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Philosophy and Pedagogy of Educational Psychology

Article  in  Knowledge Cultures · January 2015

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 Knowledge Cultures 3(2), 2015, pp. 11–17
ISSN (printed): 2327-5731 • e-ISSN 2375-6527

PHILOSOPHY AND PEDAGOGY

OF EDUCATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

NESTA DEVINE
[email protected]
Auckland University of Technology
MAREK TESAR
[email protected]
University of Auckland

“... what else can philosophy in its fullness be but psychology,

and psychology but philosophy?” (Dewey, 1886, p. 165).

Educational psychology has its origins in philosophy, and like other disci-
plines, it has its own structure, focal points and research interests. This
special issue explores the epistemological basis of educational psychology as
eclectic, yet reflecting the philosophical nature of enquiry. This special issue
also argues that rather than seeking an epistemological basis, we might con-
sider an ontological one. Like most of the post-enlightenment “life sciences,”
educational psychology presupposes a certain life form as its focus: a human
form. The articles in this issue challenge assumptions and practices that rely
on uniform characteristics of being and becoming human.
When John B. Watson gave his presidential address to the American Psy-
chological Association in 1915 he proposed that psychologists might adopt
as the ontological basis for their discipline the same manifestation of the
subject as that favored by economists: homo economicus. This character-
ization of the human subject works well for behavior modification, in that
food as a reward can be seen as analogous to money or other material forms
of reward, in manipulating and shaping behavior. This formulation of the
human subject is now the standard form in many of the sub-disciplines
deriving from psychology, such as advertising, and marketing, and reinforces
the conviction of economists and financial policy makers that they have a
form of truth, when they think of human beings in these terms. The self-
interested individual is easy to mold, as the individual performs predictably,
can be assessed, measured, redirected and recruited.
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 Nonetheless, the American Psychological Association in 1962 established
a division called philosophical psychology, following almost two years of
discussions. Originally, many disputes emerged from what was described as
an “anti-philosophical temper” in psychological discipline and practice, that
was shaping this burgeoning discipline. As Royce (1988), claims, at that time,
“before other philosophic issues would have a forum at APA, the issue had
to be settled as to whether philosophy had any acceptability at all” (p. 373).
This establishing of a division devoted to philosophical psychology reminds
us of the philosophical groundings of psychology, and of educational psy-
chology in particular, and some would even go further, to argue that psy-
chology is a branch of philosophy, on the basis of its epistemological, onto-
logical and ethical concerns, tensions and topics.
Royce (1988) describes the situation between the disciplines of psychology
and philosophy,
… after the waning of that great philosopher-psychologist William
James, American psychology tended to view philosophy with a
mixture of avoidance and disdain. Psychologists were so anxious
to identify with the big boys, the scientists, that they exhibited a
typical adolescent rejection of their philosophical parentage. It was
more important to be like physics, an established and respected
science. Indeed, any dabbling with metaphysics might make them
suspect of medieval obscurantism and superstition (p. 394).
Perhaps we do need to go further back to the year 1879, to understand how
philosopher and psychologist Wilhelm Wundt is credited with the develop-
ment and founding of experimental psychology, when he developed the first
laboratory designed specifically for psychological research. This development
separated the study of psychology from philosophy and established the dis-
cipline of psychology, which then continued to exist in often contradictory
positions to philosophy. As Royce (1988) comments, “ironically, his [Wundt’s]
successors soon found it easier and safer to experiment than to think through
a philosophy” (p. 374).
Since the 1950s and 1960s, various attempts have been made to trace the
relationship between philosophy and psychology. Royce (1988) takes the
account of Gordon S. Allport who stated, that “[e]very psychology of per-
sonality is also a philosophy of person,” and Abraham Maslow, who argued
that “[e]xperimentation is generally the last step in the acquisition of knowl-
edge rather than the first. Much theorizing and naturalistic observation has to
be done before worthwhile experiments are possible. The experimenter is the
last member of a relay team.” This further points to the strong synergies
between philosophy and psychology, of which particularly the humanistic
branch has clearly articulated philosophical roots (Davidson, 2000). However,
the complex relationships between psychology and philosophy, and their
12
disciplinary grounding and focus led in the late 1950s and early 1960s to the
following account, captured by Royce (1988):
In 1958 APA itself invited a philosopher (Feigl) to address their
annual convention on ‘philosophical embarrassments of Psychology.’
They saw a need for a ‘specialist in the general’ whose function is to
take a philosophical perch above the data so as to see the forest
instead of being lost among the trees. Others were turning to phi-
losophy for help as psychology confronted a hopelessly spreading
delta of facts constantly being deposited by the rushing river of
empirical research. Who is to map and chart it? What good are facts
without a philosophical background on which to hang them? Facts
are great, but what meaning do they have in isolation from an overall
concept of the nature of man? A mosaic cannot be studied by
examining only the individual stones that make it up. A microscope
is very useful, but the microbiologist cannot use it to tell whether his
little daughter has a frown or a smile for her daddy when he comes
home; he must lay it aside and find meaning in the arrangement of
face muscles by getting away from individual cells and looking at
the pattern as a whole (p. 375).
These concerns remain present in contemporary thinking about the relation-
ship between educational psychology and philosophy. Murphy (2003) argues
that philosophical roots are becoming more and more distant in educational
psychology. This search for the identity and re-thinking background of edu-
cational psychology is very important, and at the heart of the papers published
in this special issue. Murphy’s research argues that what most educational
psychology handbooks have in common is the “perception that educational
psychology was born out of behaviorism” (p. 137), and Dewey, James and
Whitehead remain unmentioned, downplayed or even silenced. As Murphy
further argues, “our roots are in philosophy” (p. 144). The history of these
two disciplines is represented in stories of clashes, misunderstandings, and
antagonistic arguments and feelings, a complex relationship which this special
issue aims to re-conceptualize and re-think. Furedy (1988) illustrates the ten-
sions, in arguing that the
… emancipation of psychology from philosophy was appropriate,
because issues in psychological research are not reducible to philo-
sophical ones. However, the view held by many modern psychol-
ogists – that philosophy is irrelevant for psychological research –
is also false, although it is true that many of the issues pursued by
philosophical psychologists are unrelated to those which interest
research psychologists. Philosophical considerations can significantly
affect psychology (p. 71).
In contemporary times of competitive disciplines, and academic practices
that managerialize and continue to colonize other disciplines, this special
13
issue serves both as a statement and a reminder of collaboration and of the
philosophical roots of educational psychology. At the same time it maintains
important connections to its broad epistemological base in statistics and meta-
physics, and to traditional and indigenous knowledges, and diverse societal
and political considerations. The eclectic nature of these epistemologies
performs an important ontological turn, that is grounded in the importance of
analyzing historical patterns, in order to understand contemporary tensions
of the cross-cultural perspectives of work by Dumas, Alexander and Singer.
Their work paints the contours of this special issue, highlighting the diverse
disciplinary positions, concepts and ideas that this special issue attempts to
reconceptualize. Their work clearly draws our attention to discourses of
difference, and to how the language we use shapes our understanding of the
discipline in different cultures. Dumas et al.’s analysis of the history of the
subject in educational psychology further extrapolates important questions for
us to ask about relationships between philosophy and psychology. Educa-
tional psychology has its place in school and schooling, as Varel indirectly
reminds us in his work on the importance of the historical narrative, and the
broadening of the base, of educational psychology (or education and psy-
chology), and of re-thinking how anthropology might contribute to the con-
textualisation and composition of robust and rigorous, yet open and playful
educational psychology. The historical disciplinary synergies provide us with
important background, to the problem of contemporary times in the call for
interdisciplinarity in any research field. Often, the re-thinking and consider-
ation of epistemological and ontological roots happens only too rarely.
Educational psychology is en route to change, and the critical voices in this
special issue shape the multiplicities of this direction through their research.
Vassallo reminds us that while psychology has been re-discovering itself, re-
shaping its foundations and re-discovering its roots, educational psychology
lags behind. Vassallo traces elevated critical commitments in educational
psychology, and argues for the importance of re-negotiating criticality in the
discourses of educational psychology. This paper also utilizes strong relation-
ships with pedagogy and pedagogical practices, and with their improvement
within the reconceptualized discipline. Similar perspectives are offered by
Macfarlane and Macfarlane. They utilize indigenous practices, in this instance
New Zealand Māori epistemologies, to rethink culture as a relational ground-
ing to the way we know and experience education, through a psychological
lens. They ask important questions that shake the foundations of educational
psychology, including concerns about indigeneity and minorities, about
knowledges that are dominant and superior, and therefore leading to the
subjugation of certain learning. The collaborative and enriched framework,
that not only recognizes, but actively involves the epistemological bases of

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educational psychology, are essential in their contribution to this special issue
and to re-thinking educational psychology.
Re-shaping and re-thinking the discipline starts with micro-practices. Britz-
man argues for re-reading practices of education through Freud. Providing a
“conceptual geography” for the psychology of education (as another branch
of educational psychology), she traces Freud’s models and thinking, to provoke
and shake established pathways. Britzman argues that “education’s entangle-
ment with the historicity of the human’s prolonged immaturity, dependency,
and helplessness affects the limits of psychology, learning, and pedagogy and
for any theory of the psychological subject, the laboratory of education – for
the teacher, psychologist, and analyst – provokes new thoughts for a psychology
of education.” Asking important questions and thinking with Freud, this paper
presents an important contribution to the re-invention of the discipline of
educational psychology. In a similar vein, McLaughlin argues for consider-
ing psychoanalysis as an important part of the grounding of educational
psychology. McLaughlin’s fascinating performance takes us on a genealogical
track to trace psychoanalysis, as another epistemological notion of contem-
porary educational psychology, through pedagogies of psychoanalysis, and
questionings of power and knowledge.
The shaping and molding of the epistemologies of educational psychology
is connected with the governance of subjects, and in particular with concerns
with perceptions and labeling of subjects as victims. Drawing on her United
States experience of teacher education and refugee concerns, Rodriguez argues
for a critical rethinking of the discipline from a post-structural perspective,
and asks important questions, of what becomes a problem in the discipline,
and how? Peterson and Millei also draw heavily on post-structural thinking
and on Foucault’s work. Their juxtaposition of images and stories narrates a
tale of different interpretations of epistemologies, in which educational psy-
chology is able to re-invent itself through the various psy-disciplines. The
ideas of teacher education serves as a canvas on which Peterson and Millei
re-invent the discipline through thinking with and thinking against, what
they call the “psy-cogs in the machine.” Furthermore, ethical perspectives on
educational psychology, are added by Dočkal, who uses the prism of the gifted
and talented child, particularly within the troubled histories and politics of
Central Europe, to interrogate the disciplinary groundings of educational psy-
chology.
Broadening understandings of educational psychology through the “social
psychology of the classroom” allows Rubie-Davies to examine and push the
boundaries of educational psychology. In her project, it is the teaching
relationships that are elevated and critically examined. Here she deals with
the pedagogies of educational psychology, and the disciplinary concerns with
making sense of the social psychology of the classroom, in order to improve
15
the class climate. The suggested field of the “social psychology of the class-
room,” with a strong epistemological background in diverse disciplines, seems
to be shaping up as one of the directions for moving forward. The final paper
in this collection closes the circle of searching for old and new episte-
mologies, and for considering the ontological, ethical, social and political, in
educational psychology. Norwich combines notions of educational psychology
and neuroscience that allow us to translate the research knowledge into
practice, through the particular focus and prism of teacher research. Drawing
upon histories and contemporary times, Norwich encourages us to critically
re-think the exciting directions, and epistemological challenges, that educa-
tional psychology faces.
The 11 articles in this special issue contribute to re-claiming and re-
thinking the discipline of educational psychology. With a strong background
in philosophy and pedagogy, educational psychology is critically evaluated
and reconceptualized throughout this special edition of Knowledge Cultures
in an attempt to address this issue, by bringing together, in what we believe is
an accessible form, a range of ways of thinking about educational psychology.
Perhaps it is psychology as method, as Dewey (1886) argued, that needs to
be re-examined and re-conceptualized, “if psychology as method of philosophy
means anything, it means that nothing shall be assumed except just conscious
experience itself, and that the nature of all shall be ascertained from and
within this” (p. 154). Dewey carefully considered this meaning, arguing that
… the very essence of psychology as method is that it treats
experience in its absolute totality, not setting up some one aspect
of it to account for the whole, as, for example, our physical
evolutionists do, nor yet attempting to determine its nature from
something outside of and beyond itself, as, for example, our so-
called empirical psychologists have done (p. 168).
From its early days psychology has been troubled by its relationship with
philosophy and its obligations to pedagogy. At times the focus has been on
more “scientific” or more “humanist” ways of understanding the human self.
Whether philosophy has any place in psychology has been argued, but since
even the more positivist scientific positions are themselves philosophic
positions, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that it is an intrinsic part of the
discipline. Philosophical issues, variously presented in scientistic forms have
confronted the Association over many years, and in 1962 this confrontation
led to and legitimated the question, whether philosophy has any place in
psychology. This special issue demonstrates that the answer is yes, and yes
again. Furthermore, it shows that educational psychology, in order to revitalize
itself, needs to remain open to its diverse roots and influences, and to
courageously embrace various philosophical, theoretical and empirical ideas.
These, the articles here have shown, are important steps for the strength of
16
 the field, and to become attuned and sensitized to the problems and tensions
of the contemporary world.

REFERENCES

Davidson, L. (2000), “Philosophical Foundations of Humanistic Psychology,” The

Humanistic Psychologist 28(1/3): 7–31. doi: 10.1080/08873267.2000.9976979
Dewey, J. (1886), “Psychology as Philosophic Method,” Mind 11: 153–173.
Furedy, J. J. (1988), “On the Relevance of Philosophy for Psychological Research: A
Preliminary Analysis of Some Influences of Andersonian Realism,” Australian
Journal of Psychology 40(1): 71–77.
Murphy, K. (2003), “The Philosophy in Thee: Tracing Philosophical Influences in
Educational Psychology,” Educational Psychologist 38(3): 137–145. doi: 10.
1207/S15326985EP3803_3
Royce, J. E. (1988), “Psychologists and Philosophy: The Birth of Division 24 of the
American Psychological Association in 1962,” Philosophical Psychology 1(3):
373–379. doi: 10.1080/09515088808572952
Watson, J. B. (1916), “The Place of the Conditioned-Reflex in Psychology,”
Psychological Review 23: 89–116.

Nesta Devine is an Associate Professor at AUT University. She is a product of the

New Zealand public education system, and taught educational psychology as part of
initial teacher education at the University of Waikato. She is currently Associate
Professor in the School of Education, at the Auckland University of Technology.

Marek Tesar is a lecturer at the University of Auckland in childhood studies and

early childhood education. His focus is on the history, philosophy and sociology of
childhood. He has published journal articles and book chapters in this area, and his
doctorate on this topic received prestigious national and international awards.

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