8 - PNR Vs Bunty (2006)
8 - PNR Vs Bunty (2006)
8 - PNR Vs Bunty (2006)
Garcia
GR No. 169891, November 2, 2006
FACTS:
Rhonda Brunty, an American citizen, came to the PH for a visit. Before her departure, she, together
with her Filipino host, Juan Manuel M. Garcia, traveled to Baguio City on board a Mercedes Benz,
about 12:00 midnight. By then, a PNR Train, driven by Alfonso Reyes, was on its way to Tutuban,
Metro Manila as it had left the La Union station at 11:00 p.m. By 2:00 a.m., Rhonda Brunty, Garcia
and Mercelita (driver) were already approaching the railroad crossing at Barangay Rizal, Moncada,
Tarlac. Mercelita, driving at approximately 70 km/hr, drove past a vehicle, unaware of the railroad
track up ahead and that they were about to collide with a PNR Train. Mercelita was instantly killed
when the Mercedes Benz smashed into the train; the two other passengers suffered serious physical
injuries. Unfortunately, Rhonda was pronounced dead in the hospital. However, Garcia suffered
severe head injuries and was transferred to another hospital for further treatment.
Ethel Brunty (mother of Rhona) sent a demand letter to the PNY demanding payment of actual,
compensatory and moral damages as a result of her daughter’s death. Yet, PNR did not respond. This
prompted Ethel and Garcia to file a complaint for damages against the PNR before the RTC.
Issues:
Held:
1. PNR. As a rule, railroad companies owe to the public a duty of exercising a reasonable degree of
care to avoid injury to persons and property at railroad crossings, which duties pertain both in
the operation of trains and in the maintenance of the crossings. Moreover, every corporation
constructing or operating a railway shall make and construct at all points where such railway
crosses any public road, good, sufficient, and safe crossings and erect at such points, at a
sufficient elevation from such road as to admit a free passage of vehicles of every kind, a sign
with large and distinct letters placed thereon, to give notice of the proximity of the railway, and
warn persons of the necessity of looking out for trains. In the present case, PNR failed to put a
cross bar, or signal light, flagman or switchman, or semaphores. Such failure is evidence of
negligence and disregard of the safety of the public, even if there is no law or ordinance
requiring it because public safety demands that said device or equipment be installed.
2. Yes, Mercelita was guilty of contributory negligence. Contributory negligence is conduct
on the part of the injured party, contributing as a legal cause to the harm he has suffered, which
falls below the standard to which he is required to conform for his own protection. To hold a
person as having contributed to his injuries, it must be shown that he performed an act that
brought about his injuries in disregard of warning or signs of an impending danger to health and
body. To prove contributory negligence, it is still necessary to establish a causal link, although
not proximate, between the negligence of the party and the succeeding injury. In a legal sense,
negligence is contributory only when it contributes proximately to the injury, and not simply a
condition for its occurrence. In the present case, it was established that Mercelita was driving the
Mercedes Benz at a speed of 70 km/hr and had overtaken a vehicle a few yards before reaching
the railroad track. Mercelita should not have driven the car the way he did. While Mercelita’s acts
contributed to the collision, they do not negate PNR’s liability.
3. No, the doctrine of last clear chance is inapplicable in this case. The doctrine of last
clear chance states that where both parties are negligent but the negligent act of one is
appreciably later than that of the other, or where it is impossible to determine whose fault or
negligence caused the loss, the one who had the last clear opportunity to avoid the loss but
failed to do so, is chargeable with the loss. Stated differently, the antecedent negligence of
plaintiff does not preclude him from recovering damages caused by the supervening negligence
of defendant, who had the last fair chance to prevent the impending harm by the exercise of due
diligence. The proximate cause of the injury having been established to be the negligence of
PNR, the SC held that the doctrine of last clear chance finds no application in the instant case.