First Division (G.R. No. 203923, October 08, 2018) : Leonardo-De Castro, Cj.

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FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 203923, October 08,


2018 ]
IONA LERIOU, ELEPTHERIOS L.
LONGA, AND STEPHEN L. LONGA,
PETITIONERS, V. YOHANNA FRENESI
S. LONGA (MINOR) AND VICTORIA
PONCIANA S. LONGA (MINOR),
REPRESENTED BY THEIR MOTHER
MARY JANE B. STA. CRUZ,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, CJ.:

Before Us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari


filed by petitioners Iona Leriou (Iona), Eleptherios
L. Longa (Eleptherios), and Stephen L. Longa
(Stephen) assailing the Decision[1] dated June 28,
2012 and Resolution[2] dated October 8, 2012 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92497,
affirming the Orders[3] dated July 18, 2008 and
November 3, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Muntinlupa City Branch 276, which denied
petitioners' Omnibus Motion to remove respondent
Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz as administratrix; and to
appoint petitioner Eleptherios or his nominee as
administrator of the estate of deceased Enrique
Longa (Enrique).

The factual antecedents are as follows:

Respondent-minors Yohanna Frenesi S. Longa[4]


(Yohanna) and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa[5]
(Victoria), represented by their mother, Mary Jane B.
Sta. Cruz, instituted a special proceeding entitled "In
the Matter of the Intestate Estate of Enrique T.
Longa Petition for Letters of Administration,"[6]
docketed as SP Proc. No. 07-035, with the RTC in
Muntinlupa City on June 19, 2007. Respondents
alleged that Enrique died intestate, survived by
petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen and respondents
Yohanna and Victoria, his legitimate and illegitimate
children, respectively; and that Enrique left several
properties[7] with no creditors. In the meantime,
respondents were deemed as pauper litigants and
exempt from paying the filing fee, subject to the
payment thereof once a final judgment is rendered in
their favor.[8]

On November 5, 2007, Acting Presiding Judge


Romulo SG. Villanueva of the RTC issued an Order,
[9] appointing Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz (respondent-
administratrix) as the administratrix of Enrique's
estate, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered,


Mary Jane B. Sta. Cruz, being the mother,
representative, and legal guardian of
minor children Yohanna Frenesi S. Longa
and Victoria Ponciana S. Longa, is hereby
appointed Administratrix of the
properties or estate of deceased Enrique
T. Longa. Let a Letter of Administration
be issued in her favor upon posting of a
bond in the amount of FOUR
HUNDRED EIGHTY THOUSAND
(Php480,000.00) pesos, and after taking
the required Oath of Office, she may
discharge the rights, duties and
responsibilities of her trust.
As such Administratrix, she is hereby
directed to do the following:

1. To make and return to the Court within three


(3) months from assumption of her office,
subject to such reasonable extension as may be
approved by the Court, a true and complete
inventory of all the property, real and personal,
of the deceased which shall come to her
possession or knowledge or to the knowledge
of any other person for her.

2. To faithfully execute the duties of her trust, to


manage and dispose of the estate according to
the rules for the best interest of the deceased.

3. To render a true and just account of all the


estate of the deceased in her hands and of all
proceeds and interest derived therefrom, and of
the management and disposition of the same, at
the time designated by the rules and such other
times as the Court directs, and at the expiration
of her trust, to settle her account with the Court
and to deliver and pay over all the estate,
effects, and moneys remaining in her hands, or
due from her on such settlement, to the person
lawfully entitled thereto.

4. To perform all orders of the Court by her to be


performed.

The RTC issued the Letters of Administrator[10] on


December 19, 2007. On March 18, 2008,
respondent-administratrix submitted a Report of the
Inventory and Appraisal[11] of the real and personal
properties of the decedent, which was duly noted by
the RTC in its Order[12] dated March 27, 2008.

On May 20, 2008, petitioners filed an Omnibus


Motion 1. To Remove Jane Sta. Cruz as
Administratrix; and 2. Appoint Eleptherios L. Longa
or His Nominee as Administrator (Omnibus
Motion).[13] Petitioners alleged that they were
denied due process of law because they did not
receive any notice about respondents' Petition for
Letters Administration. Petitioners accuse
respondent-administratrix of: 1) neglect for failing to
abide by the order of the RTC for her to coordinate
with the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) for
the proper service of the Petition and Order dated
July 4, 2007 to petitioners; and 2) two acts of
misrepresentation for not disclosing all the assets of
the decedent and for pretending to be a pauper
litigant. Petitioners also averred that respondent-
administratrix did not post a bond as required by
Administrative Matter No. 03-02-05-SC, or the
"Rule on Guardianship of Minors." Petitioners assert
that each of them, being the surviving spouse and
legitimate children of Enrique, has a preferential
right over respondents to act as administrator of the
estate, or to designate somebody else to administer
the estate in their behalf, pursuant to the order of
preference under Rule 78, Section 6.

On June 6, 2008, respondent-administratrix filed her


Opposition to the Omnibus Motion,[14] alleging that
she mailed the Petition for Letters of Administration
and the RTC Order dated July 4, 2007 to petitioners
in the addresses that the latter gave her, and that she
coordinated with the Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) for the service of the Petition for Letters of
Administration to petitioners as evidenced by the
RTC Order bearing the stamp[15] "RECEIVED" by
the DFA Records Division on July 27, 2007.
Respondent-administratrix also exchanged
correspondences with petitioners and their counsels
about her decision to let the court settle Enrique's
estate, as shown by her letter dated June 22, 2007
addressed to petitioners' counsels, and her electronic
mails (e-mails) with petitioner Eleptherios.[16]

Respondent-administratrix denied committing any


act of misrepresentation. With regard to the non-
disclosure of some assets of the decedent,
respondent-administratrix explained that she did not
include those properties which were not declared or
registered in Enrique's name, and that it was only
after. the Petition was filed with the RTC that
respondent-administratrix learned about a certain
real property in Carmona, Cavite. Likewise,
respondent-administratrix maintained that she is a
pauper litigant since she has no capacity to pay the
P480,000.00 bond and she had to borrow money
from a friend to pay the P25,000.00 premium[17] to
Travellers Insurance Surety Corporation so that she
may post a surety bond.

Respondent-administratrix also said that


Administrative Matter No. 03-02-05-SC or the "Rule
on Guardianship of Minors" does not apply to her as
she is merely representing her children in the
administration and preservation of the estate of
respondents' father.

In opposing petitioners' preferential right to


administer the estate, respondent-administratrix
averred that petitioners are disqualified to act as
administrators because petitioner Iona, a Greek
national, is already divorced from Enrique and has
already remarried as shown by her name Iona Leriou
Regala in the Omnibus Motion, and petitioners
Eleptherios and Stephen are non-residents of the
Philippines.

Respondent-administratrix recognizes that


respondents Yohanna and Victoria's shares in the
decedent's estate are significantly less than the
shares of petitioners Eleptherios and Stephen who
are Enrique's legitimate children. However,
respondent-administratrix sensed that petitioner
Eleptherios is slowly depleting the estate by
charging his plane fares to and from the United
States of America (USA) and huge phone bills
against the estate. In addition, petitioner Eleptherios
ordered respondent-administratrix to transfer all of
the estate to him so that he could personally partition
the properties to Enrique's heirs. Thus, respondent-
administratrix was forced to seek the help of the
courts for the proper settlement of Enrique's estate.

After the filing of petitioners' Reply and respondent-


administratrix's Rejoinder, the Omnibus Motion was
submitted for decision.

On June 18, 2008, the RTC issued the assailed Order


denying petitioners' Omnibus Motion. The RTC
ratiocinated:

Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of


Court provides the grounds by which an
administrator may be removed by the
court:

Section 2. Court may remove


or accept resignation of
executor or administrator.
Proceedings upon death,
resignation, or removal. - If an
executor or administrator
neglects to render his account
and settle the estate according
to law, to perform an order or
judgment of the court, or a
duty expressly provided by
these rules, or absconds, or
becomes insane, or otherwise
incapable or unsuitable to
discharge the trust, the court
may remove him, or, in its
discretion, may permit him to
resign. x x x.

The Court, after going over all the


evidence submitted by the parties in
support of their respective positions, finds
and so holds that the [petitioners] in their
instant Omnibus Motion has not shown
any circumstance as sufficient grounds
for the removal of Ms. Jane Sta. Cruz as
the court-appointed Administratrix of the
estate of the late Enrique Longa.

Records show that Ms. Sta. Cruz has


substantially complied with the Court's
Order and coordinated with the
Department of Foreign Affairs for the
service of the Petition and the Order to
the [petitioners] in the address/es
furnished by her, as shown by the stamp
receipt on the Order. x x x. There was any
showing that she deliberately or
maliciously neglected her duty.
Nonetheless, the record would show that
Ms. Sta. Cruz never intended to hide the
filing of the Petition from the
[petitioners] as she was in constant
communication with them, particularly
with Eleptherios, through e-mails and this
fact was never denied by the latter in his
pleadings.

Neither will the non-disclosure of Ms.


Sta. Cruz of all the assets of the decedent
in her initiatory pleading affects her
appointment as administrator. Section 2
of Rule 76 of the Rules of Court requires
only an allegation of the probable value
and character of the property of the
estate. If the true value and properties
would be known later on, the same
should be reported and made known to
the Court, just as what the Administratrix
did in the instant case .when she
submitted to the Court the true inventory
and appraisal of all the real and personal
properties of the estate after her
appointment as Administratrix.

The mere imputation of misrepresentation


on the alleged financial capacity of the
Administratrix as a pauper litigant
without any concrete and categorical.
proof is not also a sufficient ground for
the removal of the Administratrix. The
record shows that Ms. Sta. Cruz' petition
to litigate as pauper underwent the
required hearing and compliance of all
the requirements as provided by law
before she was allowed to do so. The
mere fact that Ms. Sta. Cruz resides in the
posh Ayala Alabang Village does not
necessarily disqualify her as a pauper
litigant. There must be a showing that she
is the owner of the said property.

Anent the ground that Ms. Sta. Cruz is


disqualified to represent the minors in
this instant proceedings for her failure to
post the required guardian's bond, it
should be stressed that this is a
proceeding for the settlement of estate of
the late Enrique T. Longa, not the estate
of the minor children-[respondents],
where the rights of ownership of the
children over the properties of their
deceased father is merely inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully
settled. [Salvador vs. Sta. Maria, 20
SCRA 603 (1967)]. Unless there is
partition of the estate of the deceased, the
minors cannot yet be considered owners
of properties, hence, the requirement of
guardian bond is immaterial in this case.
Needless to state, in instituting this
proceedings (sic) in behalf of her minor
children, Ms. Sta. Cruz is just exercising
her legal, moral and natural right and
duty as the mother in order to protect her
children's right and claim over the estate
of their deceased father.

While it may be true that the [petitioners],


(except for Iona) being the legitimate
children of the late Enrique Longa, have a
superior right over the Court appointed
Administratrix, it must be stressed that
Ms. Sta. Cruz was appointed as the
Administratrix, being the representative
and biological parent of the minors
Yohanna Frenesi and Victoria Ponciana,
who are equally considered surviving
heirs of the late Enrique Longa, albeit,
illegitimate children of the latter. As the
representative and biological parent of
the minor heirs, Ms. Sta. Cruz has all the
right to protect the property for the
benefit of her children. Indeed, if the
properties will be properly managed and
taken cared of, this will definitely
redound to the benefit of Yohanna and
Victoria Ponciana, whose future will
therefor be protected.

Moreover, the appointment of


Elepheriosis (sic) L. Longa as
Administrator is not allowed under Rule
78 Section 1(b) which provided that "No
person is competent to serve as executor
or administrator who is not a resident of
the Philippines."

In fine, the grounds relied upon by the


[petitioners] are not sufficient to remove
the duly court appointed Administratrix.

The settled rule is that the removal of an


administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82
of the Rules of Court "lies within the
discretion of the Court appointing
him/her. As aptly expressed by the
Supreme Court in the case of Degala vs.
Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, 'the
sufficiency of any ground for removal
should thus be determined by said court,
whose sensibilities are, in the first place,
affected by any act or omission on the
part of the administrator not comfortable
to or in disregard of the rules or the
orders of the court. [18]

The RTC, ultimately, decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the


"Omnibus Motion (1) to remove Jane Sta.
Cruz as Administratrix; and (2) Appoint
Eleptherios L. Longa or his Nominee as
Administrator" is hereby DENIED.[19]

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration,[20]


which the trial court denied in an Order[21] dated
November 3, 2008.

Petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals, which


was docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 92497.

In a Decision dated June 28, 2012, the appellate


court affirmed the Orders dated July 18, 2003 and
November 3, 2008 of the trial court. Petitioners filed
a Motion for Reconsideration[22] but it was denied in
a Resolution dated October 8, 2012.

Hence, petitioners filed the instant Petition for


Review on Certiorari,[23] raising the following
issues:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS HAS DECIDED A
QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE IN A
WAY NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE, VIZ:

A. IT DISPENSED WITH THE


MANDATORY AND
JURISDICTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
OF SECTION 3, RULE 79, IN
RELATION TO SECTIONS 3 & 4,
RULE 76 OF THE RULES OF COURT,
AND THE COURT A QUO'S OWN
ORDER DATED 04 JULY 2007, WHEN
IT CONSIDERED THE MERE PROOF
OF SERVICE OF THE ORDER DATED
04 JULY 2007 ON THE DEPARTMENT
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS COMPLIANT
WITH THE SAID LEGAL
REQURIEMENTS.

B. IT CONSIDERED THE EXCHANGE


OF ELECTRONIC MAILS BETWEEN
RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ AND
PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS AS A
POSITIVE INDICATION THAT
PETITIONERS HEIRS LONGA WERE
ALLEGEDLY OFFICIALLY SERVED
AND HAD PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE
OF THE PETITION DESPITE THE
FACT THAT SAID ELECTRONIC
MAILS WERE ONLY BETWEEN
RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ AND
PETITIONER ELEPTHERIOS.

C. IT DISREGARDED THE
PREFERENTIAL AND SUPERIOR
RIGHTS OF THE LEGITIMATE
CHILDREN OVER THE
ILLEGITIMATE CHILDREN OF THE
DECEDENT.

D. IT DISREGARDED THE
SUBSTANTIATED GROUNDS
RAISED BY PETITIONERS HEIRS
LONGA, SHOWING THE UNFITNESS
OF RESPONDENT STA. CRUZ TO
DISCHARGE HER DUTIES AS
ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEDENT.[24]

The Court's Ruling

A perusal of the Petition for Review on Certiorari


reveals that it contains the same issues and
arguments raised by petitioners in their Omnibus
Motion and Appellants' Brief.

The Petition Suffers a Technical Infirmity.

Rule 45, Section 4 of the Revised Rules of Court


requires the petition to contain a sworn certification
against forum shopping. Section 4 provides:

SECTION 4. Contents of petition. - The


petition shall be filed in eighteen (18)
copies, with the original copy intended
for the court being indicated as such by
the petitioner, and shall (a) state the full
name of the appealing party as the
petitioner and the adverse party as
respondent, without impleading the lower
courts or judges thereof either as
petitioners or respondents; (b) indicate
the material dates showing when notice
of the judgment or final order or
resolution subject thereof was received,
when a motion for new trial or
reconsideration, if any, was filed and
when notice of the denial thereof was
received; (c) set forth concisely a
statement of the matters involved, and the
reasons or arguments relied on for the
allowance of the petition; (d) be
accompanied by a clearly legible
duplicate original, or a certified true copy
of the judgment or final order or
resolution certified by the clerk of the
court a quo and the requisite number of
plain copies thereof, and such material
portions of the record as would support
the petition; and (e) contain a sworn
certification against forum shopping as
provided in the last paragraph of Section
2, Rule 42. (Emphasis supplied.)

It should be emphasized that it is the party-pleader


who must sign the sworn certification against forum
shopping for the reason that he/she has personal
knowledge of whether or not another action or
proceeding was commenced involving the same
parties and causes of action. If the party-pleader is
unable to personally sign the certification, he/she
must execute a special power of attorney (SPA)
authorizing his/her counsel to sign in his/her behalf.
In Jacinto v. Gumaru, Jr.,[25] the Court elucidated:

It is true, as petitioner asserts, that if for


reasonable or justifiable reasons he is
unable to sign the verification and
certification against forum shopping in
his CA Petition, he may execute a special
power of attorney designating his counsel
of record to sign the Petition on his
behalf. In Altres v. Empleo, this view was
taken:

For the guidance of the bench


and bar, the Court restates in
capsule form the
jurisprudential
pronouncements already
reflected above respecting
non-compliance with the
requirements on, or
submission of defective,
verification and certification
against forum shopping:

1) A distinction must be made


between non-compliance with
the requirement on or
submission of defective
verification, and non-
compliance with the
requirement on or submission
of defective certification
against forum shopping.

2) As to verification, non-
compliance therewith or a
defect therein does not
necessarily render the
pleading fatally defective. The
court may order its submission
or correction or act on the
pleading if the attending
circumstances are such that
strict compliance with the
Rule may be dispensed with in
order that the ends of justice
may be served thereby.
3) Verification is deemed
substantially complied with
when one who has ample
knowledge to swear to the
truth of the allegations in the
complaint or petition signs the
verification, and when matters
alleged in the petition have
been made in good faith or are
true and correct.

4) As to certification against
forum shopping, non​-
compliance therewith or a
defect therein, unlike in
verification, is generally not
curable by its subsequent
submission or correction
thereof, unless there is a
need to relax the Rule on the
ground of "substantial
compliance" or presence of
"special circumstances or
compelling reasons."

5) The certification against


forum shopping must be
signed by all the plaintiffs or
petitioners in a case;
otherwise, those who did not
sign will be dropped as parties
to the case. Under reasonable
or justifiable circumstances,
however, as when all the
plaintiffs or petitioners share a
common interest and invoke a
common cause of action or
defense, the signature of only
one of them in the certification
against forum shopping
substantially complies with
the Rule.

6) Finally, the certification


against forum shopping
must be executed by the
party-pleader, not by his
counsel. If, however, for
reasonable or justifiable
reasons, the party-pleader is
unable to sign, he must
execute a Special Power of
Attorney designating his
counsel of record to sign on
his behalf. (Emphases
supplied, citation omitted.)

In the instant case, it was not petitioners but Atty.


Joseph Lemuel B. Baquiran (Baquiran) of Sianghio
Lozada and Cabantac Law Offices who signed the
certification against forum shopping despite the
absence of any showing that petitioners executed an
SPA authorizing Atty. Baquiran to sign in their
behalf. By Atty. Baquiran's own revelation, their law
firm had lost communication and they could not
locate any of the petitioners who are apparently
residing in the United States of America (USA).
Atty. Baquiran, in the verification and certification
portion of the Petition, stated:

5. Considering that our law Firm has lost


communication with petitioners and has
yet to re-establish communication with
petitioners who are residing in the United
States of America, I executed this
Verification and Certification Against
Forum Shopping pursuant to my duty as a
lawyer in order to protect the rights and
interest of petitioners by availing of and
exhausting all available legal reliefs.[26]
The Petition should be dismissed pursuant to our
ruling in Anderson v. Ho[27] where the Court
clarified that a certification signed by a counsel
without an SPA is a valid cause for the dismissal of
the Petition, thus:

The requirement that it is the petitioner,


not her counsel, who should sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping is due
to the fact that a "certification is a
peculiar personal representation on the
part of the principal party, an assurance
given to the court or other tribunal that
there are no other pending cases
involving basically the same parties,
issues and causes of action." "Obviously,
it is the petitioner, and not always the
counsel whose professional services have
been retained for a particular case, who is
in the best position to know whether [she]
actually filed or caused the filing of a
petition in that case." Per the above
guidelines, however, if a petitioner is
unable to sign a certification for
reasonable or justifiable reasons, she
must execute an SPA designating her
counsel of record to sign on her behalf. "
[A] certification which had been signed
by counsel without the proper
authorization is defective and constitutes
a valid cause for the dismissal of the
petition."

In this light, the Court finds that the CA


correctly dismissed Anderson's Petition
for Review on the ground that the
certificate of non-forum shopping
attached thereto was signed by Atty.
Oliva on her behalf sans any authority to
do so. While the Court notes that
Anderson tried to correct this error by
later submitting an SPA and by
explaining her failure to execute one prior
to the filing of the petition, this does not
automatically denote substantial
compliance. It must be remembered that a
defective certification is generally not
curable by its subsequent correction. And
while it is true that in some cases the
Court considered such a belated
submission as substantial compliance, it
"did so only on sufficient and justifiable
grounds that compelled a liberal approach
while avoiding the effective negation of
the intent of the rule on non-forum
shopping." (Citations omitted.)

The Petition is Not Meritorious.

Even if we brush aside the technical defect, the


instant Petition must fail just the same.

Petitioners allege that respondents failed to adduce


evidence, i.e., Return of Service, to show that
petitioners were furnished with the Petition for
Letters Administration and the RTC Order dated
July 4, 2007. Petitioners assert that the e-mails
between respondent-administratrix and petitioner
Elephterios, and the stamp "RECEIVED" of the
DFA Records Division, do not prove that they
actually received the Petition for Letters of
Administration and the RTC Order dated July 4,
2007. Petitioners contend that, without the
mandatory and jurisdictional requirement on notice
to the known heirs of the decedent, all proceedings
before the RTC relative to the Petition for Letters
Administration are null and void.

We are not convinced. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 76 of


the Revised Rules of Court provide:
SECTION 3. Court to appoint time for
proving will. Notice thereof to be
published. — When a will is delivered to,
or a petition for the allowance of a will is
filed in, the court having jurisdiction,
such court shall fix a time and place for
proving the will when all concerned may
appear to contest the allowance thereof,
and shall cause notice of such time and
place to be published three (3) weeks
successively, previous to the time
appointed, in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province.

But no newspaper publication shall be


made where the petition for probate has
been filed by the testator himself.

SECTION 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees,


and executors to be notified by mail or
personally. — The court shall also cause
copies of the notice of the time and place
fixed for proving the will to be addressed
to the designated or other known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator
resident in the Philippines at their places
of residence, and deposited in the post
office with the postage thereon prepaid at
least twenty (20) days before the hearing,
if such places of residence be known. A
copy of the notice must in like manner be
mailed to the person named as executor,
if he be not the petitioner; also, to any
person named as co-executor not
petitioning, if their places of residence be
known. Personal service of copies of the
notice at least ten (10) days before the
day of hearing shall be equivalent to
mailing.
If the testator asks for the allowance of
his own will, notice shall be sent only to
his compulsory heirs.

Contrary to petitioners' argument that personal


notice under Section 4 of Rule 76 is a jurisdictional
requirement, the Court, in Alaban v. Court of
Appeals,[28] explained that it is just a matter of
personal convenience. Thus:

According to the Rules, notice is required


to be personally given to known heirs,
legatees, and devisees of the testator. A
perusal of the will shows that respondent
was instituted as the sole heir of the
decedent. Petitioners, as nephews and
nieces of the decedent, are neither
compulsory nor testate heirs who are
entitled to be notified of the probate
proceedings under the Rules. Respondent
had no legal obligation to mention
petitioners in the petition for probate, or
to personally notify them of the same.

Besides, assuming arguendo that


petitioners are entitled to be so
notified, the purported infirmity is
cured by the publication of the notice.
After all, personal notice upon the
heirs is a matter of procedural
convenience and not a jurisdictional
requisite. (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted.)

Moreover, it should be emphasized that a testate or


intestate settlement of a deceased's estate is a
proceeding in rem,[29] such that the publication
under Section 3 of the same Rule, vests the court
with jurisdiction over all persons who are interested
therein.
In the instant case, the Order dated July 4, 2007 was
published for three consecutive weeks in Balita, a
newspaper of general circulation, on the following
dates: July 27, 2007, August 3, 2007, and August 10,
2007.[30] By such publication which constitutes
notice to the whole world, petitioners are deemed
notified about the intestate proceedings of their
father's estate. As the Court elucidated in Alaban v.
Court of Appeals[31]:

However, petitioners in this case are


mistaken in asserting that they are not or
have not become parties to the probate
proceedings.

Under the Rules of Court, any executor,


devisee, or legatee named in a will, or
any other person interested in the estate
may, at any time after the death of the
testator, petition the court having
jurisdiction to have the will allowed.
Notice of the time and place for proving
the will must be published for three (3)
consecutive weeks, in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province, as
well as furnished to the designated or
other known heirs, legatees, and devisees
of the testator. Thus, it has been held
that a proceeding for the probate of a
will is one in rem, such that with the
corresponding publication of the
petition the court's jurisdiction extends
to all persons interested in said will or
in the settlement of the estate of the
decedent.

Publication is notice to the whole world


that the proceeding has for its object to
bar indefinitely all who might be
minded to make an objection of any
sort against the right sought to be
established. It is the publication of such
notice that brings in the whole world as
a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
Thus, even though petitioners were not
mentioned in the petition for probate,
they eventually became parties thereto as
a consequence of the publication of the
notice of hearing. (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted.)

The instant case is analogous to Pilapil v. Heirs of


Maximino R. Briones[32] where some of the heirs did
not receive any personal notice about the intestate
proceedings, yet they were deemed notified through
publication since the intestate proceeding is in rem.
The Court in Pilapil adjudged:

While it is true that since the CFI was not


informed that Maximino still had
surviving siblings and so the court was
not able to order that these siblings be
given personal notices of the intestate
proceedings, it should be borne in
mind that the settlement of estate,
whether testate or intestate, is a
proceeding in rem, and that the
publication in the newspapers of the
filing of the application and of the date
set for the hearing of the same, in the
manner prescribed by law, is a notice
to the whole world of the existence of
the proceedings and of the hearing on
the date and time indicated in the
publication. The publication
requirement of the notice in
newspapers is precisely for the purpose
of informing all interested parties in
the estate of the deceased of the
existence of the settlement proceedings,
most especially those who were not
named as heirs or creditors in the
petition, regardless of whether such
omission was voluntarily or
involuntarily made. (Emphasis
supplied.)

As to whom the Letters of Administration should be


issued, the Court, in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals,[33]
gave emphasis on the extent of one's interest in the
decedent's estate as the paramount consideration for
appointing him/her as the administrator. The Court
pronounced:

In the appointment of the administrator of


the estate of a deceased person, the
principal consideration reckoned with is
the interest in said estate of the one to be
appointed as administrator. This is the
same consideration which Section 6 of
Rule 78 takes into account in establishing
the order of preference in the
appointment of administrators for the
estate. The underlying assumption behind
this rule is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy and economical
administration of the estate, or, on the
other hand, suffer the consequences of
waste, improvidence or mismanagement,
have the highest interest and most
influential motive to administer the estate
correctly.

Here, petitioners cannot assert their preferential right


to administer the estate or that their choice of
administrator should be preferred because they are
the nearest of kin of the decedent. It is worth
emphasizing that the preference given to the
surviving spouse, next of kin, and creditors is not
absolute, and that the appointment of an
administrator greatly depends on the attendant facts
and circumstances of each case. In Uy v. Court of
Appeals,[34] the Court decreed:

The order of preference in the


appointment of an administrator depends
on the attendant facts and circumstances.
In Sioca v. Garcia, this Court set aside the
order of preference, to wit:

It is well settled that a probate


court cannot arbitrarily and
without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential
rights of the surviving spouse
to the administration of the
estate of the deceased spouse.
But, if the person enjoying
such preferential rights is
unsuitable the court may
appoint another person. The
determination of a person's
suitability for the office of
administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment
of the court exercising the
power of appointment and
such judgment will not be
interfered with on appeal
unless it appears affirmatively
that the court below was in
error. (Citation omitted.)

In the instant case, petitioners are non-residents of


the Philippines, which disqualify them from
administering the decedent's estate pursuant to Rule
78, Section 1[35] of the Rules of Court. We are
mindful that respondents are also disqualified by
reason of their minority. In view of the evident
disqualification of petitioners and respondents and
the lack of any known creditors, the parties have no
choice but to have somebody else administer the
estate for them. Petitioners nominated Juan Manuel
Elizalde (Elizalde) but failed to give adequate
justification as to why Letters of Administration
should be issued in Elizalde's favor.[36] We fully
agree with the ruling of the trial and appellate courts
in choosing respondent-administratrix over Elizalde.
Compared to Elizalde whose interest over the
decedent's estate is unclear, respondent-
administratrix's interest is to protect the estate for the
benefit of her children with Enrique. Indeed, it is
respondents who would directly benefit from an
orderly and efficient management by the respondent-
administratrix. In the absence of any indication that
respondent-administratrix would jeopardize her
children's interest, or that of petitioners in the subject
estate, petitioners' attempts to remove her as
administratrix of Enrique's estate must fail.

Notably, the trial and appellate courts did not find


any factual or legal ground to remove Mary Jane B.
Sta. Cruz as administratrix of Enrique's estate. Both
courts cleared respondent-administratrix of the
charges of misrepresentation of being a pauper and
concealment of assets of Enrique's estate. We quote
with approval the ruling of the Court of Appeals:

While it is conceded that the court is


invested with ample discretion in the
removal of an administrator, it must,
however, have some fact legally before it
in order to justify such removal. There
must be evidence of an act or omission on
the part of the administrator not
conformable to or in disregard of the
rules or the orders of the court which it
deems sufficient or substantial to warrant
the removal of the administrator. Suffice
it to state that the removal of an
administrator does not lie on the whims,
caprices and dictates of the heirs or
beneficiaries of the estate.[37]

Likewise, respondent-administratrix is not required


to pay a guardianship bond under Section 16,[38]
A.M. No. 03-02-05-SC, also known as the Rule on
Guardianship of Minors, before she could discharge
her functions as administratrix of Enrique's estate.
This is self-explanatory and needs no further
elaboration.

All told, the Court sustains the above findings


especially so that petitioners did not present any new
persuasive argument in their Petition. It is well-
settled that the findings of fact of the trial court,
when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are
generally binding and conclusive and may not be re-
examined by this Court.[39] Although this rule
admits of exceptions, none of the exceptional
circumstances applies herein.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant


Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The
assailed Decision dated June 28, 2012 and
Resolution dated October 8, 2012 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 92497 are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Del Castillo, Jardeleza, and Tijam, JJ., concur.


Bersamin, J., on official business.

[1] Rollo, pp. 8-18; penned by Associate Justice


Japar B. Dimaampao with Associate Justices
Michael P. Elbinias and Nina G. Antonio-Valenzuela
concurring.

[2] Id. at 19-20.

[3] Records pp. 279-282 & 341-343.

[4] Born on September 29, 2002 per Certificate of


Live Birth, Records p. 63.

[5] Victoria is approximately four years younger than


Yohanna, TSN (October 16, 2007) p. 4, Records, p.
68.

[6] Id. at 33-36.

[7] a) Parcel of land in Ayala Alabang Village,


Muntinlupa City covered by Transfer Certificate of
Title (TCT) No. 159705; b) Parcel of land in Rizal
Village, Cupang, Muntinlupa City, covered by TCT
No. 166270; c) Parcel of land in Moonwalk Village,
Parañaque City, covered by TCT No. 36663; d)
Condominium Unit in Baguio Green Valley Village,
covered by Condominium Certificate of Title (CCT)
No. C-3424; e) Shares of Stocks in various
companies; f) Palms Country Club shares; g)
Alabang Country Club shares; h) Gold Rolex watch;
and i) Box of precious coins. (Records, p. 34.)

[8] Records, p. 52.

[9] Id. at 71-73.

[10] Id. at 107.

[11] Id. at 109-111.

[12] Id. at 116.


[13] Id. at 118-139.

[14] Id. at 172-180.

[15] Id. at 181.

[16] Id. at 182-186.

[17] Id. at 187.

[18] Id. at 280-281.

[19] Id. at 282.

[20] Id. at 287-295.

[21] Id. at 335-337.

[22] CA rollo pp. 217-234.

[23] Rollo, pp. 46-79.

[24] Id. at 54-55.

[25] 734 Phil. 685, 696-697 (2014).

[26] Rollo, p. 77.

[27] 701 Phil. 6, 14-15 (2013).

[28] 507 Phil. 682, 695 (2005).

[29] Pilapil v. Heirs of Maximino R. Briones, 543


Phil. 184, 199 (2007).

[30] Records, p. 6.
[31] Supra note 28 at 692-693.

[32] Supra note 29 at 199.

[33] 287 Phil. 459, 466-467 (1992).

[34] 519 Phil. 673, 680 (2006).

[35] Section 1. Who are incompetent to serve as


executors or administrators. — No person is
competent to serve as executor or administrator who:

(a) Is a minor;
(b) Is not a resident of the Philippines[.]

[36] CA rollo, p. 208.

[37] Rollo, p. 16.

[38] Sec. 16. Bond of parents as guardians of


property of minor. – If the market value of the
property or the annual Income of the child exceeds
P50,000.00, the parent concerned shall furnish a
bond In such amount as the court may determine, but
in no case less than ten per centum of the value of
such property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for
general guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be
filed in the Family Court of the place where the child
resides or, if the child resides in a foreign country, in
the Family Court of the place where the property or
any part thereof is situated. The petition shall be
docketed as a summary special proceeding In which
all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
the obligations of a general guardian shall be heard
and resolved.
[39] It is generally settled in jurisprudence that the
findings of fact of the trial court specially when
affirmed by the CA are final, binding and conclusive
and may not be re-examined by this Court. There
are, however, several exceptions to this rule, to wit:

1] When the findings are grounded


entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures;
2] When the inference made is manifestly
mistaken, absurd or impossible;
3] When there is grave abuse of
discretion;
4] When the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts;
5] When the findings of facts are
conflicting;
6] When in making its findings, the CA
went beyond the issues of the case, or its
findings are contrary to the admissions of
both the appellant and the appellee;
7] When the findings of the CA are
contrary to that of the trial court;
8] When the findings are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on
which they are based;
9] When the facts set forth in the petition
as well as in the main and reply briefs are
not disputed;
10] When the findings of fact are
premised on the supposed absence of
evidence and contradicted by the
evidence on record; and
11] When the CA manifestly overlooked
certain relevant facts not disputed by the
parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.
(Republic v. Hachero, 785 Phil. 784, 792-
793 [2016].)
Source: Supreme Court E-Library | Date created: January 28, 2019
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