SECOND DIVISION

June 21, 2017 G.R. No. 220718

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee
vs.
NICOLAS TUBILLO y ABELLA, Accused-Appellant
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

On appeal is the December 11, 2014 Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 05740, which affirmed the July 4, 2012 Decision,2 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 225, Quezon City (RTC) in Criminal Case No. Q-06-
139031, finding accused-appellant Nicolas Tubillo y Abella (Tubillo) guilty of the
crime of simple rape.

On February 20, 2006, an Information3 was filed before the RTC charging Tubillo
with rape, in relation to Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7610, which reads:

That on or about the 1st day of February 2006, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused,
by means of force, violence and intimidation and at knife point, commit an act of sexual assault
upon one HGE, a minor, 13 years of age, by then and there while complainant was sound
asleep alone inside the room, forcibly opened the door then accused motivated by sexual
desire, undressed her, pulled down her underwear and mounted on top of her, and thereafter
have carnal knowledge with said complainant, all against her will and without consent, which
act debases, degrades and demeans the intrinsic worth and dignity of said HGE, as a human
being, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

On April 5, 2006, Tubillo was arraigned and he pleaded "not guilty." At the pre-
trial stage, the parties stipulated on the identity of Tubillo, the age of HGE, and
the police investigation.

During the trial, the prosecution presented HGE and Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz) as
its witnesses.

Version of the Prosecution

At the time of the incident, HGE was only thirteen (13) years old and was living
with AAA, the person who adopted her, at 249 St. Peter Street, Barangay Holy
Spirit, Quezon City.

On February 1, 2006, at around 10:00 o'clock in the evening, HGE was sleeping
at home alone, while AAA was working as a beautician at a salon. Suddenly, she
was awakened when Tubillo, her neighbor, entered their house by breaking the
padlock of the door.

Upon entry, Tubillo went directly to HGE and then he removed her clothes and
his own. He then forcibly inserted his penis in her vagina by pushing his body
towards her. HGE felt pain, but she did not resist as Tubillo was poking a knife at
her neck. The incident lasted for about thirty (30) seconds.

On February 8, 2006, HGE revealed her ordeal at the hands of Tubillo to her
aunt, leading to the filing of the subject complaint.

Dr. Ortiz testified that he was the medico-legal officer who examined HGE. He
found that she had a shallow healed laceration at 7:00 o'clock position in the
hymen; that the periurethral and vaginal smears were negative for spermatozoa;
and, that the findings were suggestive of the use of a blunt force or penetrating
trauma to the hymen which could have been an erect penis.

Version of the Defense

The defense presented Tubillo as its sole witness. He denied the accusations
against him and claimed that the complaint was filed simply because HGE' s aunt
was angry at him when he tried to collect some money from her.

The RTC Ruling

In its July 4, 2012 Decision, the RTC found Tubillo guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of simple rape, defined under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC), and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua
and to pay ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, plus interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum reckoned from the finality of the decision.

The RTC found that Tubillo sexually violated HGE on the date and time claimed
by the latter. It appreciated HGE's consistent testimony and the medical report
presented to establish the carnal knowledge committed against her will. The RTC
disregarded Tubillo's bare defense of denial because it was unsubstantiated.

Aggrieved, Tubillo elevated an appeal before the CA, arguing that HGE's
testimony was marred with inconsistencies, because she claimed prior rape
incidents which were not proven.
The CA Ruling

In its assailed December 11, 2014 Decision, the CA affirmed Tubillo's conviction
with modifications. It was of the view that HGE candidly testified about the sexual
violation committed by Tubillo against her and that the inconsistencies in her
testimony were trivial.

The CA, however, opined that as HGE was more than twelve (12) years old,
Tubillo could be charged with either rape under the RPC or child abuse under
R.A. No. 7610. The appellate court concluded that considering that Tubillo was
charged with rape in relation to R.A. No. 7610, he should be penalized under
Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610 instead. Thus, the CA modified the
penalty imposed upon Tubillo by reducing it to fourteen (14) years and eight (8)
months of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.

Hence, this appeal.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE

ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S GUILT HAS BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

In a Resolution, 5 dated December 9, 2015, the Court required the parties to

submit their respective supplemental briefs, if they so desired.

In its Manifestation and Motion,6 dated February 16, 2016, the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG) stated that it was no longer filing any supplemental brief
as it was adopting its Brief for the Appellee previously filed on November 5, 2013
before the CA.

In their Manifestation in lieu of Supplemental Brief,7 dated March 2, 2016, the

Public Attorney's Office manifested that they would not any more file a
supplemental brief, considering that Tubillo had exhaustively discussed the
assigned error in the Appellant's Brief before the CA.

The Court's Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

Rape through force or intimidation was committed

Under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender
had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished through
force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise
unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. 8

In this case, the CA and the RTC fully appreciated the testimony of HGE that, on
February 1, 2006, Tubillo forcibly entered the house where she was sleeping
alone; that he took off her clothes and his; that he forcibly inserted his penis in
her vagina; and that she could not resist because he poked a knife at her neck.
The sexual violation suffered by HGE in Tubillo's hands was corroborated by the
medical findings of Dr. Ortiz.

On the other hand, Tubillo merely invoked the defense of denial. In addition, he
claimed that the complaint was filed because HGE's aunt was angry at him. Mere
denial, however, without any strong evidence to support it, can scarcely
overcome the positive declaration by the child-victim of the identity of the
accused and his involvement in the crime attributed to him.9

As to the argument of Tubillo that HGE's testimony was incredible due to her
inconsistent claim that she was earlier sexually abused by him, it is simply bereft
of merit. As correctly observed by the CA, although HGE claimed that she was
abused earlier by Tubillo, she did not report the said incidents because she was
scared. It was only after the dastardly deed committed by Tubillo on February 1,
2006 that HGE mustered enough courage to tell her aunt about.

Evidently, no woman, least of all a child, would concoct a story of defloration,

allow examination of her private parts and subject herself to public trial or ridicule
if she has not, in truth, been a victim of rape and impelled to seek justice for the
wrong done to her being. 10

Hence, the Court is of the view that Tubillo committed rape with force and
intimidation against HGE.

Proper crime committed and imposable penalty

The CA found that Tubillo committed the crime of rape against HGE, then a 13-
year-old minor. Nevertheless, it opined that he must be convicted under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because it was the crime alleged in the information.
The Court disagrees.

To reiterate, the elements of rape under Section 266-A of the RPC are: (1) the
offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such act was accomplished
through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious; or when the victim is under twelve years of age. 11

On the other hand, the elements of Section 5(b) ofR.A. No. 7610, are:

(1) the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;

(2) the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
age. It is also stated there that children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse are tho'se children, whether male or female, who, for money, profit, or any
other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or
group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.

In the recent case of Quimvel v. People, 12 the Court ruled that the term
"coercion and influence" as appearing in the law is broad enough to cover "force
and intimidation." Black's Law Dictionary defines coercion as compulsion; force;
duress, while undue influence is defined as persuasion carried to the point of
overpowering the will. On the other hand, force refers to constraining power,
compulsion; strength directed to an end; while jurisprudence defines intimidation
as unlawful coercion; extortion; duress; putting in fear. As can be gleaned, the
terms are used almost synonymously. 13 Thus, it is not improbable that an act of
committing carnal knowledge against a child, twelve (12) years old or older,
constitutes both rape under Section 266-A of the RPC and child abuse under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In People v. Abay, 14 the Court was faced with the same predicament. In that
case, both the elements of Section 266-A of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 were alleged in the information. Nevertheless, these provisions were
harmonized, to wit:

Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse
is below 12 years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for sexual abuse but for
statutory rape under Article 266-A (1) (d) of the Revised Penal Code and penalized with
reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be
charged with either sexual abuse under Section 5 (b) of RA 7610 or rape under Article 266-A
(except paragraph 1 [d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be accused
of both crimes for the same act because his right against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A
person cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. Likewise, rape
 cannot be complexed with a violation of Section 5 (b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as
rape) cannot be complexed with an offense penalized by a special law. 15 (Emphasis
supplied)

In Abay, the offended party was thirteen (13) years old at the time of the rape
incident. Again, the information therein contained all the elements of Article 266-
A (1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610. Nevertheless, the Court
observed that the prosecution's evidence only focused on the specific fact that
accused therein sexually violated the offended party through force and
intimidation by threatening her with a bladed instrument and forcing her to submit
to his bestial designs. Thus, accused therein was convicted of the crime of rape
under Article 266-A (1) of the RPC. Notably, the prosecution did not tackle the
broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

Similarly, in People v. Pangilinan, 16 the Court was faced with the same dilemma
because all the elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A.
No. 7610 were present. It was ruled therein that the accused can be charged with
either rape or child abuse and be convicted therefor. The Court observed,
however, that the prosecution's evidence proved that accused had carnal
knowledge with the victim through force and intimidation by threatening her with
a samurai sword. Thus, rape was established. 17 Again, the evidence in that
case did not refer to the broader scope of "influence or coercion" under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.

In the present case, the RTC convicted Tubillo for the crime of rape because the
prosecution proved that there was carnal knowledge against HGE by means of
force or intimidation, particularly, with a bladed weapon. 18 On the other hand,
the CA convicted Tubillo with violation of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 because
the charge of rape under the information was in relation to R.A. No. 7610: 19

After a judicious study of the records, the Court rules that Tubillo should be
convicted of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the RPC.

A reading of the information would show that the case at bench involves both the
elements of Article 266-A (1) of the RPC and Section 5(b) of R.A. No.7610. As
elucidated in People v. Abay and People v. Pangilinan, in such instance, the
court must examine the evidence of the prosecution, whether it focused on the
specific force or intimidation employed by the offender or on the broader concept
of coercion or influence to have carnal knowledge with the victim.
Here, the evidence of the prosecution unequivocally focused on the force or
intimidation employed by Tubillo against HGE under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
RPC. The prosecution presented the testimony of HGE who narrated that Tubillo
unlawfully entered the· house where she was sleeping by breaking the padlock.
Once inside, he forced himself upon her, pointed a knife at her neck, and
inserted his penis in her vagina. She could not resist the sexual attack against
her because Tubillo poked a bladed weapon at her neck. Verily, Tubillo
employed brash force or intimidation to carry out his dastardly deeds.

In fine, Tubillo should be found guilty of rape under Article 266-A (1) (a) of the
RPC with a prescribed penalty of reclusion perpetua, instead of Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No.7610.

Awards of damages

The Court finds that· the damages awarded by the CA and the RTC should be
modified. People v. Jugueta20 established the standard of damages to be
awarded. Where the penalty imposed is reclusion perpetua, the minimum
indemnity and damages are as follows:

1. ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity;

2. ₱75,000.00 as moral damages; and
3. ₱75,000.00 as exemplary damages.

WHEREFORE, the July 4, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
225, Quezon City, in Criminal Case No. Q-06-139031, is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:

WHEREFORE, finding Nicolas Tubillo y Abella guilty beyond reasonable doubt of

one (1) count of SIMPLE RAPE, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua; and to pay HGE the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as
civil indemnity, P75,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱75,000.00 as exemplary
damages. All the amounts of damages awarded shall earn interest at the rate of
six percent (6%) per annum from the date of finality of judgment until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.