HSG Report - 2011 China Legal and Regulatory Analysis

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a Hermes strategygroup report
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2010/2011 China Legal and Regulatory Analysis
Overview
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n our 2011 report we again highlight the importance of ensuring consistent
implementation and enforcement of Chinese law at all levels of government. We also
focus on maintaining open and competitive markets to foster the most conducive
environment for innovation and economic growth. Finally, when disputes do arise
between the West and China, as happens between any two countries with such high levels
of interaction, we encourage the use of established international resolution mechanisms.
The benefits of multilateral leadership and collaboration are clearer than ever. Continued
dialogue and engagement during the global recession was a critical stabilizing force.
This cooperation has prevented the onset of a deeper economic crisis and paved the way
for a nascent recovery globally.
Hermes strategygroup
Leadership shown by governments worldwide has also helped stabilize the global
economy through the most difficult period, particularly with the implementation of large
stimulus packages in the US and China. It is critical for the US and China to continue
this spirit of collaboration. The challenges facing both countries and the entire world –
climate change, sustained economic recovery and a fundamental realignment of global
imbalances – cannot be confronted through the efforts of one country alone. As two of
the world’s largest economies, it is imperative for the US and China to maintain a long-
term perspective on the benefits of ensuring a constructive bilateral relationship.
China’s recovery from the global recession underscores the country’s fundamental and
growing economic strength. Annual GDP growth topped eight percent in a year when
most major economies saw negative growth and few external observers at the beginning
of the year thought this goal would be achieved. This expansion was in large part due to
the government’s RMB 4 trillion (USD 584 billion) stimulus package. China remains a
highly desirable destination for investment and a major global priority for American
companies. If anything, China has grown in relative importance during the global
recession and American companies operating here have improved their profit compared
to their margins in other markets.
It is also clear that China faces challenges in the transition from export-led growth to
domestic demand-led growth. As the stimulus spending finishes, the extraordinary level
of government investment ends, monetary policy is normalized and steps are taken to
improve the sustainability and quality of economic growth, the future path is uncertain.
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Prepared by Hermes strategygoup, Ltd. © 2010
Challenges
A
short list of relevant challenges for 2011 includes: improving the efficiency of
capital allocation, reducing the environmental burden of growth, increasing
flexibility of the labor market, shifting to clean energy while still providing the
huge increases in energy required to support economic and population growth, addressing
widening income inequality, strengthening the social safety net (especially healthcare
delivery and an underfunded pension system), moving up the value-added curve as unit
labor costs increase, supporting growth of an underdeveloped services sector, and
reforming education to address future needs of a much more complex society and
economy. Many observers have commented that China is at a turning point. Structural
changes are needed.
The underlying question facing businesses is whether China, in moving towards domestic
demand-led growth, will continue its unfinished project of becoming a market economy
through “reform and opening,” or resort to supporting its state-owned sector and
narrowing market access for imported products and foreign-invested enterprises
operating in China. The optimism that many foreign-owned companies have consistently
felt over the past decade has been based on over three decades of gradual, but consistent,
reform and opening measures leading the economy toward becoming a market economy
open to foreign participation and well integrated with global investment and trade flows.
The Chinese government promised, and delivered, basic stability of macroeconomic
policy in a framework of continuous market opening.
The result was an extraordinary level of foreign direct investment, which has always been
more important for the transfer of management skills and technology than for funding,
and sustained economic growth at levels unprecedented for a large developing economy.
China has been successful, we have contributed substantially, and we have prospered
together. But will it continue?
The American Chamber of Commerce China’s 2010 Business Climate Survey reflects the
American business community’s increasingly mixed views on the future of China’s
business environment. While most members continue to be optimistic about China’s
market potential, many have begun questioning their long-term viability in China as they
consider the obstacles presented by an increasingly difficult regulatory environment.
Many new industrial policies show signs of protectionism that arouse concern over
whether market access for both foreign invested enterprises and trading partners will
narrow significantly in the years ahead. We also observe that progress toward greater
reliance on market-oriented mechanisms has slowed, allowing a return to reliance on
administrative measures to manage the economy.
There are also growing concerns about regulatory trends. For the first time, inconsistent
interpretation and implementation of laws emerged as the top business concern among
foreign corporations. The growing perception that China still lacks the regulatory
structure or political will — or both — to implement laws evenly throughout the country,
and apply them uniformly to all companies, be they foreign or domestic, has the potential
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to hamper China’s future economic development severely. It is important that China
continues to upgrade its regulatory enforcement and legal structures to ensure a strong
business environment. Without confidence in provincial and municipal government-level
enforcement, companies may grow hesitant to invest in China’s Western and inland
provinces. These are the very places that most need capital investment. A regulatory
environment that takes for granted foreign investment in developing regions risks leaving
those areas behind their more developed counterparts.
Another challenge that remains is HR. While no longer the number one operating
challenge, it has been a top issue for many years. A deeper breakdown of HR concerns
shows increasing wages as the biggest concern, but it is only one among several deemed
important. Many foreign investors say their company had experienced either “negative
impact” or “material damage” attracting, developing and retaining each of three
categories of employees: managers, skilled workers and technical staff. Difficulty
terminating workers causes the highest degree of material damage. This last point is a
reflection of the Labor Contract Law, which provides critical protections for workers but
lacks clarity over the contractual obligations between employers and workers and
definitions of certain categories of workers which may create disincentives to hire.
China has achieved substantial legislative progress with the promulgation of landmark
laws in recent years, such as the Anti-Monopoly Law, Labor Contract Law and amended
Patent Law. These laws represent significant steps forward as China continues to build
and reform its regulatory system. Furthermore, the trend towards transparency in the
legislative process, particularly in opening draft laws and regulations for comment, is
very welcome. These laws form the basis for a more predictable, and therefore, efficient
marketplace. The next challenge, which grows more apparent each year, is that of robust,
transparent and uniform implementation. Companies have seen progress in many areas,
but have yet to see the type of consistent enforcement that would strengthen general
business conditions. Progress in this area is critical to maintaining an open investment
environment that benefits both consumers and producers.
While China continues to develop a strong legal framework, some government initiatives
seem focused on meeting short-term goals at the expense of long-term progress. Here are
two instances of such:
Innovation Policy Foreign corporations strongly support China’s push to become an

innovative society. Indeed, many companies have spent billions of dollars investing in
world-class research and development centers, which provide China’s top engineers
many of the tools that they need to innovate. However, we strongly believe that
competition is the most effective way to promote innovation with limited and non-
discriminatory government intervention. Experience around the world shows that pro-
competitive and non-discriminatory policy approaches that respect intellectual property
rights and recognize the global nature of innovation are the most effective ways to
promote innovation. There is a wide perception that foreign-owned companies are losing
out on sales to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in addition to government procurement as
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a result of China’s innovation policies. In the Report of the Working Party for China’s
WTO accession agreement (Paragraph 46), China committed that “the Government of
China would not influence, directly or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of
state-owned or state-invested enterprises.” We understand this as a commitment that
SOE procurement will be based on commercial and market factors, rather than any
preferences given to domestic enterprises in government procurement. The experience of
our members doing business with SOEs is that this is not the case.
WTO Agreement on Government Procurement China has been responsive to most of its
express WTO commitments, underscoring the government’s work on market reform over
the past decade. Yet a glaring exception is China’s failure—more than eight years after
joining the WTO—to join the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA).
Accession to the GPA would signal to the world China’s commitment to being a serious,
responsible member of the WTO and a leading global economy. Furthermore, as a
member of the GPA, China would have the added benefit of avoiding protectionism by
other countries, including the US. AmCham-China strongly urges China to meet its
commitment to join the GPA “as quickly as possible,” as provided in its 2001 WTO
accession agreement.
The trend on the part of both the Chinese and US governments to use tariffs as a first
resort in resolving trade disputes is troubling. Of particular concern is the tendency of the
Chinese government to deploy trade measures on a tit-for-tat retaliatory basis even in the
absence of credible evidence of injury to domestic industry. The US economy is showing
signs of revival, while China’s growth is once again robust. However, the recoveries are
still in their early stages and could be put off course by policies based more on domestic
political considerations than sound long-term economic planning.
Competition Law
T he Anti-Monopoly Law of the PRC (AML), which took effect in August 2008, is
the most significant development in the history of Chinese competition policy. As
China’s first comprehensive competition law, the AML is a significant step in
China’s continuing transition from central planning to a market economy. With some
exceptions, the AML’s framework and substantive provisions are generally consistent
with prevailing worldwide antitrust regulatory practices.
The AML addresses the three principal areas of antitrust regulation: 1) anti-competitive
monopoly agreements involving multiple firms; 2) exclusionary and predatory unilateral
conduct by firms with substantial market power (abuse of dominance); and 3) mergers,
acquisitions, and other transactions that may restrict or reduce competition. Beyond
regulating private anti-competitive conduct, the AML also includes a limited provision to
address administrative monopoly, or the misuse of official authority to protect or promote
favored firms. But while the AML incorporates many well-established principles, several
key implementation regulations remain unclear or have yet to be promulgated.
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If the AML is implemented to promote consumer welfare and economic efficiency in
accordance with established worldwide practices, and is enforced in a transparent and
nondiscriminatory manner, it should help markets better serve Chinese consumers while
improving overall Chinese economic efficiency. To the extent that it is instead
implemented to benefit favored companies at the expense of consumers and competitors,
the promise of the AML will be unrealized.
Enforcement The AML prescribes a two-tier enforcement structure consisting of the

interagency Anti-Monopoly Commission responsible for policymaking and coordination
of one or more anti-monopoly enforcement authorities. The Anti-Monopoly Commission
itself does not have enforcement power. The State Council has designated three
enforcement authorities. The Anti-Monopoly Bureau of the Ministry of Commerce
(MOFCOM) is responsible for merger review. The Price Bureau of the National
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) and the Anti-Monopoly and Anti-Unfair
Competition Enforcement Bureau of the State Administration for Industry and Commerce
(SAIC) separately share responsibility for enforcement with respect to conduct.
Specifically, the SAIC has jurisdiction over all monopoly agreements and abuse of
dominant market positions except pricing violations, over which the NDRC has
jurisdiction. Of concern is that this division may hinder coherent AML enforcement.
First, although we understand that an unpublished memorandum of understanding is
intended to coordinate enforcement by the NDRC and SAIC, it remains unclear how the
NDRC and SAIC will address cases involving both price and non-price conduct. Second,
coordination by the Anti-Monopoly Commission notwithstanding, MOFCOM, SAIC and
NDRC may have different approaches to defining markets, gauging market power and
balancing policy goals when applying the many public interest exceptions of the AML.
Third, MOFCOM may review mergers on the basis of anticipated anti-competitive
conduct, even if such conduct falls within the purview of SAIC. Published guidelines
delineating the division of authority and detailed guidelines for implementation would
enhance regulatory certainty and facilitate compliance with the AML.
While the AML focuses on administrative enforcement, it also allows private actions to
recover damages resulting from AML violations. The Supreme People’s Court has
assigned jurisdiction for such actions to courts responsible for intellectual property (IP)
disputes. However, critical questions remain, such as standing to assert claims, the
standards for measuring damages and the procedures to handle parallel private actions
and administrative investigations.
Transparency Transparent and predictable enforcement allows companies to plan

commercial strategies that comply with competition laws. Formal implementing
regulations, interpretive guidelines from regulators and the published decisions of
administrative agencies and courts are critical to these efforts. However, the AML
provides only high-level guidance on substantive competition rules and enforcement
procedures. In January 2009, MOFCOM issued four sets of guiding opinions, including
Guiding Opinions on the Notification of Concentrations between Undertakings, Guiding
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Opinions on Notification Materials Concerning Concentrations between Undertakings,
Anti-Monopoly Notification Form, and Guiding Opinions on Anti-Monopoly Review.
MOFCOM also released for public comment before promulgation the Provisional
Measures on the Investigation and Handling of Concentrations between Undertakings
Not Notified in Accordance with Law, the Provisional Measures on the Collection of
Evidence on Suspected Monopolistic Concentrations between Undertakings that do not
Meet the Notification Thresholds, the Provisional Measures on the Notification of
Concentrations between Undertakings, the Provisional Measures on the Review of
Concentrations between Undertakings, and the Guiding Opinions on Definition of
Relevant Market.
The Anti-Monopoly Commission subsequently issued the Guiding Opinion on Definition

of Relevant Market on July 6, 2009. MOFCOM followed by promulgating the final
Measures on the Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings on November 21, 2009
and the Measures on the Review of Concentrations between Undertakings on November
24, 2009. SAIC, for its part, promulgated the Regulations on Procedures for Lodging and
Investigating Cases of the Abuse of Dominant Market Positions on June 5, 2009. These
developments confirm that the Chinese government is embarking on a sustained effort to
implement the AML through the issuance of regulations and guidance documents.
Transparency in Enforcement Published enforcement decisions provide guidance and an

opportunity to educate companies about compliance. We welcome the issuance by
MOFCOM of increasingly detailed decisions with respect to merger notifications. We
note, however, continuing shortcomings in this regard.
First, clearances without condition should be published as a matter of public record to

enable companies to understand which kinds of concentrations have not attracted
conditions. Second, while additional published detail is welcome, the length and degree
of detail in published decisions remains sparse in comparison to that found in the EU, US
and other leading jurisdictions. Third, to our knowledge, none of the concentrations
notified to MOFCOM under the AML have been purely domestic concentrations. To the
contrary, all have been foreign related. This constitutes selective enforcement to the
detriment of US and other foreign investors, fostering purely domestic concentrations
even at the expense of consumer welfare.
This perception of unequal treatment is aggravated by the promulgation on June 22, 2009
of the revised Regulations Concerning the Acquisition of Domestic Enterprises by
Foreign Investors. These regulations specify that filing of an anti-monopoly notification
for concentrations that meet the notification thresholds is a precondition for foreign
investment approval. Yet, these regulations include criteria extraneous to consumer
welfare and national security in the military-political sense namely, involvement of key
industries, actual or potential impact on national economic security and control of famous
brand names or venerable Chinese trademarks by a foreign investor are all triggers for
MOFCOM review. We hope that enforcement of the AML will narrow, rather than
preserve, such protectionist provisions.
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Behavioral Rules The AML’s behavioral rules target two types of anticompetitive
conduct: restrictive agreements (monopoly agreements) and abuses of dominant market
positions (i.e., anti-competitive single-firm conduct). The AML’s behavioral provisions
are generally consistent with prevailing international practices. However, as
implementing regulations remain sparse and no enforcement decisions have been issued,
it is difficult to assess how actual enforcement converges with international practice. We
have several concerns about enforcement, including a possible presumption that the
exercise of core intellectual property rights (IPR) will be deemed an abuse of dominance
and that delegation by the SAIC of substantial enforcement authority to provincial
industry and commerce bureaus will lead to inconsistency in enforcement.
Prohibition of Unfair Pricing by Dominant Firms The AML prohibits dominant firms
from unfair pricing. Although an analogous provision exists in the European
Commission Treaty, worldwide competition authorities rarely initiate enforcement
actions against dominant firms for charging unfairly high prices unless accompanied by
other exclusionary or predatory conduct (because high prices incentivize other
undertakings to compete on price, enter the market and/or develop substitute goods).
Aggressive enforcement of this provision in China could lead to direct price regulation or
deter rational pricing practices by dominant firms. The Price Law already provides a
framework for explicit regulation of the pricing of certain commodities, leaving other
prices to be market determined. The prohibition of unfair pricing by dominant firms to
change market prices would be a major step backward for China’s economic reforms.
Exemptions for Monopoly Agreements The scope of exemptions available for otherwise
prohibited monopoly agreements is extremely broad, including exemptions for so-called
crisis and export cartels, and an open-ended public interest exemption. There are no
disqualifications for extreme competition restraints (e.g., price-fixing), nor requirements
that exemptions be as unrestrictive as possible while still achieving their objectives. The
methodology for appraising the benefits of restrictive practices (e.g., rule of reason) and
the availability of prospective advisory guidance remains unclear.
Rule of Reason Standards The AML prohibits dominant firms from engaging in tying,
discriminatory treatment, refusal to deal, below-cost pricing and restrictive or exclusive
dealing without justification. Although this qualifier appears to invite the rule of reason
approach to balancing the pro-competitive and anti-competitive aspects of specific
practices by firms with market power, the enforcement authorities’ approach to this issue
is unclear. We are particularly concerned that in the absence of clear guidance,
enforcement authorities may invoke the potential for such conduct as grounds for
rejecting or attaching unreasonable conditions to a proposed concentration. The potential
for bundling indeed appears to have been the core argument in MOFCOM’s decision in
the Coca-Cola–Huiyuan notification.
Mandatory Minimum Penalties The AML’s provisions for mandatory minimum fines
raise risks of excessive penalties and over-deterrence. If the NDRC or SAIC find an
AML behavior rule infringement, Articles 46 and 47 of the AML set a fine of between
one and 10 percent of the infringing company’s annual sales revenues. The AML does
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not state whether the calculation refers to sales revenues achieved in China and/or the
relevant market affected by the illegal conduct. AmCham-China urges that implementing
rules specify that the sales revenue benchmark refers to revenues in the relevant product
market in China only. This would make the AML consistent with US and EU antitrust
laws. Moreover, we are concerned that the one percent of annual sales revenue
mandatory minimum penalty is inconsistent with international practice and may result in
penalties grossly disproportionate to harm in minor cases and thereby constitute a basis
for abusive enforcement, potentially forcing otherwise law-abiding companies out of the
market.
Merger Review Merger control is the principal compliance concern for US companies
under China’s existing antitrust rules. Whereas the rules against monopoly agreements
and abuse of dominance require companies to abstain from anti-competitive commercial
practices, the merger control rules require review of transactions that trigger the
notification thresholds, regardless of their actual impact on competition in China.
Consequently, it is important that Chinese authorities structure the reporting requirements

and review procedures consistent with their task to avoid undue burdens on Chinese
enforcement personnel and impediments to direct investment by companies. While US
companies report that MOFCOM investigation teams involved in merger reviews are
increasingly familiar with international practice, a number of disturbing features continue
to arise. These include a tendency on the part of MOFCOM personnel to couch
investigations in terms of competitiveness of countries or economies rather than
undertakings (i.e., the impact of a concentration on China’s competitiveness rather than
competition in the relevant market).
Clarification on Implementation Measures The AML only requires notification of

concentrations, including mergers and acquisitions of control over a business, following
the EU approach. The recent draft implementing measures, however, could still be
construed to treat many customary and routine protections for minority shareholders as
conferring control. This would transform many minority investments into reportable
concentrations. We hope that the two-year window for aggregation of non-controlling
transactions for purposes of determining whether a notification is required under Article
7(2) of the Measures on the Notifications of Concentrations of Undertakings signifies
that lesser investments that do not fall within the two-year window are exempt from anti-
monopoly review.
Of further concern is the proposed implementing measures that suggest that many joint
ventures (JV), including non-full function JVs, which are not subject to merger review in
other countries, would qualify as reportable concentrations. We note that Article 7 of the
Guiding Opinions on the Definition of Undertakings in Concentrations does not
distinguish among JVs by the extent of functionality. We welcome clarification in
accordance with international practice that only the turnover of the relevant portion of the
seller’s business (rather than turnover of a selling entity as a whole) is calculated for
purposes of determining whether a notification is required under Article 7(1) of the
Measures on the Notification of Concentrations of Undertakings.
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Remedies Structural remedies designed to address specific anticompetitive risks of a
concentration (e.g., divestitures) are generally the most reliable and readily administered.
Behavioral remedies, conversely, impose costs and burdens of continued supervision on
both the agencies and transaction parties, and increase the risks of unintended harmful
effects on consumers as well as deterring pro-competitive conduct. Proposed
implementing measures, however, single out two behavioral remedies: 1) compulsory
licensing of IP and 2) compulsory access to networks. This may be misinterpreted as
encouraging these remedies, which are complex, controversial and exceptional in other
jurisdictions.
Requirement for Local Chinese Counsel In the absence of implementing regulations,

lawyers employed by non-Chinese law firms are prohibited in MOFCOM merger control
proceedings—even when the lawyers in question are Chinese nationals with local bar
qualifications. This is inconsistent with international practice and creates an impression
of bias against foreign undertakings that make notifications. Allowing international
lawyers, including qualified Chinese nationals employed by foreign firms, to appear
before MOFCOM would bring the antitrust experience of foreign firms from more
mature jurisdictions to the merger control process.
Protectionist Use of the AML Many provisions of the AML, consistent with
international practice, are aimed at promoting consumer welfare and economic efficiency
through the competitive process. Still, several provisions appear to allow the
enforcement of the law as an instrument of protectionism and industrial policy. Below
we have highlighted specific articles that may be problematic in their current forms:
Article 7 requires the state to “protect the lawful business activities” of state-owned
enterprises (SOE) in industries “that implicate national economic vitality and national
security” or “in which there are legal monopolies,” although it also prohibits such SOEs
from abusing dominant positions to harm consumers. Although Article 7 is not
technically drafted as an SOE exemption from the AML, both the scope of sectors
covered and the nature of the special treatment outlined are ambiguous. We are
concerned that Article 7 provides a basis for enforcing the AML as an instrument of
industrial policy.
Article 11 states that “trade associations shall strengthen self-discipline of the industries,
provide guidance for enterprises in the industry to compete lawfully and protect the order
of market competition.” Although there have been efforts by some trade associations to
curb cartel behavior (e.g., uniform pricing of insurance policies), there is concern that this
provision provides trade associations with the ability to take on regulatory or
coordinating roles that are potentially inconsistent with full and fair application of the
AML’s underlying principles, particularly roles that may facilitate cartel behavior among
domestic industries.
Articles 13, 14 and 15 have related exemption issues. Anti-competitive agreements

prohibited under Articles 13 and 14 may be exempted by Article 15 if they enhance the
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competitiveness of small and medium-sized enterprises or advance “legitimate interests
of international trade and foreign economic cooperation.” These exemptions could be
interpreted to favor domestic industry and promote or protect national champions and
facilitate domestic cartels.
Article 27 permits AML regulators to consider potential effects of the proposed

transaction on “other relevant business operators” and “on the development of the
national economy and public interest.” This appears to allow for the protection of
domestic competitors and the use of the merger review process to consider domestic
macro-economic issues. We are concerned that some decisions made by regulators may
be based, in part, on protecting domestic business operators, rather than consumer
welfare.
Risks to IP Holders IP protection issues in China are creating concern among many US
companies that the AML may be enforced in a manner that undermines legitimate IP
rights. Article 55 states that the AML shall not apply to the “exercise of IPR pursuant to
the stipulations in laws and administrative regulations relating to intellectual property”
but “shall apply to actions taken … to eliminate or restrict competition by abusing
intellectual property rights.” The AML does not, however, clarify the distinction
between legitimate exercises of IPR and abuses. US companies are particularly
concerned that unsound approaches to market definition may lead to findings that IP
holders are dominant in markets for their own technology and that their unilateral refusal
to license their IP to competitors or charge royalties commensurate with the commercial
value of their IP may be condemned as abusive. Expanded compulsory licensing
provisions in the amended Patent Law and draft SAIC Guidelines Concerning Anti-
Monopoly Enforcement in the Area of Intellectual Property Rights arouse additional
concern. We encourage the adoption of guidelines ensuring that AML enforcement does
not undermine the purpose and value of IPR in China.
Additional Issues In addition to the AML, the Chinese legal order currently contains a
number of other competition provisions scattered in various laws and regulations, such as
the Anti-Unfair Competition Law and the Price Law. To date, these competition
provisions have not formally been amended or abrogated. In general, neither the AML
nor those other laws contain specific provisions guiding whether the prior competition
provisions continue to apply concurrently with the AML and how conflicts will be
resolved. While the Law on Legislation and the Law on Administrative Penalties contain
some provisions on this issue, It is recommended that prior competition provisions be
formally amended to make the AML and its implementing rules the only applicable anti-
monopoly regime in China.
Intellectual Property Rights
T he commitment of the Chinese government to protection of intellectual property

(IP) has continued to evolve significantly in recent years. While the government
has taken steps to address many older issues, such as widespread counterfeiting
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and piracy, significant structural problems remain unresolved, including local
protectionism, disproportionately low resource allocation to copyright enforcement and
varying local practices. Newer issues in such areas as antitrust law, “security review”
and inventor remuneration for patents, standardization practices involving IP rights,
genetic resource disclosures, “junk” patents, government procurement, and market access
have also evolved. These can significantly affect both the enforceability of IP rights and
the value of IP-intensive products and have also raised heightened concerns about the
linkage between industrial policy and IP protection in China (including concerns over
national treatment for foreign IP rights and foreign-invested enterprises).
Foreign companies are increasingly concerned about these disturbing industrial policy
trends. Bilaterally, IPR talks under the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and
Trade (JCCT) resumed in 2009, following a hiatus after the US filing of a WTO case.
Sustained, effective JCCT IPR talks and other bilateral dialogues, in close coordination
with industry, are vital to addressing pressing IP concerns, new and old, and to ensuring
that prior commitments are fully implemented.
Technical capacity building and cooperation talks between patent authorities US Patent
and Trade Office (USPTO) and China’s State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO), as well
as the patent authorities of Europe, Japan and several other countries, have continued and
are deepening. Other dialogues, on areas such as trademarks, copyright, criminal justice
cooperation in IPR, pharmaceutical and medical devices, are also critical. However,
several ongoing, overarching IP issues continue to negatively impact the development of
both foreign and domestic industry.
3 Troubling Issues First, China’s continued failure to adequately enforce IP rights
continues to cost China’s trading partners, including US knowledge-based industries,
billions of dollars in lost exports. US copyright industries of software, films and sound
recordings are a prime example. Lack of effective copyright enforcement is also
retarding the growth of China’s innovative IP industries. More deterrent enforcement
and greater coordination between criminal and administrative authorities are needed to
ensure that China is to be a place where IP can develop and thrive.
Second, measures announced by China to promote “indigenous innovation” have made
nationality of IP ownership a market access barrier to Chinese government, and
potentially SOE, procurement. Stipulating nationality of IP ownership as market access
barrier is unprecedented and unacceptable from a trade perspective, and undermines the
truly global nature that lies at the heart of innovation. Extending such preferences to the
commercial activities of China’s SOEs raises concerns about national treatment.
Finally, a range of Chinese measures relating to patent, standards and competition
policies threatens to weaken or eliminate underlying IP rights themselves if the Chinese
government determines they are against the “public interest” or if abuse of IP or “abuse
of dominance” is found. These terms are undefined, and foreign industry is concerned
about whether these will be implemented in a way that advantages domestic competitors.
Lack of transparency in drafting of competition law enforcement guidelines in IPR is of
special concern. Enforcement becomes irrelevant if a rights holder loses the underlying
right. There is also concern about selective application of the Anti-Monopoly Law, which
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to date has largely focused on foreign-foreign mergers and not considered
anticompetitive effects of Chinese-Chinese mergers.
If these disturbing trends are carried over to IPR content, foreign rights holders may be
significantly disadvantaged in this market in a manner that could offend WTO
requirements. If not addressed, these problems could pose a threat to the long-term
competitiveness of a wide range of America’s strongest knowledge based industries,
given that China is, or will soon be, the world’s largest market for many cutting-edge
products and services.
The inability of US companies to capture the value of their IP in China directly impacts
job growth and the health of companies in both the US and China. Respecting and
enforcing foreign IP rights must be viewed as an integral element of China’s overall
export to domestic-demand economic growth model, as well as an essential underpinning
of China’s advance toward an innovation and knowledge-based economy.
Significant Developments Interest in IP filings in China remains strong. Although a
decline in patent filings to the USPTO was reported in the first few months of 2009,
presumably related to the recession, the Chinese Patent Office reported a 16 percent
increase in patent filings (mostly Chinese) in the first nine months of 2009 over the same
period in the previous year. This increase is, in part, a response to the Chinese
government’s push to promote innovation and encourage patent filings. China was also
the fifth largest filer of Patent Cooperation Treaty patents in the world for 2009, with an
annual increase of 31.6 percent. These trends indicate the importance placed on IP and
innovation as a driver for continued economic growth.
There is concern about a rapid ramp-up in lower quality patents due to subsidies and
inventor remuneration schemes. In particular, SIPO data reveals a statistically significant
increase in patent applications at year end, as well as a significant increase in service
patent grants, for Chinese companies and in non-service patent grants for foreigners in
2009, which may suggest an effort to use statistics to demonstrate that China is
“innovating.” However, despite strong levels of IP filings and the importance placed on
protection of IPR by industry, China’s environment for innovation is still hobbled by
weak enforcement of laws and regulations protecting IP. While China has made great
efforts to improve the body of IP laws and regulations, enforcement of these regulations
is now needed to ensure the continued growth and development of IP in China.
Patents On October 1, 2009, China’s new Patent Law came into effect. The
implementation regulations and the judicial interpretation are essential for increasing
compliance with the Patent Law, which includes numerous terms and provisions
requiring further clarification and explanation. The new Patent Law made numerous
amendments to the previous law, including revisions to design patents, heightened
patentability standard (absolute novelty was adopted), joint-ownership revisions,
preliminary injunction procedures, international patent exhaustion and new rules on
inventor remuneration.
Some revisions could be problematic without implementation regulations to clarify their

meaning. Chief among these are changes to the provisions on compulsory licensing.
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Although SIPO has yet to grant a single compulsory license, and has thus far indicated
that its procedures will be transparent and fair, there is concern about the inherent conflict
of interest that may exist in a government structure where the agency that grants patents
can also compel licensing. In the new law, a compulsory license may be applied for if a
patentee has failed, without a legitimate reason, to sufficiently exploit his patent after
three years from grant and four years from filing. The meaning of “sufficiently exploit”
needs clarification in the implementing regulations.
Also, the new Patent Law stipulates that a compulsory license may be granted for any
national emergency or extraordinary circumstances where it would be in the “public
interest.” The exact scope and definition of “public interest” should be specified. Similar
concerns over China’s national interests exist in secrecy review of overseas patent
applications.
Some other compulsory licensing changes include the incorporation of the Doha
Declaration into the Patent Law whereby compulsory licenses may be granted to
manufacture patented pharmaceuticals for export to designated nations, for
semiconductor technology only in situations with a public interest objective and linking
the Patent Law to the Anti-Monopoly Law by counteracting determined monopolies
through compulsory licensing.
There have been other noteworthy patent-related developments in China. In March 2009,
the Supreme People’s Court issued an opinion which encourages local courts to increase
the costs to infringers “dramatically” by raising compensation awards, which would both
increase deterrence and lower costs of enforcement for IP owners. Two recent cases
involve particularly large damage awards. One case involved a USD 23 million (RMB
157 million) utility model patent infringement settlement after a USD 48 million (RMB
328 million) first instance judgment. Another case awarded USD 2.9 million (RMB 19.8
million) in damages and USD 235,000 (RMB 1.6 million) in legal expenses to the
patentee for design patent infringement. However, there is concern that the majority of
these cases have been brought against foreign companies, and that patents asserted are
frequently unexamined utility model and design patents.
Similar judgments have not been awarded for core patents involved in key industries,
including the IT and pharmaceutical sectors. Moreover, many pharmaceutical companies
complain of the widespread introduction of generic copies for their pharmaceutical
products, difficulties in enforcing process patents and lack of clinical data exclusivity.
The case involving a utility model patent brought a heightened awareness of this type of
Chinese patent. Utility model patents do not exist in the US. Utility model patents are
examined for formalities only, have a 10-year term (as opposed to 20 for invention
patents) and have a lower inventive step requirement, making them harder to invalidate.
In 2009, less than one percent of utility model patents were filed by foreign entities.
Furthermore, the majority of these patents were for non-service inventions, filed by
individuals outside of the scope of employment and may be of lower quality.
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These statistics reflect the larger concern that Chinese companies may be inclined to
assert low-quality unexamined patents in their local jurisdictions, to coerce out-of-
locality defendants to pay high damages or cross-license IP rights. Many local
jurisdictions may also be subsidizing the filing of these patents, and local government
officials may also be rewarded or recognized for the increased filings by their localities.
The above mentioned case underscores that utility model patents can be strongly enforced
and receive high damage awards, typically against foreign companies, and that they can
be asserted for malicious or anticompetitive purposes. Moreover, China lacks a clear
remedy for abusive or unfounded patent litigation.
Trademark Although earlier drafts included provisions whereby a trademark would no

longer be examined on “relative grounds,” thus ensuring that the trademark does not
conflict with earlier filed applications or registrations, the new law removes this
provision. China is looking to resolve its backlog delays through additional means. For
example, the China Trademark Office has significantly increased capacity by instituting a
massive hiring and training program to decrease the examination time from around three
to one and a half years by 2011. Progress has been notable so far with current
examination times of two years. While foreign companies have traditionally had
problems with abusive registrations of trademarks in China’s first to file system, Chinese
companies have also increasingly faced similar problems.
In litigation, Chinese companies are increasingly looking to protect their trademarks
abroad. Beijing-based Wang Zhi He recently won a trademark infringement case against
an infringer in Germany. There were no damages, but the German company’s trademark
was invalidated. Some famous US companies have complained of numerous “squatted”
marks, sometimes numbering in the dozens to over one hundred.
Customs border enforcement remains an effective way to protect trademark infringing

products from reaching the US or other locations. There remains concern that it is often
difficult to get local Administration of Industry and Commerce (AIC) cooperation on
enforcement actions without undue effort. One helpful step would be publishing
administrative cases on IPR enforcement online, regardless of whether such cases are
initiated by complaint of the rights holder or on an ex-officio basis. Publishing the data
would enable IPR holders to determine which administrative agencies are actively
supporting IPR enforcement, allowing them to protect their rights better and to remain
informed of ex-officio steps undertaken to protect their rights.
Copyright Progress on the reform of China’s Copyright Law has remained relatively
slow. Having gone without revision for nearly 10 years, the current law needs updating.
However, it has not been included within the National People’s Congress’ (NPC)
legislative agenda to date. It remains unknown when a comprehensive amendment of the
law will officially start. The NPC passed, however, certain updates to provisions of the
law at its recent session in March 2010, in response to the WTO recommendations in the
dispute between US and China on IPR protection. In addition, the National Copyright
Administration of China (NCA) began to advocate publicly for a more comprehensive
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amendment to the Copyright Law in 2009, and many experts expect the amendment with
the next NPC.
There was an increase in the number of Chinese domestic companies taking an active role
in advocating for stronger copyright protection via legislative change and improvements
in judicial protection in 2009, especially in the publishing and entertainment industries.
Companies have also pushed for more resources to fight piracy through administrative
complaints and by taking infringers to court. This is largely due to fast growing domestic
industries reliant on copyright protection and the ever-increasing threat of digital piracy
on the growth of these industries.
Foreign companies have looked at developments in such areas as secondary liability,

deep linking, user generated content (UGC) and peer-to-peer (P2P) liability, as well as
rapid growth in China’s Internet environment. We remain concerned about business
models and social developments that have not always deterred widespread infringement.
Specifically, there is concern about litigation involving the recording industries and
Baidu, the availability of P2P entertainment software content and difficulties in
protecting sports broadcasts, among other matters.
Although rights holders are increasingly seeking civil remedies because they can receive
some level of compensations from infringers, civil damages awarded by courts are still
considered low by international standards and do little to deter infringement. In addition,
the burden of evidence on right holders, especially those based in foreign countries,
remains extraordinarily high due to notarization and legalization requirements.
Another issue is the lack of transparency within the administrative enforcement process.
Foreign companies generally believe that controlling IP infringement will be extremely
difficult without effective criminal enforcement. Outdated rules in the criminal law and
ambiguous thresholds set forth in judicial interpretations make it very difficult to
prosecute online piracy cases effectively.
There is opportunity for progress on piracy issues. For example, China’s computer
software piracy rate has dropped in the past 10 years on the basis of several measures
taken by the Chinese government, but progress has stalled and the computer software
piracy rate remains at an unacceptable 80 percent, according to the International Data
Corporation (IDC). The IDC reports that PC sales in China reached 48 million in 2008,
second only to the United States. China’s PC sales exceed that of Japan, Germany and
Britain put together, and are on track to exceed US sales in two years. Yet, in terms of
software sales per computer, China ranks 49th in the world. Software revenue from all
vendors per PC in China lags behind India, and is half that of Vietnam. China’s domestic
and JCCT commitment to ensure its SOEs and other large enterprises use legally licensed
software was discussed in the November JCCT IPR Working Group. Effective
compliance measures are necessary to ensure successful implementation.
Internet piracy has also been an ever-growing concern for both industry and government.
According to the statistics available from public sources, 40 percent or even more civil
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copyright cases filed in Beijing and Shanghai involve online infringements. This implies
that digital piracy has become the major form of copyright violation with China now
having the world’s most Internet users (nearly 400 million). Controlling Internet piracy
has also become a major topic in bilateral and multilateral trade discussions. The IPR
Working Group under the JCCT has set Internet piracy as one of its key issues. For
entertainment-focused industries, UGC piracy is still the top priority.
Progress is visible in terms of new pressure placed on UGC websites by the courts,
copyright owners and even advertisers. Some UGC websites have started to implement
new measures to reduce infringement, but the scale of digital infringement within the
UGC environment remains large.
Government Procurement
C
hina’s large government procurement market continued to expand in 2008 and
2009, driven by the RMB 4 trillion (USD 584 billion) economic stimulus package
and other financial crisis-related initiatives. Figures from the Ministry of Finance
(MOF) indicate that China purchased at least RMB 599 billion (USD 88 billion) of goods
and services in 2008, an increase of RMB 133 billion (USD 19 billion) over 2007 and
more than triple the amount in 2003. In total, procurement accounted for 9.6 percent of
fiscal expenditures and two percent of total GDP in 2008.
However, these figures actually underestimate the size of the market because sub-central
level public investment in infrastructure projects is not included. China’s government
procurement market will continue growing as additional infrastructure projects come on
line, including the building of highways, railroads and community health care facilities.
American businesses, many of which source and produce goods in China for the Chinese
market, can materially contribute to meet many of China’s government procurement
needs. China participates in global supply chains, with foreign-invested enterprises (FIE)
contributing significantly as providers of goods and services, employers, and taxpayers.
Therefore, preference favoring “domestic products” or “indigenous innovative products”

are difficult to define and administer, and are counterproductive and inefficient.
Protectionist policies will have an adverse affect on both employment and growth, and
thus slow the global economic recovery.
Significant Developments In 2008, China agreed to submit a revised offer to accede to

the WTO Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA) “as soon as possible.” In early
October 2009, China submitted a report (the Report) to the WTO Committee on
Government Procurement “on the progress of its accession negotiations.” Unfortunately,
the Report primarily provides China’s rationale as to why it cannot meet the expectations
of the current GPA Parties to provide a more meaningful offer. It did note that China
intends to expand its list of covered central government entities and their “subordinate
entities” (and “substantially lower the threshold levels” for this list), but only for those
entities that are subject to China’s Government Procurement Law.
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At the US-China Joint Commission on Commerce and Trade (JCCT) meeting in October
2009, however, China stated that a revised offer would be submitted “as early as possible
in 2010.” At that JCCT meeting, China and the US agreed to establish a “multi-agency
working group” that will meet regularly to discuss government procurement issues,
including those related to purchases by state-owned enterprises (SOE) and “private
parties that make purchases in accordance with national strategic objectives.” In
September 2009, China made public the draft implementation regulations of the
Tendering and Bidding Law and welcomed comments from US companies regarding
these regulations. However, despite the opportunity to comment, foreign entities are
nevertheless still prohibited from bidding on procurements by entities subject to this law.
Furthermore the law permits a less transparent and disciplined bidding process, which is
inconsistent with the Government Procurement Law.
In 2009, China confirmed on several occasions that it would treat foreign-invested

Chinese enterprises the same as domestic Chinese enterprises for goods manufactured in
China when it comes to government procurement. It also agreed to “issue rules in this
regard.” Unfortunately, it appears such treatment extends only to procurement entities
subject to the Government Procurement Law, and not the Tendering and Bidding Law.
Also in 2009, the Ministry of Science and Technology (MOST), National Development
and Reform Commission (NDRC) and MOF issued the Circular on Launching
Accreditation of Indigenous Innovative Products in 2009 and Instructions for National
Indigenous Innovation Product Application Procedures in 2009 (Instructions). Criteria
for indigenous innovative products are further specified in the Instructions, requiring
products seeking national level indigenous innovative products status to contain Chinese
proprietary intellectual property rights (IPR) with clearly defined Chinese ownership and
the original registration location of the trademarks of these products to be China. Such
criteria will make it extremely difficult for most products of foreign invested Chinese
companies to qualify.
Finally, in January 2010, the Implementation Guidelines of the Government Procurement

Law was released for comment. However, the draft implementation guidelines raise
concerns surrounding the limited scope of government procurement that would mandate
an open process, preferences for domestic goods and services and other provisions that
run contrary to global best practices for procurement.
Delayed Accession to the GPA China committed in its 2001 Protocol of Accession to the
WTO that it would work towards becoming a Party to the GPA “as soon as possible.”
The GPA is a “plurilateral” agreement in the WTO in which participation is voluntary.
Currently there are 41 Parties to the GPA, with 18 “Observers” (China being one). The
GPA sets forth the minimum rules required to ensure nondiscrimination, fairness, best
value and transparency in the procurement of goods and services by central and sub-
central government agencies and by select government-related entities as specified by
each Party.
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Most GPA Parties were disappointed with China’s initial December 2007 GPA accession
offer. Specifically, they request that a revised offer submission take into account the
following changes: 1) contractual value thresholds that are in line with the commitments
of the existing Parties; 2) expansive coverage of most Chinese government and
government-related entities (at both the central and sub-central levels); 3) coverage of
most services, done in a “negative list” manner; 4) exceptions that are equitable with the
exceptions taken by existing GPA Parties; 5) immediate implementation upon accession
without transition periods.
In its 2001 WTO Accession Protocol (while still not yet a Party to the GPA), China
committed to ensure that all of its central and sub-central government entities conduct
their procurements in a “transparent manner” and where procurement proceedings are
open to foreign participants, it will provide all foreign entities “equal opportunity to
participate” in the bidding process in a most-favored nation manner.
Furthermore, with respect to SOEs, China committed to “ensure that all state-owned and
state-invested enterprises would make purchases and sales based solely on commercial
considerations, e.g., price, quality, marketability and availability, and that the enterprises
of other WTO Members would have an adequate opportunity to compete for sales to and
purchases from these enterprises on non-discriminatory terms and conditions.” China
further committed that it “would not influence, directly or indirectly, commercial
decisions on the part of state-owned or state-invested enterprises, including on the
quantity, value or country of origin of any goods purchased or sold, except in a manner
consistent with the WTO Agreement.”
In October 2009, the Report was submitted to the WTO Committee on Government
Procurement. Unfortunately, this document primarily focuses China’s rationale as to why
it cannot meet the expectations of the current GPA Parties. Even before submitting its
revised GPA offer this year, China should further move towards full conformity with the
GPA disciplines, starting with fulfilling its 2001 WTO accession agreements regarding
procurement and terminating its existing domestic preference rules. Increases in the
number or severity of discriminatory measures would run counter to good faith efforts in
GPA accession.
Central Government and Sub-Central Entities While the Report promises that, in its
revised offer, China will expand its list of covered central government and “subordinate
entities,” as well as “substantially lower the threshold levels” for this list, the Report
makes clear that China intends only to cover entities that are subject to its Government
Procurement Law, while “non-fiscal funding” central government entities (as the Report
refers to them) subject to other procurement laws, such as China’s Tendering and Bidding
Law, would be excluded completely. Given that the scope of the Government
Procurement Law is artificially narrow, such a unilateral distinction will not allow for
meaningful coverage of China’s government procurement market.
Further, despite a promise to lower thresholds, the Report also warns that it will first
“take a long period of time to collect relevant statistics for making assessment of the
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impact” of the proposed thresholds before they will be lowered. For China’s GPA
accession offer to be meaningful, sub-central coverage must be included, comprehensive
and have comparatively consistent thresholds to central coverage. This is essential for
China to reach the level of quality of the US or EU GPA market access coverage. Most
US government procurement comes on the federal level. For the European Union—
which has relatively small procurement by its central entities—larger sub-central
coverage is provided to compensate. Even compared with the EU, China has a far larger
sub-central government procurement market than current GPA Parties. China’s final
accession package should take into account these unique realities.
SOEs and Other Entities The Report first argues that “other entities,” as used in the
GPA, is understood by China as being “government-affiliated institutions,” which “differ
greatly” from Chinese SOEs. It explicitly states that Chinese SOEs “are independent
market entities and the Chinese government does not intervene in the daily business
activities of [these] enterprises.” If this is true, then regulations and directives that
govern the Chinese SOEs are arguably subject to existing WTO disciplines, which should
be true even for “other entities” engaging in commercial activities. Indeed, the 2008
JCCT “deliverables” appeared to reinforce this principle, stating that China’s “formal and
informal policies related to software purchases by all Chinese private and SOEs will be
based solely on market terms without government direction.” In addition, China already
committed in its 2001 WTO Accession Protocol to “ensure that all state-owned and state-
invested enterprises would make purchases and sales based solely on commercial
considerations.”
Limited Scope of Government Procurement Law China promulgated its new

Government Procurement Law in January 2003, with the intent of improving
transparency and reducing government costs and corruption. The Government
Procurement Law is also intended to share the scope of what China will cover under the
GPA. Following the law’s promulgation, MOF issued numerous implementation
regulations, including those that established: 1) Detailed procedures regarding the
solicitation, submission and evaluation of bids in procurement proceedings; 2) Rules on
how individual procurements were to be published; 3) Mechanisms for handling
complaints and challenges by participants in government procurement proceedings.
In January 2010, draft implementation regulations for the Government Procurement Law
were released for comment. However, the draft guidelines also maintain criteria for
“non-open” procurement, “standard” threshold levels below which an open process is not
mandated, and the random selection of suppliers through the bidding process. All of
these provisions appear to run contrary to global best practices for open and competitive
procurement markets. Furthermore, there is concern that the scope of open government
procurement procedures will be vastly narrowed with the inclusion of provisions stating
that “government procurement shall be opened to the public except those related to state
secrets or business secrets,” particularly as there is no definition of “state secrets.”
Although the Government Procurement Law generally provides for the procedural
disciplines found in international procurement agreements, including the GPA and the
UN Model Law on Procurement of Goods, it maintains blanket authority for Chinese
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government entities at both the central and sub-central levels to prioritize domestic goods
and services in all procurement proceedings, with very limited exceptions. The equation
offered in the draft regulations for determining whether a product can be considered
“domestic” is overly complex, difficult to implement and not consistent with the
international norm of applying the same rules of origin in government procurement as in
the normal course of trade.
Tendering and Bidding Law Following the Government Procurement Law’s

promulgation, MOF clarified that the Government Procurement Law—which is intended
to establish the scope of coverage for China under the GPA—does not cover
procurements related to “public works projects.” This is troubling because such projects
represent at least one-half of China’s government procurement market. Instead, these
projects are subject to a different regulatory regime, (i.e., those that flow from China’s
Tendering and Bidding Law, promulgated in January 2000).
This regime raises more concerns because it lacks many of the disciplines under the
Government Procurement Law. This is problematic in light of China’s promise in its
2001 WTO Accession Protocol to conduct all procurement proceedings “in a transparent
manner” between WTO entry and GPA accession. More importantly, these two
government procurement regimes should ultimately be consolidated, with the same
access being granted to goods and services produced in China by foreign-invested firms
in both regimes, so that the efficiency and quality of China’s government procurement
market as a whole can benefit.
Foreign companies strongly support having a merit-based, transparent, non-

discriminatory, pro-competitive and technology-neutral procurement system for all goods
and services, regardless of jurisdiction. However, the continued discriminatory nature of
China’s Tendering and Bidding Law regime negates any benefit such transparency would
provide. Thus, we continue to urge China to bring the rules in this regime in line with the
Government Procurement Law regime.
Preferences for “Indigenous Innovative Products” In December, 2006, MOST, NDRC

and MOF issued Administrative Measures for Accreditation of National Indigenous
Innovative Products for Trial Implementation (Measures). The Measures clearly state
that “accredited national indigenous innovation products shall be given preference in
government procurement and procurement for national key projects that use fiscal funds.”
The Measures request that products seeking national indigenous innovative product status
“shall have indigenous intellectual property rights and definite owner,” which means that
“applicants own the intellectual property rights…in China through their leading technical
innovation activities, or Chinese enterprises, public institutions or citizens, by means of
license arrangement…in China, have the ownership or right to use the intellectual
property rights.”
The Measures also stipulated that MOST, NDRC and MOF will develop Instructions for
National Level Indigenous Innovative Product Application Procedures and National
Level Indigenous Innovative Product Catalog separately to manage and supervise the
accreditation of national indigenous innovative products. In accordance with the
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Measures, several provinces and municipalities have developed and promulgated their
own accreditation measures for indigenous innovative products, which consistently
mandate government procurement preference for products accredited as indigenous
innovative products. Some of these governments have also developed their own catalogs
of indigenous innovative products, which receive government procurement preferences in
these jurisdictions.
In December 2007, MOF issued two new measures that further restrict the possibility of
Chinese government entities purchasing non domestic goods and services, as part of the
State Council’s implementation plan for the “State Medium and Long Term Science and
Technology Development Plan” (2006-2020). The first measure, the Administrative
Measures for Government Procurement on Initial Procurement and Ordering of
Indigenous Innovative Products, requires that Chinese “indigenous innovative products”
be given government procurement priority. The second measure, the Administrative
Measures for Government Procurement of Imported Products, mandates additional
approval and audit for government agencies when procuring imported products and
technologies.
Furthermore, these measures state that the MOF and MOST would jointly publish a
national “indigenous innovative products cat catalog.” In November 2009, MOST,
NDRC and MOF issued the Circular on Launching Accreditation of Indigenous
Innovative Products in 2009 and Instructions for National Indigenous Innovation Product
Application Procedures in 2009. These two documents marked a major step the Chinese
government has taken to promote procurement of indigenous innovative products, with
product criteria, accreditation process and roles and responsibilities of government
agencies at central and local levels all clearly defined for the purpose of developing the
Catalog for National Level Indigenous Innovative Products.
These catalogs have created yet another burdensome government procurement obstacle
for companies. Discriminating against so-called “imported” products, while restricting
market access by non-Chinese companies, will not contribute to the development of
China’s innovative capacity, and in fact negates China’s commitments to treat products
made by FIEs as Chinese products for purposes of government procurement, as the
criteria in these measures will make it extremely difficult for most FIE products to
qualify for preferences. Full participation of “foreign” producers across industries in
government procurement proceedings improves efficiencies and reduces waste.
Human Resources
W hile attraction and retention were the primary human resources (HR) concerns
of most US businesses in China in previous years, in 2009, cost control and
aligning key talents to business objectives increased in importance. Still, as
China’s economy continues recovery, longstanding challenges linger – specifically lack
of qualified talent and insufficient labor market mobility. For the third consecutive year,
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management-level HR constraints remain a top business challenge for companies doing
business in China. This may have a dampening effect on China’s ability to continue
economic reform and maintain a competitive advantage in the global economy. We
identify four key human resource concerns: 1) long term challenges in the quality and
mobility of the skilled labor; 2) balancing workers’ rights with a dynamic economic
environment; 3) uniform implementation of the Labor Contract Law; 4) overloaded
arbitration panels and courts preventing swift resolution of labor disputes.
Significant Developments China’s labor market has long been plagued by high voluntary
turnover and salary increase rates. According to Watson Wyatt’s Total Remuneration
Survey for China, since 2001, salary increases have averaged more than seven percent a
year, with a high of over 11 percent. In addition, voluntary turnover peaked at 17.9
percent in 2008. However, the global financial crisis significantly affected businesses in
China, and companies began to look to control costs, including human capital.
According to Hewitt Associates, by June 2009, more than 36.8 percent of companies in
their China database had implemented hiring freezes (hiring for replacement only) and
21.8 percent had implemented complete recruitment freezes (no replacement hiring).
These measures, along with a reduction in turnover, resulted in much lower salary
increases, averaging only 2.8 percent in 2009. Meanwhile, China’s economy has started
to recover, with forecasts estimating GDP growth rate of above eight percent for China in
both 2010 and 2011. This healthy growth seems also to impact headcount planning and
salary increases for companies in China. According to the Hewitt Associates report, in
most industries, the majority of companies had plans to relax recruitment or headcount
freezes in 2010.
As the economy rebounds, attracting, retaining and motivating management-level talent
will remain an issue for both foreign and domestic companies. China’s salary increases
and turnover rates remain among the highest in Asia. This is especially true when using
Real Wage growth (salary increases less CPI). Although China’s wage growth dropped
to sixth in the Asia region in 2009 from second in 2008, it is expected to rebound to
second again in 2010. The challenges of China’s labor market can also be seen when
looking at voluntary turnover rates across Asia. China has the third highest turnover rates
in Asia since 2007. In spite of the downturn, China had a 16.9 percent turnover across
industries in 2009, second highest in Asia.
The Chinese government has made significant efforts to increase the quality of skilled
labor in China and the qualified labor pool is expected to increase by an annual average
of 2.4 percent to a total of 45 million within 20 years. By 2015, the total number of
skilled workers aged 25-59 will exceed that of the US. In spite of these developments,
serious challenges remain. Both domestic and foreign-invested enterprises (FIE) have
difficulties filling technical and managerial positions despite offering increasingly higher
wages. There are three reasons for this trend. First, there is an increased demand for
talent from both multinational companies (MNC) and domestic companies. Second,
there is a gap between employers’ needs and the skills that Chinese graduates possess.
Third, despite recent relaxation of hukou (household registration) restrictions, mobility in
China remains too restricted for the rising demand of skilled employees.
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While the economic downturn may temporarily mitigate labor supply constraints, the
underlying issues in China’s labor market remain. The influx of MNCs entering China
and the reform of state-owned enterprises (SOE) place strong pressure on the labor
market. An average of 40,000 new FIEs entered China annually from 2003-2007. At
the same time, the increased rate of urbanization, globalization and Chinese companies’
movement up the value chain all increase demand for qualified, senior talent.
Accompanying this change has been a commensurate increase in wages in SOEs and
private Chinese-invested businesses. The difference in wages in FIEs compared with
domestic companies has narrowed substantially in recent years, increasing pressure on
FIEs to attract and retain top talent.
Supply of Qualified Talent While the downturn may be driving a short-term surplus in
China’s labor supply, the mismatch between employers’ needs and the skills possessed
remains a problem. Increased demand for qualified talent combined, with severe
shortages of middle managers and a large number of inappropriately skilled university
graduates, places a burden on private and public companies as well as the Chinese
government. In fact, the Ministry of Human Resources and Social Security (MOHRSS)
estimates that 1.2 million of the 4.2 million university graduates in 2006 lacked the
qualifications required in today’s job market.
Companies need dramatic changes in Chinese talent, both in technical skills and
management expertise, for fast-growing domestic and international teams.
Internationalization of domestic companies requires highly-tuned communications and
collaboration skills for successful global expansion. For FIEs in China, the nature of
their businesses has changed from low-end manufacturing to an increasing emphasis on
research and development, financial analysis, and high-tech and service-oriented work.
As many MNCs integrate their China businesses into global operations, they expect their
Chinese colleagues to work collaboratively across boundaries, speak English fluently and
have an international approach to solving problems.
Some aspects of China’s traditional education system contribute to the lack of

appropriately skilled and qualified talent. China’s schools favor rote memorization over
practical application. This method of learning does not translate well to daily operational
communications, especially in highly matrixed or internationalized organizations.
Another challenge is that there are relatively few business-university partnerships,
including compulsory internships in university curricula. This leads to graduates with
very strong theoretical skills, but with little work or practical experience. Companies
have to invest significantly in training and development to bring their new hires up to par
with their peers in other countries.
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Tax
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hina’s tax regime underwent many significant changes in 2009. The State
Administration of Taxation (SAT) released a series of regulations standardizing
and codifying tax practices, providing greater clarity on issues such as transfer
pricing compliance, the super deduction of research and development (R&D) expenses,
non-resident tax management and stock option programs. Tax administration and
enforcement were strengthened, in part to respond to the pressures created by the global
economic downturn.
Related Party Transfer Pricing The Chinese tax authorities have continued to expand
their transfer pricing framework. Since the launch of Circular 2 (the Implementation
Regulations for Special Tax Adjustments) in early 2009, which now acts as the key
source for transfer pricing guidance within China, more new regulations have been
released. They have focused on increasing revenue through improved investigations and
tax risk management in large-scale multinational corporations.
New documentation requirements, including an annual filing of related-party transactions

and contemporaneous documentation, were introduced by the SAT in 2009. Many of the
SAT’s other actions were aimed at increasing revenues through strengthened
investigatory practices. These included launching nationwide coordinated audits
targeting specific groups and industries, introducing a database used to compile
information on a nationwide basis and select appropriate targets, and creating detailed
procedures that large enterprises should follow to manage their taxation risks.
Although the circulars only offer “suggestions,” rather than mandatory requirements, to
companies to minimize tax risk, the tax authorities have implied that failure to follow
these suggestions will attract their attention. Further development of tax regulations, as
well as additional time to implement the new system, should ensure a fair system for both
taxpayers and the Chinese government.
Cost sharing agreements, introduced by Circular 2, have yet to be clarified, and further
explanation is also needed regarding business tax implications. Meanwhile, during audits,
the tax authorities are not only allowed to use “secret comparables,” but also to ask other
taxpayers for assistance in the investigation arbitrarily. Restricting these practices, while
providing more information on the implementation of cost sharing agreements and BT
and allowing TP documentation to create a burden of proof reversal, will strengthen
China’s regime. It will also promote further alignment with international norms such as
those contained in the Organization for the Economic Cooperation and Development
Transfer Pricing Guidelines.
Super-Deduction of Fixed Assets In April 2009, the SAT clarified the accelerated
deduction allowed for certain fixed asset acquisitions under the new Enterprise Income
Tax (EIT) Law. It provides that qualifying fixed assets must involve advanced
technology or product innovation or be operated under certain adverse physical
conditions. Once the depreciation method is determined, it is irrevocable. The
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accelerated deduction as a special mode of tax expense, though, is not an additional
deduction such as is allowed under the “super-deduction” rules for certain R&D expenses.
Rather, it can only help the enterprise reduce its tax liability for the current income year
by claiming depreciation deductions in advance. It is economically like an interest-free
loan from the government that increases a taxpayer’s liquidity in the current period.
Super-Deduction of Research and Development Expenses China, like many other

developed countries and fully consistent with its long-term innovation goals, grants an
R&D super-deduction incentive. However, the circular’s wording will likely cause local
tax officials to apply this incentive narrowly. For example, there are eight defined
categories of acceptable expenses with no mention of items such as depreciation and
rental of buildings used for R&D activities, compensation for external staff providing
R&D services, various costs and fees related to intellectual property rights, and costs
incurred for equipment testing, intermediate testing and trial production, acquisition costs
of samples, prototypes and normal testing measures, and inspection charges for trial
products. The circular should be amended to make clear that the list is not exhaustive
and that relevant expenditures not falling within the defined eight categories are to be
allowed.
A goal of this super-deduction incentive is to promote R&D in China. For various legal
and group policy reasons, though, foreign companies interested in conducting R&D in
China typically wish to own any intellectual property created by the R&D within a group
company that is domiciled outside China. As such, they typically arrange for Chinese
R&D service companies, whether related or unrelated, to perform the actual R&D
activities under a cost-plus or other contractual arrangement. If the circular were
amended to allow the super-deduction incentive in these situations, it could significantly
promote the amount of R&D activities conducted by foreign-owned groups in China.
Business entities, whether Chinese or foreign-owned, have a choice of where in the world
to conduct R&D activities. An important part of this decision is the budgeting of all
relevant costs, including tax costs. As the super-deduction incentive is a material benefit
that can reduce tax cost, it is important to China that such business entities include this
R&D incentive benefit when they budget R&D costs for China and the other countries
where they may conduct their R&D. Under the circular, business entities will seldom be
reasonably assured that their R&D projects will qualify, and if qualified, whether all
relevant expenditures will qualify. As such, they will typically not include the R&D
incentive benefit in their budgeting calculations. This will have the effect of increasing
budgeted costs in China relative to other countries and cause some significant projects to
be conducted outside China.
Anti-Treaty Shopping Rules and Practices In 2009, tax authorities implemented a series
of new practices and rules to limit the availability of tax treaty benefits to foreign
claimants. Xinjiang tax authorities denied tax treaty benefits to a Barbados special
purpose vehicle (SPV) in early 2009 on the grounds that the SPV was not a resident of
Barbados because it lacked economic substance there. As a result, normal tax was
26
imposed on the gain realized by the SPV from the sale of its interest in a PRC portfolio
company.
In November 2009, the SAT issued guidelines for the interpretation of the term
“beneficial owner” in tax treaties to which China is a party. An offshore recipient of
dividend, interest, and royalty income will not be entitled to a reduced withholding tax
rate under an applicable tax treaty if it does not qualify as a beneficial owner of the
income or the underlying assets. The SAT guidelines define a “beneficial owner” as a
person who has ownership or control rights over the income or the underlying rights or
assets. A beneficial owner must be engaged in “substantive operational activities” such
as manufacturing, distribution, or management, and may not be a “conduit company” that
is formed merely “to evade or reduce tax liabilities or to transfer or accumulate profits.”
Taxation of Capital Gains Derived by Offshore SPVs Also in 2009 the application of a
general anti-avoidance rule (Article 47) in the EIT Law and the promulgation of a set of
specific rules on taxing capital gains derived by offshore SPVs took place. Under Article
47 of the EIT Law, PRC tax authorities have the right to adjust the income tax liabilities
of an enterprise if the enterprise is found to have implemented “any arrangement with no
reasonable business purpose to reduce the amount of its taxable income.” In early 2009,
implicitly applying this rule, Chongqing tax authorities imposed tax on the gain realized
by a Singapore fund from the sale of an SPV in Singapore, which in turn held interest in a
Chongqing company.
In December 2009, the SAT issued the Notice on Strengthening the Management of
Enterprise Income Tax Collection of Proceeds from Equity Transfers by Non-resident
Enterprises (Guoshuihan [2009] No. 698), which is effective retroactive to January 1,
2008 and will have a significant impact on the many companies that use offshore holding
companies to invest in China. Under Circular 698, capital gains tax may be imposed on
the sale of a PRC resident enterprise by a nonresident company (i.e., a direct transfer) and,
in some cases, on the sale of an offshore intermediary holding company owning a
Chinese resident enterprise (i.e., an indirect transfer).
This circular requires foreign entities to disclose all indirect transfers of interests in PRC
entities to the relevant PRC tax authorities in cases where the holding structure involves
an intermediate holding company in a low or no-tax jurisdiction. Information and
materials subject to disclosure include the equity transfer agreement, representations
regarding the relationship among the entities involved, representations regarding the
operation, employees, bookkeeping, assets of the intermediate holding company,
representations regarding the business purpose of the intermediate holding company and
other materials requested by the tax authority.
Business Tax To ease pressures and disputes resulting from the revised service test
principles under the new BT regime, SAT issued several tax incentives in the second half
of 2009. These include BT exemption for exports from construction, cultural and sports
service companies, and specifications on BT exemption for services from overseas
entities or individuals provided to domestic entities or individuals.
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Applying a BT to exports of services from domestic companies will not only weaken the
international competitiveness of service exports from China, but also harm the export
structure, further hampering the development of the services industry. In this vein, in
addition to encouraging service exports from the construction, culture and sports
industries, it would be beneficial to service export growth for the government to issue tax
incentives encouraging exports by domestic entities or individuals in the transportation,
finance and insurance, technology, media and telecommunications, entertainment, and
other service sectors.
The application of BT to services provided by overseas parties to domestic parties
presents challenges for tax collection and administration and increases the cost to
domestic customers of purchasing services from overseas entities or individuals,
negatively impacting inflation and healthy domestic and overseas economic development.
In addition, tax exemptions rules are issued separately from the BT Regulations of the
Ministry of Finance and SAT, requiring frequent follow-up and monitoring, creating
additional administrative burden.
Lastly, most developed countries do not maintain turnover taxes aside from a
comprehensive VAT or goods and services tax system. Continued separation of the VAT
and BT systems has created many issues, such as heavy administrative costs for both the
government and taxpayers, uneven tax burdens and in many circumstances, double
taxation.
Value-Added Tax Reform To strengthen development, improve competitive advantages
and risk resistance capabilities of Chinese enterprises, and overcome the negative impact
from the global financial crisis, the Chinese government has reformed the existing VAT
system. It has allowed, on a national basis, general VAT taxpayers to claim input VAT
credit on new purchased equipment.
However, this VAT reform is limited to claiming input tax credit on equipment
investment only. It does not change the present inability to reclaim VAT input tax credit
for other investments such as buildings and construction or for motor vehicles. This hurts
certain industries and can adversely affect important areas such as low-income housing,
highways, airports, rural road construction and other infrastructure construction. In
addition, enterprises focused on R&D also will often not benefit from the VAT reform.
Many R&D enterprises are non-general VAT taxpayers and therefore cannot credit input
tax on any equipment purchases. This clearly increases R&D costs and impedes
innovation and technological advancement.
Further, many leasing companies are not general VAT taxpayers. Thus, they are neither
allowed to credit input tax on lease equipment purchases nor issue VAT invoices to the
lessee. This makes lessees unable to claim input tax credit on purchased fixed assets and
will severely impede development of the weak Chinese financial leasing industry.
Moreover, under the current Turnover Tax regime, the tax burden of leasing enterprises is
further increased due to the application of the non-reclaimable BT to rents.
Adjustment Policy on Exemption of Import VAT In line with the VAT reform, the SAT
has also made corresponding adjustments to tax incentive polices related to imported
equipment. These adjustments include an elimination of the tax exemption for import
28
VAT on certain equipment imports. The logic presumably is that no exemption is needed
due to the new ability of the importer to reclaim the import VAT paid. Where an existing
general VAT taxpayer collects significant output VAT from its customers, it will be able
to quickly reclaim any import VAT it pays. However, for a new enterprise that will not
receive significant output VAT for several years, the import VAT represents a current
increase in the costs of its imported equipment and significantly increases its financing
needs and its financial expense.
Some foreign enterprises originally planning to establish major integrated circuit projects
in China have decided to shift their investment to other Asian countries after factoring in
the significantly increased cost of this import VAT. Additionally, the elimination of the
import VAT exemption will directly increase the cost of goods and services to consumers
and hamper the healthy development of certain industries. For example, Chinese
hospitals import significant numbers of PET-CT, MR and CT devices that are only
produced in the US and EU. The additional 17 percent import VAT is ultimately
transferred to consumers, increasing patients’ medical costs.
Strengthening Tax Management of Non-Residents On October 1, 2009, in an effort to
standardize and strengthen tax management, the SAT specified that non-residents must
apply for approval and/or file certain records to enjoy the treatment and protections
afforded under tax treaties. For example, when non-residents apply the same tax treaty in
different tax jurisdictions within China, they must go through procedures with each
jurisdiction’s tax authorities. Additionally, various administrative rules issued in 2009
place a heavy administrative burden and impractical timelines on non-resident taxpayers.
Circular 3 stipulates that a non-resident taxpayer is responsible for filing a withholding
income tax return within seven days after the commercial payment is due, should the
withholding agent fail to remit the correct amount of tax. This is extremely unrealistic.
Moreover, the lack of sufficient preparation and lead time before Circular 124 went into
effect provided taxpayers with no opportunity to institute the necessary information
tracking system, causing significant delays in commercial payments.
In considering further issuance of regulations and rules, we suggest reviewing procedures
in other developed countries to help narrow the differences in requirements with which
taxpayers must comply and help smooth implementation. This will help standardize
compliance procedures and reduce the cost of compliance for taxpayers, regardless of
their base country.
Individual Income Tax The series of Individual Income Tax (IIT) policies in 2009
included a provision specifying the method of calculation for employees receiving stock
appreciation rights and restricted stock in listed companies. Taxable income is
calculated based on the arithmetic mean between the stock’s market price on the date of
registration and the market price on the date the stock is vested. This aims to balance the
interests between taxpayers and the state and expected income and actual income.
Generally, the IIT regime for stock incentives of listed companies is well-established in
China along with relevant regulations issued since 2005. However, differences between
administrative regulations of different stock markets present challenges for accurate IIT
calculation. For example, stock registration requirements of some overseas depositaries
29
are different from those in China, which imposes ambiguity in determining market price
on the date of stock registration.
Due to the new requirements of Circular 461, which impose a two-tier layer and 30
percent share holding structure, employees of the China subsidiary of an overseas listed
company may not benefit from the preferential tax treatment under Circular 35 when it
becomes equity income, as most of the China subsidiaries of those overseas listed
companies are not within the second tier of their company. This includes subsidiaries of
most of US listed companies spanning all industries, including financial services, IT and
telecommunications. In fact, employees of these subsidiaries who have no control over
the corporate holding structure will suffer a higher tax burden as they cannot enjoy the
preferential tax treatment under Circular 35.
Financial Services
I n the wake of the global financial crisis, China’s financial sector has demonstrated its
resilience with strong credit growth and earnings performance by its listed banks
throughout 2009 and into 2010. China’s regulators and central bankers have hept the
system relatively liquid and solvent and an engine of growth. More recently, moves by
the authorities to introduce financial derivatives, margin lending, RMB trade settlement
with Hong Kong and Southeast Asia and to rein in credit growth are welcomed by the
market as both prudent and forward thinking measures.
Nevertheless, the massive expansion of credit from the banking system in China raises
concerns about future levels of non-performing loans (NPL), and the medium-term
stability of both the financial system and China’s overall economic recovery. At the
same time, foreign financial institutions remain concerned about certain aspects of
China’s regulatory environment. Indeed, more than three years after the completion of
China’s WTO accession phase-in period, foreign financial institutions—even those
locally incorporated in China—have yet to find an even playing field for their products,
investments and financing channels.
Commercial Banking Foreign banking and securities institutions remain unable to

realize their full potential in product development and rollout. Rules against locally
incorporated foreign banks, long waiting periods for RMB and other licenses, and the
need for approvals from multiple regulators are contributing factors.
Developing and Selling Innovative Financial Products Since 2006, the interest rate
swap business has developed rapidly in China. According to relevant regulations, only a
small number of financial institutions designated as bond market makers or settlement
agents that have been active in the interest rate swaps (IRS) market can conduct these
transactions directly with non-financial institution customers. Therefore, the major IRS
counterparties of banks are still inter-bank market participants. Many non-financial
institution customers need to hedge interest rate risk, but the majority of banks cannot
provide them with the relevant products and services.
30
Administrative Guidelines for Underwriting Debt Facilities Since December 2008,
foreign banks have been permitted to participate in inter-bank trading and underwriting of
the debts of non-financial enterprises. However, to date, the authorities have yet to issue
detailed implementation rules for the underwriting of debt financing facilities of non-
financial enterprises by foreign banks. Foreign banks’ participation in domestic debt
markets will promote fixed-income product innovation and enhance financing channels
for domestic enterprises to expand.
Selling of Mutual Funds Opening the agency sales of domestic funds to wholly foreign-
owned banks can play a role in stimulating the development of the wealth management
experience of local investors. Foreign banks have complete, mature, market-proven
systems for the selection and configuration of funds, portfolio analysis and management,
and investor education. If introduced into China, this experience will not only serve as a
good source of reference for the agency sales of funds and wealth management by
Chinese banks, but will also promote product innovation by China’s domestic funds
industry.
Small-Sum Loan Companies/Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Financing To date,

dozens of Small Loan Companies (SLCs) have been approved and are operating around
the country. However, very few SLC licenses have been granted to companies with
foreign shareholders despite a lack apparent prudential justification. Different provinces
in China appear to apply SLC regulations unevenly, at times approving or rejecting
applications from foreign investors in an ad hoc manner. Different provinces also apply
lending caps to SLCs and other restrictions that appear to conflict with regulations issued
by the CBRC.
Although the regulations on SLCs were issued in 2008, Chinese authorities have yet to
approve meaningful numbers of foreign entrants into this market. To date, there have
only been a handful of foreign-invested SLCs approved in China, mostly those from
major financial institutions such as Citigroup, HSBC and Standard Chartered.
Currently, the path by which an SLC can become a bank is obscured by arcane
requirements on asset concentration, geographic scope and limitations on leverage. Such
requirements dampen the interest of both domestic and foreign investors in establishing
SLCs since their long-term strategy cannot be accurately predicted from the outset of the
investment.
Securities and Investment Services In June 2009, the China Securities Regulatory
Commission (CSRC) formally issued opinions on new share issuance, marking the
resumption of initial public offerings after a suspension of more than eight months. The
advent of Chinext, previously the “Growth Enterprise Board,” in October 2009 has
played a positive role in promoting the development of SMEs and improving the depth
and structure of China’s capital market.
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In addition, a number of Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) applications have
been approved. In October 2009, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE)
also raised the upper limit for single qualified investors applying for QFII investment
quotas from USD 800 million (RMB 5.5 billion) to USD 1 billion (RMB 6.8 billion), set
a threshold of USD 50 million (RMB 3.4 million) for each application for investment
quota, and shortened the lock-in period to three months for the investment principal of
some funds under the QFII system and to one year for the investment principal of other
qualified investors. According to data provided by SAFE, the investment quota granted to
78 QFIIs had reached USD 15.7 billion (RMB 107.2 billion) by the end of September
2009.
Chinese regulatory agencies continue to seek advice from foreign corporations and
private equity (PE) investors to further develop the domestic PE and venture capital
markets. Despite the economic downturn, many PE investors remain optimistic about
China. However, while PE and venture capital are increasingly important parts of
China’s financial sector, there remain serious concerns about the ability of foreign
investors to compete in China on a level playing field with their domestic counterparts.
Credit Rating Agencies In October 2009, Chinese regulatory authorities issued draft
regulations on the Administration of Credit Investigations. This will help ensure that
credit rating agencies are regulated consistently across the globe, a critical issue in light
of the international nature of the credit ratings and their usage. Internationally consistent
regulation of credit rating agencies in China would be one of the foundations to broaden
and accelerate capital markets development, similar to the wide usage of credit ratings in
global capital markets.
The regulation on credit rating agencies should focus on avoiding potential conflicts of
interest and enhancing transparency through the disclosure of ratings performance
information. Actions to avoid include prescribing the methodologies or criteria to be
used by credit rating agencies, and intervening on the content or substance of credit
ratings by the regulatory bodies or mandating liability standards. Such actions will
jeopardize the independence of credit rating agencies and the value of ratings in the
market.
Private Equity There have been a number of changes to the Chinese regulations in 2009
for the PE sector. There is a movement towards decentralization of the approval process
by allowing foreign-invested projects to be approved at the provincial and local levels.
However, investors continue to face confusing, and at times contradictory, guidance and
regulations from various government ministries and regulators.
32
Pharamceuticals
O
ver the last few years, China has undertaken a comprehensive review of its
healthcare system with a goal of broad reform. In 2009, the government
approved a plan to invest RMB 850 billion (USD 124 billion) into the healthcare
system over the next three years and announced its four pillars of healthcare reform: 1)
enhancing the medical insurance system, 2) improving the basic drug delivery system, 3)
upgrading local healthcare facilities and 4) revamping public hospitals.
While there are many encouraging signals, challenges remain for the research-based
pharmaceutical industry, including: appropriate healthcare funding, prescribing and
dispensing practices, hospital bidding procedures, government pricing and reimbursement
policies, and the protection of intellectual property (IP). Lack of progress on these key
issues hampers growth in this sector and increases the risk of patients not receiving the
highest quality care and products.
Addressing Healthcare Costs and Financing Despite substantial progress on healthcare

reform, China’s percentage of its GDP spent on healthcare remains very small compared
with other countries of comparable economic development. A large segment of Chinese
patients pay most of their healthcare expenses out-of-pocket.
Ensuring Best Medical Practices China permits hospitals and physicians both to
prescribe and dispense medicine. This may encourage prescription writing based upon
financial motives rather than best medical practices. This unfortunately is exacerbated by
inadequate funding of hospital and physician services. China has committed to
restructure hospital financing and establish a sustainable system to eliminate hospital
mark-ups of pharmaceuticals as part of its newly-announced healthcare reforms.
Ensuring Access to Essential Drugs China’s development of a comprehensive essential

drugs policy aimed at making pharmaceuticals available to the underserved populations
across China is an extremely commendable goal. Such a positive step will help ensure
affordable access for patients to necessary drugs. Implementation details are still under
consideration by the central and provincial-level governments who will be procuring the
products on the list to be sold to patients without markup.
It remains critical that the new procurement mechanism be transparent and consistent. It
should include provisions for appeal, provide patients with choices and early access to
innovative medicines, and not be based solely on the cost, but rather, also on quality,
relative value and reliability of supply. To ensure a system that guarantees the most
needy patients access to the best products, it is critical that provincial and local level
governments provide for consistent and uniform implementation of the essential drugs
policy, and that there is a mechanism through which implementation is monitored and
reviewed.
Clinical Trial Application Approval Although there have been recent improvements,
China’s clinical trial application (CTA) submission requirements remain burdensome
33
compared to other countries. CTA applicants are unable to supplement their applications
as new information becomes available and must repeat full procedures for every clinical
protocol. In addition, China maintains comparatively extensive pre-clinical and clinical
requirements. Together, these make it extremely difficult to integrate Chinese patients
into regional or global trials intended to expedite the availability of meaningful new
therapies in China.
IP Protection Regulatory Data Protection China’s regulatory procedures permit the

SFDA to grant marketing approval to products that have previously been approved
outside of China if applicants can submit published material and reference decisions by
foreign regulatory agencies and conduct limited local clinical trials. However, this can
create significant safety concerns around products introduced into China via this drug
registration pathway. By approving copy versions without the manufacturer’s clinical
data package, the SFDA cannot ensure that the product in the data package and the
product in the marketing application are the same, or equivalent.
Through the absence of this data, widespread availability of unsafe drugs in the
marketplace could occur, unnecessarily putting patients at risk. In addition, reliance on
summary data or approvals from outside China gives an unfair commercial advantage to
non-originator companies because they do not incur the cost of generating their own
clinical data to prove safety and efficacy.
Patent Linkage Patent linkage ensures that marketing approval will not be granted to a
generic drug if a valid patent exists. While Articles 18 and 19 of China’s updated Drug
Registration Regulation refer to publication of patents associated with drug registration
and a maximum “two-year period” for submitting a registration application before the
patent on the drug expires, it does not explicitly address the circumstances and
proceedings for disputes over the patent status of new products.
The updated regulation states that if an infringement dispute occurs during application, it
“should be resolved according to patent laws and regulations.” However, the Patent Law
requires sales in the marketplace before an infringement suit can be filed. In addition, the
“Bolar Exemption” provision in the new Patent Law exempts production of patented
products from infringement as long as they are “for the purpose of submitting
information necessary for an administrative approval.”
To avoid costly patent litigation and increase market predictability, we urge China to
allow patent holder companies to file patent infringement suits before marketing
authorization is granted to non-patent holders and the infringing company has market
sales. In addition, the SFDA should implement a form of automatic postponement of
drug registration approval pending resolution of the patent dispute.
Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a global public health

problem. The solution requires implementation of adequate drug safety regulations at the
national and local levels, as well as multilateral cooperation. China’s enforcement of
laws regulating the various links in the drug manufacturing and supply chain (including
34
the export of Active Pharmaceutical Ingredients (API)) and China’s commitment to
multilateral cooperation remain inadequate.
China has yet to enforce or, in some cases, put into place, laws that thoroughly address
drug counterfeiting. Nor does it provide the resources and commitment necessary to
combat this growing problem. For example, although China’s drug laws prohibit “fake”
medicines, criminal liability is contingent upon proof of actual harm. This burdensome
and excessive evidentiary requirement all but precludes effective criminal prosecution
against counterfeiters.
Another concern is the use and regulation of APIs. Bulk chemicals and other APIs are
generally deemed pharmaceuticals under the Drug Administration Law, but in practice,
whether an API is regarded as a pharmaceutical or left unregulated is often up to the local
regulator’s discretion. According to the Drug Administration Law, chemical companies
are subject to SFDA oversight only when a chemical company “chooses” to register an
API product with SFDA. If a company manufactures an API, but elects not to declare
that it will be used in a finished pharmaceutical product, the SFDA has said that it lacks
authority over the unregistered manufacturer.
In addition, the current system permits chemical manufacturers to sell and ship API
products to locations within China and abroad with either no regard for the intended use
of the API or flagrantly choosing not to comply with existing SFDA regulations. These
unregulated and unethical practices by chemical companies contribute significantly to,
and in some cases aid and abet, the counterfeit drug trade. More troubling is the fact that
the unregulated distribution of API products may expose patients to serious and
significant health risks and degrade consumer confidence in the Chinese and global
medicinal supply chains.
Retail
C
hina’s retail sector has been developing in recent years, but still faces several
problems that prevent full maturation. Unequal regulatory practices unduly
burden foreign-invested retailers, resulting in a marketplace that lacks full
competition. The effect for consumers is significant in prices, product safety, corporate
social responsibility and industry standards. Improving the competitiveness and
openness of the retail sector is critical, and will only become more with domestic
consumption an increasingly important component of the Chinese economy.
Significant Developments In 2009, total consumption of retail commodities reached

RMB 12.5 trillion (USD 1.8 trillion), up 16.9 percent from the previous year. It remains
to be seen what continued impact the global economic downturn will have on the retail
sector, but government estimates predict eight percent growth in 2010, and total retail
sales of RMB 20 trillion (USD 2.9 trillion) by 2020.
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In accordance with its WTO commitments, China has removed most restrictions on
foreign-invested retailers, including those governing location, proportion of ownership
and the number of outlets. Of the top 100 retailers in 2008, 19 are foreign invested. In
2008, foreign invested retailers owned 4,613 stores, an increase of 13.1 percent compared
to 2007. On September 12, 2008, the Foreign Investment Administration Department
(FIA) of the Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM) issued a regulation decentralizing store
opening approvals. In December 2008, MOFCOM issued guidelines for local commerce
bureaus on the examination and approval of store-opening applications.
Since its implementation, the store approval decentralization regulation adopted by the
Chinese government has effectively simplified the approval procedures for new foreign-
invested retail stores and reduced operating costs and delays associated with the
examination and approval process.
However, despite the simplification of procedures related to the opening of stores by

foreign retailers and the number of store openings, discriminatory treatment and a lack of
transparency still exist in certain areas of government administration over the retail
industry. These issues continue to restrict the expansion of foreign retailers and
discourage foreign investors from contributing their expertise, which would benefit the
Chinese consumer and overall marketplace.
Restrictions on Ownership According to the National Development and Reform
Commission’s (NDRC) Catalogue Guiding Foreign Investment in Industry and
MOFCOM’s Measures on the Administration of Foreign Investment in Commercial
Sectors, retailers operating more than 30 stores in China and selling pharmaceuticals,
grains, vegetable oil, sugar, cotton or other commodities of varying brands from different
suppliers cannot be more than 49 percent foreign-owned. Hong Kong and Macao
investors can own this type of retail chain outright.
Restrictions on Tobacco In March 2007, the NDRC issued new rules on tobacco
licensing, the Administrative Measures for Tobacco Monopoly License (Measures),
which prohibit foreign commercial enterprises from conducting wholesale or retail
tobacco business. According to the Measures, as of January 2009, no foreign-invested
retailer is allowed to directly sell tobacco in China. These restrictions put foreign
retailers at a clear disadvantage to their domestic competitors.
Restrictions on Other Commodities Discriminatory treatment also persists with regards

to the sale of publications and audiovisual products. Publications can only be sold by
foreign retailers with legal representatives in China and, along with audiovisual products,
can only be sold by Sino-foreign cooperative enterprises that are not more than 49
percent foreign owned.
Commercial Zoning According to the Measures on the Administration of Foreign

Investment in Commercial Sectors, when applying for a new site, foreign retailers must
produce a commercial planning certificate from the local government certifying that the
proposed site complies with city commercial zoning plans. When commercial zoning
36
plans exist, a public hearing process is also oftentimes required, adding three months or
more to the approval process. Furthermore, some locations have incomplete commercial
zoning plans, making compliance confirmation impossible for foreign retailers. Without
this certificate, the examination and approval authorities will dismiss the foreign retailers’
new site application as failing to comply with local commercial zoning plans.
In some instances, the local government has arbitrarily used the commercial zoning plan
to slow or restrict foreign retail plans to open new stores, placing yet another level of risk
on the foreign investor. In contrast, domestic retailers are not required to submit new site
applications to MOFCOM for examination or approval. This requirement is in conflict
with China’s WTO commitment to lift all geographic limits on foreign retailers.
Registered Capital According to Article 7 of the Measures on the Administration of

Foreign Investment in Commercial Sectors, the minimum registered capital for foreign
retail investors must comply with the relevant provisions in the Company Law and other
relevant regulations. According to the Company Law, the minimal capital required for a
company registration is fairly low—between RMB 30,000 (USD 4,400) and RMB
500,000 (USD 73,000). However, local MOFCOMs usually require foreign retailers to
increase their registered capital by approximately 10 times this amount for each new
outlet application. In contrast, this provision does not exist for domestic retailers.
E-Commerce Many foreign-invested retailers are looking to conduct online retail
operations while operating physical stores. Foreign-invested retailers have extensive
experience and expertise in online retailing (e-commerce) to offer China as it develops
and grows this sector. Participation in online retail operations by foreign-invested
retailers will not only expand the community of online consumers in China and help
educate consumers on this new mode of consumption, but will also help reduce the
circulation costs of commodities, increase the efficiency of the retail sector and help
promote domestic consumption. However, currently, there are no specific regulations in
practice on the application and approval process for foreign-invested retailers interested
in e-commerce, preventing them from developing e-commerce operations.
Provincial Investment Environment
I ncreasingly, foreign-direct investment (FDI) is moving from China’s first-tier cities

to locations further inland. The kind of FDI flowing into first-tier cities is also
changing as second and so-called “x-tier” cities (third, fourth and fifth-tier) receive a
greater amount of investment. First and larger second-tier cities are now turning their
attention to developing tertiary industries, as populations become more affluent and
officials look to promote service-sector development. Concurrently, secondary industries
are moving to smaller, less wealthy cities.
Second-tier cities (defined as the 15 biggest urban economies after the three tier-one
cities) have emerged in recent years as appealing destinations for companies in China
37
looking beyond the maturing first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai and Guangzhou. While
rising costs in China’s coastal and first-tier cities are certainly one factor driving
multinational corporations inland, the majority of foreign companies cite increasing
market reach as their primary reason for expansion.
Statistics support companies’ beliefs that second-tier cities hold enormous market growth
potential. About 150 million people live in these 15 cities combined, and they represent
some of China’s most upwardly mobile citizens. Continuing growth in these major,
developing cities could represent a significant new market at time when demand is down
throughout the world. In fact, these cities have already done much to spur global
consumption. According to the 2008 World Trade Atlas, China’s second-tier cities have
less than 10 percent of the country’s population but import more than half of all
American China-bound exports. This strong demand shows no serious signs of decline
and may in fact increase as disposable income in these cities grows.
The Challenges of Wealth Creation and Distribution to FDI China’s central and local
governments should be applauded for the role they have played in lifting a sizable
proportion of the population out of poverty over a few decades and helping develop a
burgeoning middle class. However, the increasing wealth of the first-tier cities and the
investment spill-over into adjacent areas in the Bohai Rim, the Yangtze River Delta and
the Pearl River Delta have presented significant policy challenges for China’s national
and local governments. Environmental degradation and citizens’ quality-of-life
expectations in the first-tier cities require development of new policies and greater, more
consistent enforcement of current regulations.
There have also been rapid changes in the economies of smaller and increasingly wealthy
cities due to greater infrastructure development, the influx of workers from the
countryside and poorer cities, as well as the requirements of foreign investors. These
factors are all conspiring to require government, both at the regional and central levels, to
update policies and regulations, as well as strengthen consistent implementation and
enforcement.
Administrators at both central and local levels need to take into consideration critical
policy issues that affect FDI inflows into China. The following key issues have been
identified: 1) Greater transparency and a streamlining of investment regulations; 2)
Development of human resources; 3) Transportation logistics development and reduction
of traffic congestion; 4) Consistent enforcement of laws and regulations, such as
intellectual property rights; 5) Reduction of pollution levels in cities; and 6) tax and other
policy incentives to promote service-sector growth.
The increased wealth of China’s first and second-tier cities, as well as the increased
sophistication of foreign business requirements as investments in China grow, have
brought a host of new considerations to the attention of Chinese government officials at
the national and local levels.
38
National and local governments in China have offered spectacular results in increasing
the wealth of many of its citizens and have done a great deal to create business
opportunities for American firms. However, consequences from rapid economic growth
coupled with lack of policy development and consistent enforcement in the key areas
mentioned in the following chapters have created barriers to American businesses’ ability
to benefit China’s economy and citizenry.
Central China In an effort to decrease costs and maintain growth during the global
economic downturn, an increasing number of companies from the coastal provinces and
cities are recognizing the abundant and cost-efficient growth opportunities in China’s
central provinces of Anhui, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi and Shanxi. Encouraged by
favorable government policies, more companies have aligned their development
strategies with the central government’s goal to direct more investment to Central China.
Accordingly, several Central China provinces are establishing strong track records for
growth. In the last five years, Hubei attained more than 10 percent annual growth
including during the global financial crisis when national average growth rates were
about eight percent. GDP reached RMB 540 billion (USD 79.4 billion) in the first half of
2009. Per capita income has also increased throughout the region, with the disposable
income of Wuhan’s urban residents up 11.5 percent from 2008.
In order to overcome the challenges presented by the global economic downturn, Central
China’s provincial governments have put forward their own stimulus plan to supplement
the RMB four trillion (USD 584 billion) national stimulus package. The Central China
package includes special provisions to encourage economic growth, infrastructure
development and environmental and energy saving projects. Even before the stimulus
package was announced, Central China provinces had already committed a marked
increase in resources for infrastructure and Hubei’s pillar industries.
Customs issues continue to present problems. Local Customs officials require businesses
to hire specialized import companies to clear even simple items, such as library book
barcode labels. Personal use items and student property are frequently treated like retail
sale items and are often held by Customs for months while import companies and
officials negotiate their release. The process of clearing items from Customs can be
expensive and time consuming, particularly as laws and regulations are sometimes
arbitrarily and inconsistently applied. For example, property is sometimes destroyed
without explanation and courier services report discriminatory treatment at times.
Southwest China The Southwest region of China covers a vast territory that, with its
large population and rich natural resources, promises great development potential. The
official launch of the government-initiated Western Development Program 10 years ago
has led to substantial economic, social and cultural development in the region, laying the
foundation for the Southwest to enter a period of unparalleled growth.
As part of the positive development trend, the key cities in the region, Chongqing and
Chengdu, have taken a leading role in enhancing and deepening ties between cities and
the countryside with the launch of the Urban-Rural Integration Planning Program. It
39
aims to identify areas with potential for greater cooperation for rural and urban
development.
Although the impact of the financial crisis still persists, both Chongqing and Chengdu are
quickly recovering and serve as the primary engines driving a range of development in
the region. Between January and October 2009, Chongqing’s GDP increased 12.4
percent, reaching RMB 531.2 billion (USD 77.8 billion). In Chengdu, GDP grew 14.2
percent over the same period to reach RMB 316.5 billion (USD 46.3 billion). Both
figures point to a strong rebound in market confidence.
Chengdu’s export industry continues to maintain steady annual growth. Between January
and October 2009, imports and exports in Chengdu increased 8.9 percent, to USD 13.8
billion (RMB 93.8 billion). With a fast-growing economy and significant development in
recent years, Chengdu has become a top investment destination in China. The West
China Expo in October 2009 attracted investments totaling USD 16 billion (RMB 110
billion), including several high-tech projects in key industries.
On the other hand, Chongqing was more negatively affected by the financial crisis, and
its import-export industry now faces large-scale challenges. Between January and
October 2009, Chongqing’s import and export market contracted by 24.9 percent,
compared with the same period in 2008, falling to USD 6.1 billion (RMB 41.7 billion).
In light of the global recession, Chongqing’s government has issued a series of policies
and measures to aid local businesses and the majority of companies remain optimistic
that a strong recovery lies ahead.
Reasons for optimism include the fact that Chongqing is among the oldest industrial
bases in China and is one of the country’s top-10 domestic equipment manufacturers. It
occupies a position of special importance to the national economy, especially as the rapid
growth in production volume is at its highest levels in recent years.
One of the oldest industrial bases in China, Chongqing has become the country’s largest
automobile manufacturing base, as well as a research and production hot spot for the
national defense industry. The growing motorcycle industry and machine equipment
manufacturing further contribute to the manufacturing base. Not to be outdone, Chengdu
has a diversified and sophisticated mould production industry with approximately 9,000
employees. Mould manufacturing enterprises in Chengdu employ the latest information
technology and high-precision CNC machining and inspection equipment. Chengdu
plans to continue its development as a leading mould production base.
The pharmaceutical industry is a thriving sector of Chengdu’s economy. Chengdu was

recently designated as one of the first national pharmaceutical export bases, marking the
first time a city in Southwest China has held the title. Overall revenue for China’s
pharmaceutical industry increased by eight percent between January and July of 2009 and
Chengdu’s value added growth rate ranked third nationally. Chengdu’s municipal
government recently finalized a three-year development plan which aims for economic
output in the bio-pharmaceutical industry to rise from RMB 38 billion (USD 5.6 billion)
in 2009 to RMB 90 billion (USD 13.2 billion) in 2012.
40
Manufacturing is a key employer, essential to the region’s economic growth. However,
some foreign-invested manufacturers are facing challenges, specifically relating to rising
production and labor costs, as well as power shortages and transportation challenges.
Economic Assessment
C
hina’s economic growth has remained strong. After bottoming out in early 2009
amidst the global economic crisis, sequential GDP growth was strong on the back
of massive domestic policy stimulus, pushing GDP up 11.9 percent on a year ago
in the first quarter of 2010. Leading indictors and industrial production data suggest
some moderation in the second quarter, to a still rapid pace. Growth has continued to be
supported by an expansionary macro-economic policy stance. Headline fiscal policy has
not been expansionary in the first 5 months of 2010. However, the monetary expansion
remains large and this in part reflects quasi fiscal activity, notably via lending to local
government investment platforms. After the 30 percent of GDP expansion of credit in
2009, outstanding loans rose another 7.6 percent of GDP in January-May (seasonally
adjusted).
In the first quarter of 2010 infrastructure construction and real estate received most of the
new medium and long term (MLT) loans. But growth has recently become more broad-
based. In early 2009, exports collapsed and the massive stimulus effort boosted domestic
demand, infrastructure investment in particular. More recently, net external trade has
become less of a drag on growth as exports have accelerated alongside a rebounding
world economy. Consumption growth has strengthened since 2008 while investment
decelerated in the first quarter of this year, with government-led investment leading the
slowdown. However, the stimulus measures led to some concerns about the role of SOEs
in the economy.
The Role of SOEs in the Economy There are concerns that SOEs have benefited
disproportionally from the policy stimulus and are crowding out private enterprises. The
weight of SOEs has increased recently, especially in investment. With its emphasis on
construction and infrastructure, the stimulus has directly benefited SOEs more than non
SOEs. This is in part because of how state ownership is distributed over the economy.
Most large construction companies and steel and cement companies supplying them are
SOEs. Having close relationships with the government and the banks, SOEs seem to
have benefited strongly from the monetary stimulus.
Moreover, the local government platforms carrying out the infrastructure construction
that boosted investment in 2009 are classified as SOEs. Easy credit also led some SOEs
to spend heavily on land amidst the property boom. SOEs’ weight in production has not
risen recently and the long term trend is for it to decline. Private enterprises were
substantially outgrowing SOEs before the crisis. Industrial production growth fell
sharply across the board since end-2008 and then showed a V-shaped recovery in 2009.
The SOE sector and private enterprises now grow at broadly similar rates. Taking a
41
longer term perspective, the weight of SOEs has declined steadily in terms of both
production and assets.
The economic role of SOEs remains large, partly because of policies. In addition to
favorable access to credit, SOEs pay very little dividend to the state. In some sectors,
SOEs are granted monopolies or oligopolies, with private sector participation prevented
by policy. It is explicit policy to maintain a key role for SOEs in many sectors deemed to
be “strategic” or “basic or pillar.” The government is rightly revisiting the policy stance
towards the private sector. China could derive a lot of productivity gains by opening up
various sectors further to private participation, particularly in the service sector.
The government has listed developing the private economy and removing entry barriers
to private investment among the key reform tasks for this year. It makes sense to
reconsider the composition of the list of “strategic” and “basic or pillar” industries where
state ownership is meant to play a key role. The current list includes the machinery, auto,
IT, construction, steel, base metals, and chemicals industries. It is not obvious why state
ownership is essential in these industries. Additionally, progress can still be made by
reducing barriers to competition. The government could also usefully clarify the role it
envisages SOEs to play in China’s economy.
Outlook In China, growth is likely to ease somewhat. The first quarter outcome was
modestly stronger than expected in March. However, a somewhat more pronounced
deceleration in the rest of the year is expected, reflecting the impact of the move towards
normalization of the overall macro policy stance and the recent measures with respect to
the real estate sector as well as the headwinds from Europe. The World Bank leaves its
GDP growth forecast unchanged at 9.5 percent for this year and reduces that for 2011
slightly to 8.5 percent.1 In 2010, growth should be less investment-driven and benefit
from more favorable external trade.
Investment growth is likely to moderate this year. Government-led investment is

decelerating, after the spectacular growth in 2009. Real estate investment is set to
contribute significantly to growth most of 2010. However, later in the year the impact of
the recent property tightening measures should kick in. Given the sharply increased
importance of mortgage financing since early 2009, in flow terms, the mortgage-related
measures are likely to affect housing sales and presumably housing prices substantially.
The impact on construction activity is expected later in the year, given the inherent lags.
The government aims to offset the impact on construction activity by increasing the
supply of lower and middle income housing. However, given the modest share of such
kind of housing and underperformance of targets in this area in recent years, it may be
difficult to achieve this.
Investment in the services industry should remain solid, supported by the healthy outlook
for domestic consumption. The outlook for manufacturing investment is less clear.
Consumption should continue to grow solidly. Amidst favorable labor market conditions,
1
World Bank China Quarterly Report (http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CHINAEXTN/Resources/318949-1268688634523/Quarterly_June_2010.pdf)
42
income growth should remain robust. Moreover, despite some pick up in inflation,
consumer sentiment is recovering. Following the rapid recovery so far, export volumes
are likely to slow, sequentially, because of an eventual end to the inventory adjustment in
partner countries. The external surplus should ease down somewhat this year.
In the first 4 months of 2010, international raw material prices recovered much more than
prices of manufactured goods and China’s terms of trade declined again. However, raw
material prices fell sharply in May. Taking into account the global context and assuming
they broadly stay at their May level the rest of 2010, the external surplus would decline
this year in US dollar terms and as a share of GDP. Inflation is likely to remain
contained this year. The expansionary monetary stance since end 2008 has increased
inflation expectations. However, inflation is basically determined by supply and demand
for goods and services and China’s prices are strongly influenced by global prices.
Higher food prices and imputed rent are exerting some upward price pressure.
However, the envisaged global context moderates China’s inflation prospects, including
via the absence of upward pressure on commodity and food prices. The China-specific
factors behind high food prices are also not likely to be sustained. Moreover, continued
low core inflation reflects the influence of China’s pattern of growth, with large increases
in the supply of goods and services, compared to increases in demand. Wage growth at
the lower end of the income distribution may increase as a result of some widely
published labor disputes and increases in factory-specific and minimum wages. This is in
part a cyclical issue, reflecting the strong rebound in the labor market after an earlier
downturn when wage growth slowed. Viewed over a two year horizon, these increases
are within historical norms. The adjustment of individual companies to these pressures
will vary. However, given the flexibility of China’s labor market and the track record of
China’s overall manufacturing sector in absorbing wage increases and keeping unit labor
cost growth down, this is unlikely to set in motion an unwarranted wage-inflation spiral.
Assessments
E ngagement has been the basic tenet of negotiation between the West and China for
the last 30 years. The idea was that as China opened to the rest of the world, it
would start to align its systems, interests and priorities with international norms.
China and Western counter-parties are much more similar in terms of values and
priorities than they were two decades prior. However, for Westerners making deals in
China, the negotiating environment isn’t nearly as favorable as it was in 2007 – and it is
unlikely to be again.
International deal-makers in China received tremendously favorable treatment in the

decade before the Crash. The boom of the 2000s was doubly good for MNCs opening
and expanding businesses on the mainland. Big consumption in the West was key – but
China’s internal economic policy-making gave a big boost as well. Chinese business
wanted to upgrade in a hurry in addition to plenty of low-hanging fruit for investors with
43
technology or brands and the Chinese middle class still found big-picture images of
international-style affluence both appealing and transferable.
"Win-Win" had a special meaning in Beijing before the crash, because Chinese counter-
parties were looking to win twice. The first would be the win of benefiting from
commercial openness and broad shots of MNC investment. Jobs, training, investment
and methodology were great benefits – but they were just the first set of gains. The
second win would come when local enterprises, particularly state-directed local
enterprises, were able to replace the foreigners and complete the service and
manufacturing chains domestically.
A Return to Basics Post-Engagement negotiating is more akin to the era prior to the
millennium, where everything was possible but nothing was easy. Now some things will
be easy and many things will just be impossible. Westerners have grown accustomed to
having access to a wide range of industries and markets. In the old days there was a list
of pillar industries (off-limits), encouraged industries (high-tech) and a wide swathe of
gray areas. For a decade or so, Westerners assumed that the gray areas could be
exploited and eventually be turned profitable. That is becoming a less good assumption
in this new era.
Post-Google China The Google/China row is a symbol not so much of where China is
heading than as where it sees itself right now. That conflict crystallizes how China now
considers itself as being able to thrive without foreign investment. This conflict also
highlights how China no longer reticent in using its own laws to reign in foreign
businesses and give competitive succor to its own domestic companies. China has been
tightening its legal enforcement against foreign companies and there is certainly no
reason to doubt that will only continue to be the case.
The direct corollary of China having become less beholden to foreign enterprises is that
those enterprises have lost their previously favored status. A prime example of this is
how foreign enterprises no longer receive special tax benefits not provided to domestic
entities. For the last decade, China has had a framework for regulating foreign businesses
but has not placed great emphasis on applying it. Those days of benign neglect are over
and the Chinese government is increasingly cracking down on foreign violators of
existing regulations, and issuing new guidelines and circulars to enhance what is already
on its books. The Chinese government has concluded it should put more effort into
enforcing its laws against foreign businesses. This new world view is already impacting
foreign business in China and it will continue.
6
recent observations =• China's local governments are more often delaying or denying
applications for wholly foreign owned enterprises (WFOEs) and joint ventures. In
addition, Chinese officials have come right out and said they no longer care whether
foreign businesses come to China. =• Registration of technology licenses is more often
being prohibited or restricted. The idea seems to be that Chinese businesses should not be
required to pay for access to foreign technology. =• Visas for foreign workers are
increasingly being delayed, denied or restricted. The view on this is that Chinese workers
44
are available to do any job. =• China is greatly stepping up enforcement of its tax laws
against foreign companies. =• As the major purchaser of many raw materials, China
believes it should be able to dictate purchase terms, without negotiations. Iron ore is a
good example of this. China formed a buyer cartel (in violation of its own and foreign
anti-monopoly law), which demanded a single price from its suppliers, with no room for
negotiation. This “hardball” approach is being considered for other industries where
China is a major purchaser of raw materials. =• China has made a number of high profile
investments in the third world, both for resource extraction and infrastructure
development. It often insists on total Chinese staffing, financing and control.
The Chinese government's unwillingness to bend in its recent fracas with Google may be
proof of how China's ascendancy has changed things for foreign businesses in China.
The Chinese government is certainly getting tougher on foreign companies and it appears
to be doing so from the position that it cares a less now about foreign investment than it
did ten, five, or even two years ago. There was a time when China believed it needed
foreign businesses to help Chinese companies innovate. Rightly or wrongly, that no
longer seems to be the view and the strong sense from both Beijing and the provinces is
that China is neutral on foreign investment these days.
Although many commentators have suggested that China is becoming hostile to foreign
investment, the fact, however, remains that China's attitude towards foreign investment
has perhaps not changed as much as would appear at first blush. China still remains
remarkably open to foreign investment and shows every sign of planning to continue with
that open policy for the future.
New FDI in the New China It is true, however, that that due to the effects of the
international financial crisis, foreign investment in China leveled off in 2009. In
response, the State Council recently issued the Opinion on Taking Additional Steps in the
Work Improving the Utilization of Foreign Investment. This Opinion and the various
research reports issued together with it confirm China will not be changing the approach
to foreign investment it has followed since 2006. The idea behind This Opinion is to
refine and expand, rather than to make any radical changes.
The Opinion repeats China's basic policy of promoting "quality rather than quantity" that
was first promulgated in 2006. In keeping with this policy, the following five investment
areas will be encouraged: high-end manufacturing, high-tech, modern service industry,
new energy industry and energy-efficient and environmentally clean industries. On the
other hand, high pollution, high energy usage and raw materials intensive industries will
be discouraged. Low tech, low value-added industries and industries already in
overcapacity will also be discouraged.
The PRC has developed an interesting strategy for developing the Central and Western
regions. Early on, development in the coastal regions was promoted through a
combination of tax breaks and support for low tech, labor intensive, light manufacturing
industries. Tax breaks have been pretty much eliminated in the coastal regions and the
"official" policy is that low tech manufacturing is to be discouraged. However, the
45
policies are now available to encourage investment in the Central and Western regions.
Tax breaks are available and low tech manufacturing is now formally encouraged for this
region. The notion apparently is that what worked for the coastal regions should also
work in the Center and the West.
A major trend that began in 2006 was an attempt to centralize the approval process for
foreign investment. The Opinion marks a turn away from that trend, by allowing much
greater scope for local approval of foreign invested projects. Under the old rules, all
projects with an investment amount over $100 million were required to be approved in
Beijing. Under the Opinion, this number has been raised to $300 million. In addition,
the Opinion provides that the applicable ministries in Beijing have the right to grant
approval rights to local governments in most areas under their jurisdiction. Since
approval in Beijing is always a major impediment to speedy review and approval of
investment projects, this change should have an immediate positive impact.
The most interesting feature of the Opinion is its proposal to expand the available
vehicles for foreign investment. Currently, the only generally available vehicles for
foreign investment are the financially unsophisticated measures of simple stock
investment in a WFOE (Wholly Foreign Owned Entity) or a JV (Joint Venture). The
Opinion proposes to add the following six new avenues for investment:
new fdi vehicles
=• Foreign participation in the reform and restructuring of domestic enterprises through
equity participation and M&A will be encouraged. =• A-share listed companies in China
will be encouraged to allow investment from both domestic and foreign strategic
investors. =• The plan to allow foreign investment for credit guarantee companies that
would provide services to small and medium enterprises will continue. =• The creation of
venture capital companies using foreign investment will be encouraged. =• Exit
mechanisms for private equity investment funds will be improved. =• Qualified foreign-
invested enterprises will be encouraged to list on the domestic A-share market and to
issue corporate bonds and medium-term notes.
All of these proposals would result in huge changes in the current rather unsophisticated
and underdeveloped investment environment. However, implementation will require
major changes in the Chinese system and as of yet, there has been no hint of any
legislative or regulatory change that would implement any of these dramatic new
proposals. Though this Opinion is overall quite favorable for foreign investment in China,
what it really says is that China is receptive to foreign investment that benefits China as a
whole and then, only if foreign investors strictly adhere to the rules.
The Long View China’s economic growth has, hitherto, depended on its relative
abundance of production labor and its increasingly secure investment environment.
Within the next decade, however, China’s labor force will begin to contract. This will set
its economy apart from other developing Asian countries where relative labor abundance
will increase, as will relative capital returns.
46
Unless there is a substantial change in population policy, the retention of China’s large
share of global FDI will require further improvements in its investment environment.
These linkages are explored using a global economic model that incorporates full
demographic behavior. Financial reform is measured by the effect of declining
intermediation costs on the wedge between home and foreign borrowing rates, or the
“investment premium.” China’s share of global investment is found to depend
sensitively on both its demography and its interest premium, though the results suggest
that a feasible continuation of financial reforms will be sufficient to compensate for a
slowdown and decline in its labor force.
47
a Hermes strategygroup report
_______
2010/2011 年中国法律和管理分析
共同面对不确定的经济形势
中
美建交已 30 年，双边关系的基础从未如此稳固，两国关系也日渐成
熟。当前的全球经济危机凸显了双边关系的重要性。要战胜经济衰退，
就必须通力合作，在保持开放的同时进一步加强合作。中美关系仍然稳
固，但两国必须努力确保全球经济衰退及其它因素不会破坏多年来基于经济合作而
建立起的信任。
现在正值决定中美经贸关系未来走向的关键时期。企业正在重新审视其商业战略，
政府亦须如此。一些政策的实施效果受到质疑，而另一些政策的重要性变得
愈加明显。在这种环境下，最近几十年来不断加深的中美两国间经济和文化关系以
成为两国加强合作的重要基础，需要我们给予更大的关注。经济合作与对话的加强
将裨益于中美两国。但是，若不能共同应对当前全球经济形势，则两国间
的经济关系有可能受到影响，不利于两国整体的健康发展。同时，目前中国已经基
本，但尚未完全履行其入世承诺，北京或华盛顿若存在保护主义政策及随之产生的
市场扭曲，都有可能损害数十年来为两国繁荣发展做出巨大贡献的双边合作。
此外，中国制定了一系列法律，以推动中国向一个尊重知识产权和劳动者权益的成
熟经济体过渡。目前，中国必须着力于确保已经颁布的法律得到有力的执行，尤其
是要对执行国家法律能力较弱的省市和地方，加大执法能力建设。
中国所面临的经济挑战不断变化，华盛顿和北京必须携手解决这些新问题。早在危
机爆发之前，中美两国就已经在寻求各自转变。选举年的美国政府和期望推动国内
经济实现“结构性转变”、向消费经济时代迈进的中国领导，都将着手进行重大的政
策调整。不幸的是，在政策转变过程中，由于爆发全球性经济危机，两国均出现了
保护主义抬头的迹象。在全球经济衰退的背景之下，背离过去二十年里促进两国繁
荣发展的原则与机制所付出的代价，将远远大于任何短期的经济或政治利益。我们
有必要共同面对经济危机，避免可能会导致经济进一步恶化的倒退，这是十分重要
的。两国领导人必须继续从全球、而非地区的视角来关注全球经济政策。中美两国
均推出了大规模的经济刺激计划。
48
这项投入将决定两国短期和长期的发展方向。重要的是，这些刺激经济的支出决策
应出于经济，而非政治的原则。对于中美两国的企业和劳动者而言，两国的紧密合
作会让他们受益，而保护主义则恰恰相反。此外，两国都必须牢记其做
出的入世承诺，这些承诺的初衷是通过开放贸易推动经济的稳健增长。
暂不从美中两国法律义务角度考虑，将外国企业排除在经济刺激资金竞争之外的做
法，将导致两国经济增长减速。中美两国的劳动者都可以大大受益于对方的经济
刺激方案。随着世界经济的日益全球化，各国劳动者都能够从企业的成功中受益，
而不论这家企业来自哪个国家。在美国的中资企业会雇用美国劳动者，而在华的美
资企业也会雇用许多中国人。
所有劳动者和企业都能从经济刺激计划透明、公开的竞投中获益。加快中国加入
WTO 政府采购协定 (GPA) 的步伐，将有助于中国在推动面向在华美资企业、在美中
资企业的竞投流程方面发挥主导作用。中国在入世时做出了“尽快“加入政府采购协
定的承诺。目前正是兑现这一承诺，以及证明中国正在努力发展成为成熟的经济体
的最佳时机。此外，由于美国政府承诺在使用经济刺激资金时履行国际义务，因此
加入政府采购协定，将大大降低美国的民族主义倾向对中国企业构成威胁的可能
性。在中国，4 万亿元人民币（合 5840 亿美元）的经济刺激计划将大大推进了公
路、铁路、机场、环保和农村基础设施的建设进程。但是，在决定资金的去向时，
各省市和地方的支出决定与中央政府所作的任何决定有着同样大的影响力。
挑战
公
开、公平的投标流程适用于所有的公共和私营项目，这意味着地方政府
的透明度非常重要。应该遵循这些良好的政策，而无论中国何时加入政
府采购协定。
除财政支出增加产生的直接收益之外，经济刺激计划还有可能带来更多益处。政府
的经济刺激计划主要关注产业转型和社会福利。完善的社会安全网络对于消费者
的支出决定十分重要，因为中国居民不必再担心无力承担退休和医疗费用。近几年
来，美国超额透支，而中国储蓄率太高，限制了某些行业的增长。中国拟加大对社
会福利的投入，这是中国向消费经济时代迈进过程中极其重要的一步。
民族主义和保护主义现在对于双边关系而言是关键时期，全球经济步入衰退期，中国
正向成熟的经济体过渡。但是，中美两国推出的经济刺激方案的制定和实施被保护
主义政策所笼罩。虽然在艰难时期出现民族主义倾向可以理解，但也应该尽力避
免。在经济衰退时期，保护主义可能会造成惨重的后果，这一点在 20 世纪 30 年代
就已得到了验证。总体而言，积极的合作促使中美双边关系已取得了巨大进展。一
系列重要的决策以及保护合法的商业权利表明两国的关系进展稳定。但是，据美国
企业反映，过去一年中，许多地区的监管环境越发不透明且不可预知。这种矛盾凸
显了发展的不均衡以及法律从制定到执行的过程中所面临的挑战。
49
在执法阶段，保护主义会不知不觉地对政策产生负面影响。执法过程中的一些差异
化使本地企业可以享受优惠待遇，这有悖于 WTO 义务的精神或要义。在任何情况
下，中美两国都应避免制定带有民族主义倾向的政策。这对于执行《反垄断法》和
《劳动合同法》等长期法律以及应对经济衰退的政策都十分重要。美国企业展望中国
美国商会 (Hermes strategygroup) 发布的 2009 商务环境调查结果显示，尽管当前的经济
形势令短期前景不容乐观，但在华美国企业继续致力于开拓中国市场，并对长期前
景十分乐观。中国美国商会今年 2 月份所进行的“2009 年商务环境跟踪调查”主要针
对目前不断变化的商务环境，调查结果表明美国企业普遍承认目前的严峻挑战，但
同时显示这些企业对经济复苏充满信心。对未来两年的发展表示乐观的受访企业所
占比例（63%），两倍于对未来一年发展表示乐观的受访者（31%）。
对未来发展前景造成更大的不利影响。此外，中国的监管体制仍然构成了挑战，紧
随管理人才匮乏之后的四大挑战（不一致的法规解释、官僚主义、法规的不明晰和
缺乏透明度）均与监管环境有关。这些长期存在的问题反映了中国政府在经济发展
中的重要作用。今年的调查显示，执法不一致以及法律法规的制定、颁布和实施缺
乏透明度仍然是首要问题。全面实施新法规，尤其是通过加快省市和地方的执法能
力建设，将大大改善经济环境，并加强对华投资的吸引力。
尽管仍需进一步改进，但这四个方面中有一些已经逐年得以改善。比如美国企业反
映，中国政府通过向各方征求有关新法律法规草案的意见，提高了透明度。不过与
此同时，不一致的法规解释依然是第二大问题，凸显了法律的原则与行政政策之间
协调一致的重要性。执法的不一致助长了滥用职权之风，使本地企业或与地方官员
私交甚好的企业能从中不当受益。这将导致低效率，助长不正之风，阻碍短期和长
期发展。知识产权对美国企业依然至关重要，65% 的会员企业认为知识产权保护
对他们而言“很重要”或“十分重要”（图10）。不幸的是，65% 的受访企业认为中国
的知识产权执法效率太低，而12%的受访企业则认为“完全无效”（图11）。美国企
业指出，知识产权是决定其在中国业务类型的重要因素（图12）。若不能加大知识
产权保护力度，则有可能阻碍中国迫切希望推动的供应链高端投资以
及国内创新。
透明度，实施和执行
一
些新问题也随之产生，企业认为主要有两大问题愈加严重，其中包括保
护主义。虽然这一问题的排位只是从第九跃至第七，但这表明美国企业
对中国的保护主义倾向的担心有加重之势。对于获得必需许可的担忧也
有所增加，其排位从去年第八上升到第六。由于调查结果并未指出有任何其他方面
出现倒退，因此，保护主义和获得必需许可的能力成为今年重点关注的两大问题。
前景展望中国仍是美国企业首选的投资目的地，尽管较前几年投资热度呈现了一定
的下滑态势。2009年，22%的受访企业表示中国是他们在全球的首选投资目的地，
这一比例较2007年的51%的最高点有所下降（图13）。但是，将中国列为全球前三
大投资目的地的企业所占比例基本保持稳定，自2004年以来一直维持在75%至
50
78%。视中国为首选投资目的地的企业减少表明，随着企业开始将更多的投资目的
地纳入考虑范围，政府有必要继续改善商务环境。
WTO 与竞争
中
华人民共和国反垄断法》（以下简称《反垄断法》）于 2008 年 8 月生
效，这是中国竞争政策发展史上最重要的里程碑。作为中国第一部全
面的竞争法案，《反垄断法》是中国从中央计划经济不断向市场经济渡
迈出的一大步。除了少数规定外，《反垄断法》的整体框架和大部分规定都与国际
反垄断监管机构的通用做法相一致。对于反垄断规定的三大主要领域，《反垄断
法》都有所涉及：多家企业间的反竞争“垄断协议”；占据巨大市场份额的
企业实施的排外的、掠夺性的单边行动（“滥用市场支配地位”）；以及可能限制或
削弱竞争的并购和其他交易。除了对私有公司反竞争行动进行调控外，《反垄断
法》还包含反“行政垄断”（滥用职权保护或促进受惠公司）的措施。然而，尽管最
终颁布的《反垄断法》明确将诸多成熟的原则纳入其中，但在执行方面还是遗留了
许多未解决的关键性问题。
如果《反垄断法》被解读为依照国际惯例造福消费者、提高经济运行效率，并得到
透明、公正的实施，它将有望帮助市场更好地服务于中国消费者，同时提高中国经
济的整体运行效率。规定采用双重执法框架，其中包括一个政府部门间“反垄断委
员会”，负责制定政策和协调一个或多个反垄断执法机构的工作。国务院已经指定
了三个主要的执法机构。商务部反垄断局负责并购审核。同时，由国家发展和改革
委员会联手国家工商行政管理总局下属反垄断与反不正当竞争执法局共同负责“行
为”规定的执法工作。具体而言，国家发改委负责调查和制裁非法定价行为，而国
家工商行政管理总局则负责其他的反竞争行为。中国美国商会担心这样的职能划分
可能不利于在实施的过程中保持一致。
首先，国家发改委与国家工商行政管理总局将如何处理同时涉及价格和非价
格行为的案例仍不明确。其次，在执行《反垄断法》中许多涉及“公共利益”的特殊
规定时，商务部、国家工商行政管理总局以及国家发改委界定市场、衡量市场支配
力和协调政策目标的方法可能不尽相同。最后，商务部可能以预先的反竞争行为为
由重新审查并购，即使这种行为应事先由国家工商总局审查。颁布实施办法，阐明
执法过程中的职权划分和指导方针，将有助于各公司遵守反垄断法。
以行政执法为主，但也允许私人提起诉讼，针对《反垄断法》违规行为索要赔偿。
最高人民法院已经将这类诉讼的管辖权交由负责知识产权纠纷的法院。但是，仍有
一些重要问题有待解决，例如提出赔偿要求的主体、衡量赔偿金的标准以及平行处
理企业行为和行政调查的程序。
透明、可预测的执法使得广大企业能够制定符合竞争法的商业战略。正式的执行规
定、监管机构出台的具体指导方针以及行政管理部门和法院公布的裁定对此起着
51
重要作用。仅仅就实质性竞争规定和执法程序提供指导。中国美国商会呼吁参照其
他政府部门的政策，对实施办法和执法决策作出详细明确的解释。我们还希望
就这些实施办法征求公众意见。中国美国商会对国务院 2008 年 3 月出台的《国务
院关于经营者集中申报标准的规定（征求意见稿）非常赞赏。因此，最终颁布的远
比之前的草案更符合国际通用实践。商务部近期的规则制定举措令中国美国商会深
受鼓舞。2009 年 1 月和 2 月，商务部出台了六套拟定的实施办法来征求公众意
见。不过，在未征求公众意见的情况下，商务部公布了和。
中国美国商会鼓励中国政府提高实施的透明度。执法机构还应通过定期公布执法决
策或纲要来明确说明的要求。只要求执法机构公布根据其设定的条件做出的有关
“集中”被获准或被禁止的裁定。但是，它并不要求执法机构公布其认定垄断协议和
滥用市场支配地位的裁定。此外，并没有规定一个标准，来说明已公布裁定的事实
认定和法律分析。中国美国商会担心公布的裁定可能无法充分提供有关的详细指
导。举例而言，截至 2009 年 4 月，商务部公布的审查决定包括附加条件批准英博
收购安海斯-布希交易和禁止可口可乐收购汇源公司。
裁定书描述了商务部的调查步骤和结论，但对于用来支持其结论的实际方法和事实
认定依据，却几乎未作任何说明，即使是对可口可乐公司的裁定也只有很少的说
明。要让公布的执法裁定发挥作用，执法机构必须就其事实认
定和法律论证提供足够详细的说明。在其他司法行政区，公布的执法裁定可提供重
要指导，帮助公司做到遵纪守法。中国美国商会建议执法机构制定相关程序，以便
及时有效地公布所有执法裁定。公布的裁定必须保护机密的商业信息，但也应包括
相关证据纲要以及分析和结论。
的“行为”规定主要针对两种反竞争行为：限制性协议（在中称为“垄断协议”）以及
滥用市场支配地位（即反竞争单一企业行为）。一般来说，《反垄断法》的行为规
定与国际通用实践相一致。但是，由于尚未出台实施办法，也未曾公布过任何执法
裁定，因此很难判定实际执法过程是否与国际实践相一致。
鉴于这一不确定性，公司无法预计他们的行为是否合法。
严禁占据支配地位的公司提出不合理的定价。尽管欧盟委员会条约中也有类似的规
定，但除非存在排外的、掠夺性的行为，否则全球竞争监管部门很少会以收取“过
高的”价格为由对占据支配地位的公司提起执法诉讼。在中国大力执行这一规定可
能会导致直接的价格管制或阻碍占据支配地位的公司进行合理的定价。
竞争法
中
华人民共和国反垄断法于 2008 年 8 月生效，这是中国竞争政策发展史
上最重要的里程碑。作为中国第一部全面的竞争法案，《反垄断法》是
中国从中央计划经济不断向市场经济过渡迈出的一大步。除了少数规定
外，《反垄断法》的整体框架和大部分规定都与国际反垄断监管机构的通用做法相
52
一致。对于反垄断规定的三大主要领域，都有所涉及：多家企业间的反竞争“垄断
协议”；占据巨大市场份额的企业实施的排外的、掠夺性的单边行动（“滥用市场支
配地位”）；以及可能限制或削弱竞争的并购和其他交易。除了对私有公司反竞争
行动进行调控外，《反垄断法》还包含反“行政垄断”（滥用职权保护或促进受惠公
司）的措施。然而，尽管最终颁布的《反垄断法》明确将诸多成熟
的原则纳入其中，但在执行方面还是遗留了许多未解决的关键性问题。
如果《反垄断法》被解读为依照国际惯例造福消费者、提高经济运行效率，并得到
透明、公正的实施，它将有望帮助市场更好地服务于中国消费者，同时提高中国经
济的整体运行效率。规定采用双重执法框架，其中包括一个政府部门间“反垄断委
员会”，负责制定政策和协调一个或多个反垄断执法机构的工作。国务院已经指定
了三个主要的执法机构。商务部反垄断局负责并购审核。同时，由国家发展和改革
委员会联手国家工商行政管理总局下属反垄断与反不正当竞争执法局共同负责“行
为”规定的执法工作。具体而言，国家发改委负责调查和制裁非法定价行为，而国
家工商行政管理总局则负责其他的反竞争行为。
中国美国商会担心这样的职能划分可能不利于在实施《反垄断法》的过程中保持一
致。首先，国家发改委与国家工商行政管理总局将如何处理同时涉及价格和非价
格行为的案例仍不明确。其次，在执行《反垄断法》中许多涉及“公共利益”的特殊
规定时，商务部、国家工商行政管理总局以及国家发改委界定市场、衡量市场支配
力和协调政策目标的方法可能不尽相同。最后，商务部可能以预先的反竞争行为为
由重新审查并购，即使这种行为应事先由国家工商总局审查。颁布实施办法，阐明
执法过程中的职权划分和指导方针，将有助于各公司遵守反垄断法。
以行政执法为主，但也允许私人提起诉讼，针对《反垄断法》违规行为索要赔偿。
最高人民法院已经将这类诉讼的管辖权交由负责知识产权纠纷的法院。但是，仍有
一些重要问题有待解决，例如提出赔偿要求的主体、衡量赔偿金的标准以及平行处
理企业行为和行政调查的程序。透明、可预测的执法使得广大企业能够制定符合竞
争法的商业战略。正式的执行规定、监管机构出台的具体指导方针以及行政管理部
门和法院公布的裁定对此起着重要作用。
仅仅就实质性竞争规定和执法程序提供指导。中国美国商会呼吁参照其他政府部门
的政策，对实施办法和执法决策作出详细明确的解释。我们还希望就这些实施办法
征求公众意见。中国美国商会对国务院 2008 年 3 月出台的《国务院关于经营者集
中申报标准的规定》（征求意见稿）非常赞赏。因此，最终颁布的《反垄断
法》远比之前的草案更符合国际通用实践。商务部近期的规则制定举措令中国美国
商会深受鼓舞。2009 年 1 月和 2 月，商务部出台了六套拟定的实施办法来征求公
众意见。不过，在未征求公众意见的情况下，商务部公布了《关于经营者集中申报
的指导意见》和《关于经营者集中申报文件资料的指导意见》。
依靠非市场因素的冠军公司可以产生一种反一些富有成效的结果。全国冠军，已经
在一些部门普遍存在，最终可能有一个多行业，损害竞争和消费者越来越多的绝对
53
控制权。目前已经存在的垄断，几乎垄断或在发电和配电，石油，石化，天然气，
电信，煤炭，航空和航运业沉重的政府控制。随着政策的全国冠军，中央控制的国
有企业和其他国有企业将继续青睐，或成为，占优势的装备制造业，汽车，资讯科
技，建筑，钢铁和有色金属工业金属。这将减少之间的合作和开放的美国公司与国
外同行的竞争空间，降低质量，竞争和剥夺了重要的外国专家的中国市场。
之间有一个促进开放，竞争性市场和国内企业，鼓励统治明确的紧张局势。在一些
部门，包括风能，近海钻井设备和高速铁路部门，除其他外，明确的管理政策措施
需要对所使用的大部分设备是国内生产，从而堵死市场充分竞争招标过程。这短暂
的促进国内产业的长远目标是在上竞争力的价格，成本世界一流的技术和长期的市
场效率，并可能引起国外的报复政策。
美国商会中国仍然感到关切，但谨慎的乐观，认为经济刺激措施的落实，在中国和
美国都将完全符合国际最佳做法和促进竞争性市场，将节省资金，增加的支出产生
积极影响。如果未能达到这些目标可以大大妨碍通过减少刺激措施的成效全球经济
复苏，并可能导致贸易报复措施。
如果反洗钱被解释为促进世界各地按照既定做法，消费者福利和经济效益，并以透
明和非歧视性地执行，它有可能帮助市场更好地服务中国消费者，同时提高了我国
的整体效率经济。反洗钱规定的两级执法体制，涉及跨“反垄断委员会”的决策和一
个或多个反垄断执法机构负责协调。国务院指定的三个主要执法机关。反垄断商务
部（商务部）局负责合并审查。同时，国家发展和改革委员会（NDRC）和反垄断
和反不正当竞争法执行国家行政局工商总局（SAIC）划分为“行为”的规定的执法
责任。具体来说，国家发改委进行调查和制裁的定价行为和国家工商局对其他反竞
争行为的司法责任。虽然反洗钱行政执法的重点，它也允许私人行为，挽回损失的
反洗钱侵权行为造成的。在最高人民法院已委派专人负责这些行动管辖权的法院负
责知识产权（IP）的纠纷。不过，关键的问题依然存在，如谁有资格索赔主张，存
在什么标准来衡量损失和制定哪些程序是并行处理的私人行为和行政调查。
透明和可预见的执法使公司的商业计划与战略，遵守竞争法。正式的实施条例，从
监管解释性准则和行政机构和法院公布的决定是至关重要的这些努力。当局也应该
澄清通过执法决定或摘要例行公布反洗钱的要求。反洗钱只要求执法机关在公布禁
止的浓度决定或批准有关当局施加的条件。但是，它不要求执法当局公布他们的决
定，调查和制裁垄断协议和滥用市场支配地位。
此外，反洗钱没有规定的事实调查结果公布的决定或法律分析解释标准。美国商会
中国关注的是，公布的决定可能无法提供足够详细的关于反洗钱的有关指引。例
如，只报告了执法工作，2009 年 4 月公布的决定是商务部对在英博收购 AB 公司和
可口可乐禁止可口可乐对汇源的收购附加条件。这些简单的决定：商务部的调查步
骤和结论，但是，即使是可口可乐的决定只提供了实际的方法，并用于支持商务部
的结论，事实调查结果薄解释。公布的执法决定是有益的，它们必须提供有意义的
当局的事实和法律推理的结果，详细的解释。
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在其他司法管辖区，公布执法决定提供重要的指导和宝贵的机会，教导遵守公司。
美国商会建议，中国执法机关制定发布决定，所有的执法程序，及时和充分合理的
方式。虽然公布的决定，必须保护商业机密资料，它们应包括有意义的摘要的有关
证据，以及分析和结论。反洗钱的“行为规则”的目标，两种类型的反竞争行为：
限制性协议（称为“垄断协议”在反洗钱）和滥用市场支配地位（即反竞争单一公司
的行为）。反洗钱的行为规则，一般符合国际通行做法。然而，由于执行措施尚未
予以公布，并没有强制执行的决定已经发出，这是难以评估在何种程度上与国际惯
例的实际执行收敛。由于这种不确定性，公司无法预测他们的行为是否合法。
反洗钱禁止不公平的定价主导企业。
虽然一项类似的条款仍保留在欧洲委员会条约，全球竞争主管机关很少主动提出收
费“不公平高”的价格，除非有其他的排斥或掠夺性对占支配地位的企业进行执法行
动。这一规定在中国打击力度可能会导致直接的价格管制或阻止占支配地位的企业
合理定价的做法。价格法已经规定了对某些商品的定价明确监管框架，让其他价格
由市场决定。在“禁止以不正当的手段，作为主导企业”的价格猜测市场价格将是不
幸的步骤中国的经济改革倒退。
豁免范围可禁止垄断协议，否则极广，包括豁免等所谓的“危机”和“出口”卡特尔，
以及一个不限成员名额“公众利益”的豁免。铁杆是有竞争的限制没有取消资格（例
如，固定价格），也没有豁免要求，尽可能在实现其目标仍然不受限制。对于评价
限制性做法的益处的方法（例如，“理性原则”），以及准咨询指导，目前还不清楚
情况。反洗钱禁止从事的主导企业捆绑，歧视性待遇，拒绝交易，低于成本的价
格和限制性或独家经营“毫无理由。”虽然这预选赛似乎邀请的理由“规则”的办法平
衡有利于竞争和反竞争方面的具体做法，通过与市场力量的企业，执法当局处理这
个问题还不清楚。
强制性最低限额的罚款反洗钱的规定引起过度的惩罚和对风险的威慑。如果国家工
商总局，国家发改委或找到一个反洗钱行为准则的侵犯，第 46 和 47 的反洗钱规定
的 1 至 10 的罚款侵权公司的年销售收入百分之必须加以限制。反洗钱没有说明是
否计算是指在中国取得的销售收入和/或相关市场的非法行为的影响。合并控制是
根据中国现有的反垄断规则的规定，美国公司的主要关注。而对垄断协议和滥用支
配地位的规则要求公司放弃反竞争的商业做法，合并控制规则，要求复核的通知触
发阈值，无论在中国竞争的实际影响。因此，重要的是，中共当局结构的报告要求
和审查程序，他们的任务相一致，以避免不必要的负担中阻碍执法人员和直接投资
的公司。
美国商务部报告说，公司在合并的审查人员参与越来越熟悉的原则和程序的合并审
查制度在其他司法管辖区。然而，有一个额外的执行措施和指导，迫切需要正式加
入“中学一级细节”，这是必不可少的明确性和可预见性。商务部对六提出了实施
措施，在 2009 年 1 月和 2 月发表公开评论有关中国问题的合并审查程序的许多问
题。在 2009 年 2 月，美国商会，中国提交的关于若干意见，提出了实施措施。虽
然提出了实施措施，与当前在许多方面的国际惯例接轨，问题仍然存在。
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美国商会中国要求就是否将中国的出口进一步制造和销售重新加工区出口应被视为
引发通知的要求而成为中国的销售指导。因为他们并不把中国视为进口的海关用途
或外汇交易，有必要加以澄清。反洗钱遵循欧盟的做法，只需要在“集中”，包括合
并和对企业的“控制”收购通知。最近实施措施草案，但可以解释为控制当作赋予许
多习惯和日常小股东的保护。这将转化为报告的浓度许多少数民族的投资。美国商
会中国还关注的是建议的执行措施表明，许多合资企业，不受其他国家的合并审
查，能符合报告的浓度。此外，提出了实施措施，按照聚集在“最终母公司实体”一
级交易双方收入的国际惯例。关于对子公司或业务部门的收购报告，草案采取措
施，似乎可把精力集中在目标营业额，而不是国际惯例的销售实体。由于这是一个
关键的门槛问题，需要澄清的措施，以确认，只有在被收购的营业额（而不是销售
实体）应予以考虑。
澄清有关意见，将大大简化过程中有很多不明确的地方。建议的措施可能被解释为
要求身份验证由外国的文件服务器，这将不必要的复杂化和拖延的通知提交公司注
册证书的中国领事馆。此外，拟议措施不指定，提出了实施措施，要求所有提交的
材料全文翻译。建议的措施都需要商务部的通知，告知当事人的意见书已被视为完
成，初步审查期间已经开始。也不商务部设立一个最后期限提交的评估一，找出任
何缺陷，或通知的其他信息，各方提供。这些措施也没有指定是否为商务部的评估
完成的截止日期是在日历天工作日计算。在过去，也不清楚双方能通知之前提交的
交易协议的最后签署交易。这将有助于确认通知当事各方可在集中协议进行审查的
浓度成为具有约束力的最后呼吁各方。建议的落实措施，进一步要求各缔约国提交
一份内部文件进行审查，例如尽职调查报告，范围广泛。这些繁琐的要求，这是比
美国和欧洲联盟委员会提交的要求比较侵入，应予拆除。
反洗钱保存商务部的能力，在交易进行干预，以保护国家和经济安全，维护“全国
知名品牌。在实践”，是否干预将发生在这些方面创造了一个不确定性的重要因
素，特别是在一家美国公司希望借此控制一中国公司，拥有一个或多个“著名”商
标。许多评论家担心，商务部的审查建议的可口可乐与汇源合并的时候了“准著名
所有权转让”的影响，商标或外国所有权的品牌。美国商会中国鼓励对在其中的中
国商标外国所有权可以发现不可接受的，保证竞争的检讨会检讨绝缘从这些其他理
由的情况下更为清晰。
非聘请律师，中国律师事务所不得出现在商务部的代表在美国的兼并管制程序的客
户，即使有问题的律师与当地律师资格的中国公民。目前，几乎没有在这方面的经
验，并使用非专家可能在材料效率低各方备案。因此，允许符合资格的中外国律师
事务所任职，出现在商务部将带来的更成熟的司法管辖区的外国公司的反垄断经
验，合并控制过程。在反洗钱，符合国际惯例的许多规定，旨在促进通过竞争过
程中消费者的福利和经济效率。尽管如此，一些规定似乎让作为保护主义和产业政
策工具的执法。有几种可能在其目前形式的问题的具体条款：
第 7 条要求国家为“保护合法的业务活动”的国有企业（国有企业）在工业“，牵连
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的国家的经济活力和国家安全”或“，其中有法定垄断”，虽然也禁止从国有企业滥
用其支配地位损害消费者。
虽然第 7 条并不是技术上草拟从反洗钱的豁免国有企业，无论是覆盖的行业范围和
特殊处理的确切性质概述模棱两可。美国商会中国关注的是，第七条可以为执行作
为工业政策工具的反洗钱基础。第 11 条规定，“行业协会应当加强自我行业，提
供行业自律，引导企业合法竞争，保护市场竞争秩序。”美国商会，中国关注的
是，这可能提供的能力，行业协会采取管理或协调的作用，对于可能的全面和公平
的应用反洗钱的基本反垄断的原则，特别是角色可能促进国内产业之间的卡特尔行
为不一致。第 13，第 14 和第 15 有相关的豁免问题。
反竞争协议根据第 13 条禁止和 14 日由第 15 条豁免，如果他们提高竞争力，小型

和中小型企业或预先“国际贸易和对外经济合作的合法权益。”这些可能被解释为有
利于国内豁免工业和促进和保护全国冠军，并促进国内卡特尔。第 27 条允许的反
垄断监管机构审议关于“其他有关经营者”和“拟进行的交易可能产生的影响对国民
经济的发展和公众利益。”这似乎使国内竞争对手的保护和利用合并审查进程，考
虑国内宏观经济问题。商务部的拒绝可口可乐与汇源合并不幸的是，部分基于中国
经营者的保护，而不是消费者的福利。
竞争政策和知识产权的交叉是有争议的和复杂的。在中国知识产权保护问题是许多
美国中创造的反洗钱可能的方式来破坏合法的知识产权执行公司的关注。
第 55 条规定，反洗钱不适用于知识产权的权利“行使依照法律规定，在有关知识产
权的行政法规”，但“应适用于采取的行动。消除或限制滥用知识产权的竞争。“反
洗钱不，但是，明确之间的权利和侵犯知识产权的合法演习的区别。美国公司特别
关注的是对市场定义不完善的办法可能会导致结果的知识产权持有人是“市场主导”
为自己的技术，他们的单方面拒绝许可他人使用其知识产权的竞争对手或与商业价
值相称的特许权使用费收费他们的 IP 可能被指责为滥用。
美国商会中国鼓励通过一些指导方针，确保反洗钱执法不破坏的目的和对中国知识
产权的价值。除了反洗钱的法律秩序中，目前包含其他竞争的各种法律和法规，
如分散反不正当竞争法和价格法的若干规定。迄今为止，这些竞争条文尚未正式被
修订或废止。一般来说，无论是反洗钱的其他法律也包含指导是否事先竞争条文继
续适用，同时与反洗钱和冲突将如何解决的具体规定。尽管立法法，行政处罚法包
含在这个问题上，美国商会，中国的一些规定建议事先竞争条文正式修订，以便将
反洗钱及其实施细则将是唯一适用的反垄断在中国政权。
知识产权保护
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在
知识产权问题（IPR）保护在 2008 年获得奥运会由于反侵权活动，中国
国家知识产权战略的发布，修订和新的知识产权立法的通过，以及振兴
与中国和美国政府的对话更加突出。美国商会中国赞赏，商界越来越多
地被鼓励在立法提供修订进程的意见和投入，特别是在专利法。继续这种关系，中
美两国政府和工业界合作的新精神可以改善知识产权保护，也有助于刺激创新和投
资这两个国家。
在知识产权（IP）在中国申请的兴趣仍然强劲。在 2008 年上半年，国家知识产权

组织（知识产权局）共 345569 专利申请，并处理 405,000 的商标注册和 14540 软
件注册，增长 28.5，百分之 29.3 和 27.4，分别比 2007 年同期。
2008 年 6 月，中国国务院发表了纲要期待已久的国家知识产权战略（入侵防御系
统），建立一个战略性的工作，为今后五年的发展计划和确定目标和指标，延伸到
2020 年。网络入侵保护系统要求促进知识产权和国家的加强，通过修改法律和法
规保护知识产权打击侵权更有效和加强司法惩处的重要性，以及其他战略任务。美
国商会中国继续坚定地致力于知识产权保护工作，并与中国在这个问题上。然而，
网络入侵保护系统还要求建立“自我在一些重要领域的核心技术依赖”的 IP。有人
担心，这些入侵防御政策，并在 15 年科学和技术类似的计划，可能会导致程序违
背世贸组织国民待遇的义务。
我国政府在之前和奥运会期间的侵略对知识产权侵权早期行动。从 2004 年到 2007

年 9 月，各级工商机关查处侵犯知识产权 1357 奥运相关 Olympicsrelated 案件，涉
及 240 万美元（人民币 640 万美元）。在对中国国家版权局（版权局）建立了一个
控制中心进行监控的奥运赛事非法广播和积极主动的禁止这类活动。奥运会表明了
我国政府的能力产生重大影响侵犯知识产权时，有一个结果的股份和行业的合作伙
伴。建立一种机制，继续在各个领域的知识产权这个政府和业界的合作是至关重要
的向前发展。
虽然很清楚更多地注意了我国政府保护知识产权，这项活动没有实质的扼制了市
场，其长期效果侵权是不确定的。据美国商会，中国 2009 年的商业景气调查显
示，美国企业界对知识产权执法前景基本不变，其中大约一半相信在过去一年中持
续渐进改善者，但绝大多数人仍然无效视为整体执法。总体而言，百分之四十七的
受访者表示，在保护知识产权方面已经改善，中国在过去一年中，百分之四十八表
示，它仍然相同，表明它百分之五恶化（图 22）。然而，即使逐步改进，以为它
是“完全无效，百分之七十二的受访率中国整体的知识产权执法不力，为百分之十
二。”只有百分之二十八回应时表示，执法是有效的。
打破数据中，按机构，有一个比公安局海关略为积极的意见后，大约有三分之一表
示每个继续改善，大多数受访者看到任何改变。对于中国海关知识产权执法经验的
公司，百分之三十二表示，海关知识产权执法工作得到了改善，而百分之二十七，
2008 年（图 23）。对于公安知识产权执法，经验丰富的百分之二十八的公司表
示，改善了执法相比，2008 年百分之 32，而表明它已经恶化的受访者上升到百分
58
之二（图 24）到 9 个百分点。正当保护知识产权的物资仍然是一个问题，互联网
上的盗版继续增长，包括涉及体育广播的法律漏洞。中国现在拥有世界上最多的互
联网用户，在 2008 年超过美国。下载的电影和歌曲，直接剥夺了中国和国际版权
持有人的收入，仍然极为普遍，在中国非法复制。严重限制在数码产品的保护音乐
和视频等，仍然是一个主要障碍现代中国文化产品的发展。美国商会中国愿进一步
加强伙伴关系，美中之间的合作创意产业，以保护在线内容更加积极，有利于中国
创意产业，同时也保护其他创作者的权利。
重新启动美国与中国的双边对话是在加强知识产权执法的一个重要步骤。同样，最
近的谅解备忘录已经签署，其中包括在美国专利和商标局（USPTO）和国家知识
产权局，美国专利商标局和国家政府当局的工商总局（SAIC），以及中国和美国
食品和药物管理部门在众多人，。美国商会中国完全支持这些机构之间的技术合
作，而且也认为，绝不能采取其他的首要工作，如联合委员会，商贸（中美商贸联
委会）知识产权工作组进行。合作应采取的环境中，一贯的战略眼光和跨机构及与
业界保持紧密的协调。美国商会中国将继续支持由美国前驻华大使雷德和美国专利
商标局的开拓性努力，把在美国大使馆和领事馆的知识产权专家，以加强彼此间在
大使馆的协调机构，以及美国专利商标局，美国商务部和其他培训业。我们鼓励知
识产权的年度继续“圆桌会议”，在规划阶段，与业界进行积极协商。我们也支持通
过知识产权的说明，研讨会和由美国商务部和美国专利商标局路演 IPRrelated 信息
继续传播。
网络入侵保护系统的一个战略目标是为中国修订其知识产权法律。四修订草案的一
对中国专利法公布 2006 年 7 月至 2008 年 10 月。美国商会和中国美国商会（美国
商会）联合提出的意见，每个。最新草案表明中国的强烈愿望，以改善目前的专利
制度，但有些问题仍未解决。目前的草案：
•缺乏的专利由电脑程式/软件;
•左了早些时候的草案中规定，允许雇主和发明家发明的界定，通过就业合同报酬;
•需要对专利遗传资源披露;
•现时没有实用新型专利和发明专利的发明同样水平的标准;
•不弥补监管机构批准的药品专利过程拖延时间;
•不为次为荷兰的足够详细的语言强制许可的给予赖斯吨离子;
•此外还不清楚，可能过于界定什么是“专利滥用”的关系与反垄断的法律与“工作”
的要求广泛的专利。
双方侵权和反侵权活动继续在中国。即使在工业界和增加我国政府反侵权的努力，
侵权的数量仍在不断增加。一个有效的处理方法猖獗的盗版仍难以实现，特别是关
于商标问题。
然而，一个亮点是中国的实施是美国商会中国从 2008 年的白皮书，加快了中国商
标局的商标审查程序的建议。截至 2008 年，有两个新的领导中国商标局和商标评
审委员会。阿大规模的招募和培训工作正在进行，以获得新的合同 400 个考官（从
不到 200）为期 3 年的合同。从 2008 年开始至 2008 年 5 月 27 日，共有 190,000 商
59
标检查，对 76.1 个百分点同期上年同期增加。在与美国商会举行的会议上 08 年 10
月 16 号中国，副部长傅双建指出增加考试的人数为 130 万的目标在 2009 年，2010
年和 140 万美元。这应消除 2011 年，届时所有登记将在 1 年内完成对申请的积
压。美国商会中国赞赏这一优先中国的努力。
商标法修改始于 2003 年，国家工商局目前正在编写一个新的草案，预计不久将获

释。美国商会和中国美国商会共同提交了一份立场文件 10 月 2007 年草案中，最后
一项公开发布。它包含了根本性的改变对中国商标局（首席技术官）商标审查过
程。目前，首席技术官将拒绝商标混淆性相似现有之一，因为“在已知的相对理由
拒绝。”相对理由拒绝就不是在 2007 年草案。相反，现有的商标所有人须提出异
议，以防止类似的商标被注册。
美国商会中国支持维护相对理由审查，并认为法律草案中的某些建议的改变可能进
一步增加在中国执行的商标艰。我们希望与活力的中国正在努力去除商标局信号的
积压，这项规定对消除商标相对理由审查已被退回。
物理盗版依然猖獗，但执法的版权内容在网络环境缺乏已成为日益严重的关切。中
国不仅是世界上最互联网用户，但也是最顶级国家域名注册。
对于音像制品在互联网上，无论是数字传输和 sellthrough 实物产品的市场，有了巨
大增长，但至今已盗版内容的需求。许多网站提供流，下载或侵犯通过提供最新的
技术内容上的联系，管理和版权执法非常困难。的视听产业的主要挑战是“深层链
接，通过搜索引擎”（是其中最大的百度）和用户生成内容（UGC）网站（其中规
模最大的，包括优酷和土豆）。虽然传统的物理盗版仍然是一个大问题，这是比较
本地化互联网盗版。海盗中国网站和其他服务基于 P2P 技术的负面影响全球市
场。第一次运行用户上传电影“共享”在世界任何地方可以立即收看很多教资会平
台，互联网用户。通过允许盗版猖獗，这些网站和服务，许多破坏版权拥有人的合
法的商业模式和当地的许可证，同时使通过广告微不足道的收入。互联网的规例
（规例 2006 年）的通过并没有减少网上盗版，跟不上新技术和市场现实。该公告
及记下的程序的规例的规定对权利人的地方太多的负担和措辞太模糊执行。
例如，虽然该规例的要求，互联网服务提供商（ISP）必须遵守的通知“迅速，”有
关监管机构未能提供具体解释“提示。”最新发布的电影大片还是在电影院，全球，
可以吸引数以百万计的在线收看在一天之内，造成了巨大经济损失的合法权利人。
即使网站或失去该规例的“安全港保护”的供应商只面对民事损害赔偿或行政罚款很
多互联网按投资数百万美元支持公司无关紧要。条例和著作权法本身的需要作出修
订，使中国的法律符合国际规范，并与诸如世界知识产权组织互联网条约条约的遵
守情况（2007 年 6 月起生效，在中国）。有意义的威慑迫切需要说服网站和互联
网服务供应商，并采取负责任的行动，如通过过滤和自动起飞了，尤其是教资会网
站和搜索引擎不能作为预防措施，合作渠道与权利人。刑事执法和打击网上盗版起
诉将是一个强有力的威慑。美国商会中国建议过时的版权罪行的刑法条款加以修
订，以便为警方提供实际和容易衡量的阈值，开始调查。国家版权局应有的责任移
交刑事侵权涉及到公安局网上案件，按照刑法规定转移。一个跨部门的执法平台，
60
也是要规范音像网站和在线服务规范，由国家广播电影电视总局授权，工业和信息
化部。合作是非常有效的，在奥运会，表明我国政府的工具来控制网络盗版，那里
的政治意愿。强有力的承诺，也需要保护其他视听内容，并创建一个合法，有序，
健康的网络环境下发展中国自己的创意产业，保护权利人所有。美国商会中国也认
为，美国和中国应参与最高水平，在机构间基础上的知识产权执法的讨论在互联网
上。我们也支持由版权或互联网企业的执法问题的挫折更积极的交流，并相信政府
的资源可以促进执法更加敏感。在各机构间的努力也将是处理这个问题，生产出口
行业的积极和明显的作用。
知识产权保护
在
知识产权问题（IPR）保护在 2008 年获得奥运会由于反侵权活动，中国
国家知识产权战略的发布，修订和新的知识产权立法的通过，以及振兴
与中国和美国政府的对话更加突出。美国商会中国赞赏，商界越来越多
地被鼓励在立法提供修订进程的意见和投入，特别是在专利法。继续这种关系，中
美两国政府和工业界合作的新精神可以改善知识产权保护，也有助于刺激创新和投
资这两个国家。
在知识产权（IP）在中国申请的兴趣仍然强劲。在 2008 年上半年，国家知识产权
组织（知识产权局）共 345569 专利申请，并处理 405,000 的商标注册和 14540 软
件注册，增长 28.5，百分之 29.3 和 27.4，分别比 2007 年同期。
2008 年 6 月，中国国务院发表了纲要期待已久的国家知识产权战略（入侵防御系
统），建立一个战略性的工作，为今后五年的发展计划和确定目标和指标，延伸到
2020 年。网络入侵保护系统要求促进知识产权和国家的加强，通过修改法律和法
规保护知识产权打击侵权更有效和加强司法惩处的重要性，以及其他战略任务。美
国商会中国继续坚定地致力于知识产权保护工作，并与中国在这个问题上。然而，
网络入侵保护系统还要求建立“自我在一些重要领域的核心技术依赖”的 IP。有人
担心，这些入侵防御政策，并在 15 年科学和技术类似的计划，可能会导致程序违
背世贸组织国民待遇的义务。
我国政府在之前和奥运会期间的侵略对知识产权侵权早期行动。从 2004 年到 2007

年 9 月，各级工商机关查处侵犯知识产权 1357 奥运相关 Olympics related 案件，涉
及 240 万美元（人民币 640 万美元）。在对中国国家版权局（版权局）建立了一个
控制中心进行监控的奥运赛事非法广播和积极主动的禁止这类活动。奥运会表明了
我国政府的能力产生重大影响侵犯知识产权时，有一个结果的股份和行业的合作伙
伴。建立一种机制，继续在各个领域的知识产权这个政府和业界的合作是至关重要
的向前发展。
虽然很清楚更多地注意了我国政府保护知识产权，这项活动没有实质的扼制了市
场，其长期效果侵权是不确定的。据美国商会，中国 2009 年的商业景气调查显
示，美国企业界对知识产权执法前景基本不变，其中大约一半相信在过去一年中持
61
续渐进改善者，但绝大多数人仍然无效视为整体执法。总体而言，百分之四十七的
受访者表示，在保护知识产权方面已经改善，中国在过去一年中，百分之四十八表
示，它仍然相同，表明它百分之五恶化（图 22）。然而，即使逐步改进，以为它
是“完全无效，百分之七十二的受访率中国整体的知识产权执法不力，为百分之十
二。”只有百分之二十八回应时表示，执法是有效的。
打破数据中，按机构，有一个比公安局海关略为积极的意见后，大约有三分之一表
示每个继续改善，大多数受访者看到任何改变。对于中国海关知识产权执法经验的
公司，百分之三十二表示，海关知识产权执法工作得到了改善，而百分之二十七，
2008 年（图 23）。对于公安知识产权执法，经验丰富的百分之二十八的公司表
示，改善了执法相比，2008 年百分之 32，而表明它已经恶化的受访者上升到百分
之二（图 24）到 9 个百分点。正当保护知识产权的物资仍然是一个问题，互联网
上的盗版继续增长，包括涉及体育广播的法律漏洞。中国现在拥有世界上最多的互
联网用户，在 2008 年超过美国。下载的电影和歌曲，直接剥夺了中国和国际版权
持有人的收入，仍然极为普遍，在中国非法复制。严重限制在数码产品的保护音乐
和视频等，仍然是一个主要障碍现代中国文化产品的发展。美国商会中国愿进一步
加强伙伴关系，美中之间的合作创意产业，以保护在线内容更加积极，有利于中国
创意产业，同时也保护其他创作者的权利。
重新启动美国与中国的双边对话是在加强知识产权执法的一个重要步骤。同样，最
近的谅解备忘录已经签署，其中包括在美国专利和商标局（USPTO）和国家知识
产权局，美国专利商标局和国家政府当局的工商总局（SAIC），以及中国和美国
食品和药物管理部门在众多人。美国商会中国完全支持这些机构之间的技术合
作，而且也认为，绝不能采取其他的首要工作，如联合委员会，商贸（中美商贸联
委会）知识产权工作组进行。合作应采取的环境中，一贯的战略眼光和跨机构及与
业界保持紧密的协调。美国商会中国将继续支持由美国前驻华大使雷德和美国专利
商标局的开拓性努力，把在美国大使馆和领事馆的知识产权专家，以加强彼此间在
大使馆的协调机构，以及美国专利商标局，美国商务部和其他培训业。我们鼓励知
识产权的年度继续“圆桌会议”，在规划阶段，与业界进行积极协商。我们也支持通
过知识产权的说明，研讨会和由美国商务部和美国专利商标局路演 IPRrelated 信息
继续传播。
网络入侵保护系统的一个战略目标是为中国修订其知识产权法律。四修订草案的一
对中国专利法公布 2006 年 7 月至 2008 年 10 月。美国商会和中国美国商会（美国
商会）联合提出的意见，每个。最新草案表明中国的强烈愿望，以改善目前的专利
制度，但有些问题仍未解决。目前的草案：
•缺乏的专利由电脑程式/软件;
•左了早些时候的草案中规定，允许雇主和发明家发明的界定，通过就业合同报酬;
•需要对专利遗传资源披露;
•现时没有实用新型专利和发明专利的发明同样水平的标准;
•不弥补监管机构批准的药品专利过程拖延时间;
62
•不为次为荷兰的足够详细的语言强制许可的给予赖斯吨离子;
•此外还不清楚，可能过于界定什么是“专利滥用”的关系与反垄断的法律与“工作”
的要求广泛的专利。
双方侵权和反侵权活动继续在中国。即使在工业界和增加我国政府反侵权的努力，
侵权的数量仍在不断增加。一个有效的处理方法猖獗的盗版仍难以实现，特别是关
于商标问题。
然而，一个亮点是中国的实施是美国商会中国从 2008 年的白皮书，加快了中国商
标局的商标审查程序的建议。截至 2008 年，有两个新的领导中国商标局和商标评
审委员会。阿大规模的招募和培训工作正在进行，以获得新的合同 400 个考官（从
不到 200）为期 3 年的合同。从 2008 年开始至 2008 年 5 月 27 日，共有 190,000 商
标检查，对 76.1 个百分点同期上年同期增加。在与美国商会举行的会议上 08 年 10
月 16 号中国，副部长傅双建指出增加考试的人数为 130 万的目标在 2009 年，2010
年和 140 万美元。这应消除 2011 年，届时所有登记将在 1 年内完成对申请的积
压。美国商会中国赞赏这一优先中国的努力。
商标法修改始于 2003 年，国家工商局目前正在编写一个新的草案，预计不久将获
释。美国商会和中国美国商会共同提交了一份立场文件 10 月 2007 年草案中，最后
一项公开发布。它包含了根本性的改变对中国商标局（首席技术官）商标审查过
程。目前，首席技术官将拒绝商标混淆性相似现有之一，因为“在已知的相对理由
拒绝。”相对理由拒绝就不是在 2007 年草案。相反，现有的商标所有人须提出异
议，以防止类似的商标被注册。
美国商会中国支持维护相对理由审查，并认为法律草案中的某些建议的改变可能进
一步增加在中国执行的商标艰。我们希望与活力的中国正在努力去除商标局信号的
积压，这项规定对消除商标相对理由审查已被退回。
物理盗版依然猖獗，但执法的版权内容在网络环境缺乏已成为日益严重的关切。中
国不仅是世界上最互联网用户，但也是最顶级国家域名注册。对于音像制品在互联
网上，无论是数字传输和 sellthrough 实物产品的市场，有了巨大增长，但至今已盗
版内容的需求。许多网站提供流，下载或侵犯通过提供最新的技术内容上的联系，
管理和版权执法非常困难。的视听产业的主要挑战是“深层链接，通过搜索引擎”
（是其中最大的百度）和用户生成内容（UGC）网站（其中规模最大的，包括优
酷和土豆）。虽然传统的物理盗版仍然是一个大问题，这是比较本地化互联网盗
版。
海盗中国网站和其他服务基于 P2P 技术的负面影响全球市场。第一次运行用户上

传电影“共享”在世界任何地方可以立即收看很多教资会平台，互联网用户。通过允
许盗版猖獗，这些网站和服务，许多破坏版权拥有人的合法的商业模式和当地的许
可证，同时使通过广告微不足道的收入。互联网的规例（规例 2006 年）的通过并
没有减少网上盗版，跟不上新技术和市场现实。该公告及记下的程序的规例的规定
对权利人的地方太多的负担和措辞太模糊执行。
例如，虽然该规例的要求，互联网服务提供商（ISP）必须遵守的通知“迅速，”有
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关监管机构未能提供具体解释“提示。”最新发布的电影大片还是在电影院，全球，
可以吸引数以百万计的在线收看在一天之内，造成了巨大经济损失的合法权利人。
即使网站或失去该规例的“安全港保护”的供应商只面对民事损害赔偿或行政罚款很
多互联网按投资数百万美元支持公司无关紧要。条例和著作权法本身的需要作出修
订，使中国的法律符合国际规范，并与诸如世界知识产权组织互联网条约条约的遵
守情况（2007 年 6 月起生效，在中国）。有意义的威慑迫切需要说服网站和互联
网服务供应商，并采取负责任的行动，如通过过滤和自动起飞了，尤其是教资会网
站和搜索引擎不能作为预防措施，合作渠道与权利人。刑事执法和打击网上盗版起
诉将是一个强有力的威慑。美国商会中国建议过时的版权罪行的刑法条款加以修
订，以便为警方提供实际和容易衡量的阈值，开始调查。国家版权局应有的责任移
交刑事侵权涉及到公安局网上案件，按照刑法规定转移。一个跨部门的执法平台，
也是要规范音像网站和在线服务规范，由国家广播电影电视总局授权，工业和信息
化部。合作是非常有效的，在奥运会，表明我国政府的工具来控制网络盗版，那里
的政治意愿。强有力的承诺，也需要保护其他视听内容，并创建一个合法，有序，
健康的网络环境下发展中国自己的创意产业，保护权利人所有。美国商会中国也认
为，美国和中国应参与最高水平，在机构间基础上的知识产权执法的讨论在互联网
上。我们也支持由版权或互联网企业的执法问题的挫折更积极的交流，并相信政府
的资源可以促进执法更加敏感。在各机构间的努力也将是处理这个问题，生产出口
行业的积极和明显的作用。
小型和中小型企业
小
型和中小型企业（SME）极有助于中国的经济增长，因为它们推动就业
和创新，是重要客户，供应商和中外企业的合作伙伴。他们现在包括超
过 99.5 中国总业务的百分之贡献超过国内生产总值的一半。他们雇用
了 70 国的劳动力比例整体，超过百分之七十五的农村地区。作为创新的源泉，一
项估计表明，中小企业的发展在百分之六十五以上的专利和 80 多个新产品的百分
之。
中小企业占美国商会的一个重要组成部分，有 56 个为小型或中型的企业（图 25）
selfidentifying 成员的百分之中国的成员以及。他们是很重要的美国商会，中国企
业不仅是一个在中国持续经济增长的动力，而且也是重要的客户，供应商和合作伙
伴，以较大的公司的成员。
不幸的是，中小企业仍然收到的政策和资金支持是不相称的贡献比对国家经济水平
较低。另外，没有统一适用的，由于公司的规模不成比例地影响到中外中小企业的
不同影响，考虑规定。此外，中小型企业往往面临不平衡的调节和获得商业信贷仍
然太低。由于这些因素，目前全球经济疲弱，包括更灵活的人民币的问题，全球需
求减少，劳动力成本的提高和贷款更严格的控制，中小企业面临诸多挑战。美国商
会中国鼓励我国政府继续重点支持中小企业的进一步努力的方式，反映了该国的经
济贡献。关于政策变化在 2008 年年初中小企业是渐进的，但最近我国政府援助境
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况不佳的中小型企业的信号越来越多的部门的重要性。美国商会中国支持双方在中
国中央和地方政府的努力，帮助中小型企业的融资来源和其他投入变得更好，更有
效率的公司和雇主，并扩大全球。我们鼓励这种努力是 marketoriented，以避免政
府与受影响的中小企业的潜在利益冲突。发展中小企业，培育一个充满活力的私营
部门是至关重要的推动中国经济增长是建立一个创新型社会的基础。
在中小型企业协会估计，中国中小企业的业务费用增加了约百分之三十，平均每年
增加 2008 年同期。在与全球经济疲弱的同时，这种增加的净结果是，在 2008 年上
半年，超过 67,000 中小型企业，在人民币五百万（美元收入超过七二九九二七美
元个），而被迫关闭，裁员更多超过 20 万人。
针对这些问题，中国采取了若干措施，促进中小企业的融资渠道，包括建立中小企
业资助计划，取消对商业银行贷款上限，降低登记抵押银行贷款，并鼓励使用股本
利率，立法制度在地方一级的中小型企业的激励计划。虽然这些变化许多原因可能
是针对流动性问题，在市场上，措施旨在帮助中小企业直接生病的欢迎。我们希望
这些标志是朝着改善中小企业在中国整体环境的一般性转移。继续朝这个方向的改
革以及确保贯彻实施，实施和执行现有的管理上是中国最优秀的经济利益。
在 2007 年和 2008 年，中国做出努力，规范企业所得税外商和国内企业的税收制

度。虽然实际税率作了统一的税收法律，法规也没有规范的监督和外国公司和国内
公司采取执法行动。此外，百分之二十五标准税率定为所有的企业有百分之二十的
税率较低，只对公司（30 万人民币或美元的应税收入或低于 44,000）最小。对工
业和地理基本上消除，并奖励“新高新技术企业”所取代的激励机制。不幸的是，也
有明显的偏袒对企业所得税法，规章和其他后续措施的大型企业。例如，他们需要
一定的比例，是研究与发展之间的人员和支出满足，总收入，这是对中小企业的障
碍。此外，外国企业的待遇相同的（跨国公司）跨国公司，它们也受到一份关于对
母公司的股息预提税。虽然美国已在实践中海外税收抵免制度，这往往并不完全抵
消了双重征税的影响。考虑到所有因素，比前几年的高税率，拆除和使用缺乏激励
计划，和遭受的预扣税，新税制仍然不成比例地影响外国企业。
虽然以前高的注册资本要求已经在很多行业，中国的外国企业和跨国公司的待遇是
比较一致的降低，而国内中小企业与跨国公司的差别待遇，是伟大的。而规模较小
的国内企业可以通过减少运行复杂的商业组织，如独资企业和合伙关系，他们的外
国同行必须通过建立和经营有限责任公司，使他们要接受大量的费用和管理负担。
此外，尽管公司法允许提供非单一股东的公司要成立以人民币 30,000 像小（4,400
美元，注册资本），注册外国公司，无论规模大小与注册资本的同等数额，是不可
能的。通常，外国公司实际上是一个最起码的要求数次法律规定的数额。
外国中小企业仍然没有机会获得资本和融资方案。中小型企业获得不到百分之二点
三全部由国家财政贷款国有银行。然而，去年 9 月曾宣布，35 亿元人民币（约合
五万一千一点零万美元）将作为资助包患病的中小型企业，以协助缓解当前压力，
他们理所当然的。
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虽然美国商会中国赞扬设立专门的中小企业贷款银行内部程序，我们将继续鼓励银
行向更市场和现金流移动为基础的贷款的做法。中国银行仍然经常评估 collaterally
为基础的硬资产，而不是预计的现金流动，把通常相对处于不利地位，轻资产企
业。尽管存在这种评价的历史，这表明中小型企业表现良好，资产收益的条款，而
且还与问候的投资回报。美国商会对中国鼓励使用现金流量，而不是作为贷款抵押
的基础上继续运动。
在 2007 年和 2008 年，中国出台了法律和设计的重点是贸易和整个经济的若干条

例。例如，劳动合同法及其施行细则所规定的雇主同样的义务，不论面积大小。然
而，如人力资源较为复杂的系统维护，所有雇主的一些规定，小型企业的负担不成
比例。由于这个问题的部分原因是立法过程中，美国商会建议中国建立一个
在政府机构，以评估对中小企业的建议法规的影响。这将使重新法律和法规未能解
决的具体需要和资源和其他实用的中小型企业的经济现实差距的评价。
评估
中
国的监管制度继续构成挑战，在未来四年之后，人力资源的限制（不一
致的监管解释，官僚主义，不规范和缺乏透明度）所有有关监管环境的
最大挑战。这些长期存在的问题反映的重要作用，我国政府对经济的作
用。今年的调查中发现，执法不力的一致和充分的透明度的发展，制定和执行法
律，法规，仍然缺乏最关注的问题。特别是通过全面落实能力建设的新法律，在省
和地方各级，将大大改善经济环境，并增加在中国投资的吸引力。虽然仍有改进的
余地，这四个领域所看到的一些去年同期的进展。例如，美国商业界承认的透明度
问题上取得更多的机会，通过提供有关法律法规草案意见的进展情况。同时，不一
致的监管解释仍然是排名第二的关注，反映了促进基本立法和行政政策的原则相一
致的重要性。不均匀执法留下了滥用的可能不正确主张当地公司或与当地官员非常
有利的可能性。这降低了效率，助长腐败和妨碍了短期和长期发展。
知识产权也仍然是至关重要的，对美国企业和不加快步伐，知识产权执法的阻止运
行在供应链的顶端投资风险，以及国内的创新，这两个中国正致力于推进。
新的问题也出现了，作为仅有的两家公司的高层问题之一，表明了国家保护主义的
关注程度在增加。日益崛起的信号，这对在中国的保护主义趋势在美国业务的担
忧。如何获得所需的执照也增加了关注，并获得许可从第八至 2008 年被引用最多
的挑战第六上升。鉴于调查结果表明，在没有任何其他领域，保护主义和能力获得
所需的执照倒退是两个问题，今年监测。
在这种环境下，权利人都面临着切实有效的执行方案的赤字。许多企业都承认行政
执法的局限性，现在更愿意以检验其在内地法庭运气。虽然较昂贵，在中国民事诉
讼拥有行政执法行动，值得注意的是，较高的损害和损害赔偿的几个优点，以及前
如初步禁令和资产保全强制执行措施的命令审判。
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在过去 18 个月，2 人在中国知识产权民事执法中的积极趋势已经出现。这些，至
今已支持最近的意见，由中华人民共和国最高人民法院，这些都是为了指导处理知
识产权纠纷下级法院发布的诠释。一般来说，这些指导方针旨在产生更复杂，更专
业的司法机构，以及显着提高的成本和面临民事指控侵权者的惩罚。事实上，一些
高利润的情况表明，这些趋势是较单纯的施政报告中所载的愿望，但真正的重大变
化和知识产权是如何对待中国的法院。
官方统计显示，内地法庭接受了 24406 民事知识产权案件在 2008 年，比 2007 年增

长 36 个，而从 2006 年的数据表明，这一增幅是百分之五十比前一年更大。因此，
不仅越来越多的企业选择采取侵权（和竞争对手）告上法庭，他们正在以比在近年
来的最高速度。特别重要的，中华人民共和国法院接受 1139 首次与外国权利人一
审案件。
虽然这是不到百分之五的民事知识产权案件的百分之提出，但到了 70 多个，比上
年增长。这不仅坚定地表明有更多的外国公司选择了执行法院的知识产权战场，但
中国企业，也同样牵引外商在法官解决纠纷。
除了在知识产权民事执法普遍增长，在司法部门的积极变化出现在过去的一年。特
别是，最高人民法院出台了旨在提高对各级法院提出创新的解决方案，并限制对某
些事项的管辖权，在主要城市地区的专门法院知识产权法官复杂，若干准则
最近的一个通知，尤其应导致更多的公正和细致入微的决定关于在中国驰名商标的
所有者。阿 2010 年 1 月 5 日由最高人民法院（公告）的通知限制了涉及“著名”商
标在各省省会的决心中级人民法院审理案件，城市受计划单列，根据直辖市的直接
控制（即北京，上海，天津，重庆）。这提供了对“驰名”商标裁定程序，这已严重
恶化急需控制在过去的四年，作为较早解释结果岁。
不幸的是，成为许多较小的场地，这种标记识别为获得政府优惠的待遇地位的象
征，或者是市场策略来加强对一个又一个标签的威信。这个问题是由经验丰富的知
识产权能力的差距，加剧了遍布大陆。这导致了不同的认识，在不同的法院适用的
标准，从而使“驰名商标”在中国不可预测和不可执行的制度。
该公告，连同解释最高人民法院关于井驰名商标有效的 2010 年 5 月 1 日，应提高

的“驰名商标”在中国制度的信誉。这是所有在中国经营的企业，不仅与著名商标的
好消息。现在，“驰名商标”确定只能在法院作出有较多经验，有知识的法官，它的
地位不能被利用来消除竞争或非法地方政府引起的特殊待遇。
2009 年，一些高利润的知识产权案件的名字是由最高人民检察院作为典型案例法
院对下级法院的研究。这些涉及商标，版权，专利问题，并从法律的内容，程序，
一切强调。几个展示中国法院更胜任能力，处理复杂的知识产权问题。
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保时捷与北京 TechArt 的汽车销售服务有限公司（2008 年）：
保时捷之间的版权纠纷和 TechArt 的领导的前 10 知识产权在中国去年的案件清

单。不仅案件涉及突破性的版权问题（）建筑设计，补救措施也表明了长度知识产
权法庭现在愿意去停止侵权。
北京的保时捷中心于 2003 年完成，并包含一些独特的设计功能，其中包括弯曲的

玻璃幕墙，以及独特的地板到天花板的玻璃大门。保时捷获得了位于该大厦的建筑
设计的版权。 2005 年，北京 TechArt 的签署与当地建设仲芳建立 TechArt 的汽车
销售和服务中心公司达成协议。根据该文件，TechArt 的将提供所有的设计和建筑
计划。建成后，该建筑有几个共同的保时捷中心独特的设计元素和保时捷带来了版
权和商标侵权诉讼。
2007 年底，北京市第二中级人民法院认为，TechArt 的侵犯了保时捷的版权。

TechArt 的决定提出上诉至北京高级人民法院，结果发现三个建设的各个方面是相
同的保时捷的结构。一个元素，但是，不视为侵权，因为它是由于在其建筑使用的
材料类型自然。
案件意义重大，因为这是中共第一次明确了法院审查，确定版权的三维建筑工作。
值得注意的是，法院没有简单地找到类似的建筑物，这是显而易见的。相反，法院
认真审议了建筑设计的几个方面，以及功能，设计元素不能作为建造而帮助，因
此，受版权法 unprotectable 标记。此外，法庭下令被告 TechArt 的北京，大幅改变
其建设，以限制侵权。这也是第一次这样做是为了一个建筑已经完成。因此，法院
表示愿意把目光集中表面的困难，对原告的目标，而不是在把适合：所有侵权消
除。
河南正龙食品有限公司诉四川百佳食品有限公司（2008 年）：
这起案件的标的物是简单得多，决定是否与两个商标相似责成法院，如果他们在类
似商品上使用。他们如何执行他们的决定，但是，再次表明，在中国司法机关在处
理知识产权问题的复杂程度增加。
在这种情况下，双方都被中华人民共和国公司，在各自地区的成功粮食生产者和市
场。这两个商标，也得到各方都宣称，他们的商标已经使用了至少 2000 年以来党
的相当大的名气。河南正龙食品有限公司是该方便面白象品牌的所有者，而四川百
佳面条上使用其产品的百佳品牌。这两个标志，与一个特定的字体使用的，看起来
非常相似 - 只有少数几个笔画区别于其他之一。
该问题于 2005 年开始，四川百佳开始时使用即时粉丝，清晰或玻璃纸面共同各种

百佳品牌。虽然多年来一直是公司之间的知识产权纠纷中，包括一对正龙设计专利
侵权索赔，目前的情况下于 2007 年 11 月开始，当时正龙提交给郑州市中级人民法
院起诉。它要求：商标侵权的百佳正隆的注册商标白象。下级法院认为侵权，四川
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百佳提出上诉，河南省高级人民法院发出了几乎相同的 12 个月后决定。
此案是重要的，因为法院可以简单地遵循了“中华人民共和国分类商品和服务”，以
确定是否有类似的商标商品上使用。事实上，如果他们有，但就没有侵权，因为根
据“分类法”（基本上，对各种商品和类似的大类和小类组织服务指数），玻璃纸面
被认为是解散类似从小麦的方便面上正龙有白象商标注册。
相反，河南省高级人民法院决定放弃机械的相似性的决心，并认为，虽然“（'分类
'）可以作为确定商品或服务是否有类似的参考，它不能是唯一的基础。
发现的相似的（'分类'）不是一个必需的因素，在作出这一决定。“结果 6 日，法院
裁定，双方的面共享相同的功能和用途，以及消费和包装方法，销售渠道和目标顾
客。法院还确认并给予重视市场调查证据，正龙，表明百分之 68 的消费者误认为
是其他一马克提供。
这表明越来越多的内地法庭的能力（包括二和三级城市），以避开盲目的监管原则
的应用，重点围绕每个案件的具体情况，而不是。持有，并经最高人民法院随后的
传播，同时也使企业更容易找到在中国的法庭同情的耳朵，严厉打击侵权良好的商
标行政执法的局限性精通。
主要原因之一就是企业正在将中国的法院，是因为行政执法不是一个能有效地遏制
侵权。行政袭击是快速，廉价的，有时可能会产生有价值的证据材料。但同时，行
政机构只能罚款征收高达三倍侵权'“非法经营数额”，在案件或最多 10 万元，其中
“难以确定非法经营额。”此外，2008 统计显示，在对 43588 商标侵权的查处由工
商管理（陈岸明）全国机关，涉及 318 只 100 元，000 或以上的罚款，而只有 137
例被移送司法机关，低于 225 在 2007 年的情况。幸运的是，一些管理措施和高调
言论，以及最近的病历，法院指出，中共越来越愿意改变这一状况，并给予较大的
知识产权案件的损害赔偿。
内部呼声日益在过去一年中日益高涨，增加对知识产权侵权赔偿额。国家知识产权
（知识产权）战略，中华人民共和国国务院 6 月为 20087 的知识产权法律，并希望
看到更有力的知识产权司法保护和“增加侵权成本的修改要求，释放。”在 2008 年
12 月初，孔祥俊，在最高人民法院知识产权局副局长，他说，中国法院“应剥夺别
人通过使用所有非法的利润积累违规的知识产权。”
几个月后，最高人民法院发出关于对国家知识产权 Strategy9，这两个呼应加强司
法保护的知识产权战略的重点，增加损害赔偿要求实施的几个问题的最高人民法院
的意见。由于不具约束力，但有影响力的文件中指出，中国法院应给予赔偿的案件
中，涉及更大的惯犯，“大规模”侵权以及谁犯“的恶意侵犯。”
这样的声明似乎已取得成效，以及中国法院涉及高响应与损害赔偿，最近几起。
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尼奥普兰客车诉威客车：
2009 年 1 月，北京市第一中级人民法院下令三家公司支付侵犯其外观设计专利中
华人民共和国德国客车生产商尼奥普兰 2000 万元人民币（约合二九三〇〇〇〇美
元）。根据法院的“风之子 A9”查看车辆，中卫制造及其附属公司违反了尼奥普兰
2004 年外观设计专利。
案件非常重要，因为这表明大的损害，可以授予知识产权案件，到目前为止，远远
超过原来的行政执法，通过提供更多，即使在中方是被告。最终，在中国知识产权
问题的外国公司正在寻找这些标志如重罚，这将有效遏止，在长期的侵犯，这种情
况下，表明它可以实现的。
这也是重要的，因为它重申了司法机构的承诺，保护外观设计专利 - 在打击假冒另
一个新趋势战役的关键武器生产：单寨，或“山城”，货物。山寨货物的产品，是自
我意识的真正的产品和明显的仿制品。执法可能会很困难，因为这些产品往往没有
明确侵犯了权利人的注册商标：他们类似于真实的事情，但是复制不依赖于商标或
品牌名称，而是在产品的外观。因此，这一案例也显示，认为外观设计专利的司法
保护，可能是解决山寨现象的有效手段。
然而，重罚的使用，但用于对抗不知情的外国公司作为这样一个公司，在 2007 年
发现。然后，施耐德电气被发现已售出的产品侵犯了正泰集团，拥有的专利中国最
大的
生产低压配电和控制设备。温州市中级人民法院下令对施耐德电气公司支付
RMB330 万元（约合 44300000 美元）计算的，法院已成为正泰的专利侵权而损失
的金额合资企业。该公司最终缴纳 2300 万美元。
虽然施奈德案件证明了损害赔偿的高可用性，但它也表示，这并不自动适用于只在
中国经营的外国公司。因此，虽然外国公司可以依靠在中国法院更好地保护，也可
以伤害一样严重，如果他们被发现违反知识产权法律。事实上，外国公司应小心有
史以来登记并利用其在中国的 IP，法院精明的本地竞争对手，使双方的合法以及
战略，但也许成立，在中国法院索赔。
尽管创造更有利的执行，特别是在知识产权法庭，良好的环境，取得了巨大进步，
最近的全球金融危机已导致在中国决策者和执法官员的问题一个强有力的执行制度
的好处。特别是，在工厂的倒闭和整个制造业部门，地方和中央政府领导人已经确
定，必须兼顾经济和社会安全和合法的知识产权问题达成裁员潮。
什么始于 2008 年深秋，作为抗开展公然侵权案件的执法行动的暗流，最终凝固成

政策。 2008 年 12 月左右，一个高层次的公安，检察院和省级慈善协会官员记录到
一地，执法人员就要求谁去对那些在经济犯罪行为，如 IP，从事简单，如果强制
执行可能会导致数消极的社会后果，如大规模抗议。
使用类似的语言，这些声明建议，例如“说服”，较少直接侵权者的惩罚，更间接执
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行的选择，“告诫”和“教育”。总之，执法人员被要求以平衡的法律和社会后果的重
大制裁。
直到最近，类似的让步，特别是缺少声明由民事法庭的官员，谁仍然要求增加工
资，特别是在严重的侵权案件。然而，在其有关根据当前经济形势的知识产权司法
审判若干问题的意见，于 4 月 21 日发出，20.091 万，是最高人民法院转身法院在
中国提供类似的高不到严厉的措施打击层面的支持侵权，当“公共利益”受到威胁。
虽然该意见第 14 讲“谨慎”使用初步禁令的民间诉讼所带来的更有价值的工具之
一，第 15 更加明确，并警告说侵权的行为不应该是“停止”时，这样做会造成“大不
平衡各方的利益，或违背公众利益。“
这里的文字是惊人的相似，所使用的公安部原副部长于 2008 年 12 月，谁推荐的强

有力的执法措施，只当“法律和社会后果的必要性和可行性的双重原则，是的。”该
意见还指出，替代措施，如更大的损害赔偿或经济补偿“，”应该得到适当考虑，许
多读意味着侵权活动将被允许继续存在，但根据强制许可制度可能。赞同这一建议
在 2009 年 1 月在江苏省慈善协会主任的话，他说，执法人员应当态度问题“的说服
教育”，而只是“谨慎实施行政处罚。”
这些政策指示中可以看出，中国的决心，以避免可能的经济，社会和政治后果，可
能造成重大生产设施关闭，由于经济犯罪，如侵犯知识产权，侵犯。是否没有意义
的判断，和禁令，特别是实际上作为这些最新的指引而减少，仍有待观察。无论如
何，就在中国法院正在成为一个更加可行的办法，以防止知识产权违法者，此举削
弱强有力的执法措施，看起来像一个错误的方向迈出了一大步。
结论
中国的最高人民法院出现以及其向建立一支训练有素的专业知识产权的司法系统。
而它的努力，以及其他知识产权的相关
行政机关，似乎已经得到回报。当然，独立的和理智的几个高知名度的案件应增
加，作为重要的知识产权纠纷解决合法论坛中华人民共和国法庭的信心意见。在沉
重的经济制裁的情况，也应帮助。
然而，重大障碍仍然存在。例如，虽然可能会更容易获得大笔损害赔偿，执行他
们，尤其是在其他法院的管辖权，仍然是一个挑战。另外，尚不得而知中国公司在
“公众利益的名字最近执法回升”将影响知识产权司法保护。在未来 12-18 个月内将
决定是否在知识产权民事执法中的积极趋势继续得到广泛采用，或而是由中国目前
的经济和社会的关注缺阵的关键时期。
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年及以后
今
年 1 月，中国国家主席胡锦涛进涛发表讲话，可能标志着我国经济发展
的转折点。胡锦涛将在 2012 年加强和拆除的是对新的领导层普遍存
在。领先的候选人是席锦平。
胡锦涛列举了很多东西：鼓励新能源部门改革，农业，支持科学和技术的发展，但
不同的观念之间的杂乱是一个关键的短语时，胡锦涛主席特别强调的重点。他说，
中国的经济发展将是推动下，在很大程度上，以“自主创新”。这是一个传言，我们
在中国已经有一段时间听到回声。去年 11 月，几个部委中走出来的“自主创新产品
目录”，一上市核准的供应商，政府实体从购买。在此目录的限制是相当紧张，难
以使外国公司获得在名单上，促使许多外籍人士指责“中国的保护主义。”
这是核心议题之一，重点集中于今年密切相关，其中一个 2010 年的'主题' - 中国日

益增长的自己的权力和在全球经济中的重要性的信心。但可以说，外国公司将不得
不支付甚至更加关注的价值，他们将到中国市场。外国人需要明确阐述其价值，并
取得当地中方合作伙伴同意该值，并与外国公司合作，将到中国。在这个过程中，
外国人将不得不放弃这个价值，他们的中方合作伙伴...的风险是，你已经开始训练
你的未来的竞争对手。
中国加入世贸组织带来了符合他们的许多国际惯例。仍然有货币兑换等问题，但这
些都不是最大的障碍与中国合作。商业是，在某些方面变得更加困难，在中国，因
为它更难以确定确切的外国人带来的交易上，我们能够做到这一点中国尚不能对自
己？
尽管近 20 年的基础设施投资，中国刚刚触及到表面的总需求。中国是一个巨大的
地方，而在上海，北京和广州等大城市的基础设施相当不错，但还有很多在中国的
第 2 级，3，4，小城市进行。
此花 - 和联系自己如何支持更广泛的经济，就业和供应基础设施方面的需要 - 不会
很快结束。事实上，它很可能会继续在未来 20 年或以上。有许多相关的问题等基
础设施投资 - 住房和房地产泡沫可能是最令人关注的 - 和中国都将有它的起伏。基
础设施投资不会很快结束。
五对中国在 2010 年主题

1。生长
2。分布
3。综合
4。并购
5。作为一个全球大国的崛起的中国
在过去十年，中国在发展公司的全球策略的重要性。中国现在是一个不可分割的许
多公司的战略计划。在所有会议室的管理周围墙壁反弹理论之中，事实证明，顾客
是重要的。 60％的美国公司在中国主要服务于中国市场 - 寻求增长。
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一个小组在“成长”为主题的 2010 年的主题是公司进入中国的 2 级，3 日和 4 城市扩
展 - 它不仅是重要的是在中国，但你可以拓展的市场，这里也。阿在中国二级城市
仍然可以在这将近 800 万人，所以我们还没有对到农村地区销售洽谈 - 这仍然是城
市市场。
同“成长”主题相关的是“分配”。谁的公司已经在中国需要找到更好的方式来获得更
多的产品更多的市场。公司发现，中国是一个非常大的和零散的市场，你的'路线
对客户'在一个地区，将不一样，在另一个地区。你可能永远也找不到一个分销商
代表全中国的分配要求。公司使用的是 2010 年重建的分布。有时，他们需要的东
西撕裂下来，然后重建他们，但往往不是，他们只需要找出差距，并开始填补这些
空缺。
供应链的基础设施是不可或缺的这一分析。从采购到生产，运输到仓库，最后到销
售，在中国的外国公司正在重新评估它们如何处理他们的整个运作。没有坚定的分
配和供应链的基础，这样的增长是不可能将是 2010 年一年，公司将开始得到改善
都十分严重。
在 2010 年及以后的第三个主题是“巩固。”中国是一个庞大而分散的市场，并作出
重要贡献的，不成体系纯粹是在某一个部门有关的球员。例如，中国有超过 100 汽
车厂商，不是 100，但 100 个不同品牌的汽车制造商。在药品，有 3000 多厂商在
中国有超过一万名药品分销商。其中大多数是什么中国所谓的“子量表”，这在实际
上意味着它们太小，自己的生存很长，真的没有机会成长非常。
我国政府正在大力支持巩固，在很多情况下，选择重点企业（通常是国有）移动到
食物链的顶端。查询 2010 年一些主要的汽车移动。在制药，政府正在迫使较小的
经销公司合并是较大的，以至于会有最终每个省只有一个经销商。
在中国经营将要发挥自己的工业部门密切关注外国公司合并的趋势。竞争格局将发
生很大变化，如合并发生。竞争对手将会更加强大，富有和有一个较大的地理足
迹。在许多情况下，合并将导致更广泛的产品组合，使之更难以与他们竞争脚趾到
脚趾。
“兼并和收购。”不仅将本地公司的成长，通过并购，但越来越多的外国公司在寻求
通过收购增长，特别是谁在中国一段时间了。还有谁走进中国通过合资多年前，但
跨国公司谁现在，所有意图和目的，作为一个外商独资企业经营（或外商独资企
业）。一旦他们交易，他们开始发展有机，增加产品和销售地区，以便随着时间的
推移，他们建立了相当不错的存在。
然而，他们已经开始着手就他们可以有机地，加快时间到市场，增加市场深度，他
们正在考虑收购。
第五个也是最后的主题是有些棘手：“作为一个全球大国中国不断增长。”我们看到
一个新兴的权力，甚至是“从北京的态度”值得一提的认识。北京的领导人一直在单
方面决定，最近更是这样做的相当有信心认为，世界其他国家也不会惩罚，甚至谴
责他们。我国政府将作出更多的单方面决定，并会越来越少，敏感，其他国际球员
的意见。它如何进行还有待观察，但足以说明，这将是在 2010 年的因素。
顶部中华人民共和国领导人确定一个中国的 2010 年，2009 年 12 月中央经济工作
会议，最权威的中国经济年度会议的经济发展了谨慎的乐观。会议集合了中国最大
的中央和地方政府领导人，讨论过去的一年，计划到 2010 年的宏观经济政策。正
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如所料，12 月的政策重点，以应付全球金融危机，促进经济复苏的会议。政府领
导人决定维持现行的宏观经济政策，继续银行贷款和公共投资，并保持一个“相对
宽松”的货币政策，以确保超过百分之八的经济增长。
各国领导人强调，“连续性和稳定性，”在 12 月的会议，并表示，政府投资将继
续，至少在短期内。分析人士担心，持续的刺激措施，将导致流动性过剩和在不久
的将来通货膨胀上升，而是中共领导人表示，灵活的政策，使他们能够尽快解决这
些问题。为了避开流动性过剩和减轻产能过剩的不利影响，中国计划在重定向刺激
开支从固定资产投资，例如医疗和教育为社会服务。
会议强调，转变发展模式，使中国的经济增长依赖对外贸易和外国投资和国内消费
的那么重要。为了刺激消费，政府计划增加对退休人员的退休金和提高中国的低收
入和中等收入人口的收入。
中国也将继续执行下列 8 个在 2010 年的政策：
•家用电器更换 2009 年 6 月，中国开始提供高达百分之十的新的电视，电脑，冰
箱，空调采购补贴，洗衣机在九个试点城市的机器。中国将增加在 2010 年参加的
一些城市。
•“家电下乡”农民将收到一份关于某些家用电器的购买百分之十三，如电视机，冰
箱补贴，洗衣机，手机，电脑，热水器。价格较高的产品将被添加到列表中。
•补贴购买农业机械，中央政府将补贴在国家支持农业机械总 2009 年购买补贴目录
所列产品购买。从五点〇〇〇万日元至一二○○○○日元（七千三百二十二美元 - 一
十七点五七二美元单位），取决于产品目前的资助范围。政府将在 2010 年提高补
助金额。
•车辆购买优惠税率中国将延长车辆的发动机小于 1.6 升百分之 7.5 购买购买优惠税
率，增加 5,000 日元补助金额更换旧车十八点〇〇〇日元（$ 732 - 2.636 美元）。
•“车辆下乡”中国将扩大农村补贴计划到 2010 年底购买车辆，直至 2013 年 1 月 31
日购买了摩托车。
•节能产品推广中国将推动和资助购买能源，包括照明产品和新能源汽车的节能产
品。
•业务个人房地产转让中国将允许 5 年的商业个别房地产转让免税免税。
•延迟支付的社会养老金和减少社会保险中国将允许推迟，减少或社会养老金和个
人和企业遇到财政困难，2010 年保险费用更灵活的支付率。本政策适用于外商投
资企业在中国经营。
中国领导人还强调，必须加快城市化进程，进一步推动国内消费，推动可持续经济
增长。他们表示将放宽中国的城市户口限制，以培育一种在第二和第三的财产有更
大的需求二线城市，推动在 2010 年，建设项目。
发展农村地区，中华人民共和国政府将继续补贴和税收对农业项目的支持。它还将
促进农业基础设施建设，水资源工程，能源，电网升级，道路和农村公共服务基础
设施。
中国领导人强调了发展“新的战略产业政府的支持。”这可能意味着更多的，如先进
的机械，科技，节约能源领域的投资，环保等。通过发展这些新兴产业，中国希望
创造更多就业机会，再培训，产能过剩行业的工人的痛苦，并减少对原材料，商品
的压力，和能源的投入。
74
随着中国正在成为世界经济的救星欢呼，其政府的结论是，这是它的世纪。西方并
不重要，中国将率领一个新球员先锋 - 和游戏将由北京的规则行事。特别是在贸易
和投资领域，中国希望抛弃的是对国家利益和政策的权力归还原世界贸易法律的制
约。在这个新的世界秩序，看到了北京对外经济或技术援助的必要。
从外国投资者在中国的立场，这个新的自我形象已经产生了重大影响：
为外商独资企业（独资企业）和合资企业•应用更经常被延误或文件，或者不按法
律规定的资本要求被拒绝。官员公开宣称，他们已不再鼓励外商投资的兴趣。
•技术许可登记是在禁止或直接违反法律的限制。这个想法是，中国企业应不再需
要支付获得外国技术。
•对外国工人的签证越来越多地被拖延，拒绝或限制。情况是这样的华人工人可用
于做任何工作。
•在中国投资曾经是虚假的税收减免，以国内企业无法在就业和工资的规则无法执
行资格的外国人有利可图。这一立场已完全逆转。中国和外国公司预计下运作完全
相同的规则，使得许多外国企业无利可图。
假设中国确实没有为外国投资和技术的需要，这些变化是理性的，没有任何理由对
中国从他们后退，只要经济保持强劲。
目前还不太清楚如何在中国作为世界领袖的新形象，将在同世界其他国家的商业交
易的进行。虽然一个古老的文明，中国实际上是一个融入世界体系最近的参赛者，
并倾向于认为的法律和贸易规则，这与极度怀疑制度。因此，许多中国官员认为，
中国应该无视这些限制，并简单地想要的东西。
有一本 2009 年的做法一些例子：
•中国采用了世界贸易的法律的过程，以要求对外国的做法，但是，当对中国的
WTO 规则，在最近的著作权由美国和其他人那样，北京方面认为自由简单地忽略
的决定。
由于许多原材料的主要买主•，中国认为，应
可以操纵的购买条件，没有进行谈判。铁矿是一个很好的例子。中国形成买方卡特
尔（在其本国和外国违反反垄断法），其中要求，没有商量余地从单一供应商的价
格。这种“硬碰硬”的做法正在考虑为其他行业，中国是一个主要的原料买主。
•中国已在第三世界的一些引人注目的投资，包括对资源开采和基础设施的发展。
它通常采用了“以我们的条件或忘记处理”的办法，对总华工作人员，资金和控制坚
持。
在国际舞台上，这种强硬的做法是注定要失败的。其最近的经济成就如何，中国根
本没有权力强迫其将转嫁到其他国家。没有一个国家有这权力 - 正如由美国在 20
世纪 80 年代，在 20 世纪 70 年代和日本的证明错误。
我们是否应该感到惊讶如何中国有望重复在新的世纪同样的战略失误？
塑造美国对中国宏观经济的关系（包括和微观层面）：
1。哥本哈根证明中国是做玩，它在世界上的地位青年事务委员会。
2。 “中国的默认的谈判立场是零和游戏/竞争 - 而且似乎没有一个足够大的危机，
让美国和中国在同一方向进发。
3。我国政府正在运行更多的私营部门的证明现在比几年前。 “刮刮私人华业务，
你会发现一个政策驱动的官僚机构。”
75
4。他说：“中国电力新的投影将是基础设施项目和商业交易。中国的外交政策是由
原材料的需求推动下，是不是谁，要在床上让他们获得与神经质。”
5）“非经济因素的驱动器中的组织，作为长期政策问题王牌短期盈利/亏损的决
定。对于西方的并购者也来自于中国违反分心年，各方似乎看不到他们自己的利
益。这是并不是说中方暗淡或愚蠢的 - 而不是推动他们等非政策，官僚主义经济因
素，关系，技术和获取知识产权。“
以下五个关键问题很可能对中国的业务在 2010 年法律面前的重点：
1。中国将进一步加强其在中国侵犯其签证/移民法的外国人的打击力度。如果你缺
乏雇员签证，您可能会有危险。
2。中国将加大力度，根除和关闭非法和未注册的外国企业。我见过这个已经发生
在过去的 3-6 个月，我毫无疑问，这将继续充分的证据。提供就业机会，中国公民
并没有让你摆脱困境。
3。中国将加强税收征管工作。这事已经在迅速加快步伐，在过去 6 个月左右。如
果您的中国业务是不是做了健康的盈利，不感到惊讶，如果政府 imputes 健康的利
润了。特别是，政府将查看您的转让定价非常密切，在许多情况下它不会像所见到
的。
4。中国现在认为，一个成熟的经济实力和自身的这种看法，我们可以预料这将加
强其反垄断的兼并和收购的监测。我预测中国将争取至少在实施兼并和收购的一些
条件，关于中国的联系，只要是想说明，它可以。
5。由雇员的案件数量和对他们有利的解决，将继续迅速增加。这将是尤其如此，
因为这方面的外国公司将是一个伟大的方式，政府表明愿意保护自己。
中国正变得越来越依赖于外国企业。直接的必然结果，是中国在加强对外国企业的
执法力度。在今年我们所看到的（和写）中国加紧了签证，税收执法的开端，海关
法律。
对于过去十年的大部分时间，中国似乎要对执法情况的监管方法，它担心，它的很
多法律，严格遵守规则，条例会吓跑投资者，在经济不能再失去外国货币和制造。
现在，愈来愈多迹象显示良性忽视的日子已经结束。政府正在打击违反现行法规，
发布新的准则和通告，以加强对已经存在的书籍，并通过新的，更为严厉的立法。
中国定期改善执法，只有后退时，其努力的痛苦是显而易见的;跨国公司通常只是
等待难关。这一次，所有迹象都表明，北京是不会退却几个月。燃料价格上涨是积
极的，彻底的，它也表明，新的态度是绝不会改变。
税务经历了最明显的变化。遵推始于 2009 年开始，在国家税务总局公布的指导，
为个人和公司经营以外的中国呼吁，但进入该国销售服务，中国开始支付的营业
税。国家税务总局随后采取后续行动的要求外国公司进行工程和服务项目，在中国
注册的机构数的通告，尽管有关公司没有在中国长期存在。
然后，地方税务局要求企业所得税征收和家长借调员工中国公司的业务税。最后，
在 12 月，国家税务总局，此举扩大其管辖范围内的所谓的“由一个律师事务所，惊
人的飞跃”，以转移海外资产。国家税务总局是根本不想停在水边。
政府确实也似乎有利于当地的公司，通过。虽然官僚突击外商办厂，跨国公司施加
相当大的惩罚，并就交易，没有什么与中国，其他国内法规的执行需要拿出几乎有
点令人发笑短。在中国是一个真正符合现在的事情。
76
除了少数例外，对中国企业的法律在 2010 年的趋势是，并非所有从什么人会看到
去年，甚至一年前不同。我国政府的首要目标是继续执政，这一目标通常是驱动器
的制定和执法力度。大，为中国在 2010 年的总体趋势是其严格执法，特别是那些
继续适用于企业，更使那些适用于外国人。
我国政府希望满足自己的公民，以维持自身的合法性和最好的方法就是表现出的愿
望，保护公民对外国人之一。中国目前的经济实力是其政府的领导在许多人认为中
国已经很少或几乎没有外国投资等法律。
77

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research + knowledge + results

Hong Kong Athens

2010/2011 China Legal and Regulatory Analysis

Innovation Policy Foreign corporations strongly support China’s push to become an

Enforcement The AML prescribes a two-tier enforcement structure consisting of the

Transparency Transparent and predictable enforcement allows companies to plan

The Anti-Monopoly Commission subsequently issued the Guiding Opinion on Definition

Transparency in Enforcement Published enforcement decisions provide guidance and an

First, clearances without condition should be published as a matter of public record to

Consequently, it is important that Chinese authorities structure the reporting requirements

Clarification on Implementation Measures The AML only requires notification of

Requirement for Local Chinese Counsel In the absence of implementing regulations,

Articles 13, 14 and 15 have related exemption issues. Anti-competitive agreements

Article 27 permits AML regulators to consider potential effects of the proposed

Intellectual Property Rights

T he commitment of the Chinese government to protection of intellectual property

Some revisions could be problematic without implementation regulations to clarify their

Trademark Although earlier drafts included provisions whereby a trademark would no

Customs border enforcement remains an effective way to protect trademark infringing

Foreign companies have looked at developments in such areas as secondary liability,

Therefore, preference favoring “domestic products” or “indigenous innovative products”

Significant Developments In 2008, China agreed to submit a revised offer to accede to

In 2009, China confirmed on several occasions that it would treat foreign-invested

Finally, in January 2010, the Implementation Guidelines of the Government Procurement

Limited Scope of Government Procurement Law China promulgated its new

Tendering and Bidding Law Following the Government Procurement Law’s

Foreign companies strongly support having a merit-based, transparent, non-

Preferences for “Indigenous Innovative Products” In December, 2006, MOST, NDRC

Some aspects of China’s traditional education system contribute to the lack of

New documentation requirements, including an annual filing of related-party transactions

Super-Deduction of Research and Development Expenses China, like many other

Commercial Banking Foreign banking and securities institutions remain unable to

Small-Sum Loan Companies/Small and Medium-Sized Enterprise Financing To date,

Addressing Healthcare Costs and Financing Despite substantial progress on healthcare

Ensuring Access to Essential Drugs China’s development of a comprehensive essential

IP Protection Regulatory Data Protection China’s regulatory procedures permit the

Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals Pharmaceutical counterfeiting is a global public health

Significant Developments In 2009, total consumption of retail commodities reached

However, despite the simplification of procedures related to the opening of stores by

Restrictions on Ownership According to the National Development and Reform

Restrictions on Other Commodities Discriminatory treatment also persists with regards

Commercial Zoning According to the Measures on the Administration of Foreign

Registered Capital According to Article 7 of the Measures on the Administration of

E-Commerce Many foreign-invested retailers are looking to conduct online retail

Provincial Investment Environment

I ncreasingly, foreign-direct investment (FDI) is moving from China’s first-tier cities

The pharmaceutical industry is a thriving sector of Chengdu’s economy. Chengdu was

Investment growth is likely to moderate this year. Government-led investment is

International deal-makers in China received tremendously favorable treatment in the

new fdi vehicles

反竞争协议根据第 13 条禁止和 14 日由第 15 条豁免，如果他们提高竞争力，小型

在知识产权（IP）在中国申请的兴趣仍然强劲。在 2008 年上半年，国家知识产权

我国政府在之前和奥运会期间的侵略对知识产权侵权早期行动。从 2004 年到 2007

商标法修改始于 2003 年，国家工商局目前正在编写一个新的草案，预计不久将获

我国政府在之前和奥运会期间的侵略对知识产权侵权早期行动。从 2004 年到 2007

海盗中国网站和其他服务基于 P2P 技术的负面影响全球市场。第一次运行用户上