51. RANDOLF DAVID, ET AL. VS. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 171396 May 03, 2006

Topic: Part V: Presumption

D. Requisites for judicial inquiry in constitutional litigation

b. Legal standing / Locus standi

FACTS:

1. On February 24, 2006, as the nation celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the
Edsa People Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017 declaring a state of
national emergency.
2. The President called upon the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and the
Philippine National Police (PNP), to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism
and lawless violence in the country.
3. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and
activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I
as well as revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local
governments and dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA.
4. The police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor
at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist.
5. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list
Akbayan.
6. Early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the Criminal Investigation
and Detection Group (CIDG) of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O.
No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila and attempt to arrest was
made against representatives of ANAKPAWIS, GABRIELA and BAYAN MUNA
whom suspected of inciting to sedition and rebellion with a warrant dated
1985.
7. March 3, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist.
8. Petitioners filed seven (7) certiorari with the Supreme Court and three (3) of
those petitions impleaded President Arroyo as respondent questioning the
legality of the proclamation, alleging that it encroaches the emergency
powers of Congress and it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom
of the press, of speech and assembly.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 is unconstitutional?

RULING:

No. The Court rules that PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it

constitutes a call by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo on the AFP to prevent or
suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article
VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier.

However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or

implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all
laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by
the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint
on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under
Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a
legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business
affected with public interest.

Notes regarding the topic:

Part V: Presumption
D. Requisites for judicial inquiry in constitutional litigation
b. Legal standing / Locus standi

The locus standi of petitioners in particularly David and Llamas, is beyond

doubt. They alleged "direct injury" resulting from "illegal arrest" and "unlawful
search" committed by police operatives pursuant to PP 1017. Rightly so, the
Solicitor General does not question their legal standing.

Legal standing
In view of the number of petitioners suing in various personalities, the Court deems
it imperative to have a more than passing discussion on legal standing or locus
standi.
Locus standi is defined as "a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given
question." In private suits, standing is governed by the "real-parties-in interest"
rule as contained in Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as
amended. It provides that "every action must be prosecuted or defended in
the name of the real party in interest." Accordingly, the "real-party-in interest"
is "the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the
suit or the party entitled to the avails of the suit." Succinctly put, the
plaintiff’s standing is based on his own right to the relief sought.
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff
who asserts a "public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as
a representative of the general public. He may be a person who is affected no
differently from any other person. He could be suing as a "stranger," or in the
category of a "citizen," or ‘taxpayer." In either case, he has to adequately show
that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as
a "citizen" or "taxpayer.
Case law in most jurisdictions now allows both "citizen" and "taxpayer" standing in
public actions. The distinction was first laid down in Beauchamp v. Silk, where it
was held that the plaintiff in a taxpayer’s suit is in a different category from the
plaintiff in a citizen’s suit. In the former, the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but the mere
instrument of the public concern. As held by the New York Supreme Court
in People ex rel Case v. Collins: "In matter of mere public right, however…the
people are the real parties…It is at least the right, if not the duty, of every
citizen to interfere and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
punished, and that a public grievance be remedied." With respect to
taxpayer’s suits, Terr v. Jordan held that "the right of a citizen and a taxpayer
to maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use of public funds
to his injury cannot be denied."
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any
official policy or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of
governmental agencies engaged in public service, the United State Supreme Court
laid down the more stringent "direct injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later
reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a private individual
to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or legislative
action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of
that action, and it is not sufficient that he has a general interest common
to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal
and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was upheld in a litany of
cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’
Association v. De la Fuente,46 Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works 47 and Anti-
Chinese League of the Philippines v. Felix.48
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may
be waived by the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949
Emergency Powers Cases, Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental
importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act liberally. Such liberality was
neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court resolved to pass
upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality
to file the suit. Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been
observed, allowing ordinary citizens, and members of Congress, and civic
organizations to prosecute actions involving the constitutionality or validity of laws,
regulations and rulings.
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by
this Court. Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded
standing to sue, provided that the following requirements are met:
(1) the cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public
funds or that the tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of
the election law in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised
are of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained
of infringes upon their prerogatives as legislators.