TARIFF AND CUSTOMS CODE

G.R. No. 195876

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION

vs.
COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS

Acting on the Omnibus Motion (For Reconsideration and Referral to the Court En bane) dated January 20, 2017
filed by public respondent Commissioner of Customs, the Court DENIES the same for lack of merit. The
arguments raised by respondent in this pending incident are the very same arguments raised in the petition, which
have already been evaluated, passed upon, and considered in the assailed December 5, 2016 Decision. Ergo, the
Court rejects these arguments on the same grounds discussed in the challenged Decision, and denies, as a matter
of course, the pending motion.

Unlike in Chevron, petitioner herein is not guilty of fraud.

The Omnibus Motion is anchored primarily on the alleged applicability of Chevron Philippines, Inc. v.
Commissioner of the Bureau of Customs  1 (Chevron) to the case at bar. However, the Court desisted from
applying the doctrine laid down in Chevron considering that the facts and circumstances therein are not in all
fours with those obtaining in the instant case. Thus, Chevron is not a precedent to the case at bar. A "precedent" is
defined as a judicial decision that serves as a rule for future determination in similar or substantially similar cases.
Thus, the facts and circumstances between the jurisprudence relied upon and the pending controversy should not
diverge on material points. But as clearly explained in the assailed December 5, 2016 Decision, the main
difference between Chevron and the case at bar lies in the attendance of fraud.

In Chevron, evidence on record established that Chevron committed fraud in its dealings. On the other hand,
proof that petitioner Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation (Pilipinas Shell) was just as guilty was clearly
wanting. Simply, there was no finding of fraud on the part of petitioner in the case at bar. Such circumstance is
too significant that it renders Chevron indubitably different from and cannot, therefore, serve as the
jurispn1dential foundation of the case at bar.
In his dissent, Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta (Justice Peralta) claims that fraud was committed by
Pilipinas Shell when it allegedly deliberately incurred delay in filing its Import Entry and Internal Revenue
Declaration in order to avail of the reduced tariff duty on oil importations, from ten percent (10%) to three percent
(3%), upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 8180 (RA 8180), otherwise known as the Oil Deregulation Law.
Justice Peralta cites the February 2, 201 I Memorandum to support the allegation of fraud, but as exhaustively
discussed in Our December 5, 2016 Decision, the document was never formally offered as evidence before
the Court of Tax Appeals, and is, therefore, bereft of evidentiary value. Worse, it was not even presented
during trial and no witness identified the same.

What value can the Court then accord to the document? The Court finds its answer in Heirs of Pasag v. Sps.
Parocha,  2 which teaches that:
x x x Documents which may have been identified and marked as exhibits during pre-trial or trial but which were
not formally offered in evidence cannot in any manner be treated as evidence. Neither can such unrecognized
proof be assigned any evidentiary weight and value. It must be stressed that there is a significant distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer. The former is done in the course of the pre-
trial, and trial is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit; while the latter is done only when the
party rests its case. The mere fact that a particular document is identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean
that it has already been offered as part of the evidence. It must be emphasized that any evidence which a party
desires to submit for the consideration of the court must formally be offered by the party; otherwise, it is excluded
and rejected.
Resultantly, no scintilla of proof was ever offered in evidence by respondent Commissioner of Customs to
substantiate the claim that Pilipinas Shell acted in a fraudulent manner. At best, the allegation of fraud on the part
of Pilipinas Shell is mere conjecture and purely speculative. Settled is the rule that a court cannot rely on
speculations, conjectures or guesswork, but must depend upon competent proof and on the basis of the best
evidence obtainable under the circumstances. We emphasize that litigations cannot be properly resolved by
suppositions, deductions, or even presumptions, with no basis in evidence, for the truth must have to be
determined by the hard rules of admissibility and proof.  
The absence of fraud and its effects on the one-year prescriptive period, and on the due notice requirement
prior to ipso facto abandonment.

As extensively discussed in the assailed Decision, whether or not petitioner Pilipinas Shell defrauded the public
respondent becomes pivotal because of Section 1603 of the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines (TCC),
which reads:

Section 1603. Finality of Liquidation. When articles have been entered and passed free of duty or final
adjustments of duties made, with subsequent delivery, such entry and passage free of duty or settlements of duties
will, after the expiration of one (1) year, from the date of the final payment of duties, in the absence of fraud or
protest or compliance audit pursuant to the provisions of this Code, be final and conclusive upon all parties,
unless the liquidation of the import entry was merely tentative.

Pursuant to the above-quoted provision, the attendance of fraud would remove the case from the ambit of the
statute of limitations, and would consequently allow the government to exercise its power to assess and collect
duties even beyond the one-year prescriptive period, rendering it virtually imprescriptible. 

In the case at bar, petitioner Pilipinas Shell filed its Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration (IEIRD) and
paid the import duty of its shipments in the amount of P 11,231, 081 on May 23, 1996. However, it only received
a demand letter from public respondent on July 27, 2000, or more than four (4) years later. By this time, the one-
year prescriptive period had already elapsed, and the government had already been barred from collecting the
deficiency in petitioner's import duties for the covered shipment of oil.

In an attempt to remove the instant case from the purview of the provision, Justice Peralta and the respondent
claim that the government is no longer collecting tariff duties. Rather, it is exercising its ownership right over the
shipments, which were allegedly deemed abandoned by petitioner because of the latter's failure to timely file the
IEIRD. It is their postulation then that Sec. 1603 cannot find application in the case at bar.

We respectfully disagree.

The absence of fraud not only allows the finality of the liquidations, it also calls for the strict observance of
the requirements for the doctrine of ipso facto abandonment to apply. Sec. 1801 of the TCC pertinently
provides:

Section 1801. Abandonment, Kinds and Effect of - An imported article is deemed abandoned under any of the
following circumstances:
x x xx
b. When the owner, importer, consignee or interested party after due notice, fails to file an entry within thirty (30)
days, which shall not be extendible, from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft, or
having filed such entry, fails to claim his importation within fifteen (15) days, which shall not likewise be
extendible, from the date of posting of the notice to claim such importation.

As expressly provided in Sec.1801(b) of the TCC, the failure to file the IEIRD within 30 days from entry is not
the only requirement for the doctrine of ipso facto abandonment to apply. The law categorically requires that this
be preceded by due notice demanding compliance. To recapitulate, the notice in this case was only served upon
petitioner four (4) years after it has already filed its IEIRD. Under this circumstance, the Court cannot rule that
due notice was given, for when public respondent served the notice demanding payment from petitioner, it no
longer had the right to do so. By that time, the prescriptive period for liquidation had already elapsed, and the
assessment against petitioner's shipment had already become final and conclusive. Consequently, Sec. 1801(b)
failed to operate in favor of the government for failure to demand payment for the discrepancy prior to the finality
of the liquidation. The government cannot deem the imported articles as abandoned without due notice.

Public respondent cannot harp on the Chevron ruling to excuse compliance from the due notice requirement
before the imported articles can be deemed abandoned, for to do so would only downplay the Court's finding
anent the non-attendance of fraud. To be clear, the element of fraud in Chevron was a key ingredient on why
notice was deemed unnecessary: 

Under the peculiar facts and circumstances of this case, due notice was not necessary. The shipments arrived in
1996. The IEDs and IEIRDs were also filed in 1996. However, respondent discovered the fraud which attended
the importations and their subsequent release from the BOC's custody only in 1999. Obviously, the situation here
was not an ordinary case of abandonment wherein the importer merely decided not to claim its importations.
Fraud was established against petitioner; it colluded with the former District Collector. Because of this, the
scheme was concealed from respondent. The government was unable to protect itself until the plot was
uncovered. The government cannot be crippled by the malfeasance of its officials and employees. Consequently,
it was impossible for respondent to comply with the requirements under the rules. By the time respondent learned
of the anomaly, the entries had already been belatedly filed and the oil importations released and presumably used
or sold. It was a fait accompli. Under such circumstances, it would have been against all logic to require
respondent to still post an urgent notice to file entry before declaring the shipments abandoned.

Hence, it does not suffice that petitioner is a multinational, large scale importer presumed to be familiar with
importation rules and procedures for the ipso facto abandonment doctrine to apply. Under the peculiar facts and
circumstances of Chevron, the existence of fraud was the primary element established to warrant the application
of the doctrine. Without this element, Chevron cannot be treated at par with the case at bar. The statutorily
required due notice should still have been timely served upon petitioner before the imported oil shipments could
have been deemed abandoned.

Under public respondent's Customs Memorandum Order No. (CMO) 15-94, otherwise known as the Revised
Guidelines on Abandonment in force at that time, due notice is served upon the importer through the following
measures:
SUBJECT: REVISED GUIDELINES ON ABANDONMENT
xxxx
B. ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS
xxxx
B.2 Implied abandonment occurs when:
B.2.1 The owner, importer, consignee, interested party or his authorized broker/representative, after due notice,
fails to file an entry within a nonextendible period of thirty (30) days from the date of discharge of last package
from the carrying vessel or aircraft.
xxxx
Due notice to the consignee/importer/owner/interested party shall be by means of posting of a notice to file entry
at the Bulletin Board seven (7) days prior to the lapse of the thirty (30) day period by the Entry Processing
Division listing the consignees who/which have not filed the required import entries as of the date of the posting
of the notice and notifying them of the arrival of their shipment, the name of the carrying vessel/aircraft, Voy. No.
Reg. No. and the respective BIL No./AWB No., with a warning, as shown by the attached form, entitled:
URGENT NOTICE TO FILE ENTRY which is attached hereto as Annex A and made an integral part of this
Order.
x x xx
C. OPERATIONAL PROVISIONS
xxxx
C.2 On Implied Abandonment:
C.2.1 When no entry is filed
C.2.1.1 Within twenty-four (24) hours after the completion of the boarding formalities, the Boarding
Inspector must submit the manifests to the Bay Service or similar office so that the Entry Processing Division
copy may be put to use by said office as soon as possible.
C.2.1.2 Within twenty-four (24) hours after the completion of the unloading of the vessel/aircraft,  the
Inspector assigned in the vessel/aircraft, shall issue a certification addressed to the Collector of Customs
(Attention: Chief, Entry Processing Division), copy furnished Chief, Data Monitoring Unit, specifically stating
the time and date of discharge of the last package from the vessel/aircraft assigned to him. Said certificate must be
encoded by Data Monitoring Unit in the Manifest Clearance System.
C.2.1.3 Twenty-three (23) days after the discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel/aircraft, the
Chief, Data Monitoring Unit shall cause the printing of the URGENT NOTICE TO FILE ENTRY in
accordance with the attached form, Annex A hereof, sign the URGENT NOTICE and cause its posting
continuously for seven (7) days at the Bulletin Board for the purpose until the lapse of the thirty (30) day
period.
C.2.1.4 The Chief, Data Monitoring Unit, shall submit a weekly report to the Collector of Customs with a listing
by vessel, Registry Number of shipments/ importations which shall be deemed abandoned for failure to file entry
within the prescribed period and with certification that per records available, the thirty (30) day period within
which to file the entry therefore has lapsed without the consignee/importer filing the entry and that the proper
posting of notice as required has been complied with.
xxxx
C.2.1.5 Upon receipt of the report, the Collector of Customs shall issue an order to the Chief, Auction and Cargo
Disposal Division, to dispose of the shipment enumerated in the report prepared by the Chief, Data Monitoring
Unit on the ground that those are abandoned and ipso facto deemed the property of the Government to be
disposed of as provided by law. (emphasis supplied)
CMO 15-94 is an executive edict that implements Section 180l (b) of the TCC. It is an interpretation given to a
statute by those charged with its execution, and is intended for the guidance of subordinate executive officials to
promote a more efficient and cost effective administration of the BOC. Unless the rule appears to be clearly
unreasonable or arbitrary, it is entitled to the greatest weight by the Court, 6 if not accorded the similar force and
binding effect of law. 7
Coupled with the earlier quotation from Chevron, it becomes abundantly clear that the notice requirement as
mandated in CMO 15-94 cannot be excused unless fraud is established. Resultantly, fraud being absent on the
part of petitioner Pilipinas Shell, the ipso facto abandonment doctrine cannot operate within the factual milieu of
the instant case. Be that as it may, in view of the substantial differences between the facts of  Chevron and the
peculiarities of the instant case, and just as Chevron was justified "under the peculiar facts and
circumstances" obtaining therein, the Decision dated December 5, 2016 in the case at bar ought to be considered
as a judgment pro hac vice.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court DENIES WITH FINALITY the Omnibus Motion (For

Reconsideration and Referral to the Court En bane) dated January 20, 2017 filed by public respondent
Commissioner of Customs for lack of merit.
 G.R. No. 181007, November 21, 2016

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS
vs.
 WILLIAM SINGSON AND TRITON SHIPPING CORPORATION

FACTS: Triton Shipping Corporation (TSC) is the owner of M/V Gypsy Queen. The vessel was loaded with
15,000 bags of rice shipped by Metro Star Rice Mill (Metro, Star) of Bocaue, Bulacan and consigned to William
Singson. On September 5, 2001, the elements of the Philippine Navy apprehended and seized the vessel and its
entire rice cargo somewhere in Caubayan Island, Cebu, for allegedly carrying suspected smuggled rice.
Accordingly, on September 18, 2001, the District Collector Customs of Port of Cebu, issued a WSD against M/V
Gypsy Queen and the 15,000 bags of rice for violating the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC). Afterwards, forfeiture
proceedings were conducted where both parties submitted their respective evidence.

On December 18, 2001, the DCC rendered a Decision in favor of TSC and Singson (respondents) and ordered the
release of M/V Gypsy Queen and the said cargo on the ground that there was no evidence to establish a cause of
action. On December 19, 2001, the DCC issued a 1st Indorsement of the said decision and forwarded the entire
records of the case to the Commissioner of Customs (petitioner), through its Legal Service, BOC, Manila. On
March 11, 2002, the petitioner issued the 2nd Indorsement reversing and setting aside the decision of the DCC
and ordered the forfeiture of M/V Gypsy Queen and its cargo. On November 8, 2003, the CTA reversed and set
aside the 2nd Indorsement issued by the petitioner and adopted the findings of the DCC. On November 16, 2006,
the CA affirmed the CTA's decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the CTA's decision ordering the release of the 15,000 bags of
rice and its carrying vessel.

Ruling: NO. At the time the vessel and its cargo were seized on September 25, 2001, the elements of the PN
never had a probable cause that would warrant the filing of the seizure proceedings. In fact, the petitioner ordered
the forfeiture of the rice cargo and its carrying vessel on the mere assumption of fraud. Notably, the 2nd
Indorsement issued by the petitioner failed to clearly indicate any actual commission of fraud or any attempt or
frustration thereof. Nonetheless, the TCC requires the presence of probable cause before any proceeding for
seizure and/or forfeiture is instituted. The relevant provision governing the present case is Section 2535 which
provides as follows:

Sec. 2535. Burden of Proof in Seizure and/or Forfeiture. - In all proceedings taken for the seizure and/or
forfeiture of any vessel, vehicle, aircraft, beast or articles under the provisions of the tariff and customs laws, the
burden of proof shall lie upon the claimant: Provided, That probable cause shall be first shown for the institution
of such proceedings and that seizure and/or forfeiture was made under the circumstances and in the manner
described in the preceding sections of this Code

Based on the afore-quoted provision, before forfeiture proceedings are instituted, the law requires the presence of
probable cause which rests on the petitioner who ordered the forfeiture of the shipment of rice and its carrying
vessel. Once established the burden of proof is shifted to the claimant.

Guided by the foregoing provision, to warrant the forfeiture of the 15,000 bags of rice and its carrying vessel,
there must be a prior showing of probable cause that: (1) the importation or exportation of the 15,000 bags of rice
was effected or attempted contrary to law, or that the shipment of the 15,000 bags of rice constituted prohibited
importation or exportation; and (2) the vessel was used unlawfully in the importation or exportation of the rice or
in conveying or transporting the rice, if considered as contraband or smuggled articles in commercial quantities,
into or from any Philippine port or place.
Still, the petitioner contends that the probable cause was established by the said certification that no vessel by the
name of MN Gypsy Queen logged in or submitted a Master's Oath of Safe Departure on August 15, 2001.

This assertion is erroneous and irrational. It was heedless on the part of the petitioner to institute forfeiture
proceeding on the basis of that certification alone. A review of the records of the case shows that there was no
probable cause to justify the forfeiture of the rice cargo and its carrying vessel. To prove that the rice shipment
was imported, the respondents submitted the following pieces of evidence supporting the validity and regularity
of the shipment. Besides, the records showed that the 15,000 bags of rice were of local origin, having been
purchased from NFA Zambales pursuant to the Open Sale Program of the NFA.
 G.R. No. 178759, August 11, 2008

CHEVRON PHILIPPINES, INC., VS. COMMISSIONER OF THE BUREAU OF CUSTOMS,

TOPIC: TAX and Custom Duties

FACTS: Chevron Phils. Inc., is engaged in the business of importing, distributing and marketing of petroleum
products in the Philippines. In 1996, the importations subject of this case arrived and were covered by 8 bills of
lading. The shipments were unloaded from the carrying vessels onto petitioner’s oil tanks over a period of 3 days
from the date of their arrival. Subsequently, the import entry declarations (IEDs) were filed and 90% of the total
customs duties were paid. The import entry and internal revenue declarations (IEIRDs) of the shipments were
thereafter filed.

The importations were appraised at a duty rate of 3% as provided under RA 8180 and petitioner paid the import
duties amounting to P316,499,021. Prior to the effectivity of RA 8180 on April 16, 1996, the rate of duty on
imported crude oil was 10%.

Three years later, then Finance Secretary received a letter denouncing the deliberate concealment, manipulation
and scheme employed by petitioner in the importation of crude oil, thereby resulting in huge losses of revenue for
the government. This letter was endorsed to the Bureau of Customs (BOC) for investigation.

On August 1, 2000, petitioner received a demand letter from the District Collector requiring the immediate
settlement of the amount of P73,535,830 representing the difference between the 10% and 3% tariff rates on the
shipments. Petitioner objected to the using of the 10% duty rate and insisted that the 3% tariff rate should instead
be applied. Furthermore it raised the defense of prescription against the assessment pursuant to Section 1603 of
the Tariff and Customs Code (TCC). Thus, it prayed that the assessment for deficiency customs duties be
cancelled and the notice of demand be withdrawn.

The Special Investigator found that there was an irregularity in the filing and acceptance of the import entries
beyond the 30-day non-extendible period prescribed under Section 1301 of the TCC and in the release of the
shipments after the same had already been deemed abandoned in favor of the government. Petitioner was then
ordered to pay P1,180,170,769.21 representing the total dutiable value of the importations.

The CTA en banc held that it was the filing of the IEIRDs that constituted entry under the TCC. Since these were
filed beyond the 30-day period, they were not seasonably "entered" in accordance with Section 1301 in relation to
Section 205 of the TCC. Consequently, they were deemed abandoned under Sections 1801 and 1802 of the TCC.
It also ruled that the notice required under Customs Memorandum Order was not necessary in view of petitioner's
actual knowledge of the arrival of the shipments. It likewise agreed with the CTA Division's finding that
petitioner committed fraud when it failed to file the IEIRD within the 30-day period with the intent to "evade the
higher rate." Petitioner was ordered to pay respondent the total dutiable value of the oil shipments amounting to
P893,781,768.21.

ISSUES:
1. Whether or not “entry” under Section 1301 in relation to Section 1801 of the TCC refers to the IED or the
IEIRD;
2. Whether or not "entry" under Section 1301 in relation to whether fraud was perpetrated by petitioner and
3. Whether or not the importations can be considered abandoned under Section 1801.
RULING:

1. The position of petitioner, that the import entry to be filed within the 30-day period refers to the IED and
not the IEIRD, has no legal basis. Under the relevant provisions of the TCC, both the IED and IEIRD
should be filed within 30 days from the date of discharge of the last package from the vessel or aircraft.
 The IED serves as basis for the payment of advance duties on importations whereas the IEIRD evidences
the final payment of duties and taxes. The operative act that constitutes "entry" of the imported articles at
the port of entry is the filing and acceptance of the "specified entry form" together with the other
documents required by law and regulations. The "specified entry form" refers to the IEIRD. The word
"entry" refers to the regular consumption entry (the IEIRD) and not the provisional entry (the IED).

2. Evidence showed that petitioner bided its time to file the IEIRD so as to avail of a lower rate of duty. A
clear indication of petitioner's deliberate intention to defraud the government was its non-disclosure of
discrepancies on the duties declared in the IEDs (10%) and IEIRDs (3%) covering the shipments.

Due to the presence of fraud, the prescriptive period of the finality of liquidation under Section 1603 was
inapplicable.

3. Petitioner's failure to file the required entries within a non-extendible period of thirty days from date of
discharge of the last package from the carrying vessel constituted implied abandonment of its oil
importations. This means that from the precise moment that the non-extendible thirty-day period lapsed,
the abandoned shipments were deemed the property of the government.

Therefore, when petitioner withdrew the oil shipments for consumption, it appropriated for itself
properties which already belonged to the government. Accordingly, it became liable for the total dutiable
value of the shipments of imported crude oil amounting to P1,210,280,789.21 reduced by the total amount
of duties paid amounting to P316,499,021.00 thereby leaving a balance of P893,781,768.21.

Due notice was not necessary in this case. The purpose of posting an "urgent notice to file entry" is only to notify
the importer of the "arrival of its shipment" and the details of said shipment. Since it already had knowledge of
such, notice was superfluous. Notice to petitioner was unnecessary because it was fully aware that its shipments
had in fact arrived. The oil shipments were discharged from the carriers docked in its private pier or wharf, into its
shore tanks. From then on, petitioner had actual physical possession of its oil importations. It was thus incumbent
upon it to know its obligation to file the IEIRD within the 30-day period prescribed by law. As a matter of fact,
importers such as petitioner can, under existing rules and regulations, file in advance an import entry even before
the arrival of the shipment to expedite the release of the same. However, it deliberately chose not to comply with
its obligation under Section 1301.

Petition DENIED. Petitioner Chevron Philippines, Inc. is ORDERED to pay P893,781,768.21 plus six percent
(6%) legal interest per annum accruing from the date of promulgation of this decision until its finality. Upon
finality of this decision, the sum so awarded shall bear interest at the rate of twelve percent (12%) per annum until
its full satisfaction.
 G.R. No. 158150; September 10, 2014

AGRIEX CO. LTD. V. HON TITUS B. VILLANUEVA, ET AL.

FACTS: Agriex Co., Ltd., a foreign corporation with principal office based in Bangkok, Thailand, entered into a
contract of sale with PT. Gloria Mitra of Indonesia and R&C Agro Trade of Cebu City for 180,000 and 20,000
bags of Thai white rice, respectively. Vessel MV Hung Yen was chartered to transport the cargo to the Subic Free
Port for transhipment to Fiji Islands and Indonesia, and Cebu City.

When the petitioner requested permission from the Bureau of Customs to unload the entire shipment of 200,000
bags of Thai white rice because the MV Hung Yen must return to Vietnam, Commissioner Titus B. Villanueva
issued his 1st Indorsement directing Collector of Customs Billy C. Bibit to issue a Warrant of Seizure and
Detention (WSD) against the 20,000 bags consigned to R&C Agro. The WSD issued was later amended to
include the vessel and the 180,000 bags intended for transhipment. The issuance was based on the After Mission
Report that the alleged consignees in Indonesia are not actually existing and that B.I. Naidu and Sons, Ltd. of Fiji
Island is not engaged in the importation of rice.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the WSD but Collector Bibit denied the same. The WSD issued against the
20,000 bags consigned to R&C Agro was lifted by virtue of Commissioner Villanueva’s Order following the
payment of the settlement value. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the CA alleging grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the respondents on the ground that they had no jurisdiction over the 180,000
bags intended to be transported to foreign countries. The respondents alleged that the petition should be dismissed
on the ground that the proper remedy was to file the petition with the CTA and not with the CA.

The CA ruled in favor of the respondents stating that since the jurisdiction to determine the validity or regularity
of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings is lodged or vested on the Collector of Customs and then, to the
Commissioner of Customs, which has already been done in the case at bar, the next move of the petitioner should
have been to file an appeal to the CTA, and if unsatisfied, to the CA.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Bureau of Customs has exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and detention
cases in Subic Bay Freeport of dutiable goods.

HELD: Yes, the Bureau of Customs has exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and detention cases in Subic
Bay Freeport of dutiable goods. The Subic Bay Freeport as a separate customs territory shall not divest the
government to intervene especially in cases when there are violations of tariff and customs laws.

Section 602 (g) of Republic Act No. 1937, otherwise known as the "Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines,"
provides the general duties, powers and jurisdiction of the bureau shall include:
xxx g. Exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture cases under the tariff and customs laws
xxx
It is well settled that the Collector of Customs has exclusive jurisdiction over seizure and forfeiture proceedings,
and regular courts cannot interfere with his exercise thereof or stifle or put it at naught. The Collector of Customs
sitting in seizure and forfeiture proceedings has exclusive jurisdiction to hear and determine all questions touching
on the seizure and forfeiture of dutiable goods.

Moreover, any prohibited or excluded articles found upon search, or through any examination, audit or check of
articles in the Zone by Customs may be seized by Customs for violations of Tariff and Customs Code of the
Philippines as amended and disposed of in accordance with law.

Furthermore, as a rule, from the moment imported goods are actually in the possession or control of the Customs
authorities, even if no warrant for seizure or detention had previously been issued by the Collector of Customs in
connection with the seizure and forfeiture proceedings, the BOC acquires exclusive jurisdiction over such
imported goods for the purpose of enforcing the customs laws, subject to appeal to the Court of Tax Appeals
whose decisions are appealable to the Supreme Court. This is to render effective and efficient the collection of
import and export duties due to the State.

Therefore, the Bureau of Customs committed no grave abuse of discretion when it acquired jurisdiction over the
seizure proceedings as the same is well within its exclusive jurisdiction as provided by law.