CHAPTER - V

CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS

This chapter entitled ‘Appraisal, Conclusions, Suggestions and Reflections’
sums up the results of the study. Some conclusions have been drawn on the basis of
this study and have been incorporated in this chapter. Apart from this, certain
suggestions have also been made and incorporated in this chapter.

Dr. Ambedkar said, “The Constitution is a fundamental document which

defines the position and power of three organs of the state-the executive, the judiciary
and the legislature. It also defines the powers of the executive and the powers of
legislature as against the citizens, as we have done in our chapter dealing with
fundamental rights. In fact, the purpose of a constitution is not merely to create the
organs of the state but to limit their authority because, if no limitation was imposed
upon the authority of the organs, there will be complete tyranny and complete
oppression. The legislative may be free to frame any law; the executive may be free to
give any interpretation of the law. It would result in utter Chaos."

Our constitution is the product of turbulent debates, tidal waves of conflicting

voices, logomachic battles and constructive conclusions. As Justice V. Krishan lyer
commented in an article that1 "so great has been the final shape, so long has been the
hectic exchanges and so diverse the discussions, that one could proudly claim that the
constitution of India has been reflective of the heritage, ethos and realities of a nation
with so much complexity, cultural vintage, religious pluralism and regional
divergences that every Indian can feel a sense of pride in this supreme expression of
the will of the people. Conceding infirmities and deficiencies and colonial survivals
still haunting the otherwise politico legal wonder, the governance of india, is in law
and generally in principle, a federal democracy with a crimson hue.”

Pregnant with these observations it is stated that the office of the Governor is
an offspring of the Supreme concern of the founding fathers for the unity, strength,
stability and security of the nation. Sri Parkasa, a former Governor observed about the
importance of the Governor and says:

“The only official emblem today of unity of the country is the Governor. I have

1
Justicc V.R. Krishan Iier "for amendment not overhaul, Frontline Sept. 2001. p.100.

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a feeling the even the President is not so.”

So long as one party (i.e. the Congress) with very stable majorities was in
office in all the states as well as the centre, the office of the Governor was not
regarded as important. Liaison between states and the centre was conducted to a large
extent at the party level. However, doubts were raised whether the Governor’s office
served any useful purpose. The importance of the Governor’s role and office was
partly constitutional and largely conventional. Much dependent, on the personality of
the Governor.

But with the emergence of the multi-party system in the wake of the fourth
general elections, the office of the Governor has become more directly involved in the
constitutional processes and has thus suddenly blossomed forth into one of the crucial
significance both as a link between the Centre and the States as well as maintaining as
effective constitutional machinery in the States. Consequently, it has also become the
most controversial office as whatever decision a Governor may take, whether as the
representative of the Centre in or constitutional head of the State, he becomes a centre
of controversy, for he is bound to displease one or the other political party and that
party is bound to criticize him and attributes him partisan motives. This also brings the
central Government into controversy, for the governor being an appointee of the
Centre and holding his office during its pleasure, is regarded as a creature of the
Centre, and therefore, the disgruntled political group would criticize the central
government as well for the exercise of his discretion by the Governor.

In chapter I of this thesis an attempt has been made to discuss the position of
the Governor in pre-constitutional period, what were the views of the Constitution
makers and how the Governors function after the commencement of the constitution in
actual practice in the federal structure of India. In concluding this thesis it is
considered desirable to finally appraise the position of the Governor in federal system
of India.

As has already been pointed out in Chapter-II that Constitution-maker after

discussing various pros and cons of the problem decided that the Governor should be
appointed by the President after consulting the Provisional Government. There are
merits in this method that it is less expensive, a representative of the minority can be
appointed, it keeps the authority of the Central Government intact, outsider can be

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appointed as a Governor and the person holding the office will be beyond the party
politics. But in actual practice since the commencement of the Constitution there is
lack of healthy convention for the appointment of a Governor.

There is lack of healthy convention in India for the appointment of the

Governor and the Governor appointed against the wishes of the State Ministry strains
relations between the Centre and the States and it also affects relations between the
Governor and the Ministry.

Further, it has been discussed that Constitution-maker were of the view that if a
Governor is appointed by the President he may be above party politics. But in actual
practice usually the Governors are the partymen, some of them remain active partymen
and actively participate in the party affairs and have been making political speeches
even after their appointment and even after the rein of this office participate in active
politics. There is considered view that such persons when called upon to uphold
Constitution often fall from the standard they are expected to uphold. Moreover the
dignity of the office is marred to some extent. Therefore conclusion emerges that in
actual practice this intention of the constitution-makers is not adopted and there is
necessity for the bar on this practice so that the dignity of the office can be maintained.

Article 156 stipulates “The Governor shall hold office during the pleasure of the
President. Therefore, it is often claimed that the Governor must, as a rule, have a fixed
tenure. As Kedia Pandey have observed the constitution has not prescribed the ground
for the removal of the Governor. But, surely it is not compatible with a system which
claims to be based upon justice and democratic norms. But with the change of the
government at the center, they were asked to design and as they paid no heed to it, they
have summarily been sacked. It is rightly held that for every functionary either the
service period or the retiring age must be mentioned in express terms. And, for his
dismissal both the reason and procedure should be clearly fixed so that he finds, in
necessity, ample opportunity of self defense. In short, a person, even of the lowest rank
is personally entitled to a fixed tenure of office and there must be some definite rules
and procedure fir his untimely removal. Otherwise, his independence of mind and sense
of security are sure to be badly affected.

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 But, in the case of the Governor, the Constitution has expressively vested an
unconstitutional and discretionary power to the appointing authority. As Article 156(1)
stipulates, ‘The Governor should hold office during the pleasure of the President’. He
can be removed by the President at any time who need not assign any reason.

A Governor should normally be appointed for five years. But this is not
always the case. There are various instances where the Centre may have shortened the
tenure of a particular Governor for political reasons. Thus, in Punjab in 1966,Governor
Ujjal Singh was replaced by Dharma Vira, two days before the latter sent his report
recommending the imposition of President's rule in Punjab. Again Governor Dhawan
of West Bengal went on 'leave' and later resigned as Governor of West Bengal in 1971
well before his tenure expired. This may have taken place because he invited the
Communists to prove that they had a majority in the legislature with a view to forming
a Government, because they were the single largest minority party...

As already has been discussed under Chapter-III that the Governor performs
various functions a function in the formation of a Ministry, during the continuance of a
ministry and in the dissolution of a Ministry. The Governor appoints the Chief
Minister. But the constitution does not provide any qualification for the
appointment of a Chief Minister. But there is a convention in actual practice that
when one particular party has absolute majority in the Assembly alter the election the
Governor is bound and no discretion, to invite the leader of that party as a Chief
Minister to install the Ministry. But the task of the Governor become difficult as
already has been pointed out that when no party has a clear majority who will be
invited first to form the Government. There are various practices adopted by the
Governors in different States in such a fluid situation.

Further whether the Governor is obliged to invite a person or appoint a Chief

Minister, a person who is already a member of the State Legislature. In this regard the
Governors’ committee appointed by the President in 1970 was against the choosing
the non-legislators as Chief Ministers. But this recommendation of the Governors’
committee has been put in a cold storage because after the recommendation of this
committee the Governors in different states appoint the Chief Ministers who were
not members of the State Legislatures. Therefore from the above survey conclusion
emerges that the Governor has a very wide discretionary there is no has on the
appointment of a Chief Minister a person who is not a member of the State legislature.

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But if after six months a minister does not become the member of the legislature he
cease to be a minister. Further the concept of stability is used by the various Governors
at the time of formation of Ministry as well as recommending Presidential rule in
States. But it is seemed to be unhelpful because in certain circumstances when
Governor says particular ministry is stable was proved to be unstable and which the
Governor says unstable may become stable. Therefore, conclusion emerges that the
Governor should not forecast about the stability or instability of The Government at
the time of formation of a Ministry unless it is too frequently and too quickly fall.

Similarly the Governor plays a very important role during the continuance of a
Ministry. The Governor shall from time to time summon the house or each House of
the legislature of the State to meet at such time and place as he think fit. After the
general elections the Governor is constitutionally obliged to address the both house
assembled together at the first session and first session of each year. But the question
whether the Governor can summon the House without the advice of the Chief
Minister. As already has been pointed out in the Chapter-III that certain functions
specifically vested in the Governor can not be delegated, therefore conclusion emerges
that it is power given to the Governor, which he can exercise independently, at least in
extra-ordinary circumstances.

Likewise Governor has the power to prorogue the legislative Assembly under
article 174(2)(a). Ordinarily this power is exercised by the Governor on the advice
of the Chief Minister. But in extra-ordinary circumstances the Governor is not
bound by the advice of the Chief Minister. Therefore, conclusion emerges that the
Governor is to go by the advice of the Chief Minister in proroguing the house cannot
he accepted in toto.

Besides summoning and proroguing the session of the legislature, the Governor
has the power to dissolve the legislative Assembly of the State. In this regard
constitutional position is that if the Governor decides, while exercising his individual
judgment, not to accept such advice then his decision cannot be challenged in any
Court of law. Therefore we can conclude that the Governor is not bound by the advice
of the Chief Minister.

Like the Governors of Status in United States of America the Governors of

Indian States play a very significant role in legislation. All the Bills passed by

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legislature become an Act by the assent of a Governor. He can reserve a bill for the
consideration of the President of India2. If circumstances exist in which it is necessary
to promulgates an ordinance, the Governor in such circumstances prorogue the
assembly for the promulgation of an ordinance and the satisfaction of the Governor
in such circumstances in conclusive.

A situation of Political flux in a Stale may give rise to a complex of events

in which, the Government of the State cannot be carried on in accordance
with the provisions of the Constitution. This culminates in the involving by the
President of the Article 356 of the Constitution on the receipt of the Governor's
report and ‘other informations’ received by him. Governor’s interpretation of such
an occasion warranting the imposition of article 356 embraces a fairly wide range of
circumstances.3

During Presidential rule the Governor plays a new important role. When
article 356 is imposed on a state, all powers of governance get vested in the President,
but the President delegates the executive authority to the Governor and therefore, what
is constitutionally called President's risk gets vested in its day-to-day functioning
into the hands of the Governor. When the Council of Ministers gone, the Governor
assumes the place of the Council of Ministeis.4

As it has already been pointed out in Chapter-IV that the provisions of article
356 is very vague and flexible. In the recommendation of Presidential rule in
State the Governors interpreted article 356 of the constitution in the events which
were never thought of by the founding-fathers. No clear rules or causes were
laid down in the constitution for declaring what constitutes ‘fai lure of a
State machinery.’ This constitution lacunae has been exploited on many occasion
by the ruling party at the centre according to its political expediency and that is why a
good number of States have come under the Presidential rule on several occasions.

But now the Supreme Court has now rendered a landmark decision on Article
356(1) in S.R. Bommai v. Union of India.5 Where in August 1988 S.R. Bommai
assumed charge as Chief Minister of Karnataka, the Janta party alliance that he led

2
See articles 31(A). 31(c), 200, 201 & 304.
3
See, for such circumstances, Chapter-IV.
4
See. Supra Chapter-III. The Role Of Governor during Presidential rule.
5
AIR 1994 SC 1918: (1994)3 SCC 1.

219
along with Ramkrishan Hegde and Deve Gowda having come to power three years
earlier on a platform of value based politics. Hardly eight months into office, his
government was dismissed and the Assembly dissolved on the basis of unverified
withdrawal of support by some legislators without allowing him to prove his majority
support in the legislative assembly. As it turned out a dismissed Bommai proved to be
a more formidable force for the strengthening of constitutional values that he could
have been in office. For it was as the culmination of his long drawn battle that the
Supreme Court delivered its landmark judgment in 1994 that called a halt to the half a
century old habit of the party in power at the centre dismissing State Government and
imposing president is rule virtually at will. A bench of 9 Judges was constituted in
nominal to consider the various issues arising in several case and seven opinions were
delivered and subsequently held that the validity of the proclamation issued under Art
356(1) is justiciable on such grounds as: whether it was issued on the basis of any
material at all or if the material was relevant or whether the proclamation was issued in
the malafide exercise of the power of was has based wholly on irrelevant ground.

Rameshwar Prasad case6 has reiterated the principle enunciated in State of

Rajasthan7 and Bommai case8 with more constitutional conscience. The Court made it
clear that the Article 356 contains an emergency power and this emergency power
should be used not as normal power. “Article 356 confers a power to be exercised by
the President in exceptional circumstances to discharge the obligation cast upon him
by Article 355”. By referring Articles 74(1) and(2), the Court held that due to Bommai
case9 Article 74 (2) is not a bar against scrutiny of materials on the basis of which the
President has issued proclamation under Article 356. This approach shows objectivity
even in subjectivity. Constitutionalism or constitutional system of government abhors
absolutism- it is premised on the rule of law by which subjective satisfaction is
substituted by objectivity, providing for by provision of the Constitution itself.10

These two recent judgements of the Supreme Court in Jagdambika Pal11 and
Rameshwar Prasad12 are the reflections of the judicial progress which in turn are a

6
State of Rajasthan v. Union of India, (1977) 3 SCC 592.
7
S.R. Bommai v. Union of India, (1994) 3 SCC 1.
8
Ibid.
9
Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1 at pp. 94 & 96, paras 96 & 100.
10
Jagdambika Pal v. Union of India, (1999) 9 SCC 95.
11
Rameshwar Prasad (VI) v. Union of India, (2006) 2 SCC 1.
12
In Doypack Systems (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, (1988) 2 SCC 299, it was held that the noting of the
officials which lead to the Cabinet’s decision form part of the advice.

220
proof of the contribution in constitutional jurisprudence. The theory deducted by way
of construction of the Constitution has been an instant need of Indian constitutional
system. The President and Parliament are found sort in protecting the constitutional
misuse for political purposes. It is now expected that the judicial weapon can preclude
from abusing the provisions of the Constitution which have colourably been
interpreted with there own line by the politicians.

SUGGESTIONS AND REFLECTIONS

A constitution is not an omnipotence in the sky or omnipresence among the

stars but a politico-legal instrument functionally fundamental, directionally value
loaded and, in practical terms, a regulatory interface between the people and the power
process. But any constitution, which is irresponsive to new challenges and old evils
and permits itself to be subverted will prove a tragicomedy and must suffer eclipse
unless periodic mutations update it. Basic constitutional fidelity in its operators
and instant popular protest where reach of faith befalls arc critical safeguards. Here
the vigilant intellectual goes into social action Burke observed “the greater the power,
the more dangerous the abuse.” If we think and behave rationally we will find that in
our country democratic polity is direction is distorted beyond the foresight of our
founding fathers. We have to redesign he devices and recondition the processes for the
exercise of state power.13

The traumatic episodes with Governor is operational aberrations and president’

rule suppression have undermined the rhythm of State Union Relations. The Indian
polity is federal in nature that is why state level federalism is important. In this way
we can see that the Governor is having dual capacity one as the ceremonial device and
constitutional head of the state. It is a solemn office. He deals with the Union, not
in secrecy or as a central spy to play politics, but as the authentic head of his state
representing his government (cabinet) and conveying to the centre their (not his) views
and such other information as the President or Prime Minister may seek.14 The
Governor must be strictly neutral in state politics when his ministers act rashly, he has
a right and duty to counsel reconsideration seek information from the Chief
Minister on controversial actions and inspire confidence in the public that their

13
Justice V.R. Krishna lyer ‘Governor’s Reign and President's Rule’ Chapter-III, ‘A
constitutional Miscellany’, Universal (2002).
14
Ibid.

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representations and grievances will be considered by his government. He should
be an elder statesman like without ambition for political incarnation he should not he
an unwanted element in politics to be got rid of by gubernatorial assignment.

In Hargovind Pant v. Dr. Raghukul Tilak 15 it was held that the Governor of a
State is not a servant of the central government of its subservient agent but an
independent office holder though nominally dependent On the president's
pleasure. But if power to appoint carries with it the legitimacy to interfere in
functions then judicial independence is a giant myth.

Vice President Shri G.S. Pathak, way back in 1970 had pertinently observed
that “In the sphere in which he is bound by the advice of the council of Ministers, for
obvious reasons, he must be independent of the centre. There may be cases where
the advice of the centre may clash with the advice of the state council of Ministers
(Quoted in Report of the Centre State Relations Inquiry Committee 1971 Govt. of
Tamil Nadu p125).

In such cases the Governor must ignore the centre 16 advice and act on the
advice or his council of Ministers. This is clear incontrovertible legal position.

How should the Governor be chosen? And removed? The Governor's

committee rejected the doctrine of the Governor being blue eyed babies of
President and recommended that:

i) They should be chosen with great care and should be people well
known and respected for their integrity and competence. There is no room now for old
and decrepit politicians or civil servants to be made Governor to provide to them
comfortable living at the fag end of their lives or to make trouble some politicians
Governors either to satisfy them or to keep them away from causing mischief in
their home states.

ii) The present provision regarding removal or transfer of Governor at the

pleasure of President, which is in effect is really the pleasure of he Prime Minister
should be changed. A Governor once appointed should be removable only in the same
way as in the case of a Judge of a Supreme Court to ensure independence of
Governors. The constituent assembly rejected the suggestion of an elected Governor

15
(1979) 3 SCC 458.
16
White paper on the office of the Governor by the Govt. of Karnataka Sept. 22, 1983.

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but there was repeated stress on consultation with the state cabinet.

The Raj manner committee dealing with the Governor is office stated: The
Governor should be appointed always in consultation with the State cabinet with a
high power body specially constituted for the purpose. He should be removed only for
proved misbehavior or incapacity after inquiry by the Supreme Court.

A specific provision should be inserted in the constitution enabling the

President to issue instrument of instructions to the Governors. The instrument of
instructions should lay down guidelines indicating the matters of in respect of which
the Governor should consult the Central Government or in relation to which the
Central Govt. could issue directions to him. Those instructions should specify the
principles with reference to which the Governor should act as the head of the state
including the occasions for exercise of the discretionary powers.

The Study Team of the Administrative Reforms Commission headed by Shri

M.C. Setwald in its report submitted in September 1967 likewise observed, “There
have been instances of Governors continuing their connection with active politics and
in some cases returning to active politics after ceasing to be Governor. It is a post
which is a sinecure for mediocrities or as a consolation prize for burnt out
politicians. The Administrative Reforms Commission in its report on centre state
relationship submitted in June 1969 made similar observations and while
paper prepared by Karnataka Government (the same).

SARKARIA COMMISSION ON ROLE OF GOVERNOR

Terming the role of Governor as one of the key issues in centre state relation
day that constitution assign to the Governor the role of a constitutional sentinel and
that of a vital link between the Union and the state. But Governors it adds have not
acted with necessary objectivity in the exercise of their functions. It is of the
view that in a parliamentary type of Government though the Governor's role is
limited to his acting as a ceremonial head only but he may exercise his discretions in
certain areas and being the holder of an independent constitutional office, the
Governor is in no way a subordinate agent of Union Government.

The National Commission to Review on the Role of Governor:

The Governor should be chosen by a broad based selection pan el that

shall include the Prime Minister, the Home Minister the speaker of the Lok

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Sabha and the Chief Minister of the State concerned. It is also suggested that
Governors could be impeached by the legislators state. But it may create fresh
tensions in federal relations as Governor is not clear.

It is finally submitted that as a result of the considerations set out above that
Governors must be persons of high caliber, independent judgment, esteemed in
society and aware of the constitutional political tasks and limitations of the office.
There must be a national mechanism for scrutiny, screening and selection, so that
from a panel so prepared, the Prime Minster may make the crucial choice. The
National mechanism should be an interstate council under Article 243 of the
Constitution of India. The Prime Minister must as a matter of convention hand pick
one from this panel in consultation with the Chief Minister of a state concerned
about his acceptability for that state there must be an instrument of instructions
prepared by law commission of India approved by the parliament and kept in Raj
Bhavan for frequent reference. The Governor should not operate secretly in state
polities. He should not delay or delay any advice given to him by his cabinet within
the field of state administration. He can not and should not delay or deny assent to
bills except at the behest of state cabinet event acting under Article 200 he may take
the advice of the Advocate General and the Attorney General to decide whether he
should refer the matter for the assent of President. Prorogation of the legislature
must be the cabinet's strategy not his. Even regarding the dissolution of the house
dismissed of the Ministry and the choice of Chief Minister he should be guided by
established British conventions tuned to Indian constitutions.

All said and done we must envision Governor's role vis -a-vis Union
State relations from a higher level and from a holistic perspective. We are in
danger of disintegration and must rally the enlightened masses behind the institutions
or govt. vertically and horizontally.

SUGGESTIONS

At the end the research I would like to make some suggestions for transparent
appointment and effective discharge of duties by the governor.

1. It is suggested that, from the point of view, the Rajamannar Committee

appointed by the Tamil Nadu government in 1968 opined that before
appointing the governor, the central government should talk with the chief

224
 minister of the province. The Administrative Reforms Committee also
expressed the same view. Moreover, the Sarkaria Commission held that the
governors should be chosen from all the walks of life and they should be
nominated after the consultation with the chief minister. In this connection,
the observation of K.V. Rao is really worth consideration. He has rightly
opined that the incumbent should not be a mere centre's man, he must be an
acceptable person with an active habit and sympathetic view.

2. It is suggested that a politician from the ruling party at the Union is not
appointed as Governor of a state which is being run by some other party or a
combination of other parties. Further more, in order to ensure effective
consultation with the State Chief Minister in the selection of a person to be
appointed as Governor, the procedure of consultation should be prescribed
in the Constitution itself by suitably amending Article 155.

3. It has been recommended by Sarkaria Commission that The Vice-President

of India and the Speaker of the Lok Sabha may be consulted by the Prime
Minister in selecting a Governor, The Consultation should be confidential
and informal and should not be a matter of constitutional obligation. I am
also in agreement with recommendation of Sarkaria Commission.

4. The Governor's tenure of office of five years in a State should not be

disturbed except very rarely and that too, for some extremely compelling
reason and the governor should not be remove from his office till the expiry
of his office until and unless he violates the constitutional provisions while
discharging his duties reason should also be convey to the governor before
removing him.

5. It is further suggested that, all the steps suggested by the founding father’s
should be observe by the union government before embarking on the
imposition of President’s rule.

6. Further more, as a matter of convention, the Governor should not, on

demitting his office, be eligible for any other appointment or office of profit
under the Union or a State Government except for a second term as
Governor or election as Vice-President or President of India. Such a
convention should also require that, after quitting or laying down his office,

225
 the Governor shall not return to active partisan politics.

7. Article 156(1) should be amended in order to change the method of

gubernatorial dismissal.

8. Keeping in view the observation in chapter III it is suggested that, the

verdict of the electorate should be respected. If the ruling party has failed to
secure a majority yet has emerged as a largest single party it cannot be put
in power. The Governor, in a situation as such, should first summon the
leader of the opposition to get to know if he is in command of a majority? If
he is satisfied that the opposition is in command of majority he will invite it
to form the government. Only after sounding the opposition and finding
that it is incapable of forming a government the claim of the largest single
party can be entertained, and it can be set in power subject to command of a
majority support at the point of time of appointment and not on
consideration of coming to command such support on some future date.
Command of majority support, at the time of being put in power, is the
essential principle which can not be overlooked and overridden in any
circumstance.

9. Further more, no discrimination should be made between coalition existing

before the elections and one coming after it. Irrespective of the time factor,
both have a locus standi for being put in power, subject to commanding a
majority support. To put coalition out of reckoning for power, which had
come into existence after the elections, is extraneous to parliamentary
principles, arbitrary, prejudicial and uncalled for.

10. Governor should not discriminate between party members and independents
is grotesquely absurd and irrelevant because of both categories of members,
in the face of law, are full-fledged members and posses equal rights for the
fact of being elected and representing their constituencies. Non-counting of
independents support, while assessing the strength of the two sides, ill-
accords with the democratic system. The support of all elected members,
whether party men or independent s, should be counted in the assessment of
strength of different groups and parties.

226
11. It is also suggested that National Presidential Council should be set up to
advise the President on matters of national interest, inter alia, for selection
of persons to be appointed as Governors. This Council would be analogous
to the Council of State originally proposed at the time of framing of the
Constitution. It would be composed of the Prime Minister, Presiding
Officers and the Leaders of the Opposition in the two Houses of Parliament,
former Presidents, Prime Ministers and Chief Justices of India, the
Attorney-General for India, and a certain number of nominees of the
President.

12. Appointment of the governor should be made by the President on the advice
of the Inter-Governmental Council only. One of the State Governments has
further suggested that the Council should maintain a panel of names suitable
for appointment as Governors. The Chief Minister of the State where the
office of Governor is to be filled should choose three persons from the panel
and the Inter-State Council should select one of them for appointment. The
advice of the Inter-State Council should be accepted by the Union
Executive. Leaders of the opposition parties in Parliament should be
consulted.

13. It is also suggested that governor should allow a person as chief minister,
unless he is the leader of a party which has absolute majority in the
Assembly, should seek a vote of confidence in the Assembly within 30 days
of taking over. This practice should be religiously adhered to with the
sanctity of a rule of law. The Governor also should not risk determining the
issue of majority support, on his own, outside the Assembly. The prudent
course for him would be to cause the rival claims to be tested on the floor of
the House. The Governor should not dismiss his Council of Ministers so
long as they continue to command a majority in the Legislative Assembly.
Conversely, he is bound to dismiss them if they lose the majority but do not
resign. When the Legislative Assembly is in session, the question of
majority should be tested on the floor of the House.

14. It is also suggested that, if during the period when the Assembly remains
prorogued, the Governor receives reliable information that the Council of
Ministers has lost 'majority', he should not, as a matter of constitutional

227
 propriety, dismiss the Council unless the Assembly has expressed on the
floor of that house its want of confidence in it. He should advise the Chief
Minister to summon the Assembly as early as possible so that the 'majority'
may be tested.

15. The Governor may in the exigencies of certain situations, exercise his
discretion to summon the Assembly only in order to ensure that the system
of responsible government in the State works in accordance with the
constitutional provisions.

16. The Governor should while sending ad hoc or fortnightly reports to the
President, should normally take his Chief Minister into confidence, unless
there are overriding reasons to the contrary.

17. The discretionary power of the Governor as provided in Article 163 should
be left untouched but the same should be used by the governor in
consonance with the constitution of India.

18. The power of the president under article 356 is a constitutional power, it is
not an absolute power. The existence of material is a pre-condition to form
the ‘satisfaction’ to impose the President’s Rule.

19. Last but not the least it is also suggested that Governor being the
constitutional head of the state should use his discretionary powers for the
proper governance of the state so that the government can achieve the
principles foreseen by founding fathers and mentioned in constitution of
India. Since, the Governor is the Head of the State and he take oath to
protect and preserve the constitutional provisions. Therefore, the governor is
duty bound to protect the constitution and it is also his first and foremost
duty and every governor should perform his duty in consonance with the
constitution. Same view has been express by Dr. Bhimrao Ambedkar in
constitutional assembly debates.

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