ral concepts. is objective truth (3). For a question: what
The author indicates that there are three makes moral claims true, Dworkin replies:
types of interpretation: collaborative, expla- they are made true through an “adequate
natory and conceptual. Moral reasoning be- moral argument for their truth”. “Of course
longs to the last one of these types. It means that invites the further question: What ma-
that moral concepts are designated of given kes a moral argument adequate? The an-
values and interpretation takes place only swer must be: a further moral argument for
within the net of moral concepts. Justice is its adequacy. And so forth” (Dworkin 2011:
a moral concept which makes sense only in 37). The employment of this category to the
the connection with other moral concepts, political and moral philosophy is a very in-
the same way it works in Plato’s The Repu- novative move in the context of the nature
blic, where the clue is investigation into the of these disciplines.
nature of justice, made by the analysis of re- Justice for Hedgehogs is undeniably
lated moral concepts. As Dworkin writes: extraordinary book. But the most impor-
“We can in principle continue this expan- tant thing is it presents not only political
sion of our argument, exploring other va- doctrine and specified vision of policy or
 Reviews 193

justice. It is rather a tool-box with methods Dworkin R.  (2011). Justice for Hedgehogs.
that show how to argue and reason; the- London–Cambridge: Harvard Univer-
sity Press.
refore, this book also has a vast heuristic
Gould S.J. (2004). The Hedgehog, the Fox, and
and practical potential. As a conclusion, we the Magister’s Pox: Mending the Gap Between
can say that Dworkinian ‘skepticism about Science and the Humanities. Vintage.
skepticism’ is a robust attempt to rescue li- Lukes S. (2003). Liberals and Cannibals: The
beral discourse from its own impasse. Implications of Diversity. London–New
York: Verso Books.
REFERENCES:
Berlin I. (1993). The Hedgehog and the Fox: An „ Łukasz Perlikowski*
Essay on Tolstoy’s View of History. Chicago: DOI: 10.15804/athena.2014.44.13
Elephant Paperbacks.
Dworkin R. (1977). Taking Rights Seriously.
London–New York: Harvard University * Nicolaus Copernicus University in Toruń, Fa-
Press. Dworkin R. (1986). Law’s Empire. culty of Political Science and International Studies.
Cambridge: Harvard University Press.