G.R. No.

169004               September 15, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

For this Court's resolution is a petition1 dated September 2, 2005 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court that seeks to
reverse and set aside the Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan (Third Division), dated July 20, 2005, dismissing
Criminal Case No. 27988, entitled People of the Philippines v. Rolando Plaza for lack of jurisdiction.

The facts follow.

Respondent Rolando Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu, at the time relevant to
this case, with salary grade 25, had been charged in the Sandiganbayan with violation of Section 89 of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1445, or The Auditing Code of the Philippines for his failure to liquidate the cash advances he
received on December 19, 1995 in the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand Pesos (₱33,000.00) . The Information
reads:

That on or about December 19, 1995, and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto at Toledo City, Province of
Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused ROLANDO PLAZA,
a high-ranking public officer, being a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, and committing the
offense, in relation to office, having obtained cash advances from the City Government of Toledo in the total amount
of THIRTY THREE THOUSAND PESOS (₱33,000.00), Philippine Currency, which he received by reason of his
office, for which he is duty bound to liquidate the same within the period required by law, with deliberate intent and
intent to gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally fail to liquidate said cash advances of
₱33,000.00, Philippine Currency, despite demands to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid
amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Thereafter, respondent Plaza filed a Motion to Dismiss3 dated April 7, 2005 with the Sandiganbayan, to which the
latter issued an Order4 dated April 12, 2005 directing petitioner to submit its comment. Petitioner filed its
Opposition5 to the Motion to Dismiss on April 19, 2005. Eventually, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its
Resolution6on July 20, 2005 dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction, without prejudice to its filing before the
proper court. The dispositive portion of the said Resolution provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant case is hereby ordered dismissed for lack of jurisdiction without
prejudice to its filing in the proper court.

SO ORDERED.

Thus, the present petition.

Petitioner contends that the Sandiganbayan has criminal jurisdiction over cases involving public officials and
employees enumerated under Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, (as amended by Republic Act [R.A.] Nos. 7975 and
8249), whether or not occupying a position classified under salary grade 27 and above, who are charged not only
for violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or any of the felonies included in Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the
Revised Penal Code, but also for crimes committed in relation to office. Furthermore, petitioner questioned the
Sandiganbayan’s appreciation of this Court's decision in Inding v. Sandiganbayan,7 claiming that the Inding case did
not categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under Section 4 (a)
(1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a violation of R.A. 3019,
R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioner adds that the enumeration in
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and R.A. 8249, which was made applicable to cases
concerning violations of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, equally
applies to offenses committed in relation to public office.

In his Comment8 dated November 30, 2005, respondent Plaza argued that, as phrased in Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as
amended, it is apparent that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan was defined first, while the exceptions to the
general rule are provided in the rest of the paragraph and sub-paragraphs of Section 4; hence, the Sandiganbayan
was right in ruling that it has original jurisdiction only over the following cases: (a) where the accused is a public
official with salary grade 27 and higher; (b) in cases where the accused is a public official below grade 27 but his
position is one of those mentioned in the enumeration in Section 4 (a) (1) (a) to (g) of P. D. 1606, as amended and
his offense involves a violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal
Code; and (c) if the indictment involves offenses or felonies other than the three aforementioned statutes, the
general rule that a public official must occupy a position with salary grade 27 and higher in order that the
Sandiganbayan could exercise jurisdiction over him must apply. 

In a nutshell, the core issue raised in the petition is whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a
member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing
Code of the Philippines.
This Court has already resolved the above issue in the affirmative. People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante9 is a case
with uncanny similarities to the present one. In fact, the respondent in the earlier case, Victoria Amante and herein
respondent Plaza were both members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Toledo City, Cebu at the time pertinent to
this case. The only difference is that, respondent Amante failed to liquidate the amount of Seventy-One Thousand
Ninety-Five Pesos (₱71,095.00) while respondent Plaza failed to liquidate the amount of Thirty-Three Thousand
Pesos (₱33,000.00).

In ruling that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod whose salary
grade is below 27 and charged with violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines, this Court cited the case
of Serana v. Sandiganbayan, et al.10 as a background on the conferment of jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, thus:

x x x The Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on
June 11, 1978. It was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and
employees, based on the concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people.11

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No.
1606 expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.12

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which
was again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. x x x .

Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 7975 which took effect on May 16, 1995, which was again
amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. 8249, is the law that should be applied in the present case, the offense
having been allegedly committed on or about December 19, 1995 and the Information having been filed on March
25, 2004. As extensively explained in the earlier mentioned case,

The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the
action, not at the time of the commission of the offense.13 The exception contained in R. A. 7975, as well as
R. A. 8249, where it expressly provides that to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan in cases
involving violations of R. A. No. 3019, as amended, R. A. No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code is not applicable in the present case as the offense involved herein is a violation of The
Auditing Code of the Philippines. The last clause of the opening sentence of paragraph (a) of the said two
provisions states:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of
the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting or
interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: x x x.14

Like in the earlier case, the present case definitely falls under Section 4 (b) where other offenses and felonies
committed by public officials or employees in relation to their office are involved where the said provision, contains
no exception. Therefore, what applies in the present case is the general rule that jurisdiction of a court to try a
criminal case is to be determined at the time of the institution of the action, not at the time of the commission of the
offense. The present case having been instituted on March 25, 2004, the provisions of R.A. 8249 shall govern. P.D.
1606, as amended by R.A. 8249 states that:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, where
one or more of the principal accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government,
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense: 

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher,
otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of
1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and

(b) City mayors, vice mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads.

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

(2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution; and

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" and higher under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989.

B. Other offenses or felonies, whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.

Again, the earlier case interpreted the above provisions, thus:

The above law is clear as to the composition of the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Under Section 4 (a),
the following offenses are specifically enumerated: violations of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, R.A. No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. In order for the Sandiganbayan to acquire jurisdiction
over the said offenses, the latter must be committed by, among others, officials of the executive branch occupying
positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as Grade 27 and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989. However, the law is not devoid of exceptions. Those that are classified as
Grade 26 and below may still fall within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan provided that they hold the
positions thus enumerated by the same law. Particularly and exclusively enumerated are provincial governors,
vice-govenors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and
other provincial department heads; city mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other city department heads; officials of the diplomatic service occupying the
position as consul and higher; Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank; City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and
officials and prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor; and presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions
or foundations. In connection therewith, Section 4 (b) of the same law provides that other offenses or
felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) in relation to their office
also fall under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.15

Clearly, as decided in the earlier case and by simple application of the pertinent provisions of the law, respondent
Plaza, a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod during the alleged commission of an offense in relation to his
office, necessarily falls within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

Finally, as to the inapplicability of the Inding16 case wherein it was ruled that the officials enumerated in (a) to (g) of
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, are included within the original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
regardless of salary grade and which the Sandiganbayan relied upon in its assailed Resolution, this Court
enunciated, still in the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,17 that the Inding case did not
categorically nor implicitly constrict or confine the application of the enumeration provided for under
Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D. 1606, as amended, exclusively to cases where the offense charged is either a
violation of R.A. 3019, R.A. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code. As thoroughly
discussed:

x x x In the Inding case, the public official involved was a member of the Sangguniang Panlungsod with Salary
Grade 25 and was charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019. In ruling that the Sandiganbayan had jurisdiction over
the said public official, this Court concentrated its disquisition on the provisions contained in Section 4 (a) (1) of P.D.
No. 1606, as amended, where the offenses involved are specifically enumerated and not on Section 4 (b) where
offenses or felonies involved are those that are in relation to the public officials' office. Section 4 (b) of P.D. No.
1606, as amended, provides that:

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this section
in relation to their office.

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the above provision shows that those public officials enumerated in
Sec. 4 (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged in the Sandiganbayan with violations of
R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code, but also with other
offenses or felonies in relation to their office. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scope but are
limited only to those that are committed in relation to the public official or employee's office. This Court had ruled
that as long as the offense charged in the information is intimately connected with the office and is alleged
to have been perpetrated while the accused was in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his
official functions, there being no personal motive to commit the crime and had the accused not have
committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, the accused is held to have been indicted for "an offense
committed in relation" to his office.18 Thus, in the case of Lacson v. Executive Secretary, et al..,19 where the crime
involved was murder, this Court held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed in
relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender – that is, whether he is one of those public officers or
employees enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. x x x 

Also, in the case Alarilla v. Sandiganbayan,20 where the public official was charged with grave threats, this Court
ruled:

x x x In the case at bar, the amended information contained allegations that the accused, petitioner herein, took
advantage of his official functions as municipal mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan when he committed the crime of
grave threats as defined in Article 282 of the Revised Penal Code against complainant Simeon G. Legaspi, a
municipal councilor. The Office of the Special Prosecutor charged petitioner with aiming a gun at and threatening to
kill Legaspi during a public hearing, after the latter had rendered a privilege speech critical of petitioner’s
administration. Clearly, based on such allegations, the crime charged is intimately connected with the discharge of
petitioner’s official functions. This was elaborated upon by public respondent in its April 25, 1997 resolution wherein
it held that the "accused was performing his official duty as municipal mayor when he attended said public hearing"
and that "accused’s violent act was precipitated by complainant’s criticism of his administration as the mayor or chief
executive of the municipality, during the latter’s privilege speech. It was his response to private complainant’s attack
to his office. If he was not the mayor, he would not have been irritated or angered by whatever private complainant
might have said during said privilege speech." Thus, based on the allegations in the information, the Sandiganbayan
correctly assumed jurisdiction over the case. 1avvphi1

Proceeding from the above rulings of this Court, a close reading of the Information filed against respondent Amante
for violation of The Auditing Code of the Philippines reveals that the said offense was committed in relation to her
office, making her fall under Section 4 (b) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended. 

According to the assailed Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, if the intention of the law had been to extend the
application of the exceptions to the other cases over which the Sandiganbayan could assert jurisdiction, then there
would have been no need to distinguish between violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No. 1379 or Chapter II, Section
2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code on the one hand, and other offenses or felonies committed by public officials
and employees in relation to their office on the other. The said reasoning is misleading because a distinction
apparently exists. In the offenses involved in Section 4 (a), it is not disputed that public office is essential as
an element of the said offenses themselves, while in those offenses and felonies involved in Section 4 (b), it
is enough that the said offenses and felonies were committed in relation to the public officials or
employees' office. In expounding the meaning of offenses deemed to have been committed in relation to office,
this Court held:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], the Court elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offense
committed in relation to [an accused’s] office" by referring to the principle laid down in Montilla v. Hilario [90 Phil 49
(1951)], and to an exception to that principle which was recognized in People v. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The
principle set out in Montilla v. Hilario is that an offense may be considered as committed in relation to the accused’s
office if "the offense cannot exist without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent element of the crime x x x."
In People v. Montejo, the Court, through Chief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is not an
element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in a particular case may show that

x x x the offense therein charged is intimately connected with [the accused’s] respective offices and was perpetrated
while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [the accused]
had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not have committed it had they not held their aforesaid
offices. x x x"21

Moreover, it is beyond clarity that the same provisions of Section 4 (b) does not mention any qualification as to the
public officials involved. It simply stated, public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of the same
section. Therefore, it refers to those public officials with Salary Grade 27 and above, except those specifically
enumerated. It is a well-settled principle of legal hermeneutics that words of a statute will be interpreted in their
natural, plain and ordinary acceptation and signification,22 unless it is evident that the legislature intended a technical
or special legal meaning to those words.23 The intention of the lawmakers - who are, ordinarily, untrained philologists
and lexicographers - to use statutory phraseology in such a manner is always presumed. (Italics supplied.)24

With the resolution of the present case and the earlier case of People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,25 the issue as
to the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan has now attained clarity.

WHEREFORE, the Petition dated September 2, 2005 is hereby GRANTED and the Resolution of the

SO ORDERED.