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Port resilience: a primer

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 Version: Final 1-0

PORT RESILIENCE: A PRIMER

VERSION: FINAL 1-0

03/02/2014

DR ANDREW GRAINGER
NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL

KAMAL ACHUTHAN
NOTTINGHAM UNIVERSITY BUSINESS SCHOOL

Acknowledgment: This paper forms part of an EPSRC funded Knowledge Transfer Project between the
University of Nottingham and the Department for Transport. The authors wish to thank Mike Davis at the
Department for Transport for his invaluable help and support throughout.

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 Version: Final 1-0

Introduction
The aim of this conceptual paper is to help stimulate further research and enquiry into UK Port Resilience
and is a product of the EPSRC funded Knowledge Transfer Collaboration between the University of
Nottingham and the Department for Transport (DfT). The paper draws on collaborative work between the
authors and senior policy makers within the DfT, as well as on workshops, meetings and an extensive
interview series with members of the UK’s port sector in order to address four key questions:

 How important are ports for the UK?

 How vulnerable are UK ports?
 How do ports currently prepare themselves against vulnerabilities?
 How can port resilience be improved?

Interim drafts of the paper were also circulated across Whitehall for further comment and input. The views
presented in this paper as well as any errors or misrepresentations remain those of the authors alone.

1 How important are ports for the UK?

The UK is an island and ports play a significant feature within its economy. They help tie the UK to global
markets and provide access to critical supplies. In light of prevailing lean management practices and just-
in-time type operations, it is thought that a disruption at one (or several) of the UK’s major ports is likely to
quickly ripple down the supply chain with immediate impact upon manufacturing and production. In
severe cases, such as a tidal surge, prolonged port disruptions are also thought to have a direct impact
on daily life, especially if access to critical supplies in energy and food is severely limited or cut-off.

UK ports cater for about 95% of the UK’s foreign trade. In tonnage terms that trade amounts to a handling
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of 519 million tonnes in 2011 .Of this tonnage 46% is in liquid form, mainly gas, oil and oil products; 20%
can be classified as dry bulk-cargo, such as cereals, coal and cement; 11% is in containers, usually of a
higher value or time-critical, such as consumer goods, textiles, and perishables (e.g. meat and
vegetables).19% of the UK’s maritime trade comes in Roll-On/Roll-Off (RORO) units, such as trucks and
truck trailers, mostly between the UK and its European neighbours (DfT 2012).

Although the UK has about 1040 ports, 120 are described by the Department for Transport as
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commercially active and 52 are viewed as “major ports and handling 97 per cent of the UK’s maritime
traffic (507 Mt). The top ten ports carry 69% of the UK maritime traffic (in tonnage terms) and most types
of maritime traffic tends to be concentrated on less than a handful of ports (DfT 2012). For example, in oil
and gas, containers, and dry-bulk shipping the largest port operates at or close to twice the tonnage (or
units) as its nearest competitor, sometime significantly more (Figure 1).

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In comparison, airfreight landed at UK airports in 2011 was just shy of 2.3 million tonnes (CAA 2011,
Table 13.2); the Eurotunnel Group operating the channel tunnel carried in 2011 the equivalent of 16.4
million tonnes in cars and coaches, and 1.32 million tonnes in rail freight (Eurotunnel Group 2013).
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These are ports handling over one million tonnes per year, and a small number of other key ports.

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Moreover, ports often have a deep symbiotic relationship with production facilities that co-locate within
their premises. One example of such symbiotic relationship are the oil and gas refineries at the ports of
Milford Haven and Southampton, handling 34.4% of the UK’s oil and gas traffic (Figure 1a). Likewise, the
port of Immingham is very significant for UK coal imports, 19.9% (Figure 1b); and Dover’s capacity to
handle and turn around car-passenger ships, 41.5% (Figure 1e) dominates the ferry passenger business.

While the current level of specialisation and scale helps keep costs per unit or tonne down, and helps UK
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ports compete effectively with other European ports for traffic , it does limit the choice of alternative port
options (if any). In the event of a failure at any one of the UK’s dominant ports, it is unlikely that sufficient
spare capacity can be found to replace the loss in capacity in full. In some cases, where ships and port
equipment have been developed hand-in-hand (such as the berthing facilities at Dover, designed to
accommodate the supper-ferries on the Dover-Calais route) there are likely to be no alternative choice in
the short to mid-term.

Figure 1: Key port statistics, top 5 ports for selected traffic types: 2011

(a) Major ports: all oil and Thousand (b) Major ports: dry-bulk Thousand
Percent Percent
gas traffic tonnes traffic tonnes

Milford Haven 47,866 21.9 Grimsby & Immingham 20,566 19.9

Southampton 25,106 11.5 London 11,630 11.3
Forth 22,848 10.5 Liverpool 8,108 7.8
Tees and Hartlepool 20,495 9.4 Clyde 7,564 7.3
Grimsby & Immingham 20,314 9.3 Port Talbot 7,051 6.8
All major UK ports 218,547 100 All UK major ports 103,408 100
(c) All goods vehicle and
Thousand Thousand
unaccompanied trailer Percent (d) All container traffic Percent
units units
traffic
Dover 2,049 32.7 Felixstowe 1,980 40.2
Grimsby & Immingham 522 8.3 Southampton 965 19.6
Liverpool 441 7.0 London 429 8.7
Belfast 357 5.7 Liverpool 404 8.2
London 334 5.3 Medway 240 4.9
All ports of United
Kingdom 6,272 100 All ports of United Kingdom 4,927 100
Number
(e) All ports: accompanied Thousand
Percent (f) Ship arrivals (2009) of Percent
passenger cars units
vessels

Dover 2,565 41.5 Dover 20,127 15.5

Portsmouth 697 11.3 London 8,616 6.6
Holyhead 452 7.3 Liverpool 8,489 6.6
Belfast 270 4.4 Grimsby & Immingham 7,923 6.1
Stranraer 217 3.5 Belfast 5,623 4.3
All ports of United
Kingdom 6,188 100 All ports of United Kingdom 129,587 100

Adapted from Tables 0103 and 0302, Maritime Statistics Compendium

Source: (Department for Transport 2011, 2012)

There are many further examples of where the UK is highly dependent on UK ports for specific types of
goods, which may not necessarily be immediately apparent in current statistical reporting but will be
known to the ports and shippers concerned. For example, the port of Portsmouth handles 70 per cent of
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In comparison to other European countries the tonnage handled in the UK is right at the top, almost on
equal footing with the Netherlands (DfT 2012)

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all the bananas eaten in Britain as well as all Moroccan citrus fruit (Portsmouth Port 2013). The Tate &
Lyle Sugars Refinery at Silvertown on the Thames – located within the wider Port of London river system
– has a cane-sugar refining capacity of 1.2 million tonnes per year and is one of the largest cane-sugar
refiners in the world. It caters for much of the UK’s and EU’s sugar demand (Port of London Authority
2010; Tate & Lyle Sugars 2013).

Unfortunately, detailed sector studies examining their dependencies on specific ports are rare. One
notable exception is a study commissioned by DEFRA. It highlights that London, Liverpool and
Felixstowe handle 60% of all UK food imports received from non-EU country of origins, carried by a
variety of shipping modes (bulk, break bulk, container and RoRo). The report also suggests – reflecting
on the fact that significant UK accompanied and unaccompanied trailer traffic (much of it refrigerated) at
Dover and the Channel Tunnel, and to a lesser extent the Humber ports and London – that these three
ports handle the majority of food imports from EU countries (Peter Baker and Andrew Morgan 2012).
Considering that the UK imports about 50% of its food of which 91% comes in by sea (DEFRA 2010), it is
fair to assert that the resilience of the UK’s ports in terms of safeguarding UK food supply is of particular
public interest.

Further detailed industry studies would be desirable, though the prevalent use of containers in today’s
global production system does suggest a particularly high dependency on ports catering for container
traffic – especially Felixstowe and Southampton (Figure 1d). For example, as illustrated in Figure 2,
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72.6% of all UK textile imports enter the UK via these two ports.

Figure 2: Textile imports falling under tariff Chapters 50-63 by port in million tonnes, 2011

Port Million tonnes Percentage

Felixstowe 754.5 45.3
Southampton 453.3 27.3
All Sea and Airports 1,662.4 100
(Source: extracted from the UKtradeinfo.com database)

Unfortunately, very little research has been conducted to assess the UK’s current berth and port terminal
capacity or the respective operator’s reliance upon specialist handling equipment. Policy makers currently
rely on anecdotal evidence and their personal knowledge of the sector when making judgement about
critical equipment and spare capacity, if any. Further research, perhaps a national inventory of port
capacity and critical port resources, would be desirable.

It also needs to be noted that ports do not only serve ships and trade, they are also locations at which
many people work and reside as well as choose to spend their leisure time. The Port of London, to give
one extreme example, extends along the entire tidal Thames and at its boundaries has the world’s main
financial centre – Canary Wharf – and just a little bit further upstream, the Houses of Parliament. The tidal

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Import figures shown in Figure 2 do not include any arrivals of textiles from within the EU.

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 Version: Final 1-0

Thames is also the location for the annual Oxford-Cambridge Boat Race and the location at which many
choose to moor and sail their private yachts and leisure boats.

Key-point summary
 The UK has around 1040 ports of which 120 are commercially active. The top 10 ports account
for 69% of all UK port traffic by tonnage. Most large ports are highly specialised and the largest
of which often handles twice as much cargo (if not more) in its respective area of specialisation
(e.g. oil, gas, containers, and ferries) as its nearest competitor.
 In the absence of any alternative transport capacities (such as air or rail) the UK, as an island
and net importer, is very dependent upon its ports.
 Policy makers currently rely on anecdotal evidence and their personal experience of the maritime
transport and port sector when making judgement about critical equipment and spare capacity.
Further research, perhaps a national inventory of port capacity and critical port resources, would
be desirable.
 In addition to supporting trade and access to goods and products, ports are also places where
many people choose to reside and spend their leisure time. An extreme example is the Port of
London, which at its boundaries includes Canary Wharf and the Houses of Parliament.

2 How vulnerable are UK ports?

The Cabinet Office (2013) highlights in its National Risk Register of Civil Emergencies a wide range of
scenarios with impact on the UK’s national security (Figures 3a/b). They include tidal surges, industrial
actions, fuel shortages, industrial accidents, the pandemic flu, and severe weather, amongst others.
Cyber Security (Cabinet Office 2011) and Space Weather (Cannon 2013) are also seen amongst policy
makers as significant sources of threat to the UK’s critical infrastructure. Ports and their reliance on
electronic systems and technology in operations – especially in communication, navigation and
5
automation – are thought to be particularly vulnerable .

In practice, many things can go wrong in a port and extend significantly beyond the cursory risk
indications made by the Cabinet Office and other UK policy makers. For example, when 18 UK Port
Harbour Masters were asked in a survey (conducted by this paper’s authors) at their 2012 annual Port
Harbour Masters conference to list the top 5 scenarios for complete port closure or severe disruption in
order of likelihood, a wide diversity of issues were raised. The main three being: I) a blockage in the
marine access channel caused by, for example, a marine accident or the grounding of a ship; II) poor
weather, such as prolonged strong winds, fog and ice, as well as natural disasters, such as a flood; and
III) the failure of infrastructure and breakdowns, such as damage to cranes and quays. Further issues
raised include industrial action, fire, terrorism, oil pollution, financial collapse and the loss of business
(traffic) as well as the flu and other epidemics (Figure 4). Interestingly, under the label of “Other”

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Though awareness of cyber security threats and adverse space weather outside of Whitehall is still
thought to be poor.

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reference was also made to port access issues caused by suicides from a bridge onto the main highway
linking to the port, as well as loss of quay space subsequent to the arrest of a calling ship.

Figure 3a: High consequence risks facing the United Kingdom: Risk of terrorist and other
malicious attacks

5 Catastrophic
Terrorist Attacks

Attacks on
3 Infrastructure
Cyber Attacks: Attacks on Attacks on
Infrastructure Crowded Places Transport Systems
Smaller Scale CBR
Attacks

1 Cyber Attacks:
Data Confidentiality

Low Medium Low Medium Medium High High

Figure 3b: High consequence risks facing the United Kingdom: Other risks

5
Pandemic Influenza

Coastal Flooding
4
Effusive Volcanic
Eruption

Severe Space
Weather
Other Infectious
3 Major Transport Major Industrial Diseases
Low Temperatures
Accidents Accidents
and Heavy Snow
Inland Flooding
Heatwaves

Animal Diseases
Explosive Volcanic
2 Eruption
Drought
Storms and Gales
Public Disorder

1 Disruptive Industrial
Severe Wildfires
Action

Between 1 in Between 1 in Between 1 in

Between 1 in Greater than 1
20,000 and 1 2,000 and 1 in 200 and 1 in
20 and 1 in 2 in 2
in 2,000 200 20
Source: Cabinet Office, National Risk Register (2013)

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 Version: Final 1-0

Figure 4: UK port harbour masters’ survey findings, 2012

Weighted
Rank 1

Rank 2

Rank 3

Rank 4

Rank 5

Count

Count
Total
Cause for complete closure or severe disruption /
Count of reporting UK port harbour masters, ranked in
order of likelihood from 1 to 5
Channel blockage (accident, grounding) 6 9 2 2 3 22 16
Poor weather/natural disaster 7 1 2 2 1 13 10
Port infrastructure failure / breakdown 3 2 3 5 1 14 9
Industrial action (Pilot/Tug/Port staff/Lorry drivers) 0 3 4 5 3 15 7
Terrorism/Fire 0 2 2 2 5 11 5
Oil pollution 1 1 2 0 1 5 3
Other 0 0 2 1 2 5 2
Financial collapse / loss of business 1 0 1 1 0 3 2
Flu / Epidemic 0 0 0 0 2 2 0
(Source: survey of 18 UK Port Harbour Masters, 2012)

Most types of risk to the continuity of a port transcend organisational boundaries and are not managed by
any one single organisation. Indeed, ports can be best described as a system of interdependent
stakeholders and its geography includes: the marine and land access channels; the businesses and
industries located around the berths and terminals; and the berths and terminals themselves. Areas of
beauty, such as recreation parks and national parks as well as marine leisure facilities add a further
dimension to the port’s geography (Figure 5). An event within the confines of one specific area – for
example the sinking of a ship in the marine access channel or the destruction of a major land link (road,
rail, pipeline) to the port – will have an impact on the functioning of the entire port system. To some
extent, risks dependencies reach beyond the port itself and depend on wider shipping networks and
partnering (linked) ports. For example, within the Dover-Calais system blockades in Calais by French
fishermen and dock workers have an immediate impact on operations in Dover.

Port systems are probably best described as complex technological and sociological environments which
are exposed to a very diverse range of risks. Drawing on the work of Mansouri et al. (2010) risks to a
port might be categorised into natural disasters, organisational factors, technological factors, and human
factors. To that one might add marine and land access factors, network factors, and economic factors.
Figure 6 is a fishbone diagram, which was developed by reflecting on an extensive interview series within
the UK’s port sector and the input of senior officials within the DfT. The Figure aims to show the breadth
of risks; though it needs to be highlighted that there is a high degree of interdependency between the
various types of risks. Moreover, organisational factors can be described as compound factors, which
add to the impact of any port disruption – or, if well managed, such as through business continuity and
resilience planning – act against lasting impact.

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Figure 5: Illustrative map of the geography of a port system located on a river

Land Access Urban Area

(Rail) Land Access (Road)
Area of Beauty T

T
T
Port Centric
M M
T Economic Activities Marine Access
T Off-shore
Urban Area Economic
T Activity
Area of M

Beauty

T Terminal or Berth
M Marine Leisure Facility

(Source: Authors)

Many of the risks outlined in Figure 6 reflect upon relatively recent events, such as: the shortage of salt to
make roads and terminals safe for operations during the icy winters of 2010 and 2011; the Icelandic
volcanic ash-cloud incident in 2010 necessitating the closure of most of the Europe’s airspace and
leading to the biggest maritime focused repatriations of people since Dunkirk (mostly stranded holiday
6
makers); lasting destruction of cranes alongside Felixstowe’s quay after a container ship carrying
(ironically) a load of cranes broke free in 2008; the toppling of a dock-crane at Southampton Container
Terminal, leading to a temporary terminal closure to enable a Health and Safety investigation as well as a
clean-up operation (which to the frustration of some shippers was during the same period that the
destruction of cranes in Felixstowe occurred); regular near misses and marine accidents at the UK’s main
ports, including the significant environmental disaster at Milford Haven in 1996; industrial action, such as
blockages at fuel depots in 2007; regular heightened alertness brought about from terrorist threats; the
current economic down-turn impacting upon the income and financial resources available to ports;
conflicting uses of maritime space, such as the development of off-shore wind farms, amongst others.
th
Continued fear of unexploded World War 2 ordnance, the 60 anniversary of the big North Sea Flood in
th
January 1953 and the severe North Sea tidal-surge of 5 December 2013 play further on the minds of
those concerned with safeguarding the UK’s port infrastructure.

Most risks outlined in Figure 6 could also impact upon a multiple of UK ports. For example, a tidal surge
in the UK similar to the “Big Tide” in 1953 is likely to have an impact along the entire North Sea coast,

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The “Zhen Hua 23”

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including Grimsby and Immingham, Felixstowe and Harwich as well as all of the Thames, serving 49% of
7
the UK’s imports (DfT 2009) . It would also impact upon the continental North Sea ports, including
Rotterdam and Hamburg, severely disrupting shipping networks and any alternative shipping options to
the UK.

While it is easy to list possible risks to the continued operations of ports, the perceptions of their impact
will differ significantly amongst port stakeholders – and for that matter the wider public – depending who
has most at stake. For example, a marine accident within the port’s access channel would probably be
primarily an insurance issue for the ship-owner. For the port terminals and berths the temporary closure
of the access channel would result in short-term loss of business until the salvage and clean-up
operations are completed. For importers relying on that port for critical supplies the disruption will be
more keenly felt, very likely forcing them to identify alternative sources of supply via different shipping
routes, possibly utilising different modes of transport. It may also translate into a sustained loss of
business where competitors with different logistics options are able to fill the gap. For particularly critical
goods and those where businesses do not keep sufficient strategic stockpiles or inventories (e.g. coal,
grain, winter salt, medical equipment), there are also likely to be public policy considerations, including
rationing. For local residents any resulting pollution, such as oil-spillage, will have long term effects on the
quality of their environment, not to mention the risk to their drinking water. It is fair to assume that
perceptions of vulnerabilities and subsequent impact will differ significantly amongst the port’s
stakeholders.

Indeed, the list of participants within a port system is long and very diverse, and spreads across the port’s
entire geography (Figure 5). Broadly, stakeholders can be grouped into those directly involved in the
operations of the port. These have been categorised in Figure 7 under the heading “Primary
Stakeholders” and include those involved in the operations of the berths and terminals as well as the
maritime and land access. A second group can be labelled as “Dependent Stakeholders” and includes all
those relying on the port in the context of land based or off-shore based economic activities, as well as
those that provide supporting services to the port and its users. Finally, there are those “Linked
Stakeholders”, who may not have any direct interest in the port’s operations, but are nevertheless able to
influence port policy and operational conditions, be it through direct executive powers or by virtue of co-
location.

7
The authors are currently also involved in follow-on work to evaluate the impact of the North Sea tidal-
th
surge on 5 December 2013 upon the UK’s ports.

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Figure 6: Possible threats to continued port operations

Economic Environmental Human

Factors Adverse Factors Factors
economic Hydrological Industrial action
climate Pollution hazards Cyber Attack /
Floods Hacking Strikes
Slowdown in Seismic
business Terrorism and crime Human
events Blockades & lock-downs
Competition from errors
another port Flood wave / Siltation Slow-down
Bankruptcy of a Nuclear device /
major port user Tsunami dirty bomb
Unexploded WW2
Land-slide
ordinance Sabotage, theft and
Major shipping Adverse vandalism Decision making errors
Detonation of cargo
Loss of weather
line relocates (e.g. gas tanker) Marine-based
business Events sports events Operating errors
Seasonality Fog
Physical attack Campaigns &
Peak-periods & Storms demonstrations Epidemics (e.g. flu)
congestion Snow and ice Military mobilisation
Loss of staff
Strong winds
Civilian repatriation or evacuation by sea
(e.g. when airspace is closed) Port Disruption
At connecting Closure
Navigation aids Shore-based
ports
Customs Staff / labour equipment
Salvage Port health On the quay, General confusion /
(quarantine services) terminal or berth lack of planning
Insufficient
Marine access Highway
Dredging Accidents resources Experts Ineffective communication
Towage Navigation Crticial
Vessel traffic
Official Channel equipment
control Pilotage
inspections ICT failures
Traffic-jams Navigation Lack of risk awareness
Health and
system Bureaucracy No system wide resilience planning
Safety
Land access failures No business continuity planning
Transport Security Systems Insufficient training
In-gate / out-gate failures Port Inventory Conflicting priorities
controls amongst port
System failure Loss of
Disruption/events further stakeholders Poor planning
Disruption/events at key utilities
Highway maintenance up or down the supply chain (e.g. power)
other major ports Conflicts with contractual
and statutory obligations
Access Network Technological
Organisational
Factors Factors Factors
Factors

(Source: adapted from Mansouri et al. (2010) by drawing on findings made in interviews with the UK port sector and in consultation with policy makers at the
UK’s Department for Transport)

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Figure 7: Participants and Stakeholders in Port Operations by Grouping

Groupings Participants and Stakeholders in UK Port Operations

Terminals and  Terminal and berth operator

Berths  Stevedoring companies and Stevedore agency services
 Crane operators
 Shipping lines and their agents
 Mooring and berthing services
 Freight forwarders, customs brokers and agents
Primary Stakeholders

 Port Community Systems Providers (ICT)

Marine Access to  Ships’ masters and their crews
Terminals and  Shipping lines and vessel owners
Berths  Port Harbour Masters and Port Authorities
 Pilots
 Pilot cutters, harbour launches, workboats and water taxis
 Tug operators
 Vessel Traffic System (VTS) operators
Land Access to  Highways Agency and their contractors
Terminals and  Network rail and their contractors
Berths  Rail freight operators
 Road haulage and logistics companies
 Port security (In-gate/out-gate)
Land Based Port-  Port based manufacturing, processing and utility companies
centric Economic  Port dependent supply chains and their constituents
Activity  Transport and logistics companies, including offices and their facilities
 Warehouse, depots and storage companies
 Cargo consolidation and packaging companies
 Off-shore service companies and their facilities (e.g. wind farm maintenance
companies)
Dependent Stakeholders

 Electricity, telecommunications, water, sewage treatment, and other utilities supporting

port operations
Port Dependent Off-  Fishing
shore Economic  Off-shore wind farms
Activity  Ship-to-ship fuelling/bunkering
 Ship-to-ship loading and unloading
 Off-shore aggregate dredging
 Off-shore rigs and other off-shore installations
Supporting Marine  Dredging services
Services  Salvage and towage operators
 Ship repairers
 Ship provisioning/ bunkering
 Insurance companies
 Trade and ship-finance companies
 Maritime surveyors
 Terminal handling equipment manufacturers and repairers
Officials, Inspectors  Unions and their stewards
and other Executive  Department for Transport
Powers  Local Authorities
 Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB)
 Maritime and Coastguard Agency’s SOS-Representative
 HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) officers
 Environment Agency officers
Linked Stakeholders

 UK Boarder Agency
 Officers for the Marine Management Organisation
 Port Security, Port police, County Police and Special Branch
 Port Health Authority Inspectors, including: Environment Health Officers, and Official
Veterinary Officers
 DEFRA - Animal Health and Veterinary Laboratories Agency
 Phytosanitary Inspectors and Horticulture and Marketing Inspectors
 Maritime and Coastguard port state control ship survey
 Health and Safety Executive
 Marine Classification Societies and Accreditation Bodies
Co-location,  Urban areas and their residents
Residential and  Urban transport and utilities networks which are integrated into the port system
Environmental  Areas of beauty, national parks and nature reserves
 Marinas and leisure facilities

(Source: Authors)
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Key-point summary
 Ports are vulnerable and the list of potential risks is diverse and long.
 Lack of planning will compound the impact of disruptive events (risks) upon the port
 Risk perceptions are often informed by recent events, though long-term memory of particularly
catastrophic events – such as the Big Flood in 1953, or increasing alertness brought about
through perceived threats in International Terrorism, play a significant consideration, too.
 Many stakeholders are involved in the operations of any port; their perceptions of risks are likely
to differ significantly.

3 How do ports currently prepare themselves?

Debate about resilience in the UK appears to be largely driven by the government’s concern for
critical national infrastructure and the preparedness of the UK’s key sectors: communications,
emergencies services, energy, finance food, government, hazards sites, health nuclear, transport and
water (Cabinet Office 2012). Critical national infrastructure is defined by the UK government as
“those infrastructure assets (physical or electronic) that are vital to the continued delivery and integrity
of the essential services upon which the UK relies, the loss or compromise of which would lead to
severe economic or social consequences or to loss of life”. Transport features explicitly within the
Cabinet Office’s Strategic Framework and Policy Statement on Improving the Resilience of Critical
Infrastructure to Disruption from natural Hazards (Cabinet Office 2010). Likewise, transport
infrastructure is also the concern of the Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI),
which provides advice and guidance with regards to vulnerabilities of critical national infrastructure to
national security threats. Much of the UK government’s work is focused on regulated industries, such
as energy, health, rail and aviation. While port and docking companies operate under powers
conferred to them by Parliamentary Acts, ports fit uneasily under the umbrella of regulated industries
as most stakeholders within the wider port system (Figure 7) remain largely free from any economic
regulation.

The main instrument at the UK government’s disposal to help foster improved resilience planning is
the Civil Contingencies Act (2004). It provides for structured co-operation and information sharing
between so-called Category 1 and Category 2 responders. Within the wider context of ports Category
1 responders for England and Wales include: the Secretary of State, in so far as his functions include
responding to maritime and coastal emergencies (excluding the investigation of accidents); the county
and district councils; the emergency services, including HM Coast Guard; the port health authorities;
and the Environment Agency. Category 2 responders within the context of ports are limited to the
harbour authorities only.

Under the Act Category 1 responders have four core duties: risk assessment, business continuity
management (e.g. ISO22301; ISO 2012), emergency planning, and warning and informing the public.

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Category 2 responders have the duty to cooperate, share information, and support Category 1
responders. The principle mechanism for cooperating between Category 1 and 2 responders are the
8
so called Local Resilience Forums , which as part of their work may also look at their responsibilities
towards the port industry. However, the vast majority of organisations involved in the running and
functioning of a port (Figure 7), with the exception of the port harbour authorities, are not directly
represented within the Category 1 and Category 2 frameworks. This raises the question of whether
the framework of the Civil Contingency Act is suitable for the UK’s port sector and whether it needs to
be modified (e.g. by re-categorising Category 1 and 2 members) or by setting-up supporting
institutional mechanisms that embody all stakeholders within the wider port system and the Primary
Stakeholders outlined in Figure 7, in particular.

Irrespective of the Civil Contingency Act, port authorities are required by reference to Port Marine
Safety Code to manage marine safety specific risks, such as those arising from marine accidents (DfT
2009). Likewise, some of those organisations within the wider port system may choose to manage
risks specific to their own business, as required by good corporate governance practice (FRC 2012).
However, these provisions fall short of managing risks that extends across organisational boundaries
within the wider port as illustrated in Figure 5.

As already outlined, risks are likely to be perceived differently and will be dependent on the
organisation’s particular commercial appetite for risk, often changing in line with economic climate and
pressures on managing costs. A particular challenge in bringing various port stakeholders together is
that their interests are seldom aligned, and that those organisations best placed to manage a
particular risk may not necessarily be the most incentivised to put mitigating measures in place – or,
for that matter, lend resource to resilience planning. The alignment of interests will ultimately have
political dimensions and requires suitable mechanisms.

Key-point summary
 Resilience planning is thought to be largely driven by the respective UK government
departments. The main instrument at the UK government’s disposal is the Civil Contingencies
Act (2004). However, the Act’s mechanisms and institutions focus on specific individual
organisations (especially the harbour authority), but fail to consider the many other organisations
involved in keeping the port operational, or have an interest in resilient port operations.
 The interests amongst port stakeholders are unaligned and those best placed to manage risks
may currently not necessarily be suitably incentivised. The alignment of interest for the greater
public good will require some political commitment supported by suitable mechanisms.

8
There are a total of 43 Local Resilience Forums (LRFs) in England and Wales, additional groups
exist in Northern Ireland and Scotland (see: https://www.gov.uk/local-resilience-forums-contact-
details). In some cases, such as along the river Thames, multiple LRFs converge at the boundaries of
a port system (Figure 5) and raising further doubts about their suitability for the port industry.
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4 How can UK port resilience be improved?

Probably the main challenge for policy makers tasked with fostering greater resilience in ports is the
wide diversity in stakeholders and the fact that these are largely driven by their own commercial
interests, which may not necessarily be aligned with wider public interests. Current regulatory
instruments for the protection of Critical National Infrastructure and Resilience Planning are ill suited
for ports as they fail to recognise the mechanisms necessary to help the various stakeholders within
the wider port system (Figure 7) come together. Following ideas for Activity packages (A1-A6) might
help improve upon the current situation:

A1: Raise awareness and visibility about potential vulnerabilities within the port system and
their mitigation

Most primary stakeholders within the wider port system (Figure 7) are aware of the risks within their
specific organisations, but not necessarily about the impact such risks might have on other
stakeholders. Occasional workshops at national and local level can help raise awareness about risks
that transcend organisational boundaries.

A2: Identify scope for mitigating risks as well as plan for port system disruption and recovery

Various options are available and should all be considered. They range from ad-hoc workshops and
exercises to the development of dedicated institutions and tools:

 Ad-hoc workshops and exercises (such as those run by the DfT): These might be risk
specific, such as to explore the impact and response to a particular type of event (e.g. a tidal
surge) in detail by bringing together relevant interest groups (Figure 7) and facilitate an
exchange of views on impacts to their respective organisations as well as subsequent
planning requirements. Well run workshops can help:
 create visibility of risks across organisational boundaries
 identify requirements for derogations from statutory requirements
 identify spare capacity and resources in mitigation of any impact from the event
 help identify the scale of potential disruption
 help inform on the various workshop participants’ own business planning

 Institutional approaches: Considering the range and diversity of potential risks to continued
port operations (Figure 6) and the UK’s debendency upon the ports, it would be in the public
interest to help foster a suitable resilience culture within the wider port sector. Rather than
taking an ad-hoc approach as outlined in A1, more regular forums (maybe with a dedicated
secretariat) could be set-up to help wider resilience planning.

 Development and adoption of standardised planning and business continuity standards: To

help give stakeholders within a wider port system a common framework it might be worth
developing a common standardised framework. Inspiration may be taken from the ISO 22301

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(formerly BS25999). The drafting and use of simple templates and checklists may (perhaps
building on work already undertaken by the DfT) could be a good starting point.

Simulation Tools: The authors of this paper are actively involved in developing a simulation tool that
can be used to help inform upon the impact of specific events taking place as well as the outcome of
subsequent resilience planning choices. While computer simulation helps inform upon planning
choices, the key to successful planning relies on collaborative work between the various port
stakeholders (Achuthan, Grainger et al. 2013).

A3: Identify incentive mechanisms to ensure stakeholder interests are aligned with regard to
the overall resilience of critical national port infrastructure.

Resilience has a cost and the appetite for risk will differ significantly amongst port stakeholders.
Further consultation and research is required in order to establish how interests might be aligned,
especially with regard to developing appropriate incentive mechanisms.

A4: Exchanges, field-work and case-studies

The UK is not alone in its need for resilient infrastructure. Valuable lessons can be learnt from other
sectors with multiple stakeholders, such as energy and health, as well as from the experiences and
institutions in other countries, such as Japan and the USA. Likewise, exchanges in knowledge and
experience within the UK and across Europe are likely to be very helpful in developing awareness
and skills, too. It would be prudent to help facilitate such activity, for example within the framework of
European research funding and bilateral exchanges with countries that have a similar interest in port
resilience.

A5: Further detailed research

 At present understanding of risk and resilience within a quantifiable cost-benefit context is

limited. This needs to be redressed. In the absence of robust cost-benefit figures it might be
difficult to mobilise necessary resources – unless, of course, there is an overriding political will

 Within the UK, policy makers have little visibility of whether and where there might be any
redundancy (if any) within the wider UK port sector that could be utilised in the event of an
emergency. It would be useful to conduct some explorative studies in this area. Such
research might look at how shipping lines may choose to re-route their vessels or how ports
may choose to forgo certain types of traffic in favour of another.

A6: Improve upon early warning and communication systems

Much of the planning is dependent on the time-period available for action prior to the event. Any
enhancement in early warning and communications capabilities significantly widens the scope of
options in planning for resilience at UK ports.

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