Consti 2nd Set

1 – Tin , 2 – Josh, 3 – Marj, 4 – Dani, 5 – Robert, 6 – Anj, 7 – Kate
CASES [Second Set]
THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (Continuation)
The Legislative Process, Requirements & Procedure
4 Lidasan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
5 Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
6 Tobias. et. al. vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
7 Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987
7 Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
6 Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992
5 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
4 Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, October 30, 1995
3 Tan vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
2 Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004
1 Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
1 Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
2 Tanada, et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
Enrolled Bill Journey and the Journal
3 Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963
4 U.S. vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916
Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications
5 Philconsa vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
6 Ligot vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-34676, April 30, 1974
7 People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
7 Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

6 Puyat vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
5 Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr., G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985
Legislative Investigation
4 Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
3 Arnault vs. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955
2 Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, G.R. No. 89914, November 20,
1991
1 Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
Electoral Tribunals
1 Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No 97710, September 26, 1991
2 Abbas vs. SET, G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988
3 Pimentel vs. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002
Commission on Appointments
4 Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989
5 Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
6 Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992
THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
7 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
7 Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. 146738, March 2, 2001
6 CLU vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
5 De la Cruz vs. COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001
4 National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004
Executive Power
3 DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003
2 Blaquera vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
1 National Electrification Administration vs. COA, G.R. No. 143481, February 15,
2002
1 Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
CASE DIGEST
Lidasan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967
On June 18, 1966, Republic Act 790 entitled, “An Act Creating the Municipality
of Dianaton in the Province of Lanao Del Sur” was signed into law. It came to
light later that 12 barrios mentioned in the act are within 2 municipalities of
the Province of Cotabato and not of Lanao Del Sur. These are the barrios of
Togaig and Madalum which are within the municipality of Buldon, and Bayanga,
Langkong, Sarakan, Kat-bo, Digakapan, Magabo, Tabangao, Tiongko, Colodan
and Kabamawakan, parts of the municipality of Parang.
The Office of the President, recommended that the operation of the statute be
suspended until clarified by correcting legislation. However, COMELEC stood by
its own interpretation and declared that the statute should be implemented
unless declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court.
Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,

Cotabato filed an action for certiorari and prohibition, praying that RA 4970 be
declared unconstitutional. Petitioner relied upon the constitutional requirement
that “no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject
which shall be expressed in the title of the bill.”
Issue: WON RA 7940 is unconstitutional
Ruling:
Yes. The petitioner is correct in relying upon the constitutional requirement that
“no bill which may be enacted into law shall embrace more than one subject,
which be expressed in the title of the bill.” Compliance to this requirement is
imperative, given the fact that the Constitution does not oblige Congress to read
the entire text of a bill during its deliberations. Only the title is read from its
introduction to its final approval in the House of Representatives.
The Constitution does not require the Congress to employ in the title of an
enactment, such precise language as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all
the contents and the minute details therein. It suffices if the title be able to
inform the legislators, the persons interested in the subject of the bill and the
public of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its
operation.
In the case at bar, the title “An Act Creating the Municipality in the Province of
Lanao Del Sur” projects the impression that solely the province of Lanao del sur
is affected by the creation of Dianaton. Such title did not inform the members of
the Congress as to the full impact of the law; it did not apprise the people in the
towns Buldon and Parang and the province of the Cotabato itself that part of their
territory is being taken away. It kept the public in the dark as to what towns and
provinces were actually affected.
The Court ruled that Republic Act 4790 is null and void.
Tio vs. Videogram Regulatory Board, G.R. No. L-75697, June 18, 1987
Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators

adversely affected by Presidential Decree No. 1987, “An Act Creating the
Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the
videogram industry.
A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, PD no. 1994
amended the National Internal Revenue Code provided that:
"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. — There shall be collected on each processed video-
tape cassette, ready for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five
pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or imported blank video tapes shall
be subject to sales tax."
"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the province shall collect a
tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or rental rate, as the case may
be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a reproduction
of any motion picture or audiovisual program.”
“Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the
province, and the other fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where
the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan Manila
Commission.”
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and
unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes,
discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, have greatly
prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such unregulated
circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty
percent (40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's
specific, amusement and other taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses
estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum

from rentals, sales and disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not
been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the Government of approximately P180
Million in taxes each year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the

viability of the movie industry.
Petitioner assailed the constitutionality of the decree arguing that Section which
imposes a tax of 30% on the gross receipts payable to the local government is a
RIDER and the same is not german to the subject matter thereof.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police
power.
(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.
Held:
The Constitutional requirement that "every bill shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof" is sufficiently complied with if the
title is comprehensive enough to include the general purpose which a statute
seeks to achieve. The requirement is satisfied if all the parts of the statute are
related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as long
as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title. The
rule also is that the constitutional requirement as to the title of a bill should not be
so narrowly construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation.
Section 10 is allied and germane to, and is reasonably necessary for the
accomplishment of, the general object of the DECREE, which is the
regulation of the video industry through the Videogram Regulatory Board
as expressed in its title. The tax provision is not inconsistent with, nor foreign to
that general subject and title. The express purpose of the DECREE to include
taxation of the video industry in order to regulate and rationalize the heretofore
uncontrolled distribution of videograms is evident from Preamble. Those
preambles explain the motives of the lawmaker in presenting the measure. The
title of the DECREE, which is the creation of the Videogram Regulatory Board, is
comprehensive enough to include the purposes expressed in its Preamble and
reasonably covers all its provisions. It is unnecessary to express all those
objectives in the title or that the latter be an index to the body of the
DECREE.
Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of
the 30% tax is for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need
for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy,
the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in

pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While
the underlying objective of the DECREE is to protect the moribund movie
industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its enactment,
considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of
the moral fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of
unclassified and unreviewed video tapes containing pornographic films and films
with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government revenues due to the
drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and
municipal license fees are required to engage in business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.
Tobias. et. al. vs. Abalos, G.R. No. L-114783, December 8, 1994
Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of

Mandaluyong, filed a petition questioning the constitutionality of Republic Act
No. 7675, otherwise known as "An Act Converting the Municipality of
Mandaluyong into a Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of
Mandaluyong." Before the enactment of the law, Mandaluyong and San Juan
belonged to the same legislative district.
The petitioners contended that the act is unconstitutional for violation of three
provisions of the constitution. First, it violates the one subject one bill rule.
The bill provides for the conversion of Mandaluyong to HUC as well as the
division of congressional district of San Juan and Mandaluyong into two separate
district. Second, it also violate Section 5 of Article VI of the Constitution, which
provides that the House of Representatives shall be composed of not more than
two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise fixed by law. The division of
San Juan and Mandaluyong into separate congressional districts increased the
members of the House of Representative beyond that provided by the
Constitution. Third, Section 5 of Article VI also provides that within three years
following the return of every census, the Congress shall make a reapportionment
of legislative districts based on the standard provided in Section 5. Petitioners
stated that the division was not made pursuant to any census showing that the
minimum population requirement was attained.
Issue:
(1) Does RA 7675 violate the one subject one bill rule?
(2) Does it violate Section 5(1) of Article VI of the Constitution on the limit of
number of rep?
(3) Is the inexistence of mention of census in the law show a lack of constitutional
requirement?
Rulings:
The Supreme Court ruled that the contentions are devoid of merit. With regards
to the first contention of one subject one bill rule, the creation of a separate
congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct

subject from its conversion into a HUC but is a natural and logical
consequence. In addition, a liberal construction of the "one title-one subject" rule
has been invariably adopted by this court so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.
The second contention that the law violates the present limit of the number of
representatives, the provision of the section itself show that the 250 limit is not
absolute. The Constitution clearly provides that the House of Representatives
shall be composed of not more than 250 members, "unless otherwise provided
by law”. Therefore, the increase in congressional representation mandated by
R.A. No. 7675 is not unconstitutional.
With regards, to the third contention that there is no mention in the assailed law
of any census to show that Mandaluyong and San Juan had each attained the
minimum requirement of 250,000 inhabitants to justify their separation into two
legislative districts, unless otherwise proved that the requirements were not met,
the said Act enjoys the presumption of having passed through the regular
congressional processes, including due consideration by the members of
Congress of the minimum requirements for the establishment of separate
legislative district
The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.
Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987
Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this

country, as members of the National Assembly/Batasan Pambansa
representing their millions of constituents, as parties with general interest
common to all the people of the Philippines, and as taxpayers whose vital
interests may be affected by the outcome of the reliefs prayed for" 1 listed the
grounds relied upon in this petition as follows:
SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977';
"A. INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE

ILLEGAL TRANSFER OF PUBLIC MONEYS.
"B. REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE

OBJECTIVES AND PURPOSES FOR WHICH THE PROPOSED TRANSFER
OF FUNDS ARE TO BE MADE.
"C.ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM

AND PROCEDURE PRESCRIBED BY THE CONSTITUTION IN APPROVING
APPROPRIATIONS.
"D.AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO

THE EXECUTIVE.
"E THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE

PRESIDENT AND THE IMPLEMENTATION THEREOF BY THE BUDGET
MINISTER AND THE TREASURER OF THE PHILIPPINES ARE WITHOUT OR
IN EXCESS OF THEIR AUTHORITY AND JURISDICTION."
On September 19, 1985, the Solicitor General questioned the legal standing of
petitioners, who were allegedly merely begging an advisory from the Court, thus
no justiciable controversy. He contended that the provision under consideration
was enacted pursuant to Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution;
and that at any rate, prohibition will not lie from one branch of the government to
a coordinate branch to enjoin the performance of duties within the latter's sphere
of responsibility.
On February 27, 1986 the resolution of the present case need to hold in
abeyance
The Solicitor General filed a rejoinder with a motion to dismiss, setting forth as
grounds therefore the abrogation of Section 16[5], Article VIII of the 1973
Constitution by the Freedom Constitution of March 25, 1986, which has
allegedly rendered the instant petition moot and academic.
ISSUES:
W/N paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential-Decree No. 1177 IS

UNCONSITUTIONAL?
W/N the Supreme Court can act upon the assailed executive act?
RULING: YES. Constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution is readily perceivable from a mere cursory
reading thereof. Said paragraph 1 of Section 44 provides
"The President shall have the authority to transfer any fund, appropriated for the
different departments, bureaus, offices and agencies of the Executive
Department, which are included in the General Appropriations Act, to any
program, project or activity of any department, bureau, or office included in the
General Appropriations Act or approved after its enactment."
On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as

follows:
"Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,

however, the President, the Prime Minister, the Speaker, the Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court, and the heads of constitutional commissions may by law be
authorized to augment any item in the general appropriations law for their
respective offices from savings in other items of their respective appropriations."
The prohibition to transfer an appropriation for one item to another was explicit
and categorical under the 1973 Constitution. However, to afford the heads of the
different branches of the government and those of the constitutional commissions
considerable flexibility in the use of public funds and resources, the constitution
allowed the enactment of a law authorizing the transfer of funds for the purpose
of augmenting an item from savings in another item in the appropriation of the
government branch or constitutional body concerned. The leeway granted was
thus limited. The purpose and conditions for which funds may be transferred
were specified, i.e. transfer may be allowed for the purpose of augmenting
an item and such transfer may be made only if there are savings from
another item in the appropriation of the government branch or
constitutional body.
IN THE CASE AT BAR, Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly

overextends the privilege granted under said Section 16[5]. It empowers the
President to indiscriminately transfer funds from one department, bureau, office
or agency of the Executive Department to any program, project or activity of any
department, bureau or office included in the General Appropriations Act or
approved after its enactment, without regard as to whether or not the funds
to be transferred are actually savings in the item from which the same are
to be taken, or whether or not the transfer is for the purpose of augmenting the
item to which said transfer is to be made. It does not only completely disregard
the standards set in the fundamental law, thereby amounting to an undue
delegation of legislative powers, but likewise goes beyond the tenor thereof.
Indeed, such constitutional infirmities render the provision in question null and
void.
2. YES. Where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits
of its authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But
where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void.
Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. I,

Eight Edition, Little, Brown and Company, Boston, explained:
". . . The legislative and judicial are coordinate departments of the government, of
equal dignity; each is alike supreme in the exercise of its proper functions, and
cannot directly or indirectly, while acting within the limits of its authority, be
subjected to the control or supervision of the other, without an unwarrantable
assumption by that other of power which, by the Constitution, is not conferred
upon it. The Constitution apportions the powers of government, but it does not
make any one of the three departments subordinate to another, when exercising
the trust committed to it. The courts may declare legislative enactments
unconstitutional and void in some cases, but not because the judicial power is
superior in degree or dignity to the legislative. Being required to declare what the
law is in the cases which come before them, they must enforce the Constitution,
as the paramount law, whenever a legislative enactment comes in conflict with it.
'In exercising this high authority, the judges claim no judicial supremacy; they are
only the administrators of the public will. If an act of the legislature is held void, it
is not because the judges have any control over the legislative power, but
because the act is forbidden by the Constitution, and because the will of the
people, which is therein declared, is paramount to that of their representatives
expressed in any law.
Where the legislature or the executive branch is acting within the limits of its
authority, the judiciary cannot and ought not to interfere with the former. But
where the legislature or the executive acts beyond the scope of its constitutional
powers, it becomes the duty of the judiciary to declare what the other branches of
the government had assumed to do as void.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is granted. Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of

Presidential Decree No. 1177 is hereby declared null and void for being
unconstitutional.
Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991
Petitioners question the constitutionality of the automatic appropriation for debt

service under under RA 6831, otherwise known as the General Appropriations
Act of 1990.
The 1990 budget total was P233.5 Billion, with P86.8 Billion in automatic
appropriation for debt service. The said automatic appropriation for debt
service is authorized by P.D. No. 81, entitled "Amending Certain Provisions of
Republic Act Numbered Four Thousand Eight Hundred Sixty, as Amended (Re:
Foreign Borrowing Act), "by P.D. No. 1177, entitled "Revising the Budget
Process in Order to Institutionalize the Budgetary Innovations of the New
Society," and by P.D. No. 1967, entitled "An Act Strengthening the Guarantee
and Payment Positions of the Republic of the Philippines on Its Contingent
Liabilities Arising out of Relent and Guaranteed Loans by Appropriating Funds
For The Purpose."
In comparison, the appropriation for the Department of Education, Culture and

Sports was only P27 Billion. The petitioners (Senators) seek the declaration of
the unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Sections 31 of P.D. 1177, and P.D. No.
1967, which authorize the automatic appropriation for debt service. They assert
that there must be definiteness, certainty and exactness in an
appropriation, otherwise it is an undue delegation of legislative power to
the President who determines in advance the amount appropriated for the
debt service
Respondent contends that the petition involves a political question as the repeal
or amendment of laws is addressed to the judgment and wisdom of the
legislative body and not the courts.
"I. WHETHER OR NOT THE APPROPRIATION OF P86 BILLION IN THE P233

BILLION 1990 BUDGET VIOLATIVE OF SECTION 5, ARTICLE XIV OF THE
CONSTITUTION? NO
II. WHETHER OR NOT PD No. 81, PD No. 1177 AND PD No. 1967 STILL
OPERATIVE UNDER THE CONSTITUTION? YES
III. WHETHER OR NOT AUTOMATIC APPROPRIATION IS VIOLATIVE OF

SECTION 29(1), ARTICLE VI OF THE CONSTITUTION?" NO
RULING: The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No.
81, Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or
appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
1.
"According to Sec. 5, Art. XIV of the Constitution:
'(5) The State shall assign the highest budgetary priority to education and ensure
that teaching will attract and retain its rightful share of the best available talents
through adequate remuneration and other means of job satisfaction and
fulfillment.'
"The reason behind the said provision is stated, that;
'Mr. Ople pointed out that the recognition by the Constitution of the highest
priority for public school teachers, and by implication, for all teachers, would
ensure that the President and Congress would be strongly urged by a
constitutional mandate to grant to them such a level of remuneration and other
incentives that would make teaching competitive again and attractive to the best
available talents in the nation.
"However, as against this constitutional intention, P86 Billion is appropriated for

debt service while only P27 Billion is appropriated for the Department of
Education in the 1990 budget. It is plain, therefore, that the said appropriation for
debt service is inconsistent with the Constitution, hence, void (Art. 7, New Civil
Code)." 7
As aptly observed by respondents, since 1985, the budget for education has
tripled to upgrade and improve the facility of the public school system. The
compensation of teachers has been doubled. The amount of
P29,740,611,000.00 8 set aside for the Department of Education, Culture
and Sports under the General Appropriations Act (R.A. No. 6831), is the
highest budgetary allocation among all department budgets. This is a clear
compliance with the aforesaid constitutional mandate according highest priority to
education.
Congress is certainly not without any power, guided only by its good
judgment, to provide an appropriation, that can reasonably service our
enormous debt, the greater portion of which was inherited from the previous
administration. It is not only a matter of honor and to protect the credit standing of
the country. More especially, the very survival of our economy is at stake. Thus,
if in the process Congress appropriated an amount for debt service bigger than
the share allocated to education, the Court finds and so holds that said
appropriation cannot be thereby assailed as unconstitutional.
2. Petitioners contend that assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177
and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire with the ouster of President Marcos, after the
adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees are inoperative under Section
3, Article XVIII which provides. They assert that there must be definiteness,
certainty and exactness in an appropriation, 11 otherwise it is an undue

delegation of legislative power to the President who determines in advance the
amount appropriated for the debt service. 12
The Court is not persuaded.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that "All existing laws,
decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other
executive issuances not inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative
until amended, repealed or revoked."
This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its
framers to preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President
Marcos may be recognized. Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless
they are inconsistent with the Constitution or are otherwise amended, repealed or
revoked.
An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that
the amounts needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all
foreign loans, including those guaranteed by the national government, should be
made available when they shall become due precisely without the necessity of
periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds therefor, since both the
periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.
The court used the wordings of the SolGen:
It enables the Government to take advantage of a favorable turn of market

conditions by redeeming high interest securities and borrowing at lower rates, or
to shift from short-term to long-term instruments, or to enter into arrangements
that could lighten our outstanding debt burden debt-to-equity, debt-to-asset, debt-
to-debt or other such schemes. Second, the automatic appropriation obviates the
serious difficulties in debt servicing arising from any deviation from what has
been previously programmed. The annual debt service estimates, which are
usually made one year in advance, are based on a mathematical set or matrix or,
in layman's parlance, `basket' of foreign exchange and interest rate assumption's
which may significantly differ from actual rates not even in proportion to changes
on the basis of the assumptions. Absent an automatic appropriation clause,
the Philippine Government has to await and depend upon Congressional
action, which by the time this comes, may no longer be responsive to the
intended conditions which in the meantime may have already drastically
changed. In the meantime, also, delayed payments and arrearages may have
supervened, only to worsen our debt service-to-total expenditure ratio in the
budget due to penalties and/or demand for immediate-payment even before due
dates.
Clearly, the claim that payment of the loans and indebtedness is conditioned
upon the continuance of the person of President Marcos and his legislative
power goes against the intent and purpose of the law. The purpose is foreseen to
subsist with or without the person of Marcos."
The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the
requirement and are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI
of the Constitution which requires, among others, that "all appropriations, . . . bills
authorizing increase of public debt" must be passed by Congress and approved
by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers of the Constitution did not
contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing presidential
decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere "bills" that must again
go through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said
provisions of the Constitution which refer to "bills" is that they mean appropriation
measures still to be passed by Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof
were otherwise they should have expressed their decision in a more direct or
express manner.
3. The Court finds that in this case the questioned laws are complete in all their
essential terms and conditions and sufficient standards are indicated therein.
The legislative intention in R.A. No. 4860, as amended, Section 31 of P.D. No.
1177 and P.D. No. 1967 is that the amount needed should be automatically set
aside in order to enable the Republic of the Philippines to pay the principal,
interest, taxes and other normal banking charges on the loans, credits or
indebtedness incurred as guaranteed by it when they shall become due without
the need to enact a separate law appropriating funds therefor as the need arises.
The purpose of these laws is to enable the government to make prompt
payment and/or advances for all loans to protect and maintain the credit
standing of the country.
"The Government budgeting process consists of four major phases:
1. Budget preparation. The first step is essentially tasked upon the Executive
Branch and covers the estimation of government revenues, the determination of
budgetary priorities and activities within the constraints imposed by available
revenues and by borrowing limits, and the translation of desired priorities and
activities into expenditure levels.
Budget preparation starts with the budget call issued by the Department of
Budget and Management. Each agency is required to submit agency budget
estimates in line with the requirements consistent with the general ceilings set by
the Development Budget Coordinating Council (DBCC).
With regard to debt servicing, the DBCC staff, based on the macroeconomic
projections of interest rates (e.g. LIBOR rate) and estimated sources of domestic
and foreign financing, estimates debt service levels. Upon issuance of budget
call, the Bureau of Treasury computes for the interest and principal payments for
the year for all direct national government borrowings and other liabilities
assumed by the same.
2. Legislative authorization. At this stage, Congress enters the picture and

deliberates or acts on the budget proposals of the President, and Congress in the
exercise of its own judgment and wisdom formulates an appropriation act
precisely following the process established by the Constitution, which specifies
that no money may be paid from the Treasury except in accordance with an
appropriation made by law.
Debt service is not included in the General Appropriation Act, since authorization
therefor already exists under RA No. 4860 and 245, as amended and PD 1967.
Precisely in the light of this subsisting authorization as embodied in said Republic
Acts and PD for debt service, Congress does not concern itself with details for
implementation by the Executive, but largely with annual levels and approval
thereof upon due deliberations as part of the whole obligation program for the
year. Upon such approval, Congress has spoken and cannot be said to have
delegated its wisdom to the Executive, on whose part lies the implementation or
execution of the legislative wisdom.
3. Budget Execution. Tasked on the Executive, the third phase of the budget
process covers the various operational aspects of budgeting. The establishment
of obligation authority ceilings, the evaluation of work and financial plans for
individual activities, the continuing review of government fiscal position, the
regulation of funds releases, the implementation of cash payment schedules, and
other related activities comprise this phase of the budget cycle.
Release from the debt service fund is triggered by a request of the Bureau of the
Treasury for allotments from the Department of Budget and Management, one
quarter in advance of payment schedule, to ensure prompt payments.
The Bureau of Treasury, upon receiving official billings from the creditors, remits
payments to creditors through the Central Bank or to the Sinking Fund
established for government security issues (Annex F).
4. Budget accountability. The fourth phase refers to the evaluation of actual

performance and initially approved work targets, obligations incurred, personnel
hired and work accomplished are compared with the targets set at the time the
agency budgets were approved.
In other words, in terms of time horizons, an appropriation may be made

impliedly (as by past but subsisting legislations) as well as expressly for the
current fiscal year (as by enactment of laws by the present Congress), just as
said appropriation may be made in general as well as in specific terms. The
Congressional authorization may be embodied in annual laws, such as a general
appropriations act or in special provisions of laws of general or special
application which appropriate public funds for specific public purposes, such as
the questioned decrees. An appropriation measure is sufficient if the legislative
intention clearly and certainly appears from the language employed (In re
Continuing Appropriations, 32 P. 272), whether in the past or in the present." 17
The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81,
Section 31 of P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or
appropriations, unless they are repealed or otherwise amended by Congress.
In conclusion, it is more of a political decision for Congress and the Executive to

determine in the exercise of their wisdom and sound discretion.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED
Garcia vs. Executive Secretary, et. al., G.R. No. 101273, July 3, 1992
Executive Order no 475 was promulgated and it imposed an additional duty of

9% on crude oil and oil products imported into the Philippines. Later on,
Executive Order No. 443 was promulgated and the additional duty was
subsequently increased from five percent (5%) ad valorem to nine percent

(9%) ad valorem.
Department of Finance requested the Tariff Commission to initiate the process

required by the Tariff and Customs Code for the imposition of a specific levy on
crude oil and other petroleum products, Accordingly, the Tariff Commission,
following the procedure set forth in Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code,
scheduled a public hearing to give interested parties an opportunity to be heard
and to present evidence in support of their respective positions.
Executive Order No. 475 was issued, which reduced the rate of additional duty
on all imported articles from nine percent (9%) to five percent (5%) ad valorem,
except in the cases of crude oil and other oil products which continued to be
subject to the additional duty of nine percent (9%) ad valorem.
Upon completion of the public hearings, the Tariff Commission submitted to the
President a "Report on Special Duty on Crude Oil and Oil Products", for
consideration and appropriate action. The President then issued Executive Order
No. 478 which levied (in addition to the aforementioned additional duty of nine
percent (9%) ad valorem and all other existing ad valorem duties) a special duty
of P0.95 per liter or P151.05 per barrel of imported crude oil and P1.00 per liter of
imported oil products.
Petitioner e argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are violative of
Section 24, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which provides as follows:
"Section 24. All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of
the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate
exclusively in the House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments."
He contends that since the Constitution vests the authority to enact

revenue bills in Congress, the President may not assume such power of
issuing Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 which are in the nature of
revenue-generating measures.
Petitioner further argues that Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 contravene
Section 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code, which Section authorizes the
President, according to petitioner, to increase, reduce or remove tariff duties or to
impose additional duties only when necessary to protect local industries or
products but not for the purpose of raising additional revenue for the government.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are

unconstitutional?
2. Whether or not Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478 are legal?
RULING:
NO.
Under Section 24, Article VI of the Constitution, the enactment of appropriation,

revenue and tariff bills, like all other bills is, of course, within the province of the
Legislative rather than the Executive Department.
It does not follow, however, that therefore Executive Orders Nos. 475 and 478,
assuming they may be characterized as revenue measures, are prohibited to the
President, that they must be enacted instead by the Congress of the Philippines.
Section 28(2) of Article VI of the Constitution provides as follows:
"(2) The Congress may, by law, authorize the President to fix within specified
limits, and subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff
rates, import and export quotas, tonage and wharfage dues, and other
duties or imposts within the framework of the national development
program of the Government.
There is thus explicit constitutional permission to Congress to authorize the

President "subject to such limitations and restrictions as [Congress] may impose"
to fix "within specific limits" "tariff rates . . . and other duties or imposts . . . ."
The assailed Executive Orders are valid. Congress may by law authorize the
president to fit tariff rates and other duties within specified limits. The issuance of
these EOs authorized by Sections 104 and 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.
There is nothing in the law that suggests that the authority may only be exercised
to protect local industries. Custom duties may be designated to achieve more
than one policy objective the protection of local industries and to raise revenue
for the government.
Petitioner has not successfully overcome the presumptions of constitutionality

and legality to which those Executive Orders are entitled.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, August 25, 1994
FACTS:
Republic Act No. 7716 seeks to widen the tax base of the existing VAT system
and enhance its administration by amending the National Internal Revenue
Code.These are various suits for certiorari and prohibition, challenging the
constitutionality of Republic Act No. 7716 on various grounds summarized in the
resolution of July 6, 1994 of this Court.
Petitioners' contention is that Republic Act No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. V1, 24 of the
Constitution, because it is in fact the result of the consolidation of two distinct
bills, H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630. In this connection, petitioners point out that
although Art. VI, 24 was adopted from the American Federal Constitution,[2] it is
notable in two respects: the verb "shall originate" is qualified in the Philippine
Constitution by the word "exclusively" and the phrase "as on other bills" in the
American version is omitted. This means, according to them, that to be
considered as having originated in the House, Republic Act No. 7716 must retain
the essence of H. No. 11197.
Issues:
A.Does Republic Act No. 7716 violate Art. VI, 24 of the Constitution?
B.Does it violate Art. VI, 26(2) of the Constitution?
C.What is the extent of the power of the Bicameral Conference Committee?
RULING:
1 . It is not the law but the revenue bill which is required by the Constitution to
"originate exclusively" in the House of Representatives. It is important to
emphasize this, because a bill originating in the House may undergo such
extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a rewriting of the
whole.To insist that a revenue statute and not only the bill which initiated the
legislative process culminating in the enactment of the law must substantially
be the same as the House bill would be to deny the Senate's power not only
to "concur with amendments" but also to "propose amendments." It would
be to violate the coequality of legislative power of the two houses of Congress
and in fact make the House superior to the Senate.
What the Constitution simply means is that the initiative for filing revenue, tariff,
or tax bills, bills authorizing an increase of the public debt, private bills and bills of
local application must come from the House of Representatives on the theory
that, elected as they are from the districts, the members of the House can be
expected to be more sensitive to the local needs and problems. On the other
hand, the senators, who are elected at large, are expected to approach the same
problems from the national perspective. Both views are thereby made to bear on
the enactment of such laws.
2 .That S. No. 1630 did not pass three readings on separate days as
required by the Constitution because the second and third readings were done
on the same day, March 24, 1994 was because on February 24, 1994 and
again on March 22, 1994, the President had certified S. No. 1630 as urgent.
The presidential certification dispensed with the requirement not only of printing
but also that of reading the bill on separate days. The phrase "except when the
President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment, etc." in. Art.
VI, 26(2) qualifies the two stated conditions before a bill can become a law: (i)
the bill has passed three readings on separate days and (ii) it has been printed in
its final form and distributed three days before it is finally approved.
There is, therefore, no merit in the contention that presidential certification

dispenses only with the requirement for the printing of the bill and its distribution
three days before its passage but not with the requirement of three readings on
separate days, also.
3 .As to the possibility of an entirely new bill emerging out of a Conference

Committee, it has been explained:
“Under congressional rules of procedure, conference committees are not

expected to make any material change in the measure at issue, either by
deleting provisions to which both houses have already agreed or by inserting
new provisions. But this is a difficult provision to enforce. Note the problem when
one house amends a proposal originating in either house by striking out
everything following the enacting clause and substituting provisions which make
it an entirely new bill. The versions are now altogether different, permitting a
conference committee to draft essentially a new bill. . .”
It is within the power of a conference committee to include in its report an

entirely new provision that is not found either in the House bill or in the
Senate bill.[17] If the committee can propose an amendment consisting of one
or two provisions, there is no reason why it cannot propose several provisions,
collectively considered as an "amendment in the nature of a substitute," so long
as such amendment is germane to the subject of the bills before the
committee.
Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 October 30, 1995
FACTS: 10 motions were filed motions seeking reconsideration of the

Supreme Court’s decision dismissing the petitions filed in these cases for
the declaration of unconstitutionality of R.A. No. 7716, otherwise known as
the Expanded Value-Added Tax Law.
Petitioners reiterate their previous claims that R.A. No. 7716 did not "originate
exclusively" in the House of Representatives as required by Art. VI, 24 of the
Constitution. Although they admit that H. No. 11197 was filed in the House of
Representatives where it passed three readings and that afterward it was sent to
the Senate where after first reading it was referred to the Senate Ways and
Means Committee, they complain that the Senate did not pass it on second
and third readings. Instead, the Senate passed its own version (S. No. 1630)
which it approved on May 24, 1994.
Furthermore, it was argued that the addition of the word "exclusively" in the
Philippine Constitution and the decision to drop the phrase "as on other
Bills" in the American version, according to petitioners, shows the
intention of the framers of our Constitution to restrict the Senate's power to
propose amendments to revenue bills. Petitioner Tolentino contends that the
word "exclusively" was inserted to modify "originate" and "the words 'as in any
other bills' (sic) were eliminated so as to show that these bills were not to be like
other bills but must be treated as a special kind."
Issue: WON RA No. 7716 is unconstitutional on the abovementioned ground
Ruling:
No.
Art. VI, 24 of our Constitution reads:
All appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills authorizing increase of the public
debt, bills of local application, and private bills shall originate exclusively in the
House of Representatives, but the Senate may propose or concur with
amendments.
While Art. VI, sec. 24 provides that all appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, bills
authorizing increase of the public debt, bills of local application, and private bills
must "originate exclusively in the House of Representatives," it also adds, "but
the Senate may propose or concur with amendments." In the exercise of this
power, the Senate may propose an entirely new bill as a substitute measure.
. At any rate there is no rule prescribing this form. S. No. 1630, as a substitute
measure, is therefore as much an amendment of H. No. 11197 as any which the
Senate could have made.
Moreover, S. No. 1630 a mere amendment of H. No. 11197.In several instances,
the provisions of S. No. 1630, clearly appear to be mere amendments of the

corresponding provisions of H. No. 11197. The very tabular comparison of the
provisions of H. No. 11197 and S. No. 1630 attached as Supplement A to the
basic petition of petitioner Tolentino, while showing differences between the two
bills, at the same time indicates that the provisions of the Senate bill were
precisely intended to be amendments to the House bill.
Without H. No. 11197, the Senate could not have enacted S. No. 1630. Because
the Senate bill was a mere amendment of the House bill, H. No. 11197 in its
original form did not have to pass the Senate on second and three readings. It
was enough that after it was passed on first reading it was referred to the Senate
Committee on Ways and Means. Neither was it required that S. No. 1630 be
passed by the House of Representatives before the two bills could be referred to
the Conference Committee.
Tan vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994
Facts: Two consolidated cases assail the validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified
Net Income Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended certain provisions of
the NIRC, as well as the Rules and Regulations promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the

following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) — Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace
only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) — The rule of taxation shall be uniform and equitable.
The Congress shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 — No person shall be deprived of . . . property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
Petitioners contended that public respondents exceeded their rule-making

authority in applying SNIT to general professional partnerships. Petitioner
contends that the title of HB 34314, progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for
being merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme for the Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged in the Practice of their Profession"
(Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of the title actually reads:
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income Taxation Scheme For The Self-
Employed and Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their Profession,
Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the National Internal Revenue Code,' as
amended. Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
Petitioner also contends that SNITS should be considered as having now

adopted a gross income, instead of as having still retained the net income
taxation scheme. The allowance for deductible items, may have significantly
been reduced by the questioned law in comparison with that which has prevailed
prior to the amendment; however, allowable deductions from gross income is
neither discordant with, nor opposed to, the net income tax concept.
Petitioner contends that the law would now attempt to tax single proprietorships
and professionals differently from the manner it imposes the tax on corporations
and partnerships.
The Solicitor General espouses the position taken by public respondents. The
Court has given due course to both petitions.
Issue:
1. Whether or not RA 7496 is violative of the constitutional requirement that

taxation shall be uniform and equitable (RELATED TO THE TOPIC)
2. Whether or not public respondents have exceeded their authority in

promulgating Section 6, Revenue Regulations No. 2-93, to carry out RA 7496.
Ruling:
1. Uniformity does not prohibit classification so long as the requirements for a

valid classification under the equal protection clause are complied with.
Uniformity of taxation merely requires that all subjects or objects of taxation,
similarly situated, are to be treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long as:
(1) the standards that are used therefor are substantial and not arbitrary,
(2) the categorization is germane to achieve the legislative purpose,
(3) the law applies, all things being equal, to both present and future
conditions, and
(4) the classification applies equally well to all those belonging to the same
class.
Shifting the taxation of individuals to the scheduled system which makes the
income tax depend on the kind of taxable income and maintaining for
corporations the global treatment which treats in common all kinds if taxable
income of the taxpayer is not arbitrary.
With the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature
(kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place)
of taxation. The SC cannot freely delve into those matters which, by
constitutional fiat, rightly rest on legislative judgment. Of course, where a
tax measure becomes so unconscionable and unjust as to amount to
confiscation of property, courts will not hesitate to strike it down, for,
despite all its plenitude, the power to tax cannot override constitutional
proscriptions. This stage, however, has not been demonstrated to have
been reached within any appreciable distance in this controversy.
2. NO There is no distinction in income tax liability between a person who

practices his profession alone or individually and one who does it through
partnership (registered or not) with others in the exercise of a common
profession. General professional partnership, unlike an ordinary partnership
(which is treated as a corporation for income tax purposes and so subject to the
corporate income tax), is not itself an income taxpayer. The income tax is
imposed not on the professional partnership, which is tax exempt, but on the
partners themselves in their individual capacity computed on their distributive
shares of partnership profits. The law, in levying the tax, adopts the most
comprehensive tax situs of nationality and residence of the taxpayer (that
renders citizens, regardless of residence, and resident aliens subject to income
tax liability on their income from all sources) and of the generally accepted and
internationally recognized income taxable base (that can subject non-resident
aliens and foreign corporations to income tax on their income from Philippine
sources). In the process, the Code classifies taxpayers into four main groups,
namely:
(1) Individuals,
(2) Corporations,
(3) Estates under Judicial Settlement and
(4) Irrevocable Trusts (irrevocable both as to corpus and as to income).

Partnerships are, either "taxable partnerships" or "exempt partnerships."

Ordinarily, partnerships, no matter how created or organized, are subject to
income tax which, for purposes of the above categorization, are by law
assimilated to be within the context of corporations. Except for few variances,
such as in the application of the "constructive receipt rule" in the derivation of
income, the income tax approach is alike to both juridical persons. Obviously,
SNIT is not intended to cover corporations and partnerships which are
independently subject to the payment of income tax, but only those self-
employed and professionals engaged in the practice of their profession.
Petition dismissed.
Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29, 2004
FACTS:
The petitioner Lung Center of the Philippines is a non-stock and non-profit

entity established on January 16, 1981 by virtue of Presidential Decree No.
1823.2 It is the registered owner of a parcel of land located at Quezon Avenue
covered by TCT No. 261320 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. Erected in
the middle of the aforesaid lot is a hospital known as the Lung Center of the
Philippines.
(*A big space at the ground floor is being leased to private parties, for canteen
and small store spaces, and to medical or professional practitioners who use the
same as their private clinics for their patients whom they charge for their
professional services. Almost one-half of the entire area on the left side of the
building along Quezon Avenue is vacant and idle, while a big portion on the right
side, at the corner of Quezon Avenue and Elliptical Road, is being leased for
commercial purposes to a private enterprise known as the Elliptical Orchids and
Garden Center.)*Optional
The petitioner accepts paying and non-paying patients. It also renders

medical services to out-patients, both paying and non-paying. Aside from
its income from paying patients, the petitioner receives annual subsidies
from the government.
On June 7, 1993, both the land and the hospital building of the petitioner were
assessed for real property taxes in the amount of ₱4,554,860 by the City
Assessor of Quezon City.3 Accordingly, Tax Declarations were issued for the
land and the hospital building, respectively.4
Contentions:
Petitioner: alleged that under Section 28, paragraph 3 of the 1987 Constitution,
the property is exempt from real property taxes. It averred that a minimum of
60% of its hospital beds are exclusively used for charity patients and that the
major thrust of its hospital operation is to serve charity patients. The petitioner
contends that it is a charitable institution and, as such, is exempt from real
property taxes.
(The petitioner avers that it is a charitable institution within the context of

Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. It asserts that its character
as a charitable institution is not altered by the fact that it admits paying patients
and renders medical services to them, leases portions of the land to private
parties, and rents out portions of the hospital to private medical practitioners from
which it derives income to be used for operational expenses. The petitioner
points out that for the years 1995 to 1999, 100% of its out-patients were charity
patients and of the hospital’s 282-bed capacity, 60% thereof, or 170 beds, is
allotted to charity patients. It asserts that the fact that it receives subsidies from
the government attests to its character as a charitable institution. It contends that
the "exclusivity" required in the Constitution does not necessarily mean "solely."
Hence, even if a portion of its real estate is leased out to private individuals from
whom it derives income, it does not lose its character as a charitable institution,
and its exemption from the payment of real estate taxes on its real property. The
petitioner cited our ruling in Herrera v. QC-BAA9 to bolster its pose. The petitioner
further contends that even if P.D. No. 1823 does not exempt it from the payment
of real estate taxes, it is not precluded from seeking tax exemption under the
1987 Constitution.)
Respondent: The QC-LBAA dismissed the petition and hold the petitioner liable
for real property taxes.The decision was, likewise, affirmed on appeal by the
Central Board of Assessment Appeals of Quezon City (CBAA, for brevity) 7 which
ruled that the petitioner was not a charitable institution and that its real
properties were not actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable
purposes; hence, it was not entitled to real property tax exemption under the
constitution and the law.
(The petitioner’s real property is not exempt from the payment of real estate
taxes under P.D. No. 1823 and even under the 1987 Constitution because it
failed to prove that it is a charitable institution and that the said property is
actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
(*The respondents noted that in a newspaper report, it appears that graft

charges were filed with the Sandiganbayan against the director of the petitioner,
its administrative officer, and Zenaida Rivera, the proprietress of the Elliptical
Orchids and Garden Center, for entering into a lease contract over 7,663.13
square meters of the property in 1990 for only ₱20,000 a month, when the
monthly rental should be ₱357,000 a month as determined by the Commission
on Audit; and that instead of complying with the directive of the COA for the
cancellation of the contract for being grossly prejudicial to the government, the
petitioner renewed the same on March 13, 1995 for a monthly rental of only
₱24,000. They assert that the petitioner uses the subsidies granted by the
government for charity patients and uses the rest of its income from the property
for the benefit of paying patients, among other purposes. They aver that the
petitioner failed to adduce substantial evidence that 100% of its out-patients and
170 beds in the hospital are reserved for indigent patients. The respondents
further assert, thus:
That the claims/allegations of the Petitioner LCP do not speak well of its record
of service. That before a patient is admitted for treatment in the Center, first
impression is that it is pay-patient and required to pay a certain amount as
deposit. That even if a patient is living below the poverty line, he is charged with
high hospital bills. And, without these bills being first settled, the poor patient
cannot be allowed to leave the hospital or be discharged without first paying the
hospital bills or issue a promissory note guaranteed and indorsed by an
influential agency or person known only to the Center; that even the remains of
deceased poor patients suffered the same fate. Moreover, before a patient is
admitted for treatment as free or charity patient, one must undergo a series of
interviews and must submit all the requirements needed by the Center, usually
accompanied by endorsement by an influential agency or person known only to
the Center. These facts were heard and admitted by the Petitioner LCP during
the hearings before the Honorable QC-BAA and Honorable CBAA. These are the
reasons of indigent patients, instead of seeking treatment with the Center, they
prefer to be treated at the Quezon Institute. Can such practice by the Center be
called charitable?)
ISSUES:
The issues for resolution are the following:
(a) whether the petitioner is a charitable institution within the context of

Presidential Decree No. 1823 and the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Section
234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160; and
(b) whether the real properties of the petitioner are exempt from real property
taxes.
HELD:
In this case, the petitioner adduced substantial evidence that it spent its income,
including the subsidies from the government for 1991 and 1992 for its patients
and for the operation of the hospital. It even incurred a net loss in 1991 and 1992
from its operations.
Even as we find that the petitioner is a charitable institution, we hold, anent the
second issue, that those portions of its real property that are leased to private
entities are not exempt from real property taxes as these are not actually, directly
and exclusively used for charitable purposes.
The settled rule in this jurisdiction is that laws granting exemption from tax are
construed strictissimi juris against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the taxing
power. Taxation is the rule and exemption is the exception. The effect of an
exemption is equivalent to an appropriation. Hence, a claim for exemption from
tax payments must be clearly shown and based on language in the law too plain
to be mistaken.26 As held in Salvation Army v. Hoehn:27
An intention on the part of the legislature to grant an exemption from the taxing
power of the state will never be implied from language which will admit of any
other reasonable construction. Such an intention must be expressed in clear and
unmistakable terms, or must appear by necessary implication from the language
used, for it is a well settled principle that, when a special privilege or exemption is
claimed under a statute, charter or act of incorporation, it is to be construed
strictly against the property owner and in favor of the public. This principle
applies with peculiar force to a claim of exemption from taxation . …28
Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 1823, relied upon by the petitioner,

specifically provides that the petitioner shall enjoy the tax exemptions and
privileges:
SEC. 2. TAX EXEMPTIONS AND PRIVILEGES. Being a non-profit, non-stock

corporation organized primarily to help combat the high incidence of lung and
pulmonary diseases in the Philippines, all donations, contributions, endowments
and equipment and supplies to be imported by authorized entities or persons and
by the Board of Trustees of the Lung Center of the Philippines, Inc., for the actual
use and benefit of the Lung Center, shall be exempt from income and gift taxes,
the same further deductible in full for the purpose of determining the maximum
deductible amount under Section 30, paragraph (h), of the National Internal
Revenue Code, as amended.
The Lung Center of the Philippines shall be exempt from the payment of taxes,
charges and fees imposed by the Government or any political subdivision or
instrumentality thereof with respect to equipment purchases made by, or for the
Lung Center.29
It is plain as day that under the decree, the petitioner does not enjoy any property
tax exemption privileges for its real properties as well as the building constructed
thereon. If the intentions were otherwise, the same should have been among the
enumeration of tax exempt privileges under Section 2:
It is a settled rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one

person, thing, or consequence implies the exclusion of all others. The rule is
expressed in the familiar maxim, expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Section 28(3), Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides, thus:
(3) Charitable institutions, churches and parsonages or convents appurtenant

thereto, mosques, non-profit cemeteries, and all lands, buildings, and
improvements, actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes shall be exempt from taxation.32
The tax exemption under this constitutional provision covers property taxes
only.33 As Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., then a member of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, explained: ". . . what is exempted is not the institution
itself . . .; those exempted from real estate taxes are lands, buildings and
improvements actually, directly and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes."34
Consequently, the constitutional provision is implemented by Section

234(b) of Republic Act No. 7160 (otherwise known as the Local Government
Code of 1991) as follows:
SECTION 234. Exemptions from Real Property Tax. – The following are
exempted from payment of the real property tax:
...
(b) Charitable institutions, churches, parsonages or convents appurtenant

thereto, mosques, non-profit or religious cemeteries and all lands, buildings, and
improvements actually, directly, and exclusively used for religious, charitable or
educational purposes.35
We note that under the 1935 Constitution, "... all lands, buildings, and
improvements used ‘exclusively’ for … charitable … purposes shall be exempt
from taxation."36 However, under the 1973 and the present Constitutions, for
"lands, buildings, and improvements" of the charitable institution to be considered
exempt, the same should not only be "exclusively" used for charitable purposes;
it is required that such property be used "actually" and "directly" for such
purposes.37
Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and Rep. Act No. 7160 in order to be
entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is burdened to prove, by clear and
unequivocal proof, that (a) it is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties
are ACTUALLY, DIRECTLY and EXCLUSIVELY used for charitable purposes.
"Exclusive" is defined as possessed and enjoyed to the exclusion of others;
debarred from participation or enjoyment; and "exclusively" is defined, "in a
manner to exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively." 40 If real property is used
for one or more commercial purposes, it is not exclusively used for the exempted
purposes but is subject to taxation. 41 The words "dominant use" or "principal use"
cannot be substituted for the words "used exclusively" without doing violence to
the Constitutions and the law.42 Solely is synonymous with exclusively.43
What is meant by actual, direct and exclusive use of the property for charitable
purposes is the direct and immediate and actual application of the property itself
to the purposes for which the charitable institution is organized. It is not the use
of the income from the real property that is determinative of whether the property
is used for tax-exempt purposes.44
The petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove that the entirety of its real
property is actually, directly and exclusively used for charitable purposes. While
portions of the hospital are used for the treatment of patients and the
dispensation of medical services to them, whether paying or non-paying, other
portions thereof are being leased to private individuals for their clinics and a
canteen. Further, a portion of the land is being leased to a private individual for
her business enterprise under the business name "Elliptical Orchids and Garden
Center." Indeed, the petitioner’s evidence shows that it collected ₱1,136,483.45
as rentals in 1991 and ₱1,679,999.28 for 1992 from the said lessees.
Accordingly, we hold that the portions of the land leased to private entities as well
as those parts of the hospital leased to private individuals are not exempt from
such taxes.45 On the other hand, the portions of the land occupied by the hospital
and portions of the hospital used for its patients, whether paying or non-paying,
are exempt from real property taxes.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

The respondent Quezon City Assessor is hereby DIRECTED to determine, after
due hearing, the precise portions of the land and the area thereof which are
leased to private persons, and to compute the real property taxes due thereon as
provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Puno, Vitug, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-

Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio Morales, Azcuna, and Tinga,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992
BENGZON V DRILON
FACTS:
Petitioners are retired justices of the Supreme Court and Court of Appeals who
are currently receiving pensions under RA 910 as amended by RA 1797.
President Marcos issued a decree repealing section 3-A of RA 1797 which
authorized the adjustment of the pension of retired justices and officers and
enlisted members of the AFP. PD 1638 was eventually issued by Marcos which
provided for the automatic readjustment of the pension of officers and enlisted
men was restored, while that of the retired justices was not.
RA 1797 was restored through HB 16297 in 1990. When her advisers gave the
wrong information that the questioned provisions in 1992 GAA were an attempt
to overcome her earlier veto in 1990, President Aquino issued the veto now
challenged in this petition.
It turns out that PD 644 which repealed RA 1797 never became a valid law
absent its publication, thus there was no law. It follows that RA 1797 was still in
effect and HB 16297 was superfluous because it tried to restore benefits which
were never taken away validly. The veto of HB 16297 did not also produce any
effect.
Issue:
W/N THE VETO OF THE PRESIDENT IS CONSTITUTIONAL
HELD:
NO. The SC favored the petitioners.

1. It cannot be overstressed that in a constitutional government such as

ours, the rule of law must prevail. The Constitution is the basic and
paramount law to which all other laws must conform and to which all
persons including the highest official of this land must defer.
The act of the Executive in vetoing the particular provisions is an exercise

of a constitutionally vested power. But even as the Constitution grants the
power, it also provides limitations to its exercise. The veto power is not
absolute.
The President shall have the power to veto any particular item or
items in an appropriation, revenue or tariff bill but the veto shall not affect
the item or items to which he does not object. (Section 27(2), Article VI,
Constitution)
The OSG is correct when it states that the Executive must veto a bill in its
entirety or not at all. He or she cannot act like an editor crossing out specific
lines, provisions, or paragraphs in a bill that he or she dislikes. In the exercise of
the veto power, it is generally all or nothing. However, when it comes to
appropriation, revenue or tariff bills, the Administration needs the money to
run the machinery of government and it can not veto the entire bill even if it
may contain objectionable features. The President is, therefore, compelled to
approve into law the entire bill, including its undesirable parts.
The President did not veto this item. What were vetoed were methods or systems
placed by Congress to ensure that permanent and continuing obligations to
certain officials would be paid when they fell due.
An examination of the entire sections and the underlined portions of the law
which were vetoed will readily show that portions of the item have been chopped
up into vetoed and unvetoed parts. Less than all of an item has been vetoed.
Moreover, the vetoed portions are not items. They are provisions.
What were really vetoed are:
(1) Republic Act No. 1797 enacted as early as June 21, 1957; and
(2) The Resolution of the Supreme Court dated November 28, 1991 in
Administrative Matter No. 91-8-225-CA.
We need no lengthy justifications or citations of authorities to declare that no

President may veto the provisions of a law enacted thirty-five (35) years
before his or her term of office. Neither may the President set aside or reverse
a final and executory judgment of this Court through the exercise of the veto
power.
** It turns out, however, that P.D. No. 644 never became valid law. If P.D. No.
644 was not law, it follows that Rep. Act No. 1797 was not repealed and
continues to be effective up to the present. In the same way that it was enforced
from 1951 to 1975, so should it be enforced today.
House Bill No. 16297 was superfluous as it tried to restore benefits which were
never taken away validly. The veto of House Bill No. 16297 in 1991 did not also
produce any effect. Both were based on erroneous and non-existent premises.
From the foregoing discussion, it can be seen that when the President vetoed
certain provisions of the 1992 General Appropriations Act, she was actually
vetoing Republic Act No. 1797 which, of course, is beyond her power to
accomplish.
Presidential Decree No. 644 which purportedly repealed Republic Act No. 1717
never achieved that purpose because it was not properly published. It never
became a law.
The President has no power to enact or amend statutes promulgated by her

predecessors much less to repeal existing laws. The President's power is merely
to execute the laws as passed by Congress.
2. The attempt to use the veto power to set aside a Resolution of this
Court and to deprive retirees of benefits given them by Rep. Act No.
1797 trenches upon the constitutional grant of fiscal autonomy to
the Judiciary.
Sec. 3, Art. VIII mandates that:
Sec. 3 The Judiciary shall enjoy fiscal autonomy.

In the case at bar, the veto of these specific provisions in the General
Appropriations Act is tantamount to dictating to the Judiciary how its funds should
be utilized, which is clearly repugnant to fiscal autonomy. Judiciary must enjoy
freedom in the disposition of the funds allocated to it in the appropriations law.
In the instant case, the vetoed provisions which relate to the use of savings for
augmenting items for the payment of the pension differentials, among others, are
clearly in consonance with the above stated pronouncements of the Court. The
veto impairs the power of the Chief Justice to augment other items in the
Judiciary's appropriation, in contravention of the constitutional provision on "fiscal
autonomy."
3. Finally, it can not be denied that the retired Justices have a vested
right to the accrued pensions due them pursuant to RA 1797.
The right to a public pension is of statutory origin and statutes dealing with
pensions have been enacted by practically all the states in the United States.
Thus, in the Philippines, a number of retirement laws have been enacted, the
purpose of which is to entice competent men and women to enter the
government service and to permit them to retire therefrom with relative security,
not only those who have retained their vigor but, more so, those who have been
incapacitated by illness or accident.
Retirement laws should be interpreted liberally in favor of the retiree

because their intention is to provide for his sustenance, and hopefully even
comfort, when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his livelihood.
After devoting the best years of his life to the public service, he deserves the
appreciation of a grateful government as best concretely expressed in a
generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the value and length of his
services.
Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994
Facts:
RA 7663 (former House bill No. 10900, the General Appropriations Bill of 1994)
entitled “An Act Appropriating Funds for the Operation of the Government of the
Philippines from January 1 to December 1, 1994, and for other Purposes” was
approved by the President and vetoed some of the provisions.
Petitioners assail the special provision allowing a member of Congress to realign

his allocation for operational expenses to any other expense category claiming
that it violates Sec. 25, Art 7 of the Constitution. Issues of constitutionality were
raised before the Supreme Court.
PhilConsA prayed for a writ of prohibition to declare unconstitutional and void a.)
Art 16 on the Countrywide Development Fund and b.) The veto of the President
of the Special provision of Art XLVIII of the GAA of 1994.
16 members of the Senate sought the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition

and mandamus against the Exec. Secretary, the Sec of Dept of Budget and
Management and the National Treasurer and questions: 1.) Constitutionality of
the conditions imposed by the President in the items of the GAA of 1994 and 2.)
the constitutionality of the veto of the special provision in the appropriation for
debt services.
Senators Tanada and Romulo sought the issuance of the writs of prohibition and
mandamus against the same respondents. Petitioners contest the
constitutionality of: 1.) veto on four special provisions added to items in the GAA
of 1994 for the AFP and DPWH; and 2.) the conditions imposed by the President
in the implementation of certain appropriations for the CAFGU’s, DPWH, and
Nat’l Highway Authority.
Issue:
Whether or not the veto of the president on four special provisions is

constitutional and valid?
Held:
Special Provision on Debt Ceiling – Congress provided for a debt-ceiling. Vetoed

by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation for debt service. The said
provisions are germane to & have direct relation w/ debt service. They are
appropriate provisions & cannot be vetoed w/o vetoing the entire
item/appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Revolving Funds for SCU’s – said provision allows for the
use of income & creation of revolving fund for SCU’s. Provision for Western
Visayas State Univ. & Leyte State Colleges vetoed by Pres. Other SCU’s
enjoying the privilege do so by existing law. Pres. merely acted in pursuance to
existing law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Road Maintenance – Congress specified 30% ratio fo works

for maintenance of roads be contracted according to guidelines set forth by
DPWH. Vetoed by the Pres. w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. It is not an
inappropriate provision; it is not alien to the subj. of road maintenance & cannot
be veoted w/o vetoing the entire appropriation. VETO VOID.
Special Provision on Purchase of Military Equip. – AFP modernization, prior

approval of Congress required before release of modernization funds. It is the so-
called legislative veto. Any prov. blocking an admin. action in implementing a law
or requiring legislative approval must be subj. of a separate law. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Use of Savings for AFP Pensions – allows Chief of Staff to
augment pension funds through the use of savings. According to the
Constitution, only the Pres. may exercise such power pursuant to a specific law.
Properly vetoed. VETO VALID.
Special Provision on Conditions for de-activation of CAFGU’s – use of special

fund for the compensation of the said CAFGU’s. Vetoed, Pres. requires his prior
approval. It is also an amendment to existing law (PD No. 1597 & RA No. 6758).
A provision in an appropriation act cannot be used to repeal/amend existing laws.
VETO VALID.
Tanada, et. al. vs. Tuvera, et. al., G.R. No. L-63915, April 24, 1985
FACTS:
Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right

recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine Constitution, 1 as well as
the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the
publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential decrees, letters of
instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders.
Contentions:
Respondents contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua
non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for
their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential
issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take
effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their effectivity.
Petitioners maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right
and its object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show
any specific interest for their petition to be given due course.
ISSUE: Whether or not the presidential issuance in question need to be

published in the Official Gazette for its effectivity
HELD:
Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided, ...
Respondents' argument is logically correct only insofar as it equates the
effectivity of laws with the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other
statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that
said Article 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official
Gazette, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. Thus, Section
1 of Commonwealth Act 638 provides as follows:
Section 1. There shall be published in the Official Gazette [1] all important
legisiative acts and resolutions of a public nature of the, Congress of the
Philippines; [2] all executive and administrative orders and proclamations, except
such as have no general applicability; [3] decisions or abstracts of decisions of
the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals as may be deemed by said courts
of sufficient importance to be so published; [4] such documents or classes of
documents as may be required so to be published by law; and [5] such
documents or classes of documents as the President of the Philippines shall
determine from time to time to have general applicability and legal effect, or
which he may authorize so to be published. ...
The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give the general public
adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim "ignorantia legis non excusat." It would be the
height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of
a law of which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
Perhaps at no time since the establishment of the Philippine Republic has the
publication of laws taken so vital significance that at this time when the people
have bestowed upon the President a power heretofore enjoyed solely by the
legislature. While the people are kept abreast by the mass media of the debates
and deliberations in the Batasan Pambansa—and for the diligent ones, ready
access to the legislative records—no such publicity accompanies the law-making
process of the President. Thus, without publication, the people have no means of
knowing what presidential decrees have actually been promulgated, much less a
definite way of informing themselves of the specific contents and texts of such
decrees. As the Supreme Court of Spain ruled: "Bajo la denominacion generica
de leyes, se comprenden tambien los reglamentos, Reales decretos,
Instrucciones, Circulares y Reales ordines dictadas de conformidad con las
mismas por el Gobierno en uso de su potestad.5
The very first clause of Section I of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: "There shall
be published in the Official Gazette ... ." The word "shall" used therein imposes
upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
Constitutional right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to
be given substance and reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be
published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents
with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.
The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general
applicability" is mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for
fines, forfeitures or penalties for their violation or otherwise impose a burden or.
the people, such as tax and revenue measures, fall within this category. Other
presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or class of persons
such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned. 6
It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public

nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of
law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. As Justice Claudio Teehankee said in
Peralta vs. COMELEC 7:
In a time of proliferating decrees, orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law
demand that the Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate
and publish the texts of all such decrees, orders and instructions so that the
people may know where to obtain their official and specific contents.
The Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application,

which have not been published, shall have no force and effect. Some members
of the Court, quite apprehensive about the possible unsettling effect this decision
might have on acts done in reliance of the validity of those presidential decrees
which were published only during the pendency of this petition, have put the
question as to whether the Court's declaration of invalidity apply to P.D.s which

had been enforced or implemented prior to their publication.
Similarly, the implementation/enforcement of presidential decrees prior to their

publication in the Official Gazette is "an operative fact which may have
consequences which cannot be justly ignored. The past cannot always be erased
by a new judicial declaration ... that an all-inclusive statement of a principle of
absolute retroactive invalidity cannot be justified."
From the report submitted to the Court by the Clerk of Court, it appears that of
the presidential decrees sought by petitioners to be published in the Official
Gazette, only Presidential Decrees Nos. 1019 to 1030, inclusive, 1278, and 1937
to 1939, inclusive, have not been so published. 10 Neither the subject matters nor
the texts of these PDs can be ascertained since no copies thereof are available.
But whatever their subject matter may be, it is undisputed that none of these
unpublished PDs has ever been implemented or enforced by the government. In
Pesigan vs. Angeles, 11 the Court, through Justice Ramon Aquino, ruled that
"publication is necessary to apprise the public of the contents of [penal]
regulations and make the said penalties binding on the persons affected thereby.
" The cogency of this holding is apparently recognized by respondent officials
considering the manifestation in their comment that "the government, as a matter
of policy, refrains from prosecuting violations of criminal laws until the same shall
have been published in the Official Gazette or in some other publication, even
though some criminal laws provide that they shall take effect immediately.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish in the Official

Gazette all unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application,
and unless so published, they shall have no binding force and effect.
SO ORDERED.
Casco Chemical Co. vs Gimenez, G.R. No. L-17931, February 28, 1963
RECIT READY:
Petitioner was engaged in the manufacture of synthetic resin glues. It sought
the refund of the margin fees relying on RA 2609 (Foreign Exchange Margin
Fee Law) stating that the Central Bank of the Philippines fixed a uniform
margin fee of 25% on foreign exchange transactions. However, the Auditor of
the Bank refused to pass in audit and approved the said refunds upon the
ground that Petitioner’s separate importations of urea and formaldehyde is not
in accord with the provisions of Sec. 2, par. 18 of RA 2609.
FULL FACTS:
Casco Philippine Chem. Co is a manufacturer of synthetic resin glues. In

November and December 1959 and in May 1960 , the company bought foreign
exchange for the importation of urea and formaldehyde and paid a margin fee
to the central bank in the amount of P40, 111.14. Prior to this, the central
bank, pursuant to the Republic Act 2609 otherwise known as Foreign
Exchange Margin Fee Law, issues a circular no. 95 fixing a margin fee of 25 %
effective July 1, 1959 and later on issuing a memorandum order establishing a
procedure for the exemption thereof.
The petitioner thereof requested for a refund of the said amount. However,
although the central bank issued a voucher for a refund, the auditor did not
approve its release on the ground that it was not in accordance with section 2
paragraph 18 of RA 2609 which was affirmed by the Auditor General, hence
the petitioner sought an appeal to the Supreme Court.
Sec. 2."The margin established by the Monetary Board pursuant to the

provision of section one hereof shall not be imposed upon the sale of foreign
exchange for the importation of the following:
xxx xxx xxx
"XVIII. Urea formaldehyde for the manufacture of plywood and hardboard
when imported by and for the exclusive use of end-users."
On appeal taken by petitioner, the Auditor General subsequently affirmed said

action of the Auditor of the Bank. Hence, this petition for review.
CONTENTION PETITIONER : Petitioner maintains that the term "urea

formaldehyde" appearing in this provision should be construed as "urea and
formaldehyde"
>the bill approved in Congress contained the copulative conjunction "and"
between the terms "urea" and, "formaldehyde", and that the members of
Congress intended to exempt "urea" and "formaldehyde" separately as
essential elements in the manufacture of the synthetic resin glue called "urea
formaldehyde", not the latter a finished product, citing in support of this view
the statements made on the floor of the Senate, during the consideration of the
bill before said House, by members thereof. But, said individual statements do
not necessarily reflect the view of the Senate. Much less do they indicate the
intent of the House of Representatives.
ISSUES: Whether or not urea and formaldehyde are exempted by law from
the payment of margin fee in reference to RA 2609? (No)
RULING: The court affirmed the decision of the Auditor General denying the
claim for a refund of the petitioner on the premise that “urea formaldehyde” is a
finish product and not a chemical solution and is therefore different from urea
and formaldehyde which are raw materials used to produce synthetic glue as
clearly defined by DOST and the enrolled bill which uses the term “urea
formaldehyde” instead of urea and formaldehyde being conclusive upon
the courts passed by Congress and approved by the President.
If there has been any mistake in the printing of the bill before it was
certified by the officers of Congress and approved by the Executive - on
which we cannot speculate, without jeopardizing the principle of
separation of powers and undermining one of the cornerstones of our
democratic system - the remedy is by amendment or curative legislation,
not by judicial decree.
Hence, the importation of “urea” and “formaldehyde” is not exempt from the
imposition of the margin fee.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs

against the petitioner.
U.S. vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916
Gabino Beliso, Juan Pons, and Jacinto Lasarte are charged with the crime of
illegal importation of opium worth 62,400 pesos, through the steamer Lopez y
Lopez. Pons and Beliso were tried separately and each were found guilty of the
crime charged. Pons appealed this decision, and in its motion it contended that
the last day of the special session of the Philippine Legislature for 1914 was the
28th day of February; that Act No. 2381, under which Pons must be punished if
found guilty, was not passed or approved on the 28th of February but on March 1
of that year; and that, therefore, the same is null and void.The validity of the act
is not otherwise questioned.
Appellant maintained that the Legislature did not adjourn at midnight on February
28, 1914 but on March 1st and that this allegation may be established by
extraneous evidence. On the other hand, it is urged that the contents of the
legislative journals are conclusive evidence as to the date of adjournment.
Issue:
WON the courts may go behind legislative journals for the purpose of
determining the date of adjournment when such journals are clear and explicit
Ruling:
Judgment was affirmed. From their very nature and object, the records of the
Legislature are as important as those of the judiciary, and to inquire into the
veracity of the journals of the Philippine Journals would be to violate the spirit of
separation of powers.
The journals say that the Legislature adjourned at 12 midnight on February 28,
1914. This settles the question, and the court did not err in declining to go behind
these journals.
Philconsa vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966
Facts: RA 4134 provided for increase of salary of Senate President,

Speaker of the House and members of the Senate and House of
Representatives. This took effect on 30 June 1966. However record show that
the increase was implemented on 1964. Philippine Constitution Association
assailed the validity of RA 4134, stating that this is in violation of Section 14
Article 6 of the Constitution, “No increase in said compensation shall take
effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the members of the
Senate and House of Representatives approving such increase. Thus the
petition for writ of prohibition.
Issue: Whether or not the salary increase was constitutional?
Decision: Writ of prohibition granted. Republic Act No. 4134 is not operative until
December 30, 1969, when the full term of all members of the Senate and House
that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired. Consequently, appropriation
for such increased compensation may not be disbursed until December 30, 1969.
In so far as Republic Act No. 4642 (1965-1966 Appropriation Act) authorizes the
disbursement of the increased compensation prior to the date aforesaid, it also
violates the Constitution and must be held null and void.
Ligot vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-34676, April 30, 1974
Petitioner, Benjamin Ligot, served as a member of the House of Representatives

of the Congress of the Philippines for three consecutive four-year terms covering
a twelve-year span from December 30, 1957 to December 30, 1969.
On July 1, 1964, R.A. 4134 "fixing the salaries of constitutional officials and
certain other officials of the national government" took effect increasing the salary
of the members of Congress from P7,200 to P32,000. The Act expressly
provided that the increases "shall take effect in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution."
When Ligot was elected for his third four-year term, he was not entitled to the
salary increase by virtue of the Court’s unanimous decision in Philconsa v.
Mathay: "that the increased compensation provided by Republic Act No. 4134 is
not operative until December 30, 1969 when the full term of all members of the
Senate and House that approved it on June 20, 1964 will have expired" by virtue
of the constitutional mandate in Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution...”
Ligot lost in the 1969 elections and filed a claim for retirement under
Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 (c) as amended by Republic Act 4968 which
provided for retirement gratuity.
On May 8, 1970, the House of Representatives issued a treasury warrant in the

sum of P122,429.86 in Ligot's favor as his retirement gratuity, using the
increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum of members of Congress.
Respondent Velasco as Congress Auditor did not sign the warrant due to a
pending resolution by the Auditor General of a similar claim filed by former
Representative Melanio T. Singson, whose term as Congressman also expired
on December 30, 1969.
On July 22, 1970, respondent auditor Velasco formally requested petitioner to

return the warrant and its supporting papers for a recomputation of his retirement
claim by virtue of the Auditor General’s adverse decision to Singson’s claim.
On January 20, 1972, the Auditor General through Velasco denied Ligot’s
request for reconsideration. Ligot then filed a petition for review appealing the
decision of the Auditor-General alleging that at the time of his retirement, the
salary for members of Congess “as provided by law” was already P32,000 per
annum, so, he should receive his retirement gratuity based on that salary
increase.
ISSUE/S:
Whether or not Ligot is entitled to retirement benefits based on the salary

increase of the member of Congress
HELD:
The petition was dismissed.

There is no question that Ligot is entitled to a retirement gratuity based on

Commonwealth Act 186, section 12 as amended by RA4968. The issue is
whether or not he can claim in based on the P32,000 per annum salary of the
members of Congress. The Court decided that to grant retirement gratuity to
members of Congress whose terms expired on December 30, 1969 computed on
the basis of an increased salary of P32,000.00 per annum (which they were
prohibited by the Constitution from receiving during their term of office) would be
to pay them more than what is constitutionally allowed.
Section 14, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution provides that: “No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the full term of all the
members of the Senate and of the House of Representatives approving such
increase.”
It is thus correctly submitted by the Solicitor General that "(T)o allow petitioner a
retirement gratuity computed on the basis of P32,000.00 per annum would be a
subtle way of increasing his compensation during his term of office and of
achieving indirectly what he could not obtain directly."
People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000
The accused-appellant, Romeo F. Jaloslos is a full-pledged member of Congress

who is confined at the national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape
on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts.
The primary argument is the "mandate of sovereign will." He states that the
sovereign electorate of the First District of Zamboanga del Norte chose him as
their representative in Congress. Having been re-elected by his constituents, he
has the duty to perform the functions of a Congressman. He calls this a covenant
with his constituents made possible by the intervention of the State. He adds that
it cannot be defeated by insuperable procedural restraints arising from pending
criminal cases.
He further argues that a member of Congress' function to attend sessions is

underscored by Section 16 (2), Article VI of the Constitution which states that —
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but

a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the
attendance of absent Members in such manner, and under such penalties,
as such House may provide.
He also states that the plea of the electorate which voted him into office cannot
be supplanted by unfounded fears that he might escape eventual punishment if
permitted to perform congressional duties outside his regular place of

confinement.
Accused-appellant argues that on several occasions the Regional Trial Court of

Makati granted several motions to temporarily leave his cell at the Makati City
Jail, for official or medical reasons.
He also calls attention to various instances, after his transfer at the New Bilibid
Prison in Muntinlupa City, when he was likewise allowed/permitted to leave the
prison premises, to wit.
a) to join "living-out" prisoners on "work-volunteer program" for the purpose

of 1) establishing a mahogany seedling bank and 2) planting mahogany
trees, at the NBP reservation. For this purpose, he was assigned one
guard and allowed to use his own vehicle and driver in going to and from
the project area and his place of confinement.
b) to continue with his dental treatment at the clinic of his dentist in Makati
City.
c) to be confined at the Makati Medical Center in Makati City for his heart
condition.
Thus, He filed this Motion To Be Allowed To Discharge Mandate As Member of

House of Representatives asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties
of a Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee
meetings despite his having been convicted in the first instance of a non-bailable
offense.
ISSUE: W/N the membership in Congress exempt an accused from statutes and
rules which apply to validly incarcerated persons in general?
RULING:NO A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted under Title

Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary immunity from
arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all persons still to be
tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The court first cited the applicable law where it states that the incontestable
proposition that all top officials of Government-executive, legislative, and judicial
are subject to the majesty of law. There is an unfortunate misimpression in the
public mind that election or appointment to high government office, by itself, frees
the official from the common restraints of general law. Privilege has to be granted
by law, not inferred from the duties of a position. In fact, the higher the rank, the
greater is the requirement of obedience rather than exemption.
The immunity from arrest or detention of Senators and members of the House of
Representatives, the latter customarily addressed as Congressmen, arises from
a provision of the Constitution. The history of the provision shows that privilege
has always been granted in a restrictive sense. The provision granting an
exemption as a special privilege cannot be extended beyond the ordinary
meaning of its terms. It may not be extended by intendment, implication or
equitable considerations.
The 1935 Constitution provided in its Article VI on the Legislative Department.
Sec 15. The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall
in all cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace be privileged
from arrest during their attendance at the sessions of Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same, . . .
Because of the broad coverage of felony and breach of the peace, the exemption
applied only to civil arrests. A congressman like the accused-appellant, convicted
under Title Eleven of the Revised Penal Code could not claim parliamentary
immunity from arrest. He was subject to the same general laws governing all
persons still to be tried or whose convictions were pending appeal.
The 1973 Constitution broadened the privilege of immunity as follows:
Art. VIII, Sec. 9. A Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall, in all

offenses punishable by not more than six years imprisonment, be
privileged from arrest during his attendance at its sessions and in going to
and returning from the same.
For offenses punishable by more than six years imprisonment, there was no
immunity from arrest. The restrictive interpretation of immunity and intent to
confine it within carefully defined parameters is illustrated by the concluding
portion of the provision, to wit:
. . . but the Batasang Pambansa shall surrender the member involved the
custody of the law within twenty four hours after its adjournment for a
recess or for its next session, otherwise such privilege shall cease upon its
failure to do so.
The present Constitution adheres to the same restrictive rule minus the obligation
of Congress to surrender the subject Congressman to the custody of the law.
The requirement that he should be attending sessions or committee meetings
has also been removed. For relatively minor offenses, it is enough that Congress
is in session.
However, the accused-appellant has not given any reason why he should be
exempted from the operation of Section 11, Article VI of the Constitution. The
members of Congress cannot compel absent members to attend sessions if the
reason for the absence is a legitimate one. The confinement of a Congressman
charged with a crime punishable by imprisonment of more than six months is not
merely authorized by law, it has constitutional foundations.
The Constitution guarantees: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of laws."6 This simply means that all persons similarly situated shall be
treated alike both in rights enjoyed and responsibilities imposed. 7 The organs of
government may not show any undue favoritism or hostility to any person.
Neither partiality not prejudice shall be displayed.
The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has
never been an excuse to free a person validly in prison. The duties imposed by
the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts that
the duty to legislative ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-
appellant is only one of 250 members of the House of Representatives, not to
mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of legislation.
Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its
members. Depending on the exigency of Government that has to be addressed,
the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the highest for that
particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need to its exercise.
The duty of a mother to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of
nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives of those with a
particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A
police officer must maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular
duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from those others who are
validly restrained by law.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a

reasonable classification in criminal law enforcement. The functions and duties of
the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of prisoners
interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest
and confinement are germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those
belonging to the same class.10
Premises considered, we are constrained to rule against the accused-appellant's

claim that re-election to public office gives priority to any other right or interest,
including the police power of the State.
WHEREFORE, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.
Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

This is an ordinary civil action, originally instituted in the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, for the recovery, by plaintiffs Nicanor T. Jimenez, Carlos J. Albert and Jose
L. Lukban, of several sums of money, by way of damages for the publication of
an allegedly libelous letter of defendant Bartolome Cabangbang.
According to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the
Philippines, dated November 14, 1958.
The communication began with the following paragraph:
In the light of the recent developments which however unfortunate had

nevertheless involved the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the unfair
attacks against the duly elected members of Congress of engaging in
intriguing and rumor-mongering, allow me, Your Excellency, to address
this open letter to focus public attention to certain vital information which,
under the present circumstances, I feel it my solemn duty to our people to
expose.1äwphï1.ñët
It has come to my attention that there have been allegedly three

operational plans under serious study by some ambitious AFP officers,
with the aid of some civilian political strategists.
Then, it describes the "allegedly three (3) operational plans" referred to in the
second paragraph. The first plan is said to be "an insidious plan or a massive
political build-up" of then Secretary of National Defense, Jesus Vargas, by
propagandizing and glamorizing him in such a way as to "be prepared to become
a candidate for President in 1961". Plan No. II is said to be a "coup d'etat", in
connection with which the "planners" had gone no further than the planning
stage, although the plan "seems to be held in abeyance and subject to future
developments".
Plan No. III is characterized as a modification of Plan No. I, by trying to assuage

the President and the public with a loyalty parade, in connection with which Gen.
Arellano delivered a speech challenging the authority and integrity of Congress,
in an effort to rally the officers and men of the AFP behind him, and gain popular
and civilian support.
The letter in question recommended.: (1) that Secretary Vargas be asked to

resign; (2) that the Armed Forces be divorced absolutely from politics; (3) that the
Secretary of National Defense be a civilian, not a professional military man; (4)
that no Congressman be appointed to said office; (5) that Gen. Arellano be asked
to resign or retire; (6) that the present chiefs of the various intelligence agencies
in the Armed Forces including the chiefs of the NICA, NBI, and other intelligence
agencies mentioned elsewhere in the letter, be reassigned, considering that "they
were handpicked by Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano", and that, "most
probably, they belong to the Vargas-Arellano clique"; (7) that all military
personnel now serving civilian offices be returned to the AFP, except those
holding positions by provision of law; (8) that the Regular Division of the AFP
stationed in Laur, Nueva Ecija, be dispersed by batallion strength to the various
stand-by or training divisions throughout the country; and (9) that Vargas and
Arellano should disqualify themselves from holding or undertaking an
investigation of the planned coup d'etat".
Upon being summoned, the latter moved to dismiss the complaint upon the
ground that the letter in question is not libelous, and that, even if were, said letter
is a privileged communication.
This motion having been granted by the lower court, plaintiffs interposed the
present appeal from the corresponding order of dismissal.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the publication in question is a privileged communication.
Whether it is libelous or not?
HELD:
1. No, the publication in question is not a privileged communication.
Pursuant to the Constitution:
The Senators and Members of the House of Representatives shall in all

cases except treason, felony, and breach of the peace, be privileged from
arrest during their attendance at the sessions of the Congress, and in
going to and returning from the same; and for any speech or debate
therein, they shall not be questioned in any other place. (Article VI, Section
15.)
The determination of the issue depends on whether or not the aforementioned

publication falls within the purview of the phrase "speech or debate therein" —
that is to say, in Congress — used in this provision.
Said expression refers to utterances made by Congressmen in the performance

of their official functions, such as speeches delivered, statements made, or votes
cast in the halls of Congress, while the same is in session, as well as bills
introduced in Congress, whether the same is in session or not, and other acts
performed by Congressmen, either in Congress or outside the premises housing

its offices, in the official discharge of their duties as members of Congress and of
Congressional Committees duly authorized to perform its functions as such, at
the time of the performance of the acts in question.
The publication involved in this case does not belong to this category. According
to the complaint herein, it was an open letter to the President of the Philippines,
dated November 14, 1958, when Congress presumably was not in session, and
defendant caused said letter to be published in several newspapers of general
circulation in the Philippines, on or about said date. It is obvious that, in thus
causing the communication to be so published, he was not performing his official
duty, either as a member of Congress or as officer or any Committee thereof.
Hence, contrary to the finding made by His Honor, the trial Judge, said
communication is not absolutely privileged.
2. NO. We are satisfied that the letter in question is not sufficient to support
plaintiffs' action for damages.
Although the letter says that plaintiffs are under the control of the unnamed
persons therein alluded to as "planners", and that, having been handpicked by
Secretary Vargas and Gen. Arellano, plaintiffs "probably belong to the Vargas-
Arellano clique", it should be noted that defendant, likewise, added that "it is of
course possible" that plaintiffs "are unwitting tools of the plan of which they may
have absolutely no knowledge". In other words, the very document upon which
plaintiffs' action is based explicitly indicates that they might be absolutely
unaware of the alleged operational plans, and that they may be merely unwitting
tools of the planners. We do not think that this statement is derogatory to the
plaintiffs, to the point of entitling them to recover damages, considering that they
are officers of our Armed Forces, that as such they are by law, under the control
of the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff, and that the letter in
question seems to suggest that the group therein described as "planners" include
these two (2) high ranking officers.
It is true that the complaint alleges that the open letter in question was written by
the defendant, knowing that it is false and with the intent to impeach plaintiffs'
reputation, to expose them to public hatred, contempt, dishonor and ridicule, and
to alienate them from their associates, but these allegations are mere
conclusions which are inconsistent with the contents of said letter and can not
prevail over the same, it being the very basis of the complaint. Then too, when
plaintiffs allege in their complaint that said communication is false, they could not
have possibly meant that they were aware of the alleged plan to stage a coup
d'etat or that they were knowingly tools of the "planners". Again, the
aforementioned passage in the defendant's letter clearly implies that plaintiffs

were not among the "planners" of said coup d'etat, for, otherwise, they could not
be "tools", much less, unwittingly on their part, of said "planners".
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. It is so ordered.
Puyat vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982
A petition for certiorari and prohibition with a preliminary injunction was filed by
the petitioners to question the order of the SEC associate commissioner which
granted the motion for intervention of Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez to
intervene in a SEC case involving the directors of International Pipe Industries
Corporation.
The case stemmed from the controversy surrounding the election of the board of
directors of the said corporation, where one group, the Puyat group, won. The
other group, the Acero group, contested this by filing a case before the SEC.
In the conferences of the parties before the SEC. Assemblyman Fernandez

already entered his appearance as counsel, to which the petitioners objected to.
Thus, the Assemblyman stopped his appearance before the SEC.
Before the case was heard before the SEC, Assemblyman Fernandez bought
shares of stock in the corporation, and the following day, he filed his motion to
intervene in the case. Thus, the petitioners questioned whether the assemblyman
can intervene without violating the constitutional prohibition which prevents
members of Congress from appearing before any administrative body, whether
directly or indirectly.
Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution, which, as amended, now reads:
"SEC 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction, before any court in any civil case wherein the
Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse
party, or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government
is accused of an offense committed in relation to his office, or before any
administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with,
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned

or controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he

may be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis and paragraphs
supplied).
ISSUE:
Whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder of IPI, may

intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RULING:
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez

cannot be said to be appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on
behalf of another, although he is not joining the cause of private respondents. His
appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his ownership of ten (10)
shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of the
petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected
counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of

Assemblyman Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired stocks after the
contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed before SEC, and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case
before the SEC on May 31, 1979.
And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his intention to
appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, but which was objected
to by petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided,
instead, to "intervene" on the ground of legal interest in the matter under
litigation. And it may be noted that in the case filed before the Rizal Court of First
Instance he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior, co-defendant of
respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has
been an indirect "appearance as counsel before . . . any administrative body and
that is a circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition.
The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable him to appear actively in the

proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose, that is, to
enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an
unfavorable outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still
appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision

ineffective. All an Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an
administrative body is to acquire a minimal participation in the "interest" of the
client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the Constitution
directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act
which is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited.
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC No.

1747 falls within the ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII
of the Constitution.
Adaza vs. Pacana, Jr., G.R. No. L-68159, March 18, 1985
FACTS: Adaza was elected governor of the province of Misamis Oriental in the
January 30, 1980 elections. He took his oath of office and started discharging his
duties as provincial governor on March 3, 1980. Pacana was elected vice-
governor for same province in the same elections. Under the law, their respective
terms of office would expire on March 3, 1986. On March 27, 1984, Pacana filed
his certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 1984 BP elections; petitioner Adaza
followed suit on April 27, 1984. In the ensuing elections, petitioner won by placing
first among the candidates, while Pacana lost. Adaza took his oath of office as
Mambabatas Pambansa on July 19, 1984 and since then he has discharged the
functions of said office. On July 23, 1984, Pacana took his oath of office as
governor of Misamis Oriental before President Marcos, and started to perform
the duties of governor on July 25, 1984. Claiming to be the lawful occupant of the
governor’s office, Adaza has brought this petition to exclude Pacana therefrom.
He argues that he was elected to said office for a term of six years, that he
remains to be the governor of the province until his term expires on March 3,
1986 as provided by law, and that within the context of the parliamentary system,
as in France, Great Britain and New Zealand, a local elective official can hold the
position to which he had been elected and simultaneously be an elected member
of Parliament.
ISSUE: Whether or not Adaza can serve as a member of the Batasan and as a
governor of the province simultaneously. Whether or not a vice governor who ran
for Congress and lost can assume his original position and as such can, by virtue
of succession, take the vacated seat of the governor.
HELD: Section 10, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution provides as follows:
“Section 10. A member of the National Assembly [now Batasan Pambansa] shall
not hold any other office or employment in the government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, during his tenure, except that of prime minister or member of the
cabinet . . .”
The Philippine Constitution is clear and unambiguous. Hence Adaza cannot

invoke common law practices abroad. He cannot complain of any restrictions
which public policy may dictate on his holding of more than one office. Adaza
further contends that when Pacana filed his candidacy for the Batasan he
became a private citizen because he vacated his office. Pacana, as a mere
private citizen, had no right to assume the governorship left vacant by petitioner’s
election to the BP. This is not tenable and it runs afoul against BP. 697, the law
governing the election of members of the BP on May 14, 1984, Section 13[2] of
which specifically provides that “governors, mayors, members of the various
sangguniang or barangay officials shall, upon filing a certificate of candidacy, be
considered on forced leave of absence from office.” Indubitably, respondent falls
within the coverage of this provision, considering that at the time he filed his
certificate of candidacy for the 1984 BP election he was a member of the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan as provided in Sections 204 and 205 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 337, 5 otherwise known as the Local Government Code.
Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950
Facts:
The controversy arose out of the purchase of two estates: Buenavista and
Tambobong Estates by the Government of the Philippines. The purchase was
effected and the price paid for both estates was P5,000,000. The Senate
adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee to determine the validity
of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and just. During the said
Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of the purchase price,
or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this question, hence the
Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and ordered his
commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at- arms of the Philippines Senate
and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to the
Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and to
answer questions pertinent thereto.
It turned out that the Government did not have to pay a single centavo for the
Tambobong Estate as it was already practically owned by virtue of a deed of sale
from the Philippine Trust Company and by virtue of the recession of the contract
through which Ernest H. Burt had an interest in the estate. An intriguing question
which the committee sought to resolve was that involved in the apparent
irregularity of the Government's paying to Burt the total sum of P1,500,000 for his
alleged interest of only P20,000 in the two estates, which he seemed to have
forfeited anyway long before October, 1949. The committee sought to determine
who were responsible for and who benefited from the transaction at the expense
of the Government.
Arnault testified that two checks payable to Burt aggregating P1,500,000 were
delivered to him; and that on the same occasion he draw on said account two
checks; one for P500,000, which he transferred to the account of the Associated
Agencies, Inc., with PNB, and another for P440,000 payable to cash, which he
himself cashed.
This petition was filed on the following grounds:
a) Petitioner contended that the Senate has no power to punish him for
contempt for refusing to reveal the name of the person to whom he gave the
P440,000, because such information is immaterial to, and will not serve, any
intended or purported legislation and his refusal to answer the question has not
embarrassed, obstructed, or impeded the legislative process.
b) Petitioner also contended that the Senate lacks authority to commit him for
contempt for a term beyond its period of legislative session, which ended on May
18, 1950.
c) Moreover, it was argued that he would incriminate himself should he reveal the
name of the person
ISSUE: W/N either House of Congress has the power to punish a person not a
member for contempt
Ruling:YES.
Once an inquiry is admitted or established to be within the jurisdiction of a

legislative body to make, the investigating committee has the power to require a
witness to answer any question pertinent to that inquiry, subject of course to his
constitutional right against self-incrimination. The inquiry, to be within the
jurisdiction of the legislative body to make, must be material or necessary to the
exercise of a power in it vested by the Constitution, such as to legislate, or to
expel a Member; and every question which the investigator is empowered to
coerce a witness to answer must be material or pertinent to the subject of the
inquiry or investigation. So a witness may not be coerced to answer a question
that obviously has no relation to the subject of the inquiry. Note that, the fact that
the legislative body has jurisdiction or the power to make the inquiry would not
preclude judicial intervention to correct a clear abuse of discretion in the exercise
of that power.
It is not necessary for the legislative body to show that every question
propounded to a witness is material to any proposed or possible legislation; what
is required is that it be pertinent to the matter under inquiry.
As to the self-incrimination issue, as against witness's inconsistent and

unjustified claim to a constitutional right, is his clear duty as a citizen to give
frank, sincere, and truthful testimony before a competent authority. The state has
the right to exact fulfillment of a citizen's obligation, consistent of course with his
right under the Constitution.
The resolution of commitment here in question was adopted by the Senate,

which is a continuing body and which does not cease exist upon the periodical
dissolution of the Congress or of the House of Representatives. There is no limit
as to time to the Senate's power to punish for contempt in cases where that
power may constitutionally be exerted as in the present case. That power
subsists as long as the Senate, which is a continuing body, persists in performing
the particular legislative function involved. Petition is denied.
Bengzon, Jr. vs. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee G.R. No. 89914,
November 20, 1991
Facts:
The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the PCGG, filed with the
Sandiganbayan a civil case against Benjamin Romualdez. The complaint
alleged that Benjamin Romualdez and Juliette Gomez Romualdez, acting by
themselves and/or in unlawful concert with then President Ferdinand
Marcos and Imelda Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their
relationship, influence and connection with the latter spouses, engaged in
devices, schemes and stratagems to unjustly enrich themselves at the
expense of the Republic of the Philippines and the Filipino people.
Conflicting reports on the disposition by the PCGG of the Romualdez

corporations were carried in various newspapers. Other newspapers
declared that shortly after the 1986 EDSA Revolution, the Romualdez
companies were sold for P5 million, without PCGG approval, to a holding
company controlled by Romualdez, and that Ricardo Lopa, the President’s

brother-in-law, had effectively taken over the firm.
In the Senate, Senator Enrile delivered a speech on the alleged take over by
Lopa of SOLOIL Incorporated, the flagship of the First Manila Management
of Companies owned by Romualdez. Senator Enrile also called upon the
Senate to look into the possible violation of the law, particularly with regard
to RA 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The matter was
referred by the Senate to the Blue Ribbon Committee.
Issue:
Whether or not the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee’s inquiry has valid
legislative purpose as mandated by Art. VI, Sec. 21
Held:
The Constitution expressly recognizes the power of both Houses of

Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. But the power of both
Houses of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is not absolute
or unlimited. As provided under Art. VI, Sec. 21, the investigation must be
“in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of
procedure” and that “the rights of persons appearing in or affected by such
inquiries shall be respected.” It follows then that the rights of persons under
the Bill of Rights must be respected, including the right to due process and
the right not to be compelled to testify against one’s self.
The power to conduct formal inquiries or investigations is specifically

provided in the Senate Rules of Procedure. Such inquiries may refer to the
implementation or re-examination of any law or in connection with any
proposed legislation or the formulation of future legislation. They may also
extend to any and all matters vested by the Constitution in Congress and/or
in the Senate alone.
The speech of Senator Enrile contained no suggestion of contemplated

legislation; he merely called upon the Senate to look into a possible
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. The purpose of the
inquiry was to find out whether or not the relatives of President Aquino,
particularly Lopa, had violated the law in connection with the alleged sale of
36 or 39 corporations belonging to Romualdez to the Lopa group. There
appears to be, therefore, no intended legislation involved. This matter
appears to be more within the province of the courts rather than of the
legislature.
Arnault vs. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955
Facts:
The controversy arose out of the Government's purchase of 2 estates, the

Buenavista and Tambobong Estates. Petitioner was the attorney in-fact of Ernest
H. Burt in the negotiations for the purchase which was effected. The price paid
for both estates was P5, 000,000.
Thereafter, the Senate adopted Resolution No. 8 creating a Special Committee

to determine the validity of the purchase and whether the price paid was fair and
just. During the said Senate investigation, petitioner was asked to whom a part of
the purchase price, or P440,000, was delivered. Petitioner refused to answer this
question, hence the Committee cited him in contempt for contumacious acts and
ordered his commitment to the custody of the Sergeant at-arms of the Philippines
Senate and imprisoned in the new Bilibid Prison he reveals to the Senate or to
the Special Committee the name of the person who received the P440,000 and
to answer questions pertinent thereto. Petitioner filed a habeas corpus
proceeding.
CFI ruled that the continued detention and confinement of petitioner pursuant to
a Senate Resolution No. 114, is illegal, and that the Senate committed a clear
abuse of discretion in not considering his answer naming one Jess D. Santos as
the person to whom delivery of the sum of P440,000 was made. Further, on the
ground that that petitioner, by his answer has purged himself of contempt and is
consequently entitled to be released and discharged.
ISSUE:
1. W/N the Senate has the power to punish the petitioner for contempt (YES)
2. W/N petitioner has already purged himself of contempt (NO)
RULING:
1. The Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant
witnesses. This is implied or incidental or necessary to the exercise of legislative
power. The 1987 Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers,
making each branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority; it must
have intended each department's authority to be full and complete, independent
of the other's authority and power.
Provided that contempt is related to the exercise of the legislative power and is
committed in the course of the legislative process, the legislature's authority to
deal with the defiant and contumacious witness should be supreme, and unless
there is a manifest and absolute disregard of discretion and a mere exertion of
arbitrary power coming within the reach of constitutional limitations, the exercise
of the authority is not subject to judicial interference.
The process by which a contumacious witness is dealt with by the legislature in

order to enable it to exercise its legislative power or authority must be
distinguished from the judicial process wherein offenders are brought to the
courts of justice for punishment that criminal law imposes upon them. The former
falls exclusively within the legislative authority, the latter within the domain of the
courts; because the former is a necessary concomitant of the legislative power or
process, while the latter has to do with the enforcement and application of the
criminal law.
2. It is true that he gave a name, Jess D. Santos, as the person to whom delivery
of the sum of P440, 000 was made. However, the Senate Committee refused to
believe that this is the real name of the person whose identity is being the subject
of the inquiry. The Senate, therefore, held that the act of the petitioner continued
the original contempt, or reiterated it.
Finally, it is improper for the courts to declare that the continued confinement is
an abuse of the legislative power and thereby interfere in the exercise of the
legislative discretion.
Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006
RECIT READY Facts:
In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its
various Senate Committees, SENATE conducts inquiries or investigations in aid
of legislation.
The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the

Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public
hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in
the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called
“Gloriagate Scandal”. Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent
from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the
public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President
prior to appearing before either house of Congress
FACTS:
The Senate issued invitations to various Executive Department officials for them
to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing to investigate the alleged
overpricing and other unlawful provisions of the contract covering the North Rail
Project. The Senate Committee on National Defense likewise issued invitations
to AFP officials to be resource persons in a senate investigation hearing.
On September 28, 2005, a day before the scheduled Senate hearing, President
Arroyo issued E.O. 464 which, pursuant thereto, took effect immediately. EO
464, invoking executive privilege as basis, provides that: “all heads of
departments of the Executive Branch of the government shall secure the consent
of the President prior to appearing before either House of Congress”
Senate President Drilon received a letter from Executive Secretary Ermita that
the invited officials will not be able to attend without the President’s consent,
pursuant to EO 464.
ISSUE: Is Section 3 of E.O. 464, which requires all the public officials,
enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to
appearing before either house of Congress, valid and constitutional?
HELD:
Sec 1 of EO 464 is valid on its face.
Sec 3 and Sec 2(b) of EO 464 are unconstitutional.
--
Validity of Sec 1, EO 464

Section 1 must be construed as limited in its application to appearances of

department heads in the question hour. The requirement then to secure
presidential consent under Section 1, limited as it is only to appearances in the
question hour, is valid on its face. For under Section 22, the appearance of
department heads in the question hour is discretionary on their part.
Section 1 cannot be applied to appearances of department heads in inquiries in

aid of legislation. Congress is not bound in such instances to respect the refusal
of the department head to appear in such inquiry, unless a valid claim of privilege
is subsequently made, either by the President herself or by the Executive
Secretary.
Validity of Sec 3, EO 464
Section 3 of E.O. 464 requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b)
to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of
Congress. The enumeration covers all senior officials of executive departments,
all officers of the AFP and the PNP, and all senior national security officials who
are "covered by the executive privilege." The enumeration also includes such
other officers as may be determined by the President.
Sec. 3 actually creates an implied claim of privilege. Underlying the

requirement of prior consent is the determination by a head of office, authorized
by the President under E.O. 464, or by the President herself, that such official is
in possession of information that is covered by executive privilege. This
determination then becomes the basis for the official's not showing up in the
legislative investigation until and unless the required consent is first secured. The
proviso allowing the President to give its consent means nothing more than that
the President may reverse a prohibition which already exists by virtue of E.O.
464.
A claim of privilege must clearly state the grounds therefor. While Section 2(a)
enumerates the types of information that are covered by the privilege under the
challenged order, Congress is left to speculate as to which among them is being
referred to by the executive. It does not suffice to merely declare that the
President, or an authorized head of office, has determined that it is so, and that
the President has not overturned that determination.
The privilege being, by definition, an exemption from the obligation to disclose

information, in this case to Congress, the necessity must be of such high degree
as to outweigh the public interest in enforcing that obligation in a particular case.
Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the executive branch
whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If the executive branch withholds such

information on the ground that it is privileged, it must so assert it and state the
reason therefore and why it must be respected. The infirm provisions of EO 464,
however, allow the executive branch to evade congressional requests for
information without need of clearly asserting a right to do so and/or proffering its
reasons therefore. By the mere expedient of invoking said provisions, the power
of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation is frustrated.
In light of the highly exceptional nature of the privilege, it is essential to

limit to the President the power to invoke the privilege. She may of course
authorize the Executive Secretary to invoke the privilege on her behalf, in which
case the Executive Secretary must state that the authority is "By order of the
President," which means that he personally consulted with her. The privilege
being an extraordinary power, it must be wielded only by the highest official in the
executive hierarchy. In other words, the President may not authorize her
subordinates to exercise such power. There is even less reason to uphold
such authorization in the instant case where the authorization is not explicit but
by mere silence. Section 3, in relation to Section 2(b), is further invalid on this
score.x
Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No 97710, September 26, 1991
Facts:
In the May 1987 congressional elections, Marciano Pineda of the Laban ng

Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP) and Dr. Emigdio Bondoc of the Nacionalista Party
(NP) were rival candidates for the position of Representative for the 4th District of
Pampanga.
Pineda was proclaimed by Comelec as the winner by a difference of 3,300 votes.

Bondoc filed a protest before the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET).
A re-examination of the ballots revealed that Bondoc won by a margin of 107

votes and the Tribunal voted (5-4) that Bondoc be proclaimed the winner of the
contest.
Congressman Camasura, an HRET member from the LDP party, told

Congressman Cojuangco, Jr., the LDP Secretary General, that he voted for
Bondoc.
On the eve of the promulgation of the Bondoc decision, Conjuangco informed

Camasura by letter that he was being expelled from the LDP for acts of disloyalty
to the party (ostensibly for inviting LDP members to join the Partido Pilipino party
of Danding Conjuangco).
On the basis of the letter, the House of Representatives issued a Resolution to

withdraw the membership of Camasura in the HRET. Consequently, HRET also
cancelled the promulgation of Bondoc because “without Congressman
Camasura's vote, the decision lacks the concurrence of five members as
required by the Rules of the Tribunal and, therefore, cannot be validly
promulgated.”
Issue:
W/N the House of Representatives, at the request of a political party,

change that party’s representation in the HRET?
HELD:
NO,
The use of the word "sole" in both Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution and
Section 11 of the 1935 Constitution underscores the exclusive jurisdiction of the
House Electoral Tribunal as judge of contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives.
It is an independent organ, separate and independent from the legislature.
The resolution of the House of Representatives removing Congressman

Camasura from the House Electoral Tribunal for disloyalty to the LDP, because
he cast his vote in favor of the Nacionalista Party's candidate, Bondoc, is a clear
impairment of the constitutional prerogative of the House Electoral Tribunal to be
the sole judge of the election contest between Pineda and Bondoc.
As judges, the members of the Tribunal must be non-partisan. They must

discharge their functions with complete detachment, impartiality, and
independence even independence from the political party to which they belong.
Hence, "disloyalty to party" and "breach of party discipline," are not valid grounds
for the expulsion of a member of the tribunal.
The expulsion violates Congressman Camasura's right to security of tenure.

Members of the HRET, as sole judge" of congressional election contests,
are entitled to security of tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy
security of tenure under our Constitution. Therefore, membership in the
House Electoral Tribunal may not be terminated except for a just cause, such as,
the expiration of the member's congressional term of office, his death,
permanent disability, resignation from the political party he represents in the
tribunal, formal affiliation with another political party, or removal for other valid
cause. A member may not be expelled by the House of Representatives for
"party disloyalty" short of proof that he has formally affiliated with another political
group.
Abbas vs. SET, G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988
Recit ready:
Facts: On 09 October 1987 petitioner filed before the Senate Electoral Tribunal
an election contest against 22 candidates of the LABAN who were proclaimed
senators-elect. With the exemption of Senator Estrada, the senators filed for
motion for disqualification or inhibition from the hearing and resolution on the
ground that all of them are interested parties to said case.
Issue: Whether or not it is constitutional to inhibit all involved senators, six of
which are sitting in the tribunal?
Decision: Petition dismissed. The Constitution provides no scheme or mode for
settling such unusual situations or for the substitution of senators designated to
the Tribunal. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes for the vindication
in the fairness and sense of justice of the Tribunal.
FACTS:
In the 1987 congressional elections, petitioners filed with respondent SET an

election contest against 22 senators-elect of the LABAN coalition.
All members of the legislative component of the SET at the time happened to be
included in the senators assailed. Later, petitioners filed with SET a Motion for
Disqualification or Inhibition of all senators-members thereof for the reason
they are all interested parties (being respondents therein). SET denied the
motion hence this petition. Contending that SET committed a grave
abuse of discretion, petitioners argue that considerations of public policy

and the norms of fair play and due process imperatively require the mass
disqualification sought, and propose to amend the Tribunal’s rules as to permit
the contest being decided by only 3 Members of the Tribunal.
Issue
Should the Senators-members be disqualified?
Held
No. It seems quite clear that in thus providing for a Tribunal to be staffed by both
Justices of the Supreme Court and Members of the Senate, the Constitution
intended that both those "judicial' and 'legislative' components commonly share
the duty and authority of deciding all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of Senators. The respondent Tribunal correctly stated one part of
this proposition when it held that said provision "... is a clear expression of an
intent that all (such) contests ... shall be resolved by a panel or body in which
their (the Senators') peers in that Chamber are represented." The other part, of
course, is that the constitutional provision just as clearly mandates the
participation in the same process of decision of a representative or
representatives of the Supreme Court.
The SET must continue taking cognizance of the case with its current Senators-
members. Here is a situation which precludes the substitution of any Senator
sitting in the Tribunal by any of his other colleagues without inviting the
same objections to the substitute’s competence. However, the amendment
proposed would, in the context of the situation, leave the resolution of the
contest to the only 3 Members, all Justices of this Court, who would remain
whose disqualification is not sought. It is unmistakable that the “legislative
component” [of the SET] cannot be totally excluded from participation in the
resolution of senatorial election contest without doing violence to the spirit
and intent of the Constitution. Thus, the proposed mass
disqualification/inhibition, if sanctioned and ordered, would leave the
Electoral Tribunal no alternative but to abandon a duty that no other court or
body can perform. This, to the Court’s mind, is the overriding consideration—
that the Tribunal be not prevented from discharging a duty which it
alone has the power to perform, the performance of which is in the highest
public interest as evidenced by its being expressly imposed by no less than
the fundamental law. Litigants must simply place their trust and hopes of
vindication in the fairness and sense of justice of the Members of the
Tribunal. The charge that SET gravely abused its discretion in its denial
of the petition for [mass] disqualification/inhibition must therefore fail.
Pimentel vs. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002
Facts: In March 3, 1995, the Party-List System Act took effect.
On May 11, 1998, in accordance with the Party-List System Act, national
elections were held which included, for the first time, the election through popular
vote of party-list groups and organizations whose nominees would become
members of the House.
Proclaimed winners were 14 party-list representatives from 13 organizations,

including petitioners from party-list groups (APEC), (ABA), (COOP-NATCCO),
(AKBAYAN), and (ABANSE). Due to the votes it garnered, APEC was able to
send 2 representatives to the House, while the 12 other party-list groups had one
representative each. Also elected were district representatives belonging to
various political parties.
Subsequently, the House constituted its HRET (House of Rep Electoral Tribunal)
and CA (Commission on Appointments) contingent by electing its representatives
to these two constitutional bodies. In practice, the procedure involves the
nomination by the political parties of House members who are to occupy seats in
the HRET and the CA.
From available records, it does not appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections
the party-list groups in the House nominated any of their representatives to the
HRET or the CA.
On February 2, 2000, petitioners filed with this Court their Petitions for
Prohibition, Mandamus and Preliminary Injunction (with Prayer for TRO) against
the HRET, its Chairman and Members, and against the CA, its Chairman and
Members. Petitioners contend that, under the Constitution and the Party-List
System Act, party-list representatives should have 1.2 or at least 1 seat in the
HRET, and 2.4 seats in the CA. Petitioners charge that respondents committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing to act positively on the letter of Senator
Pimentel.
Senator Pimentel filed the instant petitions on the strength of his oath to protect,
defend and uphold the Constitution and in his capacity as taxpayer ‘and as a
member of the CA. He was joined by 5 party-list representatives from APEC,

ABA, ABANSE, AKBAYAN and COOP-NATCCO as co-petitioners.
In their Reply to Consolidated Comment, petitioners alleged that, following the

Solicitor General’s computation, the LP and LAKAS were over-represented in the
HRET and the CA. Petitioners particularly assail the presence of one LP
representative each in the HRET and the CA, and maintain that the LP
representatives should be ousted and replaced with nominees of the 14 party-list
representatives.
Issue: Whether the present composition of the house electoral tribunal violates
the constitutional requirement of proportional representation because there are
no party-list representatives in the HRET. (No)
Ruling:
The discretion of the House to choose its members to the HRET and the CA is
not absolute, being subject to the mandatory constitutional rule on proportional
representation. However, under the doctrine of separation of powers, the
Court may not interfere with the exercise by the House of this
constitutionally mandated duty, absent a clear violation of the Constitution
or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Otherwise, 'the doctrine of separation of powers calls for each branch of
government to be left alone to discharge its duties as it sees fit. Neither can the
Court speculate on what action the House may take if party-list representatives
are duly nominated for membership in the HRET and the CA. The instant
petitions are bereft of any allegation that respondents prevented the party-list
groups in the House from participating in the election of members of the HRET
and the CA. Neither does it appear that after the May 11, 1998 elections, the
House barred the party-list representatives from seeking membership in the
HRET or the CA
The court cannot resolved the issue because it is a well-settled rule that a
constitutional question will not be heard and resolved by the courts unless the
following requirements of judicial inquiry concur: (1) there must be an actual
controversy; (2) the person or party raising the constitutional issue must have a
personal and substantial interest in the resolution of the controversy; (3) the
controversy must be raised at the earliest reasonable opportunity; and (4) the
resolution of the constitutional issue must be indispensable to the final
determination of the controversy.
Finally, the issues raised in the petitions have been rendered academic by
subsequent events. On May 14, 2001, a new set of district and party-list
representatives were elected to the House. The Court cannot now resolve the
issue of proportional representation in the HRET and the CA based on the

"present composition" of the House of Representatives as presented by
petitioners and the Solicitor General. With the May 14, 2001 elections, it is
certain that the composition of the House has changed.
WHEREFORE, the consolidated petitions for prohibition and mandamus are

DISMISSED.
Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989
FACTS:
After the congressional elections of May 11, 1987, the House of Representatives
proportionally apportioned its twelve seats in the Commission on Appointments in
accordance with Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution. Petitioner Raul A.
Daza was among those chosen and was listed as a representative of the Liberal
Party. On September 16, 1988, the Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino was
reorganized, resulting in a political realignment in the House of Representatives.
On the basis of this development, the House of Representatives revised its
representation in the Commission on Appointments by withdrawing the seat
occupied by the petitioner and giving this to the newly-formed LDP. The chamber
elected a new set of representatives consisting of the original members except
the petitioner and including therein respondent Luis C. Singson as the additional
member from the LDP. The petitioner came to this Court on January 13, 1989, to
challenge his removal from the Commission on Appointments and the
assumption of his seat by the respondent.
Briefly stated, the contention of the petitioner is that he cannot be removed from
the Commission on Appointments because his election thereto is permanent
under the doctrine announced in Cunanan v. Tan. For his part, the respondent
argues that the question raised by the petitioner is political in nature and so
beyond the jurisdiction of this Court. He also maintains that he has been
improperly impleaded, the real party respondent being the House of
Representatives which changed its representation in the Commission on
Appointments and removed the petitioner. Finally, he stresses that nowhere in
the Constitution is it required that the political party be registered to be entitled to
proportional representation in the Commission on Appointments.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the realignment will validly change the composition of the
Commission on Appointments.
Ruling:
At the core of this controversy is Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution
providing as follows: Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission on Appointments
consisting of the President of the Senate, as ex officio Chairman, twelve
Senators and twelve Members of the House of Representatives, elected by each
House on the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and
parties or organizations registered under the party-list system represented
therein. The Chairman of the Commission shall not vote, except in case of a tie.
The Commission shall act on all appointments submitted to it within thirty session
days of the Congress from their submission. The Commission shall rule by a
majority vote of all the Members.
The authority of the House of Representatives to change its representation in the

Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the changes that may
transpire in the political alignments of its membership. It is understood that such
changes must be permanent and do not include the temporary alliances or
factional divisions not involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one political party to
another. The Court holds that the respondent has been validly elected as a
member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat
in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
If the petitioner's argument were to be pursued, the 157 members of the LDP in
the House of Representatives would have to be denied representation in the
Commission on Appointments and, for that matter, also the Electoral Tribunal. By
the same token, the KBL, which the petitioner says is now "history only," should
also be written off. The independents also cannot be represented because they
belong to no political party. That would virtually leave the Liberal Party only with
all of its seventeen members to claim all the twelve seats of the House of
Representatives in the Commission on Appointments and the six legislative seats
in the House Electoral Tribunal. It is noteworthy that when with 41 members the
Liberal Party was allotted two of the seats in the Commission on Appointments, it
did not express any objection.
The petition is DISMISSED. The temporary restraining order dated January 13,
1989, is LIFTED. The Court held that the respondent has been validly elected as
a member of the Commission on Appointments and is entitled to assume his seat
in that body pursuant to Article VI, Section 18, of the Constitution.
Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990
Facts:
Petitioner Anna Coseteng, the lone candidate elected to the House of

Representatives under KAIBA, wrote to Speaker Ramon Mitra to appoint her as a
member of the Commission on Appointments (CA) and House Tribunal – a
request backed by nine congressmen.
Previously, the House elected from the Coalesced Majority parties 11 out 12
congressmen to the CA and later on, added Roque Ablan, Jr. as the twelfth
member, representing the Coalesced Minority. Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino
(LDP) was also organized as a party, prompting the revision of the House
majority membership in CA due to political realignments and the replacement of
Rep. Daza (LP) with Rep. Singson (LDP).
Congresswoman Anna Coseteng and her party KAIBA filed a Petition for
Extraordinary Legal Writs (considered as petition for quo warranto and injunction)
praying that the Court declare the election of respondent Ablan, Singson and the
rest of the CA members null and void on the theory that their election violated the
constitutional mandate of proportional representation because the New Majority
(LDP) is entitled to only 9 seats and members must be nominated and elected by
their parties. She further alleged that she is qualified to sit in the CA because of
the support of 9 other congressmen from the Minority.
The respondent contends that the issue of CA reorganization was a political

question, hence outside the jurisdiction of the Court, was in consonance with the
“proportional representation” clause in Art VI of the Constitution and that
petitioner was bound by the Majority decision since KAIBA was part of the
Coalesced Majority.
Issue:
W/N the members of the CA were chosen on basis of proportional

representation.
Held:
Yes. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit, not because issue raised was a
political question but because revision in House representation in CA was based
on proportional representation.
The composition of the House membership shows that there are 160 LDP
members in the House, comprising 79% of the House membership. This granted
them a rounded-up 10 seats in the CA and left the remaining two to LP and KBL
as the next largest parties. KAIBA, being a member of the Coalesced Majority, is
bound by the majority choices. Even if KAIBA were an opposition party, its lone
member Coseteng represents less than 1% of the House membership and,
hence, does not entitle her a seat in the 12 House seats in CA.
Her endorsements from 9 other congressmen are inconsequential because they

are not members of her party and they signed identical endorsements for her
rival, Cong. Verano-Yap.
There is no merit in petitioner’s contention that CA members should have been

nominated and elected by their parties because of members were nominated by
their floor leaders and elected by the House.
Jurisdiction issue over political question was also settled in Daza vs Singson in
that the Constitution conferred the Court with expanded jurisdiction to determine
whether grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction has
been committed by the other government branches.
Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992
As a result of the national elections held on May 1992, the Senate was
composed by the following parties: LDP 15, NPC 5, LAKAS 3. Applying the
mathematical formula agreed by the parties, they are entitled to 12 seats.
No. of senators of a political party x 12 seats
__________________________________
Total No. of senators elected.
he resulting composition of the senate based on the rule of proportional

representation of each political party with elected representatives in the Senate,
is as follows:
Political Party/ Proportional
Political Coalition Membership Representatives
LDP 15 7.5 members

NPC 5 2.5 members
LAKAS-NUCD 3 1.5 members
LP-PDP-LABAN 1 .5 members.
Senator Romulo in his capacity as Majority Floor Leader nominated, for and in
behalf of the LDP, eight (8) senators for membership in the Commission on
Appointments. The nomination of the eighth senator was objected to by
Petitioner, Senator Guingona, as Minority Floor Leader, and Senator John
Osmeña, in representation of the NPC.
Senator Arturo Tolentino proposed a compromise to the effect that the Senate
elect:
". . . 12 members to the Commission on Appointments, eight coming from LDP,

two coming from NPC, one coming from the Liberal Party, with the understanding
that there are strong reservations against this proportion or these numbers so
that if later on in an action in the Supreme Court, if any party is found to have an
excess in representation, that the party will necessarily reduce its representation,
and if any party is found to have a deficiency in representation, that party will be
entitled to nominate and have elected by this body its additional representative."
The proposed compromise above stated was a temporary arrangement and it

was approved. The elected members consisted of eight LDP, one LP-PDP-
LABAN, two NPC and one LAKAS-NUCD.
Senator Teofisto Guingona, Jr., in his behalf and in behalf of LAKAS-NUCD, filed
a petition for the issuance of a writ of prohibition to prohibit from recognizing the
membership of Senators Alberto Romulo as the eighth senator elected by the
LDP, and Wigberto L. Tañada, as the lone member representing the LP-PDP-
LABAN, in the Commission on Appointments, on the ground that the proposed
compromise of Senator Tolentino was violative of the rule of proportional
representation, and that it is the right of the minority political parties in the
Senate, consistent with the Constitution, to combine their fractional
representation in the Commission on Appointments to complete one seat therein,
and to decide who, among the senators in their ranks, shall be additionally
nominated and elected thereto.
Section 18 of Article VI of the Constitution of 1987 provides for the creation of a

Commission on Appointments and the allocation of its membership, as follows:
Sec. 18. There shall be a Commission of Appointments consisting of the

President of the Senate as ex-officio Chairman, twelve senators and twelve
members of the House of Representatives, elected by each house on the basis
of proportional representation from the political parties or organizations
registered under the party list system represented therein. The Chairman of the
Commission shall not vote except in case of a tie. The Commission shall act on
all appointments submitted to it within thirty session days of the Congress from
their submission. The Commission shall rule by a majority of all the members.
Based on the mathematical computation of proportional representation of the

various political parties with elected senator in the Senate, each of these political
parties is entitled to a fractional membership in the Commission on Appointments
as stated in the first paragraph of this decision. 5 Each political party has a claim
to an extra half seat, and the election of respondents Senator Romulo and
Senator Tañada to the Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority
ISSUE:
Whether the election of Senators Alberto Romulo and Wigberto E. Tañada as

members of the Commission on Appointments is in accordance with the
provision of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.( NO)
Whether or not it is mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on

Appointments. (NO)
RULING:
FIRST ISSUE:
Election of Senator Alberto Romulo and Senator Wigberto Tañada as members

of the Commission on Appointments as null and void for being in violation of the
rule on proportional representation under Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines.
It is also a fact accepted by all such parties that each of them is entitled to a
fractional membership on the basis of the rule on proportional representation of
each of the political parties.
The problem is what to do with the fraction of .5 or 1/2 to which each of the
parties is entitled. The LDP majority in the Senate converted a fractional half
membership into a whole membership of one senator by adding one half or .5 to
7.5 to be able to elect Senator Romulo.
In so doing one other party's fractional membership was correspondingly reduced

leaving the latter's representation in the Commission on Appointments to less
than their proportional representation in the Senate.
This is clearly a violation of Section 18 because it is no longer in compliance with

its mandate that membership in the Commission be based on the proportional
representation of the political parties. The election of Senator Romulo gave more
representation to the LDP and reduced the representation of one political party
either the LAKAS NUCD or the NPC.
The provision of Section 18 on proportional representation is mandatory in

character and does not leave any discretion to the majority party in the Senate to
disobey or disregard the rule on proportional representation; otherwise, the party
with a majority representation in the Senate or the House of Representatives can
by sheer force of numbers impose its will on the hapless minority. Section 18 in
effect works as a check on the majority party in the Senate and helps to maintain
the balance of power. No party can claim more than what it is entitled to under
such rule.
Supreme Court lay down the following guidelines accordingly:
1) In the Senate, a political party or coalition must have at least two duly elected
senators for every seat in the Commission on Appointments.
2) Where there are more than two political parties represented in the Senate, a
political party/coalition with a single senator in the Senate cannot constitutionally
claim a seat in the Commission.
SECOND ISSUE:
It is NOT mandatory to elect 12 Senators to the Commission on Appointments.

The Constitution does not contemplate that the Commission on Appointments
must necessarily include twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the
House of Representatives.
What the Constitution requires is that there be at least a majority of the entire
membership. Under Section 18, the Commission shall rule by majority vote of all
the members and in Section 19, the Commission shall meet only while Congress
is in session, at the call of its Chairman or a majority of all its members "to
discharge such powers and functions herein conferred upon it". Implementing the
above provisions of the Constitution, Section 10, Chapter 3 of the Rules of the
Commission on Appointments, provides as follows:
Sec. 10. Place of Meeting and Quorum: The Commission shall meet at either the
session hall of the Senate or the House of Representatives upon call of the
Chairman or as the Commission may designate. The presence of at least thirteen

(13) members is necessary to constitute a quorum. Provided, however, that at
least four (4) of the members constituting the quorum should come from either
house . . ."
It is quite evident that the Constitution does not require the election and presence
of twelve (12) senators and twelve (12) members of the House of
Representatives in order that the Commission may function.
Other instances may be mentioned of Constitutional collegial bodies which

perform their functions even if not fully constituted and even if their composition
is expressly specified by the Constitution. Among these are the Supreme Court,
Civil Service Commission, Commission on Election, Commission on Audit. They
perform their functions so long as there is the required quorum, usually a majority
of its membership. The Commission on Appointments may perform its functions
and transact its business even if only ten (10) senators are elected thereto as
long as a quorum exists.
Assuming that the Constitution intended that there be always twelve (12)
senators in the Commission on Appointments, the instant situation cannot be
rectified by the Senate in disregard of the rule on proportional representation.
The election of Senator Romulo and Senator Tañada as members of the
Commission on Appointments by the LDP majority in the Senate was clearly a
violation of Section 18 of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution. Their nomination and
election by the LDP majority by sheer force of superiority in numbers during the
Senate organization meeting of August 27, 1992 was done in grave abuse of
discretion. Where power is exercised in a manner inconsistent with the command
of the Constitution, and by reason of numerical strength, knowingly and not
merely inadvertently, said exercise amounts to abuse of authority granted by law
and grave abuse of discretion is properly found to exist.
Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003
FACTS:
Republic (petitioner), through the Presidential Commission of Good Government

(PCGG), represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a petition
for forfeiture before the Sandiganbayan pursuant to RA 1379. In said case,
petitioner sought the Declaration of the aggregate amount of US$ 356M
deposited in escrow in the PNB, as ill-gotten wealth. The funds were previously
held by 5 account groups, using various foreign foundations in certain Swiss

banks.
(1) Azio-Verso-Vibur Foundation accounts;
(2) Xandy-Wintrop: Charis-Scolari-Valamo-Spinus- Avertina Foundation

accounts;
(3) Trinidad-Rayby-Palmy Foundation accounts;
(4) Rosalys-Aguamina Foundation accounts and
(5) Maler Foundation accounts.
In addition, the Republic sought the forfeiture of US$25 million and US$5 million
in treasury notes which exceeded the Marcos couple's salaries, other lawful
income as well as income from legitimately acquired property. The treasury notes
are frozen at the Central Bank of the Philippines, now Bangko Sentral ng
Pilipinas, by virtue of the freeze order issued by the PCGG.
Before the case was set for pre-trial, a General Agreement and the Supplemental
Agreement dated December 28, 1993 were executed by the Marcos children and
then PCGG Chairman Magtanggol Gunigundo for a global settlement of the
assets of the Marcos family.
The General Agreement/Supplemental Agreements sought to identify, collate,

cause the inventory of and distribute all assets presumed to be owned by the
Marcos family under the conditions contained therein. The General Agreement
specified in one of its premises or "whereas clauses" the fact that petitioner
"obtained a judgment from the Swiss Federal Tribunal on December 21, 1990,
that the Three Hundred Fifty-six Million U.S. dollars (US$356 million) belongs in
principle to the Republic of the Philippines provided certain conditionalities are
met x xx."
Hearings were conducted by the Sandiganbayan on the motion to approve the

General/Supplemental Agreements. In a resolution dated 31 January 2002, the
Sandiganbayan denied the Republic's motion for summary judgment.
"The evidence offered for summary judgment of the case did not prove that the
money in the Swiss Banks belonged to the Marcos spouses because no legal
proof exists in the record as to the ownership by the Marcoses of the funds in
escrow from the Swiss Banks. The basis for the forfeiture in favor of the
government cannot be deemed to have been established and our judgment
thereon, perforce, must also have been without basis."
The Republic filed the petition for certiorari.
Petitioner, in the main, asserts that nowhere in the respondents' motions for
reconsideration and supplemental motion for reconsideration were the
authenticity, accuracy and admissibility of the Swiss decisions ever challenged.
Otherwise stated, it was incorrect for the Sandiganbayan to use the issue of lack
of authenticated translations of the decisions of the Swiss Federal Supreme
Court as the basis for reversing itself because respondents themselves never
raised this issue in their motions for reconsideration and supplemental motion for
reconsideration. Furthermore, this particular issue relating to the translation of
the Swiss court decisions could not be resurrected anymore because said
decisions had been previously utilized by the Sandiganbayan itself in resolving a
"decisive issue" before it.
Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan for questioning the non-production of the

authenticated translations of the Swiss Federal Supreme Court decisions as this
was a marginal and technical matter that did not diminish by any measure the
conclusiveness and strength of what had been proven and admitted before the
Sandiganbayan, that is, that the funds deposited by the Marcoses constituted ill-
gotten wealth and thus belonged to the Filipino people.
Mrs. Marcos contends that petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law in view of the resolution of the Sandiganbayan
dated January 31, 2000 directing petitioner to submit the authenticated
translations of the Swiss decisions. Instead of availing of said remedy, petitioner
now elevates the matter to this Court. According to Mrs. Marcos, a petition for
certiorari which does not comply with the requirements of the rules may be
dismissed. Since petitioner has a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, that is, to
proceed to trial and submit authenticated translations of the Swiss decisions, its
petition before this Court must be dismissed. Corollarily, the Sandiganbayan's
ruling to set the case for further proceedings cannot and should not be
considered a capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment.
Respondents insist that the Sandiganbayan is correct in ruling that petitioner

Republic has failed to establish a prima facie case for the forfeiture of the Swiss
deposits.
ISSUE:W/N petitioner Republic was able to prove its case for forfeiture in
accordance with the requisites of Sections 2and 3 of RA 1379.
HELD: We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima facie presumption
that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were manifestly and
patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public officials.
The management of businesses, like the administration of foundations to

accumulate funds, was expressly prohibited under the 1973 Constitution:
• Article VII, Sec. 4(2) – The President and the Vice-President shall not, during
their tenure, hold any other office except when otherwise provided in this
Constitution, nor may they practice any profession, participate directly or
indirectly in the management of any business, or be financially interested directly
or indirectly in any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted
by the Government or any other subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including any government owned or controlled corporation.
• Article VII, Sec. 11 – No Member of the National Assembly shall appear as

counsel before any court inferior to a court with appellate jurisdiction, x xx.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in any contract
with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof including any government owned
or controlled corporation during his term of office. He shall not intervene in any
matter before any office of the government for his pecuniary benefit.
• Article IX, Sec. 7 – The Prime Minister and Members of the Cabinet shall be
subject to the provision of Section 11, Article VIII hereof and may not appear as
counsel before any court or administrative body, or manage any business, or
practice any profession, and shall also be subject to such other disqualification
as may be provided by law.
In the case at bar, The sum of $304,372.43 should be held as the only
known lawful income of respondents since they did not file any Statement
of Assets and Liabilities (SAL), as required by law, from which their net
worth could be determined. Besides, under the 1935 Constitution,
Ferdinand E. Marcos as President could not receive "any other emolument
from the Government or any of its subdivisions and instrumentalities".[84]
Likewise, under the 1973 Constitution, Ferdinand E. Marcos as President
could "not receive during his tenure any other emolument from the
Government or any other source."
Section 2 of RA 1379 explicitly states that \"whenever any public officer or

employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is
manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and
to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property,
said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired. x
x x\"
The elements which must concur for this prima facie presumption to apply are:
(1) the offender is a public officer or employee;
(2) he must have acquired a considerable amount of money or property during

his incumbency; and
(3) said amount is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately
acquired property.
It is undisputed that spouses Ferdinand and Imelda Marcos were former public
officers. Hence, the first element is clearly extant.
The second element deals with the amount of money or property acquired by the
public officer during his incumbency. The Marcos couple indubitably acquired
and owned properties during their term of office. In fact, the five groups of Swiss
accounts were admittedly owned by them. There is proof of the existence and
ownership of these assets and properties and it suffices to comply with the
second element.
The third requirement is met if it can be shown that such assets, money or
property is manifestly out of proportion to the public officer's salary and his other
lawful income. It is the proof of this third element that is crucial in determining
whether a prima facie presumption has been established in this case.
Petitioner Republic presented not only a schedule indicating the lawful income of
the Marcos spouses during their incumbency but also evidence that they had
huge deposits beyond such lawful income in Swiss banks under the names of
five different foundations. We believe petitioner was able to establish the prima
facie presumption that the assets and properties acquired by the Marcoses were
manifestly and patently disproportionate to their aggregate salaries as public
officials. Otherwise stated, petitioner presented enough evidence to convince us
that the Marcoses had dollar deposits amounting to US $356 million representing
the balance of the Swiss accounts of the five foundations, an amount way, way
beyond their aggregate legitimate income of only US$304,372.43 during their
incumbency as government officials.
THE PETITION WAS GRANTED.
The Swiss deposits which were transferred to and are now deposited in escrow
at the Philippine National Bank in the estimated aggregate amount of
US$658,175,373.60 as of January 31, 2002, plus interest, are hereby forfeited in
favor of petitioner Republic of the Philippines.
Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. 146738, March 2, 2001

FACTS:
In the May 11, 1998 elections, petitioner Joseph Estrada was elected President
while respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo was elected Vice -President. From
the beginning of his term, however, petitioner was plagued by problems that
slowly eroded his popularity. On October 4, 2000, Ilocos Sur Governor Chavit
Singson, a longtime friend of the petitioner, accused the petitioner, his family and
friends of receiving millions of pesos from Jueteng lords. The expose’
immediately ignited reactions of rage.
On November 13, 2000, House Speaker Villar transmitted the Articles of

Impeachment signed by 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of all the members
of the House of Representatives to the Senate. On November 20, 2000, the
Senate formally opened the impeachment trial of the petitioner. On January 16,
2001, by a vote of 11-10, the senator-judges ruled against the opening of the
second envelope which allegedly contained evidence showing that petitioner held
P3.3 billion in a secret bank account under the name “Jose Velarde.”
The ruling was met by a spontaneous outburst of anger that hit the streets of the
metropolis. Thereafter, the Armed Forces and the PNP withdrew their support to
the Estrada government. Some Cabinet secretaries, undersecretaries, assistant
secretaries and bureau chiefs resigned from their posts. On January 20, 2001, at
about 12 noon, Chief Justice Davide administered the oath to respondent Arroyo
as President of the Philippines. On the same day, petitioner issued a press
statement that he was leaving Malacanang Palace for the sake of peace and in
order to begin the healing process of the nation. It also appeared that on the
same day, he signed a letter stating that he was transmitting a declaration that he
was unable to exercise the powers and duties of his office and that by operation
of law and the Constitution, the Vice-President shall be the Acting President. A
copy of the letter was sent to Speaker Fuentebella and Senate President
Pimentel on the same day.
After his fall from the power, the petitioner’s legal problems
appeared in clusters. Several cases previously filed against him in the Office of
the Ombudsman were set in motion.
ISSUES:
I
Whether the petitions present a justiciable controversy.

II
whether petitioner Estrada is a President on leave while respondent Arroyo is an Acting
President.

III
Whether conviction in the impeachment proceedings is a condition precedent for the
criminal prosecution of petitioner Estrada. In the negative and on the assumption that
petitioner is still President, whether he is immune from criminal prosecution.

IV
Whether the prosecution of petitioner Estrada should be enjoined on the ground of
prejudicial publicity.

RULINGS:
Private respondents raise the threshold issue that the cases at bar pose a political
question, and hence, are beyond the jurisdiction of this Court to decide. They contend
that shorn of its embroideries, the cases at bar assail the "legitimacy of the Arroyo
administration." They stress that respondent Arroyo ascended the presidency through
people power; that she has already taken her oath as the 14th President of the
Republic; that she has exercised the powers of the presidency and that she has been
recognized
We reject private respondents' submission. To be sure, courts here and abroad, have
tried to lift the shroud on political question but its exact latitude still splits the best of
legal minds. Developed by the courts in the 20th century, the political question doctrine
which rests on the principle of separation of powers and on prudential considerations,
continue to be refined in the mills constitutional law.[55] In the United States, the most
authoritative guidelines to determine whether a question is political were spelled out by
Mr. Justice Brennan in the 1962 case of Baker v. Carr,[56] viz:
Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not political questions. The principal
issues for resolution require the proper interpretation of certain provisions in the 1987
Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,[74] and section 8[75]of Article VII, and the
allocation of governmental powers under section 11[76] of Article VII. The issues
likewise call for a ruling on the scope of presidential immunity from suit. They also
involve the correct calibration of the right of petitioner against prejudicial publicity. As
early as the 1803 case of Marbury v. Madison,[77] the doctrine has been laid down that
" it is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is . . ." Thus, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political is but a foray in the
dark.

2. we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he suffers from a permanent
disability. Hence, he submits that the office of the President was not vacant
when respondent Arroyo took her oath as president.
. The issue brings under the microscope of the meaning of section 8, Article VII of the
Constitution which provides:

"Sec. 8. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office or resignation of
the President, the Vice President shall become the President to serve the unexpired
term. In case of death, permanent disability, removal from office, or resignation of both
the President and Vice President, the President of the Senate or, in case of his inability,
the Speaker of the House of Representatives, shall then acts as President until
President or Vice President shall have been elected and qualified.

In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of
resignation before he evacuated Malacañang Palace in the Afternoon of January 20,
2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not
petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during
and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.
To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is
important to follow the succession of events after the exposal of Governor Singson. The
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of
petitioner's alleged misgovernance in the Blue Ribbon investigation spiked the hate
against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which
initially was given a near cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it
gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioner's powerful political allies began deserting him.
Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate President Drilon and
Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected
senior economic advisers resigned together with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at
12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The negotiation was limited to three
(3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioner's resignation; (2)
the guarantee of the safety of the petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to
open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner.[87] Again, we note
that the resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign
ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he briefed the
petitioner on the three points.
After petitioner contended that as a matter of fact he did not resign, he also argues that
he could not resign as a matter of law. He relies on section 12 of RA No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which allegedly prohibits
his resignation, viz:

"Sec. 12. No public officer shall be allowed to resign or retire pending an investigation,
criminal or administrative, or pending a prosecution against him, for any offense under
this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery."

There is another reason why petitioner's contention should be rejected. In the cases at
bar, the records show that when petitioner resigned on January 20, 2001, the cases
filed against him before the Ombudsman. While these cases have been filed, the
respondent Ombudsman refrained from conducting the preliminary investigation of the
petitioner for the reason that as the sitting President then, petitioner was immune from
suit. Technically, the said cases cannot be considered as pending for the Ombudsman
lacked jurisdiction to act on them. Section 12 of RA No. 3019 cannot therefore be
invoked by the petitioner for it contemplates of cases whose investigation or
prosecution do not suffer from any insuperable legal obstacle like the immunity from
suit of a sitting President.

Petitioner contends that the impeachment proceeding is an administrative investigation
that, under section 12 of RA 3019, bars him from resigning. We hold otherwise. The
exact nature of an impeachment proceeding is debatable. But even assuming arguendo
that it is an administrative proceeding, it can not be considered pending at the time
petitioner resigned because the process already broke down when a majority of the
senator-judges voted against the opening of the second envelope, the public and
private prosecutors walked out, the public prosecutors filed their Manifestation of
Withdrawal of Appearance, and the proceedings were postponed indefinitely. There
was, in effect, no impeachment case pending against petitioner when he resigned.
3. In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily.
the contention of the petitioner that he is merely temporarily unable to perform the
powers and duties of the presidency, and hence is a President on leave. As aforestated,
the inability claim is contained in the January 20, 2001 letter of petitioner sent on the
same day to Senate President Pimentel and Speaker Fuentebella.

Petitioner postulates that respondent Arroyo as Vice President has no power to adjudge
the inability of the petitioner to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. His
significant submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority under the Constitution
to determine whether the President is incapable of performing his functions in the
manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII."[95] This contention is the centerpiece
of petitioner's stance that he is a President on leave and respondent Arroyo is only an
Acting President.

An examination of section 11, Article VII is in order. It provides:

"SEC. 11. Whenever the President transmit to the President of the Senate and the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written
declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice-
President as Acting President.

Whenever a majority of all the Members of the Cabinet transmit to the President of the
Senate and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration
that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice-
President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting
President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President of the Senate and to the
Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists,
he shall reassume the powers and duties of his office. Meanwhile, should a majority of
all the Members of the Cabinet transmit within five days to the President of the Senate
and to the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the
President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Congress shall
decide the issue. For that purpose, the Congress shall convene, if it is not in session,
within forty-eight hours, in accordance with its rules and without need of call.

If the Congress, within ten days after receipt of the last written declaration, or, if not in
session within twelve days after it is required to assemble, determines by a two-thirds
vote of both Houses, voting separately, that the President is unable to discharge the
powers and duties of his office, the Vice-President shall act as President; otherwise, the
President shall continue exercising the powers and duties of his office."

That is the law. Now the operative facts:

(1) Petitioner, on January 20, 2001, sent the above letter claiming inability to the
Senate President and Speaker of the House;

(2) Unaware of the letter, respondent Arroyo took her oath of office as President on
January 20, 2001 at about 12:30 p.m.;

(3) Despite receipt of the letter, the House of Representative passed on January 24,
2001 House Resolution No. 175;[96]

On the same date, the House of the Representatives passed House Resolution No.
176[97]which states:
What leaps to the eye from these irrefutable facts is that both houses of Congress have
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President. Implicitly clear in that recognition is the
premise that the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer temporary. Congress has
clearly rejected petitioner's claim of inability.

The question is whether this Court has jurisdiction to review the claim of temporary
inability of petitioner Estrada and thereafter revise the decision of both Houses of
Congress recognizing respondent Arroyo as President of the Philippines. Following
Tañada v. Cuenco,[102] we hold that this Court cannot exercise its judicial power for
this is an issue "in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
Legislative x x x branch of the government." Or to use the language in Baker vs. Carr,
[103] there is a "textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable
standards for resolving it." Clearly, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's claim of
inability to discharge the powers and duties of the presidency. The question is political
in nature and addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is a political issue
which cannot be decided by this Court without transgressing the principle of separation
of powers.

In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not resign, still, he cannot
successfully claim that he is a President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid to rest by Congress and the
decision that respondent Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal branch of
government cannot be reviewed by this Court.

4. Petitioner also contends that the respondent Ombudsman should be stopped from
conducting the investigation of the cases filed against him due to the barrage of
prejudicial publicity on his guilt. He submits that the respondent Ombudsman has
developed bias and is all set to file the criminal cases in violation of his right to due
process.
we hold that there is not enough evidence to warrant this Court to enjoin the
preliminary investigation of the petitioner by the respondent Ombudsman. Petitioner
needs to offer more than hostile headlines to discharge his burden of proof.[131] He
needs to show more weighty social science evidence to successfully prove the impaired
capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Well to note, the cases against the
petitioner are still undergoing preliminary investigation by a special panel of
prosecutors in the office of the respondent Ombudsman. No allegation whatsoever has
been made by the petitioner that the minds of the members of this special panel have
already been infected by bias because of the pervasive prejudicial publicity against him.
Indeed, the special panel has yet to come out with its findings and the Court cannot
second guess whether its recommendation will be unfavorable to the petitioner.

The records show that petitioner has instead charged respondent Ombudsman himself
with bias. To quote petitioner's submission, the respondent Ombudsman "has been
influenced by the barrage of slanted news reports, and he has buckled to the threats
and pressures directed at him by the mobs."[132] News reports have also been quoted
to establish that the respondent Ombudsman has already prejudged the cases of the
petitioner[133]and it is postulated that the prosecutors investigating the petitioner will
be influenced by this bias of their superior.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions of Joseph Ejercito Estrada challenging the
respondent Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as the de jure 14th President of the Republic
are DISMISSED.
CLU vs. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991
(Former) President Corazon Aquino issued Executive Order No. 284, allowing
appointive officials of the Executive Department (members of the Cabinet, their
undersecretaries and assistant secretaries) to hold, in addition to his primary
position, not more than two positions in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding compensation therefor.
The constitutionality of Executive Order No. 284 is being challenged by

petitioners on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to Section 13,
Article VII other than those provided in the Constitution, which provides:
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during
said tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any
business, or be financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or
special privilege granted by the Government or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations or
their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of
their office.”
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution“, the only exceptions against holding any other office or employment
in Government are those provided in the Constitution, namely: (i) The Vice-
President may be appointed as a Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2),
Article 7; and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member of the Judicial
and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), Article 8.
Petitioners further argue that the exception to the prohibition in Section 7, par.
(2), Article IX-B on the Civil Service Commission applies to officers and
employees of the Civil Service in general and that said exceptions do not apply
and cannot be extended to Section 13, Article VII which applies specifically to the
President, Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet and their deputies or
assistants.
Article IX-B, Section 7, par. (2) 8 provides:
"Sec. 7. . . .
"Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the government or
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries."
Issue:
Is EO 284 is constitutional? (NO)
Ruling:
No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 Constitution seeks to prohibit

the President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
assistants from holding during their tenure multiple offices or employment in the
government, except in those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
above clarified with respect to posts held without additional compensation in an
ex-officio capacity as provided by law and as required by the primary functions of
their office, the citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as examples
during the debate and deliberation on the general rule laid down for all appointive
officials should be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot override
the constitution’s manifest intent and the people’s understanding thereof.
In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in relation to Sec 7, par. (2),
Art IX-B of the 1987 Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet members, undersecretaries or
assistant secretaries may hold in addition to their primary position to not more
than 2 positions in the government and government corporations, EO 284
actually allows them to hold multiple offices or employment in direct
contravention of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution
prohibiting them from doing so, unless otherwise provided in the 1987
Constitution itself.
The prohibition imposed on the President and his official family is all-embracing
and covers both public and private office or employment.
It is quite notable that in all Constitutional provisions on disqualifications to hold

other office or employment, the prohibition pertains to an office or employment in
the government and government-owned or controlled corporations or their
subsidiaries. In striking contrast is the wording of Section 13, Article VII which
states that “(T)he President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and
their deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during their tenure.”
These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions imposed on the President and his

official family, which prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
officials or employees such as the Members of Congress, members of the civil
service in general and members of the armed forces, are proof of the intent of the
1987 Constitution to treat the President and his official family as a class by itself
and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
While all other appointive officials in the civil service are allowed to hold other
office or employment in the government during their tenure when such is allowed
by law or by the primary functions of their positions, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by the
Constitution itself.
In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay down the general rule
applicable to all elective and appointive public officials and employees, while
Section 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable only to the
President, the Vice-President, Members of the Cabinet, their deputies and
assistants.
The prohibition under Section 13, Article VII is not to be interpreted as covering
positions held without additional compensation in ex-officio capacities as
provided by law and as required by the primary functions of the concerned
official's office, namely:
(a)the Vice-President being appointed as a member of the Cabinet under Section

3, par. (2), Article VII; or
(b) the Vice-President acting as President in those instances provided under

Section 7, pars. (2) and (3), Article VII;
(c) the Secretary of Justice being ex-officio member of the Judicial and Bar
Council by virtue of Section 8 (1), Article VIII.
The term ex-officio means "from office; by virtue of office." It refers to an

"authority derived from official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the
individual character, but rather annexed to the official position."
An ex-officio member of a board is one who is a member by virtue of his title to a

certain office, and without further warrant or appointment. To illustrate, by
express provision of law, the Secretary of Transportation and Communications is
the ex-officio Chairman of the Board of the Philippine Ports Authority, and the
Light Rail Transit Authority.
De la Cruz vs. COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001

FACTS: Twenty petitioners were members of the Board of Directors of the

National Housing Authority (NHA) from 1991 to 1996. On September 19, 1997,
the Commission on Audit issued Memorandum No. 97-038 directing all unit
heads/ auditors/ team leaders of the national government agencies and
government owned and controlled corporations which have effected payment of
any form of additional compensation or renumeration to cabinet secretaries, their
deputies and assistants, or their representatives in violation of the rule on
multiple positions, to:
a.) immediately cause the disallowance of such additional compensation or

renumeration given to and received by the concerned officials, and
b.) effect the refund of the same from the time of the finality of the Supreme
Court En Banc Decision in the consolidated cases of Civil Liberties Union vs.
Executive Secretary and Anti- Graft League of the Philippines, Inc. et. al. vs.
Secretary of Agrarian Reform, et. al., promulgated on February 22, 1991.
The COA Memorandum further stated that the said Supreme Court Decision,
which became final and executory on August 19, 1991 declared Executive Order
No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members, their deputies and
assistants to hold other offices in addition to their primary offices and to receive
compensations therefor.
Accordingly on October 23, 1997, NHA Resident Auditor Salvador J. Vasquez

issued Notice of Disallowance No. 97-011-061 disallowing in audit the payment
of representation allowances and per diems amounting to P276,600.00 of
"Cabinet members who were ex- officio members of the National Housing
Authority Board of Directors and/ or their respective alternates who actually
received the payments."
Petitioner through then Chairman dela Serna of the NHA Board of Directors,
appealed from the Notice of Disallowance to the Commission on Audit on these
following grounds:
a.) that the SC Decision in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the
Philippines; was clarified in the resolution of the Court en banc that the
constitutional ban against multiple positions applies only to the members of the
Cabinet, their deputies and assistants. It does not cover appointive officials with
equivalent rank or those lower than the position of Assistant Secretary; and
b.) The National Housing Authority Directors are not Secretaries,

Undersecretaries or Assistant Secretaries and that they occupy positions lower
than the position of Assistant Secretary.
On September 22, 1998, the COA issued Decision No. 98-381 denying
petitioners' appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not COA erred in disallowing compensation in favor of NHA

Board Members
RULING: No. Under Sec. 7 of P.D. 757 or the law in creating NHA, the persons
mandated by law to sit as members of the NHA Board are the following: 1.
Secretary of Public Works, Transportation and Communications, 2. the Director-
General of the National Economic and Development Authority 3.) The Secretary
of Finance 4.) the Secretary of Labor 5.) the Secretary of Industry 6.) the
Executive Secretary and 7.) the General Manager of the NHA.
While petitioners are not among those officers, however, they are "alternates" of
the said officers, "whose acts shall be considered as acts of the principals".
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides that:
Sec. 13. The President, Vice President, the Members of the Cabinet and their
deputies or assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution,
hold any other office or employment during their tenure.
The Court, in Civil Liberties and Anti Graft League of the Philippines interpreted
in Sec. 13 to mean that the prohibition in holding dual or multiple offices must not
be construed as applying to posts occupied by Executive officials specified
therein without additional compensation in an ex officio capacity as provided by
law and as required by the primary functions of said officials' office.
It should be obvious that, if say, Secretary of Finance attends a meeting of the

Monetary Board as an ex- offficio member, he is actually in legal contemplation
performing the primary function of his principal office in defining policy in
monetary banking matters, which come under the jurisdiction of his department.
For such attendance, he is not entitled to collect any extra compensation whether
be in the form of per diem or an honorarium or an allowance or some other such
euphemism. Such additional prohibition is prohibited in the Constitution.
In rendering its challenged decision, the COA did not gravely abuse its discretion.
Petition DISMISSED in favor of the respondents.
National Amnesty Commission vs. COA, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004
Facts:
Petitioner National Amnesty Commission (NAC) is a government agency created

on March 25, 1994 by then President Ramos through Proclamation No. 247. The
NAC is tasked to receive, process and review amnesty applications, and
composed of seven members (1 Chairperson, 3 regular members appointed by
the President, and the Secretaries of Justice, DND, and DILG as ex officio
members)After attending initial meetings, the three ex officio members turned
over their said responsibilities to their representatives who were paid honoraria
beginning December 12, 1994.
Almost three years later, NAC resident auditor Eulalia disallowed on audit the
payment of honoraria to these representatives amounting to P255,750 pursuant
to a COA memorandum.
On April 28, 1999, the NAC passed an Admin Order which was approved by
then President Estrada, Section I, Rule II of which provides:
1. The NAC shall be composed of 7 members, a Chairperson appointed by the

President, 3 Commissioners who shall be appointed by the President, and 3 ex-
officio members).
2. The ex officio members may designate their representatives to the

Commission. Said Representatives shall be entitled to per diems, allowances,
bonuses and other benefits as may be authorized by law.
Petitioner invoked the AO in assailing before the COA the rulings of the resident
auditor disallowing the payment of honoraria to the ex officio members’
representatives, to no avail. On March 14, 2003, the NAC filed the present
petitioner contending that COA committed grave abuse of discretion in applying
the COA memorandum to the representatives and disallowing payment of
honoraria to them on the ground that they lack authority.
ISSUE:
WON the Secretaries of National Defense, Interior and Local Government, and
Justice are entitled to hold office in an ex officio capacity (actually not really an
issue since what was questioned was entitlement of the representatives to
honoraria)
Ruling:
Yes, the Secretaries of National Defense, Interior and Local Government, and
Justice are entitled to hold office in an ex officio capacity. In the earlier Civil
Liberties Union case, the SC ruled that Cabinet Secretaries, their deputies and
assistants may not hold any other office or employment. It also declared
Executive Order No. 284 unconstitutional insofar as it allows Cabinet members,
their deputies and assistants to hold other offices in addition to their primary
office and to receive compensation thereof. The same became final and
executory on August 19, 1991. The same prohibition is reiterated in Sections 54
and 56 of the Administrative Code of 1987.
However, the prohibition on multiple offices does not cover offices in ex officio
capacity, provided that there is no additional compensation. The term “ex officio”
means “from office, by virtue of office.” It refers to an “authority derived from
official character merely, not expressly conferred upon the individual character,
but rather annexed to the official position.” It also denotes an “act done in an
official character, or as a consequence of office, and without any other
appointment or authority than that conferred by the office. The petition is thereby
dismissed for lack of merit.
DENR vs. DENR Region 12 Employees, G.R. No. 149724, August 19, 2003
FACTS:
Petition for review assailing CA decision dismissing the petition for certiorari and
denial of motion for consideration.
November 15, 1999 – Regional Executive Director of the DENR for Region XII,
Israel Gaddi, issued a Memorandum directing the immediate transfer of the
DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to Koronadal (formerly Marbel),
South Cotabato—Providing for the Redefinition of Functions and Realignment of
Administrative Units in the Regional and Field Officeso Sec 1. Realignment of
Administrative Units. 1.6. The supervision of the Provinces of South Cotabato
and Sarangani shall be transferred from Region XI to XII Respondents filed a
petition for nullity of orders with prayer for preliminary injunction RTC of Cotabato
issued TRO against DENR Sec and Regional Executive Director from
transferring the offices. DENR then filed a Motion for Reconsideration, asserting
that:
o The power to transfer the Regional Office of the DENR is executive in nature.
o The decision to transfer the Regional Office is based on Executive Order No.
429, which reorganized Region XII.
o The validity of EO 429 has been affirmed by the Honorable Supreme Court in
the Case of Chiongbian vs. Orbos (1995) 245 SCRA 255.
o Since the power to reorganize the Administrative Regions is Executive in

Nature citing Chiongbian, the Honorable Court has no jurisdiction to entertain this
petition.
RTC then decided, ordering the DENR to cease and desist from enforcing their
Memorandum Order for being bereft of legal basis and issued with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on their part, and they are
further ordered to return back the seat of the DENR Regional Offices 12 to
Cotabato City.
Petition for certiorari with the CA was dismissed for procedural errors: (1) failure
to submit a written explanation why personal service was not done on the
adverse party; (2) failure to attach affidavit of service; (3) failure to indicate the
material dates when copies of the orders of the lower court were received; (4)
failure to attach certified true copy of the order denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration; (5) for improper verification, the same being based on
petitioners knowledge and belief, and (6) wrong remedy of certiorari under Rule
65 to substitute a lost appeal. Motion for Reconsideration denied.
ISSUE:
Whether or not DENR Secretary has the authority to reorganize the DENR
Region 12 Office. (Yes)
RULING: Applying the doctrine of qualified political agency, the power of the
President to reorganize the National Government may validly be delegated to his
cabinet members exercising control over a particular executive department. All
executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the Executive
Department, and the acts of the Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive, are presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive. It is corollary to the control power of the President as provided for
under Art. VII Sec. 17 of the 1987 Constitution: "The President shall have control
of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed."
The concern issues addressed to the wisdom of the transfer rather than to its
legality. It is basic in our form of government that the judiciary cannot inquire into
the wisdom or expediency of the acts of the executive or the legislative

department, for each department is supreme and independent of the others, and
each is devoid of authority not only to encroach upon the powers or field of action
assigned to any of the other department, but also to inquire into or pass upon the
advisability or wisdom of the acts performed, measures taken or decisions made
by the other departments.
In the case at bar, the DENR Secretary can validly reorganize the DENR by
ordering the transfer of the DENR XII Regional Offices from Cotabato City to
Koronadal, South Cotabato. The exercise of this authority by the DENR
Secretary, as an alter ego, is presumed to be the acts of the President for the
latter had not expressly repudiated the same.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition for review is GRANTED
Blaquera vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998
Facts:
On Feb. 21, 1992, then Pres. Aquino issued AO 268 which granted each
official and employee of the government the productivity incentive benefits
in a maximum amount equivalent to 30% of the employee’s one month
basic salary but which amount not be less than P2, 000.00. Said AO
provided that the productivity incentive benefits shall be granted only for
the year 1991. Accordingly, all heads of agencies, including government
boards of government-owned or controlled corporations and financial
institutions, are strictly prohibited from granting productivity incentive
benefits for the year 1992 and future years pending the result of a
comprehensive study being undertaken by the Office of the Pres.
The petitioners, who are officials and employees of several government

departments and agencies, were paid incentive benefits for the year 1992.
Then, on Jan. 19, 1993, then Pres. Ramos issued AO 29 authorizing the grant
of productivity incentive benefits for the year 1992 in the maximum

amount of P1,000.00 and reiterating the prohibition under Sec. 7 of AO
268, enjoining the grant of productivity incentive benefits without prior
approval of the President. Sec. 4 of AO 29 directed all departments, offices
and agencies which authorized payment of productivity incentive bonus for
the year 1992 in excess of P1, 000.00 to immediately cause the refund of the
excess. In compliance therewith, the heads of the departments or agencies
of the government concerned caused the deduction from petitioners’
salaries or allowances of the amounts needed to cover the alleged
overpayments.
Issue: Whether or not AO 29 and AO 268 were issued in the valid exercise
of presidential control over the executive departments
Held:
The Pres. is the head of the government. Governmental power and

authority are exercised and implemented through him. His power includes
the control of executive departments as provided under Sec. 17, Art. VII of
the Constitution.
Control means the power of an officer to alter or modify or set aside what a
subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. The Pres. can, by
virtue of his power of control, review, modify, alter or nullify any action or
decision of his subordinate in the executive departments, bureau or offices
under him.
When the Pres. issued AO 29 limiting the amount of incentive benefits,

enjoining heads of government agencies from granting incentive benefits
without approval from him and directing the refund of the excess over the
prescribed amount, the Pres. was just exercising his power of control over
executive departments.
The Pres. issued subject AOs to regulate the grant of productivity incentive
benefits and to prevent discontent, dissatisfaction and demoralization
among government personnel by committing limited resources of
government for the equal payment of incentives and awards. The Pres. was
only exercising his power of control by modifying the acts of the heads of
the government agencies who granted incentive benefits to their employees
without appropriate clearance from the Office of the Pres., thereby resulting
in the uneven distribution of government resources.
The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin. So, too, is
his control of executive departments.
National Electrification Administration vs. COA, G.R. No. 143481, February 15,
2002
FACTS:
Petitioner National Electrification Administration is a GOCC created under

PD 269. NEA is charged with the responsibility of organizing, financing and
regulating electric cooperatives throughout the country.
Government employee salaries were raised via a Joint Resolution of
Congress, urging the President to revise the existing compensation. This was
made into a 4-year program. In 1996, President Ramos issued EO 389 to
implement the final year salary increases authorized by the joint Resolution. EO
389 called for a 2-tranche salary increase: one on January 1, 1997, and another
on November 1, 1997.
In January 1997, NEA implemented the salary increases. However, they
implemented such increase in a single lump sum beginning January 19, 1997
(NEA accelerated the implementation by paying the second tranche starting
January 1 instead of November 1). The Commission on Audit issued a Notice of
Suspension and Notices of Disallowance. The Notices of Disallowance were
appealed by NEA, but rejected the COA en banc. The decision of COA was then
challenged in the Supreme Court.
ISSUES:
1) Whether or not COA committed a grave abuse of discretion

amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in disallowing the
increased salaries – NO
2) Whether or not NEA is allowed to accelerate the
implementation of the salaries depending on the availability of
funds – NO
HELD:
No, the Commission on Audit did not commit any grave abuse of
discretion. Neither is NEA allowed to accelerate the implementation.
On NEA’s accelerated implementation

The Court ruled that such acceleration was not in accordance with the law.
NEA claimed that RA 8250 (GAA of 1997) was their legal basis. However, such
law was not self-executory. Budgetary appropriations under the GAA do not
constitute unbridled authority to government agencies to spend the appropriated
amounts as they wish.
Itemization of the Personal Services (the appropriation used by NEA) is
prepared after the enactment of the GAA, and requires the approval of the
President. The execution of the GAA is subject to a program of expenditure to
be approved by the President, which will be the basis for the fund release.
No portion of the appropriations in the GAA shall be used for payment of
any salary increase, unless authorized by law. Salary increases are subject to
the approval of the President.
In essence, the mere approval of Congress of the GAA does not make the
funds automatically available for spending instantly. The funds must still be
collected during the fiscal year.
NEA also argues, from Sec 10 of EO 389, that GOCCs are exempted from
the rule. The Court rejected this argument, for only GOCCs with insufficient
funds are exempted. There is no rule that allows those with sufficient funds to
accelerate their schedule. There is no express or implied authorization.
NEA also argues that such acceleration was allowed in a Memo of the
Office of the President. However, SC pointed out that the accelerated
implementation is also allowed upon the approval of the Department of Budget
and Management, upon meeting certain terms and conditions. NEA did not
comply by seeking approval from the DBM.
The Court pointed out that NEA cannot assail the authority of the President
to issue EO 389. The Administrative Code gives the President such power.
Joint Resolution 01 has also acknowledged such authority.
On the DBM’s approval of NEA’s proposed budget

Once the proposed budget was approved by the DBM, it is submitted to
Congress for evaluation and inclusion in the appropriation law. This
authorization does not include the authority to disburse.
On the President’s control of all executive departments

Art 7, Sec 17
“The President shall have control of all the executive departments,
bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.”
The Supreme Court held that the presidential power of control over the
executive branch of government extends to all executive employees from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This power is self-executing and
does not require statutory implementation. It cannot be limited nor
withdrawn by the Congress.
All other executive officials must implement in good faith the President’s
directives and orders. The case would not have arisen had NEA complied in
good faith with the directives and orders of the President. NEA’s reasons in
disregarding the President were patently flimsy, even ill-conceived
Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000
FACTS:
● On December 27, 1997, the President of the Philippines issued AO 372.
· Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition seeking:

o to annul Section 1 of Administrative Order (AO) No. 372, insofar

as it requires local government units to reduce their expenditures
by 25 percent of their authorized regular appropriations for non-
personal services;
o and (2) to enjoin respondents from implementing Section 4 of the

Order, which withholds a portion of their internal revenue
allotments.
· Petitioner contends that the President, in issuing AO 372, was in

effect exercising the power of control over LGUs. The Constitution vests
in the President, however, only the power of general supervision over
LGUs, consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Petitioner further argues that the directive to withhold ten percent (10%) of their
IRA is in contravention of Section 286 of the Local Government Code and of
Section 6, Article X of the Constitution, providing for the automatic release to
each of these units its share in the national internal revenue.
ISSUE(S):
(1) Whether Section 1 of AO 372, insofar as it "directs" LGUs to reduce their
expenditures by 25 percent is valid exercise of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments.
(2) Whether Section 4 of the same issuance, which withholds 10 percent of their
internal revenue allotments, is valid exercise of the President's power of general
supervision over local governments.
HELD:
RATIO:
(1) Yes. Since it is only advisory/directory and not mandatory, the Court ruled
that it is within the President’s power of general supervision.
● AO 372 is merely directory and has been issued by the President

consistent with his power of supervision over local governments.
● It is intended only to advise all government agencies and instrumentalities
to undertake cost-reduction measures that will help maintain economic
stability in the country, which is facing economic difficulties.
● Besides, it does not contain any sanction in case of noncompliance.

● Being merely an advisory, therefore, Section 1 of AO 372 is well within the
powers of the President. Since it is not a mandatory imposition, the
directive cannot be characterized as an exercise of the power of control.
Section 4 of Article X of the Constitution confines the President's power over

local governments to one of general supervision. It reads as follows:
"Sec. 4. The President of the Philippines shall exercise general supervision

over local governments.
(2) No. Section 4 of AO 372 is no longer an exercise of general supervision but of

control.
● Section 4 of AO 372 cannot, however, be upheld. A basic feature of local

fiscal autonomy is the automatic release of the shares of LGUs in the
national internal revenue. This is mandated by no less than the
Constitution.
● The Local Government Code specifies further that the release shall be
made directly to the LGU concerned within five (5) days after every quarter
of the year and "shall not be subject to any lien or holdback that may be
imposed by the national government for whatever purpose."
● As a rule, the term "shall" is a word of command that must be given a
compulsory meaning.
● Section 4 of AO 372, however, orders the withholding, effective January 1,

1998, of 10 percent of the LGUs' IRA "pending the assessment and
evaluation by the Development Budget Coordinating Committee of the
emerging fiscal situation" in the country.
○ Such withholding clearly contravenes the Constitution and the law.

○ Although temporary, it is equivalent to a holdback, which means
"something held back or withheld, often temporarily."
○ Hence, the "temporary" nature of the retention by the national
government does not matter. Any retention is prohibited.
○ In sum, while Section 1 of AO 372 may be upheld as an advisory
effected in times of national crisis, Section 4 thereof has no color of
validity at all. The latter provision effectively encroaches on the fiscal

autonomy of local governments.

Consti 2nd Set

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Consti 2nd Set

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Consti 2nd Set

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

1 – Tin , 2 – Josh, 3 – Marj, 4 – Dani, 5 – Robert, 6 – Anj, 7 – Kate

CASES [Second Set]

THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT (Continuation)

The Legislative Process, Requirements & Procedure

4 Lidasan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

7 Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987

7 Guingona vs. Carague, G.R. No. 94571, April 22, 1991

3 Tan vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 109289, October 3, 1994

1 Bengzon vs. Drilon, G.R. No. 103524, April 15, 1992

1 Philconsa vs. Enriquez, G.R. No. 113105, August 19, 1994

Enrolled Bill Journey and the Journal

4 U.S. vs. Pons, G.R. No. L-11530, August 12, 1916

Salaries, Privileges and Disqualifications

5 Philconsa vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-25554, October 4, 1966

6 Ligot vs. Mathay, G.R. No. L-34676, April 30, 1974

7 People vs. Jalosjos, G.R. No. 132875-76, February 3, 2000

7 Jimenez vs. Cabangbang, G.R. No. L-15905, August 3, 1966

6 Puyat vs. De Guzman, G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982

4 Arnault vs. Nazareno, G.R. No. L-3820, July 18, 1950

3 Arnault vs. Balagtas, G.R. No. L-6749, July 30, 1955

1 Senate vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777, April 20, 2006

1 Bondoc vs. Pineda, G.R. No 97710, September 26, 1991

2 Abbas vs. SET, G.R. No. 83767, October 27, 1988

3 Pimentel vs. HRET, G.R. No. 141489, November 29, 2002

4 Daza vs. Singson, G.R. No. 86344, December 21, 1989

5 Coseteng vs. Mitra, G.R. No. 86649, July 12, 1990

6 Guingona vs. Gonzales, G.R. No. 106971, October 20, 1992

THE EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT

7 Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 152154, July 15, 2003

7 Estrada vs. Arroyo, G.R. 146738, March 2, 2001

5 De la Cruz vs. COA, G.R. No. 138489, November 29, 2001

2 Blaquera vs. Alcala, G.R. No. 109406, September 11, 1998

1 Pimentel vs. Aguirre, G.R. No. 132988, July 19, 2000

Lidasan vs. Comelec, G.R. No. L-28089, October 25, 1967

Bara Lidasan, a resident and taxpayer of the detached portion of Parang,

Issue: WON RA 7940 is unconstitutional

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. —

Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum

The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the

(2) Whether or nor the DECREE is constitutional.

We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Facts: Complainants, invoking their right as taxpayers and as residents of

congressional district for Mandaluyong is not a separate and distinct

The petition was dismissed for lack of merit.

Demetria vs. Alba, G.R. No. 71977, February 27, 1987

Petitioners, who filed the instant petition as concerned citizens of this

SECTION 44 OF THE 'BUDGET REFORM DECREE OF 1977';

"A. INFRINGES UPON THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW BY AUTHORIZING THE

"B. REPUGNANT TO THE CONSTITUTION AS IT FAILS TO SPECIFY THE

"C.ALLOWS THE PRESIDENT TO OVERRIDE THE SAFEGUARDS, FORM

"D.AMOUNTS TO AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWERS TO

"E THE THREATENED AND CONTINUING TRANSFER OF FUNDS BY THE

W/N paragraph 1 of Section 44 of Presidential-Decree No. 1177 IS

On the other hand, the constitutional provision under consideration reads as

"Sec. 16[5]. No law shall be passed authorizing any transfer of appropriations,

IN THE CASE AT BAR, Paragraph 1 of Section 44 of P.D. No. 1177 unduly

Thomas M. Cooley in his "A Treatise on the Constitutional Limitations," Vol. I,