Republic of The Philippines Supreme Court Manila: Petitioners, - Versus

Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 178501

FRANCISCO T. ALISANGCO,
BENJAMIN T. ANG, VICENTE P.
ANG, SILVESTRE D. ARROYO,
RUDERICO C. BAQUIRAN,
WILFREDO S. CRUZ, EDMUNDO
M. DELOS REYES, JR.,
VIRGILIO V. ECARMA, ISMAEL
F. GALISIM, TITO F. GARCIA,
LIBERATO D. GUTIZA, GLADYS
L. JADIE, LUISITO M. JOSE,
PATERNO C. LABUGA, JR.
NOEL Y. LASTIMOSO, DANILO
C. MATIAS, BEN T. MATURAN,
VIRGILIO N. OCHARAN,
GABRIEL P. PIAMONTE, JR.,
ARTURO A. SABADO, MANUEL
P. SANCHEZ, MARGOT A.
CORPUS as the surviving spouse of
the deceased ARNOLD S. CORPUS,
and ESTHER VICTORIA A.
ALCAÑESES as the surviving
spouse of the deceased EFREN S.
ALCAÑESES,
Petitioners,
- versus -
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,

AND NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS COMMISSION,
Respondents.
x------------------------x
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., G.R. No. 178510
Petitioner,
- versus -
NILO S. RODRIGUEZ,
FRANCISCO T. ALISANGCO,
"·
DECISION 2 G.R. Nos. 178501 &

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·· · · . R.un:ERito c. BAQUIRAN,
"ARNOI;D *•· S. CORPUS,
WILFREDO S. CRUZ, EDMUNDO
M. DELOS REYES, JR.,
VIRGILIO V. ECARMA, ISMAEL
F. GALISIM, TITO F. GARCIA,
LIBERATO D. GUTIZA, GLADYS
L. JADIE, LUISITO M. JOSE,
PATERNO C. LABUGA, JR., Present:
NOEL Y. LASTIMOSO, DANILO
C. MATIAS, BEN T. MATURAN, SERENO, CJ,
VIRGILIO N. OCHARAN, Chairperson,
GABRIEL M. PIAMONTE, JR., LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,
RODOLFO 0. POE, JR., ARTURO BERSAMIN,
A. SABADO, MANUEL P. PEREZ, and
SANCHEZ, and ESTHER PERLAS-BERNABE, JJ.
VICTORIA A. ALCANESES, as the
Sole Heir of the Deceased EFREN S. Promulgated:
ALCANESES, = 1 201
Respondents. JAN 1 6 __,-
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - -x
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on

Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision 1 dated November 30, 2006 and Resolution dated June 8, 2007 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71190.
The petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 are 24 former pilots of Philippine

Airlines, Inc. (PAL), namely, Nilo S. Rodriguez (Rodriguez), Francisco T.
Alisangco (Alisangco ), Benjamin T. Ang, Vicente P. Ang, Silvestre D.
Arroyo (Arroyo), Ruderico C. Baquiran (Baquiran), Wilfredo S. Cruz,
Edmundo M. Delos Reyes, Jr. (Delos Reyes), Virgilio V. Ecarma (Ecanna),
Ismael F. Galisim (Galisim), Tito F. Garcia (Garcia), Liberato D. Gutiza
(Gutiza), Gladys L. Jadie (Jadie), Luisito M. Jose (Jose), Paterno C. Labuga,
Jr. (Labuga), Noel Y. Lastimoso (Lastimoso), Danilo C. Matias (Matias),
Additional member per Special Order No. 2188 dated September 16, 2015.
Rollo (G.R. No. 178501), pp. 80-110 and rollo (G.R. No. 178510), pp. 68-98; penned by
Associate Justice Edgardo F. Sundiam with Associate Justices Rodrigo V. Cosico and Celia C.
Librea-Leagogo, concurring.
~
178510
Ben T. Maturan (Maturan), Virgilio N. Ocharan (Ocharan), Gabriel M.

Piamonte, Jr. (Piamonte), Arturo A. Sabado (Sabado), Manuel P. Sanchez
(Sanchez), Margot A. Corpus as the surviving spouse of the deceased Arnold
S. Corpus (Corpus), and Esther Victoria A. Alcañeses as the surviving
spouse of the deceased Efren S. Alcañeses (Alcañeses), hereinafter
collectively referred to as Rodriguez, et al., deemed by PAL to have lost
their employment status for taking part in the illegal strike in June 1998.
The petitioner in G.R. No. 178510 is PAL, a domestic corporation

organized and existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines,
operating as a common carrier transporting passengers and cargo through
aircraft. PAL named Rodriguez, et al. and Rodolfo O. Poe (Poe) as
respondents in its Petition.
In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the

Decision dated November 6, 2001 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC NCR CA No. 027348-01 which declared the
loss of employment of Rodriguez, et al. (except for Jadie) to be in
accordance with law; and (2) reinstated the Decision dated December 11,
2000 of the Labor Arbiter in NLRC NCR Case No. 00-06-06290-99 which
held PAL liable for the illegal dismissal of Rodriguez, et al. but with the
modifications directing PAL to pay the pilots their separation pay in lieu of
reinstatement and deleting the awards for moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees.
Rodriguez, et al., pray that the Court partially reverse the judgment of
the Court of Appeals by ordering their reinstatement with backwages and
restoring the awards for moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees;
while PAL petitions that the same judgment be completely annulled and set
aside.
The relevant facts of the case are as follows:
On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the

Philippines (ALPAP) filed with the National Conciliation and Mediation
Board (NCMB) a Notice of Strike, docketed as NCMB NCR NS 12-514-97
(Strike Case), on the grounds of unfair labor practice and union-busting by
PAL.2
By virtue of the authority vested upon him under Article 263(g)3 of

the Labor Code of the Philippines (Labor Code), the Secretary4 of the
2
Rollo (G.R. No. 178510), p. 177.
3
Art. 263. Strikes, picketing, and lockouts. – x x x (g) When, in his opinion, there exists a labor
dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national
interest, the Secretary of Labor and Employment may assume jurisdiction over the dispute and
178510
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over

the Strike Case, and issued an Order5 on December 23, 1997 prohibiting all
actual and impending strikes and lockouts. On May 25, 1998, the DOLE
Secretary issued another Order6 reiterating the prohibition against strikes and
lockouts.
Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP

filed a second Notice of Strike on June 5, 1998 and staged a strike on the
same day at around 5:30 in the afternoon. The DOLE Secretary immediately
called PAL and ALPAP for conciliation conferences on June 6 and 7, 1998
to amicably settle the dispute between them.7 After his efforts failed, the
DOLE Secretary issued an Order8 on June 7, 1998 (Return-to-Work Order)
with the following directive:
WHEREFORE, FOEGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, all

striking officers and members of ALPAP are hereby ordered to return to
work within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt of this Order and for PAL
management to accept them under the same terms and conditions of
employment prior to the strike.
Our directive to both parties to cease and desist from committing

any and all acts that will exacerbate the situation is hereby reiterated.9
On June 26, 1998, the members of ALPAP reported for work but PAL
did not accept them on the ground that the 24-hour period for the strikers to
return set by the DOLE Secretary in his Return-to-Work Order had already
lapsed, resulting in the forfeiture of their employment.
Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on June 29, 1998 a

Complaint10 for illegal lockout against PAL, docketed as NLRC NCR Case
No. 00-06-05253-98 (Illegal Lockout Case). ALPAP averred that after its
counsel received the Return-to-Work Order on June 25, 1998, its members
reported back to work on June 26, 1998 in compliance with the 24-hour
period set in the said Order. ALPAP prayed that PAL be ordered to
decide it or certify the same to the Commission for compulsory arbitration. Such assumption or
certification shall have the effect of automatically enjoining the intended or impending strike or
lockout as specified in the assumption or certification order. If one has already taken place at the
time of assumption or certification, all striking or locked out employees shall immediately return
to work and the employer shall immediately resume operations and readmit all workers under the
same terms and conditions prevailing before the strike or lockout. The Secretary of Labor and
Employment or the Commission may seek the assistance of law enforcement agencies to ensure
compliance with this provision as well as with such orders as he may issue to enforce the same.
4
Leonardo A. Quisumbing.
5
Rollo (G.R. No. 178510), pp. 152-154.
6
Id. at 159-160. Issued by former DOLE Secretary Cresenciano B. Trajano.
7
Id. at 178.
8
Id. at 175-176.
9
Id. at 176.
10
Id. at 209-212.
178510
unconditionally accept its members back to work and pay the salaries and
other benefits due them. On August 21, 1998, the Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter ordered the consolidation of the Illegal Lockout Case with the Strike
Case pending before the DOLE Secretary.11
The DOLE Secretary12 issued a Resolution13 on June 1, 1999 in the

consolidated Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases, with a dispositive portion that
reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby:
xxxx
b. DECLARES the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998

and thereafter illegal for being procedurally infirm and in open
defiance of the return-to-work order of June 7, 1998 and
consequently, the strikers are deemed to have lost their
employment status; and
c. DISMISSES the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of

merit.14
ALPAP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the

DOLE Secretary in a Resolution dated July 23, 1999.15
ALPAP assailed the foregoing Resolutions dated June 1, 1999 and

July 23, 1999 of the DOLE Secretary in the consolidated Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases in a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised
Rules of Court filed before the Court of Appeals and docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 54880. The appellate court dismissed said Petition in a Decision16
dated August 22, 2001. ALPAP elevated the case to this Court by filing a
Petition for Certiorari, bearing the title “Airline Pilots Association of the
Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc.” docketed as G.R. No. 152306 (1st
ALPAP case). The Court dismissed the Petition of ALPAP in a minute
Resolution17 dated April 10, 2002 for failure of ALPAP to show grave abuse
of discretion on the part of the appellate court. Said Resolution dismissing
the 1st ALPAP case became final and executory on August 29, 2002.18
11
Id. at 213-218. Order dated August 21, 1998. The Order was affirmed by the NLRC in a
Resolution dated January 18, 1999 (id. at 219-231). ALPAP filed an Urgent Petition for Injunction
to prevent the consolidation but it was denied by the NLRC in a Resolution dated August 26, 1998
(id. at 236-254). The NLRC Resolution was later affirmed by the Supreme Court in a Resolution
dated September 21, 1998 (id. at 255-257).
12
Bienvenido E. Laguesma.
13
Rollo (G.R. No. 178510), pp. 258-264.
14
Id. at 264.
15
Id. at 265-267.
16
Id. at 269-283.
17
Id. at 285.
18
Id. at 287. Entry of Judgment.
178510
Meanwhile, 32 ALPAP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al., Poe,

Nino B. Dela Cruz (Dela Cruz), Baltazar B. Musong (Musong), Elmer F.
Peña (Peña), Cesar G. Cruz, Antonio O. Noble, Jr. (Noble), Nicomen H.
Versoza, Jr. (Versoza), and Ryan Jose C. Hinayon (Hinayon), hereinafter
collectively referred to as complainants – with varying ranks of captain, first
officer, and second officer19 – filed with the NLRC on June 7, 1999 a
Complaint20 for illegal dismissal against PAL, docketed as NLRC-NCR
Case No. 00-06-06290-99 (Illegal Dismissal Case). The Complaint stated
three causes of action, to wit:
CAUSES OF ACTION
A. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL in that [PAL] terminated the

employment of the above-named complainants on 7 June 1998 (except for
complainant Liberato D. Gutiza, who was dismissed on 6 June 1998) for
their alleged participation in a strike staged by ALPAP at the Philippine
Airlines, Inc. commencing on 5 June 1998 when in truth and in fact:
(i) Complainants EFREN S. ALCAÑESES,

VICENTE P. ANG, BENJAMIN T. ANG, SILVESTRE D.
ARROYO, LIBERATO D. GUTIZA, LUISITO M. JOSE,
DANILO C. MATIAS, GABRIEL M. PIAMONTE, JR.,
MANUEL P. SANCHEZ, and NICOMEN H. VERSOZA,
JR. actually reported for work and duly discharged all
their duties and responsibilities as pilots by flying their
assigned equipment and completing their respective flights
to their specified destinations, as scheduled;
(ii) Complainants GLADYS L. JADIE and BEN

T. MATURAN, having been on duly approved and
scheduled medical leaves, were authorized and permitted
to absent themselves from work on 5 June 1998 up to the
termination of their employment on 7 June 1998,
complainant JADIE being then on maternity leave and
grounded as she was already in her ninth month of
pregnancy, while complainant MATURAN was
recuperating from a laparotomy and similarly medically
grounded until 15 June 1998;
(iii) Complainants EDMUNDO M. DELOS

REYES, JR., BALTAZAR B. MUSONG, ANTONIO O.
19
The 21 captains are: Nilo S. Rodriguez, Efren S. Alcañeses, Francisco T. Alisangco, Benjamin T.
Ang, Ruderico C. Baquiran, Arnold S. Corpus, Nino B. Dela Cruz, Virgilio V. Ecarma. Ismael F.
Galisim, Tito F. Garcia, Gladys L. Jadie, Paterno C. Labuga, Jr., Noel Y. Lastimoso, Danilo C.
Matias, Ben T. Maturan, Baltazar B. Musong, Virgilio N. Ocharan, Elmer F. Peña, Rodolfo O.
Poe, Arturo A. Sabado and Manuel P. Sanchez. The nine first officers are: Vicente P. Ang,
Silvestre D. Arroyo, Cesar G. Cruz, Wilfredo S. Cruz, Edmundo M. delos Reyes, Jr., Liberato D.
Gutiza, Luisito M. Jose, Antonio O. Noble, Jr. and Nicomen H. Versoza, Jr.; and the two second
officers are: Ryan Jose C. Hinayon and Gabriel M. Piamonte, Jr.
20
CA rollo, pp. 122-133.
178510
NOBLE, JR., ELMER F. PEÑA, and ARTURO A.

SABADO were not required to work and were legally
excused from work on 5 June 1998 up to the termination of
their employment on 7 June 1998 as they were on their
annual vacation leaves as approved and pre-scheduled by
[PAL] as early as December 1997 conformably with
Company policy and practice on vacation leave scheduling;
(iv) Complainants NILO S. RODRIGUEZ,

RUDERICO C. BAQUIRAN, ARNOLD S. CORPUS,
CESAR G. CRUZ, WILFREDO S. CRUZ, NINO B.
DELA CRUZ, VIRGILIO V. ECARMA, ISMAEL F.
GALISIM, TITO F. GARCIA, RYAN JOSE C.
HINAYON, PATERNO C. LABUGA, JR., NOEL Y.
LASTIMOSO, RODOLFO O. POE and VIRGILIO N.
OCHARAN were likewise not required to work and were
legally excused from work on 5 June 1998 up to the
termination of their employment on 7 June 1998 as they
were off duty and did not have any scheduled flights
based on the June 1998 monthly flights schedules issued to
them by [PAL] in May 1998; and
(v) Complainant FRANCISCO T.

ALISANGCO was serving a seven-day suspension and,
thus, not required to work from 4 June 1998 to 10 June
1998 under Memorandum of Suspension, dated 5 May
1998.
negating that there was any stoppage of work or refusal to return to work
on the part of the above-named complainants, as was made the basis of the
termination of their employment by [PAL] on 7 June 1998 (6 June 1998
for complainant Gutiza), due solely to their union affiliation and
membership.
FURTHER, [PAL] denied the above-named complainants due

process in the termination of their employment in that it failed to notify
them in writing of the charges against them, did not give them any
opportunity to be heard and to explain their side at an administrative
investigation, and to date, has not served them with any formal notice of
the termination of their employment and the cause or causes therefor.
THUS, [PAL] summarily effected the dismissal of the above-

named complainants without just or lawful cause.
B. NON-PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS
1. Basic or guaranteed pay

2. Productivity pay
3. Transportation allowance
4. Rice subsidy
5. Retirement Fund
6. Pilots Occupational Disability Fund
178510
7. Vacation leave
8. Sick leave
9. Unutilized days off
10. Trip leave
11. Trip passes
C. DAMAGES
1. Actual Damages
2. Moral Damages
3. Exemplary Damages
4. Attorney’s Fees
5. Cost of Suit.21
Complainants alleged that they were not participants of the June 5,

1998 strike of ALPAP and that they had no obligation to comply with the
Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary. The respective allegations of
the complainants are summed up below:
COMPLAINANT ALLEGATION/S
Alcañeses He was the scheduled instructor of the simulator sessions on

June 5, 8 & 9, 1998. However, the sessions were canceled due
to the breakdown of the 737 simulator. He was assigned on
home reserve duty on June 6, 1998 and had a day-off on June 7,
1998.
Alisangco He was serving a seven-day suspension from June 4 to 10,

1998.
Benjamin T. Ang He flew Flight No. PR-722 from Manila to London and was
supposed to embark on a return trip from London to Manila on
June 7, 1998. However, no aircraft arrived due to the strike. He
arrived in Manila on June 13, 1998.
Vicente P. Ang He was the First Officer in Flight No. PR-105 from San
Francisco, which arrived in Manila on June 6, 1998. He
immediately went to his hometown in Cebu City for his
scheduled days-off until June 11, 1998, and thereafter on annual
vacation leave until July 2, 1998.
Arroyo He left Manila and flew to Europe, arriving there on June 5,

1998. He was stranded in Paris since no PAL aircraft arrived.
He flew back to Manila on June 13, 1998.
Baquiran He arrived in Manila from Los Angeles on June 4, 1998, and

was off-duty until June 7, 1998. His next flight assignment was
on June 8, 1998. He called PAL Dispatch Office on June 7,
1998 to confirm his flight but was advised that his flight was
21
Id. at 130-131.
178510
canceled and that he was already dismissed.
Corpus He arrived in Manila from Vancouver on May 30, 1998, and

was off-duty until June 10, 1998. His next assignment was on
June 11, 1998.
Cesar G. Cruz He arrived in Manila from Riyadh on June 5, 1998, and was
off-duty until June 9, 1998. His next flight assignment was on
June 10, 1998.
Wilfredo S. Cruz He arrived from Honolulu on June 4, 1998, and was off-duty
until June 8, 1998. He reported for his next assignment on June
9, 1998 but was unable to enter as Gate I of PAL compound
was locked.
Dela Cruz He arrived in Manila from Los Angeles on June 5, 1998, and
was off-duty until June 12, 1998. His next assignment was on
June 13, 1998.
Delos Reyes He was on leave from May 26, 1998 to June 26, 1998.
Ecarma After attending ground school at PAL Training Center on June

4, 1998, he was on scheduled off-duty until June 17, 1998. His
passport was in the custody of PAL as it was scheduled for
processing from June 6, 1998 to June 13, 1998. His next flight
assignment was on June 18, 1998.
Galisim He underwent training in Toulouse, France from April 1998 to

May 22, 1998. He was waiting for his schedule from PAL.
Garcia He was on leave from May 25, 1998 to June 10, 1998.
Gutiza He was the Flight Officer of Flight No. PR-100 bound for
Honolulu. Upon arriving back in Manila on June 7, 1998, he
was told that he was already terminated.
Hinayon He arrived in Manila from Bangkok on June 5, 1998, and was

off-duty until June 10, 1998. His next flight assignment was on
June 11, 1998.
Jadie She was on maternity leave from June 5, 1998. She gave birth
on June 24, 1998.
Jose He flew from Honolulu and arrived in Manila on June 7, 1998.

He was on scheduled day-off on June 8, 1998, and was on home
reserve duty from June 9 to 12, 1998.
Labuga He arrived in Manila from Dhadran on June 4, 1998, and was

off-duty until June 10, 1998.
Lastimoso He arrived in Manila on June 4, 1998 on Flight No. PR-298,

178510
and was off-duty until June 9, 1998. His next flight assignment
was on June 10, 1998.
Matias He commanded the flight from Manila to San Francisco, which

arrived on June 4, 1998. He left San Francisco the following
day or on June 5, 1998 and arrived in Manila on June 6, 1998.
He was on scheduled days-off from June 7 to 11, 1998. His next
flight assignment was on June 12, 1998.
Maturan He was on sick leave from June 5-15, 1998 to undergo a

medical operation called laparotomy.
Musong He was on leave from May 22, 1998 to June 11, 1998.
Noble He was on leave from May 22, 1998 to June 11, 1998.
Ocharan He arrived in Manila from Honolulu in May 1998, and was off-
duty until June 11, 1998. His next flight assignment was on
June 12, 1998.
Piamonte He arrived from Honolulu on June 6, 1998 and was on

scheduled days-off until next flight on June 10, 1998. He
reported on June 9, 1998 for said flight but could not enter the
PAL compound.
Peña He was on leave from June 5, 1998 to June 28, 1998.
Poe He completed a ground course for the Airbus-320 captaincy in

May 1998, and was waiting for his schedule from PAL.
Rodriguez He arrived in Manila from San Francisco on June 2, 1998. He

was on scheduled days-off and/or off-duty until June 12, 1998.
His next flight assignment was on June 13, 1998.
Sabado He was on leave from May 21, 1998 to June 11, 1998.
Sanchez He arrived from Los Angeles in Manila on June 6, 1998, and

was directed to leave the airport premises immediately. He was
prevented from retrieving his car inside the employees’ parking
area. He had no scheduled flights until June 15, 1998.
Versoza He was on duty on June 5, 1998 as he flew from Paris to

Bangkok arriving there on June 6, 1998. He flew back to
Manila on June 7, 1998 and had no scheduled flights until June
10, 1998.
PAL terminated complainants from employment together with the

strikers who disobeyed the Return-to-Work Order, even though
complainants had valid reasons for not reporting for work.
178510
Complainants, except for Gutiza,22 further asserted that PAL did not
observe the twin requirements of notice and hearing in effecting their
termination; that PAL refused to admit them when they reported for work on
June 26, 1998; and that PAL, which long planned to reduce its fleet and
manpower, took advantage of the strike by dismissing its pilots en masse.
Complainants thus prayed for reinstatement to their former positions without
loss of seniority rights; backwages and other monetary claims; and moral
and exemplary damages, and attorney’s fees.
In its Motion to Dismiss and/or Position Paper for Respondent,23 PAL

averred that the Complaint for illegal dismissal is an offshoot of the Strike
and Illegal Lockout Cases wherein the DOLE Secretary already adjudged
with finality that the striking pilots lost their employment for participating in
an illegal strike and/or disobeying the Return-to-Work Order. Hence, PAL
argued that the Complaint was already barred by res judicata.
In addition, PAL presented the following evidence to refute

complainants’ allegation that they were not strikers: (a) the logbook showing
that complainants belatedly complied with the Return-to-Work Order on
June 26, 1998; and (b) the photographs showing that some of complainants
were at the strike area or picket line, particularly: Maturan, who was
supposed to be on sick leave from June 1 to 15, 1998 but was seen picketing
on June 9, 1998; Delos Reyes, Musong, Noble, Sabado, and Peña, who were
supposed to be on vacation leave but were seen in the strike area24 and who
did not report back for work after their respective vacation leaves ended;
Rodriguez, Baquiran, Corpus, Cesar G. Cruz, Wilfredo S. Cruz, De La Cruz,
Ecarma, Galisim, Garcia, Hinayon, Labuga, Lastimosa, Poe, and Ocharan,
who were off-duty but participated in the strike against PAL; and Alcañeses,
Benjamin T. Ang, Vicente P. Ang, Arroyo, Gutiza, Jose, Matias, Piamonte,
Sanchez, and Versoza who, after returning from abroad and completing their
respective flights, joined the strike instead of offering their services to PAL
who was in dire need of pilots at that time. As regards Jadie, PAL contended
that she forfeited her employment by failing to report for work at the end of
her maternity leave.
Labor Arbiter Francisco A. Robles (Robles) rendered a Decision25 on

December 11, 2000. According to Labor Arbiter Robles, the Illegal
Dismissal Case may proceed independently from the Strike and Illegal
Lockout Cases:
22
Id. at 149. Gutiza, an ALPAP union officer, received a notice of termination dated June 5, 1998.
23
Id. at 197-214.
24
Except for Peña.
25
Rollo (G.R. No. 178501), pp. 155-208.
178510
On the threshold issue of jurisdiction, it is unfortunately a lost

cause for [PAL] to argue that the instant case involves a dispute already
assumed and decided by the Secretary of Labor in NCMB-NCR-NS-12-
514-97 and its related cases. The strike case resolved by the Labor
Secretary is not more and no less than that - a strike case wherein the
validity of ALPAP’s declared mass action on June 5, 1998 is at issue. In
contrast, going by the allegations of the complaint in the instant case, the
cause of action pleaded by complainants against [PAL] are for illegal
dismissal, non-payment of salaries and benefits, and damages, based
precisely on the pivotal fact alleged by complainants that they are not
“strikers” in the eyes of the law and yet had been inexplicably slapped
with termination of their employment along with the strikers. Not one of
the consolidated cases NCMB-NCR-NS-12-514-97, NCMB-NCR-NS-06-
236-98 NLRC-NCR-No. 00-06-05235-98 shall resolve or has already
resolved the instant termination dispute.
We note that this case has not been ordered consolidated with the
strike case, nor has [PAL] at anytime asked for such consolidation. The
June 1, 1999 Resolution of the Secretary of Labor in NCMB-NCR-NS-12-
514-97, cited by [PAL] as having a binding effect on complainants do not
mention the[m] at all, or purport to treat of their peculiar case of being
non-strikers dismissed as strikers. We cannot therefore subscribe to the
view advanced by [PAL] that this is a dispute already assumed by the
Secretary of Labor and decided by him with the affirmance of the strikers’
loss of employment in his June 1, 1999 Resolution in NCMB-NCR-NS-
12-514-97. Complainants should be given their day in court with respect
to their claims herein as there is simply no basis for assuming that the
same have already been resolved in the strike case.
It is well-settled that as an element of res judicata, there must be

between the first and second action identity of parties, identity of subject
matter and identity of causes of action. (Linzag vs. Court of Appeals, 291
SCRA 304; Nabus vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 91670, February 7,
1991, 193 SCRA 732; VDA Fish Broker, et al. vs. NLRC, et al., G.R. Nos.
76142-43, December 27, 1993). The parties, subject matter and causes of
action involved in this case are so vastly different from those in NCMB-
NCR-NS-12-514-97 etc. that it is difficult if not virtually impossible to
conceive how the resolution of such strike case can constitute res judicata
in the case of complainants herein. This Office therefore cannot but
exercise the jurisdiction duly invoked by complainants over this
termination dispute with the filing of their complaint.26
Labor Arbiter Robles then proceeded to resolve the merits of the case
in complainants’ favor:
Turning now to the merits of the case, [PAL] has not rebutted and
even admits that complainants’ status and individual circumstances at or
about the time of the strike declared on June 5, 1998 are essentially as
stated by them in their complaint (i.e., that complainants were working or
were on leave of absence, day-off, etc.) and related in further detail in their
26
Id. at 168-170.
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submitted individual sworn statements in the case. Since complainants

were concededly working or otherwise excused from work at the time of
the strike, their employment with [PAL] should not have been prejudiced
or affected in any way at all by its occurrence. Yet [PAL] implemented the
mass dismissal of close to 600 pilots, including complainants, without
distinction as to their guilt or innocence of “striking”.
A strike, by definition, is a temporary stoppage of work by the

concerted action of employees as a result of an industrial or labor dispute
(Art. 212 (o) of the Labor Code). It is incongruous to accuse an employee
who was actually working or was excused from work of “stoppage” of the
work he was precisely carrying out or was not required to perform. [PAL]
should have made these distinctions between the pilots who staged the
strike and those peculiarly situated as complainants (working or excused
from work) before taking action against its employees for the June 5, 1998
strike, instead of dismissing them in a sweepingly reckless, arbitrary, and
oppressive manner.
Indeed, on the basis of [PAL]’s Return-to-Work Notice and the

DOLE Return-to-Work Order, loss of employment in connection with the
strike was a consequence to be faced only by “PAL pilots who joined the
strike” and “all striking officers and members and officers (sic) of
ALPAP”, to whom the warning notices had expressly been issued. It
should not have been made to apply to complainants, who were working
or were not at all supposed to be working at the time of the strike, and
therefore had every reason to believe that the issuances addressed to
“strikers” do not refer to them. For the same reason, it does not make any
sense to consider complainants as having “defied” the return-to-work
mandate in failing to beat the deadline prescribed for the strikers.
Precisely, complainants were not strikers.
[PAL] asserts that it “called” on its reserve pilots including

complainants to man its flights when the strike was declared and in any
case complainants should have “offered” their services at that time
because it was in dire need of pilots. However, not a single piece of
evidence was ever presented by [PAL] to prove that it sent out any rush
dispatch messages to complainants, or even made a telephone call, to
upgrade them to active duty or recall them from their leave of
absences/days-off/suspension on the ground that their services were
urgently needed. It being the responsibility of [PAL] under the CBA to
draw up the pilots’ monthly schedule and deploy them on flight
assignments, it did not have to wait for complainants to volunteer manning
PAL flights. [PAL] had the prerogative to change complainants’ flight
schedules in accordance with the CBA. It did not exercise this prerogative.
It cannot now blame complainants for the consequences of its own
inaction.
As for [PAL]’s contention that the photographs taken of

complainants at the picket line proves their being “strikers”, the pictures
do not show that those who admittedly were working at the time of the
strike were in fact among the picketers at the Company premises and not
on the PAL flights that they claim to have crewed for. In any case, [PAL]
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does not take issue with the working status of the complainants who had
flights on or about June 5, 1998; only that complainants did not report for
work thereafter. On the other hand, the rest of the complainants were
excused from work. Their “free time” would be meaningless if they were
not at liberty to man the picket line while off-duty without fear of adverse
consequences from their lawful exercise of their guaranteed rights. It is to
be stressed that complainants have sufficiently shown by their
uncontradicted evidence that they were working or were excused from
work during the material period of the strike until their dismissal. Without
more, the unexplained pictures of the complainants at the picket line (most
of which were taken long after June 9, 1998) cannot be said to constitute a
proven case of “striking.”
We further find pertinent the cited cases of Bangalisan vs. Court of

Appeals (276 SCRA 619) and Dela Cruz vs. Court of Appeals (305 SCRA
303) to the effect that an alleged “striker” who was excused from work
during a strike staged by his co-workers cannot be penalized with the loss
of his employment as a striker in the absence of his actual participation in
the strike since those who avail of their free time “to dramatize their
grievances and to dialogue with the proper authorities within the bounds
of the law” cannot be held liable for their participation in the mass action
against their employer, this being a valid exercise of their constitutionally
guaranteed rights. Picketers are not necessarily strikers. If complainants
had manned the picket lines at some time during their off-duty, it was their
right to do so. They cannot be accused of stoppage of work if they do.
As correctly pointed out by complainants, [PAL] certainly had the

records to verify if complainants were in fact striking, working, or off-
duty as of June 5, 1998. Despite this, it precipitately ousted complainants
from their employment in a mass purging of about 600 pilots as strikers.
Significantly, [PAL] had made no attempt to rebut complainants’ evidence
(consisting of sworn statements of witnesses and documentary exhibits)
tending to show that:
1. Management’s declared intention since 1997 was to

retrench/retire about 200 pilots and drastically
downscale operations because of alleged business
losses, but its restructuring program gained no
ground despite the passage of several months
because ALPAP was staunchly opposed to it and in
the meantime, [PAL] continued “bleeding’;
2. A PAL management pilot, Capt. Emmanuel

Generoso, disclosed to several ALPAP pilots that a
strike by ALPAP would be a welcome development
as it would make management’s job of ridding the
company pilots easier;
3. The instant ALPAP declared the strike,

complainants ceased receiving their salaries,
allowances, and benefits which fell due, as though
[PAL] had merely been waiting for the strike to
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happen and, this done, it considered the pilots’

termination as effected ipso facto. Complainants
were not furnished any written notice requiring
them to show cause why they should not be
dismissed from employment for any offense; nor
were they given written notices of termination
(except for complainant Liberato Gutiza who
received a termination letter with the effectivity
date of June 6, 1998 after being made to crew Flight
No. PR-100 which arrived in Manila from Honolulu
on June 7, 1998);
4. Confirming the veracity of several press statements

made by [PAL] on its mass dismissal of about 600
pilots by June 7, 1998, when some of the
complainants thereafter called PAL Flight Deck
Crew Scheduling to check on their next scheduled
flights, they were informed that they were
terminated employees and no longer had any flight
assignments, and would furthermore be barred from
entering the Gate to [PAL] offices;
5. Complainants were given employment application

forms to accomplish and submit if they were to
resume their work as PAL pilots; and
6. [PAL] considered its dismissal of almost 600 pilots,

including complainants, as “reaffirmed” under the
DOLE Return-to-Work Order as of June 9, 1998 or
upon the lapse of the 24-hour deadline fixed therein.
It immediately downscaled its flight operations on
the basis of a 44-man pilot complement, shutting
down several stations in the process.
The foregoing facts, which stand in the record unrebutted by

countervailing evidence from [PAL], all too clearly reveal management’s
prior decision and firm resolve to dismiss its pilots at the first opportunity,
which it found in the June 5, 1998 strike. Of course, complainants’ case
presented an unexpected complication since they cannot be lumped
together with the strikers given their circumstances at the time of the
strike. [PAL] however took its chances, it dismissed them anyway and is
now straining in vain to rationalize complainants’ termination as
“strikers”. The facts present a classical case of dismissal in bad faith.
Complainants never had a chance to hold on to their employment since
[PAL] was hell-bent from the start on the mass dismissal of its pilots
regardless of the existence of actual and valid grounds to terminate their
employment. It should be made to face the consequences thereof.27
Ultimately, Labor Arbiter Robles adjudicated:
27
Id. at 170-178.
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IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered:
(a) Finding the dismissal of complainants to be illegal;
(b) Ordering [PAL] to reinstate complainants to their former

positions without loss of seniority rights, privileges and benefits;
(c) Ordering [PAL] to pay complainants their full backwages

from June 9, 1998 up to date of reinstatement, x x x.
xxxx
and in addition, (i) longevity pay at P500.00/month for every year of

service based on seniority date falling after June 9, 1998; (ii) Christmas
bonus for 1998 and 1999 per the CBA; (iii) complainants’ proportionate
share in the P5 million contribution of [PAL] to the Retirement Fund, and
(iv) cash equivalent of vacation leave and sick leave which complainants
earned from June 9, 1998 until reinstatement based on the CBA scheduled
(sic).
(d) Ordering [PAL] to pay moral damages to complainants in

the amount of P300,000.00 each;
(e) Ordering [PAL] to pay exemplary damages to complainants

in the amount of P200,000.00 each;
(f) Ordering [PAL] to pay complainants on their money claims

for unpaid salaries for the period June 1-8, 1998, and productivity
allowance, transportation allowance, and rice subsidy for May 1998 and
June 1-8, 1998; and
(g) Ordering [PAL] to pay complainants attorney’s fees in an

amount equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.28
PAL appealed before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR CA No.

027348-01. In its Decision dated November 6, 2001, the NLRC reversed
Labor Arbiter Robles’ Decision.
On the jurisdictional and procedural matters, the NLRC found that:

(a) The on-going receivership proceedings before the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) involving PAL had no effect on the
jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC over the Illegal Dismissal
Case; (b) The Illegal Dismissal Case was not barred by res judicata despite
the prior ruling of the DOLE Secretary in the Strike Case because the latter
did not resolve the particular cause of action asserted by the complainants in
the former; and (c) The issue on forum shopping was rendered moot by the
finding of the NLRC on the absence of res judicata.
28
Id. at 202-208.
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The NLRC next addressed the substantive issue of whether or not

complainants were illegally dismissed. The NLRC ruled in the negative for
all the complainants except Jadie. According to the NLRC, the strike was
not a one-day affair. It started on June 5, 1998 and lasted until the later part
of June 1998. Complainants’ assertion that they were not strikers was
controverted by the photographs submitted as evidence by PAL showing that
several complainants were at the strike area on June 9, 1998, some even
holding a streamer saying: “WE ARE ON STRIKE.” The NLRC gave
weight to the finding of the DOLE Secretary, affirmed by the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880, that ALPAP was served a copy of the
Return-to-Work Order on June 8, 1998, thus, the ALPAP strikers had 24
hours, or until June 9, 1998, to comply with said Order. However, based on
the logbook, the complainants only reported back to work on June 26, 1998.
As a result of their defiance of the DOLE Secretary’s Return-to-Work Order,
complainants lost their employment status as of June 9, 1998. Even if
complainants were supposedly on official leave or off-duty during the strike,
records revealed that their official leave or off-duty status had expired at
least two weeks before June 26, 1998. The logbook establishing that
complainants reported for work only on June 26, 1998 must prevail over the
complainants’ unsupported allegations that they called PAL offices upon the
expiration of their respective leaves or days off to verify the status of their
flights. The NLRC additionally pointed out that complainants, while
claiming they were not strikers, reported back for work in compliance with
the DOLE Secretary’s Return-to-Work Order, their signatures appearing in
the logbook pages under the captions: “RETURN-TO-WORK
RETURNEES,” “RETURN-TO-WORK COMPLIANCE,” and “RETURN-
TO-WORK DOLE COMPLIANCE.”
In the case of Gutiza, the NLRC held that he was dismissed for being
a union officer who knowingly participated in the illegal strike.29 The NLRC
also particularly noted that while other complainants belatedly reported for
work on June 26, 1998 together with the other ALPAP pilots, Baquiran did
not ever attempt to comply with the Return-to-Work Order, and was
declared to have simply abandoned his job.30 The NLRC only spared Jadie,
there being no evidence that she participated in the illegal strike. Jadie was
on leave being in her ninth month of pregnancy at the time of the strike,
actually giving birth on June 24, 1998. The NLRC opined that given her
circumstances, it was impossible for Jadie to comply with the Return-to-
Work Order, hence, she was illegally dismissed on June 9, 1998.31
However, Jadie could no longer be reinstated. Jadie’s former position as
Captain of the F-50 aircraft no longer existed as said aircraft was returned to
the lessors in accordance with the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation
29
Id. at 146.
30
Id. at 150.
31
Id. at 151.
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Plan of PAL. Also, per the certification of the Air Transportation Office
(ATO), Jadie’s license already expired in 1998. Consequently, the NLRC
directed PAL to pay Jadie backwages and separation pay, instead of
reinstatement.
The dispositive portion of the NLRC Decision dated November 6,

2001 reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hold that the following

complainants lost their employment status with respondent PAL for cause
and in accordance with law: Arnold S. Corpus, Cesar G. Cruz, Liberato D.
Gutiza, Luisito M. Jose, Paterno C. Labuga, Jr., Baltazar B. Musong,
Arturo A. Sabado, Jr., Nilo S. Rodriguez, Edmundo delos Reyes, Jr., Tito
F. Garcia, Virgilio V. Ecarma, Noel Y. Lastimoso, Virgilio N. Ocharan,
Rodolfo O. Poe, Efren S. Alcañeses, Benjamin T. Ang, Vicente T. Ang,
Silvestre D. Arroyo, Manuel P. Sanchez, Nicomen H. Versoza, Jr., Danilo
C. Matias, Francisco T. Alisangco, Antonio O. Noble, Jr., Ben T. Maturan,
Wilfredo S. Cruz, Ismael F. Galisim, Gabriel M. Piamonte, Jr., Elmer F.
Peña, Nino B. dela Cruz, Ruderico C. Baquiran and Ryan Jose C.
Hinayon.
The Labor Arbiter’s decision declaring that the aforementioned

complainants were illegally dismissed, and all the monetary awards
granted to them, are hereby reversed and set aside for lack of merit. The
Labor Arbiter’s order for the reinstatement of the complainants is likewise
declared to be devoid of merit, and any claim based on said order of
reinstatement, such as, but not limited to, backwages pending appeal, is
declared to be without any legal basis.
Respondent PAL is hereby directed to pay complainant Gladys L.

Jadie, the monetary award granted in the assailed decision which is
P2,024,865.00 and (I) longevity pay at P500.00/month of every year of
service based on seniority date falling after June 9, 1998; (II) Christmas
bonus for 1998 and 1999 per the CBA; (III) [Jadie’s] proportionate share
in the P5 million contribution of [PAL] to the Retirement Fund, and (IV)
cash equivalent of vacation leave and sick leave which [Jadie] earned from
June 9, 1998 until September 11, 2000.
[PAL] is also ordered to pay [Jadie] her unpaid salaries for the
period June 1-8, 1998 and productivity allowance, transportation
allowance, and rice subsidy for May 1998 and June 1-8, 1998.
In addition, [PAL] is ordered to pay [Jadie] separation pay

equivalent to one half (1/2) month for every year of service as a PAL
employee.
[PAL] is ordered to pay [Jadie] attorney’s fees in an amount

equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary award.32
32
Id. at 152-154.
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Aggrieved, Rodriguez, et al., Dela Cruz, and Poe filed a Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71190,
assailing the NLRC judgment for having been rendered with grave abuse of
discretion. Dela Cruz subsequently withdrew his Petition on June 25, 2003.
The Court of Appeals promulgated its Decision on November 30,

2006 favoring Rodriguez, et al., and Poe. The appellate court adjudged that:
(a) PAL indiscriminately dismissed on June 7, 1998 its more than 600 pilots,
including Rodriguez, et al. and Poe, who did not comply with its Return-to-
Work Notice published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer; (b) PAL simply
took advantage of the strike on June 5, 1998 to dismiss ALPAP members en
masse, regardless of whether the members participated in the strike or not,
so as to reduce its pilots complement to an acceptable level and to erase
seniority; (c) since they were already terminated on June 7, 1998, any
activity undertaken by Rodriguez, et al. and Poe on and after June 9, 1998
was already immaterial; (d) the NLRC gave undue weight to the
photographs and logbook presented by PAL; (e) the photographs were not
properly identified nor the circumstances under which they had been taken
satisfactorily established; (f) the logbook and its entries are self-serving
because the logbook was supplied by PAL itself and there was a dearth of
explanation as to the implications of the pilots’ signatures appearing therein
and the significance of the annotations “RETURN-TO-WORK
RETURNEES,” “RETURN-TO-WORK COMPLIANCE,” and “RETURN-
TO-WORK DOLE COMPLIANCE;” and (g) as for Jadie, PAL did not
satisfactorily prove that her reinstatement was an impossibility as there was
no showing that her services were obsolete or could no longer be utilized.
Although the Court of Appeals essentially agreed with the findings

and conclusion of Labor Arbiter Robles that Rodriguez, et al. and Poe were
illegally dismissed, it modified Labor Arbiter Robles’ Decision as follows:
All told, We find that [NLRC] gravely abused its discretion in

setting aside the Decision of the Labor Arbiter which found that
[Rodriguez, et al. and Poe] had indeed been illegally dismissed. We are
mindful, however, that the relief of reinstatement of [Rodriguez, et al. and
Poe] may no longer be viable or practicable in view of several factors, i.
e., the animosity between the parties ([Rodriguez, et al. and Poe] occupy
positions of confidence) herein as engendered by this protracted and
heated litigation, the fact that [Rodriguez, et al. and Poe) may have
already secured equivalent or other employments after the significant
lapse of time since the institution of their suit and, finally, the nature of
[PAL’s] business which require the continuous operations of its planes,
and because of which, new pilots have already been hired.
We, therefore, modify the Decision of the Labor Arbiter by

affirming the grant of backwages to [Rodriguez, et al. and Poe] but,
instead, order the payment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement.
178510
Moreover, We delete the awards of moral and exemplary damages as well

as attorney’s fees. Moral and exemplary damages cannot be justified
solely upon the premise that an employer dismissed his employee without
cause or due process. The termination must be attended with bad faith, or
fraud or in a manner oppressive to labor, which were not convincingly
established herein. Where a party is not entitled to actual or moral
damages, an award of exemplary damages is likewise without basis (San
Miguel Corporation vs. Del Rosario, 477 SCRA 619; Tanay Recreation
Center and Development Corp. vs. Fausto, 455 SCRA 457). Likewise, the
policy of the law is to put no premium on the right to litigate. Hence, the
award of attorney’s fees should also be deleted.33
The Court of Appeals decreed in the end:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for certiorari is

hereby GRANTED. The Decisions of the public respondent NLRC, dated
November 6, 2001 and March 25, 2002 are hereby SET ASIDE and the
Decision of Labor Arbiter Francisco Robles, dated December 11, 2000, is
REINSTATED subject to the MODIFICATIONS that in lieu of
reinstatement, [PAL] is ordered to pay [Rodriguez, et al. and Poe]
separation pay and that the awards of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees are hereby deleted.
The Court NOTES the withdrawal of the petition insofar as

petitioner Nino de la Cruz is concerned.34
Rodriguez, et al., and Poe filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,

while PAL filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Decision, but
the appellate court denied both motions in a Resolution35 dated June 8, 2007.
Hence, Rodriguez, et al., and PAL assail before this Court the
Decision dated November 30, 2006 and Resolution dated June 8, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals by way of separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari,
docketed as G.R. No. 178501 and G.R. No. 178510, respectively.
In G.R. No. 178501, Rodriguez, et al., assigned four errors on the part
of the Court of Appeals, viz.:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ORDERING THE

PAYMENT OF SEPARATION PAY TO [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.]
IN LIEU OF REINSTATEMENT, ON THE GROUNDS THAT
[RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.] “MAY HAVE ALREADY SECURED”
OTHER EMPLOYMENT AND THAT “NEW PILOTS HAVE
ALREADY BEEN HIRED”, CONTRARY TO THE EXPRESS
PROVISIONS OF THE LABOR CODE, THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES AND REGULATIONS THEREOF, AS WELL AS
33
Id. at 109-110.
34
Id. at 110.
35
Id. at 112-114.
178510
EXISTING JURISPRUDENTIAL POLICY, ALL MANDATING

THAT ILLEGALLY DISMISSED EMPLOYEES SHALL BE
ENTITLED TO THE TWIN REMEDIES OF REINSTATEMENT
AND PAYMENT OF BACKWAGES.
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DENIED THE

AWARD OF REINSTATEMENT ON THE SUPPOSITION
THAT SAID RELIEF, WHICH IS A RIGHT AUTHORIZED
UNDER THE LAW AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, “MAY
NO LONGER BE VIABLE OR PRACTICABLE” IN THE
PRESENT CASE DUE TO ALLEGED STRAINED RELATIONS
BETWEEN THE PARTIES.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE

AWARD OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES,
DESPITE ITS OWN FINDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENT
HAD ENGAGED IN AN “INDISCRIMINATE DISMISSAL”
AND HAD SIMPLY TAKEN ADVANTAGE OF THE 5 JUNE
1998 STRIKE TO DISMISS [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.] EN MASSE,
IN VIOLATION OF LAW AND JURISPRUDENTIAL
PRECEDENTS.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DENYING THE

AWARD OF ATTORNEY’S FEES, DESPITE FINDING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAD ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY TERMINATED [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL.’S]
EMPLOYMENT, THUS FORCING THEM TO LITIGATE AND
CONSEQUENTLY INCUR EXPENSES TO PROTECT THEIR
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS, CONTRARY TO SETTLED LAW
AND JURISPRUDENCE.36
Whereas PAL based its Petition in G.R. No. 178510 on the following
assignment of errors:
I. [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. AND POE’S] COMPLAINT FOR

ILLEGAL DISMISSAL IS BARRED BY THE FINAL AND
EXECUTORY DECISION IN THE COMPLAINT FOR
ILLEGAL LOCKOUT FILED BY ALPAP IN BEHALF OF ALL
ITS MEMBERS, INCLUDING [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. AND
POE].
II. THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT IN G.R. NO.

170069 FILED BY ONE OF [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. AND
POE’S] ORIGINAL CO-COMPLAINANTS (CESAR CRUZ) IS
APPLICABLE AND BINDING ON [RODRIGUEZ, ET AL. AND
POE], BEING BASED ON THE SAME FACTS AND
EVIDENCE.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED WHEN IT

REVIEWED AND REASSESSED THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
36
Id. at 29-30.
178510
OF THE NLRC AND SUPPLANTED THE SAME WITH ITS

OWN FACTUAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS IN A
PETITION FOR CERTIORARI WHERE THE ONLY ISSUE
WAS WHETHER THE NLRC ACTED WITHOUT
JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.
IV. THE SIXTH DIVISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS

GRAVELY ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PAL MERELY TOOK
ADVANTAGE OF THE ALPAP STRIKE TO DISMISS ITS
PILOTS EN MASSE, CONTRARY TO THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE SECRETARY OF LABOR, THE NLRC,
THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THIS HONORABLE COURT
IN EARLIER CASES INVOLVING THE SAME FACTS AND
EVIDENCE.37
In the meantime, during the pendency of the instant Petitions, the

Court decided on June 6, 2011 Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines
v. Philippine Airlines, Inc,.38 docketed as G.R. No. 168382 (2nd ALPAP
case). The 2nd ALPAP case arose from events that took place following the
finality on August 29, 2002 of the Resolution dated April 10, 2002 which
dismissed the 1st ALPAP case. Below is the factual background for the 2nd
ALPAP case as summarized by the Court in said Decision:
On January 13, 2003, ALPAP filed before the Office of the DOLE
Secretary a Motion in [the Strike Case], requesting the said office to
conduct an appropriate legal proceeding to determine who among its
officers and members should be reinstated or deemed to have lost their
employment with PAL for their actual participation in the strike conducted
in June 1998. ALPAP contended that there is a need to conduct a
proceeding in order to determine who actually participated in the
illegal strike since not only the striking workers were dismissed by
PAL but all of ALPAP's officers and members, even though some
were on official leave or abroad at the time of the strike. It also alleged
that there were some who joined the strike and returned to work but were
asked to sign new contracts of employment, which abrogated their earned
seniority. Also, there were those who initially defied the return-to-work
order but immediately complied with the same after proper receipt thereof
by ALPAP's counsel. However, PAL still refused to allow them to enter
its premises. According to ALPAP, such measure, as to meet the
requirements of due process, is essential because it must be first
established that a union officer or member has participated in the
strike or has committed illegal acts before they could be dismissed
from employment. In other words, a fair determination of who must
suffer the consequences of the illegal strike is indispensable since a
significant number of ALPAP members did not at all participate in the
strike. The motion also made reference to the favorable recommendation
rendered by the Freedom of Association Committee of the International
Labour Organization (ILO) in ILO Case No. 2195 which requested the
37
Rollo (G.R. No. 178510), pp. 35-36.
38
665 Phil. 679 (2011).
178510
Philippine Government “to initiate discussions in order to consider the

possible reinstatement in their previous employment of all ALPAP’s
workers who were dismissed following the strike staged in June 1998.” A
Supplemental Motion was afterwards filed by ALPAP on January 28,
2003, this time asking the DOLE Secretary to resolve all issues relating to
the entitlement to employment benefits by the officers and members of
ALPAP, whether terminated or not.
In its Comment to ALPAP's motions, PAL argued that the motions

cannot legally prosper since the DOLE Secretary has no authority to
reopen or review a final judgment of the Supreme Court relative to [the
Strike Case]; that the requested proceeding is no longer necessary as the
CA or this Court did not order the remand of the case to the DOLE
Secretary for such determination; that the NLRC rather than the DOLE
Secretary has jurisdiction over the motions as said motions partake of a
complaint for illegal dismissal with monetary claims; and that all money
claims are deemed suspended in view of the fact that PAL is under
receivership.
On January 24, 2003, the DOLE called the parties to a hearing to

discuss and clarify the issues raised in ALPAP's motions. In a letter dated
July 4, 2003 addressed to ALPAP President, Capt. Ismael C. Lapus, Jr.,
then Acting DOLE Secretary, Imson, resolved ALPAP's motions in the
following manner:
xxxx
After a careful consideration of the factual

antecedents, applicable legal principles and the arguments
of the parties, this Office concludes that [the Strike Case]
has indeed been resolved with finality by the highest
tribunal of the land, the Supreme Court. Being final and
executory, this Office is bereft of authority to reopen an
issue that has been passed upon by the Supreme Court.
It is important to note that in pages 18 to 19 of

ALPAP's Memorandum, it admitted that individual
complaints for illegal dismissal have been filed by the
affected pilots before the NLRC. It is therefore an implied
recognition on the part of the pilots that the remedy to their
present dilemma could be found in the NLRC.
xxxx
Thus, to avoid multiplicity of suits, splitting causes

of action and forum-shopping which are all obnoxious to an
orderly administration of justice, it is but proper to respect
the final and executory order of the Supreme Court in this
case as well as the jurisdiction of the NLRC over the illegal
dismissal cases. Since ALPAP and the pilots have opted to
seek relief from the NLRC, this Office should respect the
authority of that Commission to resolve the dispute in the
178510
normal course of law. This Office will no longer entertain

any further initiatives to split the jurisdiction or to shop for
a forum that shall only foment multiplicity of labor
disputes. Parties should not jump from one forum to
another. This Office will make sure of that.
By reason of the final ruling of the Honorable

Supreme Court, the erring pilots have lost their
employment status and second, because these pilots have
filed cases to contest such loss before another forum, the
Motion and Supplemental Motion of ALPAP as well as the
arguments raised therein are merely NOTED by this
Office.”
ALPAP filed its motion for reconsideration arguing that the issues
raised in its motions have remained unresolved hence, it is the duty of
DOLE to resolve the same it having assumed jurisdiction over the labor
dispute. ALPAP also denied having engaged in forum shopping as the
individual complainants who filed the cases before the NLRC are separate
and distinct from ALPAP and that the causes of action therein are
different. According to ALPAP, there was clear abdication of duty when
then Acting Secretary Imson refused to properly act on the motions. In a
letter dated July 30, 2003, Secretary Sto. Tomas likewise merely noted
ALPAP's motion for reconsideration, reiterating the DOLE's stand to
abide by the final and executory judgment of the Supreme Court.
Proceedings before the Court of Appeals
ALPAP filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, insisting that
the assailed letters dated July 4, 2003 and July 30, 2003, which merely
noted its motions, were issued in grave abuse of discretion.
xxxx
The CA, in its Decision dated December 22, 2004, dismissed the
petition. It found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas
and Imson in refusing to conduct the necessary proceedings to determine
issues relating to ALPAP members' employment status and entitlement to
employment benefits. The CA held that both these issues were among the
issues taken up and resolved in the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution which
was affirmed by the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 54880 and subsequently
determined with finality by this Court in [the 1st ALPAP case]. Therefore,
said issues could no longer be reviewed. The CA added that Sto. Tomas
and Imson merely acted in deference to the NLRC's jurisdiction over the
illegal dismissal cases filed by individual ALPAP members.
ALPAP moved for reconsideration which was denied for lack of

merit in CA Resolution dated May 30, 2005.39 (Emphases supplied.)
39
Id. at 684-688.
178510
ALPAP once more sought remedy from this Court through a Petition
for Review on Certiorari in the 2nd ALPAP case. The Court therein denied
the Petition of ALPAP for lack of merit, based on the ratiocination
extensively quoted below:
We deny the petition.
There was no grave abuse of

discretion on the part of Sto. Tomas
and Imson in merely noting ALPAP's
twin motions in due deference to a
final and immutable judgment
rendered by the Supreme Court.
From the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution, which declared the strike
of June 5, 1998 as illegal and pronounced all ALPAP officers and
members who participated therein to have lost their employment status, an
appeal was taken by ALPAP. This was dismissed by the CA in CA-G.R.
SP No. 54880, which ruling was affirmed by this Court and which became
final and executory on August 29, 2002.
In the instant case, ALPAP seeks for a conduct of a proceeding to

determine who among its members and officers actually participated in the
illegal strike because, it insists, the June 1, 1999 DOLE Resolution did not
make such determination. However, as correctly ruled by Sto. Tomas and
Imson and affirmed by the CA, such proceeding would entail a reopening
of a final judgment which could not be permitted by this Court. Settled in
law is that once a decision has acquired finality, it becomes immutable and
unalterable, thus can no longer be modified in any respect. Subject to
certain recognized exceptions, the principle of immutability leaves the
judgment undisturbed as “nothing further can be done except to execute
it.”
True, the dispositive portion of the DOLE Resolution does not

specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in the
strike but only mentions that those strikers who failed to heed the return-
to-work order are deemed to have lost their employment. This omission,
however, cannot prevent an effective execution of the decision. As was
held in Reinsurance Company of the Orient, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, any
ambiguity may be clarified by reference primarily to the body of the
decision or supplementary to the pleadings previously filed in the case. In
any case, especially when there is an ambiguity, “a judgment shall be read
in connection with the entire record and construed accordingly.”
There is no necessity to conduct a

proceeding to determine the
participants in the illegal strike or
those who refused to heed the return
to work order because the ambiguity
can be cured by reference to the
178510
body of the decision and the

pleadings filed.
A review of the records reveals that in [the Strike Case], the

DOLE Secretary declared the ALPAP officers and members to have
lost their employment status based on either of two grounds, viz.: their
participation in the illegal strike on June 5, 1998 or their defiance of
the return-to-work order of the DOLE Secretary. The records of the
case unveil the names of each of these returning pilots. The logbook
with the heading “Return to Work Compliance/Returnees” bears
their individual signature signifying their conformity that they were
among those workers who returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or
after the deadline imposed by DOLE. From this crucial and vital piece
of evidence, it is apparent that each of these pilots is bound by the
judgment. Besides, the complaint for illegal lockout was filed on
behalf of all these returnees. Thus, a finding that there was no illegal
lockout would be enforceable against them. In fine, only those
returning pilots, irrespective of whether they comprise the entire
membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999 DOLE
Resolution.
ALPAP harps on the inequity of PAL's termination of its

officers and members considering that some of them were on leave or
were abroad at the time of the strike. Some were even merely barred
from returning to their work which excused them for not complying
immediately with the return-to-work order. Again, a scrutiny of the
records of the case discloses that these allegations were raised at a very
late stage, that is, after the judgment has finally decreed that the returning
pilots’ termination was legal. Interestingly, these defenses were not raised
and discussed when the case was still pending before the DOLE Secretary,
the CA or even before this Court. We agree with the position taken by Sto.
Tomas and Imson that from the time the return-to-work order was issued
until this Court rendered its April 10, 2002 resolution dismissing ALPAP's
petition, no ALPAP member has claimed that he was unable to comply
with the return-to-work directive because he was either on leave, abroad or
unable to report for some reason. These defenses were raised in
ALPAP's twin motions only after the Resolution in G.R. No. 152306
reached finality in its last ditch effort to obtain a favorable ruling. It
has been held that a proceeding may not be reopened upon grounds
already available to the parties during the pendency of such
proceedings; otherwise, it may give way to vicious and vexatious
proceedings. ALPAP was given all the opportunities to present its
evidence and arguments. It cannot now complain that it was denied
due process.
Relevant to mention at this point is that when NCMB NCR NS

12-514-97 (strike/illegal lockout case) was still pending, several
complaints for illegal dismissal were filed before the Labor Arbiters of
the NLRC by individual members of ALPAP, questioning their
termination following the strike staged in June 1998. PAL likewise
manifests that there is a pending case involving a complaint for the
recovery of accrued and earned benefits belonging to ALPAP
178510
members. Nonetheless, the pendency of the foregoing cases should not

and could not affect the character of our disposition over the instant
case. Rather, these cases should be resolved in a manner consistent
and in accord with our present disposition for effective enforcement
and execution of a final judgment.40 (Emphases supplied.)
The Decision dated June 6, 2011 of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case
became final and executory on September 9, 2011.
Bearing in mind the final and executory judgments in the 1st and 2nd
ALPAP cases, the Court denies the Petition of Rodriguez, et al., in G.R. No.
178501 and partly grants that of PAL in G.R. No. 178510.
The Court, in the 2nd ALPAP case, acknowledged the illegal dismissal
cases instituted by the individual ALPAP members before the NLRC
following their termination for the strike in June 1998 (which were apart
from the Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases of ALPAP before the DOLE
Secretary) and affirmed the jurisdiction of the NLRC over said illegal
dismissal cases. The Court, though, also expressly pronounced in the 2nd
ALPAP case that “the pendency of the foregoing cases should not and could
not affect the character of our disposition over the instant case. Rather, these
cases should be resolved in a manner consistent and in accord with our
present disposition for effective enforcement and execution of a final
judgment.”
The Petitions at bar began with the Illegal Dismissal Case of

Rodriguez, et al. and eight other former pilots of PAL before the NLRC.
Among the Decisions rendered by Labor Arbiter Robles, the NLRC, and the
Court of Appeals herein, it is the one by the NLRC which is consistent and
in accord with the disposition for effective enforcement and execution of the
final judgments in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
The 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases which became final and executory on
August 29, 2002 and September 9, 2011, respectively, constitute res judicata
on the issue of who participated in the illegal strike in June 1998 and whose
services were validly terminated.
The Court expounded on the doctrine of res judicata in Spouses Layos

v. Fil-Estate Golf and Development, Inc.41:
Res judicata literally means “a matter adjudged; a thing judicially

acted upon or decided; a thing or matter settled by judgment.” Res
judicata lays the rule that an existing final judgment or decree rendered on
the merits, and without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent
40
Id. at 689-693.
41
583 Phil. 72, 101-105 (2008).
178510
jurisdiction, upon any matter within its jurisdiction, is conclusive of the

rights of the parties or their privies, in all other actions or suits in the same
or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction on the points and
matters in issue in the first suit.
It is espoused in the Rules of Court, under paragraphs (b) and (c)

of Section 47, Rule 39, which provide:
SEC. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a
court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce
the judgment or final order, may be as follows:
xxxx
(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is,

with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any
other matter that could have been raised in relation thereto,
conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
action or special proceeding, litigating the same thing and
under the same title and in the same capacity; and
(c) In any other litigation between the same

parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to
have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order
which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or
which was actually and necessarily included therein or
necessary thereto.
The doctrine of res judicata lays down two main rules which may
be stated as follows: (1) The judgment or decree of a court of competent
jurisdiction on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties and
their privies and constitutes a bar to a new action or suit involving the
same cause of action either before the same or any other tribunal; and (2)
any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily
involved in the determination of an action before a competent court in
which a judgment or decree is rendered on the merits is conclusively
settled by the judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claims or demands, purposes,
or subject matters of the two suits are the same. These two main rules
mark the distinction between the principles governing the two typical
cases in which a judgment may operate as evidence. In speaking of these
cases, the first general rule above stated, and which corresponds to the
afore-quoted paragraph (b) of Section 47, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, is
referred to as “bar by former judgment”; while the second general rule,
which is embodied in paragraph (c) of the same section and rule, is known
as “conclusiveness of judgment”.
The Resolution of this Court in Calalang v. Register of Deeds of

Quezon City, provides the following enlightening discourse on
conclusiveness of judgment:
178510
The doctrine res judicata actually embraces two

different concepts: (1) bar by former judgment and (b)
conclusiveness of judgment.
The second concept – conclusiveness of judgment –

states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former
suit and was there judicially passed upon and determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusively settled
by the judgment therein as far as the parties to that action
and persons in privity with them are concerned and cannot
be again litigated in any future action between such parties
or their privies, in the same court or any other court of
concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or different cause
of action, while the judgment remains unreversed by proper
authority. It has been held that in order that a judgment in
one action can be conclusive as to a particular matter in
another action between the same parties or their privies, it
is essential that the issue be identical. If a particular point
or question is in issue in the second action, and the
judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the
same parties or their privies will be final and conclusive in
the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit (Nabus vs. Court of Appeals,
193 SCRA 732 [1991]). Identity of cause of action is not
required but merely identity of issue.
Justice Feliciano, in Smith Bell & Company (Phils.),

Inc. vs. Court of Appeals (197 SCRA 201, 210 [1991]),
reiterated Lopez vs. Reyes (76 SCRA 179 [1977]) in regard
to the distinction between bar by former judgment which
bars the prosecution of a second action upon the same
claim, demand, or cause of action, and conclusiveness of
judgment which bars the relitigation of particular facts or
issues in another litigation between the same parties on a
different claim or cause of action.
The general rule precluding the

relitigation of material facts or questions
which were in issue and adjudicated in
former action are commonly applied to all
matters essentially connected with the
subject matter of the litigation. Thus, it
extends to questions necessarily implied in
the final judgment, although no specific
finding may have been made in reference
thereto and although such matters were
directly referred to in the pleadings and were
not actually or formally presented. Under
this rule, if the record of the former trial
shows that the judgment could not have
178510
been rendered without deciding the

particular matter, it will be considered as
having settled that matter as to all future
actions between the parties and if a
judgment necessarily presupposes certain
premises, they are as conclusive as the
judgment itself.
Another case, Oropeza Marketing Corporation v. Allied Banking

Corporation, further differentiated between the two rules of res judicata,
as follows:
There is “bar by prior judgment” when, as

between the first case where the judgment was rendered
and the second case that is sought to be barred, there is
identity of parties, subject matter, and causes of action.
In this instance, the judgment in the first case constitutes an
absolute bar to the second action. Otherwise put, the
judgment or decree of the court of competent jurisdiction
on the merits concludes the litigation between the parties,
as well as their privies, and constitutes a bar to a new action
or suit involving the same cause of action before the same
or other tribunal.
But where there is identity of parties in the first

and second cases, but no identity of causes of action, the
first judgment is conclusive only as to those matters
actually and directly controverted and determined and not
as to matters merely involved therein. This is the concept of
res judicata known as “conclusiveness of judgment”.
Stated differently, any right, fact, or matter in issue directly
adjudicated or necessarily involved in the determination of
an action before a competent court in which judgment is
rendered on the merits is conclusively settled by the
judgment therein and cannot again be litigated between the
parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand,
purpose, or subject matter of the two actions is the same.
In sum, conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation in a

second case of a fact or question already settled in a previous case. The
second case, however, may still proceed provided that it will no longer
touch on the same fact or question adjudged in the first case.
Conclusiveness of judgment requires only the identity of issues and
parties, but not of causes of action. (Emphases ours.)
The elements for res judicata in the second concept, i.e.,

conclusiveness of judgment, are extant in these cases.
There is identity of parties in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases, on one
hand, and the Petitions at bar. While the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases concerned
ALPAP and the present Petitions involved several individual members of
178510
ALPAP, the union acted in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases in representation of
its members. In fact, in the 2nd ALPAP case, the Court explicitly recognized
that the complaint for illegal lockout was filed by ALPAP on behalf of all its
members who were returning to work.42 Also in the said case, ALPAP
raised, albeit belatedly, exactly the same arguments as Rodriguez, et al.
herein. Granting that there is no absolute identity of parties, what is
required, however, for the application of the principle of res judicata is not
absolute, but only substantial identity of parties. ALPAP and Rodriguez, et
al. share an identity of interest from which flowed an identity of relief
sought, namely, the reinstatement of the terminated ALPAP members to
their former positions. Such identity of interest is sufficient to make them
privy-in-law, one to the other, and meets the requisite of substantial identity
of parties.43
There is likewise an identity of issues between the 1st and 2nd ALPAP
cases and these cases. Rodriguez, et al., insist that they did not participate in
the June 1998 strike, being on official leave or scheduled off-duty.
Nonetheless, on the matter of determining the identities of the ALPAP
members who lost their employment status because of their participation in
the illegal strike in June 1998, the Court is now conclusively bound by its
factual and legal findings in the 1st and 2nd ALPAP cases.
In the 1st ALPAP case, the Court upheld the DOLE Secretary’s
Resolution dated June 1, 1999 declaring that the strike of June 5, 1998 was
illegal and all ALPAP officers and members who participated therein had
lost their employment status. The Court in the 2nd ALPAP case ruled that
even though the dispositive portion of the DOLE Secretary’s Resolution did
not specifically enumerate the names of those who actually participated in
the illegal strike, such omission cannot prevent the effective execution of the
decision in the 1st ALPAP case. The Court referred to the records of the
Strike and Illegal Lockout Cases, particularly, the logbook, which it
unequivocally pronounced as a “crucial and vital piece of evidence.” In the
words of the Court in the 2nd ALPAP case, “[t]he logbook with the heading
‘Return-To-Work Compliance/Returnees’ bears their individual signature
signifying their conformity that they were among those workers who
returned to work only on June 26, 1998 or after the deadline imposed by
DOLE. x x x In fine, only those returning pilots, irrespective of whether they
comprise the entire membership of ALPAP, are bound by the June 1, 1999
DOLE Resolution.”
The logbook was similarly submitted as evidence by PAL against the

complainants in the Illegal Dismissal Case now on appeal. Rodriguez, et al.,
42
Airline Pilots Association of the Philippines v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., supra note 38 at 691.
43
Firestone Ceramics, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 372 Phil. 401, 422 (1999).
178510
except for Jadie and Baquiran, were signatories in the logbook as

returnees,44 bound by the Resolution dated June 1, 1999 of the DOLE
Secretary. The significance and weight accorded by the NLRC to the
logbook can no longer be gainsaid considering the declarations of the Court
in the 2nd ALPAP case. Moreover, the logbook entries were corroborated by
photographs showing Rodriguez, et al., excluding Baquiran, Galisim, Jadie,
Wilfredo S. Cruz, and Piamonte, actually participating in the strike. The
objection that the photographs were not properly authenticated deserves
scant consideration as rules of evidence are not strictly observed in
proceedings before administrative bodies like the NLRC, where decisions
may be reached on the basis of position papers only. 45 It is also worth noting
that those caught on photographs did not categorically deny being at the
strike area on the time/s and date/s the photographs were taken, but assert
that they were there in lawful exercise of their right while on official leave
or scheduled off-duty, or in the alternative, that they were already dismissed
from service as early as June 7, 1998 and their presence at the strike area
thereafter was already irrelevant. The Court further concurs in the
observation of the NLRC that the official leave or scheduled off-duty of
Rodriguez, et al. expired at least two weeks prior to June 26, 1998, yet they
did not make any effort to return to work before said date. Rodriguez, et al.
instead heeded the advice of their lawyer to report en masse with the other
ALPAP members, only proving that they were complying not with the
Return-to-Work Order of the DOLE Secretary but the orders of their union
and its counsel.
There is no compelling reason for the Court to disturb the findings of

the NLRC as to Baquiran and Jadie, the two pilots who did not sign the
logbook.
To stress, the Return-to-Work Order was served on ALPAP on June 8,

1998, and its members had 24 hours or until June 9, 1998 to report back for
work. There is no evidence that Baquiran complied, or at least, attempted to
comply with said Order. Neither did Baquiran report back for work with the
other ALPAP members on June 26, 1998. Baquiran, who made no attempt to
report for work at all, cannot be in a better position than the other ALPAP
members who belatedly reported for work on June 26, 1998 and were still
deemed to have lost their employment. As the NLRC declared, Baquiran
“simply abandoned his job.”
Only Jadie among Rodriguez, et al., was illegally dismissed by PAL.

During the strike, Jadie was already on maternity leave. Jadie did not join
the strike and could not be reasonably expected to report back for work by
44
Rollo (G.R. No. 178501), pp. 428-440.
45
Rabago v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 82868 and 82932, August 5, 1991,
200 SCRA 158, 165.
178510
June 9, 1998 in compliance with the Return-to-Work Order. Indeed, Jadie

gave birth on June 24, 1998. However, as both the NLRC and the Court of
Appeals had held, Jadie can no longer be reinstated for the following
reasons: (1) Jadie’s former position as Captain of the E-50 aircraft no longer
existed as said aircraft was already returned to its lessors in accordance with
the Amended and Restated Rehabilitation Plan of PAL; (2) Per ATO
certification, Jadie’s license expired in 1998; (3) the animosity between the
parties as engendered by the protracted and heated litigation; (4) the
possibility that Jadie had already secured equivalent or other employment
after the significant lapse of time since the institution of the Illegal Dismissal
Case; and (5) the nature of the business of PAL which requires the
continuous operations of its planes and, thus, the hiring of new pilots. In lieu
of reinstatement, Jadie is entitled to separation pay.
Following latest jurisprudence,46 Jadie is entitled to the following

reliefs/awards for her illegal dismissal: (1) separation pay equivalent to one
month salary for every year of service in lieu of reinstatement; (2)
backwages from June 9, 1998; (3) longevity pay at P500.00/month for every
year of service based on seniority date falling after June 9, 1998; (4)
Christmas bonuses; (5) Jadie’s proportionate share in the P5 Million
contribution of PAL to the Retirement Fund; and (5) cash equivalent of
vacation leaves and sick leaves which Jadie earned after June 9, 1998. All
of the aforementioned awards shall be computed until finality of this
Decision.
Jadie is further entitled to receive benefits due her even prior to her
illegal dismissal on June 9, 1998, namely: (1) unpaid salaries for June 1 to
8, 1998; and (2) productivity allowance, transportation allowance, and rice
subsidy for May 1998 and June 1 to 8, 1998.
All monetary awards due Jadie shall earn legal interest of 6% per
annum from date of finality of this Decision until fully paid.
Finally, the Court acts upon the Motion for Leave to Reinstate Elmer
F. Peña, Antonio P. Noble, Baltazar B. Musong, Nicomen H. Versoza and
Ryan Jose C. Hinayon as Petitioners in G.R. No. 178501. Peña, Noble,
Musong, Versoza, and Hinayon, hereinafter referred to collectively as Peña,
et al., were among the original complainants in the Illegal Dismissal Case
before the Labor Arbiter. However, Peña, et al. were unable to join as
petitioners in the Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 71190, as well as the present Petition in G.R. No. 178501,
because at the time said Petitions were filed, they were already employed
46
Bani Rural Bank, Inc. v. De Guzman, G.R. No.170904, November 13, 2013, 709 SCRA 330; Lim
v. HMR Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 201483, August 4, 2014, 731 SCRA 576.
178510
outside the country. The Court denies the Motion. When Peña, et al. failed
to join the Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 71190, the Decision dated November
6, 2001 of the NLRC in NLRC NCR CA No. 027348-01 had become final
and executory as to them. Peña, et al. cannot simply be “reinstated” as
petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 since they are not parties to and had no legal
interest in the appealed Decision dated November 30, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71190.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
(1) DISMISSING the Petition of Rodriguez, et al., in G.R. No.

178501 and PARTLY GRANTING the Petition of PAL in G.R. No.
178510;
(2) REVERSING and SETTING ASIDE the Decision dated

November 30, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71190;
(3) DECLARING that Jadie was illegally dismissed and

ORDERING PAL to pay her the following:
(a) As consequences of her illegal dismissal: (i) separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month salary for every year of service in lieu
of reinstatement; (ii) backwages from June 9, 1998; (iii) longevity pay
at P500.00/month for every year of service based on seniority date
falling after June 9, 1998; (iv) Christmas bonuses from 1998; (v)
Jadie’s proportionate share in the P5 Million contribution of PAL to
the Retirement Fund; and (vi) cash equivalent of vacation leaves and
sick leaves which Jadie earned after June 9, 1998, all of which shall
be computed until finality of this Decision;
(b) Benefits due her prior to her illegal dismissal on June 9,

1998: (i) unpaid salaries for June 1 to 8, 1998; and (ii) productivity
allowance, transportation allowance, and rice subsidy for May 1998
and June 1 to 8, 1998; and
(c) Legal interest of 6% per annum on all monetary awards

due her from the date of finality of this Decision until full payment
thereof;
(4) DISMISSING for lack of merit the Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal of Rodriguez, Alisangco, Benjamin T. Ang, Vicente P. Ang,
Arroyo, Baquiran, Wilfredo S. Cruz, Delos Reyes, Ecarma, Galisim, Garcia,
Gutiza, Jose, Labuga, Lastimoso, Matias, Maturan, Ocharan, Piamonte,
Sabado, Sanchez, Corpus, and Alcañeses; and
178510
(5) DENYING the Motion for Leave to Reinstate Elmer F. Pefia,

Antonio P. Noble, Baltazar B. Musong, Nicomen H. Versoza and Ryan Jose
C. Hinayon as Petitioners in G.R. No. 178501.
SO ORDERED.
~~h~
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO

Chief Justice
Chairperson
ESTELA M.~~ERNABE
Associate Justice
178510
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that

the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court's
Division.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

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Republic of the Philippines

NILO S. RODRIGUEZ, G.R. No. 178501

PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC.,

DECISION 2 G.R. Nos. 178501 &

1 ,· ' ,·i11,')J;E.N.J~IN. T. ANG, VICENTE P.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Before the Court are two consolidated Petitions for Review on

The petitioners in G.R. No. 178501 are 24 former pilots of Philippine

Ben T. Maturan (Maturan), Virgilio N. Ocharan (Ocharan), Gabriel M.

The petitioner in G.R. No. 178510 is PAL, a domestic corporation

In its assailed Decision, the Court of Appeals: (1) reversed the

The relevant facts of the case are as follows:

On December 9, 1997, the Airline Pilots Association of the

By virtue of the authority vested upon him under Article 263(g)3 of

Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) assumed jurisdiction over

Despite the abovementioned Orders of the DOLE Secretary, ALPAP

WHEREFORE, FOEGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, all

Our directive to both parties to cease and desist from committing

Consequently, ALPAP filed with the NLRC on June 29, 1998 a

The DOLE Secretary12 issued a Resolution13 on June 1, 1999 in the

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office hereby:

b. DECLARES the strike conducted by ALPAP on June 5, 1998

c. DISMISSES the complaint for illegal lockout for lack of

ALPAP filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied by the

ALPAP assailed the foregoing Resolutions dated June 1, 1999 and

Meanwhile, 32 ALPAP members, consisting of Rodriguez, et al., Poe,

A. ILLEGAL DISMISSAL in that [PAL] terminated the

(i) Complainants EFREN S. ALCAÑESES,

(ii) Complainants GLADYS L. JADIE and BEN

(iii) Complainants EDMUNDO M. DELOS

NOBLE, JR., ELMER F. PEÑA, and ARTURO A.

(iv) Complainants NILO S. RODRIGUEZ,

(v) Complainant FRANCISCO T.

FURTHER, [PAL] denied the above-named complainants due

THUS, [PAL] summarily effected the dismissal of the above-

B. NON-PAYMENT OF SALARIES AND OTHER BENEFITS

1. Basic or guaranteed pay

Complainants alleged that they were not participants of the June 5,

Alcañeses He was the scheduled instructor of the simulator sessions on

Alisangco He was serving a seven-day suspension from June 4 to 10,

Arroyo He left Manila and flew to Europe, arriving there on June 5,

Baquiran He arrived in Manila from Los Angeles on June 4, 1998, and

canceled and that he was already dismissed.

Corpus He arrived in Manila from Vancouver on May 30, 1998, and

Ecarma After attending ground school at PAL Training Center on June

Galisim He underwent training in Toulouse, France from April 1998 to

Hinayon He arrived in Manila from Bangkok on June 5, 1998, and was

Jose He flew from Honolulu and arrived in Manila on June 7, 1998.

Labuga He arrived in Manila from Dhadran on June 4, 1998, and was

Lastimoso He arrived in Manila on June 4, 1998 on Flight No. PR-298,

Matias He commanded the flight from Manila to San Francisco, which

Maturan He was on sick leave from June 5-15, 1998 to undergo a

Piamonte He arrived from Honolulu on June 6, 1998 and was on

Peña He was on leave from June 5, 1998 to June 28, 1998.

Poe He completed a ground course for the Airbus-320 captaincy in

Rodriguez He arrived in Manila from San Francisco on June 2, 1998. He

Sanchez He arrived from Los Angeles in Manila on June 6, 1998, and

Versoza He was on duty on June 5, 1998 as he flew from Paris to