EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-25856. April 29, 1968.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES , plaintiff-appellee, vs. JACINTO

RICAPLAZA @ TOTING RICAPLAZA , defendant-appellant.

Arturo P. Peralta and Felixberto A. Perbillo for appellant.

Solicitor General Antonio P. Barredo, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A.
Torres & Solicitor Crispin V. Bautista for appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. EVIDENCE; WITNESSES; TESTIMONY OF; CREDIBILITY OF CHILDREN OF

TENDER AGE; IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED. — Where the children had served meals
to appellant during me latter's stay in the deceased's house for two days and where all
ate together and saw appellant converse with the deceased while they were eating, they
had all the opportunity and time to look at appellant's face. It is not possible therefore
that these children could forget appellant's face for so short a time. Children have good
and retentive memory, especially at the ages of 12 like the children herein.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES WITH NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO
TESTIFY. — Just because Lucia and Jose na were young in age and the former was the
granddaughter of the deceased and, like Miss Ruellan, were given free board and
lodging, did not necessarily mean that they could allow themselves to be used as tools
of the relatives of the deceased by perjuring themselves. It has been consistently ruled
that where no improper motive has been shown, relationship to the victim does not
render the clear and positive testimony of witnesses less worthy of full faith and credit.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CONCLUSION OF TRIAL COURT ON THEIR CREDIBILITY
RESPECTED. — Conclusion of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses,
commands a great respect and consideration, and appellate courts will not interfere
with the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility of witnesses for the
latter is in a better position to appreciate the same, having seen and heard the
witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of testifying during the
trial.
4. I D.; RES GESTAE; REQUISITES. — There are three requisites for the
admission of evidence of res gestae: (1) That the principal act, the res gestae be a
startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were made before the declarant had time
to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements must concern the occurrence in
question and its immediately attending circumstances.
5. ID.; ID.; IDENTIFICATION OF ACCUSED AS PART OF THE RES GESTAE . —
The intervening time between the act and the declaration relating to it is so short that it
may not be deemed to have relieved the declarant from the existing in uence of the
startling occurrence. No other circumstance had intervened which might have removed
from Lucia's mind the startling incident. The identi cation of appellant may, therefore,
be considered as part of the res gestae since it was made before the declarant could
contrive or devise a plan to incriminate him.

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 6. ID.; ALIBI; WHEN AVAILABLE. — To establish an alibi, it is not enough to
prove that the defendant was at some other place when the crime was committed but
must, likewise, demonstrate that it was physically impossible for him to have been at
the scene of the crime at such time.
7. ID.; ID.; NATURE OF ALIBI. — The rule is that alibi is the weakest of all
defenses and that the same should be rejected when the identity of the accused has
been su ciently and positively established by eye-witnesses to the crime. And since
alibi can easily be fabricated, the same must be established by clear and positive
evidence, free from doubt and bias, and the purely oral evidence presented to prove it
can not prevail over positive evidence showing the presence of the defendant at the
scene of the crime and his participation in the commission thereof.

DECISION

ANGELES , J : p

Jacinto Ricaplaza @ Toting Ricaplaza was charged with the crime of robbery in
band with homicide in an information led by the Provincial Fiscal of Cotabato, together
with ve other persons whose identities were, at the time of the trial, still unknown and
at large, in the Court of First Instance of Cotabato.
After trial, the court found Jacinto Ricaplaza guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of robbery with homicide only, as the number of the robbers was not
established by the evidence. There being no modifying circumstance attendant in the
commission of the crime, the accused was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased, Francisco Poncardas, in the sum of
P6,000.00. and P375.00 for the value of a shotgun, P120.00 for the value of jewelry, and
P320.00 for the value of a transistor radio, all belonging to the deceased; and to
indemnify Miss Gliceria Ruellan the sum of P45.00 for her wrist watch, P5.00 for the
value of her goggles and cash amount of P30.00, all of which were lost in the robbery
committed on the night of June 18, 1962, and to pay the costs.
Hence, this appeal from the decision.
On June 18, 1962, at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening, Francisco Poncardas was
lying down on the sofa that was in the sala of his house in Padidu, Glan, Cotabato. He
had just taken supper with the members of his household, namely: Irinea Clarrisan, his
wife; Ru na Poncardas, daughter; Justiniano Poncardas and Lucia grandson and
granddaughter, respectively; Jose na Bigapria, his ward; and Gliceria Ruellan, a public
school teacher boarding in the house. All of a sudden, a man entered the sala with a
pistol pointed at Francisco Poncardas, and demanded where his money was. At that
moment, Lucia was wiping the dining table which was about 3 meters from the sala;
Jose na was washing dishes in the kitchen; Ruellan and Ru na were in the toilet, about
20 meters away from the house. Francisco Poncardas reacted to the demand by rising
from the sofa and tried to wrest the gun from the intruder. Shots were thereupon red
at Francisco, from someone outside the house and by the intruder himself. As a
consequence, Francisco suffered gunshot wounds, fell to the floor and died instantly.
After the robbers had ed, it was found that the wardrobe was forced open by a
shot right at the key hole and things were scattered all over the room. The following
articles were found missing: A shotgun worth P375.00, jewelry worth P120.00, and a
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 transistor radio worth P320.00, all belonging to the deceased. Gliceria Ruellan lost cash
in the amount of P30.00, a wrist watch worth P45.00 and goggles worth P5.00. Jose
Poncardas, son of the deceased, also claimed that cash amounting to P9,000.00 kept
by the deceased in his aparador was missing. He said this amount represented the
proceeds of the sales of copra made by the deceased.
At the time of the commission of the crime on June 18, 1962, Lucia Ferolino and
Jose na Bigapria were living in the house of Francisco Poncardas (TSN, pp. 15, 75, 82,
888, 107). Both were studying and being supported by the deceased, aside from the
fact that Lucia is his granddaughter (TSN, pp. 15, 75, 82). Gliceria Ruellan was a school
teacher boarding in the house of the deceased but she did not pay for her board and
lodging (TSN, pp. 299-300). When Lucia and Jose na were called to testify in this case
both were only 12 years of age (TSN, pp. 15, 88).
Lucia Ferolino testi ed that she rst met appellant Jacinto Ricaplaza in May
1962, when he stayed for two days and two nights in the house of her grandfather
Francisco Poncardas in Padidu, Glan, Cotabato. She said she served meals to him (TSN,
pp. 105, 110, 111). On the night in question, after taking supper, she was wiping the
dining table which was about 3 meters from the sala, when all of a sudden a man
entered, pointed his gun to his grandfather, and asked: "Where is the key?" She
recognized the intruder as Toting Ricaplaza. Her grandfather stood up and grappled
with him. At once she heard a shot from the intruder. Then she saw one robber at the
window shot her grandfather. As a consequence, her grandfather fell. (TSN, pp. 90-92)
She wanted to go upstairs, but when she saw four legs in the stairs, she went instead to
the kitchen and told Jose na that there were robbers in the house and that her
grandfather was shot. (TSN, pp. 93- 97). Lucia and Jose na then ran towards the door
to escape, but they were blocked by appellant who, at gunpoint, ordered them to go
inside, otherwise they would be killed. They obeyed and ran to the sala. Upon seeing
Francisco Poncardas dead, they ran outside through the main door towards the
evergreen. Jose na separated from her. She proceeded to the house of Melchor
Poncardas. Lucia declared that she was positive it was Jacinto Ricaplaza who shot her
grandfather because she saw his face. (TSN, pp. 98-102, 116-118.) When she and
Jose na returned to the house of Francisco Poncardas after the shooting had stopped,
they volunteered the information to the people there that it was Jacinto Ricaplaza who
killed Francisco Poncardas. (TSN, p. 122.)
Jose na Bigapria testi ed that she was living in the house of Francisco
Poncardas when the incident happened. The deceased was the one sending her to
school. (TSN, p. 15) On the night in question, she was washing dishes in the kitchen
when Lucia Ferolino came running and told her that there were robbers in the house and
that her grandfather was shot. Before that, she heard gunshots inside the house. She
(Jose na) and Lucia ran towards the door but they were blocked by appellant and
pointed his pistol to them. They were told by appellant to go inside otherwise they
would be killed. They ran to the sala and saw Francisco Poncardas dead. They went out
running towards the evergreen. She heard many shots outside. On the road, they met
Ru na Poncardas. They told her that Toting Ricaplaza blocked their way by the kitchen.
Then she (Jose na) and Lucia parted ways. Jose na went running to the house of
Melchor Poncardas where she met Lucia. When it was already quiet, she and Lucia went
back to the house of Francisco Poncardas. There were many people inside the house.
Without being asked, they told the people there that Toting Ricaplaza shot Francisco
Poncardas. (TSN, pp. 23-24; 25-26; 36-39). Witness declared that she knew appellant
before the night of the incident because he stayed in the house of Francisco Poncardas
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 in May 1962 for two days and two nights and that she and Lucia served him food. (TSN,
pp. 25, 26, 55.)
When Lucia and Jose na were brought to jail to identify the assailant of
Francisco Poncardas, they singled out appellant among three individuals in the jail as
the person whom they saw on the night in question. (TSN, pp. 42, 131.) Jose na further
identi ed appellant by the scars on his face: one in the right forehead and the other on
his left cheek. She said she saw those scars during the night of the incident because
she looked very well at appellant's face. Appellant did not wear mask at the time. (TSN,
pp. 44, 45, 46, 50.) Both witnesses declared that appellant was wearing a cap. (TSN, pp.
84, 142.) They recognized appellant by the light of electric bulbs when they tried to
escape towards the kitchen door but were blocked by appellant. (TSN, pp, 98-100.)
Gliceria Ruellan testi ed that when Francisco Poncardas was shot, she was in the
toilet together with Ru na Poncardas. The toilet was about 20 meters from the house.
They were about to return to the house but when they saw men ring towards the
house, they ed to the house of Melchor Poncardas. Five minutes later, Lucia Ferolino
arrived and she told witness that Francisco Poncardas was killed by Toting Ricaplaza.
(TSN, pp. 282-285.)
It is argued that having met the appellant occasionally, and considering the
length of time that had elapsed since Lucia and Jose na rst met him in May 1962 to
June 18, 1962, when the crime was committed, it is not possible that these witnesses
could print in their minds the look of appellant especially under a situation of fear and
distress.
The argument is untenable.
It is true that Lucia and Jose na met appellant only once before the commission
of the crime on June 18, 1962, but their meeting was not merely casual. For two days in
May 1962, appellant and the witnesses stayed together in the house of Francisco
Poncardas. The children served meals to appellant during his two-days stay there. They
ate together. They saw appellant converse with the deceased while they were eating.
(TSN, pp. 26, 55, 65, 105, 110, 111.) They had all the time and opportunity to look at
appellant's face. From May to June 1962, only a month had elapsed. It is not possible
that these children could forget appellant' face for so short a time. Generally, children
have good and retentive memory, especially at the ages of 12 like Lucia and Jose na.
They said they were afraid, but not so much. They still remember appellant's face. (TSN,
pp. 33, 116.)
Lucia and Jose na were subjected to rigid questioning on cross- examinations.
Attempts were made by counsel to mislead them by suggesting that the one they saw
on the night in question had a similarity to appellant, but despite long and tedious
cross- examination, the children stuck to their testimony that it was appellant Toting
Ricaplaza whom they saw and not another who looked like him. Never for a moment did
they falter, waver or vaccillate in their testimonies during their direct and cross-
examinations. As the record shows, they testi ed in a clear, straightforward manner
which can only mean that what they narrated in court was what they actually saw and
observed on the night in question. Their story remained consistent and free from
material contradictions.
Appellant maintains that Lucia and Jose na were taught by the prosecution what
to say in court and because of their tender age and relationship with the deceased,
couple with the fact that the expenses for their education were shouldered by the
deceased, the said children had to adopt whatever coaching the prosecution should
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 advise them to testify in court. And in the case of Miss Ruellan, appellant claims that
she had to follow the suggestion of the private prosecutor if only to please the relatives
of the deceased and to manifest in some way her debt of gratitude for having lived in
the house of the deceased without expense.
Just because Lucia and Jose na were young in age and the former was the
grand-daughter of the deceased and, like Miss Ruellan, were given free board and
lodging, did not necessarily mean that they could allow themselves to be used as tools
of the relatives of the deceased by perjuring themselves. This is specially true of Miss
Ruellan who as a school teacher, is presumed to have a high regard for truth and to be
conscious of the far-reaching results of her testimony. Anyhow, the contention is
devoid of factual basis, and merits no consideration.
It has been consistently ruled that where no improper motive has been shown,
relationship to the victim does not render the clear and positive testimony of witnesses
less worthy of full faith and credit (People vs. Tividad, et al., L-21469, June 30, 1967;
People vs. Santos, et al., L-17215-17, Feb. 28, 1967; People vs. Reyes, et al., L-18892,
May 30, 1966; People vs. Villalba, L-17243, August 23, 1966; People vs. Asmawil, L-
18761, March 31, 1965; People vs. Libed, et al., L-20431, June 23, 1965; People vs.
Miranda, et al., L-18508-09). In the case at bar, no improper motive has been proved on
the part of the witnesses for the prosecution. It cannot be assumed that in seeking
justice and the punishment of the assailant, they would indiscriminately, and without
any motive, point to the wrong parties. (People vs. Valera, L-15662, August 20, 1962;
People vs. Tagaro, L- 18518, January 31, 1963; People vs. Asmawil, supra; People vs.
Constantino, et al., L-23558, August 10, 1967.)The trial court, after having observed the
witnesses on the stand, found them credible. The conclusion of the trial court regarding
the credibility of witnesses, command great respect and consideration, and appellate
courts will not interfere with the conclusion of the trial court concerning the credibility
of witnesses for the latter is in a better position to appreciate the same, having seen
and heard the witnesses themselves and observed their behavior and manner of
testifying during the trial. (People vs.Portugueza, L- 22604, July 31, 1967; People vs.
Gumahin, L-22357, October 31, 1967; People vs. Jarawata, L-22029, August 15, 1967;
Addenbrook vs. People, L-22995, June 29, 1967; People vs. Castro, L-20555 & 21449,
June 30, 1967.)
Appellant assails the testimony of Lucia Ferolino to the effect that after the
appellant had allegedly asked for the key, he immediately shot Francisco Poncardas
without giving the latter a chance to say anything or answer the inquiry. This, appellant
claims, is inconsistent with the ordinary course of events since the deceased and
appellant were intimate and related to each other (the deceased was allegedly the
second cousin of appellant's father). Appellant maintains that under the circumstances,
the natural reaction would have been for the appellant to wait for the answer of the
deceased before shooting him. He mentions some probable comments that the
deceased could have made, thus: "What is the matter, Toting"; or "Why have you done
this to me, Toting"; or "Don't you pity me, Toting"; or "Please don't kill me, Toting." This,
the deceased never said, much more mentioned appellant's name, during his supposed
distressed moments and, therefore, the reasonable inference is that the person who
shot him was not known to him in any way.
Reduced to few words, appellant's theory is that what is not ordinary is not
credible. Appellant's argument ignores the fact that different persons respond to crisis
differently. Francisco Poncardas might have been a man of few words. Besides, the
deceased treated appellant like a son (appellant testi ed that the deceased loved him
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 very much, even gave him money (TSN, p. 822), and, as a father, he must have thought
that he could stop appellant by simply getting the gun from him, sans any dialogue. And
so, without much ado, he tried to wrest the gun from the appellant. It was perhaps this
attitude of the deceased that provoked the appellant, so he shot his benefactor. This is
not uncommon nowadays. Many cases there are when children are the masterminds of
robbery committed against their own parents or against the persons who have given
them shelter, food and education. Children have the temerity of shooting their own
parents even for tri ing reasons, as when they are refused money, or when they are
scolded or prevented to do this and that. If children can do this to their own parents,
what more of strangers?
It is argued that robbers do not usually commit robbery in a place where they are
well known, and more so, when the place is well lighted, and that robbers instinctively
commit robbery with the highest precaution in order that nobody may recognize them.
This theory does not hold true anymore. Time has changed a great deal. Now, robberies
are committed left and right in broad daylight, in the midst of crowds, and under the
very noses of police authorities. Even if their identities are known, the robbers can get
away with the robbery; they hide in far away places where they are not known and with
assumed names, they enjoy their loot. Before they are caught, if ever they can be
discovered, they have pulled another robbery and disposed of their loot. Like in the case
at bar, among the robbers who participated in the commission of the crime, only
appellant was apprehended and brought to trial; the others, who presumably hold the
stolen goods and money, have not yet been apprehended and are scot free.
It is also contended that the trial court erred in considering as part of the res
gestae the statement of Lucia Ferolino that immediately after she arrived in the house
of Melchor Poncardas, to where she ed during the time of the robbery, Lucia told
Ruellan, that Francisco Poncardas was killed by a person named "Toting", because
appellant claims that when Lucia returned to the house of the deceased after the
robbers had left, she did not mention this information to anybody, more so to the police
officers who were investigating the case. (TSN, pp. 283-285; 298-299.)
Appellant doubts that this information connecting him to the crime had really
been relayed to Ruellan, otherwise, as appellant claims, she would have reiterated the
statement to the authorities. The failure of Miss Ruellan to inform the police o cers
about the statement does not make her an incredible witness. In the rst place, she
was not asked about the statement. And since Lucia and Jose na, who have actually
witnessed the incident, had already volunteered the information to the people inside the
house of Poncardas. (TSN, p. 122), there was no need for Miss Ruellan to repeat the
same statement.
There, are three requisites for the admission of evidence of res gestae: (1) that
the principal act, the res gestae, be a startling occurrence; (2) that the statements were
made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise; and (3) that the statements
must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.
(Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 5, 1963 Ed. 36). There is no question that
robbery with homicide is a startling occurrence so as to produce nervous excitement.
The declaration of Lucia Ferolino that appellant shot her grandfather, no doubt,
concerned the occurrence in question. The question then to determine is whether the
statement, made after the robbery and homicide had ended, was made before the
declarant had time to contrive or devise anything contrary to the real fact that occurred.
Lucia Ferolino testi ed that after she saw Toting Ricaplaza shoot her
grandfather, she ran to the kitchen and informed Jose na Bigapria about the incident.
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 Then the two of them went out running towards the evergreen, hide for a while, and then
proceeded to the house of Melchor Poncardas. Upon arrival there, Lucia immediately
informed Miss Ruellan that the person who shot her grandfather was Toting Ricaplaza.
The intervening time between the act and the declaration relating to it is so short that it
may not be deemed to have relieved the declarant from the exciting in uence of the
startling occurrence. No other circumstance had intervened which might have removed
from Lucia's mind the startling incident. The identi cation of appellant may, therefore,
be considered as part of the res gestae since it was made before the declarant could
contrive or devise a plan to incriminate him. But, even if the statement of Miss Ruellan
admitted by the trial court as part of the res gestae is excluded, still the evidence in
respect to the participation of the appellant in the commission of the crime is
convincing.
The appellant vigorously assails the decision because the trial court did not
accord credence to his defense of alibi.
Appellant denied the charge that he was one of those who robbed and killed
Francisco Poncardas on the night of June 18, 1962. While admitting having been at the
house of the deceased in May 1962, he denied, however, that he had been served his
meals there by Lucia and Jose na (TSN, pp. 794-795). To determine the truth of
appellant's alibi, it is important to enumerate here his activities before and after the
commission of the crime.
Appellant testi ed that on June 18, 1962, from morning up to 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, he was busy working in the shpond of Dionisio Liong in Balangonan, Jose
Abad Santos, Davao, many kilometers away from Padidu, Glan, Cotabato. From the
shpond, he went to the house of Dionisio Liong where he sat by the balcony and
listened to the radio up to 6:00 o'clock, when he was asked by one Leonardo Saavedra
to help him catch pigs (TSN, pp. 805, 808-809, 874-875). The catching of pigs lasted
for about half an hour, after which he was ordered by Dionisio Liong to close the gate of
the shpond and repair the dikes. He left the shpond at about 10:00 o'clock in the
evening (TSN, pp. 811, 874-875).
The next day, June 19, appellant learned of the tragedy. He felt worried and wept
because the deceased was to him like his father who loved him very much and even
gave him money (TSN, pp. 815, 822). On June 23, he left Balangonan for Dadiangas. He
declared that although in going to Dadiangas, he had to pass Glan, he did not bother to
stop there because his wife and children were waiting for him in Dadiangas where they
intended to take a bath at the beach there on June 24 — St. John the Baptist Day (TSN,
pp. 823-825; 851).
Appellant presented witnesses to corroborate his claim: Capt. Jose Momongan
who was then the Commanding O cer of the 10 1st P.C. Company stationed at
General Santos, Cotabato; Sgt. Salvador Garcira of the same company; Dionisio Liong,
Leonardo Saavedra and Hilario Tubuan.
Captain Jose Momongan testi ed that he rst met appellant in May 1962, in
General Santos, Davao. He met him again in Balangonan on June 16, 1962, where he
went to investigate the boundary dispute between Glan and Abad Santos regarding
Batulaki and to see the shpond offered to him by Dionisio Liong (TSN, pp. 342-346).
He did not know appellant's real name. He merely called him Ting. On June 18, 1962, at
about 6:00 to 6:30 in the afternoon, appellant, with two others, was ordered by Dionisio
Liong to catch pigs. The catching of pigs lasted up to 7:00 o'clock in the evening.
Witness saw appellant again while he and Dionisio Liong were eating supper about 7:30
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 o'clock that evening. Appellant ate supper during the second serving (TSN, pp. 352-
354). After eating, appellant went to the shpond together with the other employees of
Liong. That from the veranda of Liong's house, he could see appellant and his
companions in the shpond until they returned to the house at 10:00 o'clock in the
evening (TSN, pp. 356, 357). He further declared that appellant was wearing white shirt
and maong pants with a red cap on the day in question. The next day, June 19, he saw
appellant early in the morning in the beach of Balangonan wearing the same cap (TSN,
pp. 357-358).
Dionisio Liong testi ed that appellant is a relative of his wife. He rst met him in
May 1961 in Dadiangas, Cotabato. The second time he met him was on June 15, 1962,
when appellant applied for a job in his shpond. He immediately appointed him as
supervisor of his shpond although he knew that he had no experience in shpond
business. Before appellant's appointment, there was a regular supervisor of the
shpond (TSN, pp. 726-728, 745-746). Witness declared that appellant arrived in
Balangonan in the morning of June 15, 1962. He said the distance between Balangonan
and Padidu Glan can be negotiated by boat in 3 to 4 hours (TSN, pp, 751, 769). In the
afternoon of June 18, 1962, appellant emptied the shpond up to 6:30 o'clock.
Afterwards, he chased hogs with two other companions. The chasing of hogs lasted
until 7:00 o'clock. The last time he saw appellant was at 10:00 o'clock that same
evening (TSN, pp. 733-735).
Witness testi ed that he knew Capt. Jose Momongan since 1961. He said he did
not offer his fishpond to Capt. Momongan; it was the Captain who wanted to buy it. And
the Captain went to Balangonan not to convince him to sell his shpond but to
investigate the boundary dispute regarding Batulaki (TSN, pp. 754-759). On June 18,
1962, after lunch, the Captain took his siesta. After he woke up, witness and the Captain
conversed off and on inside his house until 10:00 o'clock in the evening. The Captain did
not go out of the house from the time he woke up from his siesta (TSN, pp. 765-766).
In the preliminary investigation before the Justice of the Peace Court, appellant
testi ed as follows: Appellant arrived in Balangonan on June 16, 1962, at 12:00 o'clock
noon. On June 18, 1962, after chasing pigs, appellant took his supper with Captain
Momongan at about 8:00 o'clock or more. Afterwards, appellant slept. That the
distance between Balangonan and Padidu Glan can be travelled in one and a half hours
using a boat with 40 horse power engine.
Sergeant Salvador Garcira testi ed that he saw appellant about 6:00 o'clock in
the afternoon of June 18, 1962, before chasing the hogs. He saw him again at 6:40
after catching the pigs. That was the last time he saw appellant (TSN, p. 665). In the
preliminary investigation, however, witness declared that the last time he saw appellant
was on June 18, 1962, at 5:15 in the afternoon (TSN, pp. 683-689).
Appellant's alibi must fail.
According to appellant, his uncle Francisco Poncardas loved him very much. Yet
when he learned of his uncle's tragic death in Padidu Glan, he did not even bother to go
there and pay his last respects to the deceased or condole with his bereaved family.
And all because his wife and children were waiting for him in Dadiangas where they
intended to take a bath at the beach there. Appellant explained later that he did not go
to Glan anymore because he was being suspected as the mastermind of the robbery
and homicide. For more reason he should have presented himself to the family of the
deceased and to the authorities as well in order to clear his name, if indeed, he had
nothing to do with the commission of the felony. This is the most logical thing that an
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 innocent man would have done under the circumstances. Appellant's behavior is
unusual and inconsistent with human experience. His actions betray his guilty
conscience.
Appellant had chosen the time between 6:30 and-7:00 o'clock in the evening to
catch pigs. The reason he gave for so doing is that the pigs during day time go to the
mountains and come back late in the afternoon. He said the pigs were domesticated.
This is a very peculiar excuse. Domesticated pigs do not usually go far but remain
within the premises of the house. If ever they go far and get lost, they would not know
how to come back, unlike the dogs and cats. And if the pigs were really that tamed as
suggested by appellant, there was no need for him to chase them. While eating, the pigs
can be caught without di culty. There is evidence that the house of Dionisio Liong is
surrounded by coconut trees and forest (TSN p. 895). This piece of evidence renders
more unconvincing appellant's excuse. Chasing pigs in open space crowded with trees
at nighttime is a departure from the ordinary way of catching them.
It will be observed that the testimonies of defense witnesses dovetailed in nearly
every detail as to where and what appellant did prior to, at the time of and even after the
commission of the crime. The things related by the witnesses seemed to be very fresh
and vivid in their minds despite the lapse of time. The exact and uniform time given by
said witnesses, their having noticed said time without special reason for doing so, and
their close association with appellant, render their testimonies unconvincing. (People
vs. Fontanosa, et al., L-19421, May 29, 1967; People vs. Raquel, L-17401, November 28,
1964).
It is also worthy to note that the aforesaid testimonies suffer from aws and
inconsistencies. Thus, Captain Momongan declared that in the afternoon of June 18,
1962, he stayed in the veranda of Dionisio Liong's house from where he witnessed the
chasing of the hogs. From there, he also saw appellant and his companions while they
were working in the shpond. He also stated that he and Dionisio Liong ate their supper
ahead; appellant ate his supper during the second serving. On the other hand, Dionisio
Liong testi ed that Captain Momongan did not leave the house from the moment he
woke up from his siesta; they were conversing off and on inside his house up to 10:00
o'clock in the evening. He also denied the Captain's claim that he offered his shpond
to him. While the variance may pertain only to minor matters of the incident, they surely
affect witnesses' credibility.
To establish an alibi it is not enough to prove that the defendant was at some
other place when the crime was committed but must, likewise, demonstrate that it was
physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at such time.
(People vs. De los Santos, et al., L-19067-68, July 30, 1965; People vs. Libed, et al., L-
20431, May 27, 1966; People vs. Noril Sampang, L-15743, March 31, 1966; People vs.
Sinaon, L-15631, May 27, 1966; People vs. Constantino, L-23558, August 10, 1967;
People vs. Pelagio, et al., L- 16177, May 24, 1967.)
Assuming that appellant was really in Balangonan on the day in question — June
18, 1962, — there is evidence that it was not physically impossible for him to be at the
place of the crime at the precise time the robbery and homicide were committed.
During the preliminary investigation, Sgt. Garcira testi ed that the last time he saw
appellant was at 5:15 in the afternoon of July 18. And Dionisio Liong declared that the
distance between Balangonan and Padidu Glan could be negotiated in one and a half
hour by boat. The crime at bar was committed at about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of
June 18, 1962. It is true that Liong tried to change his testimony in court (TSN pp. 736,
737, 743) but between his testimony at the trial and his testimony at the preliminary
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 investigation, the latter should be given credence because it was made when declarant
had not had sufficient time to meditate or concoct what to say in court.
Then, too, appellant's alibi deserves scant consideration for it is supported only
by friends and relatives. That Captain Momongan is a friend of appellant can be gleaned
from the following facts: Captain Momongan played the role of defense counsel for
appellant and even asked the court to let him act as amicus curiae at the preliminary
investigation. He made representations to the Mayor of Glan and to the relatives of the
deceased that appellant was not guilty of the crime charged. (TSN p. 521.) And he even
approached important people to have the case against appellant dismissed. (TSN p.
529.) He did not also make any effort to examine appellant or take his testimony in
writing despite his knowledge that two witnesses positively identi ed and linked him to
the crime. He also failed to determine the identity of the persons who may shed light to
the commission of the crime and the authors thereof. And, notwithstanding that there
was already a warrant for the arrest of appellant, Captain Momongan still allowed him
to go to Glan as a free man. (TSN pp. 528-529.) Witness claimed that he had no
familiarity with appellant; in fact, he declared that he knew of appellant's real name only
when he was implicated in the crime. But from the very start of the case up to its
termination, Captain Momongan has shown extraordinary interest to have him cleared
of the crime charged. His interest had assumed a personal character.
The other witness, Dionisio Liong, is related to appellant by a nity. He admitted
that he hired appellant as supervisor of his shpond although he knew very well that he
had no experience whatsoever in its management. It is strange that appellant was hired
just a few days before the commission of the crime and immediately thereafter he
hurriedly left. His employment, therefore, may be said to have another purpose than the
mere taking care of the shpond. He had chosen this place as a convenient start for his
journey to Glan, Cotabato, to commit the murder and the robbery. There is one
circumstance which clinches the certainty of the identi cation of the accused. Jose na
Bigapria stated without being asked that the man who entered the sala of Francisco
Poncardas was wearing a cap. When Captain Momongan was testifying in turn for the
defense, he volunteered the information that appellant was wearing a cap on the day in
question and also the next day when he saw him at the beach of Balangonan. (TSN pp.
357-358.) This extraordinary coincidence attests to the reliability of the identi cation
made by Josefina Bigapria.
The rule is that alibi is the weakest of all defenses and that the same should be
rejected when the identity of the accused has been su ciently and positively
established by eyewitnesses to the crime. And since alibi can easily be fabricated, the
same must be established by clear and positive evidence, free from doubt and bias, and
that purely oral evidence presented to prove it cannot prevail over positive evidence
showing the presence of the defendant at the scene of the crime and his participation
in the commission thereof. (People vs. Reyes, et al., L-18892, May 30, 1966; People vs.
Contante, L- 14639, December 29, 1964; People vs. Sagario, et al., L-18659, June 29,
1965.) Appellant's evidence on this point is not su cient to overcome the positive
identi cation made by the prosecution witnesses — Lucia Ferolino and Jose na
Bigapria — that he was the very man who shot Francisco Poncardas.
Finally, the appellant contends that the trial court erred in not considering the
confessions of Alfredo Fernandez and Remigio Arzula admitting their participation in
the commission of the crime at bar, and exonerating by reason thereof.
The confessions of Alfredo Fernandez and Remigio Arzula (Exhibits 1 and 2),
were submitted as evidence for the defense. In said confessions, Fernandez and Arzula
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 admitted their participation in the commission of the crime charged, naming their
companions but not in any way mentioning the name or nickname of appellant. The
theory of the defense is that not having been mentioned in the aforesaid confessions,
appellant has no participation at all in the felony; otherwise, the declarants would have
made mention of appellant as a participant in the commission thereof.
Before Alfredo Fernandez and Remigio Arzula were brought to the constabulary
headquarters, they were con ned in the provincial jail in General Santos charged with
vagrancy. They were interviewed on June 25, 1962, but their testimonies were reduced
into writing only the next day, June 26th. The reason, according to Captain Momongan,
is that the declarants at rst denied their participation but through the use of
diplomatic techniques, he was able to persuade the suspects to admit their guilt. What
these techniques are, the Captain did not clearly explain. First, he said, he appealed to
the suspects' civic consciousness and moral duty. Then he said, he employed the
persuasive technique which took long hours to make. What he did, he declared, is to
make the two suspects disagree on certain facts resulting rst to the confession of
Arzula, followed by Fernandez. (TSN, pp. 515-520.) True, there was a re-enactment of
the crime but it was made to t the statements narrated in the confessions. (TSN pp.
382-383.)
The confessions, Exhibits 1 and 2, consisted of 30 questions. Only 15 questions
relate to the killings of Glan. The suspects were questioned for several hours for two
days before the written confessions were secured. While there is no claim or evidence
of physical torture, the above circumstances show beyond doubt that pressure was
applied to subvert the declarants' freedom of will, thereby making their confessions
involuntary. The trial court shared with this view when it dismissed the case against
Alfredo Fernandez and Remigio Arzula.
Upon the foregoing considerations, the decision appealed from being in
accordance with law and the evidence, the same is a rmed, with costs against the
appellant.
Reyes, J.B.L., (Acting C.J.), Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez,
Castro and Fernando, JJ., concur.

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