People Vs Burton GR No 114396 Feb 19, 1997 - Case Digest

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People vs Burton

G.R. No. 114396.  February 19, 1997

Facts: Appellant, a British national, was convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, for attempting to
transport 5.6 kilograms of hashish, a prohibited drug, through the Ninoy Aquino International Airport.  Though caught
in  flagrante delicto, he denies criminal liability therefor on the novel ground that he was not aware that his traveling
bags contained the prohibited drug.  He also challenges the credibility of the lawmen who apprehended him.
The trial court convicted him.
The main thesis of the defense is that it was not proven that appellant knew that the bags he had checked in
at the airport contained a prohibited drug.  Appellant further claims that the trial court misunderstood his defense
to be lack of “criminal intent” in carrying the prohibited drug instead of “lack of knowledge” that he was carrying
it.  Appellant explains that the trial court confused malice or criminal intent, which is unimportant in malum prohibitum,
and animus possidendi or intent to possess a prohibited drug, which is an element of illegal transportation of a
prohibited drug.
The prosecution’s evidence was allegedly overcome by appellant’s testimony that he bought the luggage and shoes
from a certain John Parry without knowing that they concealed hashish.
In any event, he challenges the prosecution’s evidence, particularly the testimony of Zuño, as unworthy of credence.
Issue: Whether or not appellant’s contentions deserve a reversal of decision.
Held: No.
Under the Rules of Evidence (Sec. 3[j], Rule 131, Rules of Court), “things which a person possesses, or
exercises acts of ownership over, are owned by him.”  Such disputable presumption is based upon the principle that
direct proof of facts of this nature is rarely available, except in cases of confession.  In several cases, the Court has
held that possession of a considerable quantity of marijuana cannot indicate anything except the intention of the
accused to sell, distribute and deliver said prohibited drug.[22]
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact.  Since courts cannot penetrate the mind of an
accused and thereafter state its perceptions with certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary.  Animus possidendi,
as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding circumstances.  Its existence may and usually
must be inferred from the attendant events in each particular case.[23]
In prosecutions involving prohibited drugs, the state has a right to specify what proofs shall constitute prima
facie evidence of guilt, and thereafter to place upon the accused the burden of showing that his act or acts are
innocent and are not committed with any criminal intent or intention.[24]
The existence of animus possidendi is only prima facie.  Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be
rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control over the thing in question, and did
not intend to do so.[25] The constitutional presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is “some
rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the inference of one fact
from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be (a) purely arbitrary mandate.” [26]
The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi.  A mere
uncorroborated claim of the accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his possession is
insufficient.  Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at concealment on his part, in explaining how the drug came
into his possession, may be considered in determining his guilt.[27]
Under the facts obtaining in this case, the 5.6 kilos of hashish cleverly and painstakingly concealed
inside appellant’s luggage and rubber shoes can be said to be in the possession and control of appellant
with his knowledge.  Not only were the blocks and bars of the prohibited drug of a considerable amount, but
they were placed inside three different objects in order to escape detection by the authorities.
The Court also finds incredible appellant’s allegation that he had no idea that the luggage and rubber shoes he
“purchased” from a certain John Parry contained prohibited drugs.  Even the alleged transaction between them is
dubious.  Appellant claims that he had paid Parry P10,000.00 for the two pieces of luggage, clothes, camera, tape
recorder, and Reebok rubber shoes which Parry would redeem from appellant in Australia. Appellant explains that
this transaction, which brought no benefit or advantage to him, was more of a loan, an act of charity, to Parry who
was raising money for his plane fare.  However, appellant also admits that Parry was only a casual acquaintance
whom he had met for about five to six times only.  Thus, it is unbelievable for anyone, much less appellant who was
unemployed and was relying only on the P6,000.00-per-month trust fund proceeds, to be so generous as to shell out
such an amount to a mere acquaintance.
Furthermore, this “purchase” was suspiciously made only hours prior to appellant’s apprehension at the
airport.  Appellant’s explanation, as a whole, is undeserving of credence as it is contrary to common experience.  It
leaves us with no other conclusion than that the animus possidendi did in fact exist at the time of the arrest.

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