Toward a Sociocognitive Approach to

Second Language Acquisition

DWIGHT ATKINSON
Graduate School of Education
Temple University Japan
2-8-12 Minami Azabu
Minato-ku
Tokyo 106-0047
Japan
Email: [email protected]

This article develops the notion of a sociocognitive perspective on second language acquisition
(SLA), proposed as an alternative to the cognitivism pervading the field. By sociocognitive, I
mean a view of language and language acquisition as simultaneously occurring and interac-
tively constructed both “in the head” and “in the world.”
First, I develop a view of language and its acquisition as social phenomena—as existing and
taking place for the performance of action in the (socially-mediated) world. Second, I describe
the cognitive nature of language and its acquisition, focusing especially on recent develop-
ments in connectionism. Third, I introduce sociocognitive views of language and posit a social
interpretation of connectionism as bridging the gap between cognition and social action.
Fourth, I discuss sociocognitive perspectives on first language acquisition. Fifth, I describe the
cognitivist biases of much SLA research, then suggest how sociocognitive approaches can help
overcome them. I end by considering implications of the perspective I develop in this paper.

Theorists and researchers tend to view SLA as a mental pro- essential to understand how they constitute each other.
cess, that is, to believe that language acquisition resides Rather than according primacy to the role of sociocultural
mostly, if not solely, in the mind. (Davis, 1995, pp. 427–428) activity or of the individual, the aim is to recognize the
essential and inseparable roles of societal heritage, social
Most SLA researchers view the object of inquiry as in large engagement, and individual efforts. (Rogoff, 1990, p. 25)
part an internal, mental process. (Long, 1997, p. 319)
A RECURRING IMAGE COMES TO MIND WHEN
SLA has been essentially a psycholinguistic enterprise, domi-
I read much second language acquisition (SLA)
nated by the computational metaphor of acquisition. (R.
Ellis, 1997, p. 87)
research and theory. It is the image of a single
cactus in the middle of a lonely desert—the only
It is fair to say that the dominant theoretical influences [in thing except sand for miles around. The cactus
SLA] have been linguistic and psycholinguistic. . . . While sits there, waiting patiently for that rare cloud to
more socially oriented views have been proposed from time to pass overhead and for that shower of rain to come
time, they have remained relatively marginal to the field
pouring down. Like the solitary cactus, the
overall. (Mitchell & Myles, 1998, p. x)
learner in mainstream SLA research seems to sit
Much of what we identify as our cognitive capacities in the middle of a lonely scene, and, like the
may . . . turn out to be properties of the wider, environmen- cactus, the learner seems to wait there for life-giv-
tally extended systems of which brains are just one (impor- ing sustenance (or at least its triggering mecha-
tant) part. (A. Clark, 1997, p. 214) nism)—input—to come pouring in. At that point
Individual effort and sociocultural activity are mutually the real action begins, and we watch the learner
embedded, as are the forest and the trees, and . . . it is miraculously grow and change.
A contrasting image sometimes also occurs to
The Modern Language Journal, 86, iv, (2002)
me, though more often when reading in fields
0026-7902/02/525–545 $1.50/0 other than SLA, such as language socialization
©2002 The Modern Language Journal and cultural anthropology. This is the image of a
526 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
tropical rainforest, so densely packed and thick acknowledgments of the existence of other hu-
with underbrush that it would be hard to move man beings. None of these activities makes sense
through. This forest is constantly wet with humid- apart from a fundamentally social environ-
ity and teeming with life, sounds, growth, and ment—All language is language in use, to para-
decay—a lush ecology in which every organism phrase M.A.K. Halliday. Language has brought
operates in complex relationship with every manifold evolutionary advantages to our species,
other organism. Each tree grows in and as a result allowing us the possibility of both working
of this fundamentally integrated world, develop- smoothly and efficiently in groups, and critiqu-
ing continuously and being sustained through its ing and improving them. The social nature of
involvement in the whole ecology. And this image language is not incidental to its existence and
satisfies me at a deeper level, because it corre- ongoing use—it largely if not completely ex-
sponds to how I (and others) believe language plains them (e.g., Elman et al., 1996; Seiden-
acquisition “really works.” berg, 1996). To the degree that we are cogni-
In this article, I undertake a critique of the tively predisposed to learn and use language, it
“lonely cactus” view of SLA and offer in its place is because as a social tool it allowed those who
a perspective that integrates learners, teachers originally took advantage of it (in however ru-
(not necessarily or perhaps even usually of the dimentary a form) an edge in survival over those
classroom variety), acquisitional contexts (both who did not. And language as a species-wide ca-
of situation and of culture, e.g., Halliday & pability continues to yield multiple advantages
Hasan, 1989; Malinowski, 1923; Ochs, 1990), and to human beings.
social practices, products, tools, and worlds (e.g., In the defining moment of 20th-century lin-
Berger & Luckmann, 1966; A. Clark, 1997; Gee, guistics, Chomsky took structuralism to its logical
1992; Wertsch, 1985). I argue that our obsession extreme, completely abstracting language from
with the decontextualized, autonomous learner its social setting and declaring its ontological (or
has prevented us from conceptualizing SLA as a at least methodological) self-sufficiency. By re-
situated, integrated, sociocognitive process—a view- ducing the social out of language he was able to
point that will bear real fruit in attempts to un- produce an idealized pseudolanguage about
derstand the complex phenomenon of SLA. which some “facts” could be explained using the
In order to reach this goal, however, one must tools of logic and calculus. Yes, speakers of En-
start some way back. As SLA theorists (e.g., glish certainly do use question transforma-
Gregg, 1988) have pointed out, studying SLA tions—and arguably quite often do not, generally
without first defining the substance and scope of speaking, in oral discourse—but to base a whole
the L and the A is a haphazard endeavor. Much linguistic theory on a handful of such phenom-
of this article will therefore be devoted to estab- ena belies the reductiveness and abstractness of
lishing what I mean by the two foundational con- Chomsky’s model of language.2
cepts language and its acquisition, as a necessary In fact, grammar (rightly understood) is itself
prerequisite to focusing the discussion explicitly a social accomplishment and social tool. Thus, a
on SLA. More specifically, the staging, sequenc- recent volume in Cambridge’s Studies in Interac-
ing, and relative emphasis of the exposition will tional Linguistics series (Ochs, Schegloff, &
be: (a) language and language acquisition as so- Thompson, 1996) investigates the many ways in
cial phenomena, (b) language and language ac- which grammatical features both function so-
quisition as cognitive phenomena, (c) language cially and are influenced by and shaped in inter-
as a sociocognitive phenomenon, (d) language actional context:
acquisition as a sociocognitive phenomenon; and
(e) second language acquisition as a sociocogni- Grammar is part of a broader range of resources—or-
tive phenomenon.1 ganizations of practices, if you will—which underlie
the organization of social life, and in particular the
way in which language figures in everyday interaction
LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION and cognition. In this view, the involvement of gram-
AS SOCIAL PHENOMENA mar in such other organizations as those of culture,
action and interaction has as a consequence that mat-
Obviously but nontrivially, language is so-
ters of great moment are missed if grammar’s order
cial—a social practice, a social accomplishment, is explored as entirely contained within a single, self-
a social tool. People use language to act in and enclosed organization. Grammar’s integrity and effi-
on their social worlds: to convey, construct, and cacy are bound up with its place in larger schemes of
perform, among other things, ideas, feelings, ac- organization of human conduct, and with social in-
tions, identities, and simple (but crucial) passing teraction in particular.3 (p. 3)
Dwight Atkinson 527
More specifically, the authors in this volume Pennycook, 1994, 1998; Street, 1984, 1993) have
investigate how “grammar organizes social inter- also dealt with the profound sociohistorical im-
action” (p. 33; e.g., how grammatical structure brication of written and spoken language in sys-
contributes to conversational turn-taking); how tems of social and cultural practice, hierarchy,
“social interaction organizes grammar” (p. 36; professional specialization, and power.
e.g., how grammatical structure varies, changes, 4. Turn-taking, participation structures, and oppor-
and is emergent across social settings and socio- tunity structures. The mechanisms and ideologies
historical time); and how “grammar is a mode of by which participation in language activity is so-
social interaction” (p. 38; e.g., how people co- cially apportioned are central to the notion of
construct utterances using grammar as a shared language as a social phenomenon (e.g., Sacks,
resource). Schegloff, & Jefferson, 1974). They also vary
Beyond grammar, a brief sampling of phenom- markedly according to cultural norms of lan-
ena which socially-oriented linguists have at- guage use and the distribution of power in society
tempted to account for—and which, I would ar- (e.g., Bourdieu, 1991; Edelsky 1981; McDermott,
gue, deserve a central place in any valid, 1988; Ochs, 1988a; Philips, 1983; Tannen, 1993;
comprehensive approach to language and its ac- Tannen & Saville-Troike, 1985).
quisition—include: 5. Speech as an interactional accomplishment. A
number of scholars (e.g., Goodwin, 1986, 1987,
1. Politeness, identity, and presentation of self. A 2000; Lerner, 1996; Ochs, Schieffelin, & Platt,
major use of language is to negotiate and main- 1979) have shown how oral language is struc-
tain relationships between people. This includes tured across individuals, rather than by indi-
its central role in presenting and performing viduals operating autonomously. A persistent
identities, or socially expressive versions of the contention has been that the individual is not the
self (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987; Gee, 1990; appropriate unit of analysis when examining lan-
Goffman, 1959; Peirce, 1995; Tannen, 1986). guage and associated behavior from a truly social
2. Perspective taking and contextualization cueing. point of view (e.g., Bakhtin, 1990; Rogoff, 1990,
All language in use incorporates markers of how 1998).
it is to be interpreted (e.g., Gumperz, 1982; 6. Social indexicality. Overlapping and possibly
Quirk, Greenbaum, Leech, & Svartvik, 1985). subsuming several of the categories already men-
Thus, the string I hate you, while not devoid of tioned, the notion of indexicality, broadly con-
(socially-structured) lexical and grammatical strued, suggests the all-important use of language
meaning, would usually be incomprehensible as to orient oneself and others in the (socially-medi-
a spoken utterance without at least some of the ated) world. Far beyond the perceived oddities of
following (which typically co-occur): intonation, traditional indexicals—e.g., personal pronouns
loudness, voice quality, and emphasis (but see and deictic expressions—social indexicality sees
next point).4 virtually all linguistic referrings as underspeci-
3. Language-in-context. Of central importance to fied, and, therefore, as taking their meaning as
a truly social understanding of language is what much from their contextual (and sociocontextu-
else goes on vis-à-vis the languaging event that ally-construed) surroundings as from their literal
contributes to its situated significance. To compli- sense (Hanks, 1996; Ochs, 1990, 1992, 1996).
cate usefully the example given to support the
previous point, if the I hate you is accompanied by Other phenomena that a valid approach to
a passionate embrace, changes in the intonation language-in-the-world would have to account for,
contour may not be needed to gauge the intent but which cannot be explicated here, include:
of the statement. Language never occurs apart social knowledge of and participation in speech
from a rich set of situational/sociocultural/his- events, sociolinguistic (including register) vari-
torical/existential correlates, and to separate it ation, and the organization and “addressivity”
out artificially is to denature it. Recent research (Bakhtin, 1990) of discourse. None of the lin-
on the complex implicatedness of speech with guistic features or functions mentioned to this
gestural systems, eye gaze and head movement, point should be considered add-ons to a basic
bodily orientation, and the manipulation of ob- framework for understanding language—on the
jects (e.g., Goodwin, 2000; Goodwin & Goodwin, contrary, they comprise part of the core set of
1992; Kendon, 1992; McNeill, 2000; Ochs et al., phenomena that such a framework needs to ex-
1996) is highly suggestive in this regard. Dis- plain.
course analysts and anthropologists (e.g., Fair- Just as surely as language is social, so is its
clough, 1992; Gee, 1990; Hutchins, 1995; acquisition. As with other social practices, new-
528 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
borns are actively inducted into “languaging” ritualized. Rituals “freeze” meaning for the learner’s
(Becker, 1988) from day one, or almost certainly observation. (p. 336)
before (Foster, 1990; Locke, 1993, 1995). This The public principle: The meanings of the parts of new
is not to suggest that infants are not cognitively systems, whether words, visual symbols, actions, or
predisposed to language-related phenomena— objects must initially be rendered public and overt, so
to human voices and faces (e.g., Bower & that the learner can see the connection between the
Wishart, 1979; Eimas, 1975), for instance, or pro- signs and their interpretations. And this is done, in
nounced intonation contours (Snow, 1995)—or first language acquisition and other forms of learn-
that children themselves are anything less than ing, by the ways in which words, actions, and social
active participants in the first language (L1) ac- interaction are integrally intertwined. (p. 337)
quisition process. What it does suggest is that The context-variability principle: In learning the parts of
such cognitive potentials are realized in (and a new system, the learner will initially tie meanings to
such dynamic actors supported by) extremely specific contexts or experiences. Appreciating wider
rich, nurturing social activities and contexts. meaning is a matter of having multiple experiences,
Quite opposed to the Chomskyan “poverty of the not (just) learning “general rules,” and mastery re-
stimulus” argument, a first principle of L1 ac- quires practice at varying aspects of meaning so as to
quisition should therefore be the richness of the actively fit them to the context of use. People who
know only “general meanings” and cannot vary these
context, that is, the deep, multiplex embedding
in context neither know the system, nor are they
of language activities in the lush social world
acquiring it in a useful way. (p. 346)
that surrounds most children, and which, in the
words of Bourdieu (1991), “instead of telling the A substantial literature on child language so-
child what he [sic] must do, tells him what he cialization now exists that details the manifold,
is, and thus leads him to become durably what diverse ways in which language is shaped for and
he has to be” (p. 52). Thus, whereas communi- by acquirers into the dynamic, creative social sig-
cative intentionality as we know it cannot be at- nifying system that it is. The basic assumption
tributed to newborns and early infants, underlying socialization in general is that “chil-
caregivers often interpret their behaviors as in- dren come to share the world view [and social
tentional (Foster, 1990; Smith, 1988) and act on practices] of their community through the ar-
that basis. As Newson (1979, cited in Foster rangements and interactions in which they are
1990) expressed it: “Human babies become hu- involved, whether or not such arrangements and
man beings because they are treated as if they interactions are intended to instruct them” (Ro-
already were human beings [italics added]” (p. 16). goff, 1990, p. 98). Consequently, early language
A second principle of L1 acquisition should socialization studies focus on language learned
therefore be the social input (or insertion—Gee, “through intensive . . . contact under conditions
1995) principle. In opposition to the notion of allowing maximum feedback such as we find in
input as linguistic information presented to and home and peer settings” (Gumperz, 1982, p.
activating the language learning automaton (i.e., 139). Given the highly active stimulus-seeking na-
the lonely cactus view), input is used here to de- ture of children, this makes the “conservative[ly]”
note that the child herself is input/inserted into estimated 12,000–15,000 hours of intensive con-
an ongoing stream of social interaction that sup- tact between average caregivers and children over
ports her language development at every turn. their first years together (Larsen-Freeman, 1991,
Gee (1995) generalized his nearly identical “in- p. 336; for similar estimates see N. C. Ellis, 1998;
sertion principle” of L1 acquisition to all kinds of McLaughlin, 1987) a period in which a seemingly
complex learning: impossible amount of learning-in-context can
take place.
The insertion principle: Efficacious learning of a new Although language is clearly internalized in a
complex system is a process involving socially sup- sense during L1 acquisition, however, it never
ported and scaffolded insertion into an activity that ceases to be part of the learner-as-social mem-
one does not yet understand. (p. 336)
ber’s set of interactively constructed social tools,
Gee (1995) also described additional princi- practices, and experiences, and, in this way and
ples by which L1 acquisition takes place vis-à-vis others, continues to be held jointly with the so-
its rich social environment. Among them are: cial world. In fact, I will argue below that too
much has been made of the internal/external
The routine principle: Early insertion into an activity opposition—the division between the cognizing
one does not yet understand requires that the activity individual and the social (or socially-mediated)
be to a certain extent repeated and routinized or world.
Dwight Atkinson 529
LANGUAGE AND LANGUAGE ACQUISITION mar does not represent a single, logical, a priori
AS COGNITIVE PHENOMENA system whose basic existence and implementation
for communicative purposes is irrelevant to its
To say that language is social is in no sense to
cognitive status.
deny that it is also cognitive. Humans have evolu-
Language acquisition as well is obviously a cog-
tionarily highly-developed brains, and language,
nitive phenomenon. Cognition and language de-
to some substantial degree, is stored in, compre-
velop hand in hand in early childhood, and less
hended by, produced by, and therefore reflects
dramatically into the later years—in several impor-
the basic design features of the human brain. In tant senses their development never ceases (e.g.,
fact, the human cognitive apparatus is much more Kemper, 1987). Cognitive predispositions toward
of a virtuoso language performer than rather cut- learning and using language (Foster, 1990; Locke,
and-dried functional portrayals typically allow (al- 1993, 1995) are clearly also present at the begin-
though, as will be explained further below, its ef- ning of life—infants truly do seem to come
fective performance can only take place by virtue equipped with either linguistic protoknowledge
of a rich, interactive fund of social knowledge, in already built in, or cognitive systems primed to
a rich social/interactional context). Thus, in the learn an amazing amount linguistically in a short
act of conversing, we not only store and retrieve time. Operating principles, parameter setting,
linguistic and contextual information “online” al- bootstrapping, and child-directed speech are all
most instantaneously and normally with great ac- attempts to account for the incredible amount of
curacy, but we also produce, comprehend, moni- language awareness children display early in life,
tor our production and comprehension, plan our and for how they so quickly complexify it.
next contribution, and perform myriad other op- One recent cognitive attempt to explain L1
erations (e.g., adopt various politeness strategies, acquisition is connectionism (e.g., Plunkett, 1995;
negotiate turn-taking, anticipate what others are Rumelhart & McClelland, 1986; cf. N. C. Ellis,
going to say, integrate different modes of lan- 1998). Connectionist theories depend on the
guage and symbol system use such as reading, ges- computational modeling of language (and other
turing, eye gaze, and body orientation with speak- kinds of) learning via the gradual buildup of
ing) virtually all at the same time. It is small richly internetworked association potentials at
wonder then that some psychologists have begun the neural level which are selectively and simulta-
to redefine intelligence in terms of the amazing neously activated in specific patterns to perform
things all (or at least many) humans do cogni- cognitive activities, including language produc-
tively—including, notably, in their use of lan- tion and comprehension.5 Connectionist L1 ac-
guage—rather than in terms of intelligence mea- quisition models appear to account for how vari-
sures which place individuals in rigid hierarchies ous complex language systems such as the
of difference and deficit (Scribner & Cole, 1981; English past tense verb-marking system (e.g.,
cf. Gee, 1990; Gould, 1981). Plunkett & Marchman, 1993; Rumelhart &
Several recent cognitive theories of language McClelland, 1986) can be learned over time with-
and grammar have presented interesting contrasts out assuming innate linguistic knowledge. Al-
to Chomskyan linguistics in the important roles though much effort has gone into establishing
they give to context and use. Thus, Hopper (1988) the modeling of this particular grammatical sys-
coined the term emergent grammar to describe a tem as a paradigm example of connectionism’s
view of grammar as “a vaguely defined set of sedi- power, connectionist researchers have investi-
mented (i.e., [more or less] grammaticized) re- gated other linguistic domains as well. Thus, El-
current partials whose status is constantly being re- man (1992) and others have modeled connec-
negotiated and which cannot be distinguished in tionist systems that correctly assign syntactic
principle from stategies for building discourses” (p. category labels after exposure to a range of syn-
118). He went on to give evidence from written tactic strings, and Stemberger (1992) “has of-
Malay of the ways such discourse phenomena as fered a connectionist model as a plausible ac-
foregrounding and backgrounding substantially count of the characteristics of child phonology”
shape the grammar that is used to enact them. (Leonard, 1995, p. 590).
Other scholars proposing cognitively focused but A major strength of connectionist approaches
context-driven and noncomponential approaches to L1 acquisition is that, unlike their innatist
to grammatical knowledge include Becker (1979; counterparts, they appear to account for empiri-
1988), Langacker (1987), C. J. Fillmore, Kay, and cally determined hallmarks of the acquisitional
O’Connor (1988), and Seidenberg (1996). Their process. These hallmarks include: in the acquisi-
theories all have in common the notion that gram- tion of the lexicon, semantic overextension and
530 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
underextension (e.g., Barrett, 1995; Gruendel, to keep them separate. In actual fact, however, a
1977) and the “vocabulary burst” often seen in growing number of linguists, anthropologists, de-
children during their second year (e.g., Bates, velopmental psychologists, and language acquisi-
Dale, & Thal, 1995; Nelson, 1973); overgenerali- tion researchers do not accept such a dichotomy
zation of past tense verb endings (e.g., Brown, (e.g., Gee, 1990, 1992; Halliday, 1978; Hanks,
1973; Marchman & Bates, 1994); the comprehen- 1996; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Ochs, 1992, 1996;
sion-production lag in language acquisition (e.g., Rogoff, 1990).6 Along with these scholars, I con-
E. V. Clark, 1983; Plunkett, 1995); and U-shaped sider the social and cognitive aspects of language
growth in a number of areas (e.g., Brown, 1973; to have co-evolved from the beginning, and
Plunkett, 1995). therefore to function interdependently—if not
Just as importantly, perhaps, connectionist re- inseparably. In this section, I will try to describe
searchers have modeled interdomain language ac- how the social and the cognitive work together in
quisition. Thus, Bates et al. (1995) discussed the this way.
efficacy of connectionism in accounting for the A number of linguistic phenomena can, in fact,
“continuity hypothesis” (cf. Foster, 1990) relating only be accounted for if the cognizing individ-
early lexical development to early grammatical ual’s linguistic knowledge is seen to be abetted by,
development in English. They pointed out that in actuated within, and broadly continuous with a
the past tense morphology-learning simulations rich social context. Researchers (e.g., Goodwin,
mentioned above there is “temporal asynchrony” 1986, 1987; Lerner, 1993, 1996; Ochs et al.,
between the acquisition of discrete lexical forms 1979), for example, have described the interac-
and the emergence of a rule-like system that cor- tional accomplishment of propositions across indi-
rectly assigns past tense inflectional endings to viduals—the remarkable ability of individuals to
previously unseen verbs: contribute jointly to the expression of a single
idea or action. Such a feat is possible only in the
In the early stages of learning, the system appears to presence of joint cognition—a form of intersubjec-
learn each mapping from present to past tense by
tivity created and maintained on the basis of both
rote, with no generalization to novel lexical forms. . . .
As instances of present/past tense mapping accumu-
shared (and highly-articulated) cognitive knowl-
late, some dramatic nonlinear changes are observed: edge of the activity being engaged in, and a world
the rate of learning accelerates markedly, overgener- that gives such activity a social purpose, a conven-
alization errors start to appear, and the system starts tional shape (e.g., a participation structure), and
to provide a default mapping to novel items. . . . Su- an approximately agreed-upon means of linguis-
perficially, the network behaves as though it has tic expression.
switched from one mode of learning (rote) to an- Among socially-oriented linguists, conversation
other (rule). And yet there are no structural discon- is frequently considered the paradigm speech ac-
tinuities in the system itself, or in the one-verb-at-a- tivity within the human language-making capacity
time nature of the input. . . . Simply put, grammatical
(e.g., Ochs et al., 1996). One of the foremost
generalizations (i.e., rulelike behaviors) do not arise
until this system has acquired enough instances to
characteristics of conversation is its jointly-accom-
support those generalizations. When the requisite plished nature, whether within or across utter-
number of items has been acquired, dramatic ances. Thus, topic nomination by one party often
changes can take place, even within a single system. leads to multiple utterances on the topic (which
(Bates et al., 1995, pp. 118–119) itself may be subtly negotiated and modified in
the interaction) by both the nominator and other
Connectionist approaches to language acquisi- parties, leading eventually to the expression of a
tion thus have the potential to tell us much about broadly-shared perspective, if only for the dura-
the cognitive mechanisms implicated in L1 acqui- tion of the interaction (e.g., Goodwin, 1981,
sition. In addition, they have characteristics—to 1986, 1987). Likewise, conversational storytelling
be discussed in the following two sections of this is a highly co-constructed sociocognitive activity,
article—that allow the cognitive and social as- with different parties exercising influence over
pects of language use and acquisition to be tied the story’s course through their responses, by
much more closely together than previously. sharing more actively in its co-construction, or
even by taking it over as it proceeds (Goodwin,
LANGUAGE AS A SOCIOCOGNITIVE 1986, 1987; Mandelbaum, 1987).7 The effective
PHENOMENON use of any language, in fact, crucially assumes the
preexistence and interactionally-achieved devel-
In describing the social and cognitive attributes opment of shared sociocognitive perspec-
of language to this point, I have purposely tried tives—thus a basic precondition for effective lin-
Dwight Atkinson 531
guistic reference (e.g., nominal, deictic, or defi- approaching each other), neither cognition itself
nite reference—H. H. Clark & Marshall, 1981; nor the resulting speech event could have taken
H. H. Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986) is that lan- place. Put a bit more metaphorically, perhaps, the
guage users actively co-construct and adopt a acts of cognition described in this example are
common referential ground (Hanks, 1996).8 substantially continuous with the social
It is necessary at this point to consider in more world—they do not start in the head, although
detail how the cognizing individual and the so- the head is certainly involved, nor do they end in
cially-constructed and mediated world make their the head, because the output is social action. Nor
integrated contributions to linguistic activity in do the social (signifying) practices involved sim-
that world. In order to do so, I will adopt a con- ply take on their meaning once they arrive in the
nectionist understanding of cognition, but one head; instead, they come with meaning already,
that extends rather directly into the social world, in a sense, built in—just as language carries with
and vice versa. My account substantially follows it meaning that is only “borrowed” (Bakhtin,
that of Gee (1992). 1990) in specific instances of language use. The
As described previously, connectionism posits point here, then, is that cognition is not a private
that meaning/knowledge exists largely in poten- activity that occurs exclusively in the confines of
tial form in the human cognitive apparatus. That an independent, isolated cerebral space, but
is, rather than having prebuilt cognitive struc- rather that it is at least a semipublic activity, pro-
tures, or schemas stored in the brain, all that duced as part of a substantially open system.
exists is the potential for such structures to be Whenever we participate in social activity, we par-
formed basically online through the activation of ticipate in conventional ways of acting and being
various networks of neural associations. Thus, that are already deeply saturated with signifi-
meaning (or its material substrate) is distributed cance.
across a large number of neurons, all of which Gee (1992, p. 12) gave the following example
have varying probabilities of firing in concert of how cognition (or at least knowledge) is both
with other neurons, depending both on the na- “in the head” and “in the world”:
ture of the input stimulus and on what has been
Consider the way people move around a city. Some
experienced in the past—and thus what connec-
people undoubtedly have quite impressive “maps” of
tions have been previously trained/socialized to the city in their heads, others have less complete
activate together. For instance, while walking ones, and some people have quite impoverished
along a New England country road on a sunny ones. However, people do not need to have any very
summer day, a passing stranger’s “Hi!” or “Nice full representations in their minds . . . since the struc-
weather we’re having”—suitably accompanied by ture of the city, out in the world as it is, determines a
eye contact, a smile, a certain affective disposition good deal of their movement. . . . People’s “knowl-
(at least to the extent of desiring to communi- edge” of the city is stored, in good part, out in the city
cate), the orientation of the speaker’s face toward itself. Their “city schema” . . . is not just made up of
that of the (assumed) recipient of the utterance, things in their heads, it is also composed of the struc-
tures in the city itself, as well as physical maps (and
delivered in a suitably friendly tone at a socially
things like public transportation schedules) that peo-
acceptable distance while enacting a socially ap- ple can read. (p. 12)
propriate identity, and so forth—will, in princi-
ple, activate in the recipient a set of previously Thus, meaning resides (partway) in social
socialized neural connections leading to the ho- products (e.g., cities, maps, country roads, cars),
listic understanding that this is the speech act we social practices (e.g., greeting somebody, read-
call a greeting. Quite probably, it will also result ing, baking a cake, playing the role of teacher or
in neurally-based and highly-patterned action by student in a classroom), and social tools (e.g.,
the recipient, comprising, among other things, a language, literacy, computer programs, methods
reciprocal physical orientation, affective stance, of navigation), even as it resides (partway) in the
facial expression, tone of voice, and utter- head.
ance—what we call a response. A second, slightly different aspect of the coun-
What I first want to highlight in this example is try road greeting example that I want to highlight
the interactive, “outside-in” (Shore, 1996) nature is the profoundly integrative nature of the socio-
of the sociocognitive event. Without the rich con- cognitive event. That is, language activity and its
tribution of social (signifying) practices and tools cognitive correlates always occur as integral parts
such as facial expression, physical orientation, of larger sociocognitive wholes. Thus, without
voice quality, language, social scene (an isolated each of the following occurring and being cog-
New England byway), and social actors (strangers nized in relation to one another—socially signify-
532 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
ing facial expressions and physical orientations, 1995) provide both the framework and the con-
affective stance, a conventionalized social scene tent through which basic context-language form
in a social setting with a social purpose per- associations are made and internalized. Gee’s
formed by social actors, and the effective deploy- (1995) routine principle and public principle, de-
ment of the social tool of language—the activity scribed earlier, capture important facets of how
of exchanging greetings could not have taken such routines provide repetitive, public, and
place. An important strength of connectionism is highly-structured opportunities for infants to con-
that it can account for such complex intertwin- nect specific utterances with specific semantic
ings of sensory and affective modalities, emer- complexes. Coordinated activity of infant and
gent cognitive structures, social phenomena, and caregiver is central in this kind of routine—de-
language ability and use in the accomplishment spite the fact that intentionality cannot be strictly
of social activity. It does so in terms of the inter- attributed to infants, as aggressively stimulus-seek-
actions of various sets of activated neurons—of ing organisms with a natural attraction to interac-
neural networks that work together because of tive and repetitive behavior (Locke, 1993) they
previous exposure to similar experience com- learn to play their part early on. More specifically,
plexes (e.g., Gee, 1992, chap. 2; Strauss & Quinn, the related notions of scaffolding (e.g., Ninio &
1997, chap. 3). From this viewpoint, language per Bruner, 1978), vertical constructions (Scollon,
se is not the privileged and separate summum 1976), zone of proximal development (e.g., Cole,
bonum, but rather an integral element of socio- 1985; Vygostky, 1978), socializing attention
cognitive activity, the ultimate purpose of which (Zukow-Goldring & Ferko, 1994), and proposi-
is to perform situated action-in-the-world. tions across individuals and utterances (Ochs et
al., 1979) all reconceptualize the child and the
LANGUAGE ACQUISITION AS A caregiver as an interactional unit in their accom-
SOCIOCOGNITIVE PHENOMENON plishment of sociocognitive tasks that the child
could not perform independently, and, therefore,
Equally good arguments for the sociocognitive as a central mechanism of developmental growth.
nature of language come from the circumstances It is generally thought that as L1 development
of its acquisition. A well-established finding in L1 progresses, context becomes a less important part
acquisition research is that external context plays of the acquisitional scheme. Thus, whereas chil-
a crucial role early on. In early acquisition of the dren’s early utterances are tied closely to the here
lexicon, for instance, it is vital that children be and now (Foster, 1990), they become progres-
able to link particular sounds, words, and phrases sively less so as time goes on. This finding is often
repetitively to the appearance of particular ob- taken as evidence that some sort of basic lan-
jects or to the occurrence of particular actions guage learning machinery has kicked fully into
(Barrett, 1995; see also Gee, 1995, described pre- gear and is now operating on a fairly systematic
viously). To say that linguistic form is simply and autonomous basis.
being “input” into an autonomous language Although it is no doubt true that qualitative
learning system at this point would be inaccurate; changes take place once linguistic knowledge
at minimum, both the form and the object/ac- reaches a certain critical mass for children, con-
tion are being cognitively represented in some nectionist theories of cognition and language ac-
kind of associative relationship. The widely ac- quisition suggest that much if not all learning is
cepted notion of event representation (e.g., Barrett, accomplished not by progressively greater separa-
1995; Nelson, 1986) goes one step further, pro- tion of the knowledge being acquired from the
viding a richer and, from a sociocognitive per- external world and other domains of cognitive
spective, more plausible view of early language knowledge, but by their increasing integration. If
acquisition. It postulates that children already this is the case, then it might be more accurate to
have cognitively well-developed, organized asso- say that context, rather than disappearing from
ciations of activity sequences, actors, and objects the scene altogether, partly “comes inside.” That
(along with open slots by which some actors and is, as has been widely posited by neo-Vygotskian
objects may be substituted for by others) onto sociocultural theorists (e.g., Lantolf & Appel,
which different words are initially mapped, and 1994; Wertsch & Stone, 1985), the fundamental
within which they thereafter become substantially dynamic of acquiring language (as well as other
integrated. “higher mental functions”) is that formerly exter-
Nor is it just any external context that early nalized/social knowledge is substantially recon-
language development depends on. Rather, social- figured as internalized/cognitive knowledge. But
interactional routines (e.g., Barrett, 1995; Gee, scholars who have recently attempted to link cog-
Dwight Atkinson 533
nition via connectionism more closely to the so- mental growth. The gradual approximation by
cial and cultural world (e.g., Gee, 1992; Shore, developing humans of what is “in the head” to
1996; Strauss & Quinn, 1997) might take excep- what is “in the world” is just such an adaptive
tion to the implications of the Vygotskian claim dynamic.
that language is, to some degree, gradually loos- Gee (1992; following C. J. Fillmore, 1975) de-
ened during development from its moorings in scribed the cultural model associated with the lexi-
social life. Rather, from this newer perspective, it cal item bachelor. According to Gee, the dictionary
might be more accurate to say that social life is definition of bachelor as unmarried male is only rudi-
now becoming articulated at a cognitive level in mentarily related to the dense linkings of associa-
the development of cultural models (Gee, 1992; tions that fall within the culturally construed un-
Holland & Quinn, 1987; Shore, 1996)—models derstanding of bachelor. For one, bachelor invokes
that owe both their origins and their continued an idealized, culturally normative view of mascu-
activation and use directly to their social exist- line sexuality. Thus, Roman Catholic priests,
ence—and that in this important sense the cogni- young boys, homeless men, and so forth, seem to
tive and the social are growing progressively fit into the category only problematically. Like-
closer together. wise, when contrasted with the term spinster—its
If this version of connectionism is even ap- apparent gender counterpart—bachelor seems to
proximately correct, then the notion of “decon- carry with it the cultural presupposition that sin-
textualized language”—so important in descrip- gle men become progressively more eligible and
tions of later language and literacy learning and desirable marriage partners as they grow older (or
early success and failure in schooling—is perhaps at minimum their eligibility never ceases),
neither useful nor accurate. That is, if context is whereas women become progressively less so.
taken to be only the immediate social and physi- Although not all connections in the complex
cal setting of language behavior in the here and web of potential associations with the word bache-
now—the context of situation first described by lor need be activated on every occasion of its use,
Malinowski (1923) and later elaborated by Halli- the point is that such a rich, articulated back-
day (in Halliday & Hasan, 1989, chap. 1)—such ground exists, and that this background is located
language behavior might well be seen as thor- not only in cognitive but also social space. It
oughly decontextualized. But if context is more might also be pointed out that examples of the
widely construed as context of culture (Halliday & type I have given in this article cannot even begin
Hasan, 1989; Malinowski, 1923; Ochs, 1990)—in- to approximate the extremely rich, complex, and
volving the increasing cognitive interarticulation highly-articulated kinds of sociocognitive knowl-
of cultural models with social practices, social edge that most humans are privy to simply by
products, and social tools (including, crucially, virtue of their lived experience and sociogenetic
how to deploy them effectively)—then to think of inheritance. To mention just one further (and
language as becoming progressively more decon- more or less linguistic) element that must figure
textualized and autonomous in the course of its importantly in such highly developed knowledge
acquisition may be fundamentally misguided. complexes vis-à-vis language use, consider the
Event representations in early L1 acquisition, growing realization among linguists that statisti-
although sometimes claimed to be relatively tem- cal-collocational relationship between various
porary and evanescent, suggestively resemble linguistic features is a major principle in the syn-
early and relatively unarticulated schemas or tagmatic and paradigmatic organization of lan-
mental models (or, in connectionist terms, net- guage-in-use and its acquisition (e.g., Saffran,
works of neural associations out of which such Aslin, & Newport, 1996; Seidenberg, 1996;
schemas/models are formed basically online). Stubbs, 1996, chap. 2). Such knowledge is easily
Whether or not they provide a skeletal base for accounted for in terms of connectionist networks
the later articulation of sociocultural knowledge (Seidenberg, 1996), and would obviously be held
in the form of cultural models, schemas, frames, in joint, if variable, ownership with one’s social
or scripts (Cole, 1985), their early existence does milieu. Taken together with the other kinds of
suggest a sort of continuity of sociocognitive pro- knowledge I have so far mentioned and exempli-
cesses—the progressive “thickening” of “knowl- fied, it suggests “a semantics . . . more like an
edge in the head” by “knowledge in the encyclopedia than a dictionary, [which] incorpo-
world”—the basic outside-in dynamic described rates the view that linguistic categories exist in
by Shore (1996) and alluded to above. Put yet relation to ‘particular structured understandings
another way, any organism’s progressive adapta- of cultural institutions, beliefs about the world’”
tion to its environment is a hallmark of develop- (Hanks, 1996, p. 244, including a quotation from
534 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
C. J. Fillmore, 1985). Although this formulation this reason (as seen, in part, in the quotations
may still assume something of the traditional di- beginning this article). But Breen’s (1985) plea
vide between the social and the cognitive I have to researchers and teachers to treat second lan-
been arguing against, it also captures some of the guage classrooms as cultural scenes is still one of
interpenetration and connectivity I am trying to the most eloquent statements of the problem:
portray.9
Given that we wish to understand how the external
social situation of a classroom relates to the internal
SLA AS A SOCIOCOGNITIVE PHENOMENON psychological states of the learner, the metaphor of
the classroom as provider of optimal input or rein-
Let me summarize the main argument of the
forcer of good strategies is inadequate. It reduces the
article as developed to this point: Neither lan- act or experience of learning a language to linguistic
guage acquisition nor language use—nor even or behavioural conditioning somehow independent
cognized linguistic knowledge—can be properly of the learner’s social reality. Not only is SLA re-
understood without taking into account their search currently offering us a delimited [sic] ac-
fundamental integration into a socially-mediated count of language learning, reducing active cogni-
world. Beyond simply saying that the cognitive tion to passive internalisation and reducing
and the social interact, I use recent research in language to very specific grammatical performance,
linguistics, anthropology, language acquisition, the mainstream of SLA research is also asocial. It
neglects the social significance of even those vari-
and cognitive science—work I have necessarily
ables which the investigators regard as central. The
had to rely on, because so little of its kind has yet
priority given to linguistic and mentalistic variables
been done in the field of SLA—to argue that they in terms of the efficient processing of knowledge as
are mutually constituted. It is commonplace for input leads inevitably to a partial account of the lan-
cognitively-oriented and socially-oriented lan- guage learning process. The social context of learn-
guage researchers to assume (at least for working ing and the social forces within it will always shape
purposes) the separability of their domains. I ar- what is made available to be learned and the inter-
gue instead that these two domains cannot use- action of individual mind with external linguistic or
fully be separated: The coinage “sociocognitive” communicative knowledge. Even Wundt, the first ex-
(e.g., Ochs, 1988b) is adopted to represent this perimental psychologist, believed that he could not
study higher mental processes such as reasoning, be-
distinct perspective.
lief, thought, and language in a laboratory precisely
With its beginnings in the cognitive psychology because such processes were rooted within authentic
revolution of the 1960s (e.g., Brown, 1973; Cor- social activity. (pp. 138–139)
der, 1967), the field of SLA has adopted, by and
large, a highly cognitivist view of second language Likewise, Vygotskian researchers (e.g., Hall,
learning (e.g., Breen, 1985; Crookes, 1997; Firth 1997; Lantolf, 2000; Lantolf & Appel, 1994) have
& Wagner, 1997). By cognitivist, I mean a perspec- argued against the reductive cognitivism of the
tive that places SLA mainly within individual field. Lantolf and Appel (1994), for example,
heads and that sees individuals therefore as radi- criticized a view of the language learner “as a
cally autonomous language acquirers (Penny- solipsistic biological organism whose cognitive
cook, 1997). Even where social variables appear powers simply unfold or ripen with the passage of
to enter in, from this perspective, they do so only time, rather than as someone who experiences
as indirect influences on the acquisitional process productive participation in joint activity” (p. 11).
(R. Ellis, 1994).10 Discourse analysts Firth and Wagner (1997) also
Although this shared perspective has provided offered a broad critique of SLA research as “indi-
a (very) roughly common ground for inquiry in vidualistic and mechanistic”—as based on a per-
SLA, it comes at the cost of denaturing reduction. spective that is:
If the development of “languaging” depends on
greater engagement with and adaptation to the weighted against the social and the contextual, and
(socially-mediated) world—or, more accurately, heavily in favour of the individual’s cognition, par-
on the progressive interarticulation of the social ticularly the development of grammatical compe-
tence. This has led to an imbalance of adopted theo-
and the cognitive—then a SLA based substan-
retical interests, priorities, foci, methodologies,
tially on such master concepts as input, the (ide-
perspectives . . . resulting in distorted descriptions of
alized) learner, and a “lonely” version of cogni- and views on discourse, communication, and inter-
tion is an impoverished endeavor. personal meaning—the quintessential elements of
Others have, of course, made similar points language. Moreover, this has occurred even in SLA
from time to time, and in recent years main- work that is concerned with discourse and interac-
stream SLA has been increasingly criticized for tion. (p. 288)
Dwight Atkinson 535
Although I do not agree with elements of Firth Interaction
and Wagner’s argument, their general claim that
mainstream SLA is lopsidedly cognitivist—and Most SLA researchers who study “interaction”
that much of its current practice virtually com- do so mainly for the sake of understanding its
pels a view of language as radically disconnected conditioning effect on input. This is made clear
from its natural environment, even in studies that by Gass (1998):
seem to investigate language use in that environ- The goal of my work (and the work of others within
ment—is, in my opinion, all too accurate.11 the input/interaction framework . . .) has never been
Taking the just-mentioned critiques of SLA as to understand language use per se . . . but rather to
part of a larger critical endeavor, I would like to understand what types of interaction might bring
delineate my own understanding of some key about what types of changes in linguistic knowledge.
concepts in the field, and indicate where I find (p. 84)
them at odds with a sociocognitive perspective. This is truly a pale reflection of the study of
authentic human (linguistic) interaction, as Lid-
dicoat (1997) noted:
Input
What is missing . . . [in] the study of interaction in L2
As dramatized at the beginning of this paper, I contexts is interaction between people who have a
see the notion of input in mainstream SLA as preexisting relationship, who are interacting for the
coming fairly close to that of a switch or trigger, purpose of engaging in that relationship, and who
are engaged in interaction in which their options for
whether one adopts a Universal Grammar per-
participating are not constrained by institutional
spective or not. At least one can say that input is roles.12 (p. 314)
of interest in this approach mainly as a stimulus
activating an autonomous cognitive learning ap- In other words, what is missing in mainstream
paratus, which is assumed to perform certain SLA is any concern whatsoever for the dominant
(often unclearly-specified) processing opera- forms of interaction in the world, and for those
tions. In this way, the stimulus is converted into interactions qua interactions. The term therefore
some kind of internal grammatical repre- seems to be a misnomer, given the fact that the
sentation, which finds, over time, its proper rela- focus of work that purportedly studies it is still
tionship with other such representations in a language-in-the-head. Again in the words of Lid-
rule-governed structuralist system that is virtually dicoat: “Essentially, what is happening here [in
immune to nonlinguistic influence. Even SLA the contrived interactional settings favored in
studies of input modification and interaction (see mainstream SLA] is an interaction designed to allow
below), which focus nominally on language-in- the NNS to produce a language sample [italics
use, seem to adopt this scenario—or something added]” (p. 315). From a sociocognitive perspec-
quite like it—as their underlying “central dogma” tive this is hardly interaction at all.
(Crick, 1988).
Much of this characterization is problematic The Language Learner
from a sociocognitive perspective. If knowledge
of the world, including linguistic knowledge, is To put it bluntly, the language learner in main-
organized in the form of “actional wholes” stream SLA is something like an automaton, in-
(Hanks, 1996, p. 245, where actional refers to the teresting only in the sense that it houses a discrete
fundamental purpose of language to contribute language learning system. This view is well at-
to the carrying out of action in the world), it is tested in writing on the goals of SLA; to restate
hard to imagine how such knowledge would de- the words of Long (1997), cited at the beginning
velop via decontextualized internalization. The of this article: “Most SLA researchers view the
developing grammatical system as I have de- object of inquiry as in large part an internal,
scribed it furthermore lacks any motivation other mental process” (p. 319). If SLA is about lan-
than perhaps a purely genetic one, which is why guage-learning human beings, they are therefore
its description is often pervaded by an odd sort of human only in a derivative sense—analogous,
anomie, in my opinion—it just is because it is. As more or less, to the attenuated manner in which
I have tried to make clear, any approach to lan- language is considered “creative” by Chomskyans.
guage and its acquisition which ignores or dis- As noted previously, I frequently find the read-
misses the basic functionality of language for hu- ing of SLA research to be almost an exercise in
man beings in society is lacking in descriptive and surrealism—based, I believe, in the just-men-
theoretical adequacy. tioned contradictory “present absence” of human
536 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
beings. Human beings as I know them, whether Cognition
people on the street, students I teach and work
with, professional colleagues, or those I am close In mainstream SLA cognition is a “lonely” pro-
to and love, appear to act, think, and feel in ways cess taking place within an autonomous language
and for reasons entirely different than those most learning organism. Its forte is the processing of
typically featured in SLA research. Case studies, input/construction of linguistic knowledge. It
diary studies, and (mostly earlier) work that fo- serves as a bank of internal linguistic knowledge,
cuses on authentic interaction and language use or competence, which most often has only an
(e.g., L. W. Fillmore, 1979; Saville-Troike, 1988; indirect connection to language performance.
Schmidt, 1983; Schmidt & Frota, 1986) are some Even non-mainstream areas of SLA that focus on
of the exceptions I know of in this regard—and language performance, such as interlanguage
they are admirable exceptions. pragmatics, sometimes seem to assume this view
(e.g., Kasper, 1997).
(Scientific) Methods
Language
From the start, SLA was “scientized” by its prac-
titioners (Block, 1996). This was partly because it Where language is reduced substantially to
adopted cognitive psychology and linguistics as its grammar, and its use largely to the provision of
source disciplines (e.g., Crookes, 1997; Mitchell input, there exists a reductiveness approaching
& Myles, 1998). As time went on, however, a sec- that of Chomksy’s influential vision. From a socio-
ond good reason for seeing SLA as science be- cognitive perspective, however, language is an
came apparent: Academic politics and prestige abundantly rich resource for getting on in the
favored doing so, especially if SLA was thereby world—for performing social action. Language is
dissociated from the low-status occupation of lan- intricately but dynamically interwoven with hu-
guage teaching (Schachter, 1993). Although this mans’ other means of ecological adaptation and
move may have brought a certain amount of re- activity, and removing it from that context comes
spect-by-(dis?)association to the field, recent at a real cost.
charges of “science envy” (Block, 1996) or “phys- Beyond simply defining a sociocognitive ap-
ics envy” (Lantolf, 1996) are, in some respects, proach to SLA negatively by criticizing SLA ortho-
not far off the mark. The idea that one can study doxy, however, I would also like to provide a view
inherently social phenomena by applying meth- of what it is, or, more accurately, what it could be.
ods and approaches originally developed to de- One thing is clear: Such a perspective does not
scribe the behavior of inanimate objects has been yet exist in SLA. For this reason, it will be possible
widely critiqued, starting as far back, perhaps, as to go just so far in conjuring up its image.
Wundt (see quotation from Breen, 1985, given First, a sociocognitive approach to SLA would
above). Strong arguments have also been made take the social dimensions of language and its
to the effect that quantitative scientific method- acquisition seriously. Interaction in sociocognitive
ologies, because they neutralize by design what is SLA would have its full sociocognitive signifi-
variable and individual (in human behavior or cance and constitute a foundational concept.
otherwise), produce epiphenomenally uniform Language is learned in interaction, often with
accounts (e.g., Daston, 1995; Hacking, 1981; Por- more capable social members. Classroom teach-
ter, 1995). That is, uniform results have been ar- ers are part of this group where second languages
gued to be substantially an artifact of methodolo- are concerned, but only a part—peers, mentors,
gies which, in a sense, presuppose them—for role models, friends, family members, and signifi-
example, by statistical generalization or strict con- cant others can also fall into this category. Al-
trol of “extraneous” variables. Although such cri- though interaction might not include conversa-
tiques have been widespread in the social sci- tion in all cases, it would certainly entail the deep,
ences over the past 20 or so years, it is of more holistic investment of learners in learning activi-
than passing interest that defenders of main- ties, and would see those learners as active agents,
stream scientized SLA (e.g., most of the contribu- not passive recipients.
tors to Beretta, 1993) tend to rely for their argu- Second, language and its acquisition would be
ments more on the (nonempirical) philosophy of fully integrated into other activities, people, and
science, than on actual, empirical accounts of sci- things in a sociocognitive approach to SLA. They
entific behavior (e.g., Collins, 1985; Gilbert & would be seen as integral parts of larger sociocog-
Mulkay, 1984; Latour & Woolgar, 1986; Traweek, nitive wholes, or, in Gee’s (1992) term, Discourses:
1988). “Discourses are composed of people, of ob-
Dwight Atkinson 537
jects . . . and of . . . talking, acting, interacting, of the same problems with mainstream SLA re-
thinking, believing, and valuing, and sometimes . search discussed in this article, I would like here
. . writing, reading, and/or interpreting . . . . Dis- briefly to indicate where I believe my approach
courses are out in the world, like books, maps, differs from this one and is not simply reducible
and cities” (p. 20). In other words, language to it.
would be seen in terms of its rich ecological/con- A major claim of Vygotsky—and a claim that
textual/relational “worldliness” (Pennycook, seems typically to be assumed or endorsed by
1994) and complexity rather than its simplicity, current neo-Vygotskian SLA researchers (e.g.,
parsimony, and autonomy. Lantolf, 2000)—was that language appears, devel-
Third, language and its acquisition, from a so- opmentally speaking, first on the interpsychologi-
ciocognitive perspective, would be seen in terms cal plane (i.e., as social speech) and only after-
of “action” and “participation”—as providing an wards on the intrapsychological plane (i.e., as
extremely powerful semiotic means of perform- internalized or inner speech). There is thus a
ing and participating in activity-in-the-world (Ro- gradual process of internalization whereby a fully
goff, 1990, 1998; Lave & Wenger, 1991). It is just externalized social practice becomes a substan-
because language serves this vital function, one tially internalized cognitive practice (e.g., Lan-
could say, that it exists and that people acquire it: tolf, 2000; Lantolf with Pavlenko, 1995). In fact,
One does not usually acquire a language in order according to Vygotsky, this is how people learn to
to acquire it, or talk about it, or provide data for cognize—how “higher mental development” oc-
SLA researchers. One acquires a language in or- curs: “Any higher mental function was external
der to act, and by acting, in a world where lan- because it was social at some point before becoming an
guage is performative. This is exactly why and internal, truly mental function [italics added]” (Vy-
how children learn their first language, and it gotsky, 1981, p. 162).
accounts as well for most of the second/addi- In a recent major statement of sociocultural
tional language learning going on in the world theory in SLA, Lantolf (2000) has echoed Vygot-
today. It is an extremely unfortunate matter that sky’s view:
we have some influential myths suggesting other-
wise—for example, that SLA takes place primarily Internalization is in essence the process through
in cases where students are taught something dis- which higher forms of mentation come to be. Inter-
crete called language (Gee, 1990), or that SLA nalization then assumes that the [original] source of
takes place within isolated heads whose only mo- consciousness resides outside of the head and is in
fact anchored in social activity. At first the activity of
tivation is creative construction.
individuals is organized and regulated (i.e., medi-
Finally, a sociocognitive perspective should
ated) by others, but eventually, in normal develop-
not, strictly speaking, exclude. As an approach to ment, we come to organize and regulate our own
language, it is fundamentally cognitive and funda- mental and physical activity through the appropria-
mentally social. A sociocognitive perspective does tion of the regulatory means employed by others. At
not diminish a view of language as one or the this point psychological functioning comes under the
other—it argues for the profound interdepen- voluntary control of the person. (pp. 13–14)
dency and integration of both. Thus, although I
have described a cognitivist view of SLA as “im- From this point of view, we could say that lan-
poverished,” that is not the same as saying it is guage is sociocognitive in a manner of speaking,
wrong. In fact, I believe that cognitivists have but only or most substantially in its developmental
contributed to our understanding—however ten- profile (see also Kirshner & Whitson, 1997, for a
tative and partial at this point—of SLA. But if similar critique). That is, language starts social,
language is in the world at the same time as it is but becomes substantially cognitive as develop-
in the head, then we need to account for its ment proceeds: in the words, once again, of Lan-
integrated existence, rather than adopt positions tolf (2000), “The convergence of thinking [i.e.,
that reduce the life—the humanity—out of lan- the cognitive] with culturally created mediational
guage. artifacts [i.e., the social] . . . occurs in the process
of internalization, or the reconstruction on the
A NOTE ON NEO-VYGOTSKIAN inner, psychological plane, of socially mediated
SOCIOCULTURAL THEORY IN SLA external forms of goal-directed activity” (p. 13).
For some neo-Vygotskians this may be a sufficient
Given the increasing popularity of a non-main- explanation of both language development and
stream form of SLA theory—neo-Vygotskian so- use in toto, given that for Vygotsky, “to under-
ciocultural theory—which tries to address some stand behavior means to understand the history of
538 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
behavior [italics added]”(cited in Cole, 1993, p. ond language education, they have not yet in
9).13 most cases been closely linked to SLA theory.
But my own argument—as developed on a step- One implication of a sociocognitive approach
by-step basis in this article—is that although lan- to SLA is that teaching is valuable, and that learn-
guage may perhaps be seen from some points of ing and teaching go hand-in-hand (a view that
view as more or less internalized and self-regu- mainstream SLA, incidently, has yet to agree
lated—as the property of an individual, cognitive on—Crookes, 1997; R. Ellis, 1997). But teaching
self—in actuality it always and everywhere exists in this view is also often incidental: If one learns
in an integrated sociocognitive space. In terms of by participating in specific and meaningful social
the above-given formulation of Vygotsky (1981), activity, then co-participants are often one’s
I would therefore argue that, contra his view, teachers. The expert-novice (or master-appren-
language (no matter what its stage of develop- tice) metaphor emanating from studies of situ-
ment) never takes on an “internal, truly mental ated cognition is a useful thinking tool in this
function” at all. Rather, it is always mutually, si- context, exactly because it emphasizes learning
multaneously, and co-constitutively in the head through active and increasingly knowledgeable
and in the world. Certainly, at critical points in participation in a particular “community of prac-
development, language may seem to “come in- tice.” But this metaphor should not be taken to
side”—but if one end of language, so to speak, is imply that learners and those they learn from are
embedded in cognitive space, the other end is profoundly separated. As already noted, peers
just as strongly embedded in social space. can be teachers, depending on the situation, and
In actual fact, this use of spatial and object-ori- the same is true for all others with whom we have
ented metaphors to describe language hardly suf- social relationships. If we consider that most of
fices, but I hope at least to have indicated what I the additional language learning going on in the
believe is a basic difference—certainly at least in world today is of this nonformal variety, then we
terms of emphasis—between what I propose here have a more realistic notion of teaching, and how
and what many neo-Vygotkians assume or are teaching and learning interact. If, as second lan-
proposing in their SLA work. There are other guage teachers, we can harness more of the range
differences—for instance, the artificial tasks and of teaching situations that actually take place in
conditions that have historically obtained in Vy- the world outside the classroom (e.g., Atkinson,
gotskian research, and the need in such research 1997, 1998; Hawkins, 1998), then we will be able
to break behavior down into component parts to utilize more fully the teaching and learning
while at the same time professing holism (e.g., potential of all human beings.
Wertsch, 1998; see also Kirshner & Whitson, A second implication of a sociocognitive ap-
1997). But the first-mentioned difference is the proach to SLA is intimately related to the view
most important one, and from it many of the that language and its acquisition are not radically
other differences proceed. This is not to say that disconnected from the rest of the world. Lan-
I do not value or respect research being done in guage-in-the-world suggests a richness and power
this framework in the field, nor that it has not for it that extends well beyond the transfer of
contributed significantly to my own thinking on information from brain to brain. A sociocognitive
SLA. approach to SLA promotes and reinforces many
connections to other realms of inquiry and prac-
tice, such as: culture (e.g., Atkinson, 1999;
CONCLUSION Kramsch, 1993); schooling (e.g., Poole, 1992);
identity (e.g., Peirce, 1995); power, politics, and
What, then, are some of the implications of a ideology (e.g., Fairclough, 1992; Gee, 1990, 1992;
sociocognitive view of SLA? Here I will speculate Pennycook, 1994); discourse (e.g., Firth & Wag-
because, as I have already pointed out, no such ner, 1997); social ecology (e.g., Capra, 1996;
coherent view yet exists. In the interim, I will take Schumacher, 1997); and embodied action-taking
my cues largely from pedagogically-oriented L1 (e.g., Goodwin, 2000). When one considers the
research on situated cognition, social linguistics, deep involvement of second/additional lan-
and learning-as-participation (e.g., Gee, 1990, guages in world politics, exploitative capitalism,
1992; Kirshner & Whitson, 1997; Lave & Wenger, and globalization (e.g., Pennycook, 1994, 1998;
1991; Rogoff, 1990, 1998; Wenger, 1998; cf. Atkin- Phillipson, 1992), then a very real gain is realized
son, 1997). I should also note that although sev- in the intrinsic consequentiality of studying,
eral of the implications described below are in learning, and teaching them. We need and can
areas that are already receiving attention in sec- have a SLA—not to mention approaches to sec-
Dwight Atkinson 539
ond language teaching—with real potential for standings do not exist in isolation; they are part of
changing the world, rather than being radically broader systems of relations in which they have mean-
separated from it. ing. These systems of relations arise out of and are
reproduced and developed within social communi-
A third implication of the sociocognitive study
ties, which are in part systems of relations among
of SLA concerns research methods for studying
persons. The person is defined by as well as defines
the learning and teaching of second/additional these relations. Learning thus implies becoming a
languages. Although individual-aggregating sta- different person with respect to the possibilities en-
tistical and experimental methods have a place in abled by these systems of relations. To ignore this
SLA, studying real humans in real human con- aspect of learning is to overlook the fact that learning
texts and interactions, including classrooms, en- involves the construction of identities. (pp. 52–53)
tails methodologies that do not denature phe-
nomena by removing them from their natural
environments and breaking them down into ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
countable component parts. Qualitative research
approaches that attempt to honor the profound James Paul Gee first introduced me to many of
wholeness and situatedness of social scenes and the ideas developed in this article. I would like to
individuals-in-the-world, such as ethnographic thank him, as well as A. Vishnu Bhat, Michelle
methods (e.g., Holliday, 1996; Lazaraton & Davis, Burnham, Joan Carson, John Hedgcock, Hiroko
1995; Ramanathan & Atkinson, 1999), will have a Itakura, Robert B. Kaplan, Wakako Kobayashi,
central place in this endeavor. One further im- Claire Kramsch, Ilona Leki, Takako Nishino, and
portant advantage of such methodologies is that Nirmal Selvamony, for their critical comments
they are less likely to reproduce the theory-prac- and encouragement in what has been a drawn-
tice divide—the asymmetrical division of labor out writing/publishing process. David Beglar,
between (classroom) teachers and researchers. In Suresh Canagarajah, George Kamberelis,
the suggestive phrasing of Holliday (1994), “the Genevieve Patthey-Chavez, and Vai Ramanathan
teacher cannot afford to be anything but a re- also generously read and commented on earlier
searcher” (p. 31) where broad sociocognitive drafts. I would further like to thank the MLJ edi-
connections are acknowledged between the class- tor, Sally Sieloff Magnan, and the four anony-
room and the outside world. Likewise, class- mous reviewers for their thoughtful editing and
rooms, among other kinds of learning situations, comments. This article is dedicated to the mem-
can be studied via these methods as complex so- ory of Matha Bean.
ciocognitive activity systems in their own right
(Breen, 1985; Holliday, 1996).
Fourth and finally, sociocognitive approaches NOTES
to SLA will provide a means by which second
language learners can be seen as real people, 1 The sociocognitive approach developed here takes

doing something they naturally do—not as mere its lead from a wide variety of disciplines and ap-
research subjects, or mere students, or mere sites proaches: cognitive and cultural anthropology (e.g.,
for language acquisition. Perhaps the theme I Hanks, 1996; Shore, 1996; Strauss & Quinn, 1997); soci-
ology (e.g., Berger & Luckmann, 1966; Goffman, 1959;
have emphasized above others in this article is
Sacks et al., 1974); social linguistics (Gee, 1990, 1992);
that thought, feeling, and activity in the social
sociolinguistics and language socialization studies (e.g.,
world are brought together in the form of human Hymes, 1972; Ochs, 1988a, 1988b, 1990, 1992, 1996;
beings actively operating as part of that world. It Schieffelin & Ochs, 1986); neo-Vygotskian sociocultural
is therefore fitting to give the last word to Lave theory (e.g., Lantolf, 2000; Lantolf & Appel, 1994; Vy-
and Wenger (1991), two scholars who have done gotsky, 1981; Wertsch, 1985, 1998); studies of situated
much to promote this view: cognition/learning and communities of practice (e.g.,
Brown, Collins, & Duguid, 1989; Kirshner & Whitson,
Participation in social practice . . . suggests a very 1997; Lave & Wenger, 1991; Rogoff, 1990; Wenger,
explicit focus on the person, but person-in-the-world, 1998); cognitive science and connectionism (e.g.,
as member of a sociocultural community. This focus Churchland, 1996; A. Clark, 1997; Elman et al., 1996;
in turn promotes a view of knowing as activity by Rumelhart & McClellan, 1986; Seidenberg, 1996); L1
specific people in specific circumstances. acquisition (e.g., Bates et al., 1995; Foster, 1990;
As an aspect of social practice, learning involves the Plunkett, 1995); SLA (e.g., Breen, 1985; Firth & Wagner,
whole person: it implies not only a relation to specific 1997; Peirce, 1995); and studies of conversation and
activities, but a relation to social communities—it im- interaction (e.g., Goodwin, 1986, 1987, 2000; Lerner,
plies becoming a full participant, a member, a kind of 1993, 1996; Ochs et al., 1996).
person. . . . Activities, tasks, functions, and under- The term sociocognitive has been used in a variety of
540 The Modern Language Journal 86 (2002)
contexts in a number of different disciplines, some of not seek to articulate them here, substantial areas of the
which are listed above. My own first exposure to the interpenetration of cognitive and social phenomena
term came in a graduate class in sociolinguistics taught must operate much more dynamically and dialecti-
by Elinor Ochs, one of the main proponents of some of cally—perhaps along the lines of Giddens’ (1979) no-
the views I develop here (e.g., Ochs, 1988a; Ochs et al., tion of structuration (see also Atkinson, 1999). Thus, it
1996). can be said that individuals and social groups not only
2 As this is a historical description, I do not refer to progressively adapt to their environments, but that they
more recent Chomskyan formalisms. In fact, however, also actively construct those environments in many and
Chomsky’s basic theory of language (as opposed to its varied ways. Larsen-Freeman’s (1997) third meaning of
ever-changing formal realizations) has remained re- the term “dynamic” (p. 148) in describing language
markably stable over the years (e.g., Chomsky, 2000). from a chaos/complexity perspective—although it still
3 This same basic point is at least implicit in Hymes’s seems to depend in some senses on the much-ques-
(1972) original conceptualization of communicative tioned notion of linguistic rules—captures something of
competence, which I regard as foundational to a socio- the interactivity, feedback-sensitivity, and constructed-
cognitive view of language. ness of “languaging” (Larsen-Freeman herself uses the
4 The point has even been made (e.g., Goffman, term grammaring) I am trying to get at here. In general,
1959) that, given an utterance in which the proposi- I find Larsen-Freeman’s discussion of chaos/complexity
tional content and the nonpropositional content are in theory vis-à-vis SLA inspirational in its potential for refo-
conflict, the latter is usually taken as the final arbiter of cusing the field.
meaning. 10 This view seems problematic if one is to define
5 Implicit in most definitions of connectionism is the language more broadly than a set of grammatical forms
notion of parallel distributed processing—often taken to be and rules. How would one account for the acquisition of
its virtual synonym. Parallel (vs. serial) processing in- norms of politeness (e.g., Brown & Levinson, 1987; Tan-
volves the simultaneous carrying out of large numbers nen, 1986), for instance, other than by appealing to the
of computational events (vs. the step-by-step nature of direct effect of social factors? Tannen has shown in
serial processing), whereas distributed (versus central) various publications that politeness is an aspect of lan-
processing indicates that cognitive computational activ- guage that is central to its use and functionality—every
ity is spread out over a large number of neurons/neural bit as important as the grammatical features more stan-
connections, rather than having to depend on any one dardly studied in SLA.
or a small number of them. 11 Two SLA researchers whose work has been largely
6 This approach is part of a broader critique across within the cognitivist tradition seem recently to have
the social sciences of mainstream psychology as the realized the reductionism inherent in that tradition. R.
study of “lonely cognition,” instead of self-in-context Ellis (1997)—partly cited at the beginning of this arti-
(e.g., Gergen, 1985; Hutchins, 1995; Lave & Wenger, cle—and Crookes (1997), respectively, state: “SLA in
1991; Rogoff, 1990, 1998). A deeper and more philo- general has paid little attention to the social context of
sophical critique of the self is a major theme in post- L2 acquisition, particularly where context is viewed non-
modernist and poststructuralist thought (see, e.g., At- deterministically (i.e., as something learners construct
kinson, 1999) but is beyond the scope of this article. for themselves). SLA has been essentially a psycholin-
7 At the same time, participants hew closely to the guistic enterprise, dominated by the computational
conventional story structure and register of narratives, metaphor of acquisition” (R. Ellis, 1997, p. 87).
or if they do not are usually brought into line. “Though cognitive psychology [as a source discipline
8 Deixis is perhaps the paradigm example here, but for SLA research] was to be preferred to its dominant
the same basic claim can be made across linguistic do- predecessor [i.e., behaviorism] because it was (purport-
mains and systems (Hanks, 1996; Ochs, 1992). edly, at least) about people (rather than rats), it was a
9 In general, the descriptions given in this section are long time before I began to understand that it . . . could
incomplete as they stand in that they do not sufficiently be seen as a sociocultural construct . . . that reflected at
capture the bidirectionality of influence and interpene- least to some extent the presumptions of the societies in
tration of social and cognitive processes. Because I am which it developed. That was why it was fundamentally
partly focusing on cognition here—specifically as it con- an individualist psychology that treats people as isolates”
cerns the issue of “decontextualized language”—I have (Crookes, 1997, p. 98).
necessarily had to downplay the reciprocal influence of It is noteworthy that both of these statements were
the cognitive on the social, as well as the continuous and made in articles discussing the relevance of SLA to sec-
integrated nature of feedback between them. To give ond language teaching.
two examples by way of atonement and the restoration 12 Although any claim that participation in interac-

of holistic bidirectionality: (a) The design of our cogni- tion between familiars is not constrained by institutional
tive apparatus fundamentally influences the way we per- roles is highly questionable (e.g., Bourdieu, 1984), Lid-
ceive things, so that social practices and products must dicoat is clearly making a distinction here between what
be preadapted to our cognitive-sensory capabilities; and conversation analysts call “ordinary conversation” and
(b) Gee’s (1992) description of the sociocognitive sche- what they call “institutional interaction” (for more on
mas of cities demonstrates profound sociocognitive in- this distinction, see Drew & Heritage, 1992).
terpenetration and interaction. In fact, although I will 13 If this is not an understanding of language shared
Dwight Atkinson 541
by all neo-Vygotskians (e.g., Rogoff, 1998; Wertsch, cognition and the culture of learning. Educational
1998), it still seems a dominant emphasis among neo-Vy- Researcher, 18, 32–42.
gotskians who study SLA, as seen in the Lantolf quota- Brown, P., & Levinson, S. C. (1987). Politeness: Some uni-
tions given earlier in this section. To me, this emphasis versals of language usage. Cambridge: Cambridge
represents a particularly literalistic interpretation of Vy- University Press.
gotsky’s original thought. Brown, R. (1973). A first language: The early stages. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Capra, F. (1996). The web of life: A new scientific under-
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