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Cover: Damage from the German sabotage of Black Tom Island on 30 July 2016.
Photo: Library of Congress.
Mission The mission of Studies in Intelligence is to stimulate within the Intelligence Commu-
nity the constructive discussion of important issues of the day, to expand knowledge
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Studies in Intelligence
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Central Intelligence Agency
Washington, DC 20505

Awards The Sherman Kent Award of $3,500 is offered annually for the most significant
contribution to the literature of intelligence submitted for publication in Studies. The
prize may be divided if two or more articles are judged to be of equal merit, or it may
be withheld if no article is deemed sufficiently outstanding. An additional amount is
available for other prizes.
Another monetary award is given in the name of Walter L. Pforzheimer to the gradu-
ate or undergraduate student who has written the best article on an intelligence-relat-
ed subject.
Unless otherwise announced from year to year, articles on any subject within the
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ondarily on literary qualities. Members of the Studies Editorial Board are excluded
from the competition.
The Editorial Board welcomes readers’ nominations for awards.
ii
 Studies in Intelligence
Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)
CENTER for the STUDY of INTELLIGENCE

Washington, DC 20505
Contents
EDITORIAL POLICY
Intelligence Today and Tomorrow
Articles for Studies in Intelligence may
be written on any historical, operation- Why Spy Now?
al, doctrinal, or theoretical aspect of The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking
intelligence.
in the Digital Age 1
Dr. Ursula M. Wilder
The final responsibility for accepting or
rejecting an article rests with the Edito- Why Spy?
rial Board. The Psychology of Espionage 19
Dr. Ursula M. Wilder
The criterion for publication is whether,
in the opinion of the board, the article Historical Perspectives
makes a contribution to the literature of
intelligence.
Cold War Spy Fiction in Russian Popular Culture:
EDITORIAL BOARD From Suspicion to Acceptance via Seventeen
Moments of Spring 37
Peter Usowski (Chairman) Erik Jens
John Bennett
Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland
William Caniano
Catherine S. Higgins The Office of Naval Intelligence in World War I:
Gary Keeley Diverse Threats, Divergent Responses 49
Stephen O. Maddalena Dr. Eric Setzekorn
Jason Manosevitz
Terrence Markin Intelligence in Literature and Media
John McLaughlin
Fran Moore Tracking the History of a Counterinsurgency Expert:
LTG Theodore Nicholas (USA, Ret.) Four Books by David Kilcullen 61
Abbas W. Samii Reviewed by JR Seeger
Valerie P.
Jay R. Watkins Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada 65
Cindy Webb Reviewed by John Ehrman

Members are all active or former The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the
Intelligence Community officers. One Final Days of Imperial Iran 67
member is not listed. Reviewed by Brent G.

EDITORS
Spies in Palestine: Love, Betrayal, and the Heroic
Life of Sarah Aaronsohn 69
Andres Vaart (Managing Editor) Reviewed by Dr. Carly Speranza, Lt. Col., USAF
Rebecca L. Fisher
Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War
Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990 71
Reviewed by David A. Foy

 iii
The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police 73
Reviewed by David A. Foy

Spinning History: Politics and Propaganda in World War II 77

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961 79

Reviewed by JR Seeger

Berlin Station 83
Reviewed by James Burridge

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf 85

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

v v v
 

C ontributors

James Burridge is a retired NSA officer working as a CIA contract historian. He is a fre-
quent reviewer of books and movies dealing with intelligence.
John Ehrman is a Directorate of Analysis officer specializing in counterintelligence issues.
He is a frequent contributor.
David A. Foy is the Intelligence Community historian on the History Staff of the Center for
the Study of Intelligence. He is a frequent contributor of book reviews.
Brent G. is a CIA staff historian.
Erik Jens is chair of the Department of Transnational Issues at the National Intelligence
University’s College of Strategic Intelligence.
Clayton Laurie is a historian serving in the CIA History Staff.
Hayden Peake has served in the CIA’s Directorates of Operations and Science and Technol-
ogy. He has been compiling and writing reviews for the “Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf”
since December 2002.
J.R. Seeger is a retired operations officer. He is a frequent reviewer of works on paramili-
tary operations.
Eric Setzekorn specializes in the history of China and Taiwan, with an emphasis on mili-
tary history. He is a historian with the US Army Center of Military History and an adjunct
professorat George Washington University.
Carly R. Speranza, Lt Col, USAF, directs the Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence
Graduate Program at the National Intelligence University.
Dr. Ursula Wilder is a CIA psychologist who has served in the Intelligence Community
for over 20 years, applying psychology to operational, counterintelligence, and analytic
missions. She currently serves on the faculty of the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence
Analysis and on a cyber task force.

v v v

Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  v

Why Spy Now?

The Psychology of Espionage and Leaking in the Digital Age

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder

Introduction are expanding what people mean element—ease of opportunity. During

In 2003, Studies in Intelligence when they use the term “reality.”2 the past 15 years, a prospective spy’s
published my classified article “Why access to customers for espionage via
The new technologies have, unsur- the Internet has grown exponentially,
Spy?: The Psychology of Espionage.” prisingly, precipitated changes in the
A newly unclassified version of that and media platforms seeking leakers
manifestations of spying from within have proliferated. Today, many main-
article follows this one. “Why Spy” the world of professional intelligence,
focused on the personalities, mo- stream media outlets provide “leak
where leaking now joins espionage bait” options on their websites that
tives, behaviors, and experiences of as a major threat to national security.
people who commit espionage. The allow people to anonymously deliver
Other threats from insiders include information. Professional intelligence
article also explored how unwitting sabotage and workplace violence.3
colleagues might experience a spy’s services hunting for prospective
personality and behavior during candidates for espionage now have
The model of espionage presented
day-to-day interactions in the work- Internet-enabled spotting, developing,
in the 2003 article describes three
place. Leaking was not addressed in and recruiting tools that work just as
core elements that motivate a person
2003 because it was not at the time a effectively for professional handlers
toward espionage: personality pathol-
leading threat. That has changed, and seeking candidates to manipulate
ogy or vulnerabilities, a precipitating
this essay addresses some of the rea- into espionage as they do for retailers
life crisis, and opportunity (finding a
sons for the change.a, 1 (See Textbox seeking to target customers suscepti-
safe customer for the spy’s espionage
1 on the next page for my working ble to advertising.4
services). The critical role of person-
definitions of espionage, leaking, and ality vulnerabilities has not changed For the remainder of this article,
spilling.) in today’s spies, but, as we shall see, my primary focus will be on the
the Internet and associated technolo- role of the Internet (to include social
Advances in technology—broadly gies can amplify them. Similarly, the
speaking, the Internet, mobile plat- media) in espionage and leaking.
emergence of a life crisis remains an However, other aspects of technolo-
forms, social media, and computing integral part of the decision to spy;
power—are driving unparalleled, gy, such as the physical engineering
in the digital age, technologies can and operational design of devices
epoch-defining changes in the world. exacerbate existing crises and also
Communication technologies, in par- and software, also play a potentially
generate new ones.b powerful role in priming vulnerable
ticular, have altered how people relate
to each other individually, in social persons toward spying. Our devices
The greatest impact of the new
groups, in nations, and globally, and of entry into the Internet “behave” as
technologies is in the third necessary

a. Readers interested in gaining insights into the perceptions of serving officers on the WikiLeaks website, its sponsors and supporters, and
related matters are encouraged to read the transcript of the Director of the CIA’s presentation at the Center for Strategic and International
Studies in Washington, DC, on 13 April 2017 entitled, “A Discussion on National Security with CIA Director Mike Pompeo”; available at
https://www.csis.org/analysis/discussion-national-security-cia-director-mike-pompeo. In his opening remarks, DCIA Pompeo said intelli-
gence officers are “not at liberty to stand up to . . . false narratives and explain our mission to the American people. But fortunately, I am.”

b. This is not to say technology can only have negative effects on the vulnerable. At-risk people may find online interlocutors who alleviate
loneliness and alienation in positive ways and who offer balanced views eluding people in crisis and point them toward options other than
illegal or dangerous behavior.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  1


Why Spy Now?

if they have lives of their own; they

Textbox 1: Definitions
can have strong “holding power”
over the psyche of users (they are The vocabulary surrounding matters of unauthorized disclosures is in flux. For
readability and conciseness, in this article the behavior of individuals engaged
designed to have this power). People
in either espionage or leaking is referred to as “spying.” I use this word on the
whose work, play, and relation-ships premise that in both cases insider access to classified information is deliberately
are mostly mediated through abused to make unauthorized disclosures, in secret or publicly.
keyboards and devices and who Espionage. Spies engaged in espionage secretly deliver classified information
experience their engagements in the to a party the spy understands is working directly against his or her own country.
cyber realm as more rewarding than This typically involves an intermediary—a handler—who usually is a foreign
anything else in their lives are, as we intelligence service officer trained in managing agents safely and productively.
shall see, particularly vulnerable to The aim of a handler is to keep the spy undetected and the transfer of infor-
the role the Internet and associated mation ongoing and secret. For reasons of security and veracity, professional
intelligence officers rarely handle anonymous sources for long periods.
technologies can play in paving the
way to spying.5 Leaking. Spies who leak make classified information publicly available without
authorization, usually through contacts with media outlets or via the Internet.
Despite the breathtaking size and Leakers may have regular, dedicated interlocutors such as journalists, who
receive and disseminate the information. Unlike spies engaged in espionage,
pace of the social and psychologi-
most leakers are (at present) not paid or otherwise rewarded materially for their
cal change we are witnessing in the actions. Nor do their interlocutors normally engage in the kind of long-term han-
digital realm, much remains the same dling tradecraft used by professional intelligence services—although source pro-
in human nature. What we witness tection and information authentication are core missions of journalists as well.
occurring in global culture because of Spilling. The key concept in defining spilling is lack of intent. Spies engaged
technology is monumental and dis- in espionage or leaking have specific goals in mind, whereas spilling is the
ruptive, but it is also coherent to us inadvertent, unintended disclosure of information to uncleared environments,
because we recognize our universal organizations, or people.6
human needs, desires, and common
pursuits playing out in the midst of sense anchored in factual reality. The 2003 article made a dis-
the complexity and change. We can They also include negative qualities tinction between self-serving and
still rely on these universals as a solid such as treachery, greed, cruelty, mal- heroic spies; this article addresses the
basis for explanations for why people ice, duplicity, readiness to dupe and former. How professional intelli-
do what they do. Human fundamen- manipulate others for personal gain gence officers address the subject
tals include complex positive quali- or entertainment, and susceptibility to is discussed in Note 7. The note
ties such as loyalty, dedication, good powerful psychological control tech- also addresses a parallel distinction
faith, authentic friendship and social niques applied by experts. We should between leakers and whistleblowers.
bonds, need for real intimacy and examine what is new but keep these (See also Textbox 2 on facing page
trust, desire to belong in a communi- fundamentals in mind as anchors to for discussion of ethical dimensions
ty, curiosity, creativity, and common understanding contemporary humans of the issue.)
and their behavior and choices.

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2  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy Now?

What Causes Someone to Spy or Leak?

The three essential factors pre- emotions, undermine already com- Personality
disposing individuals to espionage promised judgment, and galvanize Psychologists consistently detect
or leaking classified material—dys- impulses to seize opportunities to four personality characteristics when
functions in the personality, states of obtain escape or relief through ill- they study spies: psychopathy, nar-
crisis, and opportunity—operate sym- judged negative conduct. People in cissism, immaturity, and grandiosity
biotically. Pathological personality this state are ready targets for manip- (see page 21 of “Why Spy?” for
features not balanced by healthy traits ulation and recruitment for espionage. detailed discussion of each). Some
can result in conduct that precipitates They are also primed for behavior of these features are present in the
life crises. These in turn, stress the such as leaking, if they believe it will personalities of a great many, if not
already tenuous coping capacities bring them respite and reward. most, people who will never engage
of vulnerable personalities. Crises in wrongdoing—the reader is likely
and vulnerability together intensify

Textbox 2: Observations on the Ethics of Political Disclosure of Sensitive Information

Unauthorized disclosure of sensitive or proprietary informa- ing from strong passions in American society that exert pres-
tion to the media for political purposes is an age-old feature sure on democratically elected leaders.”9
of political life and will remain a permanent fixture of any
democratic society with a free press. Those seeking political In an article in Foreign Policy, William J. Burns (former
advantages through such disclosures generally partner with deputy secretary of state) and Jared Cohen (president of
established media outlets, both to ensure an extensive au- Jigaw (previously Google Ideas) argue that “We should build
dience and to gain legitimacy; they presume that audiences a global consensus around both the need to protect the
will assume the media partner has screened and verified the integrity of financial data and systems on which the global
information before using it. Less well known is that profes- economy relies and the illegality of cyber-enabled commer-
sional members of the media usually seek comment from rel- cial espionage, making a clear distinction between tradition-
evant members of the Intelligence Community before making al espionage and wholesale commercial theft.”10 (Emphasis
public classified information they have acquired. Sometimes added.)
they will revise their drafts to mitigate credible risks described
to them by the Intelligence Community or may even withhold Apparently, in the international consensus these authors
a story when they are convinced that risks to national securi- propose to build for the cyber age, an exception will remain
ty, US citizens, or US allies or innocent persons are too high. between nations (in the tradition of a true gentlemen’s
agreement) that permits political and military espionage
A 2013 case study on leaking published in the Harvard Law against each other to continue unabated, whereas technolo-
Review hypothesizes that periodic, tumult-inducing, unau- gy-enabled commercial espionage and digital infrastructure
thorized disclosures are not caused so much by institutional destruction will be forbidden. Intelligence service officers
weak points or failures (such as feeble security measures, will be pleased that their jobs remain secure, and at least
law enforcement investigations, and prosecutions of leakers) somewhat respectable, according to the proposed rules for
but by the considered choices of high-level officials who the brave new cyber world.
benefit from lax enforcement of legal prohibitions against
unauthorized disclosures. The author further argues that, It is hard to predict where all of this is going to take us,
in subtle ways, lax enforcement benefits national security, nationally and globally; at present, we can only note that a
government efficiency, and democratic transparency more sea change is occurring in the way all levels of society view
than it harms them.8 technology and the access to information it enables. These
are major areas of ongoing discussion and conflicts on both
The Harvard Law Review published a riposte to the essay the formal governance level and on the “street” level. In
asserting that the harm caused by “high level” leaking is regard to the psychology of espionage and leaking, persons
very real, but, despite the self-evident harm, “the executive considering spying will find ample justification and support
branch has been unable and unwilling to close the ‘sluice to act on their impulses and desires in the evolving and con-
gates’ due to easily underestimated legal and technological tentious social dynamic in the public commons concerning
constraints and also because of political constraints emerg- the uses and control of technology and information.11

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  3


Why Spy Now?

thinking of such people now. In the dents who said that trolling was their their secret enjoyment of the contrast
case of spies, however, personality favorite online activity.13 Illustrative between the day-to-day, “real life”
vulnerabilities are relatively unme- of the attitudes the researchers were humdrum in their offices, surrounded
diated by other characteristics that studying was inclusion in their Likert by unwitting, duped colleagues, and
might provide a counterbalance, as scale surveys of items such as “The their charismatic, online “spy” perso-
happens with healthy personalities. more beautiful and pure a thing is, na, uninhibited and free and complete
the more satisfying it is to corrupt,” with applauding admirers, provides
A balanced personality might and “Hurting people is exciting.”14 ample reward for engaging in espio-
have a strong preference for logical nage or leaking. There is also plenty
reasoning and the detachment to The online jargon for producing of material and people online to feed
counter the impulsivity and fanta- and enjoying the distress of others is the vengeful, spiteful characteristics
sies of immaturity; a healthy person “lulz.”a The phenomenon of cruelty that are common to both psychopathy
might have empathy for others or for sport on the Internet now has its and narcissism.
respect for hard-earned expertise that own etymology (with recognized
compensates for a tendency toward usages such as “trolling” and “lulz”). People with narcissistic personali-
the egoism and sense of entitlement Trolling is highly performative be- ty features can find ample fuel online
characteristic of narcissists. Yet an- havior: beyond seizing the attention for their grandiose fantasies and
other individual might have acquired and provoking the responses of the can experience on the Internet the
a capacity to anticipate long-term targeted persons, trolls also pursue expansive, protean sense of power
consequences or a set of acceptable psychological reward by gaining the and superiority that characterizes
rules for navigating the world that attention of admiring audiences who them, complete with clusters of fans
override psychopathic thrill-seeking share their taste for “lulz.” Keeping and/or supporters spurring them on in
and a predatory approach to exploit- bad company, online and anonymous, espionage or leaking “for the great-
ing the present moment. egged on by like-minded others look- er good” or validating their desire
ing for entertainment, can stimulate a to get revenge on organizations or
Features of the Internet and asso- vulnerable personality toward many authorities they believe insufficient-
ciated technologies have the potential harmful and destructive actions, ly appreciated them or otherwise
to undermine the counterbalancing including leaking and espionage. wronged them.
traits of even healthy personalities
and pose the risk of escalating patho- For example, a person with Immature personalities, defined
logical features. Often this occurs in psychopathic personality features by difficulties separating the fic-
anonymous encounters with facilitat- might engage in espionage or leaking tions and dreams of their imagina-
ing individuals or groups who mutu- simply for the thrill of breaking tions from hard, factual reality, find
ally reinforce and validate extreme or rules and creating chaos; like trolls, plenty of scope on the Internet for
pathological viewpoints and embold- psychopaths “do it for the lulz.” For fantasy-driven activity—including
en inappropriate behavior. them, the Web is a playground and espionage and leaking—that simply
its darker elements a confirmation bypasses any consideration of con-
Online survey studies of the of their view of reality: exciting, sequence in real life (“IRL” in Web
personality features of Internet trolls Darwinian, and pitiless—a world parlance). The immature personality
conducted by a group of Canadian populated by either predator or prey. is more easily seduced into action
scholars concluded that trolls are When people such as these spy in by the seeming unreality of behavior
“prototypical everyday sadists.”12 an Intelligence Community context, in the cyber realm, actions that can
The researchers explored the links seem to disappear with the click of a
between trolling and what psy- mouse or the swipe of a fingertip.
chologists call the “dark tetrad”
a. The online Oxford Living Dictionary de-
of personality traits—narcissism, An enduring paradox of the Inter-
fines “Lulz” (also “luls”) as “fun, laughter,
Machiavellianism, psychopathy, and or amusement, especially derived at anoth- net is that while it is distinctly real
sadism—and found that the tetrad er’s expense” and describes it as “an early (it exists in material reality), it is also
was highest among survey respon- 21st century corruption of LOL or LOLZ distinctly different—and, to some,
(“Laugh Out Loud”).

4  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy Now?

quite separate—from concrete reality. displeased, or psychologically threat- cal crises that are equally acute but
This is dangerous ground for those ened online, he or she can back out invisible to others might include
who do not readily distinguish be- and re-enter in a different persona, silently carried, lasting rage over
tween fact and fiction, between what not something that is possible—at perceived slights or injustices, an
resides in their imaginations, their least not to the same degree—IRL. overwhelming desire for revenge, or
desires and hopes, and what resides A user can also set aside, discard, or other deep-seated feelings or beliefs
in concrete, material reality or IRL. destroy poorly functioning or frus- that compel the vulnerable person to
In contrast, well-grounded people trating devices, again, something dif- action.
can find cyberspace exciting, even ficult to do with people. Furthermore,
enchanting, and useful to sustaining both the Internet and the associated Intelligence services have long ex-
a complex, full life—while remain- devices of entry into it appear to have ploited crisis states to recruit agents.
ing solidly anchored in the material “lives” of their own (they continue to As described in the 2003 article, un-
world and retaining good judgment act autonomously and separately scrupulous services may deliberately
about the consequences of actions from logged-off users), but the user create crises in the lives of targets to
taken in either realm. has an illusion of control because he improve recruitment prospects, for
or she can turn the devices on or off, example through escalating gambling
Psychopathy, narcissism, and thus suspending their digital lives debts or entangling the target in a
immaturity all have in common the until the user chooses to re-engage on risky sexual or romantic relationship
characteristic of grandiosity. A well- his or her own terms. Such seeming with a partner controlled by the ser-
known adage of the digital age is: sovereignty over something as global vice. Such intelligence services may
“On the Internet, everyone knows and powerful as the Internet, the also find ways to precipitate similar
you are a dog.”a, 15 It could also be people one encounters there, and the crises in the lives of family members
said that: “On the Internet everyone “thinking and behaving” machines or other loved ones in order to con-
thinks you are a hero, or a villain.” that mediate relationships can feed trol the prospective spy by offering
Our technology now makes it possi- grandiosity, at least if the tendency espionage as a solution to the loved
ble for a person to develop and ex- toward grandiosity is uncoupled from one’s predicament. (See “Why Spy?”
press multiple selves in cyberspace.16 the leveling and grounding of “real “Exploitation of the Vulnerable” on
This is a context of human interaction life.” page 34.)
and action that can feed and reward
grandiose self-perceptions.17 As we have seen, the cyber realm
A Precipitating Crisis is a hazardous environment for those
Furthermore, the Internet, and in crisis or easily led to crisis. Those
the technology and devices that give The second necessary element with a propensity for problematic or
access to it, are ostensibly under the that paves the way for spying is the pathological behavior—for example,
control of the anonymous user. If the emergence of a personal crisis of uncontrollable gambling, computer
anonymous user feels unrewarded, such intense weight and urgency gaming, spending, or sexual behav-
that the vulnerable person experi- ior—will find on the Internet remark-
ences a sense of immediate threat, ably easy ways to reach outlets for
loses perspective and judgment, and their addictions or compulsions. In
a. This is an evolution of the now-classic
adage “On the Internet, nobody knows
becomes fixated on finding a way to cases such as these, the name “World
you’re a dog,” the caption of a 1993 New put an end to the situation. The state Wide Web” is apt: psychologically
Yorker cartoon by Peter Steiner featuring of crisis may or may not be visible to vulnerable people, like insects in a
two dogs, one sitting on a chair working on friends, family, and associates. (See spider’s web, do get snared online. In
a computer, making the above observation “Why Spy?” “Precipitating Crises” addition, while they may believe they
to the other dog, seated on the floor. The on page 31.) Sources of psycho-
cartoon quickly became iconic and signaled have found relatively safe outlets
the moment when global culture recog-
logical pressure obvious to observers for their pathological or hazardous
nized the pervasive problems of identity on might include a looming bankruptcy, behavior, they are subjecting them-
the Internet, where a user can never fully imminent dismissal from work, or selves to the possibility they will
trust or know the true natures of unseen a divorce. Sources of psychologi- be tracked and risk suffering crises
interlocutors.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  5


Why Spy Now?

of embarrassment or becoming the For others seeking justification, escalating order of gravity, a long list
subjects of the attention of those online material assists in rationalizing of illegal goods and services acces-
eager to find and exploit vulnerable or trivializing acts such as espio- sible to paying anonymous custom-
persons. Finally, the more a person’s nage or leaking of national security ers, ranging from pirated content
online life becomes the center of his information. This nullifying effect to drugs, to legal documents (pass-
or her consciousness and motivation, of the Internet, where qualms about ports, citizenship papers, transcripts,
the more real-life, stabilizing com- espionage and leaking are neutralized professional licenses), trafficking in
mitments—to self-care, to others, by comparisons to a glut of “worse” organs and humans, and murder-for-
to community—will weaken and behavior—is often underestimated. hire. He ended the list by describing
attenuate. Work, relationships, health, FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen a site that offered the opportunity to
financial status, and lifestyles suffer made this argument when he stated witness through live streaming the
for people who have arrived at this to an interviewer who was sharply worst acts of child abuse—while
point, causing the kinds of tangible, challenging him to recognize the interacting with other paying anony-
IRL crises that might bring a per- consequences of his espionage, “In mous customers and the perpetrators.
son with access to national security the whole march of history, a little Goodman called this the very center
information to the attention of hostile espionage doesn’t amount to a hill of hell, and concluded that “the In-
intelligence services, and from there of beans.” (See “Why Spy?” “Rob- ternet provides a delivery system for
lead them into espionage. ert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold pathological states of mind.”
Warrior” on page 30 for a review
More subtly, in a context in which of the case.) Today’s spies need not The Dark Web is also an educa-
seemingly complete anonymity turn to human history to find ways to tion in nihilism. A prospective spy
enables the expression of all desires, minimize their behavior; they need can find there sufficient reason to dis-
no matter how deviant, dangerous, only visit the Dark Web in the present card doubts and move forward into
or harmful to others, no brakes on moment and see what transpires espionage or leaking. After such ex-
behavior exist other than those a per- there.a posure, for those with compromised
son already possesses when entering moral compasses, espionage seems
cyberspace. For the group of people In his book on Internet crime, trivial and leaking seems a lark.
we are discussing—people with per- former FBI futurist-in-residence, People with strong inherent moral
sonality pathologies, in crisis—these Interpol advisor, and police officer compasses and an uncompromised
brakes are often already weak and Marc Goodman devoted a section capacity to stay grounded in con-
likely to grow weaker. to the Dark Web entitled “Into the crete reality understand that behavior
Abyss.”18 He used the metaphor of online has consequences in real life,
For those with moral qualms, Dante’s circles of hell to provide, in such as the real plight of child and
Internet content can provide justifica- adult victims in Internet-mediated
tion for behavior that leads to crises crimes.
and to subsequent illegal choices. a. The Dark Web forms a small part of the
That justification can come from Deep Web, which is the part of the Web
not indexed by search engines. Because of
online dialogue with kindred spirits Ease of Opportunity
free software, anonymity in the Dark Web
or with more focused interlocutors is at present almost unbreakable, enabling The third necessary element in
such as intelligence service officers, hackers, terrorists, gangsters of every sort, spying is connecting with a customer,
e.g., agent recruiters, pursuing their pedophiles, and other criminals to transact
their business there in safety, unless they
patron, or platform interested in the
own goals through manipulating a
become subject to their own “insider threat” information on offer. It is in this third
person’s crisis. Platforms seeking
(undercover police informants, for exam- element that the greatest changes
leakers may also manipulate a vul-
ple). More positively, the Dark Web also have occurred since the publication
nerable person who is experiencing provides a venue in which political dissi- of “Why Spy?” (See “Elements of
what he or she perceives as a crisis of dents and others with positive or non-crim- Espionage” on page 20.) Those
conscience. inal intent are able to communicate and
collaborate in relative safety. (See Kristin
currently seeking to connect with
Finklea, Dark Web, Congressional Research customers or platforms for either
Service Report R44101, 10 March 2017.) espionage or leaking now have many

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Why Spy Now?

more possibilities and opportunities agents engaged in espionage. Han- Leaking

to explore via the Internet. Those dlers work hard to stabilize their Such stabilization is generally not
considering leaking have a dizzy- agents once they have started spying, the case for leakers, many of whom
ing array of possible online venues because operational security and seek immediate rewards and visible
to leak to as well as the promise of maintaining cover are paramount in impact on a global scale, now achiev-
global dissemination of the infor- sustaining the espionage, and unsta- able via the Internet. The attention of
mation they provide. Many websites ble agents cannot attend to either. others is for many the main currency
now include instructions for potential For example, a handler will work of reward online, and being noticed
leakers, and these customers or pa- to prevent an agent from pursuing and famous is often the primary
trons provide the option for anonym- attention and affirmation by show- psychological reward pursued by
ity, at least initially.19 It should be boating online, will step in to head leakers.20 Psychologically gratify-
noted that, in contrast to media, pro- off or settle crises in the life of the ing attention can come in the form
fessional intelligence services do not agent (somewhat ironically, given of either fame or infamy—even if
generally handle anonymous agents the critical prerecruitment role of life the leaker’s name is never revealed.
for reasons of safety and veracity. crises in priming potential agents to In many cases leakers get a double
consider espionage), and if the agent dose of attention and reward: intense
is motivated by the desire to earn responses from admirers and oppo-
The Experience of Spying a place in history, the handler will nents, who engage in vituperative
After Making the Connec- provide reassurances about the spy’s conflicts with each other, adding lulz
tion and Commitment impact and offer substitutes for the to the reward accruing to the leaker.
Espionage missed acclaim. Keeping a watchful As a result, encouraged and validated
The information age has altered eye on and reducing the destabilizing and absent the stabilizing presence
the environment for professional elements of the Internet in the agent’s of a professional handler, leakers
intelligence officers handling agents, life is part of contemporary profes- will tend to intensify their activities,
not just in how they spot and recruit sional intelligence officer tradecraft. chasing more acclaim, excitement, a
potential spies but also in managing sense of power and efficacy—until
they are unmasked.

v v v

Remedies, Risk Management, and a Caution

My focus throughout this article behavior or in their circumstances; Actively Counter Loneli-
has been on the human dimension we still must provide support to trou- ness and Safeguard and
of espionage and leaking, not on bled employees to help them through Build the Community
specific counterintelligence and their crises and return to productivity
The psychological malady of the
security tools, programs, or tech- and a sense of belonging to the com-
digital age—paradoxically, given its
niques. The recommendations I made munity at work.
positive, extraordinary capacity to
in 2003 remain as relevant today as
These measures, necessary and connect millions across the globe—is
they were then. (See “Remedies and
still vital, are not, however, suffi- loneliness and its close cousin, alien-
Risk Management” on page 35.)
cient anymore. In “Why Spy?” I also ation. These conditions do not apply
Safeguarding entry points into Intel-
suggested broad programs of educa- pervasively, of course. For the major-
ligence Community agencies through
tion and community-building. In the ity of people, digital connectivity is
applicant screening remains a corner-
digital era, these are now keystones just one more way to initiate, sustain,
stone of institutional risk mitigation
to mitigating the risk of employees’ or complement healthy interpersonal
against insider threats. We also still
becoming spies. relationships. As noted throughout
need programs designed to spot and
this article, however, the Internet is a
address warning signs in employees’
dangerous place for the vulnerable—

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  7


Why Spy Now?

those who struggle with relationships to the mission and experiences of ings and gatherings. This occasion-
IRL, and may be alienated from other professional intelligence officers. ally inconvenient (sometimes very
aspects of real life, or those who find inconvenient) but necessary secu-
themselves temporarily alone and at Volunteer employee groups rity requirement may disappear at
loose ends. should be actively supported, provid- some point but at present we should
ed senior sponsors, and validated by celebrate our simple, yet profound,
In the face of the risks exacerbat- the attention of senior leaders, and difference from the rest of the work-
ed or caused by loneliness and alien- these groups should be encouraged to ing world: we converse with each
ation, frequent organizationally spon- reach out to colleagues who seem to other, rather than with our screens, in
sored events in workplaces—with need help in connecting with commu- the “open” moments before and after
people in physical attendance, not nity. In the digital era, such elements meetings, in the cafeteria, and in our
virtually present—have never been of community life in intelligence hallways. We have opportunities to
more critical to counterintelligence. agencies have moved from being break away from the “holding pow-
When vulnerable employees are em- “nice to have” morale-builders to er” of our devices and are therefore
bedded in communities in which they critical features of security and coun- able to enjoy the best of both the
feel they belong and are accepted, the terintelligence risk mitigation. digital world and the concrete, IRL,
risk of their acting on their vulnera- material world.
bilities in times of personal crisis is The Intelligence Community can
mitigated. They will be less prone also fight digital fire with fire by
to seek connections and relief in the encouraging its online, secure, clas- A Caution: The Phenome-
dangerous domains of the Internet or sified “village commons” to flourish
nology of Surveillancea
susceptible to relationships offered and grow, including supporting those
commons as venues for expressions Big data, allied with machine
by those seeking to manipulate and
of creativity, opinion, critique, and learning and cognitive computing,
exploit them.
even dissent. We can count on the has ushered in an amazing pano-
Examples of significant tradi- lack of anonymity in these online ply of digital surveillance methods
tions and community-building at government-sponsored venues to purporting to evaluate, profile, and
CIA include annual events such as avert the ills that plague the open predict the behavior of people,
Family Day and Combined Federal Internet: trolling, harassment, bully- based on the record of their activ-
Campaign (CFC) fundraising events ing, hacking, and the like. At present ities online.22 New technological
before the winter holidays, during our secure, classified online venues tools collect and exploit the trail of
which offices and teams develop cre- parallel the best of Internet values information—sometimes labeled
ative methods, including book sales and provide a precious insider-threat “digital exhaust”—that all people
and auctions, to raise funds—one risk-mitigating resource that must be leave in IT systems as they go about
particularly memorable fundraiser protected despite potential disclosure their normal activities at work and
was the auctioning of a gingerbread risks.21 Efforts to manage the risks in their personal lives. Big data and
replica of the model of Usama Bin that come from permitting open, computing power together allow an
Ladin’s compound used in planning online discourse should be devised in individual’s present behavior to be
the SEAL operation against him in ways that protect the current vibrancy evaluated against his or her personal
2011. Also important is the commem- of this classified cyber community, baseline of past behavior; changes
oration of those lost in service held because the vitality and the bonds and anomalies—for good or ill—can
at CIA’s Memorial Wall each May. created there will spill over into the be flagged and analyzed. Proponents
Presentations by outside speakers in Intelligence Community.
the Headquarters auditorium that are
One of the hidden benefits of the a. Phenomenology is a specialized branch
open to all employees and attended of philosophy and psychology that studies
and moderated by senior leaders have prohibition of most portable personal
subjective experience. Here I address how
also become highly popular opportu- devices in Intelligence Community people subjectively experience surveillance
nities for the workforce to gather and buildings is connection; people are when they are aware of being subject to it
consider issues and ideas important not locked into their screens in meet- and how people subjectively experience the
process of surveilling others.

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of such methods assert that they can heated cultural debate surrounding mines loyalty to the organization.
be used to expose in intimate detail surveillance and privacy issues can Furthermore, blanket surveillance
the psyche driving behavior, includ- be framed in many ways: political, methods risk flattening a culture into
ing assessing and predicting the legal, philosophical/ethical, and insti- blandness and dulling its creative
current and potential risks individuals tutional risk management, as well as edge. (See the “Appendix: Consider-
present to systems, to others, and to in terms of individual personality dif- ations on the State of Surveillance in
themselves. ferences in support of and tolerance Democratic Societies,” beginning on
for surveillance.25 For the purposes of page 11.)
For example, some elements of this article, I focus on research that
spoken and written language unrelat- sheds light on how people experience Finally, it is important to be wary
ed to the content or meaning being surveillance psychologically and of the long-term, eroding effects
communicated—behaviors such as the potential consequences of those of blanket, intrusive, or shadowy
a person’s habitual choice of words, experiences on individual psyches surveillance on the composition of
repeated use of certain grammatical and therefore on their attitudes and teams or across an organization’s
structures, tempo, and syntax—can behavior. workforce. Social and behavioral
shed light on a person’s identity, science research has demonstrated
background (regional and education- What the research shows is that that there are individual differences
al), state of mind, and emotions at people dislike being surveilled.26 in attitudes toward and tolerance of
the moment of communication. The Most, however, will tolerate some workplace surveillance. Technology-
“sentiments” expressed by oth- level of intrusion, if they believe driven assessment and surveil-lance
ers—such as colleagues, neighbors, it is necessary for institutional and tools pervading a workplace are
friends, and even family members— social safety and to maintain order.27 likely to repel highly autonomous,
about a particular person can be The surveillance, however, must be creative, questioning people who
collected and assessed using the same experienced as fair and transparent; then self-select themselves out of the
methods corporations use to track the consensus from studies in man- team or organization, leaving be-
public sentiments surrounding their agement science in this area is that hind a concentrated group of people
brands.23 honest communication with employ- whose temperaments tend toward
ees—and citizens—about the specific caution, order, and safety, and who
Currently employers, private nature of and need for surveillance are comfortable with established
corporations, politicians, and gov- is critical to gaining acceptance and systems for security and institutional
ernments are applying these and compliance. Being able to judge for control. Over time, the “diversity of
other data analysis tools to assess, themselves if the level of surveillance mind and temperament” necessary
influence, and monitor persons and is reasonable and knowing with some for an intellectually fresh, creative
groups. The promise of such tech- specificity about the methods used re- organization is damaged by systemat-
niques to assist security and counter- turns some of the personal autonomy ic loss of certain types of productive,
intelligence insider-threat programs that surveillance inevitably removes psychologically healthy people, irre-
is self-evident, but there are risks and recalibrates the relationship of spective of which type they happen
that must be taken into account in trust and fair-dealing between the to be.
using them and costs to be tallied and surveillors and the surveilled.
weighed against promised benefits.
(See Textbox 3, which addresses this Government reports have reached Active Support for CI
point, on the following page.) the same conclusions. An atmosphere and Security Officers
of constant observation that is per-
There exists a robust body of In this dawning digital age, those
ceived to be aimed at control rather
empirical research in the social and responsible for protecting employees
than stopping wrongdoing breeds
behavioral sciences tallying the and information in the Intelligence
resentment and a tendency toward
potential negative effects on people Community have extraordinarily dif-
hidden protest; such surveillance at
and organizations of pervasive sur- ficult jobs. Pre-Internet and pre-digi-
work undermines morale and produc-
veillance.24 The current complex and tal methods still apply somewhat, but
tivity, increases stress, and under-
new technology-driven risks prolifer-

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Why Spy Now?

the-art security methods against the

Textbox 3: Weighing Costs and Benefits—Security at Fort Detrick
in the Wake of the 2001 Anthrax Attacks importance of also protecting the
scope of responsibility, access to in-
The week after the 9/11 terrorist attack, letters containing anthrax spores were formation, capacity for informal open
mailed to several news media offices and to two US Senators over the course discussion with peers that broadens
of several weeks, killing five people and infecting over a dozen more. After a thinking and lends unexpected, fresh
long and complex investigation, the FBI homed in on microbiologist Bruce Ivens,
a senior biodefense researcher at the US Army Medical Research Institute of
perspective to important questions,
Infectious Diseases (USAMRIID) at Fort Detrick, Maryland. Ivens committed and the fundamental inquisitiveness,
suicide in July 2008 while anticipating his imminent arrest. The investigation openness, and trust necessary to
had revealed that Ivens had longstanding severe psychiatric conditions; several sustain a creative, engaged, and agile
mental health professionals who had treated him over the years considered him workforce. Counterintelligence and
highly dangerous to them, to himself, and others. At work he had shown behav- security officers wrestling with these
ior ranging from the eccentric to the bizarre.
always exigent, but now intensify-
After it was created in 2002, the Department of Homeland Security established ing, dilemmas need our full support,
the National Biodefense Analysis and Countermeasures Center (NBACC). The not just in concrete resources, but in
center soon developed a program—Personnel Reliability Program (PRP)—to recognition of the enormity of what
identify specific psychological characteristics to be assessed in “more compre- they face and the daily tough deci-
hensive” security evaluations of scientists and technicians and other “agents”
working with the most dangerous biological materials. The PRP-recommended
sions they must make to safeguard
characteristics to be evaluated are: mental alertness, mental and emotional sta- their organizations, colleagues, and
bility, trustworthiness, freedom from unstable medical conditions, dependability in our common mission.
accepting responsibilities, effective performance, flexibility in adjusting to change,
good social adjustment, ability to exercise sound judgment [in emergencies], free-
dom from drug/alcohol abuse and dependence, compliance with requirements, Conclusion
and a positive attitude toward the Personnel Reliability Program (PRP).28
Today’s intelligence officers
Setting aside for the sake of argument the infeasibility—on a technical assess- know they are serving in tumultuous,
ment level—of psychologically screening personnel for these characteristics exciting, astonishing, and dangerous
with any degree of scientific reliability and validity, taken together they depict a
times. In every generation, a few
certain type of person: dependable, responsible, comfortable complying with au-
thority and rules, conscientious, socially and emotionally stable, and predictable. insiders have chosen the destructive
If people could be hired and retained on the basis of these criteria, dangerous path of betrayal and harmed them-
biological agents would certainly be in good hands. On the other hand, would a selves, their families, their nation,
research program staffed solely with this type of person perform with insightful, and many others who trusted in the
prescient, inventive science? While the PRP’s criteria might reduce the insider United States to keep them safe.
threat in USAMRIID labs, the ability of the resulting team to carry out its missions
Three things keep loyal insiders
through innovative, cutting-edge science might also be compromised.
going when news breaks of another
case of espionage or leaking by one
ate, adapt, or mutate before counter- when military professionals relying
of our own: our personal commit-
measures can be fully conceived, on horses were first confronted with
ment to our mission; our bonds of
tested, and applied. For leaders and tanks must have been terrifying, as
trust with our colleagues and teams;
officers serving in the domains of were those when infantrymen faced
and the example of the generations of
security and counterintelligence, the barrages of artillery and machine gun
patriots who served before us, who
situation today is analogous to the fire unimaginable previously.
also weathered betrayals by some of
challenges faced by military leaders
We are confronting such a seismic their own. So we keep faith, serve
and combat commanders at the dawn
moment now in the world of profes- the Constitution with integrity and to
of mechanized warfare in the early
sional intelligence. In addition, secu- the best of our abilities, and expect to
20th century. Horse cavalry even-
rity and counterintelligence officers pass the torch on to a new generation
tually became armored cavalry, and
have to manage, as never before, the of officers who will do the same.
“best practices” in the craft and art
of tank warfare became normative, core dilemma of balancing the need
v v v
but the moments on the battlefields for technology augmented, state-of-

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Appendix: Considerations on the State of Surveillance in Democratic Societies

The discussion within democrat- ogy-driven surveillance process as White House Review Group, 2013
ic societies about the abundance of follows: Similarly, a 2013 report to the
data, computing power, privacy and White House from the President’s
security (some frame this as a polit- Effective monitoring tools . . . Review Group on Intelligence and
ical conflict between civil rights and take advantage of technology to Communications Technologies rec-
government surveillance) is ongoing. surpass standard [personnel] ommended the following:
Below are some highlights for con- screening. . . . In particular,
sideration. advanced text analytics and All personnel with access to
psycholinguistic tools that track classified information should be
George Orwell, 1984 an employee’s communications included in a Personnel Con-
Orwell’s classic 1949 novel has across social media and other tinuous Monitoring Program
enjoyed a resurgence in popularity platforms to detect life stressors (PCMP). The PCMP would
because of renewed focus on privacy and analyze sentiment can help access both internally available
issues and fear of totalitarian govern- detect potential issues early. . . .  and commercially available in-
ment control enabled by technology.29 Another critical element is formation, such as credit scores,
The novel explores the psychology improving the sharing of infor- court judgments, traffic viola-
of surveillance from the perspective mation within the organizations tions, and other arrests. (239)
of the surveilled. Orwell counted on among managers, human re-
his readers’ intuitive understanding sources, information technology The authors added:
of the motives of a protagonist who (IT), security, and legal advisers
We recognize that such a pro-
would risk everything to secure a bit regarding minor counterproduc-
gram could be seen by some as
of privacy in a world characterized tive work behaviors that may
an infringement of the privacy
by “Big Brother’s” oversight of every indicate an employee struggling
of federal employees and con-
aspect of life. The novel’s enduring and at heightened risks of com-
tractors. . . . But, employment in
power results from the readers’ empa- mitting a malicious act.
government jobs with access to
thy for the fictional Winston Smith’s
The INSA document notes that special intelligence or special
effort to resist, and his ultimate fail-
this “continuous monitoring” ap- classified programs is not a
ure to attain even a small measure of
proach to mitigating insider threat right . . . we believe that those
autonomy, making it one of the great
might have implications for “work- with the greatest amount of ac-
tragic novels in the Western canon.
place morale,” “civil liberties,” and cess to sensitive programs and
INSA, 2017 concludes that each organization information should be subject
In April 2017 the Intelligence and must arrive at its own culture-driven to Additional Monitoring . . .
National Security Alliance (INSA) decisions about the optimal balance (240–41)31
published a list of state-of-the-art sur- of privacy and security in the organi-
The House of Lords, 2009
veillance tools available to organiza- zation:
In February 2009, the British
tions interested in mitigating insider
In the end, this is a critical risk Parliament received a document from
risks, particularly in the national
management exercise for senior a House of Lords committee titled
security context.30 The document
leaders in all organizations as Surveillance: Citizens and State.32
suggested mitigating insider threat
the destructive power of ma- It reported the results of a general
through “leveraging innovative tech-
licious insiders grows and the review of methods and practices and
nology and data sources to monitor
tools to monitor and mitigate included recommendations for future
and evaluate individuals on a contin-
become more sophisticated and actions. It also described concerns
uous basis” and noted that the listed
intrusive. that ubiquitous surveillance is chang-
computer-based tools could assist in
ing the relationship between citizen
“swift, continuous identification and
and state.
assessment.” It defined the technol-

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Why Spy Now?

The report quoted a professor Several years ago London was surveillance, can cause by eroding
of sociology and deputy director of suffering from a nail bombing bonds of trust within society, par-
Criminological Research at the Uni- campaign by an individual ticularly between those who control
versity of Sheffield: . . . targeting specific parts of the surveillance and those being
London with his nail bombs surveilled. He asks, hypothetically, if
Mass surveillance promotes and there were extremist groups you would you rather attend Scrutiny
the view . . . that everybody is claiming responsibility for the College, where examination rooms
untrustworthy. If we are gather- actions. That event was entirely are equipped with several cameras
ing data on people all the time supported by CCTV evidence in and jammers prevent the use of pri-
on the basis that they may do terms of actually detecting the vate devices for cheating, or Probity
something wrong, this is pro- crime. What value do you put on College, where students are trusted to
moting a view that as citizens the price of that detection?(21) abide by an ethics code. The philoso-
we cannot be trusted. (27) pher argues that blanket surveillance
Emrys Westacott, 2010 aimed at control undermines the ideal
The report also described the Philosopher Emrys Westacott that persons in society will behave
distinct social gains—tangible and begins a 2010 article in Philosophy responsibly because they want to, out
perceived—of broad surveillance Now by asking if Adam and Eve of love and respect for themselves
programs, particularly in countering would have eaten the forbidden apple and others. He concludes that too
terrorism and crime, and it summa- had God installed CCTV cameras in much monitoring destroys the free
rized empirical data suggesting that Eden.33 A more serious discussion bonds between people in societies; it
most citizens support the counterter- follows this amusing opening in weakens the internal moral compass-
rorism and crime-fighting functions which Westacott explores the distinct es of both the people and their soci-
of surveillance. The report quoted pragmatic social benefits that derive ety. He also concludes, however, that
a senior constable and chair of The from some forms of surveillance not enough surveillance of people’s
Association of Chief Police Offi- (for example, from traffic cameras) behavior results in a lawless state, as
cers CCTV Working Group, who and also the harms that too much we have seen on the Dark Web.
said: surveillance, or certain forms of

v v v

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Notes and Sources:

1. Author Note: When I was drafting my first article on the psychology of espionage 15 years ago, I relied on a long and estab-
lished history of classified and unclassified scholarship on espionage that has accrued since the establishment of CIA’s forebear,
the OSS, in WWII. In contrast to the robust, longstanding literature that was then available to me, this essay on the psychology
of digital-age spying must be more provisional. The current social and cultural contexts—in real life, online, domestically, and
globally—are developing too rapidly to arrive at definitive conclusions about all of the elements at the core of the psyches and
behavior of today’s spies, particularly how they experience their espionage and leaking and the people, groups, and technologies
assisting them in spying.
2. Cyber vs. Material Reality: Some argue that cyber reality is a part of material reality because it exists; however, the anchors of
time, place, and physical contact are different in the digital and the concrete realms. For purposes of discussing how vulnerable
people experience both cyber and concrete reality and navigate between the two psychologically, they are treated as distinct in
this article, though there are some who would dispute this distinction and consider it as arbitrary as the mind/body division.
3. Evolving Insider Threat Model: In the past decade the model of “insider threat”—applicable to both private and public sec-
tors—has evolved, and is commonly understood to include five types of threats from people inside organizations: spills, leaks,
espionage, sabotage, and workplace violence. The focus of this essay is on those who leak and commit espionage. The five types
of threats can overlap: leaking and espionage can include elements of sabotage and even workplace violence because the spy’s
underlying intent may be aggressive, aimed at harming an organization and sometimes targeting specific individuals for danger
or distress. CIA officer William Kampiles, for example, said that one of his reasons for committing espionage was to get back at
his supervisor who had not supported his desire to leave his entry-level job as a watch officer prematurely in order to gain entry
into the operational domain. (See: “Why Spy?”: “William Kampiles: Self-Styled Special Agent” on page 28.) FBI Special
Agent Robert Hanssen was bitterly angry at and contemptuous of the FBI when he spied for the Russians. (See: “Why Spy?”:
“Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior” on page 30.) Sometimes the danger and violence to others is secondary to
the primary goals of the spy; danger to others might be an inevitable and predictable outcome of the espionage. In some cases
the spy deliberately pursues harming others as a safeguard against being caught. Many Soviet citizens spying for the United
States lost their lives when Aldrich Ames deliberately identified them to his Soviet handlers in order to prevent them from alert-
ing their CIA handlers that there was a mole in CIA, which would have triggered an internal counterintelligence investigation,
endangering Ames. By his own admission, Ames was purely driven by money, and he equated the risks he was taking for the
Soviets to those Russian agents were taking when spying for the United States. In support of this article’s theme of personality
pathology and espionage, the author notes the psychopathic nature of Ames’s rationalization of his ruthless elimination of those
endangering him, and yet he remains alive, albeit in prison for life. In contrast, most of the agents he identified to the Soviets
eventually were executed in Soviet prisons.
4. For examples of the application of such means in the corporate world, see Doug Laney, “Data as Corporate Asset: Private Sector
Applications of Data Science” in Studies in Intelligence 61, No. 1 (March 2017).
5. Mind and Machines: For classics and contemporary overviews of the psychological effects of machines, devices, and tech-
nology on humans and culture, see: Louis Mumford, Technics & Civilization (Harcourt, Inc, 1934); Sherry Turkle, The Second
Self: Computers and the Human Spirit (Simon & Shuster, 1984) and (MIT Press, 2005); Sherry Turkle, Life on the Screen:
Identity in the Age of the Internet (Touchstone, 1997); Sherry Turkle, The Inner History of Devices (MIT Press, 2008); James
Gleick, The Information (Pantheon Books, 2005); Nicholas Carr, The Shallows: What the Internet is Doing to Our Brains (W.W.
Norton, 2011); Kirsten Weir, “(Dis)Connected: Psychologists’ Research Shows How Smartphones are Affecting Our Health and
Well-Being, and Points the Way Toward Taking Back Control,” American Psychological Association Monitor 48, No. 3 (March
2017): 42.
6. Spilling and J.K. Rowling. A spill may be caused by misjudgments or accidental inclusion of classified materials with doc-
uments authorized for release, or by skilled elicitors who induce people to say more than they should or intend. Sometimes
spillers remain unaware of the spillage, whereas spies always know they are spying. In the digital age, spills may be caused by
technical errors involving little human agency. A famous example of spilling is the revelation in July 2013 that Harry Potter
author J.K. Rowling was also the author “Robert Galbraith,” a pseudonym Rowling had used to publish an adult detective novel.
Rowling’s identity was spilled by one of Rowling’s lawyers, who had inappropriately discussed the book with his wife’s best
friend and revealed the author’s true name. The friend then tweeted about it to a columnist. Responding to the resulting firestorm
of speculation, the lawyer’s firm confirmed Rowling’s authorship in a statement that included the following language, which
illustrates the unwanted, unintentional element of spilling: “We, Russells Solicitors, apologise unreservedly for the disclosure
caused by one of our partners, Chris Gossage, in revealing to his wife’s best friend, Judith Callegari, during a private conversa-

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Why Spy Now?

tion that the true identity of Robert Galbraith was in fact J. K. Rowling. Whilst accepting his own culpability, the disclosure was
made in confidence to someone he trusted implicitly.” (See Jon Stock, “J.K. Rowling unmasked: the lawyer, the wife, her tweet
—and a furious author, ” The Telegraph, 21 July 2013. Also at www.telegraph.co.uk/culture/books/10192275.)
7. The Heroic vs. Self-serving Spy: This article focuses on self-serving spies or those who have been manipulated or coerced.
There is another type of person who commits espionage: the genuinely heroic spy. A critical element of a professional intelli-
gence officer’s expertise is the ability to accurately assess the true, underlying conscious or unconscious motives of sources.
The evaluators begin by first registering, then looking beyond, the self-images of sources and testing the stated motives against
the tangible and emotional benefits actually accruing to them. An officer’s true assessment can be quite different from what the
officer purveys to a source during handling interactions. Professional officers are trained to use observation, critical thinking,
vetting techniques, comparisons with what is known from studies of past cases of espionage, and above all expert judgment to
distinguish between sources who are genuinely heroic, and those who are not. Officers also submit their assessments to the scru-
tiny of their peers, particularly counterintelligence officers who independently evaluate sources and ensure that what is on record
about a source’s motives for espionage is unbiased and accurate and handling methods are appropriately matched to the source’s
true motives. While self-serving, manipulated, or coerced spies are the subject of this article, it is important to remember that
heroic ones do exist and that their personalities, the crises that led them to spy, and the handling tradecraft appropriate for them
are different from those of other types. There is also a distinction—psychological as well as legal—between whistleblowers,
who use legal channels to address their ethical or other workplace concerns, and leakers, who bypass legal, authorized channels
of redress. Readers who wish to explore the distinctions may be interested in the recently published, newspaper opinion piece
written by a Washington, DC, lawyer who handles classified matters and represents whistleblowers in the national security field:
Mark S. Zaid, “Reality Winner Isn’t a Whistleblower—Or a Victim of Trump’s War on Leaks,” Washington Post, 8 June 2017.
See also on this subject, US Department of Labor Occupational Safety and Health Administration, The Whistleblower Protection
Programs, at https://www.whistleblowers.gov.
8. David E. Pozen, “The Leaky Leviathan: Why the Government Condemns and Condones Unlawful Disclosures of Information,”
Harv. L. Rev. 127, No. 2 (20 December 2013).
9. Rahul Sagar, “Creaky Leviathan: A Comment on David Pozen’s Leaky Leviathan,” Harv. L. Rev. 127, No. 2 (20 December
2013).
10. William J. Burns and Jared Cohen, “The Rules of the Brave New Cyberworld,” Foreign Policy.com (16 February 2017).
11. Disclosures in the Private Sector: The ethical, legal, and media dynamics surrounding the leaking of classified government in-
formation also apply to disclosures of private-sector sensitive or proprietary corporate information. These issues were the central
themes, for example, of the film “The Insider,” which was based on the true story of a former tobacco industry senior executive
and scientist who worked with a reporter to disclose his former employer’s effort to suppress information demonstrating that the
company was aware of and manipulated the addictive components of cigarettes. The story was originally carried in Vanity Fair.
(Marie Brenner, “Whistleblower: The Man Who Knew Too Much,” May 1996). The article and movie also touched on questions
about the scientist’s mental stability, motives, and veracity.
12. Trolls and Trolling: The exact definitions of Internet “trolling” or “trolls” are evolving in tandem with changes in technology.
Roughly speaking, there are two broad categories of trolls. Some primarily troll instrumentally and some primarily for fun or
“for the lulz”—a variant of LOL, “laugh out loud,” in Internet jargon. They differ psychologically in important ways. Those
who engage in online manipulation, attack, and sabotage chiefly in pursuit of some other goal, most often financial profit (for
example, those who are paid to disrupt commercial websites), may find only limited pleasure in the trolling itself. Their sense
of reward (what psychologists call “emotional benefits”) comes from achieving the primary goal, such as getting paid. The
pleasure-seeking trolls do so for the inherent emotional reward (the “lulz”) they generate in the behavior itself. The difference
between the instrumental type and the lulz-seeking type is akin to the difference between a professional hit man, for whom
killing is an emotionally neutral “professional” act that leads to a secondary reward, and a killer whose gratification resides in
the act of killing itself, such as, for example, the sense of god-like power it brings or sadistic pleasure in the suffering of victims.
Engaging in destruction for personal gain or for pleasure—an age-old practice among human beings—like so much else in real
life has found new expression in cyberspace.
13. Readings on Trolls: E. E. Buckels, Paul D. Tranpnell, and Delroy L. Paulhus, “Trolls just want to have fun.” Personality and
Individual Differences 67 (2014):97–102. See also: N. Craker and E. March, “The Dark Side of Facebook: The Dark Tetrad,
negative social potency, and trolling behaviors,” Personality and Individual Differences 102 (2016): 79–84. For an early study of
the decreased self-monitoring, decreased self-evaluation, and the disinhibiting and de-individuation effects of anonymity online,
see: Sara Kiesler, Jane Siegel, Timothy.W. McGuire, “Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication,”

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Why Spy Now?

American Psychologist 39, No. 10 (October, 1984): 1123–34. For a somewhat different take on trolling that examines how it
may not be wholly deviant behavior because it corresponds to and fits comfortably within the contemporary media landscape,
readers are directed to Whitney Phillips,“Internet Troll Sub-Culture’s Savage Spoofing of Mainstream Media,” Scientific Amer-
ican, 15 May 2015. The article is excerpted from a book by the same author, This Is Why We Can’t Have Nice Things: Mapping
the Relationship between Online Trolling and Mainstream Culture (MIT Press, 2015).
14. This specific survey item from the research cited immediately above was reported by Chris Mooney in Slate, on 14 February
2014, in an article titled: “Internet Trolls Really Are Horrible People: Narcissistic, Machiavellian, psychopathic, and sadistic.”
See http://www.slate.com/articles/health_and_science/climate_desk/2014/02/internet_troll_personality_study_machiavellian-
ism_narcissism_psychopathy.html.
15. Dogs on the Internet: In 2017, the New York Daily News published a cartoon by Bill Bramhall that played off of the 1993 New
Yorker cartoon and resulting canine-at-a-keyboard meme. The new cartoon captured current alarms about surveillance, dimin-
ished or impossible online privacy, and the use of data analytics by private corporations and public agencies to profile, track, and
target users who wish to remain incognito when they surf, work, or shop online. Bramhall’s cartoon features a solitary dog at his
computer confronting a full-screen pop-up advertisement showing a can of dogfood with the caption “You might like ALPO.” A
word bubble shows the dog thinking: “Whatever happened to ‘On the Internet nobody knows you are a dog’?”
16. Turkle, The Inner History of Devices and Identity on the Web.
17. Internet Aliases: Anonymous online aliases, rhetoric and slogans often hint at the slyness of psychopathy, the egotism of nar-
cissism, and the fantasies of immaturity. For example, some famous hacker handles are Scorpion, SOLO (which gestures to the
allure of being a lone operator and also to the Star Wars character), MafiaBoy, Gigabyte, cOmrade, “why the lucky stiff” (some-
times abbreviated “_why”), Dread Pirate Roberts, Poison League, Commander X. According to the global computer magazine
PCWorld, the British hacker SOLO left a message on a compromised machine that read: “US foreign policy is akin to Govern-
ment-sponsored terrorism these days . . . I am SOLO. I will continue to disrupt at the highest levels.” (http://www.pcworld.com/
article/2989146/security/infamy-and-alias-11-famous-hackers-and-their-online-handles.html#slide1). A famous online motto is
this clever but also barbed inversion, from the hacking group Anonymous, of biblical stories of demonic possession and New
Testament values: “We are Anonymous. We are legion. We do not forgive. We do not forget. Expect us.”
18. The Onion Router: Tor (“The Onion Router”) is the most popular gateway into the Dark Web. It is free software, enabling
anonymous communication through encryption and multiple peer-to-peer Internet relay channels designed to hide users’ IP
addresses from those interested in tracking them. The result is an untraceable, secure platform that conceals users’ location and
usage. The concept of “onion routing” (the underlying metaphor is that pursuing an anonymous user through multiple relays
is like peeling an onion, never arriving at the core) was developed in the mid-1990s by a mathematician allied with computer
scientists at the US Naval Research Laboratory in order to protect US intelligence online communications.
19. Leak Bait: Sue Halpern, in her review of Risk, a documentary portrait of Julian Assange (“The Nihilism of Julian Assange,”
The New York Review of Books, 13 July 2017: 15), writes: “Almost every major newspaper, magazine, and website now has a
way for leakers to upload secret information, most through an anonymous, online, open-sourced drop box called Secure Drop
. . . The New York Times, The Washington Post, The New Yorker, Forbes, and The Intercept, to name just a few, all have a way
for people to pass secrets along to journalists.”
20. Keith Hampton, Lauren Sessions Goulet, Cameron Marlow, and Lee Rainie, “Why Most Facebook Users Get More Than They
Give”, PEW Internet and American Life Project, 3 February 2012, at http://www.pewinternet.org/2012/02/03/why-most-face-
book-users-get-more-than-they-give; Sherry Turkle, Alone Together: Why We Expect More from Technology and Less from Each
Other (Basic Books, 2011).
21. Positive Internet Values: In an article in The Wall Street Journal titled “The Dark Side of the Digital Revolution” (19 April
2013), Google’s executive chairman and former CEO Eric Schmidt and Google Ideas Director Jared Cohen described trying to
explain the nature of the Internet to North Koreans during a visit to their country. They wrote: “We ended up trying to describe
the Internet to North Koreans we met in terms of its values: free expression, freedom of assembly, critical thinking, and meritoc-
racy.” These values are evident in the secure digital commons shared by the Intelligence Community but absent the blight that
anonymous negative actors bring to the World Wide Web.
22. Big Data: “Big data” is the term currently in common usage to refer to extremely large data sets that can be analyzed computa-
tionally to reveal patterns, trends, and associations, often relating to human behavior and interactions. While “big data” specif-
ically refers to the data itself, the term is also used colloquially to allude to the many uses to which such data can be applied,
such as profiling, tracking, predicting, and identifying individuals, and trends or patterns in both individual and group behavior.

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Why Spy Now?

For an accessible, balanced book-length view of the benefits, limits, and downsides to society and to corporations of computing
technology applied to data, see Viktor Mayer-Schönberger and Kenneth Cukier, Big Data (First Mariner, 2014). For easy-to-
read skeptical views, see: Tim Harford, “Big Data: Are We Making a Big Mistake?” Financial Times, 28 March 2014 at: https://
www.ft.com/content/21a6e7d8-b479-11e3-a09a-00144feabdc0?mhq5j=e1 and “The Economist Explains: The Backlash Against
Big Data” in The Economist, 21 April 2014, at https://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2014/04/economist-ex-
plains-10. At present, large-scale data analytics—their powers and capacities and their positive and negative effects on people
and culture—are still very much in flux and subject to widespread opinion and debate.
23. Psycholinguistics: Corporations use big data to engage in so-called “sentiment analysis” to evaluate, based on data available on
the Internet, the emotions around their brands. Sentiment analysis means computationally identifying and categorizing opinions
expressed in pieces of text, and also now in voice communications, in order to determine whether writers’ or speakers’ attitudes
toward a particular topic, product, or corporation (or brand) trend toward the positive, negative, or neutral. For a discussion of
psycholinguistics (or forensic linguistics), including the history of their development and use, validity, reliability, and the stakes
to individuals if computational tools applied to linguistics get it wrong in forensic contexts, see Jack Hitt, “Words on trial: Can
linguistics solve crimes that stump the police?” in The New Yorker, 23 July 2012.
24. Readings on Organizational Risks of Surveillance: See for example: Harvard Business Review Staff, “With Big Data Comes
Big Responsibility,” Harvard Business Review, November 2014; Neil M. Richards, “The Dangers of Surveillance,” Harvard
Business Review 126, 20 May 20 2013; Kirstie Ball, “Workplace Surveillance: An Overview,” Labor History 51, 1 April 2010;
Watson N. Nathan, “The Private Workplace and the Proposed ‘Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act’: Is ‘Notice’ Enough?”
Federal Communication Law Journal 54(1) (2001): 79–104, retrieved at http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1288&context=fclj; Graham Sewell and James R. Barker “Neither Good, Nor Bad, but Dangerous: Surveillance as
an Ethical Paradox,” Ethics and Information Technology 3 (3) (2001): 183–96.
25. Readings on Employee Attitudes Toward Surveillance: Those interested in individual differences in employee attitudes toward
and tolerance of workplace surveillance are directed to: G. Stoney Alder, Marshall Schminke, Terry W. Noel, and Maribeth
Kuenzi, “Employee Reactions to Internet Monitoring: The Moderating Role of Ethical Orientation,” Journal of Business Ethics
80 (2007): 481–98; the American Management Association/ePolicy Institute. Electronic Monitoring Surveillance Survey (2007);
Bernd Carsten Stahl, Mary Prior, Sara Wilford, Dervla Collins, “Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: If People Don’t Care,
Then What is the Relevance?” in John Weckert (ed.), Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and Solutions (Idea
Group Publishing, 2005). This last reference explores not only how employees or other subjects react to being surveilled (they
do not necessarily see it as problematic, within certain limits) but also how custodians and policy-creators of the surveillance
methods react to their roles and the ethical dimensions of their functions. These researchers acknowledge real limitations to their
empirical methods (small sample sizes and lack of generalizability) but their findings are still thought-provoking, given that they
counter the general, decades-long consensus of scholars in multiple fields that people do not like being surveilled, even if they
are willing to tolerate it in some circumstances and contexts.
26. Readings on Risks to Individuals of Surveillance: For a good academic book-length treatment of the range of issues involved
in workplace surveillance, see John Weckert (ed.), Electronic Monitoring in the Workplace: Controversies and Solutions (Idea
Group Publishing, 2005) (one article in this book is cited immediately above). Core arguments for and against employee
monitoring are examined in Kirsten Martin and R. Edward Freeman, “Some Problems with Employee Monitoring,” Journal of
Business Ethics 43 (2003): 353–61. For an article-length contemporary and a book-length classic exploration of the negative
subjective experience of surveillance, see Michael P. Lynch, “Privacy and the Threat to the Self,” New York Times, 22 June 2013,
retrieved at https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/06/22/privacy-and-the-threat-to-the-self/; Sissela Bok, Secrets: On the
Ethics of Concealment and Revelation (Pantheon Books, 1983).
27. The importance of context to acceptance of electronic monitoring is explored in: Lamar Pierce, Daniel C. Snow, Andrew McA-
fee, “Cleaning House: The Impact of Information Technology Monitoring on Employee Theft and Productivity,” MIT Sloan
Research Paper No. 5029-13, October 2014, retrieved at: http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Pages/item.aspx?num=51564.
28. Jessica Stern and Ronald Shouten, “Lessons from the anthrax letters” in Matthew Bunn and Scott D. Sagan (eds.), Insider
Threat (Cornell University Press, 2016), 93–94.
29. George Orwell, 1984 (Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1949).
30. Assessing the Mind of the Malicious Insider: Using a Behavioral Model and Data Analytics to Improve Continuous Evaluation
(http://www.insaonline.org/i/d/a/b/MindofInsider_wp.aspx. See also INSA, Leveraging Emerging Technologies in the Security
Clearance Process, March 2014

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31. Richard A. Clarke, Michael J. Morell, Geoffrey R. Stone, Cass R. Sunstein, and Peter Swire, Liberty and Security in a Chang-
ing World: Report and Recommendations of the President’s Review Group on Intelligence and Communications Technologies,”
December 12, 2013. Available at https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2013/12/18/liberty-and-security-changing-world.
32. United Kingdom House of Lords, Select Committee on the Constitution, 2nd Report of Session 2008–09, Surveillance: Citizens
and the State, 27. Available at https://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/ldconst/18/18.pdf.
33. Emrys Westacott, “Does Surveillance Make Us Morally Better?” in Philosophy Now 79 (June/July, 2010). Available at https://
philosophynow.org/search?q=westacott+surveillance.

v v v

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Why Spy?

The Psychology of Espionage

Dr. Ursula M. Wilder
They [the KGB] went around and they wrapped all the agents up. I was
amazed. I was anxious and amazed and shocked and scared. And in the
course of the following years, all of the agents I told them about were
recalled, transferred, arrested, whatnot, and then later on some of them
were shot. . . . The KGB later told me that they regretted acutely that they
had been forced to take those steps [thereby triggering a mole hunt at
“In the whole march of CIA]. Had I known they were going to do that, I either would not have
gone and sold them that information or I would have passed them out
history, a little espio- one by one.
nage doesn’t amount to — CIA mole Aldrich “Rick” Amesa
a hill of beans.” There was just one part of me, a small part of me, I guess, that wanted
— FBI spy Robert something that was a bit abandoned, a bit uncontrolled, almost suicidal,
Hanssen maybe.
— Former CIA watch officer William Kampiles

v v v

People who commit espionage sustain double lives. When a person passes
classified information to an enemy, he or she initiates a clandestine second
identity. From that time on, a separation must be maintained between the
person’s secret “spy” identity, with its clandestine activities, and the “non-spy”
public self. The covert activities inescapably exert a powerful influence on the
person’s overt life. They necessitate ongoing efforts at concealment, compart-
mentation, and deception of those not witting of the espionage, which includes
almost everyone in the spy’s life. For some people, sustaining such a double
identity is exciting and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful. For a

a. “Why I Spied: Aldrich Ames,” New York Times interview with Tim Weiner, 31 July 1994.
A career CIA case officer, Ames was arrested in 1994 for spying over a nine-year period for
the KGB and its successor, the Ministry of Security for the Russian Federation. Ames made
a calculated decision to give the Russians the names of US penetrations in Russia who were
in position to alert their American handlers—and therefore the FBI—that there was a mole
in the CIA. All but one were executed. Weiner wrote, “He sold a Soviet Embassy official
the names of two KGB officers secretly working for the FBI in Washington. The price:
$50,000. The next month, he volunteered the names of every Soviet intelligence official
and military officer he knew was working in the United States, along with whatever else he
knew about CIA operations in Moscow . . . he received a wedding present from the KGB:
$2 million.” Ames is serving a life sentence without parole.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author
and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement
of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of
any component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  19


Why Spy?

For some people, sustaining a double identity is exciting

and desirable; for others, it is draining and stressful. Third, ease of opportunity is
a prerequisite for espionage. The
few heroic people, spying is a moral First, any consideration of mo- potential spy must have access not
imperative that they would prefer to tivation in espionage must closely only to classified information but also
avoid but feel compelled to act on. examine personality pathology. Per- to an interested “customer.” The ma-
sonality is the mix of traits, attitudes, nipulations of such customers, who
This article focuses on spies and values that characterize a person. are often professionally trained to
whose espionage appears to be Spies frequently have pathological present themselves to potential spies
primarily self-interested, rather than personality features that pave the way as rewarding and safe patrons, can be
altruistic or self-sacrificing. Within to espionage, such as thrill seeking, a major determinant in motivating a
this criminal or treasonous type, a sense of entitlement, or a desire vulnerable person to take the step of
specific psychological factors com- for power and control. In addition, committing espionage.
monly occur, providing a guide to healthy countervailing traits—such as
understanding the motives, behavior, The elements of personality, crisis,
a calm temperament or strong sense
and experiences of this type of spy. and opportunity do not operate inde-
of responsibility—may be either
The risk of espionage can be reduced pendently. Vulnerabilities in one area
weak or entirely absent.
through understanding these psycho- generate vulnerabilities in the others.
logical patterns and tailoring counter- The second essential motivator A person with a problematic mix of
measures accordingly. is an experience of acute personal personality features will tend to have
crisis resulting in intense distress. more than the average number of life
Though the spy may have regrets crises, including job terminations,
Elements of Espionage in hindsight, at the time he or she
initiates the espionage, it appears a
Three essential elements set the ployees to establish a baseline of employee
logical decision to solve a problem or
conditions for a person’s entry into attitudes and opinions regarding counterin-
the only option available to escape a
espionage: telligence and security policies, procedures,
desperate or painful situation.b requirements, and training. The results
• dysfunctions in the personality attest to employee awareness of the links
between psychological factors and counter-
• a state of crisis Offenders,” Slammer Psychology Team intelligence risks. Those surveyed identified
Technical Report, May 1992; and “Manag- emotional instability related to ambition,
• ease of opportunity ing At Risk Employees,” Project Slammer anger leading to a need for revenge, feel-
The converse is true as well. Safe- Report, February 1993. Project Slammer is ings of being unrecognized and unreward-
guards or strengths in these areas an Intelligence Community research effort, ed, and loneliness as the top vulnerabilities
initiated in 1983, to understand espionage on the road to espionage. They ranked such
mitigate the risk of espionage.a through in-depth interviews and psycholog- problem behaviors as drug abuse and illicit
ical evaluations of incarcerated spies. More sex as second, and various mental crises or
a. “Why People Spy,” Project Slammer than 40 spies were interviewed. stresses brought on by debt, work issues,
Report, December 1992; “Personality b. In the wake of the Aldrich Ames case, the or psychological factors such as depression
Characteristics of Convicted Espionage CIA surveyed 1,790 randomly selected em- as third.

Scope Note
A classified version of this article was published in Studies in Intelligence in December 2003. The concepts discussed in the
2003 article are unchanged in this revision, but the case study information contained in textboxes in the original article have
been updated with unclassified or declassified material made available since 2003. This revision is intended to supplement
the author’s re-examination, 14 years later, of the psychological drivers of espionage and of intentional leaking of intelli-
gence data. The latter is an issue the original article and this, now unclassified, article do not address because such leaking
was not then the prominent problem it now is. The new article, “Why Spy? Why Leak?” begins on page 1.

Unless otherwise noted, quotations and information about the convicted spies used in this article are drawn from multiple
sources, including law enforcement investigative documents, counterintelligence reports, court documents, and publicly
available media accounts and books about US espionage and intelligence.

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Why Spy?

No typology can encompass the full complexity of the

relationship or family problems, and psyche of any individual spy.
financial troubles. Such personal
crises will, in turn, further stress this, everybody, but money I don’t believe that I was affect-
and magnify problematic traits and solves everything. And it did. ing the security of this country
behaviors just when the person needs And why did it all fall apart? [the United States] and the safe-
most to function with stability and You wanna know? I’ll tell you. ty of its people. . .  . I didn’t give
maturity. Agents “spotting” a vulner- Because the Soviets cut off that stuff to the Soviets because
able person may insinuate themselves the money supply and the old I thought espionage is a dirty
into the situation and find ways to lady—I couldn’t pay her off game. I mean, that’s trivial.
exacerbate the personal crisis, “ripen- anymore—so she picked up the
ing” a targeted person’s vulnerability phone [tipping off the FBI]. —CIA mole Rick Amesc
to recruitment. Handlers will then Otherwise I would not be sitting
continue to manipulate a recruited Psychopaths are predators,
here. Money solves everything.a
asset’s vulnerabilities to maintain the approaching life with remorseless-
person’s long-term engagement in —Navy spy John Walker ness, manipulation, pursuit of risk
espionage. and excitement, and sharp, short-
If I really thought of the conse- term tactical abilities alongside poor
The descriptive categories that quences all the time, I cer- long-term and strategic planning.
follow are offered as a map of the tainly wouldn’t have been in They frequently leave people with a
psychological terrain of espionage. the business. I’m sure that the positive first impression. Over time
All maps oversimplify to a degree, people from Dow Chemicals in and with extended exposure, the ini-
and so does this one. No typology Delaware, I’m sure that they tial impression wears away as people
can encompass the full complexity didn’t think of the consequences become aware of, or are directly
of the psyche of any individual spy. of selling Napalm. If they did, victimized by, the psychopath. Before
Moreover, a proportion of people they wouldn’t be working at the they are unmasked, psychopaths can
caught in criminally oriented or factory. I doubt very much that cause severe damage to individuals
self-serving espionage will not fit the they felt any more responsible and institutions.
predicted patterns. Therefore, the ty- for the ultimate use than I did
pology must be applied with caution. for my equipment. Psychopaths cannot consistently
Trained professionals can apply these follow laws, rules, and customs and
concepts to mitigate risk in contexts —Former CIA Communications do not understand the social neces-
such as applicant screenings and Officer, illegal arms merchant, sity of doing so. They have limited
evaluations for clearances. Managers and access agent for the Cubans capacity to experience the feelings
and other members of the Intelli- Frank Terpilb of guilt, shame, and remorse that
gence Community may use this in- are the building blocks of mature
formation to sharpen their awareness a. See case study on page 24.
of potentially risky behavior patterns. b. Frank Terpil: Confessions of a Danger-
They should bear in mind, however, ous Man, documentary directed by Anthony intelligence as an access agent, targeting
that these psychological patterns do Thomas, 1981, WGBH (Boston). Terpil’s former CIA colleagues. He died in Havana
comment related to his selling weapons, in March 2016.
not always lead to trouble—and that
many troubled people do not exhibit explosives, torture instruments, poisons, c. In the 1994 New York Times interview
and classified information to such custom- from which this quote is drawn, reporter
these patterns.
ers as African dictator Idi Amin, Libya, Weiner described Ames as follows: “Since
and assorted terrorists. Terpil was a CIA the 53-year-old Ames was arrested, his hair
communications officer who resigned under and skin have grayed perceptibly. On the
Psychopathy duress in 1972. Arrested in New York in surface, he is smooth, beguiling, sometimes
1979 for illegal arms dealing, he fled the charming. He fumbles for words only when
Money was a solution. Sorry United States while free on bail. He was he considers the nature of his treason and
about this, Hollywood. Sorry tried in absentia and sentenced to over 60 then that calm exterior cracks. His interior?
about this, Church. Sorry about years in prison for illegal arms dealing. As There is an emptiness where pain or rage or
a fugitive, he began working with Cuban shame should be.”

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  21


Why Spy?

Case Studies in Investigating Espionage:  Use and Limitations

Experts in the Intelligence Community and outside scholars rely on case studies for insights into the motives and behavior
of those who spy. Case studies look backward and highlight warning signs that in hindsight become obvious. Because it
can be easy to discount the factors that obscured such signs, case study methods run the risk of hindsight and confirmation
bias, focusing solely on the spy and insufficiently on the context. Often spies go undetected by exploiting or manipulating
routine organizational processes and accepted customs or practices, first to “survive” in the system despite problems in
personality and job performance, and later to cover their espionage. Sometimes larger organizational variables erode or
undermine counterintelligence and security practices to such a degree that these variables are arguably equally instrumen-
tal in espionage. The term “systemic failure” is often used in official reports after major catastrophes to account for such
variables. It is important, therefore, not to assume that the problem of espionage resides solely in the nature of the individu-
al spy; problems in the context within which the spy operates can be equally serious.a

Alert readers will point out that experts in espionage only have arrested spies to study and that there may be some who
have “gotten away with it.” These spies would by definition not be included in our study sample, and therefore our model
only describes those who get caught. Ironically, many caught spies eventually tell investigators they were certain they had
the skills to avoid capture, unlike their less skilled counterparts. Nicholson, for example, said this about his fellow case
officer Ames, whose arrest prompted Nicholson to start his own espionage and “do better” at not getting caught. FBI special
agent Hanseen served in counterintelligence and was convinced he could outperform the spies he was tasked to study and
catch.

It is extremely difficult to predict complex, relatively rare human behavior such as espionage because of the problem of
false positives: many people demonstrate the common warning signs that can lead to the the decision to spy but most
will never engage in espionage. It is equally difficult for an organization to detect, measure, and therefore account for the
reasons behind good-news “success” stories, for example, when a budding insider threat is recognized early and effectively
addressed before causing great harm.

The small number of arrested spies means there is insufficient statistical power to conduct meaningful empirical analyses to
predict who in an organization will become a spy. For example, the press dubbed 1985 the “Year of the Spy” because of a
string of high-profile cases: eight Intelligence Community insiders were arrested that year on charges of espionage. In fact,
the previous year the FBI had apprehended a much larger number: 12.b Even in these two consecutive “banner years” for
espionage arrests, the total number of spies (20 individuals) was vanishingly small compared to the millions in the US gov-
ernment with top secret accesses who did not commit espionage. The low base rate for espionage cases has not changed
since the mid-80s. The 2015 Annual Report of Security Clearances Determinations by the Office of the Director of National
Intelligence reports that 1,220,678 top secret security clearances were active in 2015, and arrests for espionage in 2015
were in no way comparable to the “high” of 20 cases in 1984 and 1985.

In sum, as a result of these limitations, the Intelligence Community turns to in-depth psychological assessments to better
understand the psychology of espionage.c The long-term consensus among Community counterintelligence professionals
(psychologists, law enforcement and investigative professionals, and analysts) is that the key individual variables motivating
espionage described in this article—personality, crisis, and opportunity—are supported through the accumulation of case
studies of arrested spies since formal psychological and investigative studies began during and after WWII.

a. A good example of a study that addresses the relationship of organizational processes to an insider crime is Amy B. Zegart’s case
study of the Army psychiatrist, Maj. Nidal Malik Hasan, who killed 14 soldiers and wounded 43 in a military deployment center at Ft.
Hood, TX. See “The Fort Hood Terrorist Attack: An Organizational Postmortem of Army and FBI Deficiencies” in Matthew Bunn and
Scott D. Sagan (eds.), Insider Threats (Cornell University Press, 2017), 42–74. The book contains numerous other useful case studies.
b. https://www.fbi.gov/history/famous-cases/year-of-the-spy-1985.
c. Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennet, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 4th ed. (MIT Press, 2005).

22  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

In the workplace, psychopaths are noteworthy for their

conscience and moral functioning. central roles in frequent, enduring, and bitter conflicts.
They are facile liars. In fact, many
psychopaths take inordinate plea-
his access to classified materials. resolve and courage are required to
sure in lying because perpetrating an
Walker also exhibited a psychopath’s publicly take on psychopaths because
effective “con” gives them a sense
excessive need for excitement and of their ruthlessness, manipulative
of power and control over the person
characteristic pursuit of thrills and acumen, and the thrill and excitement
lied to, an emotional charge some-
adventure. This need for stimulation they experience from generating
times termed “duping delight.”a Their
can express itself in multiple ways stress and conflict.
glee in manipulating others may be
and in many contexts, such as in
so acute that it overrides judgment Those in the bureaucracy respon-
gleefully breaking rules and disre-
and good sense, causing them to take sible for oversight or disciplinary
garding social conventions, deliber-
foolish risks simply for the pleasure functions—such as security or
ately provoking authority, harming
of temporarily conning others. finance officers—will frequently
others or their property, using drugs
illegally, and engaging in hazardous be the first targets of psychopathic
Psychopaths are interpersonally
physical activities such as excessive manipulations. These institutional
exploitative. The condition is not
speeding or extremely dangerous watchdogs or disciplinarians are
infrequently associated with acute
sports. often in positions to collect hard
cruelty and the enjoyment of in-
data against the psychopath, such as
flicting pain on others. Harming or
Finally, psychopaths rarely learn fraudulent accountings or inaccurate
alarming others is, to psychopaths, its
from mistakes and have difficulty time-and-attendance records. There-
own reward. They pursue these plea-
seeing beyond the present. Conse- fore, they present an especially acute
sures with relish irrespective of the
quently, they have deficient long- threat to a psychopath’s freedom to
risks involved or the limited potential
term planning, and their judgment is maneuver undetected within a bu-
for gain.
weak. In contrast to their problems reaucracy. They often are subjected
Navy spy John Walker illustrates in strategic planning, psychopaths to vicious attacks instigated by the
the manipulative, exploitative, pred- can be supremely skilled tacticians psychopath, which may take personal
atory characteristics of psychopaths. and exceptionally quick on their feet. rather than professional form. These
(See case study on next page.) Faced Absent the usual prohibition against preemptive strikes serve to obstruct
with retirement, he aggressively violating rules or social customs, or obscure legitimate efforts to bring
recruited family members to preserve psychopaths are tactically unbound to light concerns about the psycho-
and remarkably uninhibited. path’s integrity and behavior. In
addition, if a psychopath’s immediate
Snakes in Suits supervisor, peers, or subordinates
a. The psychological literature on psychop-
athy and its cousin, antisocial personality,
In the workplace, psychopaths are try to feed their concerns upward to
is voluminous. Classics include: Hervey noteworthy for their central roles in management, they often find that the
Cleckley, Mask of Sanity: An Attempt to frequent, enduring, and bitter con- psychopath has been there before
Reinterpret the So-Called Psychopathic flicts. Psychopaths exert themselves them and had prepared key managers
Personality (Originally published in 1941, to charm select superiors, whereas to expect such criticism. The warn-
it is now in a fifth edition with a slightly their immediate peers experience
different subtitle, “An Attempt to Clarify ings, therefore, fall on deaf ears or
Some Issues . . .”.); Robert Hare, Without
their abuse and quickly come to view result in blowback to the messengers.
Conscience: The Disturbing World of the them with mistrust. Peers see them
Psychopaths Among Us (Guilford Press, as possessors of a guilt-free lack of Because psychopaths thrive in
1993); Paul Babiak and Robert Hare, integrity, as remorseless pursuers of an atmosphere of turbulence and
Snakes in Suits: When Psychopaths Go to their own agendas, and as ruthless instability, corporate cultures that tol-
Work (HarperBusiness, 2007); M.J. Vitacco, eliminators of threatening critics or erate risk taking and controversial or
“Psychopathy,” The British Journal of Psy-
obstacles—even legitimate compet- even abusive behaviors will provide
chiatry 191 (2007): 357; R. Hare and C.
S. Neumann, “Psychopathy as a Clinical itors. Subordinates of psychopaths congenial ground for them. Organiza-
and Empirical Construct,” Annual Review most often fear them. A great deal of tions in which the usual institutional
of Clinical Psychology 4 (2008): 217–46. systems of control or supervision are

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  23


Why Spy?

The John Walker Spy Ring: Keeping it in the Family

John A. Walker joined the Navy in 1955. He developed into an experienced and competent communications specialist,
received numerous awards and promotions, and retired as a chief warrant officer after 20 years in the service. At the time of
his retirement, he had been spying for the Soviet Union for a decade. Before leaving the Navy, Walker recruited three sub-
agents with active clearances to ensure that his espionage could continue and that he would retain personal control over
the feed mechanisms to his handlers.

Walker recruited his friend Jerry Whitworth, a Naval communications specialist who, like Walker, had a “top secret crypto”
clearance. Walker and Whitworth agreed to a “50/50 split” of the proceeds, with Walker functioning as the middleman. After
retirement. Walker also recruited his brother, Arthur, a retired Navy lieutenant commander, who was working for a defense
contractor. He also signed up his 20-year-old son, Michael, who had enlisted in the Navy. Walker used greed to induce his
brother and son to spy, though during post-arrest debriefings Michael said his primary motive had been a desire to be like
his father.

Walker’s daughter enlisted in the Army in 1978. He offered her “a great deal of money” if she would seek a position in Army
communications, giving her $100 and promising that this was only the beginning should she cooperate. She steadfastly re-
fused, but he continued to contact her periodically to ask if she had given it further thought. After his daughter left the Army,
Walker appeared at her residence accompanied by Whitworth and Whitworth’s wife and again tried to recruit her, telling her
that his “man in Europe” was willing to provide her with special equipment to spy but was worried that she was getting “too
old” to reenlist. She rebuffed him again, but Walker later sent her $500, characterizing the money as an advance from his
“man in Europe.”

Walker and his subagents were arrested in 1985 after his ex-wife called the FBI after he had stopped support payments to
her. She was stunned when her tip-off also resulted in the arrest of her son and said afterward that she would never have
called the FBI had she known that Walker had recruited their son. Walker’s daughter called the FBI separately in an attempt
to regain custody of her only child, which she had surrendered during divorce proceedings from her husband, who had
threatened to reveal her father’s espionage to the FBI if she fought for custody.

During the debriefings after his arrest, Walker characterized his spying as an exciting game and adventure that was also
“quite profitable.” Asked if, in hindsight, he would have done things differently, he joked that he should have killed his
alcoholic ex-wife, and he maintained that he was caught only because he lost his capacity to pay for “the drunk’s” silence.
Walker’s exploitative and callous attitude and inability to appreciate his role in damaging the lives of others are characteris-
tic of psychopaths.

Walker died in prison in August 2014. His son was paroled in 2000 after serving 15 years of a 25 year sentence.

weak—such as those with inadequate and lifestyle support for troubled Narcissism
personnel measurement and tracking employees. These unique institution- I have had much opportunity
systems or with vulnerable informa- al controls are essential because the to reflect on what happened .
tion systems— will be particularly Intelligence Community’s compart- . . Greed did not motivate me.
unprotected against psychopathic mentation of information, secrecy It never did. If it had, I would
manipulations. regarding programs and activities, have taken the actions I did far
and constant mobility of personnel sooner. There were many chanc-
The Intelligence Community has make it relatively easy for unscrupu- es to pursue greed through sus-
both more protection from and more lous employees to maneuver unde- tained contacts with Russians
vulnerability to deliberate manipu- tected and to manipulate the system. and others in [various locations]
lation by insiders. The institutional In the national security environment, . . . but I didn’t. This is not
safeguards are greater than in most such behaviors have the potential to meant to be an excuse, just a
workplaces because of rigorous med- do especially grave harm. reflection. Patriotism, Loyalty,
ical and security screenings of appli- Honor—all these had once been
cants, regular security reviews of the of paramount importance to me.
workforce, and programs for medical They all took a back seat when

24  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

Convinced of their own inherent superiority, narcissists

my true loves were threat- blame others for their problems or for negative things
ened— my children and my that happen to them.
future.

—CIA spy Jim Nicholsona Narcissistic personalities are char- control. Convinced of their own in-
acterized by exaggerated self-love herent superiority, they blame others
Yes, and there were Kapos, too, and self-centeredness. Alongside an for their problems or for negative
during the concentration camps. all-encompassing grandiosity runs a things that happen to them, including
subtle but equally pervasive insecuri- social rejection. Because they do not
—Navy civilian analyst Jay
ty, into which narcissists have limited consider themselves at fault for any
Pollardb
insight. Their internal world typically troubles or setbacks, narcissists feel
is built around fantasies about their at liberty to take whatever steps they
remarkable personal abilities, charis- deem necessary to redress wrongs
a. Harold James Nicholson, in a letter ma, beauty, and prospects. They are or regain a sense of mastery and
written from prison addressed to a senior compelled to exhibit their presumed superiority.
Intelligence Community official. A career
CIA case officer, Nicholson was arrested
stellar attributes and constantly seek
affirmation from others. Though their Narcissistic self-absorption should
in 1996 for spying for the Russians, to
whom he had volunteered in 1994 when imaginings distort common sense or not be confused with an inability to
he was completing a tour of duty as the everyday reality, narcissists never- grasp the perspective of others. Their
second-in-command of a post in Asia. In theless believe in the accuracy of hunger for affirmation produces acute
addition to passing a wide range of intelli- their daydreams and act accordingly. awareness of the reactions they are
gence documents, Nicholson compromised provoking from the people around
the identities of numerous CIA colleagues
Others, therefore, often experience
them as lacking common sense and them. This deep hunger for affirma-
working under cover, including the identi-
ties of many newly hired students destined twisting reality. When facts or other tion also makes them vulnerable to
for their first posts. (He had been one of people contradict or interfere with manipulation, particularly by people
their trainers as a senior faculty member their fantasies, narcissists become whose admiration or approval they
at a CIA training center.) He pleaded combative and vengeful. Their de- desire. Narcissists are particularly
guilty and was sentenced to 23 years and sensitive to authorities or to other-
7 months imprisonment. While serving
fensive hostility to criticism— even
mild feedback—is often well out of wise socially prominent or powerful
his sentence, he induced his youngest son,
Nathan, then 22, to contact and collect over proportion to whatever provocation people. Conversely, they can be inor-
$47,000 from Russian officials, which the sparked it. dinately indifferent to or contemptu-
elder Nicholson called a “pension.” FBI ous of the feelings or needs of people
agents were tracking Nathan and arrested Narcissists possess a careless dis- whom they believe to be insignificant
him in 2008; his father then pleaded guilty regard for personal integrity and can or social inferiors.
to charges of conspiracy to act as an agent be very unscrupulous and manipula-
of a foreign government and conspiracy Narcissists in the Workplace
to commit money laundering. Eight years
tive in pursuing their own ends. They
are, on the whole, indifferent to the Narcissists are often magnetic
were added to his sentence, which he
is now serving in a federal “supermax” needs of others, who in turn see them because their supreme self-confi-
penitentiary. His son cooperated with the as having flawed social consciences. dence wedded to their urgent drive
investigation and was sentenced to five Narcissists feel entitled to special— to impress enables them to project
years probation (see “Twice Convicted even extraordinary— favors and the appearance of talent and charm
ex-CIA spy gets 8 more years,” USA Today, effectively. Over time, the charisma
18 January 2011).
status that they do not believe they
have to reciprocate. They heedlessly wears thin as it becomes evident
b. This comment reflects Pollard’s in- that this appearance is not built on
exploit others emotionally and finan-
dictment of Jewish-American officials,
cially, or in other ways that suit their substance, but rather on fantasies and
including a federal judge, involved in his
prosecution, trial, and life sentence for ends. They are deeply antagonistic to fabrications. Furthermore, narcissists’
spying for Israel. In “60 Minutes: The sharing decisionmaking with others, pervasive tendency to see others as
Pollards,” an interview with Mike Wallace, irrespective of the legitimacy of the inferior causes them to be needlessly
CBS, 20 November 1988. (See case study claims of others for some degree of sarcastic, belittling, or supercilious.
on page 26.)

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  25


Why Spy?

Jonathan Jay Pollard: Self-Appointed Hero

Jonathan Pollard, a civilian analyst with the Navy, spied for Israel from June 1984 until his arrest on 21 November 1985.
Pollard was highly responsive to Israeli tasking and compromised numerous intelligence documents from CIA, NSA, DIA, and
the US military. He has consistently characterized his espionage as the duty of a loyal Israeli soldier and claimed he was a
martyr, comparing his life of incarceration to that of an Israeli pilot abandoned after being shot down in enemy territory.

Pollard’s pre-espionage history showed a pattern of self-aggrandizement and lapses in judgment. As an undergraduate at
Stanford University, he bragged to fellow students that he was a Mossad agent, claiming that Israel was paying his tuition
and that he had fought and been wounded in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In one memorable episode, he brandished a pistol
in front of startled fellow students, loudly proclaiming that he needed to carry it for protection because of his intelligence
activities. A former college roommate described Pollard as having a penchant for “dirty jokes” and being so immersed in
fantasy war games on campus that he was nicknamed “Colonel” (of the Mossad).a

Pollard’s conduct and attitude problems continued after he secured an analytic job with the Navy. One Monday, he arrived
disheveled and unshaven for an interview for a new position, claiming that the Irish Republican Army had kidnapped his
then-fiancée and he had spent the weekend securing her release. This incident went unreported, although he did not get
the job.b In a 1980 effort to join the Navy’s HUMINT intelligence element, Pollard made fictitious claims to have completed
an M.A., to be proficient in Afrikaans, and to have applied for a commission in the naval reserve. Even more far-fetched, he
told his immediate supervisor that he had valuable South African contacts because his father had been a CIA chief of station
in South Africa. (Pollard’s father was a microbiologist on the faculty of Notre Dame University.) Based on these fabrications.
Pollard secured the assignment. Once on the job, his falsehoods became apparent and his erratic behavior raised further
alarms. He showed up at meetings against orders, claiming he was entitled to attend, and he disclosed classified informa-
tion without authorization to a South African defense attaché, perhaps in an attempt to sustain his lies about his valuable
liaison contacts.

In a letter from jail in 1989 designed to raise political support for an Israeli-fostered campaign to gain his release from his
life sentence, Pollard wrote, “I do not believe that the Draconian sentence meted out to me was in any way commensurate
with the crime I committed. As I have tried to point out on innumerable occasions, I was neither accused of nor charged with
having intended to harm this country, as I could have been under the provisions of the espionage statute. In other words,
I did not spy ‘against’ the United States. Nowhere in my indictment . . . was I ever described as a ‘traitor,’ which is hardly
a surprise given the fact that the operation with which I was associated actually served to strengthen America’s long-term
security interests in the Middle East.” Pollard’s lack of insight into his failures in judgment and ethics and his recasting of
events to conform to his grandiose fantasies and self-image are consistent with narcissistic personalities.c

a. Wolf Blitzer, Territory of Lies: The Rise, Fall and Betrayal of Jonathan Jay Pollard (Harper Paperbacks, 1990), 36.
b. Seymour M. Hersh, “The Traitor,” New Yorker, 18 January 1999: 27.
c. In a 15 May 1998 interview with the Associated Press, Pollard expressed regret. “There is nothing good that came as a result of
my actions,” he conceded “I tried to serve two countries at the same time. . . . That does not work. . . . People could identify with my
predicament . . . because they knew they could be in my place through love of state. . . . There can be no justification for violating the
trust given an intelligence officer. I made a mistake.” In November 2015 Pollard was released on parole after serving 30 years of his life
sentence.

People around narcissists may the recipients of antagonistic feelings the interpersonal conflicts they habit-
note stark contrasts in their conduct at distinct odds with their view of ually generate.
toward different classes of people, themselves as infinitely superior and
depending on their social rank and admirable. They have limited insight In addition, narcissists often show
usefulness. Furthermore, the hostile into their role in these dynamics and a pattern of violating organizational
and vindictive attacks narcissists tend to blame others for their own rules and disregarding institutional or
mete out when others challenge their lack of social success, in the work- managerial authority. They trivialize
grandiosity tend to provoke angry place as elsewhere. Their managers inconvenient regulations or hold
responses in return. The result is that will frequently have to intervene in themselves superior and exempt from
narcissists frequently find themselves policies, directives, and laws. They

26  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

It can be very difficult for managers to know where to

feel entitled to favorable workplace draw the line between a tolerable or useful level of nar-
treatment— whether this comes in cissism and more dangerous self-absorption and self-ag-
the form of forgiveness for trans- grandizement.
gressions, early or frequent promo-
tions, attractive work assignments,
this was a—a real damaging Observers frequently compare
or other advantages such as having
thing that I had done. I thought immature adults to adolescents.
their requests expedited by support
that more good really could Attitudes and behaviors that are ex-
staff. They are acutely sensitive
come out of it. That’s the reason pected and even endearing in normal
to the advancement of others and
that I returned to the CIA, adolescents or children, however, are
become suspicious and angry if they
contacting them and obviously, unsettling, disruptive, and potentially
find themselves being left behind.
you know, the whole thing was hazardous in adults.
They perceive workplace competitors
backwards and I’m not sure if—
who get ahead of them as “steal- The most salient characteristic
even if—I’ll ever really know
ing” advantages or rewards that are of immaturity is the ascendancy of
how it happened. It’s—when
rightfully their own. Finally, narcis- fantasy over reality. Immature adults
I think back about it—it—it
sists will lie, fabricate information or spend an inordinate amount of time
almost seems impossible that it
events, willfully exaggerate accom- daydreaming, deliberately calling to
could have happened but it did
plishments, and often believe their mind ideas that stimulate pleasant or
and I hope maybe it, you know,
own fabrications, all in the interest of exciting emotions. In contrast to ma-
clears up.
appearing successful or important. ture adults, immature adults do not
—Former CIA watch officer readily distinguish their private world
Many of these characteristics,
William Kampilesa from objective external reality and,
properly contained, can be very use-
in fact, may expect reality to conform
ful in certain types of work requiring No one is born a spy. Spies are to their self-serving and stimulating
flexibility, charisma, and persua- made. Some are volunteers, fantasies. Their fantasies about their
sion—for example, in sales, politics, many are coerced, but all begin special powers, talents, status, pros-
and case officer work. It can be very somewhere on the other side pects, and future actions can be so
difficult for managers to know where from where they inevitably end seductive that they become resentful
to draw the line between a tolerable up. . . . My age at the time of of conflicting real-world truth.
or useful level of narcissism—what entry into the world of espio-
psychologists call healthy narcis- nage was nineteen. I was one of All three types of personalities
sism—and more dangerous self-ab- the youngest spies ever in the described in this article are distin-
sorption and self-aggrandizement. history of the United States. . guished by active fantasy lives, but
One way to make this determination . . This story is not only one of the fantasies tend to differ in both
is to look for positive, counterbalanc- manipulation. Like all spy sto-
ing features in the personality—such ries, it is also one of betrayal. .
as tolerance of competition and a . . I betrayed and was betrayed. An American’s Cold War Journey [Cre-
realistic self-perception—that control Today, years after my release, ateSpace, 2013], 11–12). Carney was a
and channel the narcissism into pro- years after my kidnapping and mole for the East Germans while he was
ductive pursuits. a US Air Force linguist. After he was
trial, I am confronted by this
exfiltrated to East Germany, he developed
reality on a near daily basis. detailed targeting files on Americans for
Immaturity
My thinking before I joined the them. (See case study on page 32.) The
—Enlisted Air Force linguist kidnapping Carney refers to in this quote
CIA was, I think, noble and Jeffrey Carneyb is his arrest after German reunification
patriotic and all this, help the in 1990, when a tip from his former East
United States or whatever. And German handler led officers from the US
a. See case study on page 28.
even when this happened, I Air Force Office of Special Investigations
didn’t feel anti-American or an- b. These quotations are from the opening to seize him in Germany and return him to
ti-CIA. It never came to me that chapter of Jeffery M. Carney’s self-pub- the United States for trial. (See case study
lished memoir (Against All Enemies: on page 32.)

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  27


Why Spy?

William Kampiles: Self-Styled Special Agent

In March 1978, after resigning under duress from his position as a watch officer in the CIA Operations Center, William
Kampiles passed to the Soviet Union a top secret KH-11 satellite technical manual. He received $3,000 for this document
that contained detailed information on a major US intelligence collection system.

Kampiles had joined the CIA in 1977 at age 22. He was offered a watch officer position when his application for Directorate
of Operations (DO) case officer training was rejected. He arrived at work with distorted notions of his abilities and prospects
and quickly became disgruntled. Uninterested and contemptuous of his assigned duties, he clashed with his supervisor, and
his persistent efforts to transfer to the DO led to a formal notice that he was required to serve in his present position for two
years, which only deepened his disgruntlement.

Through personal contacts, Kampiles managed to secure an interview with the DO Career Training Staff. His interviewer de-
scribed him as immature and lacking self-discipline and judgment. Highlights of their discussion include Kampiles revealing
that he had only accepted the watch officer position as a way to secure entry into the DO and that he would resign from the
CIA if he were not accepted. He attributed his difficulties in the Operations Center to his reputation as a playboy, and when
his interviewer asked if this reputation was deserved, he boasted of his successes with women. Questioned about what he
had liked best about a past menial job, he quipped that it was the expense account.

Kampiles smuggled a KH-11 manual out of the Operations Center to try to get his CIA supervisor in trouble when it was
found to be missing. He also vaguely envisaged that he could turn around his upcoming termination by using the document
to initiate a free-lance, James Bond-style operation, thus persuading the CIA that he was indeed case officer material and
could be deployed as a double agent against Moscow. Four months after his resignation, he volunteered the document to
the Soviets in Athens, Greece, where he was visiting relatives. Upon his return to the United States, he got in touch with
a former CIA colleague and revealed his contact with the Soviets. The colleague asked him to describe his activities in a
letter. Kampiles wrote about his “accidental” meeting with a Soviet in Athens and noted that other meetings followed, but
he did not directly admit to passing documents. “What I have talked about thus far has been generalized,” he explained. “I
did this because to be entirely specific it would take the length of a short book to narrate this entire story. If you think there
might be agency [i.e., CIA] interest, I might be willing to discuss this experience in full detail.”

The letter led to an FBI investigation and Kampiles’s arrest for espionage, for which he was sentenced to 40 years in prison.
Reflecting on his motives and state of mind at the time that he took the KH-11 manual and later when he passed it to the
Soviets, Kampiles told his FBI interrogators, “I think you know, boiling it down, I think it was monetary and the glamour and
the excitement, that this sort of thing might bring on . . . the danger . . . the intrigue, all that together.” Kampiles’s immersion
in a fantasy world, his belief that both reality and other people would play along, the profound failures in perception and
judgment caused by his fantasies, and his initial shock upon his arrest and eventual remorse at the harm he caused are all
consistent with immaturity.

content and degree. Psychopaths oped, such individuals are less tied anticipation of consequences that to
tend to fantasize mostly about power, to factual reality than their mature most people would be completely
pain, and control, while narcissists peers and more dependent on fantasy predictable. They are often genuinely
focus on their personal superiority to cope with events and to maintain shocked when reality intrudes on
and the hostility provoked by those stability. their plans and interferes with antici-
who do not notice it and their plans pated outcomes.
to get revenge for perceived slights Consequently, immature adults
and insults. The fantasy lives of generally expect others to embrace Furthermore, immature people
immature persons are frequently what to them is the self-evident are persistently egocentric, they see
much less well defined; they can be legitimacy of their personal ideas and themselves as the epicenter of any
likened to the dreamlike blend of longings. They often cannot under- crowd or event. They believe others
perceptions, thoughts, imagination, stand why others do not share their are paying close attention to them
and facts characteristic of psycholog- perspective and fail to see that reality personally in most contexts, and as
ically healthy children. Because the itself works against the validity of a result they are acutely self-aware.
reasoning, judgment, and self-control their fantasies. They frequently will When it becomes clear that they are
of immature adults are underdevel- act on their fantasies with little not the center of attention and that

28  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

Like psychopaths and narcissists, immature persons

others might, in fact, be indifferent have defective consciences, but they are capable of feel-
to them, they often react negatively ing real guilt and often have well-developed moral codes.
and take steps to bring attention to
themselves. ly to control their behavior is com- imaginations can cause problems
Immature people have difficulty promised. with decisionmaking and judgment.
moderating their feelings. Rather If stress is not reduced, immature
An occasional feature of imma- workers rapidly lose their ability to
than appropriately disciplining and turity is dependency, which is highly
channeling feelings, they are subject cope and can become inordinately
relevant to espionage because depen- needy and demanding. Coworkers
to them. As a result, they are given to dency makes a person particularly
dramatic displays of emotion when who discern these patterns become
susceptible to manipulation and con- alarmed, and immature people are
stressed or excited, and while these trol. (See Sharon Scranage case study
displays may be congruent to what- often considered by others to be
on page 34.) Dependent people somewhat unbalanced and a risk for
ever stimulated the feelings—for ex- experience relationships to be so cru-
ample, they will become very angry hazardous behavior and bad judg-
cial to their well-being that they will ment.
at perceived injustices or delight in do almost anything to sustain them.
successes—observers will sense that Dependent people may function quite In general, immature persons are
the emotions lack proper proportion adequately and seem well adjusted naive about normal expectations
and moderation. as long as they are not required to regarding adult workplace attitudes
A significant consequence of be on their own and are able to rely and conduct. They are too susceptible
poor emotional control is impulsiv- on a relationship as a psychological to environmental distractions and
ity. Immature people have difficulty crutch. If the relationship is threat- internal pressures to be consistent
restraining their immediate wishes ened, or there is even the possibility performers. They do not readily
in the interest of anticipating long- of separation, they become anxious distinguish between personal and
term consequences. When prompted and less able to cope. Their hunger to professional spheres. They are easily
by sudden feelings or urgent desires, both please and cling to the person or bored with routine and heedlessly
they take precipitous action. They people on whom they are dependent seek stimulation from people and
tend to have limited attention spans necessarily affects their judgment, things around them. They can be
and need to be emotionally engaged and they will willingly compromise either too dependent on, or reactive
with a task or a person to retain their own and others’ well-being— against, control mechanisms. They
focus. They can be quite fickle and including their personal ethics— to tend to be very demanding of posi-
easily distracted. sustain the relationship on which they tive attention from authorities, while
depend. at the same time overly hostile or
Finally, like psychopaths and sensitive to negative feedback. Their
narcissists, immature adults have Children at Play seeking after attention or stimulation
defective consciences, but they are In the workplace, immature often becomes a drain on supervisors,
capable of feeling real guilt and often people are often spontaneous and who must engage in constant over-
have well-developed moral codes. imaginative and can be quite appeal- sight, and can deplete peers, who get
Their egocentricism and impulsivity ing. In optimal conditions, they can pressed into fixing problems caused
limit their capacity for foresight, but be productive and inventive people by their immature colleague’s inat-
in hindsight they often deeply regret who are eager to form attachments tention and poor judgment.
their impetuous actions. Though with others and to please and impress
they may want to behave ethically them.
and feel guilt and shame when they When such employees are
behave badly or hurt other people, stressed, however, these characteris-
their capacity to apply their moral tics can take distinctly negative turns.
understanding and desires consistent- Spontaneity can translate into erratic
and impulsive behavior, and active

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  29


Why Spy?

Robert Hanssen: Self-Designated Cold Warrior

Former FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen spied for the Russians for a total of nine years over a 21-year period, beginning
in 1979 and ending with his arrest in 2001. Because of his position in the FBI Foreign Counterintelligence Unit and his use
of computer technologies, Hanssen was able to pass extensive and highly damaging information.

After his arrest, Hanssen reported that as a junior special agent working in the FBI’s New York office, he was inspired to
commit espionage by reading operational files of past and then current Russian agents. While fascinated by the clandes-
tine and secret world described in the files, he was also struck by what he estimated to be amateurish tradecraft and was
curious to see if he could do better. He initiated his espionage by leaving a letter signed with a code name for a Russian
case officer whose tradecraft he admired. In this, as in all communications with his handlers, Hanssen insisted on remaining
unidentified.

His anonymous letters to his handlers provide a window into his psyche. The tone varies from arrogant lecturing to pleading
for understanding and communication. He often addressed his handlers with a mixture of superciliousness and admonition,
as in the following excerpt from an 8 June 2000 letter in which he describes how they should view the United States: “The
US can be errantly [sic] likened to a powerfully built but retarded child, potentially dangerous, but young, immature, and
easily manipulated. But don’t be fooled by that appearance. It is also one which can turn ingenius [sic] quickly, like an idiot
savant, once convinced of a goal.”

Hanssen was motivated to spy by a mixture of greed, need for excitement, desire to test himself, and craving to feel like
a “hero” by becoming involved in something significant. To external appearances, there were many signs of stability in his
lifestyle. The Hanssen family was religiously devout with extensive ties in their faith community. Hanssen appeared to be a
responsible primary breadwinner. He was a moderately successful FBI special agent who, while not necessarily fitting the
typical mold, had secured a niche job that suited his talents. Despite these external signs of stability, however, Hanssen
possessed salient secret vulnerabilities. His desire to serve as a hero led him to initiate a mentoring relationship with a pros-
titute he imagined he could rescue from her lifestyle by showing her a better way to live. He abruptly cut off this relationship
when she proved unable to live up to his expectations. He installed a live-feed camera in his bedroom and surreptitiously
captured his sexual activity with his wife for a male friend, even discussing with this friend ahead of time what he would like
to watch. He also passed to him nude pictures of his wife and posted pornographic stories on the web featuring him and his
wife, all without her knowledge.

At work, Hanssen was considered odd and carried several pejorative nicknames. He was disciplined for angrily grabbing a
female colleague. He exploited a breach in the computer firewall to break into his supervisor’s computer, claiming he did it
to show FBI security the vulnerability of sensitive computer systems. When he was reprimanded as a young special agent
for throwing classified information in the trash rather than shredding it, he responded that he knew what was really classified
and what was not. The failures in empathy and in respect for others, the self-absorption, and the poor judgment evident in
these behaviors suggest a mixed personality disorder.

Mixed Personality Disorder What may be most notable in such ality contains a mix of psychopathic,
I feel I had a small role in cases is a lack of positive personality narcissistic, and dependent features.
bringing down the USSR. . . . I features to counterbalance negative
wanted to be able to contribute ones. In addition, some spies show a
in some way to that. . . . So I mix of characteristics from all three Healthy Personalities
launched my own war. dominant types. Some may also show
In healthy personalities, positive
other psychopathologies such as
—FBI mole Robert Hanssen characteristics counterbalance neg-
paranoid or compulsive symptoms.
ative ones. Positive features might
A case in point is former FBI Special
While the traits and behaviors include the ability to accept criticism;
Agent Robert Hanssen, who spied
of many spies match the features to feel remorse and make reparations
for the Russians over the course of
specific to psychopathy, narcissism, for mistakes; to show genuine empa-
21 years. A psychological evaluation
or immaturity and dependency, in thy for at least some people. Healthy
conducted as part of the damage as-
some cases the personalities do not personalities also exhibit reasonable
sessment concluded that his person-
readily fit any one of these types. stability of mood over time and

30  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

While problematic personality features are essential, they

in different contexts; experience, are not sufficient to provoke espionage. The majority of
express, and contain a wide range of people who have some, or even many, of the personality
emotions; show tactical adaptability features described above will never engage in criminal
alongside good long-range planning conduct.
and self-discipline; and demonstrate
ethical behavior across various situ-
ations. —CIA mole Rick Amesb frustration at not being able to pro-
vide his children with a more affluent
In contrast to exhibiting a mix of I think I was pissed off in the and sophisticated lifestyle are exam-
positive features to temper problem fact that all my expectations on ples of how a psychological crisis
characteristics, pathological person- what the job would be like were can lead to espionage. To all external
alities tend to be structured around a falling short and I guess I was appearances, this GS-15 case officer
few dominant, relatively uninhibited perhaps bitter about the situa- was progressing well in his career
characteristics. The complexity of tion as it was and that may have and, while not in a superior financial
healthy personalities enables them been part of the motive but I’m position, was living a solidly mid-
to deploy an array of coping strate- not sure because when I look dle-class lifestyle. This view did not
gies depending on the nature of the back it’s not really all that clear. match his internal sentiments of frus-
challenges they have to address. In tration and failure, which led him to
—Former CIA watch officer
contrast, pathological personalities volunteer to spy for the Russians. He
William Kampiles
possess a limited range of coping was prompted by the arrest of fellow
techniques. People with personality While problematic personality case officer Rick Ames and his ob-
pathology tend to adhere stubborn- features are essential, they are not servation that Ames had experienced
ly to a few approaches to problem sufficient to provoke espionage. The a long and financially lucrative run
solving and have difficulty adjust- majority of people who have some, or of espionage for the same customer.
ing, changing, and growing despite even many, of the personality features Nicholson believed his tradecraft was
repeated evidence that their strategies described above will never engage in better than Ames’s and that he would
for dealing with life are not working criminal conduct. Espionage must be not be caught.
adequately. triggered by a crisis and the per-
Navy spy Jonathan Pollard also
son’s assessment that illicit criminal
went through a psychological crisis
conduct offers the solution to or an
just prior to his espionage—he later
Precipitating Crises escape from the crisis. The precip-
described it as a spiritual crisis. In
I’m growing extremely tired of itating crisis may be self-evident to
contrast to Nicholson, however.
American society, American observers—for example, the breakup
Pollard was experiencing work and
modern day values, American of a marriage, the loss of a job, or
financial problems alongside his
class consciousness, American bankruptcy. But it can also be private
psychological crisis. In debriefings
TV, American law, American and invisible. Such psychological
after his arrest, Pollard said he had
consumerism, American hypoc- crises as feeling intensely frustrated
resolved to spy for Israel in a state of
risy. and humiliated at being consistently
deep anger and frustration after the
outperformed at work by peers can be
US Marine Corps barracks in Beirut
—CIA spy Jim Nicholsona just as acute and painful as externally
was bombed in 1983. He claimed
evident problems.
What I was thinking? How was I that he “walked out of the memorial
thinking? It was a very busy and CIA officer Jim Nicholson’s sense service [for the Marines] committed
stressful period both profession- of deep personal humiliation at not to doing something that would guar-
ally and personally and it was having savings in the bank and his antee Israel’s security even though it
like a leap in the dark. might involve a degree of potential

b. “Ames on the Inside,” CNN Interview

a. Nicholson, personal journal entry, 15 July with Wolf Blitzer and Bob Franken, 27 De-
1985. cember 1994.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  31


Why Spy?

Jeffrey Carney: The Spy Codenamed “The Kid”

Jeffrey Carney enlisted in the US Air Force on his 17th birthday in 1980 and was granted a top secret clearance a year later.
He began spying for East Germany’s Ministry of State Security (MfS) in 1983 while working as a linguist at Marienfelde Base
in West Berlin. He continued spying at his next post in Texas, from which he abruptly deserted in 1985. The MfS exfiltrated
and resettled him in Berlin, where he helped them target Americans. When the Iron Curtain fell, his handlers abandoned him
and tipped off US authorities; he was arrested in 1991.

Carney’s initial motivation for his walk-in was a sense of betrayal by family, friends, and supervisors. His family background
was painful and unstable, including severe physical and emotional abuse and neglect and the frequent disappearance of
his father. Carney described himself as having been a lonely child, an “underdog” who felt inferior and had a burning desire
to prove his worth. He dropped out of high school to help support his mother financially, including paying for her divorce
from his father. When he visited home in 1983 on leave, he was shocked to find his father living there. After an acrimonious
visit, he returned to Germany, nursing feelings of bitterness and inadequacy. He was also coming to terms with his homo-
sexuality, which at the time put his military career at risk. In addition, Carney was deeply dissatisfied with the Air Force.
Despite salient intellectual gifts, he was unable to sustain an unblemished work record, had been decertified as a language
instructor, and had trouble regaining his credentials. He was outraged by his decertification, which he blamed on his super-
visors’ ill will, and felt humiliated and embarrassed.

On the night of his impulsive attempt to defect to East Germany, all of the acquaintances and friends he approached
rejected his overtures to go out. He went alone to some bars, had several drinks, and contemplated suicide. At one bar, he
happened to read an article about a Taiwanese pilot who defected to mainland China, was feted as a hero, honored with a
parade, and given money. “I’ll show them, I’ll show them all,” was Carney’s reaction. Acting on this thought, he took a cab to
Checkpoint Charlie, walked across, and presented himself to the East Germans as a defector. They quickly convinced him
to go back to his post at Marienfelde as a spy.

After his routine reassignment in 1984 to a domestic post, Carney became preoccupied with the announcement that all
employees with access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI) would be polygraphed. He was also furious with Air
Force doctors, who refused to operate on what he believed was a hernia. When he threatened to go to the inspector gen-
eral with his complaint, he was referred for a psychological evaluation and became concerned that drugs would be used
to make him say things beyond his control, exposing both his espionage and his homosexuality. He deserted and flew to
Mexico City, presenting himself unannounced to the East Germans. Upon his resettlement in East Berlin, the MfS tasked
him with transcribing intercepted conversations of US military and embassy personnel, from which he discerned their
responsibilities, attitudes, relationships, and personalities. If he felt that particular individuals were vulnerable, he wrote an
assessment describing their situation and suggesting the best recruitment approach. Carney claimed that the MfS appar-
ently prized his work.

After his arrest,a Carney readily confessed to his espionage and said that it helped him regain a sense of personal pride
and purpose. “Each time I took information out,” he asserted, “I felt like I was slapping my supervisors in the face.” He also
expressed bitterness that the US government had violated his German rights by forcibly taking him away from his home,
his personal belongings, and his common-law spouse. Carney’s impulsive decision to defect in a time of despair, along with
the psychological stability and sense of achievement and purpose that he temporarily gained once engaged in espionage,
demonstrate the role that stress and crisis can play in motivating a vulnerable person to seek a solution through espionage.

Carney was released in 2002 after serving 11 years of a 38-year sentence. He attempted to return to Germany, claiming
German citizenship, but he was denied entry because the East Germans had never granted him citizenship.

a. In his memoir Carney quotes himself as asking the OSI officers arresting him “What took you so long?” (Against All Enemies,
592); he also claims to have made several attempts during the arrest to assert rights as a German citizen but was told to shut up. FBI
Special Agent Robert Hanssen also contemptuously asked the FBI colleagues arresting him, “What took you so long?” Both Hanssen
and Carney demonstrated the reflexive grandiosity described in the personality section of this article in this sarcastic comment. When
he was arrested, Ames said, “You’re making a big mistake! You must have the wrong man!” demonstrating the automatic cunning and
slipperiness characteristic of psychopaths.

32  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

States of crisis often result in patterns of thinking that

risk and personal sacrifice.” During
a degrade judgment and behavior.
this same period, Pollard had several
heated discussions with his super-
or to find a way to escape it at all he didn’t directly teach me a lot,
visor regarding chronic tardiness,
costs. Most significant with respect to but indirectly I learned an awful
conflicts with coworkers, and inabil-
motivation for espionage, a person in lot . . . in terms of what the Soviets
ity to complete assignments. More-
this state of mind can acquire “tunnel are all about.
over, the Pollards frequently were late
paying their rent or their rent checks vision,” in which the person’s atten- Journalist: How would you arrange
bounced; the Navy Federal Credit tion becomes riveted on the current to contact the other side [KGB]
Union reported him delinquent in crisis. This fixation on the present can and meet?
repaying a loan. He and his wife were degrade long-term planning and the
capacity to anticipate lasting con- Spy: Through a go-between, a Soviet
witnessed using cocaine and marijua- Embassy officer, who’s not a KGB
na at parties, and an anonymous call sequences. Such mental conditions
make a person vulnerable to taking officer. We had an overt relation-
to the Navy’s security service report- ship–I was assessing the guy [for
ed that Pollard had been involved in badly judged actions.
CIA] to see if he’d be of value as a
an altercation in Georgetown.b While life crises are ubiquitous, target and did develop him a little
criminal responses remain rare. bit–so this [meeting with a Soviet]
Robert Hanssen began spying
Personality flaws that weaken moral is all approved [by the CIA]c
after an assignment to the FBI’s
New York Field Office caused such reasoning, judgment, and control over —CIA mole Rick Ames
financial strain on his family that, impulsive behavior are aggravated
on one occasion, his wife broke into by the sense of immediate threat, “You need to show us that you
their children’s piggy banks to collect urgent need to escape, and tunnel are serious.” His voice had mel-
enough change to carry the family vision common to crises. A person lowed. “You can be a soldier on
through until the next paycheck. Air with personality problems is therefore the Invisible Front. What good
Force spy Jeffrey Carney impulsive- doubly vulnerable to misjudgments are you here? [in East Ger-
ly defected to East Germany in the and misconduct in a crisis. Converse- many]” he asked rhetorically.
course of a night of drinking alone, ly, people who as a rule have strong “Here, you are one person with
contemplating suicide, and brooding judgment, good self-control, and perhaps a little ability to make
on his loneliness and ill-usage by healthy consciences have more insu- a difference. There [as a mole
family, friends and supervisors. lation against tendencies to impulsive inside the US Air Force], work-
action or misconduct when under the ing for peace – and you don’t
States of crisis often result in pat- pressures of crisis. even have to be Communist or
terns of thinking that degrade judg- Special Handling Socialist – you can make a great
ment and behavior. A person in crisis difference! You will have earned
typically experiences a sense of threat Journalist: Why did you make the de- your right to come and stay
alongside a severe loss of control. cision to work for the other side? here.” . . . There are those who
The combined result frequently is a Spy: Some of that started in the 70’s say I was brainwashed, but that
feeling of paralysis or helplessness, in New York [before volunteer- is not true. While it is true that
a desire to either fight the situation ing to spy for the Russians in the I originally lacked the convic-
1980’s] tion I claimed that fateful April
morning, I would soon need lit-
Journalist: Why?
a. Director of Central Intelligence, Foreign tle prodding to betray my former
Denial and Deception Analysis Committee, Spy: As you know, I knew some colleagues [in the US military].
The Jonathan Jay Pollard Espionage Case: Soviets in New York who were . . . In my naiveté I also was
A Damage Assessment, 30 October 1987 very interesting. The chief Pravda
(MORI DocID: 1346933). Available at representative in New York and I
https://www.archives.gov/files/declassifica- had lunch together every couple of c. “Why I Spied: Aldrich Ames,” New York
tion/iscap/pdf/2007-010-doc1.pdf.
weeks for about three years. And Times interview with Tim Weiner, 31 July
b. Ibid. 1994.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  33


Why Spy?

Exploitation of the Vulnerable

The “Handling” of Sharon Scranage
A well-trained espionage recruiter
Sharon Scranage compromised CIA staff officers, agents, and operations while will search for vulnerable targets.
serving as a secretary and administrator in Africa from 1983 to 1985. Her spying Professional intelligence officers
necessitated the exfiltration and resettlement of numerous African agents and are trained to spot outward signs of
their families. The total cost of her espionage has been estimated to be several trouble in a person’s history or behav-
million dollars.
ior—such as tumultuous relationships
Scranage joined the CIA in 1976 as a clerk-stenographer. She consistently or frequent job changes—and to
received favorable performance reports, including appreciative comments evaluate the deeper, more enduring
about her pleasant and dedicated workplace demeanor. Her private life was psychological dysfunctions that may
less settled, however. She divorced her husband of two years in 1980, after he be at the root of the problems. These
had become physically and psychologically abusive, including hitting her and
threatening her with a gun.
professional recruiters are trained to
deploy sophisticated psychological
Only two days after Scranage’s arrival at her post in Africa in 1983, a State De- control techniques matched to the
partment communicator introduced her to the man who subsequently became vulnerabilities they have detected in
her handler. He quickly drew her into a sexual affair and—apparently working order to manipulate, apply pressure,
from an accurate assessment of Scranage’s susceptibility to psychological
abuse—began to use a combination of affection and fear to increase his power
or induce a person to commit espio-
over her and to elicit more and more sensitive information from her. In addi- nage.
tion to establishing a sexual relationship with her and thus asserting physical
control, Scranage’s handler also used verbal intimidation and threats to deter Some intelligence services do not
her from revealing what she had done to station personnel and to isolate her limit themselves to exploiting pre-
socially from sources of support in the station and community. He systemati- existing problems, but may actively
cally assaulted her trust in CIA and her most senior manager, arguing that this foster crises to enhance the target’s
manager had put her in her present position. Her handler also fed her dread susceptibility to recruitment. Com-
of being discovered and made veiled threats to harm those agency personnel
and their family members with whom she appeared close. By such means,
mon forms of such aggressive pursuit
Scranage’s handler positioned himself as her preeminent authority figure and and manipulation of targets include
protector rather than the CIA and her managers and colleagues. In hindsight, emotional or sexual entrapment
she described herself as “a puppet” in his hands. After her arrest, Scranage and financial manipulation through
consistently expressed profound remorse for her espionage. increasing the target’s level of debt.
A psychologically vulnerable target’s
grandiosity, sense of being above the
unable to sense my true value to up on me. Giving up on me is a rules, or vengeful impulses can all be
the MfS in those early days, and mistake. I have proven inveter- manipulated in the service of recruit-
it would be many years later ately loyal and willing to take ment.
before I understood the damage grave risks, which even could
I had caused the United States cause my death, only remain- The role of such manipulations by
ing quiet in times of extreme a potential customer and the prospec-
—Air Force spy Jeffrey Carney, uncertainty. So far my ship tive spy’s own sense of the ease and
describing his recruitmenta has successfully navigated the safety of espionage are often underes-
slings and arrows of outrageous timated as key factors in increasing or
I have come about as close as I
fortune. I ask you to help me decreasing motivation. Adept profes-
ever want to come to sacrificing
survive. sional handlers depict themselves not
myself to help you, and I get
silence. I hate silence. . . . It’s only as willing to reward espionage
—FBI mole Robert Hanssen, in but also as capable of safeguard-
been a long time dear friends, letters to his handlersb
a long and lonely time. . . . ing their agent. Good professional
Perhaps you occasionally give “handling” is designed not only to
collect classified information but also
b. Excerpts from Hanssen’s letters to his to stabilize and reassure the spy in
Russian handlers, dated 15 July 1988, the interest of sustaining his or her
a. Carney, Against All Enemies, 155–56. 14 March 2000, and 17 November 2000.

34  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Why Spy?

capacity to commit espionage for tap into this informal reservoir of such reviews can pinpoint problems
as long as possible. As a result, the observations to identify maladaptive they do not necessarily ameliorate or
relationship between an agent and a patterns that would put an intelli- fix them. Programs of education and
handler is frequently highly personal, gence organization at risk. support for the cleared workforce
intense, and emotional, at least from must supplement the safeguards
the perspective of the spy, and the While such medical and security provided by regular reviews. Edu-
nature of this relationship is often a screenings of applicants are the first cational programs regarding dan-
powerful force behind an individual’s line of defense, ongoing security ger signs can assist employees and
choice to spy. reviews of the employee population managers in spotting emotional or
are the second line, with the intent of behavioral problems in colleagues or
detecting personnel who demonstrate subordinates, or even occasionally in
Remedies and Risk patterns of troubling attitudes or themselves, before they evolve into
behaviors and intervening before seri- serious counterintelligence or security
Management ous misconduct occurs. The typology problems.
How people who have the poten- of psychological factors in espionage
tial to spy gain clearances and secure presented here has been helpful in Effective follow-through once
entry into the Intelligence Commu- organizing observations regarding the problems have been spotted is imper-
nity, how they progress and function personalities, behaviors, and life cir- ative in the form of active and well-
once inside, and how the risk they cumstances of captured spies, with an staffed medical support for troubled
pose might be mitigated are questions eye to developing countermeasures employees. It is especially important
of critical interest to security and and risk-mitigation strategies applica- to make such services available to
counterintelligence personnel as well ble to the workplace. employees who identify their own
as to medical and management pro- problems and come forward to seek
fessionals. The risk of spying can be Routine security and counterin- support voluntarily.
mitigated through programs designed telligence reviews of applicants and
to spot and address warning signs at staff should not be the only lines of Finally, case studies of apprehend-
each stage of an employee’s career defense, however, because while ed spies have demonstrated that some
and by providing support services to
troubled employees once they have The Anger of Edward Lee Howard
been identified or by disciplining Howard was dismissed from the CIA in 1983 after a polygraph exam indicated
them appropriately. he was involved in petty theft and drug use. In the months after his dismissal,
he moved to New Mexico with his wife, Mary. His alcohol abuse escalated, and
The entry points into an organi- he became increasingly angry at what he perceived to be the agency’s unfair
zation can be safeguarded through treatment. Howard claimed he provided information to the Russian KGB and
rigorous security and psychological eventually defected to Russia when he became aware of US surveillance of his
evaluations of applicants designed activities, while believing he was unfairly targetted and accused. A book about
Howard by David Wise and Howard’s own memoir, though filled with significant
to spot and weed out chronically
errors of fact, provide good examples of how a vulnerable person’s sense of
dysfunctional people unsuitable for disgruntlement and perceived ill-usage can provide the impetus to turn to es-
clearances. Patterns of personality pionage and the flawed, but compelling, justification for doing so.a Readers will
deficiencies that can result in trouble notice similar strands of acrimony and disgruntlement in the Carney, Pollard, and
both at work and in personal lives not Hanssen cases.
only attract the attention of trained
Howard’s death in Russia was reported on 22 July 2002. He supposedly broke
observers of human behavior—such his neck in a fall at his dacha, but the exact circumstances have never been
as psychologists and case officers— made public.
but also can be registered by more
incidental observers, such as cowork-
a. David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of the CIA Agent Who Betrayed
ers and neighbors. For this reason, His Country’s Secrets and Escaped to Moscow (Random House, 1988) and Edward Lee
background checks in the security Howard, Safe House: The Compelling Memoirs of the Only CIA Spy to Seek Asylum in
clearances process are designed to Russia (National Press Books, 1995).

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  35


Why Spy?

began their espionage in a state of disgruntlement and, on a pragmatic has been violated. It would be con-
crisis marked by intense anger and level, making efforts to provide for soling if the capture of major spies in
frustration, and sometimes by finan- job placement programs and psy- recent years and the end of the Cold
cial desperation, after being fired or chological and financial counseling War signaled a downward trend in
in anticipation of termination. (See services to assist the person in estab- espionage. But the impetus to spy
textbox on Edward Lee Howard on lishing a stable lifestyle outside of grows out of the human psyche, and
preceding page.) the Intelligence Community. personality dysfunctions, personal
crises, and opportunities to serve oth-
Prudent risk mitigation in cases The Intelligence Community er masters will never vanish. Under-
of termination or forced resignation recoils every time a spy is caught. standing the elements of espionage
should include, when possible, safe- Laws have been broken, national is critical to remaining vigilant and
guarding the dignity of the person to security has been breached, and the safeguarding the vital mission of US
inhibit feelings of vengefulness and bond among patriotic professionals intelligence.

v v v

36  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

Cold War Spy Fiction in Russian Popular Culture: From Suspi-
cion to Acceptance via Seventeen Moments of Spring
Erik Jens
Introduction

In 1972, a classified CIA document

(right) describing an episode of a novel that
was serialized in Komsomolskaya Pravda
during January and February 1969 was filed
in CIA Headquarters. The episode involved
a supposed Soviet intelligence operation
early in 1945, in which a “Colonel Isayev”
successfully “sabotaged” negotiations OSS
officer Allen Dulles was then conducting
with the Germans in Bern, Switzerland. Ac-
cording to the report, Isayev also met two
senior Germans, “Chancellor Bruening”
and “Gestapo chief Mueller.” The report
writer went on to conclude the account was
“in all probability a fabrication”—although
the Dulles negotiation was a fact— but in
the interests of caution the report’s preparer
recommended it be filed in Heinrich Muel-
ler’s CIA file—where it remained at least
until 2008, when it was declassified.1 As it
turned out, the episode was neither a real
operation nor a “fabrication,” but a synopsis
of an episode in a Soviet spy thriller titled
Seventeen Moments of Spring, which went
on to become one of the USSR’s most pop-
ular and enduring television miniseries.

That US intelligence analysts could

mistake a work of Soviet-era spy fiction for
reportable intelligence says much about the most famously, the 1973 television miniseries Seven-
opacity, to Western observers throughout the Cold War teen Moments of Spring.a, 2 The series, commissioned by
and even afterward, of Soviet popular culture. The single then-KGB chief Yuri Andropov to burnish the reputation
most popular and venerable hero of Russian spy fiction,
for nearly 50 years, has been Col. Maxim Maximovich
Isaуev, known to every Russian of a certain age by his a. This essay will use the terms “Soviet” and “Russian” in-
working cover name, Max Otto von Stierlitz, or simply terchangeably when discussing cultural attitudes, which had,
as “Stierlitz,” the hero of several Soviet-era novels and, and retain, deep roots in the Russian motherland.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government. © Erik Jens, 2017

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 37


Seventeen Moments of Spring

In the Soviet Union of the late 1940s and 1950s, espio-

nage, as a genre of fiction, held little appeal for the Soviet The Russian literary world had
reading and movie-going public. therefore, by the start of the Great
War and later, abdicated the field
of the intelligence profession, was Soviet Espionage Fiction of espionage fiction to (primarily)
hugely successful upon its broadcast Before the Cold War the English, with Rudyard Kipling
premiere, and its annual broadcast leading the charge. Along with him
thereafter until the 1990s remained In the Soviet Union of the late came the respective anti-German jer-
a major pop culture event for Soviet 1940s and 1950s, espionage, as a emiads dressed up as popular fiction
viewers. genre of fiction, held little appeal for of novelists Erskine Childers and
the Soviet reading and movie-going William le Queux, who established
Seventeen Moments of Spring public. This was partly a result of the spy thriller as a permanent fixture
may even have played a role in the Tsarist Russia’s cultural affiliations in the English literary landscape.6
rise of Vladimir Putin. In his first job with European high society. Russian But, neither Kim, that pivotal novel
following his 1991 resignation from political, cultural, and literary life of Great Game espionage, nor the
the KGB, Putin, then a St. Petersburg had closely followed that of France later writings of T.E. Lawrence (who,
city official, had himself featured in since the 17th century; the connec- if not the first British “political” to
a local documentary reenacting, as tion strengthened throughout the don native garb, was surely the first
“Stierlitz,” an iconic scene from the 19th century and persisted until the to lend a largely fictional glamour to
miniseries. The episode, which also establishment of the Soviet Union the intelligence business by posing
marked Putin’s “coming out” as a cut off, officially at least, most such in full regalia for the home newspa-
former spy, helped launch his politi- Western influences.5 The 19th-cen- pers as “Lawrence of Arabia”) had
cal career, and the subsequent decade tury European literary disdain for counterparts in or made any lasting
of adoring media comparisons to fictional “spies” had therefore persist- impression on Russia or the Soviet
Stierlitz helped him all the way to the ed in Russian literature and popular Union of the period.
Russian presidency in 2000.3 Vladi- attitudes far longer than it did in the
mir Putin, thus, like Schwarzenegger, The Soviet Union’s own early
West.a And, at the turn of the 20th
rode the coattails of a fictional perso- history created a second, more imme-
century, the decade-long machina-
na to political leadership. diate and visceral, source of Russian
tions of the sorry Dreyfus affair,
cultural antipathy toward espionage
Yet Stierlitz, “one of the central perpetrated by mendacious French
as a genre of entertainment. By the
characters in Soviet [and present-day intelligence officers, gripped Russian
start of the Cold War, “intelligence”
Russian] grassroots mythology,” readers and helped to solidify their
in the collective Russian memory
remains almost entirely unknown image of “intelligence” as, by defini-
meant spies, informers, and secret
outside the former Soviet Union.4 For tion, wicked and, at best, a necessary
murder, from the revolution through
the intelligence historian, the back- evil.b
years of purges culminating in the
ground and production of Seventeen Great Terror of the mid-1930s.
Moments of Spring provide worth- a. One of the few 19th-century novels
while glimpses into Russian popular dealing directly with spies was American: The Soviet intelligence services
attitudes, informed by their national James Fenimore Cooper’s 1821 tale of also emerged from the Great Patri-
history and temperament, toward Revolutionary War espionage, The Spy. otic War with few, if any, sweeping,
Cooper took pains to assure the reader that
intelligence work as a subject of ready-for-fiction espionage or coun-
even though the hero is spying, he is still a
fiction. worthy person, as good as a soldier.—Brett
F. Woods, “Revolution and Literature:
Cooper’s The Spy Revisited,” varsityturos. eventual exoneration amid revelations of
com (accessed 3 February 2017). the French military’s anti-Semitism and
other perfidy, the “Dreyfus affair” was per-
b. In 1894, French intelligence officers—as haps the first media-friendly global (or at
was eventually proved—framed Jewish least Europe-wide) scandal and, incidental-
army captain Alfred Dreyfus for treason. ly, helped to launch the espionage genre, at
Throughout his trial, conviction, and least in Western Europe, as an established
imprisonment on Devil’s Island until his category of popular fiction.

38  Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Seventeen Moments of Spring

A tipping point in overcoming Soviet popular disdain for

terintelligence exploits. In contrast, fictional espionage was the 1961 elevation of Vladimir
the wartime American and British Semichastny to the head of the KGB.
intelligence and counterintelligence
services had made critical, dramatic, Japanese fleet’s location and defeat it later Russian war films have ever had
and well-publicized contributions at Midway. much use for happy endings.
in breaking German and Japanese
ciphers and otherwise helping to Yet another primary obstacle to What few spy-protagonists ap-
militarily defeat the Axis powers on the emergence of fictional hero-spies peared on page or screen in postwar
the ground and at sea. Soviet intelli- was the Russian obsession with de- settings had to be free from the taint
gence could boast of no comparably fense. This long predated the USSR, of Stalin-era repression. One solu-
dramatic contributions to their coun- but the Soviet Union could not be tion was to make the fictional spy a
try’s grinding war of attrition against portrayed, even in fiction, as an NATO officer who sees the light and
German invaders. Whether for lack aggressor; its mighty military and se- defects to the party, as in the popular
of imagination or opportunity, the curity forces were wholly for the peo- 1968 spy film, Oshibka Rezidenta
Soviet spymasters never executed ple’s protection. But espionage, by (The Resident’s Mistake). In the grad-
operations with the inherent drama definition, is something that a state ually burgeoning field of Russian spy
of such British operations as Double does primarily to other states, usually fiction of the mid- and late 1960s, the
Cross or Mincemeat.a on their territory. Indeed, the very hero, if not a sympathetic Westerner,
name of the Stalin-era counterintelli- was likely to be placed in the Great
A noteworthy exception was the gence organization, Smert’ Shpionam Patriotic War—“the only time in So-
Rote Kapelle (Red Orchestra) the (English acronym, SMERSH), meant viet history when the interests of the
acclaimed, if ultimately smashed, So- “death to spies.” people coincided with the interests of
viet HUMINT network in Europe in the state”—or else during the Bolshe-
the early 1940s. The Red Orchestra, Given all the obstacles—histori- vik Revolution.10
however, was concerned mainly with cal disdain for spying, memories of
incrementally damaging German the Terror, and a lack of inspiring A tipping point in overcoming
military and industrial production.7 dramatics in actual Soviet espio- Soviet popular disdain for fictional
No Soviet intelligence operation that nage history—Soviet “spy” fiction espionage was the 1961 elevation of
we know of saved so many Allied in the early Cold War centered less Vladimir Semichastny to the head of
lives or was so valuable to eventual on traditional clandestine espio- the KGB, a post he held until 1967.
Allied victory as, for example, the nage and more on military scout or Only 37 upon his ascension to KGB
Americans’ use in 1942 of decrypted reconnaissance units, which at least leadership, Semichastny had little
Japanese naval traffic to divine the were incontrovertibly a part of the direct memory of the Terror and had
Soviet military machine that had been just old enough to be drafted
saved the motherland in the Great late in the Great Patriotic War. Jeal-
Patriotic War.8 Most Soviet films ous for the reputation of his agency,
a. As most intelligence historians will rec-
and books involving intelligence Semichastny anonymously wrote an
ognize, Mincemeat was a British deception were thus packaged as “historical” or article for Izvestia to assure readers
operation involving a dead tramp dressed as “adventure” films, their spy-like plot that “many young Communist Party
a British officer with false documents, left elements dressed up as Red Army and Communist Youth League work-
at sea for the Spanish to find and hence con- scout patrols, or perhaps domestic ers have joined the KGB and none
vince the Germans to prepare for invasion counterintelligence—all ideally set of the people who, during the time of
at the wrong place. And British intelligence,
in Operation Double Cross, used decrypt-
during the Great Patriotic War. For the personality cult of Joseph Stalin,
ed German Enigma traffic to capture and example, SMERSH’s operational took part in the repressions against
then double the entire German HUMINT high point was working against the innocent Soviet people is now in the
network in England back against the Ger- German military on Soviet soil.9 The Service [italics added].” Throughout
mans throughout the war. For more on this, heroes in such stories also tended his tenure, Semichastny not only
see Robert Cowden, “OSS Double-Agent to die tragically. Neither Soviet nor supported positive fictional portray-
Operations in World War II,” Studies in
Intelligence Vol 58, no. 2 (June 2014)
als of the KGB, but also worked

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  39


Seventeen Moments of Spring

At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov produced from his

novel a script for a television miniseries, which was pro- hands, its English translation has
duced—again, with KGB approval and support. Zakhov throwing 07 off a cliff to his
death—which may say more about
to publicize the feats of formerly who might excite and inspire socialist the political or money-making agen-
obscured, if not officially denied, readers.12 das of Cold War–era translators than
Soviet intelligence officers.11 During about Gulyashki himself.
and after Semichastny’s time in the Seeking a literary riposte to the
KGB, the Kremlin came to lionize increasing global popularity of the
such Soviet intelligence officers and Bond franchise, Soviet officials
turned to Bulgarian author Andrei Beginning the Transformation
assets as Rudolf Abel, Kim Philby,
and Richard Sorge.a Gulyashki, whose 1963 novel The
Zakhov Mission had brought him to In 1966, the Soviet author Julian
the attention of Soviet authorities Semyonov, a longtime news reporter
as the likeliest candidate to cre- and tracker of Nazi war criminals,
Soviet Reactions to the ate a Soviet literary rival to James published a novel about a young So-
Rise of James Bond Bond.13 Gulyashki, probably with viet intelligence officer, one Colonel
KGB approval and support, visited Isayev, working against anti-Bol-
On the other side of the Iron London in 1966 to ask the late Ian sheviks in 1921. His book attracted
Curtain, Ian Fleming’s James Bond Fleming’s publisher for permission the favorable attention of KGB chief
novels were gaining increasing pop- to use James Bond as a character Semichastny and his successor, Yuri
ularity throughout the late 1950s and in his new book. His presence in Andropov. Also intent on rehabilitat-
1960s. The Bond film franchise, be- England created a minor splash in ing the KGB’s popular image, An-
ginning in the early 1960s, launched Time magazine, which wondered dropov commissioned Semyonov to
Agent 007 into the global cultural in print, “Who would that baggy write a follow-up novel about a Sovi-
stratosphere alongside Coca-Cola Bulgarian be, prowling up Bond et agent in Germany during the Great
and Mickey Mouse. The Kremlin Street, slipping into pubs all over Patriotic War. Semyonov accordingly
made sure to have Bond blasted in town and quietly haunting the men’s wrote his next novel, Seventeen Mo-
the pages of Komsomolskaya Pravda clubs?”14 Gulyashki failed. Fleming’s ments of Spring (1969) with substan-
(not unjustly) as “liv[ing] in a night- publisher not only promptly denied tial KGB support, including access to
marish world where laws are written him permission to use Bond or his its secret archives.16
at the point of a gun, where coercion 007 prefix, it took immediate steps to
While the perennial Soviet “book
and rape are considered valour and protect its copyright by commission-
drought” prevented most Soviet
murder is a funny trick.” Privately, ing Kingsley Amis to write, under
citizens from reading Seventeen
however, Soviet leaders were well a pseudonym, the first of over 30
Moments before the miniseries
aware of Bond’s propaganda value post-Fleming Bond novels.15
premiered in 1973, many had read at
to the West and of the absence of any
Gulyashki, undeterred, renamed least some of the story in the install-
equally charismatic Russian hero
his forthcoming book Zakhov vs. 07 ments noted above in the CIA report
and saw it into print in 1968. While on the Komsomolskaya Pravda series
as literature the novel has little to early in 1969. As printed, Seventeen
a. Abel was arrested in the United States recommend it, it does illustrate a pe- Moments relied heavily on offi-
and eventually traded for captured U-2 pilot rennial distinction between Western cial-looking “dossiers” to introduce
Gary Francis Powers; Philby, one of the characters and move the plot along—
“Cambridge Five,” did immense damage
and Soviet-era fictional spies: Agent
Zakhov is more of a detective than doubtless one reason the CIA analyst
to the British and American services in his
work for the KGB; and Sorge, one of the a superspy, a man of simple tastes took it seriously enough to have it
most famous and venerated wartime Soviet who nonetheless is able to best the filed as possibly genuine intelligence.
intelligence officers, was captured and brutal and misogynist “07.” Curious-
eventually executed by the Japanese when At Andropov’s urging, Semyonov
ly, while the original novel leaves
Stalin refused to acknowledge him as nashi produced from his novel a script for
(one of ours).
07 alive and chastened at Zakhov’s

40  Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Seventeen Moments of Spring

The television premiere of Seventeen Moments, eagerly

a television miniseries, which was anticipated by Russian viewers, was an immediate smash
produced—again with KGB approval success.
and support—during 1971–72. Upon
completion of filming, a first edit of agents, and engages in a battle of Russian viewers largely accepted as
the miniseries sparked a spat between wits with various high-level Nazis, fact, is that the supposed secret peace
the KGB officials who had midwifed especially Gestapo chief Heinrich talks were designed to carve up the
it and their military counterparts; the Mueller. As the Javert-like Mueller postwar world behind Stalin’s back,
latter castigated Seventeen Moments comes closer and closer to identify- not for its more limited aims, about
for ignoring the Red Army’s role in ing Stierlitz as the mole within his which Moscow was duly informed.18
actually winning the Great Patriotic organization, the latter must rely American journalist Hedrick Smith,
War. To placate the generals, director almost entirely on his wits to avoid traveling in Russia during 1973–74,
Tatyana Lioznova was forced to add detection. found that “ordinary Russians,” al-
a number of “meanwhile, on the bat- most universally admirers of Seven-
tlefield” interludes, mostly random To a Western viewer, the minise- teen Moments, routinely accepted as
stock footage of Soviet ground forces ries is deliberately paced—even for a historic truth its depiction of Amer-
in combat.17 Soviet film production— sometimes ican connivance with Nazis at the
to the point of catatonia. Stierlitz Soviet Union’s expense.19
The television premiere of Seven- seems to spend as much time tak-
teen Moments, eagerly anticipated by ing languid walks and engaging in
Russian viewers, was an immediate conversations with people uncon-
smash success. Viewed by an esti- nected to intelligence—or the plot of Seventeen Moments of Spring’s
mated 30–50 million viewers nightly, the miniseries—as he does actually Uniqueness in Soviet Television
the 12-part series was immediately thwarting the Nazi high command.
heralded—and remains to this day—a And in contrast to the typically The series was very well-made by
cultural touchstone of Russian lethal, kinetic climax of a Western Soviet standards, on par with theat-
popular culture and the single most spy thriller, as the entire Gestapo rical films of the era. Among many
transformative event in rehabilitating, appears to be rummaging Berlin to other cultural accolades, Mikael
in the eyes of the Soviet citizenry, the find Stierlitz, we see him sleeping in Tariverdiev’s music, especially the
image of the heroic Russian spy. It a car just outside of town. Yet this is theme song “Moments,” has entered
continued to be annually rebroadcast part of the point of the story: Stierlitz the Russian pantheon of popular, fre-
nationwide well into the 1990s. spends time and does things with quently performed film music.20 But
people who have nothing to do with its production quality was only one
The plot of Seventeen Moments of several factors that ensured Seven-
his mission, simply because, while
plays out in and around Berlin, teen Moments cultural immortality.
an active intelligence officer, he
during the war’s final months in Firstly, and in sharp contrast to most
remains a human being. He balances
1945. Max Otto von Stierlitz (played genre films and books to that point
the necessary hardness of clandestine
by the popular actor Vyacheslav in Soviet culture, the script almost
intelligence work with his need to
Tikhonov) is a longtime mole high in never refers to “the Soviet Union” or
remain a functioning social being
the Nazi hierarchy. His primary mis- “the party.” Stierlitz works and fights
with meaningful relationships—even
sion is to disrupt secret peace talks for “Russia.” And, significantly, we
if they are mostly with citizens of an
between Germany and the United learn that Stierlitz has spent “over a
enemy state.
States, a scenario based very loosely decade” in deep cover in Germany
on talks OSS officer Allen Dull- The show’s “documentary” style, and thus cannot have been involved
es and SS commander Karl Wolff complete with portentous voiceovers in the Great Terror of the mid-1930s.
had as part of Operation Sunrise, a and onscreen “dossiers” providing In Semyonov’s earlier books, Stierlitz
negotiation to secure the surrender background on various characters, had been on duty at least since 1921,
of German troops in Italy. Along the lends even its creative fabrications but that backstory was dropped from
way Stierlitz disrupts a German nu- an authoritative air. Most notably, the Seventeen Moments.
clear weapon project, recruits several central plot point of the series, which

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  41


Seventeen Moments of Spring

Among Russian citizens, the cultural legacy of Seventeen

Moments was the lasting positive impression of espio- In any case, even under the
nage it created. KGB’s scrutiny, Seventeen Moments
of Spring director Tatyana Lioznova
Casting was another factor lifting toward Stierlitz—the hero’s pre- made the most of her talents and
Seventeen Moments far above the dicament as a deep-cover operative her opportunities to introduce many
usual run of Soviet television produc- in Nazi Germany echoed for more layers of subtlety in realizing the ap-
tions. In contrast to the usual Soviet discerning Soviet viewers their own proved shooting script on film—even
depictions of wartime Germans as daily lives: an intelligent person sur- beyond the unusually long leash the
unequivocally evil, most of the Ge- rounded by mostly sympathetic char- KGB provided.
stapo high officials with whom Stier- acters, to whom they can never utter
litz spars throughout the series were a word of their secret thoughts. In
played by beloved Russian character informer-saturated Soviet Russia, this
Lasting Cultural Impact: Who
actors, whose mostly advanced ages was a compelling metaphor. Indeed,
Is the “American Stierlitz”?
in this KGB-assisted production also many critics identified the Nazi Party
served as “a courteous bow to the of the television series as an allegory
Among Russian citizens, the cul-
vitality of Soviet gerontocracy.”21 for the Soviet Communist Party.22
tural legacy of Seventeen Moments
In particular, Leonid Bronevoi, the In this reading of the miniseries,
was the lasting positive impression of
Jewish actor and survivor of the Stierlitz represents and speaks for the
espionage it created. This emerging
Great Terror, playing Gestapo chief Soviet intelligentsia, forced to live
popular appreciation of the spy trade
Mueller, pulls off the same trick that within a society hostile to much of
became, as will be discussed below,
Tommy Lee Jones famously achieved what they hold dear, prevented from
first an inspiration and later a pow-
in the 1993 American film The Fugi- ever speaking aloud what they truly
erful political asset for an ascendant
tive: making the antagonist at least as believe. Seventeen Moments thus
Vladimir Putin. To fully appreciate
sympathetic as the hero. works both as a typical espionage
the miniseries’ impact on Russian
thriller and as an unusually nuanced
The sympathetic portrayal of culture, we must first examine candi-
metaphor for Soviet daily life.
many Germans throughout the dates, in the English-speaking world,
series—including most lower-rank- Critics differ on whether the KGB for a similar position in our own
ing and civilian Germans—not allowed or even encouraged such popular culture.
only deepened the story’s depth and “dog whistles” to the Soviet educat-
While Stierlitz is often called
subtlety in contrast to decades of po- ed class. Given the extent to which
“the Russian James Bond,” he is not
litically orthodox hackwork in Soviet the KGB had involved itself in the
nearly so cartoonish or formulaic a
film and television but also served production of both the source novel
figure as is Agent 007 or indeed the
to assure the German audience of and the TV series, it seems likely
majority of Western, and especially
the 1970s that they were not held to that it licensed a calculated degree
American, fictional spies. While
blame for the evils of Nazi Germa- of subversive language and imagery
of course Bond’s love of creature
ny. This approach, in turn, reflected that would help the series’ bona fides
comforts and use of high technolo-
the long-running Soviet propaganda with cynical Soviet viewers.23 For
gy reflect Western ideas (one might
strategy that separated Western lead- example, Stierlitz, while certainly
even say, the Western id), he also
ers and their policies from Western never approaching “Bondian” levels
springs from a society that, much as
countries’ citizens, an approach that of ostentatious consumption, is not
it suffered in World War II, for the
was perhaps wiser than the West’s above enjoying black-market treats
most part cannot begin to compre-
less subtle approach to Cold War from America and France: cigarettes,
hend the shadow the Great Patriotic
propagandizing by railing against the cognac, and other items that Soviet
War cast throughout the Cold War
“commies.” orthodoxy disapproved of but many
over the roughly 80 percent of Soviet
ordinary Soviets of the 1970s craved
Finally—and perhaps most citizens who survived the German
and acquired whenever possible.
critically for the continuing respect
and affection Russians felt, and feel,

42  Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Seventeen Moments of Spring

As a piece of technical filmmaking, Seventeen Moments

onslaught. No fictional Russian
a has had little discernible influence on other filmmakers
spy, either approved by the Kremlin within or outside the former Soviet Union.
or accepted by the Soviet citizenry,
could take such a cartoonish view throughout Seventeen Moments but more than any other television series
of life and death as do James Bond with never a whisper of seductive to recast science fiction as a genre
and his countless Western imitations. intent. Handsome enough to garner garnering the attention of an intelli-
Stierlitz’s strength lies rather in his the lasting adoration of millions of gent audience. Indeed, the Kremlin
intellect, his ability to keep a secret, Russians, Stierlitz nonetheless re- evidently had its share of Trekkies.
and, especially, his endless patience, mains the consummate father figure, Pravda allegedly complained after
which, on film, occasionally tests no more romantically available than the first few episodes about the lack
the patience of, at least, the Western Mr. Spock or Atticus Finch to those of any Russians in the otherwise
viewer. More George Smiley than around him. overtly “liberal” and progressive
James Bond, Stierlitz remains a step series, resulting in the last-minute
ahead of the Gestapo “by cunning Indeed, Atticus Finch, as written assignment of Ensign Chekov to the
and rhetoric, not an ejector seat.”24 by Harper Lee in To Kill a Mocking- Enterprise.c
bird and played on-screen in 1962 by
Comparisons of Stierlitz to Gregory Peck, may be the Western Imagine a Soviet-era intelligence
Bond, or even to more cerebral and literary and screen character whose or propaganda service trying to
well-written Western creations like impact most closely mirrors that understand American culture without
George Smiley, fall short in another of Stierlitz in Russia. This lawyer ever having heard of either To Kill
sense. Bond is a pop-culture icon, on of the Deep South is, like Stierlitz, a Mockingbird or Star Trek, and the
the same plane as Superman, Tintin, a morally complex and admirable lesson for American intelligence and
or Mickey Mouse. And however character, highlighting by sheer messaging professionals about the
intricately and realistically John le force of character a national cultural value of keeping up, to some degree,
Carré rendered him or how compel- attitude (in his case, awareness of with Russian popular culture be-
lingly Gary Oldman and the late Alec the evil of racism). And Atticus, like comes clear.
Guinness played him on-screen, Smi- Stierlitz, works to redeem an oft-dis-
ley remains a creature of the shadowy dained profession.b Finally, again like As a piece of technical filmmak-
intelligence world, known mainly to Stierlitz and emphatically unlike the ing, Seventeen Moments has had little
fans of the genre and having little to ever-fungible James Bond, Atticus discernible influence on other film-
say to the wider culture. was, and for most Americans could makers within or outside the former
only be, played onscreen by a single Soviet Union. Though much admired
Finally, Stierlitz’s quiet fidelity in Russian culture, the veteran direc-
beloved actor, whose face and perso-
to his wife throughout a decade of tor Tatyana Lioz­nova’s masterpiece
na have become inextricably linked
cover assignment contrasts strongly has never been emulated by her peers
with the character he played.
with James Bond’s famous readiness in the same way that, for example,
to seduce seemingly any woman who Frivolous as it might initially Stanley Kubrick or the great Russian
stops moving long enough. Stier- seem, Mr. Spock is nearly as apt
litz spends time, and even dances a Western analog of Stierlitz as is
and drinks, with attractive women Atticus Finch. The original run of
Star Trek (1966–69) probably did c. This claim, which producer Gene
Roddenberry first made in a 1968 book,
a. The author’s wife recalls classroom di- The Making of Star Trek, has never been
atribes, all through her Moscow childhood verified or disproved, though a 1996 book
in the 1980s, about America’s pernicious b. The 2015 publication of the Mockingbird by the series’ original producers reproduces
delay in opening a second front against the “sequel” Go Set a Watchman, featuring, a letter that Roddenberry wrote to Pravda,
Germans during the Great Patriotic War. alas, a racist Atticus, does not change this apparently in response to its complaint, in-
Like many former Soviet citizens, she cultural history, though the character’s im- forming the editors of Chekov’s addition to
remains impatient with Western film depic- age has surely been tainted for those readers the cast—Herb Solow and Robert Justman,
tions of the war as a gallant adventure, won (not including this author) who accept the Inside Star Trek: The Real Story (Pocket
by the Western Allies as a matter of course. 2015 book as “canon.” Books, 1996).

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  43


Seventeen Moments of Spring

Vladimir Putin was 21 when he first saw Seventeen Mo-

ments of Spring and has often credited the show as a Political Impact: Russian Re-
primary influence in his joining the KGB. sentments and the Rise of
Vladimir “Stierlitz” Putin
director Andrei Tarkovsky continue within his fictional universe, but a
to influence the language of film. hapless stooge outside of it. An entire Seventeen Moments of Spring
academic subfield addresses the phe- cemented in Soviet popular culture
That said, at least one Hollywood nomenon of Soviet-era anekdoty, and the lasting belief that America and
spy thriller, Brad Bird’s Mission Im- Stierlitz and Gestapo chief Mueller, Germany had secretly bargained
possible: Ghost Protocol (2011), paid his chief foil in the miniseries, loom for peace behind Stalin’s back—a
homage to perhaps the most famous large in this literature. central, and fictional, plot point in the
scene of the entire miniseries. Stier- miniseries. The Kremlin was nervous
litz is allowed to see, from across Finally, there is a small irony in enough about the series’ depiction of
a café, his wife, secretly smuggled the fact that starting in 1973, the this pernicious American scheme—
into Berlin from Russia for the sole same year when Soviet intelligence, complete with a cartoonishly Machi-
purpose of this one meeting after after decades of popular disdain, avellian Allen Dulles—to delay the
a decade of being apart: they gaze acquired via Seventeen Moments series’ 1973 broadcast premiere until
at one another for over six minutes of Spring new respect and esteem after Brezhnev’s visit to the United
of screen time, allowed neither to at home, the American Intelligence States, that summer.26 They need not
approach or even speak to the other. Community began suffering a series have worried. Other than a New York
In the final scene of Ghost Protocol, of public blows—Watergate, Sey- Times article by Hedrick Smith in
Ethan Hunt, still in deep cover like mour Hersch’s revelations of spying January 1974, almost no US media
Stierlitz, is granted the chance to on domestic groups, and reports from outlets reported on the series, nor was
share a long, silent, poignant gaze the Church and Pike Committees— any official notice taken on this side
with his wife from a distance, before from which it would take decades of the Atlantic about the depiction
resuming his mission. to recover in the public eye. Indeed, of a villainous Dulles scheming to
most pre-1990s American scholarship betray his country’s wartime ally.
Russian popular affection for Max on “intelligence ethics” proceeded
Otto von Stierlitz has not prevented on the assumption that intelligence Vladimir Putin was 21 when
the emergence of an entire genre of work is amoral and those who do he first saw Seventeen Moments of
jokes (anekdoty) lampooning the it, by definition, morally compro- Spring and has often credited the
often portentous and self-evident mised. To what extent was this badly show as a primary influence in his
voiceovers throughout the series: mistaken stance influenced by the joining the KGB: “What amazed me
contemporary depictions of spies in most of all,” he was quoted as saying,
Stierlitz had a thought. He liked
American culture as violent and/or “was how one man’s effort could
it, so he had another one.
evil? Not only James Bond’s objec- achieve what whole armies could
A flower pot fell off the window tively poor behavior, but any number not.”27 Putin has also credited another
sill of the secret apartment and of 1970s thrillers using the CIA as miniseries of the Andropov KGB era,
smashed Stierlitz on the head. the plot’s default Big Bad, and even The Sword and the Shield (1968),
This was the signal that his wife M*A*S*H’s paranoid counterintelli- which, however, seems to have left
had just given birth to a son. gence officer, Colonel Flagg, come to very little impression on Soviet and
Stierlitz shed a single manly mind—and all suffer in contrast with subsequent Russian culture—likely
tear. He hadn’t been home for the virtuous, and virtuoso in espio- because of its strict party orthodoxy
seven years.25 nage, Stierlitz. and inferior overall quality.
In these jokes, Stierlitz is affec- From the very beginning of his
tionately conceived as a combination political career, Putin cultivated his
of the American TV characters Joe media image as a “real-life Stier-
Friday and Maxwell Smart: a compe- litz.” Indeed, Putin’s first television
tent if self-important “straight man” appearance, when he was working

44  Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Seventeen Moments of Spring

in the St. Petersburg mayor’s office the Fatherland, Third Class) to the four-decades-old miniseries is its
the year after his resignation from 75-year-old Vyacheslav Tikhonov, artful blend of facts and propaganda,
the KGB, was in a 1992 documenta- who had remained a pop-culture icon presented with little effort to dis-
ry about the city government. Putin since the 1970s based on his portray- tinguish historic truth from creative
himself urged the director to stage al of Max Otto von Stierlitz.31 fiction. As a result, even today many
a famous scene from the miniseries Russians derive their understanding
finale—Stierlitz’s long drive back An important lesson that Vlad- of the wartime US-Soviet relation-
to Berlin after his final mission, as imir Putin—and indeed, any polit- ship largely from old memories of
the iconic theme music plays—with ical leader who studies the role of watching Seventeen Moments of
Putin himself as Stierlitz. This “hom- misinformation in consolidating Spring, cheering Stierlitz’s noble ef-
age” to Russia’s most beloved fic- power—might have drawn from this
tional spy both announced Vladimir
Putin to the nation as a former KGB
officer and helped launch his national
political career.28

Throughout the 1990s, Putin

would continue to benefit politically
from the stream of media compari-
sons to Stierlitz. The KGB veteran’s
public image of quiet, reassuring
professionalism played into popular
angst about Russian political and
social instability and the “public
longing for a real-life Stierlitz who
could deal with any crisis calmly and
efficiently.”29 Indeed, the “Stierlitz
phenomenon” had already become a
cliché in Russian media commentary
by early in Putin’s first presidency.
The newspaper Vlast noted the polit-
ical value to Putin of such compari-
sons:

The only thing that puts any

blood at all in the veins of the
generally rather pallid image of
Putin is his past as a spy. Work
in Germany, devotion to the
homeland, shedding a tear on
Soviet holidays. Maxim Maxi-
movich Isayev [Stierlitz’s true
Russian name], the very one.30

In 2003, presumably in recogni-

tion of his debt to the actor whose
popularity and talent had helped
launch his own career, Putin present- “President 2000: Portrait of the Future Head of State,” Vlast (Power) magazine, 14 March
ed a medal (the Order for Service to 2000, The cover image of Stierlitz invoked the fictional spy’s popularity in coverage of
Putin during the election that took him to Russia’s presidency a week later.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  45


Seventeen Moments of Spring

forts to thwart America and Germany Conclusion of Seventeen Moments of Spring

from plotting against the motherland. in the Agency’s historical Nazi
While both Western and Soviet/ files, given the book’s (and minise-
In our era of rapidly increasing, Russian espionage fiction have his- ries’) highly permeable membrane
politically driven, and often highly torically developed at least partially between historical accuracy and
successful “fake news,” increasing- in response to their respective gov- creative fiction. Whether the endur-
ly abetted by high-tech fakery, it is ernments’ agendas, as well as what ing Russian love for Max Otto von
worth remembering that carefully their readership wanted, Seventeen Stierlitz is in spite of, or due to, the
crafted, low-tech misinformation Moments of Spring represents the KGB’s involvement with its produc-
can be at least as effective, even apotheosis of a high-quality, enduring tion, Seventeen Moments of Spring
after several decades. The KGB has work of popular art—which nonethe- remains well worth watching, both as
seldom enjoyed such lasting success less had its origins in, and was both entertainment and as a window into
with any propaganda or disinforma- supported and vetted throughout by, Russian popular culture and its effect
tion campaign as with its support the very government whose agents’ on recruiting for, and glamorizing
of Julian Semyonov’s story about secret heroics it portrayed. The CIA that nation’s intelligence communi-
a spy—nashi (one of ours)—in the analyst who wrote the report quoted ty—no less in recent years than four
Great Patriotic War. at the beginning of this essay may decades ago.
easily be forgiven for filing the plot

v v v

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Seventeen Moments of Spring

Endnotes

1. CIA website, Special Collection, document titled MUELLER, HEINRICH VOL. 2 0027. pdf, document num-
ber 519b7f99993294098d5131d5, (accessed 30 January 2017), https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/
519b7f99993294098d5131d5.
2. “Seventeen Moments of Spring,” Sovlit.net website, 12 November 2014 (accessed 23 January 2017), http://www.sovlit.net/17moments.
3. Arkady Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia: From Gorbachev’s Freedom to Putin’s War (Viking, 2016), chapter 8. Clips from the 1992
documentary in question can be viewed in an online article on pbs.org, Tim Malloy, “Watch Part of a Film Commissioned by Vladimir
Putin—About Himself,” published 12 January 2015 (accessed 2 March 2017), http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/frontline/article/watch-part-of-
a-film-commissioned-by-vladimir-putin-about-himself.
4. Ivan Zasoursky, Media and Power in Post-Soviet Russia (Routledge, 2004), 144.
5. Encyclopedia.com, “French Influence on Russia” (accessed 6 February 2017), http://www.encyclopedia.com/history/encyclopedias-al-
manacs-transcripts-and-maps/french-influence-russia.
6. Christopher R. Moran and Robert Johnson, “In the Service of Empire: Imperialism and the British Spy Thriller 1901–1914,” Studies in
Intelligence 54, no. 2 (June 2010): 1–20.
7. Paul Brown, “Report on the IRR File on the Red Orchestra,” National Archives website (accessed 3 February 2017), https://www.
archives.gov/iwg/research-papers/red-orchestra-irr-file.html.
8. Elena Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies: Soviet TV Mini-Series of the 1970s (doctoral dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 2003),
33.
9. Ibid., 63.
10. Igor Pomoranzev, “The Case of the Missing Russian Crime Novel,” Radio Free Europe website, published 31 July 2009 (accessed 1
February 2017), http://ww”w.rferl.org/a/The_Case_Of_The_Missing_Russian_Crime_ Novel/1789846.html.
11. World Heritage Encyclopedia, reprinted on Project Gutenberg website (accessed 31 January 2017), http://self.gutenberg.org/articles/
vladimir_yefimovich_semichastny.
12. Yuri Zhukov, Komsomolskaya Pravda, 30 September 1965, reprinted in Jeremy Black’s The Politics of James Bond: From Fleming’s
Novels to the Silver Screen (Praeger, 2000), 6.
13. Andrew Nette, “A Proletarian James Bond?”, Overlord 214 (Autumn 2014) (accessed 20 January 2017) https://overland.org.au/previ-
ous-issues/issue-214/feature-andrew-nette/.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Cecile Vaissie, “False Nazis and True Chekists,” in The Cold War and Entertainment Television, ed. Lori Maguire (Cambridge Scholars,
2016), 107–20.
17. Ibid., 111.
18. “Office of Strategic Services: Secret Intelligence Branch,” CIA public website, published 19 November 2009 (accessed 6 February
2017), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/featured-story-archive/oss-secret-intelligence-branch.html.
19. Hedrick Smith, “Soviet Spy Thriller ‘Exposes’ U.S. Plot,” New York Times, 7 January 1974.
20. David MacFadyen, Red Stars: Personality and the Popular Soviet Song (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 115.
21. Prokhorova, Fragmented Mythologies, 103.
22. Ibid.
23. Vaissie, “False Nazis,” 112.
24. Greg Afinogeniov, “A Portrait of Bureaucracy in Twelve Parts: Seventeen Moments,” in Idiom, March 2010 (accessed 31 January 2017),
http://idiommag.com/2010/03/a-portrait-of-bureaucracy-in-twelve-parts-seventeen-moments/.
25. “Vashatedil’s Blog” (accessed 30 January 2017), https://vahshatedil.wordpress.com/2010/02/01/Stierlitz-jokes-the-funniest-i-have-ever-
read/ .
26. Hedrick Smith, The Russians (Ballantine, 1976), 432–34.
27. Richard Sakwa, Putin: Russia’s Choice (Routledge, 2003), 6.
28. Ostrovsky, The Invention of Russia, chapter 8.
29. Ibid.
30. Zasoursky, Media and Power, 136.
31. “Putin Decorates Beloved Screen Spy,” Moscow Times, 10 February 2003 (accessed 19 January 2017), http://old.themoscowtimes.com/
sitemap/free/2003/2/article/putin-decorates-beloved-screen-spy/240496.html.

v v v

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  47

Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

The Office of Naval Intelligence in World War I:

Diverse Threats, Divergent Responses
Dr. Eric Setzekorn
Between 1917 and 1919, the ternal security organization along the
Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI) lines of the United Kingdom’s MI5
operated a multifaceted intelligence (The Security Service). However,
organization and was far ahead of its ONI’s clear rejection of nonmilitary
bureaucratic rivals, the still nascent intelligence functions in the postwar
During the late 19th FBI and US Secret Service, in a wide period was a major inflection point
range of intelligence capabilities. It in the evolution of US intelligence
century, naval intelli-
operated intelligence and counter- organizations.
gence became an ur- intelligence programs both at home
gent requirement as the and abroad and pursued relatively
sophisticated joint operations with ONI and the American Intelli-
Industrial Revolution gence Community, 1914–18
other government agencies.
changed the nature of The Office of Naval Intelligence
the global security en- In key US industrial and scientific
was the first agency of the US
facilities, such as the Sperry plant in
vironment on land and Brooklyn, New York, ONI gathered
government organized specifically
to collect information on foreign
sea. intelligence and detained suspects
threats. During the late 19th century,
in cooperation with local police
naval intelligence became an urgent
agencies. It also worked to impede
requirement as the Industrial Revolu-
German smuggling operations by
tion changed the nature of the global
disrupting financial networks. Efforts
security environment on land and sea.
to develop a foreign intelligence
In the case of the latter, ships rapidly
capability, including collection and
switched from sail to steam and rifled
analysis, however, were less success-
steel cannons increased engagement
ful.
ranges to miles rather than yards.
Examination of ONI during World In 1882, General Order 292 estab-
War I offers a perspective into several lished an Office of Naval Intelligence
aspects of American intelligence attached to the Bureau of Navigation.
history, such as homeland security The primary function of the new of-
operations and intergovernmental fice was the selection and assignment
bureaucratic politics among mili- of naval officers to US embassies in
tary, civilian, and nongovernmental London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna, and St.
agencies. Petersburg.1 This program was steadi-
ly expanded, and by 1900, ONI could
The ONI case also suggests the draw on a network of roughly 15
United States did have the organi- full-time attachés, each with a small
zational framework and ideological staff, to collect and translate foreign
orientation to develop an effective in-

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author
and should not be construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement
of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of
any component of the United States government. © Erick Setzekorn, 2017

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  49


Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

After 1914, and particularly after the United States entered

the war in 1917, multiple US executive agencies vied for of bureau investigations was, and
counterintelligence primacy. remains, an institutional structure and
work culture based around the pursuit
of legal prosecutions, which require
newspapers or conduct private inves- countries. After 1914, and particular- information gathered to be both cer-
tigations. ly after the United States entered the tain and judicially admissible.
war in 1917, multiple US executive
Early ONI assignment and train- agencies vied for counterintelligence The Treasury Department,
ing procedures were haphazard, with primacy. With no clear bureaucratic through the Secret Service, its inves-
naval attachés dispatched to for- guidance, the State Department, Trea- tigation arm, was also a competitor
eign capitals with only rudimentary sury Department, Attorney General, in the bureaucratic maneuvering in
language skills and no clear under- US Army military intelligence, and Washington. The politically connect-
standing of intelligence methods or ONI all expanded their intelligence ed and ambitious Treasury Secretary
critical information requirements. In operations. William McAdoo had a limited staff
the early decades, naval attachés col- and resources but assigned Secret
lected large amounts of open-source The Department of State had Service personnel to trail German
information on naval ship designs, bureaucratic prestige and an existing diplomats and received presidential
new armaments, and political devel- global network to undertake an inte- authorization to surveil the German
opments, but the ONI organization grated intelligence program, and in embassy.7
lacked a coherent internal structure to 1916, it established an office—under
analyze and disseminate the infor- a chief special agent to the secretary The military rival of ONI was
mation. A major hindrance to ONI’s of state—with the mission of provid- the US Army’s Military Intelligence
development was the perception, ing security for American diplomats, Division (MI), established on 3 May
generally accurate, that command exchanging interned enemy aliens, 1917 as the result of the efforts of the
positions on major warships offered and conducting investigations of for- energetic Col. Ralph van Deman as
the best way for officers to gain eign espionage.4 After the passage of an appendage of the Army War Col-
promotion quickly, leading most the Travel Control Act in May 1918, lege Division.8 Although the Army’s
ambitious or skilled officers to avoid the State Department also had control bureaucratic position was extremely
assignment to ONI.2 over the issuance of US passports and weak and administratively chaotic, it
visas, a vital first step in any counter- had legal authority to draft personnel,
In the decade prior to World intelligence system.5 Factors working an advantage that allowed it to grow
War I, ONI gained in importance as against the State Department were much faster than other agencies. At
US naval strategists began prepar- a limited staff and an institutional the MI’s Washington DC headquar-
ing detailed war plans, especially culture centered around a politically ters, a massive staff of 1,259 super-
focusing on Japan’s growing strength appointed elite with little inclination vised global operations.9 Domestic
in the Pacific. ONI benefited greatly for intelligence “grunt work.” divisions of the MI did exist, but
from a reorganization of the Navy’s the organization’s primary duty was
command structure in 1915 that The Department of Justice’s supporting American ground forces
established ONI as an independent Bureau of Investigation had been cre- in France.
department answering to the newly ated in 1908 to handle both domestic
created post of Chief of Naval Opera- terrorism, specifically anarchists, The X factor in the American
tions (CNO).3 and criminal violations of interstate Intelligence Community was the role
commerce. It expanded rapidly after of private contractors. The largest
Vying for Primacy 1914, doubling in size to 200 agents private intelligence organization
At the start of the war, ONI was by 1916, in large part because of was the American Protective League
the largest US intelligence organiza- instability along the US southern (APL), founded in 1917 by a Chica-
tion, with a global network of per- border associated with the Mexican go advertising executive. The APL
sonnel and preexisting connections Revolution and shipments of weap- operated a national system of offic-
to intelligence agencies in foreign ons to Mexico.6 The Achilles’ heel es staffed by volunteers, generally

50  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

ONI was in a strong position to pursue counterintelli-

upper-middle-class businessmen or gence operations during WWI. It had a strong bureaucrat-
professionals who helped government ic position, a lengthy organizational history, and a global
departments gather information on network of naval attachés.
draft dodgers and enemy aliens.10
While not trained in counterintelli-
Despite these difficulties, ONI tion, shipping security/antismuggling
gence duties, the APL provided all US
was in a strong position to pursue violations, and nonattaché foreign
intelligence groups with information,
counterintelligence operations during intelligence collection. As we shall
especially in the form of background
WWI. It had a strong bureaucratic see, ONI had its greatest success
details on suspects. While APL
position, a lengthy organizational in domestic intelligence operations
members were not paid, World War
history, and a global network of naval to protect against enemy sabotage
I presented a business opportunity
attachés. It was also well motivated or espionage. However, in the third
for many former law enforcement,
to pursue unglamorous jobs such as area, methods for collecting foreign
private detectives, and retired bureau-
plant protection because the Navy intelligence were poorly conceived,
crats to form private intelligence com-
was the premier “high tech” service horribly executed, and added little to
panies. The Federal Service Bureau,
during World War I and was heavily national security.
which former Bureau of Investigation
reliant on sophisticated equipment.
inspector Raymond Horn established, After “Black Tom”: Plant Protec-
ONI was also well placed to leverage
was typical of this type of contractor. tion and the Sperry Corporation
its organizational familiarity with
Horn offered “to secure prompt and During the period of US neutral-
foreign trade networks that, in an era
accurate information of value” by de- ity, 1914–17, the American defense
before air transport, was dominated
veloping private intelligence sources industry grew as it exported war
by maritime connections. Like the
in factories and conducting surveil- materials to Great Britain and France.
Army, ONI could also use the draft to
lance on designated targets.11 Blocked from purchasing American
fill manpower shortfalls, but, unlike
After the war began, ONI was the Army, which had few facilities in munitions and supplies, Germany
challenged by a wide range of new major cities, ONI could operate from sought to destroy or disrupt the flow
duties in foreign and domestic intel- naval bases already established in all of American supplies, often at its
ligence. Wartime conditions hindered major American harbors.12 source in the United States. In 1915
the operations of naval attachés, alone, explosions in 10 US munitions
especially those assigned to Berlin plants and aboard 13 British ships
and Vienna, and security measures ONI’s Three Primary Missions that had sailed from US ports caused
such as censorship eliminated most ONI devoted the majority of its widespread concern over industrial
of the open-source material attachés time and personnel to plant protec- sabotage.13 Although poor safety
had relied on. Domestically, ONI was Image below showing damage from the Black Tom Island sabotage of 30 July 1916.
faced with the challenge of working Photo: Library of Congress
with other US government agen-
cies to maintain peace and stability
while multiple nations, international
groups, and domestic activists sought
to influence policy. The term “do-
mestic intelligence” refers to efforts
by US government organizations to
gather, assess, and act on information
about individuals or organizations in
the United States that is not neces-
sarily related to the investigation of
a known past criminal act or specific
planned criminal activity.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  51


Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

The Sperry Plant in 1920

and 2010. Photos: Hathi
Trust and Internet Archive-
Wikimedia Commons.

procedures and untrained workers its urban location and because of its Lieutenant Fish’s first action was
were most likely the cause of some heavily German workforce. Lieu- to compile an extensive system of
explosions, several German embassy tenant Fish began his investigation dossiers on all company personnel,
personnel, with the knowledge and by establishing an independent office with managers subject to lengthy ex-
support of Amb. Johann von Berns- away from both the Sperry plant and aminations of their personal history
dorff, conducted a sabotage cam- nearby Navy facilities.16 Fish was in and associations. Based on these doc-
paign aimed at crippling munitions a strong position to demand coop- uments, Fish identified key individ-
shipments.14 The most spectacular of eration from the company’s founder uals who had questionable personal
German sabotage operations was the and president Elmer Sperry because behavior, unsupervised work posi-
destruction of the munitions depot on of a clause inserted into all naval tions, or family relationships in Ger-
Black Tom Island in New York Har- contracts that allowed for oversight many, Austria, or Russia. The major
bor, resulting in seven deaths and the of all production methods—and the problem facing Fish was the com-
destruction of $17 million in property Sperry plant had over $1.2 million in position of the workforce, with only
(over $400 million in 2014 dollars).15 Navy contracts.17 The clause read as 509 workers out of a total workforce
follows: of 1,371 born in the United States to
A key facility the US Navy was US-born parents.19 Roughly 25 per-
especially interested in protecting The contractor shall provide cent of the workforce were non-US
from sabotage was the Sperry Gyro- additional watchmen and de- citizens, with Germans and Austri-
scope Company in Brooklyn, New vices for the Navy Department ans representing the overwhelming
York. Established by the brilliant against espionage, acts of war, majority of this group. Looking at
inventor Elmer Sperry, by 1917 the and enemy aliens as may be Sperry Company management, Fish
company was responsible for nu- required by the Secretary of the concluded that Elmer Sperry lacked
merous Navy contracts and the sole Navy . . . When required by the both the skills and inclination to han-
producer of a series of highly sophis- Secretary of the Navy, he shall dle day-to-day management, which
ticated gyroscopes used for naviga- refuse to employ, or if already was delegated to Otto Meitzenfield,
tion and accurate gunnery operations employed, forthwith discharge the plant superintendent. A German
aboard navy ships. from employment and exclude immigrant himself, Meitzenfield had
from his works, any person been influential in recruiting highly
In early July 1917, ONI ordered or persons designated by the
Lt. Albert Fish to begin a confidential trained German workers to operate
Secretary of the Navy as unde- the complex machinery.
investigation into the security of the sirable for employment or work
Sperry plant. The facility was seen for the Navy Department.18 With a solid understanding of the
as particularly vulnerable because of company structure, operations, and

52  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

During the investigation process, Lieutenant Fish also

personnel, Fish proceeded to the sec- used passive defense measures to strengthen the phys-
ond phase of his investigation: focus- ical and information security (InfoSec) procedures at the
ing on key security risks. In August Sperry plant.
1917, he engaged private detectives
and local citizens to verify the per-
Fish arranged for five Navy person- from 6 April 1917, which stated, “An
sonal information in the security dos-
nel to be assigned to the Sperry plant enemy alien shall not approach or be
siers, interview family members, and
security team. Unlike the civilian found within one-half of a mile of
question neighbors about the person-
watchmen, the Navy personnel were any . . . workshop for the manufac-
al behavior of Sperry employees.20
armed and reported directly to Fish.23 ture of munitions of war or of any
Common questions during these
products for the use of the army or
interviews included details of family Supporting the investigations was navy.”25
members living overseas, personal a network of informants developed
finances, and political statements. among plant workers. Although his After receiving authority from
The majority of these investigations presence was not officially an- the ONI office in Washington DC,
turned up nothing substantive, but nounced, Lieutenant Fish was known Lt. Fish coordinated the arrest of 96
areas of concern such as frequent at the plant, and several workers workers in the early morning hours
contact with foreign nationals or a volunteered to provide information if of 27 September.26 As a result of
recent change in spending habits they saw anything illegal or unpa- excellent surveillance work and using
were flagged, marking the subject for triotic. Although Fish had initially the resources of 250 police officers
further investigation. planned to use bribes to gain in- in 30 vehicles, all of the targets were
formation from within the factory, seized with no reports of escape or
The third phase of the investi-
this was not necessary. Many of the resistance.
gation was in-depth surveillance of
informers at the plant appear to have
high-risk targets, using private inves- ONI operations at the Sperry plant
been motivated by a strong dislike
tigators working in shifts. The New demonstrated a highly methodical
for Meitzenfield, who was nicknamed
York Police Department (NYPD) and apparently successful counterin-
“the Kaiser” for his domineering
greatly assisted ONI efforts by lend- telligence operation. While the scale
style and temper.24 Moreover, Meit-
ing the services of a German-speak- of the detentions might appear exces-
zenfield had promoted a large num-
ing detective to the surveillance op- sive, all ONI actions between July
ber of ethnic Germans to foreman
eration. The detective entered bars or and September 1917 were conducted
and management positions, causing
restaurants in the German immigrant in a logical, phased process and,
discontent among many workers.
community wearing plain clothes and in the threatening times, were seen
engaged the subjects in conversation With a solid network of infor- as legitimate. The New York Times
or a game of cards.21 mants, an ONI staff of 17, effec- lauded ONI for identifying the “nests
tive liaison with the NYPD, and a of Teuton Troublemakers.”27
During the investigation, Lieu-
methodically collected intelligence
tenant Fish also used passive defense A special characteristic of the
database of potential security threats,
measures to strengthen the physical ONI operation at the Sperry plant
Lieutenant Fish asked for permission
and information security (InfoSec) was the use of “private contractors”
to arrest workers on precautionary
procedures at the Sperry plant. To ranging from unpaid plant informants
security charges. Since ONI’s eval-
protect important documents and to “trailing men” (surveillants). The
uation of what constituted threats to
blueprints, Fish arranged for a large small size of the federal government
the Sperry plant was not sufficient to
safe to be installed in the plant’s pri- before the New Deal often required
bring direct charges, Fish identified
mary design room. An armed guard the use of short-term private contrac-
only foreign nationals who could
controlled access to the safe and any tors to fulfill government responsi-
be detained for violations of immi-
employee wishing to use a document bilities. Many criticized the practice
gration procedures and presidential
needed to sign the item in and out.22 because of the potential for fraud
directives. The specific charge used
In addition to the regular watchmen and abuse of power, and in 1893,
to detain the suspects was Article 4
responsible for protecting the plant, Congress passed the so-called An-
of Presidential Proclamation 1364

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  53


Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

An indirect but more lasting method of disrupting smug-

gling was breaking apart the network of financial institu- for Denmark, another major trans-
tions and brokerage companies acting as fronts for Ger- shipment point into Germany.33
man agents.
An indirect but more lasting
method of disrupting smuggling was
ti-Pinkerton Act, which banned any not a full member, ONI quickly breaking apart the network of finan-
individual employed by the Pinkerton became a vital source of information cial institutions and brokerage com-
Agency or “similar organization” for the War Trade Board, supplying panies acting as fronts for German
from employment by the federal background information on ship’s agents. Despite the possibility of seri-
government.28 In spite of this statute, personnel, placing informants on ously disrupting German operations,
most government agencies, including ships suspected of smuggling, and the practical details of investigating
the Navy, continued to use private tracking vessels to foreign ports in multiple layers of front companies,
detectives. In 1913, the Navy used order to monitor transfers. maneuvering through legal codes,
the Burns Detective Agency, famous and tracking international financial
for tracing stolen jewels, to find A major problem for the War
transfers proved difficult.
stolen blueprints of the USS Pennsyl- Trade Board and ONI was Germany’s
vania.29 well-developed smuggling network. The case of George Mogensen
During World War I, Great Britain’s is an example of the difficulties and
From a counterintelligence per- naval blockade slowly crippled the opportunities ONI faced in creating
spective, Lieutenant Fish’s investiga- German economy by restricting all a proactive intelligence investigation
tion set a high standard for internal imports. Prior to the war the German of smuggling. Mogensen first came
security measures. It systematically economy was a dynamic and integral to ONI’s attention in April 1918 after
collected information, analyzed part of the world economy, but with- one of his clerks was reported mak-
the data to identity key threats and out vital imports of key raw materials ing large purchases in Barranquilla,
protect primary targets, and, only and foodstuffs, its war efforts and Colombia.34 Mogensen was a Danish
after review by higher headquarters, the domestic political system came immigrant who had settled in the
arranged for arrest by police services. under increasing pressure.31 Amer- United States, and in 1914, he and
It highlighted ONI’s ability to design, ican smugglers and agents of the a French partner, Gerome Dumont,
manage, and coordinate all aspects of German government used dummy established the United States Broker-
a counterintelligence operation and, corporations, reflagged merchant age and Trading Company to conduct
within 60 days, ensure the security of ships, transshipped cargoes in neutral a general import and export business
a key strategic production facility. ports, and forged paperwork to get between Europe and ports throughout
around British and, later, US counter- the Western Hemisphere. Initial-
Shipping Control and Smuggling measures. ly, the two partners invested only
A corollary to ONI’s involvement
$10,000 but after only three years in
in the protection of vital defense The most direct method of hin-
business, gross revenue for 1917 was
industrial plants was the protection dering smuggling was to arrest the
estimated at over $5 million.
of American ships and enforcement smugglers and seize their vessels.
of trade embargoes against Germany. Although most smugglers limited As general manager of the United
After American entry into the war, their efforts to small loads, several States Brokerage and Trading Co.,
an executive order established the major arrests did occur, including Mogensen’s primary business was the
War Trade Board on 12 October 1917 with the seizure of the SS Ryndam, shipment of foodstuffs to his home
with authority to control all imports which was carrying 750,000 pounds country of Denmark. Mogensen’s
and exports.30 The board included of copper, 250,000 pounds of brass, father Christian and brother Knud
representatives of the Departments and 1,700 barrels of lubricating oil to managed the firm’s branch office in
of State, Treasury, Agriculture, and the Netherlands for transshipment to Copenhagen. Knud Mogensen was
Commerce and sought to block all Germany.32 In another case, 1 million on a State Department watchlist and
shipments to the Central Powers re- rounds of rifle ammunition were was denied entry into in the United
gardless of the type of product. While seized from a Norwegian ship bound States as the result of his frequent

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ONI sent more than 85 nonofficial cover (NOC) agents—

trips into Germany and the suspicion those not protected by diplomatic immunity—to locations
he sometimes acted as a courier of as varied as China, Denmark, and Japan, but the over-
German dispatches.35 whelming majority went to countries in the Western Hemi-
Throughout his business career, sphere.
George Mogensen developed a
network of shell companies that ONI paperwork showing the sale of coffee 1919, Mogensen’s partner, Gerome
investigators had extreme difficulty to a Mr. Johs Jacobson in Aux Cayes, Dumont, was convicted of defrauding
understanding. United States Broker- Haiti; the sale was technically illegal the US government by conspiring to
age and Trading had worked around because Jacobson had been restricted divert large amounts of government
US restrictions on foreign trade by from doing business in the United rail freight and report it stolen.43
breaking up large shipments into States and Mogensen’s Company was
smaller ones under the names of nu- registered in the United States. In While ONI’s efforts do appear
merous silent partners, often clerks in addition, Navy investigators found a to have imposed substantial costs
Mogensen’s employ. Mogensen also discrepancy between the sale price of on Mogensen’s activities in terms
routed a large number of shipments the coffee listed in the records of the of time and money, the inability to
through Caribbean ports such as Ha- United States Brokerage and Trading achieve a conviction was indicative
vana, Santo Domingo, and Port-au- and US tax records.37 of systemic issues with interagency
Prince in conjunction with non-US coordination, the difficult transition
trading firms. Mogensen used the ONI also acted to disrupt Mo- from intelligence to judicial systems,
South Seas Import and Export Com- gensen’s operations if the legal and ONI’s trouble understanding
pany as the middleman to launder his charges failed. In conjunction with business activity. The failure to
Caribbean transfers. Mogensen was communications companies, it achieve a conviction undoubtedly
the sole owner of South Seas Import blocked overseas messages Mo- was dispiriting for ONI officers but
and Export. Inside the United States, gensen tried to send to his branch of- many of the tactics ONI used against
outbound shipments of the United fices in Copenhagen and Paris.38 The Mogensen were effective in reducing
States Brokerage and Trading were use of deliberate censorship to harass smuggling operations into Germany.
stored in the Rose Street Storage and disrupt was in the gray area of
Warehouse Company Inc., also ONI’s legal authority, but war censor- Foreign Intelligence Collection
ship was common at the time and it The third aspect of ONI efforts
owned by George Mogensen.36
does appear to have been effective in was foreign intelligence collection in
Between April and October 1918, significantly hindering Mogensen.39 areas not actively engaged in conflict.
ONI—with the cooperation of the This program was separate from the
Army’s Military Intelligence Bu- The US Attorney’s Office did attaché system and sought to collect
reau, the War Trade Board, and the eventually take up the case of Mo- information on German espionage
US Attorney’s Office—attempted to gensen and his violations of the War networks and the potential of eth-
piece together an accurate picture of Trade Act.40 This was met with a furi- nic-Germans to support German
Mogensen’s commercial activities. In ous rebuttal by Mogensen’s attorney, operations. Although it was creative
spite of the impressive coordination Frederick Czaki, a well-known and and interesting, the practical value of
between the agencies, the network of politically connected business law- the intelligence collected in foreign
Mogensen’s activities were too clev- yer.41 Czaki was ultimately successful areas was extremely limited. The
erly opaque for any clear evidence of in getting the charges dropped be- high value ONI placed on these oper-
illegal activity to be found. cause of the incomplete nature of the ations is reflective of biases toward
evidence. ONI’s rapid demobilization high status operations rather than a
Unable to find treasonable or even after the end of the war in November rational evaluation of practical utility.
criminal activity, ONI worked with 1918, which scattered the primary
the US Attorney’s Office to find evi- investigators across the country back Between 1917 and 1918, ONI
dence of improper bookkeeping and into civilian life, also hindered the sent more than 85 nonofficial cover
breaches of the tax code. It uncovered trial.42 In a separate legal case in (NOC) agents—those not protected

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  55


Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

Upon arrival in Brazil, Breck energetically tracked wild

rumors of Germans establishing secret bases, supplying Navy telegraph office. Moreover,
U-boats, and storing arms for an insurrection. because Breck had to do the encod-
ing himself, the messages per force
by diplomatic immunity—to loca- lowing month. On paper the oppor- were extremely short and had many
tions as varied as China, Denmark, tunity of sending a highly qualified, small errors that could have hindered
and Japan, but the overwhelming independent agent to conduct intelli- the operation.46 Breck mailed longer
majority went to countries in the gence work that naval attachés could reports to the Navy attaché at the
Western Hemisphere.44 The threat not conduct seemed ideal. Breck was American embassy in Rio de Janeiro
of German activity in the Western well educated, had traveled widely, for inclusion in diplomatic pouch-
Hemisphere was complex, with and spoke German, Spanish, and es; it could take more than three
political instability in Mexico, the Portuguese fluently.45 The cover weeks for these reports to reach ONI
presence of large German immigrant developed for Breck was that he was headquarters. Along with the formal
communities in South America, and “Dr. Ernst Brecht,” an independently reports sent through the Brazilian
widespread smuggling in Central wealthy “traveling professor” with mail service, Breck enclosed person-
America and the Caribbean. ONI pro-German sympathies. al correspondence to his wife with
NOC agents attempted to integrate full names, addresses, and personal
themselves into local communities, The intelligence mission assigned information.47 Both of these methods
gather information and report to to Lieutenant Commander Breck exposed Breck’s association with the
headquarters but were not tasked to was to evaluate the potential for ONI, and even the most basic coun-
undertake any kind of covert action pro-German Brazilians to influence terintelligence operation could have
or contact with local government. foreign policy or provide support to discovered that association.
Germany. Brazil had attempted to
The case of Edward Breck is in- remain neutral during the war but Upon arrival in Brazil, Breck
dicative of larger patterns of foreign after German submarines sunk sev- energetically tracked wild rumors of
intelligence operations. Breck had eral Brazilian ships, most notably the Germans establishing secret bases,
previously served the US Navy by ship Parana in April 1917, Brazilian supplying U-boats, and storing arms
providing reports from Spain during public opinion shifted in support of for an insurrection. Some of the more
the Spanish-American War. He en- joining the war against the Central outlandish claims involved the build-
tered ONI service in February 1917 Powers. Breck’s arrival in Brazil ing of a secret German U-boat base
and was dispatched to Brazil the fol- coincided with a period of extensive upriver in the Amazon jungle.48 Much
political maneuvering as prowar poli- of Breck’s reporting appears to be un-
ticians, especially Brazilian President solicited political and diplomatic ad-
Venceslau Bras, organized political vice rather than anything resembling
support against pro-German leaders, an intelligence report. He frequently
most notably ethnically German For- noted that Brazilians were “hypersen-
eign Minister Lauro Müller. sitive” to social norms and status and
felt it would be helpful if an Ameri-
Complicating Breck’s mission can admiral arrived in the area.49 That
was the uncertain communications Breck appears to have lied about
system. Operating independent of his ability to speak Portuguese and
the US embassy and therefore unable was forced to find English-speaking
to use diplomatic communications sources of information also hindered
services, Breck was forced to use his investigations.50
Western Union to send reports to the
ONI office. And because of the en- ONI Director Roger Welles had
coding, his reporting created a secu- instructed Breck to avoid unneces-
rity risk because it would have been sary exposure, but upon arrival in
highly unusual for a foreign traveler Brazil he decided to announce him-
Lcdr. Edward Breck, undated. Library of
Congress, Harris Ewing Collection to send encoded messages to the US self to the British in order “simplify

56  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

The one systematic aspect of Breck’s misadventures was

the work, and probably save much the way in which he addressed his finances.
time and money” and, he reasoned,
“in any case the U.S. and Britain
plant, a single collection of arms and Edward Breck in particular. When
would probably be allies soon.”51 Af-
ammunition for war purposes of any writing close friend Adm. Austin
ter meeting the British naval attaché,
account, or of any naval base for Knight, Welles stated that during the
Breck gullibly agreed to follow some
provisions or ammunition.”54 war, Lieutenant Commander Breck
of the “good leads” the British officer
traveled to Buenos Aires and joined
had given him and share information. Enclosed in this final report was German clubs and was convincing,
a newspaper clipping from a Bra- valuable and “a perfect wonder” of
The one systematic aspect of
zilian English-language newspaper an agent.55
Breck’s misadventures was the way
reporting that a US naval officer
in which he addressed his finances. In
using the name “Ernest Brecht” was
his letters Breck is careful to contin-
engaged in spying on Brazil’s Ger- Organizational Change
ually ask for large amounts of money
man community. The English paper and the MI5 Model
to ensure his ability to mix with high
was reprinting an earlier article in the
society and entertain. Entertaining After the Armistice was signed
German-language Urwaldbote (Jun-
prominent Germans appears to have on 11 November 1918, ONI quickly
gle Courier), which had interviewed
been the primary method of Breck’s relinquished all major responsibili-
many of the Brazilians that “Profes-
intelligence collection. “I am laying ties in plant protection and shipping
sor Brecht” had contacted and found
plans to get in more closely with the security. After Admiral Welles was
that he had repeatedly tried to induce
aristocratic element, the headquarters reassigned, the new ONI director,
them to make statements supporting
of which is the Deutscher Club,” he Adm. Albert Niblack, made decisions
the Central Powers and the kaiser.
reported. “The chief interests seem strongly favoring attaché activities
Astoundingly, Brecht appears to have
to be wine, women, and horses, with over domestic intelligence opera-
contacted the Urwaldbote newspaper
some gambling thrown in. A little tions. “It has been the aim of the
to demand a retraction. “The gentle-
bird shooting also takes place also office to use only reputable business
man assured us very volubly that he
(sic).”52 methods and avoid anything savoring
has only the most friendly feeling for
of ‘gumshoe’ methods,” he wrote
Breck’s other primary inves- the German colonists,” the Urwald-
tigative technique was reading bote wrote, “but we do not believe
German-language newspapers. He him.”
argued that although ethnic Germans
Based on this newspaper clip-
in Brazil were not well integrated
ping, it appears that from his earliest
and there was no real chance of
arrival in Brazil, Breck had been
significant violence, nevertheless the
identified as an agent of the American
German-language newspapers were
government engaged in espionage.
a “real German menace to Brazil.”53
His official reports contain little real
He believed closure of the outspo-
information and are, for the most
ken German-language newspapers
part, filled with rumors and specu-
would send a signal to the population
lation inferior in quality to any local
and eliminate the trouble of “loud-
newspaper.
mouthed” agitators.
Although to an intelligence
After four months of investiga-
analyst the adventures of Edward
tion, Breck was able to report that
Breck appear incompetent, ama-
fears of German-inspired violence in
teurish, and a waste of time and
Brazil were unfounded. As he put it,
resources, in postwar correspondence Albert Niblack as a commander. Undated.
“I have not been able to discover the
Admiral Welles gave great praise to Library of Congress, Harris Ewing Collec-
actual existence of a single wireless
foreign intelligence collectors and tion.

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Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland

In congressional testimony, Niblack explicitly said that he

would forgo many of ONI’s wartime functions . . . greatest difference between the two
appears to be the level of political
support and personal encouragement
in 1920. “This point can not be too the Navy from the kind of condem-
given to MI5 by Winston Churchill,
strongly emphasized.”56 The clearest nation Attorney General Mitchell
who at various times filled the role
manifestation of this approach can be Palmer would eventually suffer for
of home secretary, first lord of the
seen in the rapid contraction of ONI his actions in 1919 and 1920 against
admiralty, secretary of state for mu-
headquarters staff from over 300 offi- perceived internal enemies. Niblack’s
nitions, and secretary of state for war.
cers in late 1918 to 24 by July 1920. shrinkage of ONI functions to core
Churchill’s use of MI5 in each over-
All branch offices closed in Decem- functions of technical collection
lapping area appears significant in
ber 1918 regardless of the status of was in this sense a “safe bet” that
allowing a steady expansion of MI5
investigations.57 maximized long-term organizational
functional boundaries. In addition,
security over short-term budgets.
In congressional testimony, MI5’s first chief retained the post
Niblack explicitly said that he would from 1909 through 1940, ensuring a
forgo many of ONI’s wartime func- Implications for US Intelligence stable organizational system.
tions even if it meant relinquishing
ONI’s operations during World In contrast, ONI functioned within
the large budgets and staff that went
War I demonstrate that in its early a military structure that had clearly
with the domestic counterintelligence
years the US intelligence apparatus defined areas of specialization. US
mission:
was highly fluid, with shifting bound- Navy officers had no specialized ca-
One of the great things I have aries of authority and objectives reer track for naval intelligence, and
had to contend with has been to defined by intelligence organizations ONI was often headed by officers
get the Office of Naval Intelli- themselves. In spite of press attention destined for early retirement. Rapid
gence away from some of the to the “confusion and impotence of turnover among ONI staff and the re-
wartime activities which grew the spy-catchers,” no agency estab- tention of a traditional Navy promo-
up and which had to do with lished a strong bureaucratic claim tion track ensured that no ambitious
enemy agents. I have done my to the domestic intelligence role.60 officer would seek an ONI posting.
best to unload that . . . my en- Despite operations ranging from the
protection of defense industrial facil- The experience of ONI during
deavor has been to get back to
ities, commercial surveillance, and World War I demonstrates that the
the old-fashioned system with a
foreign intelligence collection, ONI US intelligence system had the
naval attaché who is a member
essentially rejected these functions. potential to evolve along lines similar
of the Diplomatic Corps and
to MI5, with ONI as the nucleus.
who conforms to all the conven-
The Navy’s decision not to main- Instead, domestic “intelligence” func-
tionalities.”58
tain the large intelligence posture it tions would grow within the FBI and
By dropping ONI’s counterintel- had created during the war, especially eventually a US intelligence commu-
ligence mission, Admiral Niblack for domestic and commercial surveil- nity would emerge that maintained an
moved from a budget of over $1 mil- lance, represented a clear difference almost sacrosanct distinction between
lion per year allocated for fiscal year between the US experience and those organizations responsible for domes-
1918/19 to only $65,000 projected nations that adopted a dedicated do- tic security functions and those with
for 1919/20.59 mestic security service. Before 1918, foreign intelligence responsibilities.
ONI and MI5 shared roughly equiv- The decision marked, in my judg-
Whatever the explanation for alent roles and similar military struc- ment, a key moment in the evolution
Niblack’s unloading of counterintel- ture and operating procedures.61 The of US intelligence.
ligence, he may well have protected

v v v

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Endnotes
1. Navy Department, General Orders and Circulars Issued by the Navy Department From 1863 to 1887 (Government Printing Office,
1887), 208.
2. Jeffrey Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence: The Birth of America’s First Intelligence Agency, 1865–1918 (Naval Institute Press,
1979), 38–39.
3. Julius Furer, Administration of the Navy Department in World War II (US Government Printing Office, 1959), 115–16.
4. United States Department of State, Bureau of Diplomatic History, A Brief History, http://www.state.gov/m/ds/about/history/c9107.htm,
accessed 6 October 2013.
5. Act of May 22, 1918, Pub. L.65-154, 40 Stat. 559 (1918).
6. John F. Fox Jr, “Bureaucratic Wrangling over Counterintelligence, 1917–1918,” Studies in Intelligence 4, no. 1 (April 2007): 1.
7. Ibid., 3.
8. James P. Finley (ed.), U.S. Army Military Intelligence History: A Sourcebook, (US Army Intelligence Center, 1995), 80.
9. James L. Gilbert, World War I and the Origins of U.S. Military Intelligence (Scarecrow Press, 2012), 216.
10. Emerson Hough, The Web (Arno Press, 1969), 29–35.
11. “Federal Service Bureau,” pamphlet, 1917–1919, Roger Welles Papers, box 3, Library of Congress.
12. Legislative, Executive and Judicial Appropriation Bill 1919: Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the House Committee on Appropri-
ations, 65th Cong. 825, January 1918 (statement of Capt. Roger Welles, Director, Office of Naval Intelligence).
13. “History of the Bureau of Diplomatic Security of the United States Department of State,” 4. http://www.state.gov/m/ds/rls/rpt/c47602.
htm, accessed 6 October 2013.
14. Bill Mills, The League: The True Story of Average Americans on the Hunt for WWI Spies (Skyhorse Publishing, 2013), 41–50.
15. Stephen Schwab, “Sabotage at Black Tom Island: A Wake-Up Call for America,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterin-
telligence 25, no.2 (2012): 386.
16. ONI, “Memorandum: Information Regarding Sperry Plant,” 17 September 1917, Record Group (RG) 38, National Archives and Re-
cords Administration (NARA).
17. ONI, “Contracts of the Sperry Corporation,” 22 September 1917, RG 38, NARA.
18. Wyman Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (US Government Printing Office, 1996), 41.
19. ONI, “Memorandum: Information Regarding Sperry Plant,” 17 September 1917, RG 38, NARA.
20. ONI, “Memorandum: Information Regarding Sperry Plant,” 15 August 1917, RG 38, NARA.
21. ONI, “Memorandum: Sperry Plant,” 12 September 1917, RG 38, NARA.
22. ONI, “Memorandum: Sperry Plant,” 14 July 1917, RG 38, NARA.
23. ONI, “Memorandum: Conditions at Sperry Plant,” 26 July 1917, RG 38, NARA.
24. ONI, “Memorandum: Information Regarding Sperry Plant,” 17 September 1917.
25. Presidential Proclamation 1364 of 6 April 1917 (President Wilson’s declaration of war against Germany) http://research.archives.gov/
description/299966, accessed on 6 October 2013.
26. ONI, “Memorandum for the Secretary of the Navy: Sperry Plant,” 22 September 1917, RG 38, NARA.
27. “More Germans to Be Interned,” New York Times, 28 September 1917.
28. Employment of Detective Agencies; Restrictions, 5 U.S.C. §3108 (3 March 1893).
29. “All Warship Plans Stolen Last March,” New York Times, 15 May 1913.
30. A Regulation of Transaction in Foreign Exchange of Gold and Silver; Property Transfers; Vested Interests, Enforcement and Penalties,
12 U.S.C. § 95 (6 October 1917).
31. Eric W. Osborne, Britain’s Economic Blockade of Germany, 1914–1919 (Routledge, 2004).
32. James Green, “The First Sixty Years of the Office of Naval Intelligence” (thesis, American University, 1963), 54.
33. “Slip Kaiser U.S. Bullets,” Chicago Tribune, 8 January 1918.
34. ONI, “Subject: George Mogensen,” 17 October 1918, RG 38, NARA.
35. ONI, “Memorandum: George Mogensen,” 14 October 1918, RG 38, NARA.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Office of the Cable Censor, 4 June 1918, RG 38, NARA.
39. “Mogensen and Co. Fail Owing 2,000,000,” New York Times, 18 March 1920.
40. United States Attorney’s Office, New York, “Correspondence,” 3 January 1919, RG 38, NARA.
41. “Frederick M. Czaki Dead,” New York Times, 30 March 1926.
42. Office of Naval Intelligence, “Memorandum for Lt. Van Slyke,” 18 December 1918, RG 38, NARA.
43. “Government Wins in Freight Frauds,” New York Times, 25 December 1919.
44. Charles H. Harris III and Louis Sadler, The Archeologist was a Spy: Sylvanus G. Morley and the Office of Naval Intelligence (Univer-
sity of New Mexico Press, 2003), 29.
45. Wyman Packard, A Century of U.S. Naval Intelligence (US Government Printing Office, 1996), 41.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  59


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46. ONI, “Western Union Telegram,” 30 March 1917, RG 38, NARA.

47. ONI, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 1,” 8 April 1917, RG 38, NARA.
48. ONI, “Memorandum for Record: Naval Attaché, Rio de Janeiro,” 5 May 1917, RG 38, NARA.
49. ONI, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 2,” 14 April 1917, RG 38, NARA.
50. ONI, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 11,” 21 June 1917, RG 38, NARA.
51. ONI, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 1,” 8 April 1917, RG 38, NARA.
52. ONI, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 14,” 27 July 1917, RG 38, NARA.
53. ONI,, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 5,” 5 June 1917, RG 38, NARA.
54. ONI,, “Agent Sixty-One, Letter 6,” 5 June 1917, RG 38, NARA.
55. Adm. Roger Welles, letter to Adm. Knight Roger, 12 January 1920, Roger Welles Papers, box 3, Library of Congress.
56. Albert Niblack, The History and Aims of the Office of Naval Intelligence (US Government Printing Office, 1920), 6.
57. Dorwart, The Office of Naval Intelligence, 139.
58. Naval Appropriation Bill, 1921, Hearings by the Committee on Naval Affairs, House of Representatives, statement of Rear Admiral
Albert P. Niblack, Director of Naval Intelligence, 14 February 1920, 834.
59. Ibid., 833.
60. “Spy, Spy, Who Has the Spy?” New York Times, 3 November 1918.
61. Christopher Andrew, Defend the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (Knopf, 2009), 4, 29–34.

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 Intelligence in Public Media

Tracking the History of a Counterinsurgency Expert: Four Books by David Kilcullen

(Oxford University Press, 2009–2016)

Reviewed by JR Seeger

• The Accidental Guerrilla: Fighting Small Wars in the Most of Kilcullen’s arguments are not entirely new
Midst of a Big One (2009), 346 pp., maps, photos. and, to his credit, he acknowledges the fact that he is
• Counterinsurgency (2010), 251 pp., photos. writing on a subject that has a long history.a His focus on
the human motivations of allies, neutrals, and adversaries
• Out of the Mountains: The Coming of Age of the Urban and the cultural and politico-military environment of the
Guerrilla (2013), 342 pp., photos. conflict is consistent with that of many earlier writers on
• Blood Year: The Unraveling of Western Counterterror- the subject. For example, his focus on the importance of
ism (2016) 288 pp., maps. the motivations of locals as a key to understanding the
reasons for an insurgency or terrorism is entirely con-
In the last 15 years, David Kilcullen has become one sistent with the writings of previous experts in the same
of the most influential scholar-warriors of his generation. fields. What makes the Kilcullen books well worth read-
Kilcullen started his career as an Australian infantry ing is that he has applied the same theories of counterin-
officer. During his service, Kilcullen was deployed to surgency and counterterrorism to the current world, where
East Timor and West Papua. His interests in the local culture and ideology are mixed with accelerating factors
insurgency there resulted in a PhD in anthropology from more often studied by economists and futurists. In short,
the Australian Defence Force Academy in 2000 with a he is using established theory, modified to address the
thesis entitled, “The Political Consequences of Military 21st century, in which insurgents and terrorists are linked
Operations in Indonesia, 1945–1999: A Fieldwork Anal- to the outside world through transnational economies and
ysis of the Political Power-Diffusion Effects of Guerrilla global telecommunications networks.
Conflict.” This began Kilcullen’s transformation from a
well-respected infantry officer to a leading strategist and In the first two books, Kilcullen describes the hostile
policy expert in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism, environments that the US government faced in the first 10
in both Australia and the United States. He served as an years of the 21st century. US forces were fighting in Iraq
advisor to the International Security Assistance Force and Afghanistan as well as in multiple, smaller but just as
(ISAF) in Afghanistan from 2005 to 2011, the special deadly actions in other regions of the globe. The original
advisor for counterterrorism to the Secretary of State counterterrorism purpose for these conflicts—the hunt for
from 2005 to 2009, as well as a senior counterinsurgency terrorists and/or the defeat of state and non-state sponsors
advisor to General Petraeus in 2007, when Petraeus was of terrorism—had an entirely different result. By 2005,
commander of the Multinational Force—Iraq. He is cur- both US conventional ground forces and US special op-
rently the chairman of Caerus Global Solutions. erations forces were fighting counterinsurgencies in Iraq
and Afghanistan with little strategic gain, while still hunt-
A review of all of Kilcullen’s publications is outside
the scope of this paper. Instead, this paper focuses on the a. Some of the classics of counterinsurgency that serve as the
four books he has published since 2009. In these four background for Kilcullen’s material including Mao Tse-Tung On
books, we see Kilcullen working through the changing Guerrilla Warfare; Roger Trinquier’s work Modern Warfare: a
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism threat landscape, French View of Counterinsurgency; David Galula’s Counterinsur-
gency Warfare: Theory and Practice; Frank Kitson’s work on Brit-
and in each book, he focuses on strategic and policy
ish counterinsurgency entitled, Bunch of Five; Edward Landsdale’s
issues, offering specific tactical and operational guidance In the Midst of Wars: An American’s Mission to Southeast Asia;
to on-the-ground practitioners involved in counterinsur- John Nagl’s Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam:
gency and counterterrorism. Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife; and Thomas Hammes’s The
Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century.

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government. . © JR Seeger, 2017

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  61


Four Books by David Kilcullen

ing terrorist networks in both countries. In The Accidental with what theatre commanders in Iraq and Afghanistan
Guerrilla and Counterinsurgency, Kilcullen focused his between 2008 and 2010 regarded as the “way forward.”
writing on capturing the reasons why these insurgencies
occurred, the transformative nature of these insurgencies, However, some of the same problems Kilcullen iden-
and how US and allied forces might better address these tifies in his first two books remain problems in the second
challenges at the operational and tactical level. The title decade of the 21st century. Akbar Ahmed in his 2013
“the accidental guerrilla” arises from the premise that work The Thistle and the Drone (Brookings Institution
adversaries in conflict zones gain additional manpower Press) reiterates Kilcullen’s premise of the risk of alien-
simply in response to the actions of the counterinsurgency ating local populations while attacking adversaries. It is
force. Individuals who had been neutral or even potential clear that not all strategic advisors on terrorism and insur-
allies at the beginning of a conflict can become commit- gency understood the challenges. This may have been due
ted adversaries if they see the counterinsurgency force as in part to the shift, late in the George W. Bush administra-
doing more direct harm than the insurgents. tion and early in that of Barack Obama toward a small-
er military footprint in both Iraq and Afghanistan, and
Kilcullen begins The Accidental Guerrilla with a list greater use of manned and unmanned air assets to conduct
of ways to think about the new conflict environment, counterterrorism operations. If nothing else, Ahmed’s
which Kilcullen describes as “complex, ambiguous, book underscores the importance of Kilcullen’s focus on
dynamic, and multi-faceted . . . impossible to describe cultural, economic, and political environments that create
through a single model.” (7) The four models to consider both insurgents and terrorists. In counterinsurgency and
the problem, he suggests are: counterterrorism missions, kinetic solutions from the air
alone will not translate to strategic success.
• as a backlash against globalization,
• as a globalized insurgency, In the second two books, Kilcullen moves from a
• as a civil war within Islam, and focus on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan
toward a focus on the international terrorist threat and the
• as asymmetric warfare. transformation of terrorist networks in the second decade
of the century. Out of the Mountains is a very specific
Kilcullen uses the example of three 21st century bat-
discussion of how the United States and US allies must
tles to help explain what happened, why it happened, and
transform strategic counterterrorism tactics, techniques,
possible solutions for winning the battle or—at the very
and procedures in response to terrorist networks’ moving
least—mitigating the damage that the conflict environ-
from rural, mountainous safe havens to the mega-cities of
ment might do to the local population. In Counterinsur-
the developing world. Kilcullen continues to use the term
gency, Kilcullen reinforces this sophisticated argument by
“guerrilla” and often conflates counterterrorism opera-
stating categorically, “Even if we are killing the insur-
tions with counterinsurgency operations—in part, because
gents effectively, if our approach also frightens and harms
he views al Qa‘ida as a globalized insurgency. This is not
the local population, or makes people feel unsafe, then
surprising because his experience in Iraq blurs the line
there is next-to-no chance that we will gain their support.
between insurgents and terrorists, between those fight-
If we want people to partner with us, put their weapons
ing in the cities (because they were hostile to a central
down, and return to unarmed political dialogue rather
government in Baghdad nominally allied to US and UK
than work out their issues through violence, then we must
forces in country) and those fighting in the cities (because
make them feel safe enough to do so…” (4)
they were determined to establish an extremist foothold in
a state riven with conflict).
Kilcullen’s message in these two books argues for a
level of nuance that is a challenge for any conventional
Kilcullen argues that the nature of the conflict is going
military force commander who has young soldiers and
to change because
Marines not trained in the culture and not able to speak
the language of the people they are supposed to be “. . . the context for these operations . . . will differ
protecting. The messages of these two books resonate radically from what we’ve known since 9/11. In par-
ticular, research on demography and economic geog-

62 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Four Books by David Kilcullen

raphy suggest that four megatrends are driving most looking at an atomized, pervasive threat even harder
aspects of future life on the planet, including conflict. to counter than the global insurgency it replaced.”
These are rapid population growth, accelerating ur- (113)
banization, littoralization (the tendency for things to
cluster on coastlines), and increasing connectedness. In these two books, as with his two earlier works,
If we add the potential for climate-change effects Kilcullen brings the reader back from the academic and
such as coastal flooding, and note that almost all of strategic and returns to the practical and tactical.
the world’s population growth will happen in coastal
cities in low-income, sometimes unstable countries, There have been many articles and books published on
and we can begin to grasp the complex challenges the conflicts that followed the tragedy of 9/11. Scholars
that lurk in this future environment.” (25) have debated in detail the question of whether the Unit-
ed States has been fighting a “global war on terrorism,”
In Blood Year, Kilcullen focuses on the rise of Daesh, a “transnational terrorist network,” or fighting multiple
also known as the Islamic State. He addresses the origins wars defined as insurgencies, civil war, and even “wars
of Daesh and looks at the challenges the Western world of civilization.” Kilcullen offers a different perspective
faces in handling this new and complex terrorist threat. on these conflicts. He sees the conflicts as part of a larger,
Kilcullen attributes some of the threat to the efforts of the single “global insurgency,” generated by and reflecting
United States and its allies to “disaggregate” al Qa‘ida by the massive changes that have taken place in the Islamic
decapitating its leadership, by disrupting and demolishing world at the end of the 20th and the first decades of the
funding networks, and by breaking al Qa‘ida into region- 21st century. While Kilcullen’s scholarship matches that
al component parts. He argues that this disaggregation of others in the field of military strategic thinking and
helped to build a different threat, which calls itself Daesh structures an explanation for why we are facing the chal-
or the Caliphate. lenges we are facing, he never loses sight of the fact that
many of his readers are practitioners of counterinsurgency
“For those of us who worked so hard to ‘disaggre- and/or counterterrorism who are directly involved in these
gate’ al-Qa‘ida, the implication was as obvious as it conflicts. He provides concrete recommendations for
was uncomfortable: a fully disaggregated terrorist the practitioner, even as he closes his books on strategic
movement, with an ideology insidiously attractive transformation (or in the case of Blood Year, an argument
to alienated and damaged people likely to act on it, on what he sees as our strategic failure). Kilcullen is not
combined with omnipresent social media and commu- the only author that specialists in counterterrorism and
nications tools that hadn’t even existed on 9/11, could counterinsurgency need to read, but he is certainly one of
enable a spread of terrorist violence unconstrained the authors that practitioners need to read if they wish to
by time, space, money, or organizational infrastruc- understand current and future threats and design strategies
ture. Add in a do-it-yourself tactical toolkit of impro- and tactics to address them.
vised weapons and random targets, and we could be

v v v

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 63

 This article is Unclassified in its entirety.

Intelligence in Public Media

Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada

Donald Mahar (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017), 221 pp., notes, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by John Ehrman

Shattered Illusions is a quirky example of intelligence mission. She, in turn, convinced him to walk in to the
history. It tells the story of a Soviet illegal in Canada, RCMP, whose Security Service at the time was respon-
Yevgeniy Brik, who became a double agent for the Royal sible for Canadian counterintelligence. He did so in
Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) in the early 1950s, November 1953, and soon was giving his debriefers full
was betrayed and imprisoned in the Gulag, resurfaced details of his biography, mission, and tradecraft. He also
after the collapse of the Soviet Union, and finally resettled handed over his shortwave communications schedule and
in Canada. The case is little known—Mitrokhin gave a one-time pads, enabling the Mounties to read all of Mos-
brief summary and Sawatsky a longer, though necessarily cow’s messages. The KGB, with no idea that Brik had
incomplete account—but Mahar’s recounting shows why been doubled, increased his operational responsibilities,
it is one to be familiar with.a and gave him agents to run. He promptly identified all of
them to his RCMP handlers.
It’s easy to see why the KGB chose Brik to be an ille-
gal. His father worked in the Ministry of Foreign Trade Brik was a handling nightmare for the Mounties, fre-
and in 1926, when Yevgeniy was five, was posted at the quently drunk and erratic in his behavior, but overall the
Soviet Trading Corporation office in New York. Yevgeniy case went well until February 1954. Then, in a decision
and his mother joined the elder Brik a year later and the that violated the basic rules of operational security, the
family lived in Flatbush, where Yevgeniy went to school head of the Security Service, James Lemieux—who had
and became a native English speaker, until they returned risen in the RCMP’s criminal side and had no intelligence
to Moscow in 1932. Yevgeniy continued his education at experience prior to his appointment to run the Security
the Anglo-American School until he went to a Russian Service—asked Corporal James Morrison, a Mountie who
school in 1936, and was a university student when he was not read into the case, to drive Brik from Ottawa to
was drafted in 1939. He served as an army communicator Montreal. (Morrison had managed to ingratiate himself
during the war, achieved a high level of proficiency in with Lemieux, and the Security Service chief’s main rea-
Morse, and joined the Communist Party. Small wonder, son for detailing Morrison to the drive seems to have been
then, that in the late 1940s when he was back in school to have the corporal bring back some smoked meat from
and working as a part-time English translator, the KGB their favorite Montreal deli.) Morrison, like Brik, was a
came knocking. Yevgeniy needed none of the years of womanizer. In addition, he was a spender and chronically
language and cultural training that most illegals recruits in debt, to the point that he began to steal RCMP funds.
require; trained in tradecraft and equipped with a false The inevitable came in June 1955 when Morrison, real-
identity, Brik arrived in Canada in November 1951, with izing his thefts were about to be discovered and that he
the mission of ultimately moving to the United States needed to replace the money, approached a Soviet intelli-
to become the communicator for another illegal, Rudolf gence officer in Ottawa and betrayed Brik for $3,000.
Abel.
Two months later, Brik was called to Moscow for
Despite his promise, Brik was a disaster as an illegal. training; before he departed Canada, the RCMP and Brit-
He spent much of his time binge drinking and whoring, ish (to whom the Mounties had declared the case) gave
and then fell into an affair with the wife of a Canadian him a communications plan. Brik, however, was arrested
soldier to whom he eventually confessed his identity and on his arrival, interrogated, tried for treason, and sen-
tenced in 1956 to 15 years imprisonment. Brik likely was
a. Christopher Andrews and Vasiliy Mitrokhin, The Sword and saved from execution by his decision to tell all and then
the Shield (Basic Books, 1999), 165–71, and John Sawatsky, For cooperate in a deception operation that identified Daphne
Services Rendered (Doubleday, 1982), chaps. 4–6.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  65


Shattered Illusions

Park—who eventually rose high in SIS and was made a Eitingon, who had directed the murder of Trotsky. One
baroness but at the time was a first-tour officer at the Brit- certainly could meet interesting people in Soviet prisons.
ish Embassy in Moscow—as an intelligence officer.
The author of Shattered Illusions, Donald Mahar, start-
More twists were to come. Morrison continued his ed his intelligence career with the Mounties and retired
espionage—he no longer had any meaningful access and, from CSIS, which took over Canada’s CI mission when
to the Soviets’ annoyance, little to give up after Brik—un- it was established in 1984. He worked on Brik’s exfiltra-
til he was caught in 1958. Rather than charge Morrison, tion and debriefings in the 1990s and now, with the aid of
however, the RCMP cashiered him and covered up the declassified files and interviews with surviving figures,
affair. Not until 1983, after journalist John Sawatsky pub- has written a fast-paced account of this fascinating case.
lished For Services Rendered, did the Brik case, Morri- Therein, unfortunately, lies the problem with the book.
son’s treachery, and the RCMP’s cover-up become public Mahar keeps the story moving so fast—189 pages broken
knowledge. He was charged under the Official Secrets into 38 chapters—and writes in such a terse, just-the-facts
Act, convicted, and sentenced to 18 months. Meanwhile, style that the reader is left wanting additional detail to
Brik survived the Gulag and, after his release, became a flesh out the characters and operations. While he writes
low-level railroad worker. He retired in 1985 and, with with commendable clarity, Mahar gives so little back-
his pension, also received a lifetime railroad pass, which ground, in fact, that his book is best suited to readers who
he used to go to Vilnius in 1992 and, recalling his 1955 already are familiar with the history of Russian intelli-
instructions, walk in to the British Embassy. There, he gence and illegals operations, the Bennett case, and the
asked the British to contact the Canadians. In June, after recent history of Canadian intelligence. Additional back-
several months of careful preparation, Brik was exfiltrat- ground information would have made Shattered Illusions
ed and flown to Canada. There he lived until his death in accessible to an audience beyond specialists.
2011, as much a handling problem in resettlement as he
had been decades earlier. Morrison died in 2001. The reader is also left with the nagging feeling that
Mahar has left out important points. For example, while
This summary barely hits the highlights, let alone Mahar understandably withholds details of Brik’s exfiltra-
captures the complexities and tragic ironies of the Brik tion in 1992 because the particulars remain classified, one
case. Making Brik’s case even more interesting is the wonders why there was such a complex operation at all.
number of others it touched. Brik’s was the first of a Brik had no trouble taking a train to Vilnius, so why did
number of Soviet cases to go bad for the RCMP and, as the Canadians not simply fly him to North America right
the mole hunt began, suspicion fell on Leslie James Ben- away, rather than spend months making elaborate prepa-
nett, who happened to be a personal friend of Morrison’s rations? (Other former Western agents left Russia during
from whom the traitor elicited information (and also the this period by openly obtaining visas from the countries
focus of Sawatsky’s book). In what has become a classic they had worked for and then flying or taking trains out of
example of a CI investigation gone bad, Bennett became Moscow.) It makes no sense, unless the explanation still is
the lead suspect, eventually resigning from the Mounties too sensitive for publication, which raises the question of
and emigrating to Australia (he was publicly exonerated what else Mahar may have chosen to omit or was required
in 1993). Others who came into contact with Brik include to leave out.
his cellmate, Grigoriy Maironovskiy, who developed poi-
sons for the KGB; one of his formulations was used to kill These issues aside, Shattered Illusions is a solid and
Cy Oggins, an American who had spied for the Soviets accurate account that tells the basics of its story and fills
but wound up in the Gulag. Two more prison acquain- in the historical blanks. For that reason, it is a worthwhile
tances were Pavel Sudoplotov, who had been in charge addition to the literature on Soviet and Russian intelli-
of assassinations for the KGB, and his deputy, Leonid gence.

v v v

66 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

The Fall of Heaven: The Pahlavis and the Final Days of Imperial Iran
Andrew Scott Cooper (Henry Holt and Company, 2016), 587 pp., index.

Reviewed by Brent G.

A common pitfall in writing revisionist history is the endnotes, it is clear that Cooper relied heavily on inter-
tendency of authors who set out on such endeavors to views with the Shah’s widow, Shahbanou Farah Pahlavi,
realize—at least on some levels—that the orthodox inter- the Shah’s children, and former members of the deposed
pretation of historical events or leaders had much going royal court—and parts of his opening chapter read like a
for it. Such is the case with The Fall of Heaven, Andrew panegyric he might have drafted to convince them to lend
Scott Cooper’s biography of Mohammad Reza Shah him their time and memories.
Pahlavi, the last king of Iran. The title says a lot about
what the author probably intended to write, but also about Cooper struggles almost from the outset with the evi-
what the book becomes in the end. Cooper wants his dence before him. If he intended to reevaluate the Shah,
readers to reconsider the Shah and the prevailing image too often he is confronted with anecdotes and illustrations
of him as a cowardly, prevaricating despot who squelched that point to the Shah’s being who we thought he was.
democracy, squandered Iran’s enormous oil wealth, and Cooper, to his credit, does not try to explain them all
ruled with—to mix metaphors—an iron fist, disguised away and tries—more often than not—to paint a nuanced
in a velvet glove. At the outset, in fact, Cooper boldly picture of Pahlavi, drawn from an impressive array of
declares that the Shah has been misunderstood and that interviews with those who knew him and a smattering
his rule marked a golden era of Iranian history. By the of secondary sources. However, in several cases, Cooper
time he is finished, however, Cooper shows more balance, fails to give sufficient weight to evidence that suggests his
and focuses on telling a compelling story about how the efforts to rehabilitate the Shah’s image are in vain. For ex-
Shah’s family managed the end of its dynasty and, in the ample, Cooper describes how the Shah adored his teenage
process, makes a noteworthy contribution to the literature daughter but grew to neglect her because his second wife
on the Iranian Revolution. did not care for her. (68–69) He pointed out that this deci-
sion would haunt the Shah when his daughter later turned
Some of the praises Cooper showers on Pahlavi in on him publicly, but Cooper fails to mention how this
the opening chapter are excessive and would appear to reflected the Shah’s own personal weakness. In another
even the informed generalist as transparently question- instance, Cooper recounts an interview the Shah gave
able and probably unsubstantiated. Take, for instance, his during a trip to the United States in which he declared,
claims that the Shah “outmaneuvered ruthless and wily “this king business has personally given me nothing but
American presidents” such as Eisenhower, Johnson, and headaches” (35)–comments Cooper calls “maudlin and
Nixon, or that he “steered Iran through the treacherous self-pitying” (100) but implies were the exception rather
currents of World War II.” (13–14) In the former exam- than the rule. The problem, however, is that Cooper
ple, most American presidents viewed the Shah, when provides the reader sufficient evidence to argue that the
considering him at all, as a necessary ally against Soviet opposite was more likely the case.
encroachment in the Middle East and resigned themselves
to working with him in spite of his weak character and The Fall of Heaven is not without its merits. Cooper
grating pomposity. In the latter example, the Shah was 21 convincingly argues that Queen Farah probably deserves
years old when the British army placed him on the throne more credit than contemporary observers gave her, and he
following its 1941 invasion and occupation of Iran—with draws a flattering portrait of her as a frustrated reformer.
American and Soviet forces—for the remainder of the He highlights her efforts to tone down the over-the-top,
war. Pahlavi no more “steered” Iran during World War weeks-long celebration of what the Shah called 2,500
II than did his father, Reza Shah, from British-imposed years of Persian monarchy at the site of the ancient city
exile in South Africa, where he died in 1944. From his of Persepolis in 1971, as well as corruption within the

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  67


The Fall of Heaven

royal family and its court. Likewise, he credits Farah for the proper context of the Iranian people and their leaders.
promoting women’s issues and education for girls, as well With the exception of only a very few members of the
as promoting the arts and public health. Also, Cooper’s royal court and family, Cooper points out that the Shah
almost day-to-day account of the last few months of the shared power with practically no one by the mid-1970s.
Pahlavi rule and the Shah’s mismanagement illustrates (152) In 1975, the Shah abolished Iran’s two nominal po-
how a crisis so unthinkable to outside observers—includ- litical parties and established the Rastakhiz (Resurgence)
ing the CIA and the State Department, until the damage Party, commonly referred to as the “King’s Party.” As
was largely done—could unfold over a relatively short Cooper points out, the Iranian people interpreted this as “a
period of time. final, brazen attempt to bury their cherished 1906 Consti-
tution.” (217) In the end, the Shah had few true loyalists
Perhaps the most novel aspect of Cooper’s account who would stand and fight for him against Khomeini and
is his discussion of the revered Iranian-Lebanese cleric, his followers, and he had only himself to blame.
Musa Sadr, whom Cooper argues was a closet support-
er of the Shah and was prepared to return to Iran from The Fall of Heaven falls short of the best biography of
Lebanon in 1978 to stand with the king in a call for the last king of Iran—Abbas Milani’s The Shah (St. Mar-
national unity before disappearing during a trip to Libya. tin’s Press, 2012)—but it is more nuanced and balanced
Many theories exist about Sadr’s disappearance; he was than most other Shah biographies to date. At the very
never seen again, but Cooper lays his death at the feet of least, its careful examination of Queen Farah, detailed
Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and his revolutionaries. account of the royal family’s last days in power, and
This story is interesting and shines a light on the Shah’s reconsideration of the true level of Shah-era repression
efforts to find a clerical counterweight to Khomeini, but should prove useful to students of Iranian history and pol-
no evidence indicates that Sadr could have successfully itics, political psychologists, and leadership and political
challenged the exiled Ayatollah by that late stage. analysts writ large.

Another aspect of this book that bears further exam- Thus the book will also inform those who have
ination—even if Cooper’s conclusions do not always hold absorbed literature addressing intelligence in the period
up—are points of evidence that suggest the Shah’s regime 1954–79, including books such as Columbia scholar Rob-
was less repressive than is commonly believed. For exam- ert Jervis’ Why Intelligence Fails: Lessons from the Ira-
ple, Cooper highlights the research of former seminarian nian Revolution and the Iraq War. The work, published in
and Islamic Republic bureaucrat Emad al-Din Baghi, who 2010, is partly based on Jervis’ classified research—since
led the post-revolutionary investigation into the Shah’s declassified—into CIA analysis before the Shah’s fall.a, b
crimes. In short, Baghi found that the number of those
the Shah ordered killed or imprisoned for political crimes v v v
was far smaller than what the mullahs and other political
opponents had claimed. Where Khomeini had accused
the Shah of killing over 100,000 people during his rule,
Baghi could only find fewer than 4,000, a number that
included 2,781 fatalities during the 1978–79 revolution.
Those numbers pale in comparison to the 12,000 who
are believed to have been killed by the Islamic Republic
during Khomeini’s decade in power from 1979 to 1989,
including an estimated 3,000 political prisoners in one
week in July 1988.

Cooper is not the first to cite Baghi’s data to a Western

audience, but he uses that information to argue convinc-
ingly that the Shah’s repression was no worse than that of a. See Torrey Froescher’s review in Studies in Intelligence 54, No.
contemporary despots such as Chile’s Augusto Pinochet, 3 (September 2010).
and that his was milder, certainly, than Iraq’s Saddam b. As this issue was being prepared, the State Department released
about 1000 pages of declassified documents concerning TPAJAX. It
Hussein or Syria’s Hafez al-Asad. What he fails most is available in State’s digital Foreign Relations of the United States
importantly to do, however, is to put that repression into collection.

68 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

Spies in Palestine: Love, Betrayal, and the Heroic Life of Sarah Aaronsohn
James Srodes (Counterpoint Press, 2016), 203 pp., endnotes, photos, index.

Reviewed by Dr. Carly Speranza, Lt. Col., USAF

This book provides an unusual view of World War I down, and headed on a tour of the United States that later
through the archival scholarship and research efforts of greatly benefited the Zionist movement. By the end of his
James Srodes. Srodes’s idea for Spies in Palestine came first trip to the United States, Aaron met with and re-
about while he conducted research to produce a biography ceived patronage from a number of prominent Americans,
of Allen W. Dulles, a fact he shares in the prologue. While including Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis and
combing through British archives, he came across ref- US Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau. In 1910, he
erences to an intelligence organization referred to as “A returned to Palestine with $20,000 to support the Zionist
Organization.” This led him to Sarah Aaronsohn and her movement and to establish an agricultural research station
heroic intelligence efforts assisting the British in defeat- named Athlit. Over time, this research station—in Otto-
ing the Ottomans during World War I. The book itself is man territory—provided the Aaronsohns the opportunity
poorly titled and misleading, as it is about so much more and cover to conduct clandestine intelligence operations.
than Sarah Aaronsohn—and only roughly five pages of
it is spent on her love life and betrayal. Instead, this is an After Srodes introduces the Aaronsohn family, he
excellent history of how, in search of a homeland, Jews breaks from the storyline to focus on the Three Pashas,
worked globally through diplomatic and intelligence ef- Ottoman rulers established through conflicts in the region.
forts to establish a separate state, free from Ottoman rule. While the dialogue of the book takes on a journalistic
style at this juncture, the background is critical to the
Srodes begins by introducing the Aaronsohn family. storyline. By 1913, the Ottoman Empire was ruled by
In 1882, Ephraim Aaronsohn and his family arrived in a trio of war heroes, Ismail Enver, Mehmed Talaat, and
Syria-Palestine from Romania, becoming one of the most Ahmed Gamal Djamal, who established power through
prominent families in the First Aliyah of Jews to migrate. the invasion of Libya in 1911, and the First Balkan War
Srodes deftly explains the reasons behind the Jewish that ended in 1913. Once in power, they sought to cleanse
migration, and the environment and challenges that the the Ottoman territory of foreigners. As history reports,
first wave of Jewish settlers faced. In fact, it was these Constantinople set its sights first on cleansing the territory
challenges that fortified the Aaronsohn family and many of Greeks and Armenians. During this period, Arabs in
others to fight for Eretz Israel, the biblical homeland of the territory also experienced executions and police action
the Jews. In the migration, Ephraim brought over two against them. These unfortunate and reprehensible actions
sons, Aaron and Zvi. Aaron is a central figure in the book against foreigners provided a warning for the Jewish pop-
and is critical to the American and British Zionist move- ulation and ultimately led to the founding of NILI.
ments. His relationship with his sister Sarah, who was not
born until 1890, is crucial to the intelligence work they What began as an attempt by the Aaronsohns to use
eventually embarked upon. World War I to their advantage and break free from Ot-
toman rule to establish a Jewish state eventually became
Aaron Aaronsohn, a well-educated young man, a full-fledged intelligence organization called NILI. The
found his first opportunity to spread Zionism to Ameri- name of the organization originated from the Book of
ca through his studies of wheat. In 1905, and during the Samuel, “Nitzach Israel lo Ishakari,” translated to “The
Second Aliyah of Jews to migrate from Europe, Univer- Eternity of Israel shall not lie.” Because Sarah was a
sity of California Berkeley invited Aaron to visit and woman, she was unable to travel outside of her home-
share his research on wheat as America was searching for town; as such, she was left behind to run intelligence
additional ways to feed its own booming population. He operations, while her brother Aaron traveled to garner
was offered a lucrative position at the university, turned it

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  69


Spies in Palestine

funds, support, and ensure that NILI’s intelligence reports and cultural area sorely misunderstood by the British.
made it into British hands. In fact, throughout the book, one cannot help but think
about the American struggle in the Middle East and how
As Srodes reports, NILI initially provided the Brit- important knowledge and intelligence is to operational
ish with maps of Palestine and the Gaza Desert, which planning. In his quest to fight for a Jewish State, Aaron
included geological and cultural specifics. Then, in 1917, worked beside T.E. Lawrence, Gertrude Bell, and British
the British formally recognized “A Organization” as a Prime Minister David Lloyd George, and was present at
source of “reliable” intelligence and began requesting and the 1919 Versailles Peace Conference that ended World
receiving up-to-date intelligence reports. To do this, NILI War I. It took 28 more years for Israel to become a state.
used homing pigeons, trained and provided by the British,
and drops-offs in the nearby port and off-coast excursions. Spies in Palestine reads as part novel, part history
Until the end of the war, NILI provided up-to-date Turk- book. Srodes did an incredible job weaving history into a
ish troop activity, including the movements of artillery palatable story of human suffering and accomplishment.
and other weaponry and transportation vehicles. NILI’s This book is a worthwhile read for anyone interested in
intelligence and Aaron’s diplomacy won over the British intelligence operations, the Ottoman Empire, World War
High Command to eventually pursue a Jewish state. I, and the history of the Zionist movement and establish-
ment of the State of Israel.
Sarah and Aaron, working together, were able to pro-
vide critical intelligence to the British on a geographical

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70 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

Special Forces Berlin: Clandestine Cold War Operations of the US Army’s Elite, 1956–1990
James Stejskal (Casemate, 2017), 333 pp., notes, timelines, appendices, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by David A. Foy

The goal of any historian worth his or her academic demonstrate a high level of proficiency in German or an
salt should be to either plow new ground or rearrange the Eastern European language; those with the best language
furrows with newly-planted facts or interpretations. Au- skills and who represented the bulk of the unit early on
thor James Stejskal has satisfied that goal with this brief tended to be “Lodge Act” soldiers, ethnic Eastern Europe-
volume on the history of Special Forces Berlin (SF Ber- ans welcomed into the US Army in the postwar period.
lin). Known by various names throughout its three-decade
existence, the unit—initially known as “Det A” (unclassi- Two external developments affecting Det A were the
fied), formally the 39th Special Forces Detachment (then 1961 construction of the Berlin Wall five years after the
classified)—has been described by the former commander unit arrived in Berlin, which heightened the tension and
of the US Army Special Operations Command, Lt. Gen. potential danger, and the Vietnam War, which decreased
Charles Cleveland (Ret.), as a unit that “remained in the the pool of potential replacements for the unit. From a
shadows until history and discretion allowed a public high of 10,000, the number of SF troops declined to 4,200
accounting.” (vii) The author, who served in the unit in by the mid-1970s. As the author points out, the unit also
the 1970s and 1980s, volunteered to write this book— had to deal with the constant challenge of missions other
dedicated to the 800 members who served in SF Ber- than its primary UW one: underwater operations, in which
lin—seeking to preserve their stories while they are still only one team was trained; counterterrorism operations,
alive to tell them. Understandably, there were few extant which involved close coordination and training with the
official records concerning the unit during its existence German police and anti-terrorist force GSG-9; and close
and fewer now, which amplified his challenge. quarters battle training, in concert with the FBI, the Israe-
lis, and Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS).
The warriors of SF Berlin, located 110 miles inside
East Germany, knew their primary responsibility in As the author notes, Det A was training for participa-
wartime was to conduct unconventional warfare (UW)— tion in the Iranian hostage crisis following the seizure of
specifically, missions targeting the Berlin road, rail, and the US embassy in Tehran in 1979. Even then, its primary
canal infrastructure. In a larger sense, their mission was to mission was intelligence collection and the rescue of the
buy time for the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe three Americans held captive at the Foreign Ministry.
(SACEUR), who had only 10,000 US troops in West Again, the Det’s mandatory support to Army exercises
Berlin to temporarily fend off 575,000 East German and limited personnel available for the Iran hostage rescue
Soviet troops. Additionally, they were to train whatever mission. The collision of a helicopter and a C-130 at the
local guerrilla forces could be located or organized, using Desert One landing site in Iran aborted Operation EA-
the extensive caches of weapons, explosives, radios, and GLE CLAW and led to widespread adverse publicity; an
dollars buried in the area; the theory was that a 12-man unintended consequence was that team members were left
team could train 1,200 guerrillas. in Iran to find their own way out. Afterward, the Det A
contingent began training for its own follow-on, SNOW-
As Stejskal notes early on, the first SF units were BIRD, inside the Foreign Ministry. The 20 January 1981
patterned after those of the Office of Strategic Services release of the hostages made the task superfluous.
(OSS) in World War II. After some experimentation with
structure, SF settled on 12-man teams, each member In 1981, SACEUR Gen. Bernard Rogers visited the
cross-trained in several areas to add depth to the limited unit for a briefing, the upshot of which was a refocusing
manpower. Besides being SF-qualified, each unit mem- on strategic intelligence collection and reporting and an
ber was required to hold a Top Secret clearance and to emphasis on CT operations—the latter both an “oppor-

The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  71


Special Forces Berlin

tunity” and a “problem,” according to Stejskal—rather statements that Special Forces “contributed greatly to
than UW, which he notes was still perceived as counter the end of the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe” and
to “the American way of war.” (5) Fatefully, the shift also that “principal Warsaw Pact commanders were aware
triggered an OPSEC survey of the unit that uncovered of its existence and respected its capabilities” (268) are
irregularities. Adding insult to injury, the unit’s OPSEC largely unproven. Stejskal does admit, however, that since
was compromised by a Newsweek article focused on a Warsaw Pact forces never swept through Western Europe,
team member who had participated in the hostage rescue it is impossible to say if the unit could have performed its
operation and mentioned an “SF unit in Berlin.” As a wartime mission. He notes, for example, that OSS had the
result of that disclosure, the OPSEC survey judged that benefit of pre-existing resistance movements to work with
the unit should be shut down and a new unit be created in in Europe; these did not exist in the Soviet satellites.
a different location, which happened in 1984.
Stejskal concludes Special Forces Berlin with a look
The new unit was designated the US Army Physical at how the Soviets and the East Germans viewed the SF
Security Support Element-Berlin (PSSE-B), its classified unit and what they knew of its mission and operations.
designator the 410th SF Detachment. The PSSE-B was He notes, for example, that the Military Liaison Mission,
ostensibly an MP unit tasked with conducting vulnerabil- Field Station Berlin, CIA’s Berlin Operations Base, and
ity surveys on US government facilities. This renaissance the 766th MI Group were prime targets of Soviet and East
brought with it two significant problems, however—first, German intelligence, as was the SF unit. The Stasi’s first
Det A and the PSSE-B were never divorced from one report on Det A was produced in 1975, with a fuller one
another, not in the eyes of the German police, with whom in 1982—while the adversary services apparently never
they trained and not with the German public, with whom knew specifics, Stejskal writes that they had a good idea
they had interactions, and most definitely not in the eyes of the general SF mission in Berlin.
of Soviet and East German military and intelligence
entities. Second, PSSE-B’s Regional Survey Teams found Given the unit’s secretive nature, its limited manpow-
themselves doing little else; thus, the unit was spending er, and the passage of time, it is not surprising Stejskal’s
60 percent of its time on its cover rather than on its true book is the only one on this somewhat esoteric subject.
mission. Although the unit was able to participate in a full An extensive selection of photographs adds to the vol-
urban UW exercise in 1985, other missions still intruded, ume’s value, but readers will need to have a tactical bent
including CT (such as TWA 847, the Achille Lauro cruise to appreciate the numerous weapons references. The
ship attack, and the La Belle disco bombing) and the fatal SCUBA jargon (85) will leave non-Woods Hole research-
shooting of Military Liaison Mission (MLM) member ers in a haze, and the near-glorification of alcohol use and
Maj. “Nick” Nicholson by a Soviet border guard. abuse does not redound to the credit of an elite military
element. The author also spends pages (101–103) explain-
The other unexpected development was the fall of the ing how sergeants major “choose” brigade commanders,
Berlin Wall. The event prompted security concerns and which will come as a surprise to the US Army, and he
the withdrawal of all SF and Military Intelligence (MI) clearly has no use for such skills as Soviet uniform recog-
units in Berlin until a decision could be made concerning nition, described as a “stupefyingly monotonous subject,”
future dispositions in Germany, if any. In the meantime, (107) despite its proven value in ground order-of-battle
the unit’s extensive linguistics capabilities came in handy and related intelligence collection and reporting. Finally,
when a flood of refugees from the former East Germany the repeated appearance of “[Redacted]” in the text serves
began inundating the West. The unit’s last mission was no useful purpose and is frustrating for readers.
to provide linguistics support to the Joint Allied Refugee
Operations Center in Berlin. In this radically changed en- Despite some flaws, Special Forces Berlin is a decent
vironment and with no need for its mission, PSSE-B was and valuable study of a little-known topic whose signif-
officially disbanded on 15 Aug 1990 and the UW mission icance is enhanced by the continuing challenges in the
would fade for a decade. US-Russia strategic relationship in Europe and elsewhere.
In short, if we did not have the information in this vol-
In retrospect, did it matter that Det A and PSSE-B ume, we would be the worse for it.
had ever existed? While the author clearly thinks so, his
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72 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police

Frank McDonough (Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 293 pp., notes, glossary, sources, illustrations, and index.

Reviewed by David A. Foy

The very mention of the word “Gestapo” brings ordinary officers from either working-class or lower-class
immediately to the minds of most people nightmarish backgrounds, many of whom had left school at age 16
images of sadistic butchers working for a criminal orga- with no formal qualifications. By the late 1930s, those
nization that prided itself on its ability to expertly and who were “up-and-comers” tended to be young, well-ed-
enthusiastically engage in genocide within Germany and ucated, middle class individuals, many of whom had law
occupied Europe before and during World War II. British degrees or doctorates. Those German males who pro-
historian and author Frank McDonough has written The cured coveted posts in the political police/Gestapo were
Gestapo to refute that false impression, to provide what selected for their police training and experience, not their
he calls a “fresh interpretation”—some would call it a Nazi Party membership or status, and only a minority of
“revisionist” view—of how the Geheime Staatspolizei Gestapo officers were ever Party members. Most who did
operated, primarily within Germany from 1933 to 1945. join the NSDAP (Nationalsocialistiche Deutsche Arbeit-
As he states categorically, “The assumption that Gestapo erpartei (Nazi Party)) did so simply to keep their jobs, the
officers arrested individuals, interrogated them brutally, only way to enjoy a lucrative pension in retirement.
then sent them to a concentration camp, is a myth.” (54)
He also refers to his book as an example of “history from In his opening chapter, McDonough discusses the
below,” written from the standpoint of individuals affect- origins and rapid development of the Gestapo, from a
ed, rather than the traditional approach of “history from Prussian political police force in 1932, led by World War
above,” focused on the organization. McDonough’s book I fighter pilot ace Hermann Göring, to what was by 1936
is derived from research into a group of Gestapo records a secret state police force for all Germany. McDonough
that amazingly survived the war: 73,000 records from the credits Göring, along with Rudolf Diels, Heinrich
Dusseldorf region of Germany that document the interac- Himmler, and Reinhard Heydrich, with the creation of the
tions between the Gestapo and the German populace. Gestapo.

It is important to remember, McDonough posits, that The year 1933 proved to be a watershed for the devel-
the Gestapo began as nothing more than a police depart- opment of the Gestapo—the Reichstag fire of February,
ment, whose detectives followed strict protocols and likely set by mentally handicapped Dutch communist
were even issued an instruction manual for the conduct Marinus van der Lubbe, prompted the declaration of the
of investigations, arrests, and interrogations. He assesses Gestapo as the secret state police in Prussia by April. As
that the Gestapo left most German citizens alone, because Göring and Diels consolidated their gains and expanded
they were determined to be no threat to the state; fur- their authorities in Prussia, Himmler and Heydrich com-
thermore, the vast majority of even those Germans who peted with Sturmabteilung (SA) leader Ernst Rohm for
were investigated was usually released. It was not only a control of the police in the other states of Germany. Rohm
question of proclivities and authorities, it was a matter of naively believed that Himmler’s Schutzstaffeln (SS) was
numbers—McDonough claims that at no time in its his- subordinate to the SA, a conclusion McDonough accu-
tory did the Gestapo ever have more than 16,000 active, rately characterizes as “a grave tactical error.” (27)
full-time officers to monitor 66 million people, making it
Wrongly believing that Rohm intended to wage a
impossible to live up to their reputation of being omnip-
coup, Göring, Himmler, and Heydrich murdered him
otent and omnipresent. His research also enables him
during the 1 July 1934 “Night of the Long Knives,” a
to “bin” the victims of Gestapo abuse and torture into
bloody purge of the SA by the SS. Heydrich used this
specific categories—religious dissidents, Communists,
non-existent threat to redefine the term “enemy of the
“social outcasts,” and Jews. The mature Gestapo recruited
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  73


The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police

state” and justify the continued existence of the Gestapo Although not the primary target of the Gestapo, at least
after 1934. Within two years, the Gestapo was recognized not initially, German Jews also fell victim to the secret
as the secret state police for all of Germany, and by the police service. The author partially attributes the stage-by-
advent of World War II in 1939, the Reich Security Main stage persecution of the Jews in Germany to the economic
Office (RSHA) was the centralized security authority for success of German Jews, which prompted resentment
the entire country, solidifying Himmler’s victory. from the rest of the populace. The 1935 Nuremberg Laws
motivated many Jews to leave Germany, while those
Predictably, the tenets of the major religious faiths remaining faced increased persecution by the Gestapo,
in Germany before and during World War II ultimately especially for “race defilement,” the legal definition of
meant conflict with the Gestapo. The welcome news of Aryan-Jewish sexual relations. But worse was to follow,
the Concordat between the Papacy and the Third Reich especially in the wake of the November 1938 murder of
deceived many Catholic bishops, who were reluctant a minor German consular official, Ernst vom Rath, by a
to criticize Hitler’s regime, at least until priests began German-Jewish teenager and refugee incensed at learn-
being charged with currency smuggling and sexual abuse ing that his parents had been deported from Germany to
and once Hitler adopted the T4 program, the innocuous Poland. The response to the murder was a nationwide
cover name for a program of euthanasia. Among religious Jewish pogrom known as Kristallnacht (“The Night of
groups in Germany, the Gestapo particularly singled out Broken Glass”), in which the windows of Jewish-owned
Jehovah’s Witnesses for persecution, as they were a small shops were smashed, prompting more Jews to leave the
group with no defenders and were officially banned by Fatherland. In September 1941, when German Jews were
1935. forced to begin wearing the yellow Star of David with the
word Jude (Jew) in black in the middle, most non-Jewish
The most systematically persecuted political group in
Germans applauded. Beginning the next month and con-
Nazi Germany proved to be the Communists. The Reich-
tinuing until the summer of 1942, the Gestapo organized
stag fire provided the pretext for a crackdown, and 10,000
wholesale deportations of German Jews. As McDonough
Communists were arrested that night. Some tragically fled
puts it, “It is hard to understand the consequences of a
to the Soviet Union, where they became victims of Stalin
tidal wave in the hours of darkness.” (211)
rather than Hitler; ironically, even after the 1939 Nazi-So-
viet Non-Aggression Pact, German Communists remained Although McDonough argues effectively that the
supporters of the Soviet Union. The bottom line was that Gestapo, at least in the pre-war period and the early days
by the late 1930s, most German Communists resigned of the war, generally operated in accordance with the
themselves to the Nazis as a fact of life, just another form law, he also points out in an interesting chapter how the
of oppression the bourgeoisie waged against the proletar- Gestapo always investigated denunciations of individuals
iat. by the public. He claims that 26 percent of all Gestapo
cases began with a denunciation of, usually, a neighbor
Also falling victim to the Gestapo’s depredations
or family member. While few such cases resulted even in
were all those categorized as “social outsiders”—spe-
imprisonment, much less death, the advent of war predict-
cifically, habitual criminals, homosexuals, sex offend-
ably brought less tolerance of dissent, especially in the
ers, prostitutes, juvenile delinquents, members of street
wake of the February 1943 German defeat at Stalingrad.
gangs, Gypsies, and even the long-term unemployed. The
Many such denunciations were “self-inflicted,” resulting
most-hardened habitual criminals—the “three strikes and
from “loose lips” freed either by alcohol or unrestrained
you’re out” equivalents—could find themselves in a con-
rage and frustration.
centration camp; 20,000 did, and most died, according to
McDonough. In the most extreme cases of sexual miscon- The final chapter of The Gestapo discusses the bring-
duct, the state resorted to sterilization in a last-ditch effort ing of the Gestapo before the bar of justice during the
to salvage these individuals as members of the “National postwar period, from 1945 until the mid-1960s. Mc-
Community.” Between 1933 and 1945, McDonough Donough highlights the “sub-trial” of the Gestapo at
estimates that the state involuntarily sterilized more than Nuremberg, where a German defense attorney vigorously
350,000 Germans. denied the charge that the Gestapo was a criminal orga-
nization, because it was acting in accordance with the

74 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police

law at the time rather than violating it. The attorney also need to be aware of what they’re getting into—The Gesta-
refuted the idea that the Gestapo was all-powerful or filled po reads more like a quantitative, scientific study than a
with rabid Nazi Party members. Although the Nuremberg flowing historical narrative. Particularly vexing is the au-
tribunal rejected such statements out of hand, a paucity of thor’s penchant for including a personal account and then,
surviving documentation made prosecutions difficult and once the reader is hooked on the details, abruptly ending
rare, and leniency was the usual result of denazification the discussion with the phrase “ultimate fate unknown,”
court trials as well. perhaps understandable but also avoidable.

McDonough concludes his book on the depressing Readers who seek a more traditional history may be
note that in postwar Germany, many former Nazis had more satisfied reading other books or at least supplement-
prominent positions and the vast majority of former ing The Gestapo with such, although the number of books
high-ranking Gestapo officials with law degrees were able focused on just the Gestapo is limited—Carsten Dams’s
to return to their law practices without having to worry 2014 volume The Gestapo: Power and Terror in the Third
about looking over their shoulders. Reich seems to suffer from some of the same criticisms
as McDonough’s, and Jacques Delarue’s The Gestapo:
The Gestapo is a welcome restoration of balance to A History of Horror is extremely dated and colored by
history’s view of the Gestapo and provides much new the author’s background as a French Resistance member
information. It is well-documented, and the author’s captured by the Germans. Nevertheless, The Gestapo is
familiarity with archival sources and the historiography of worth the read, especially for its “revisionist” view that
the Gestapo is evident. It is a readable volume, with a nice the Gestapo was not inherently evil but prostituted to
selection of photographs, although the addition of maps serve other causes than law enforcement.
would be helpful. By the same token, however, readers

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Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 75

 Intelligence in Public Media

Spinning History: Politics and Propaganda in World War II

Nathaniel Lande (Skyhorse Publishing, 2017), 277 pp., photos, bibliography, index.

Reviewed by Clayton Laurie

Historical figures and episodes are often the focus of yond living memory. While Lande’s thesis makes sense
the dramatic arts and have been, from the time of Ho- from a theatrical viewpoint, he repeatedly demonstrates
mer’s Iliad and Odyssey, to Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar a very shallow knowledge of people and most subjects
and Henry V, to today’s Hamilton. Just as often, howev- discussed, often elevating trivial and anecdotal episodes
er, history on stage and screen is changed, glossed over, and people to major significance. The duplex drive tanks
misinterpreted, or even ignored for the sake of making that failed on D-Day and the Slapton Sands training fiasco
a particular political or social point or in creating what are certainly tragic, but neither was a war-changing event.
scriptwriters may perceive as a more interesting or capti- That Hollywood studios self-censored their movies to
vating story. Historians are used to this. Where, after all, enable export to Nazi Germany in the 1930s is interesting,
would Hollywood, cable TV, and much of the print and but also not significant because the nefarious Nazi soon
broadcast media be without history as the basis for much became a stock film character.
of our popular entertainment?
In addition, neither the subversive “black” propagan-
In Spinning History, author Nathaniel Lande takes da of the OSS or Britain’s Political Warfare Executive
this “theater meets history” connection to an absurd level, had any measurable impact on the course or outcome
applying the terminology and processes of the stage to of the war, nor did Frederick Kaltenbach or the handful
his interpretation of the politics and propaganda of World of Americans who made Nazi propaganda broadcasts.
War II, which he describes not just as the 20th century’s Poet and Librarian of Congress Archibald MacLeish and
greatest conflict but also as “its greatest theatrical produc- journalist Norman Corwin were fleeting players, and even
tion.” This thesis may seem plausible to anyone in the arts, though millions viewed Frank Capra’s Why We Fight
from actor to scriptwriter or producer, to whom history film series, Americans were convinced of the justice of
seems one grand saga, a long-running stage play, careful- the Allied cause before then. The fact that Adolf Hitler
ly and deliberately crafted and scripted, acted, produced, and the Nazis, and Stalin and the Communists, excelled
and managed. This book, as a cover blurb notes, “illumi- at producing glitzy rallies, lurid posters and movies, and
nates how all sides used social psychology, propaganda, solemn rituals that garnered cult-like support is not new.
and drama to skew public opinion” and how “theatrical The author does not address how Franklin Roosevelt
staging, dramatic storytelling, and message manipulation and Winston Churchill managed to elicit similar support
were key to the efforts of both sides,” as demonstrated by without such displays; he evidently deems fireside chats
Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, Adolf Hitler, and and BBC broadcasts as equally effective even though the
Joseph Stalin. The thesis indicates a total misunderstand- totalitarian governments controlled all media toward a
ing of history, and this book ironically accomplishes what single party line. Historians will note that leaders since
the title states—if only historical events and human beings ancient times have used whatever means they deemed
were as simple, understandable, or predictable as Lande’s necessary to muster support for national goals, but that
interpretation implies. Serious scholars and intelligence often such persuasion is not needed as people respond to
officers can safely ignore this book. threats, invasions, or attacks without much higher-level
inducement. World War II was not new in this regard
To those in the fine arts looking for a basic primer or even though film, radio, and a more literate public made
broad overview of World War II propaganda, media, and messages easier to convey to wider audiences.
politics, or those entirely new to history or to the conflict,
this work will superficially enlighten, as it touches on The book contains far too many factual errors to list
ideas, people, and events that are rapidly moving be- here; one of the most egregious places the D-Day inva-

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be con-
strued as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  77


Spinning History: Politics and Propaganda in World War II

sion on 7 June 1944 rather than the correct 6 June date Scholars in the humanities welcome interdisciplinary
used several pages later. Thorough historical fact-check- crossover, where subject matter experts in the various
ing and editing would have helped, but every error of fact fields enhance the collective understanding of human
and interpretation further undermines what is already an affairs. Historians are quick to concede that their profes-
amateurish history. The book contains a large bibliogra- sion rarely produces award-winning plays, films, movies,
phy of many older works, many long ago deemed inaccu- and TV series without collaboration from experts outside
rate or superseded by newer, more solid research. Lande their immediate discipline. Those in the dramatic arts will
has overwhelmingly relied on popular, non-scholarly just as rarely produce quality history without like collab-
histories, a genre prone to sensationalizing or simplifying oration from historians. Sadly, that vital crossover did not
for the sake of the story. A much, much larger, yet uncit- occur here.
ed, scholarly corpus exists on every one of the subjects he
attempts to cover.

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78 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961

Nicholas Reynolds (HarperCollins, 2017), 357 pp., notes, bibliography, photographs, index.

Reviewed by J. R. Seeger

Nicholas Reynolds’s work on Ernest Hemingway surrogates—would craft a suitable approach, sending the
offers new insights into one of the most famous American appropriate man or woman to sound him out and find out
writers of the 20th century. This extensively researched how far he was willing to go.
book highlights Hemingway’s interest and participa-
tion in the major wars of the century and, whereas other In 1937, Hemingway served as both a journalist and a
books have covered this ground before, Reynolds’s is the part-time fighter in the Spanish Civil War, on the side of
first to use historical records, declassified intelligence, the Republicans. Reynolds outlines the cast of characters
and personal correspondence to focus on Hemingway’s who were all part of the same civil war environment,
personal and professional links to both the US and the including fighters, writers, polemicists, and political advi-
USSR intelligence communities of the mid-20th century. sors, who were all associated with the communist volun-
Reynolds makes clear in this book that Hemingway was teers fighting for the Spanish Republic. Among this cadre
in periodic contact with the Soviet foreign intelligence were two close associates of Hemingway—Joris Ivens
service—the NKVD (the People’s Commissariat for Inter- and Alexander Orlov. Reynolds points out that Ivens was
nal Affairs)—while at the same time in contact with and a member of the Communist International (Comintern)a
informally assisting both the US Navy Office of Naval and Orlov was an established recruiting agent for the
Intelligence (ONI) and, following the invasion of France NKVD. While in Spain, Hemingway made no secret of
in June 1944, the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). The his grave disappointment with the US and the UK official
question that Reynolds poses throughout the book is, position of neutrality while Nazi Germany supported
“Who was in charge of this relationship?” By the time the the fascists in Spain. The only Republican lifeline for
reader finishes the book, the only reasonable answer is, resources was from the Soviet Union—and from Heming-
“Ernest Hemingway was in charge.” way’s perspective—the only nation-state focused on the
fight against fascism. Hemingway used a phrase later in
It is easy enough to imagine why the Soviets would his life to explain this commitment at the time: he called
want to establish contact with a writer of Hemingway’s himself a “premature antifascist,” to describe his strong
stature. His works had been published in multiple lan- support for the Comintern effort in Spain.
guages and he was one of the most popular writers of the
1930s. In 1935, Hemingway submitted an article to the Reynolds describes in detail how Ivens used his access
leftist journal New Masses which was a scathing descrip- to Hemingway to introduce this well respected American
tion of the US government’s handling of the Matecumbe author to Comintern-selected warriors, connecting him to
Keys catastrophe, following a hurricane landfall in an
. . . the right people: communist fighters. For this
area that was housing World War I veterans. Reynolds
purpose, the International Brigades, created and run
points to Hemingway’s experience in assisting in the
by the Comintern to fight for the Republic, were made
aftermath of this hurricane as the start point for Heming-
way’s disenchantment with Depression Era America. It
was also the starting point for NKVD interest in Heming- a. The Communist International, abbreviated as Comintern and also
known as the Third International (1919–1943), was an international
way.
communist organization that advocated world communism. The
International intended to fight “by all available means, including
Though on the NKVD radar, it is unlikely that there
armed force, for the overthrow of the international bourgeoisie and
was a plan to recruit Hemingway, but rather a disposi- for the creation of an international Soviet republic as a transition
tion to take advantage of any opportunities that might stage to the complete abolition of the State.” Source: “Communist
present themselves. If that happened, the NKVD—or its International” Wikipedia page, available at https://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Communist_International.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government. © JR Seeger, 2017

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  79


Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy

to order. They were filled with tough, colorful, and What is abundantly clear is that they made a critical error
educated men (as well as a few women) from various in case management: they did not maintain regular contact
countries, including the United States, the kind of with their newly recruited agent as he went off on a jour-
people who appealed to Hemingway. (25) nalist mission to China. By the time Hemingway returned
to the United States and then onward to his residence in
This was the beginning of a multi-year effort, first on Cuba, the United States was at war, and Hemingway had
the part of the Comintern and then the NKVD to formally alternative means of satisfying his commitment to fighting
recruit Hemingway as what would most accurately be fascism.
called an “agent of influence.” By 1937, Hemingway was
writing articles, stories, a stage play, and even making Reynolds takes us through Hemingway’s war years,
public speeches that supported both Republican Spain and focusing on his links first to the US Navy—through the
Soviet assistance to the Republicans. Reynolds offers no Office of Naval Intelligence (ONI)—in Cuba, and then
evidence Hemingway did this for any reason other than with the Office of Strategic Services in Europe after
his own commitment to anti-fascism. However, in the D-Day. The Cuba episodes underscore both Heming-
summer of 1940, Hemingway was formally pitched to way’s enthusiasm for adventure and intrigue as well as
serve the Soviet Union, and that pitch was managed by an his regular disregard for chain of command and tasking
established NKVD talent spotter—Jacob Golos. Reyn- by the US government. This period in Hemingway’s life
olds’s research effort uncovered a Soviet summary of the also brought him in direct contact and conflict with the
recruitment; below, he quotes a key line from the report: Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) in Havana. Cuba
had local political intrigues as well as embassy conflicts,
Before he left for China, [Hemingway] was recruited and Hemingway seemed drawn to both—perhaps because
for our work on ideological grounds by [Golos]. (81) of his interest as a writer, but more likely because conflict
was part of the “essential” Hemingway.
After this recruitment message, all subsequent NKVD
reporting used Hemingway’s NKVD issued cryptonym: The conflict and intrigue started when Hemingway
Argo. We know from available Soviet intelligence records offered to create an informal “counterintelligence bureau”
and from declassified intercepts of Soviet cable traffic (which he called “the Crook Factory”) that he directed,
from the United States that cryptonyms were used almost to hunt and report on suspicious characters in Havana
exclusively for individuals the Soviets believed to be their and throughout Cuba. The Crook Factory ran in a manner
committed agents. more akin to 1930s and early 1940s film noir than any
formal effort that might produce results usable by the US
The most important part of this book follows, as
government. It was almost as if Hemingway were creating
Reynolds takes us through the extensive research effort
a novel of intrigue in real life. Hemingway’s enthusiasm
he used to confirm what he saw as the NKVD claim to
and charisma charmed the US ambassador and the naval
have recruited one of America’s greatest writers. Reyn-
attaché, and they sidestepped any effort on the part of
olds describes the painstaking effort of wading through
the FBI to claim primacy on spy hunting. This followed
Soviet archives that were available in the first few years
a scheme by Hemingway to use his fishing boat, the
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. By the end of the
Pilar, to hunt for German submarines in the Caribbean.
chapter entitled “The Secret File,” Reynolds has made a
In the early days of the US entry into war, Hemingway’s
very strong case that the Soviets certainly were convinced
suggestions made some sense and were consistent with
their talent spotter and agent handler, Golos, had recruited
the overall effort to “just do something.” By late 1943,
Hemingway.
however, these types of operations were no longer useful
It is common for US intelligence officers after a re- and Hemingway moved on to Europe.
cruitment to point out that their target said “yes,” but it is
In the European theatre of operations (ETO) in 1944,
not entirely clear what “yes” means until the new contact
Hemingway found another role in intelligence opera-
begins to deliver on tasking. Throughout the remaining
tions—this time with other “glorious amateurs” from the
two-thirds of the book, Reynolds underscores that it is not
Office of Strategic Services. The OSS Special Opera-
entirely clear what Hemingway thought he had agreed to
tions and OSS Operational Groups in France focused on
and, for that matter, what the Soviets wanted from him.

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Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy

supporting, training, and guiding French resistance forces. necessary to try to sift what he said from the exagger-
Just prior to and after D-Day, this effort included work- ations and total fabrications that sometimes infused
ing with the allied commands to synchronize the French his accounts of his wartime exploits. As in many other
resistance operations with the strategic and operational activities during his life, he often viewed the war—
efforts to defeat the German Army in France. Heming- and the portrayal he sought of his own personal
way was initially affiliated as a war correspondent with involvement—through a storyteller’s eyes.c
the 4th Infantry Division and specifically with a brigade
commanded by Col. Charles Lanham. Lanham provided Reynolds spends the last third of the book on the re-
Hemingway with a jeep and a driver and gave Heming- maining 16 years of Hemingway’s life, describing the au-
way remarkable leeway to travel throughout his area of thor’s time in Cuba as he watches the Cuban Revolution
operations; in fact, Hemingway used this mobility to trav- unfold before his own front door. It was a bittersweet time
el beyond the frontlines. He spent much of the summer of for Hemingway who was suffering from both physical
1944 in French villages between the advancing US forces and mental maladies and difficulty writing commercially
and the retreating German Army. successful works of fiction. As Reynolds and other biog-
raphers have pointed out, after the publication of The Old
Along the way, he picked up some members of the Man and the Sea (1954) and his winning the Nobel Prize
French resistance and, while doing so, he met with OSS for literature that same year, Hemingway began a down-
colonel David K.E. Bruce and other the French resistance ward spiral that would eventually result in his suicide.
fighters who were under Bruce’s responsibility—though During that period in America, the revelations of Soviet
not his “command.” Hemingway thrived in this type of espionage in America, the House Un-American Activities
battlefield, which was consistent with his experience in Committee (HUAC) investigations, and Senator Joseph
the Spanish Civil War. Reynolds focuses much attention McCarthy’s hearings clearly played on Hemingway’s
on the short period between mid-July 1944 and the liber- mind. Reynolds’s research into Hemingway’s letters at the
ation of Paris on 24 August 1944. Multiple authors have time make it clear that he was concerned not only about
done the same, since it was during this period of Hem- the accusations concerning his former friends’ activities
ingway’s involvement that his role in the war arguably but also about the possibility that he himself might be
morphed into something complex. Was Hemingway a called to testify.
correspondent, or was he an informal combatant? Did he
lead French resistance forces, or was he simply a partner Hemingway carried an inner and an outer burden.
in the effort lead by Bruce? The compilation of Bruce’s Hemingway was able to tell Lanham and one or two
diariesa suggests that Hemingway was both correspondent others about his outer burden of “premature antifas-
and sometime resistance guide. In her book on the Paris cism,” but the inner burden of his relationship with
Ritz Hotel entitled The Hotel on the Place Vendome, Tilar the NKVD was known only to himself and the Sovi-
J. Mazzeo presents an image of Hemingway arriving in ets—he could not share it with anyone else. To make
Paris as part soldier, part journalist, and a full time vio- matters worse, Hemingway certainly would have had
lent, sometimes charismatic individual.b It is hard to know to worry that there might one day be a defector—an-
who Hemingway was at any given time. other Gouzenko or Bentley—who happened to know
his secret, and would share it with the FBI or HUAC.
As Michigan State University journalism professor (213)
William Coté writes in an article for The Hemingway
Review, Reynolds’s book belongs on the shelf of anyone inter-
ested in Hemingway, the Spanish Civil War, and World
Pinning down the truth of the particular claims is elu- War II operations in the ETO. His extensive research es-
sive, as with many aspects of Hemingway’s life. It is tablishes him as an excellent historian, and he is a superi-
or storyteller. At another level, Reynolds’s book is import-
ant to any practitioner of espionage. The book illustrates
a. OSS Against the Reich: The World War II Diaries of Colonel
David K.E. Bruce, Nelson D. Lankford, ed. (Kent State University
Press, 1991). c. William E. Cote, “Correspondent or warrior? Hemingway’s
b. Tilar J. Mazzeo, The Hotel on Place Vendome: Life, Death, and murky World War II ‘combat’ experience,” The Hemingway Re-
Betrayal at the Hotel Ritz in Paris (Harper, 2014). view, Vol. 22, No.1 (Fall 2002): 88–104.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 81


Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy

several key points in “the trade.” First, it identifies how a “yes” means. This part of the story demonstrates precise-
man most would argue was a quintessential 20th century ly how and why the recruitment effort failed. Finally, it
American could be recruited to spy for the Soviets. It emphasizes the importance of maintaining a regular and
shows in detail how well the Soviets managed the case professional relationship with a target—especially in the
during the spotting and assessment phase and how they first year of the relationship. Hemingway may have said
slowly developed Hemingway for the recruitment pitch. “yes” to the Soviet recruitment pitch, but unless there is
Second, it shows how easy it is for the recruiter to get some additional trove of material in the NKVD archives
the target to say “yes,” even when it can remain unclear that argues otherwise, it is clear Hemingway was never a
to either the target or to the recruiter—or to both—what productive Soviet agent.

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82 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 Intelligence in Public Media

Berlin Station
Produced by Olen Steinhauer (EPIX, 2015), 10 episodes

Reviewed by James Burridge

Berlin Station is a 10-episode cable television mini-se- engage developmentals if helpful. He is guilt-stricken
ries that aired on the premium cable channel “EPIX” in over his role in administering enhanced interrogation
October 2016. The series is the first collaboration between techniques (EITs) at a black site in Morocco.
two writers well known to the Intelligence Community
audience: the espionage novelist Olen Steinhauer and The personal and operational subplots are too complex
the former CIA officer and frequent agency critic Robert to describe here, without considering their spoiler poten-
Baer, credited as a “technical consultant.” The literary tial. Eventually the leaker is unmasked, but he escapes
roots of the series may include Graham Greene, Charles and leaves us with a monologue about the collective
Dickens (in terms of scope and number of characters), responsibility of everyone at CIA for the moral stain of
and, of course, John le Carré—in fact, New York Times EITs:
critic Mike Hale called the series “le Carré light.”a The
My name is Thomas Shaw and this is my final
Christopher Isherwood novel “Cabaret” or any of its stage
message. From the start I’ve tried to make the CIA
or film adaptations is probably also in the mix.
accountable for its actions. I’ve not always succeed-
The place is Berlin and the time is 2015. European ed, but I have tried. And along the way I‘ve ruined
stations and Berlin, in particular, are under siege by a the lives of real people. Now I need to be accountable
Snowden-like leaker named “Thomas Shaw.” Shaw for my own actions. The CIA’s hunt for Thomas Shaw
favors the Berliner Zeitung paper and appears to be an through what it called an eyewash has resulted in
insider. The CIA deputy director secretly sends a case too many deaths and too much destruction. To what
officer named Daniel Miller to Berlin to plug the leak. end? They still don’t know who I am and they’ll never
Miller is killed at the beginning of the first episode, and know. All that’s left of their deceit is broken bodies
we flash back to his arrival. and broken lives. It would be irresponsible to contin-
ue on my path. We’re all complicit. We all know that
We next meet the station personalities. The COS is something is wrong, and we’ve known it for a long
a cerebral patriarch, played by Richard Jenkins, a won- time, but we do nothing. Exposing wrongs is not the
derful character actor nominated for a Best Actor Oscar same as righting them.
in 2008. The D/COS is a twitchy bundle of energy and
profanity. We first encounter him when he emerges from Now the bottom line question that motivates most of
his office to ask, “Who do I have to (expletive deleted) us to watch these shows: what did they get right about
around here to get a password reset?” The chief of opera- our business? Not much, in this reviewer’s opinion. First
tions is ambitious, manipulative, and rarely misses an op- of all, there is no bureaucratic context. This is a common
portunity to undermine the COS and his deputy. The only feature in fictional portrayals of CIA. The COS talks to
ops officer we get to know is a burned-out but effective the director and the deputy director, but there is no inter-
recruiter who trolls the Berlin sex scene with considerable mediate level—no Mission Centers, no Headquarters di-
success. He is apparently bisexual and willing to sexually visions. There is also no ambassador or embassy; it’s as if
CIA rented an entire building and hung out a sign saying
a. Mike Hale, “Disillusioned Spook, and Spilled Secrets,” New “US Embassy.” Although the leaks and failed operations
York Times, 15 October 2016, C4. Also published online as disturb the broader US-German bilateral relationship,
“Review: ‘Berlin Station,’ the Hunt for a CIA Whistle-Blower,” there is no interaction with anyone from the embassy. No
New York Times online, 14 October 2016, at https://www.nytimes. one does any cover work. Operations with enormous flap
com/2016/10/15/arts/television/review-berlin-station-the-hunt-for- potential are undertaken very casually. In one episode,
a-cia-whistle-blower.html.
The views, opinions, and findings expressed in this article are those of the author and should not be construed as asserting or
implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations or representing the official positions of any
component of the United States government.

Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  83


Berlin Station

Miller is simultaneously directing two unrelated opera- fect” the general, returning him to the Chinese authorities.
tions from a rooftop: a cyber attack on the Berliner Zei- The Chinese agree to propagate the story that the general
tung and a lethal CT operation against a suicide bomber was under surveillance in Beijing the entire time, making
in a local market. The cyber operation succeeds, but the Shaw’s account of the BND role in the defection look
suicide bomber blows up the market after a sniper kills an completely false. Finally, the COS ignores warnings about
innocent woman. the danger to a non-official cover officer (NOC) in a fake
ISIS bride operation, because he has been led to believe
Everyone except Miller is ethically challenged, some that success will ensure a promotion. The NOC is killed.
to the point of criminality. In previous posts, the COS and
the D/COS both invented assets and pocketed the mon- A stock situation in nearly every fictional depiction
ey, the COS to cover his 2008 investment losses and D/ of CIA is a verbal confrontation between an asset and a
COS to pay for an expensive divorce. The COPS fell in case officer, and Berlin Station is no exception. Perhaps
love (and lives with) a German bar owner who provided script writers and directors should get a pass from insider
access to an Algerian suspected of terrorist financing. She critics on this issue. Good tradecraft minimizes face to
closed the case prematurely so as not to complicate her face meetings. But the asset-case officer relationship is so
relationship with her lover, concluding that the Algerian inherently dramatic that slavish adherence to tradecraft
was clean. He wasn’t, and later helped fund the Charley would deprive the writers of some of their best moments.
Hebdo attack. The administrative assistant is sleeping So this reviewer will no longer bash writers for their
with the COS and destroys evidence of the bogus assets. depictions of such meetings.
The COS sabotaged the recruitment of an Iranian cabinet
minister solely to discredit a rival. To recap, we have a station where the conduct of the
leadership is highly unethical and even criminal. It is
Station’s treatment of both assets and officers is both completely autonomous and answers to no higher man-
callous and counterproductive. The body count of those agement levels at Headquarters nor to an ambassador.
sacrificed for bureaucratic convenience or personal The leadership views its assets and even its own officers
advancement expands with every episode. After the first as disposable. This is not a station most of us have ever
Berlin leak, the station leadership scapegoats an officer to encountered.
placate the BND, although he had nothing to do with the
program revealed. Shaw’s rationale for his leaks is that we’re all complic-
it. The notion that the entire CIA workforce is complicit
The station leadership keeps a Saudi asset in place in the use of EITs is the underlying artistic and ideological
despite warnings from his case officer that his increas- premise of the series. Even the Christ-like Miller, who
ingly flagrant homosexuality had placed him in danger sacrifices his own life for his colleagues, is guilty. At one
of being recalled to Riyadh. Another subplot involves a point he says, “I accept the fact that I choose to work for
Chinese general who defected by means of a CIA-BND an imperfect institution.”
operation and is awaiting resettlement. When the comput-
er penetration of the Berliner Zeitung reveals that the next In summary, this is an ambitious portrayal of the spy
Shaw story will describe the BND role in the general’s business, beautifully filmed and enhanced by a terrific
defection, the COS and his BND interlocutor develop a cast. Its central premise of collective guilt is both implau-
brilliant but heartless way to discredit Shaw. They “unde- sible and objectionable—but it is, after all, entertainment.
Perhaps Season Two will bring redemption.

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84 Studies in Intelligence Vol 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

Intelligence in Public Literature

Intelligence Officer’s Bookshelf

Compiled and reviewed by Hayden Peake

CURRENT TOPICS
How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, The Man and The Threat, by Edward Jay Epstein
Spy Sites of Washington, DC, by Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton with Henry R. Schlesinger

HISTORICAL
Agent 110: An American Spymaster and the German Resistance in WWII, by Scott Miller
Deep Under Cover: My Secret Life & Tangled Allegiances as a KGB Spy in America, by Jack Barsky
with Cindy Coloma
Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World’s Best Writers, by Joel Whitney
The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police, by Frank McDonough
Lawrence of Arabia’s War: The Arabs, The British and the Remaking of the Middle East in WWI
by Neil Faulkner
Operation Blunderhead: The Incredible Adventures of a Double Agent in Nazi-Occupied Europe,
by David Gordon Kirby
Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain’s Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the
Nazis and Changed the Nature of War, by Ben Macintyre
Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada, by Donald G. Mahar
Sikunder Burnes: Master of the Great Game, by Craig Murray
Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis—The Most Remarkable Agent of the Second World War,
by Mihir Bose
Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961,
by Nicholas Reynolds

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD
Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform,
by Peter Gill
Swedish Military Intelligence: Producing Knowledge, by Gunilla Eriksson

v v v

All statements of fact, opinion, or analysis expressed in this article are those of the author. Nothing in the article should be
construed as asserting or implying US government endorsement of its factual statements and interpretations.

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017) 85

 
Intelligence in Public Literature

CURRENT TOPICS

How America Lost Its Secrets: Edward Snowden, The Man and The Threat, by Edward Jay Epstein. (Alfred A.
Knopf, 2017) 350, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The image of Edward Snowden as champion whistle- Snowden’s own account about the files he stole from Dell.
blower—propagated by a generally friendly, sometimes Those acquired later at Booz, Allen, Hamilton (BAH),
fawning mediaa—is irreconcilable with the account articu- however, were a different matter: they were more highly
lated in How America Lost Its Secrets. Author Edward classified than those at Dell and Snowden did not have
Epstein first came to the attention of many in the Intel- access. Just how he managed to acquire them remains a
ligence Community with his book Legend (McGraw-Hill, mystery, but NSA’s subsequent damage assessment was
1978) about Lee Harvey Oswald, Yuri Nosenko, and the that “more than one million of them had been moved by
JFK assassination. It was there that he argued Nosenko [the] unauthorized party.” (138)
was a KGB provocation—not a genuine defector. The
source of this controversial view, he later admitted, was Before he left BAH in Hawaii, Snowden made elabo-
former CIA counterintelligence officer, James Angleton. rate arrangements with journalists that led to a meeting
History suggests that Epstein was wrong about Nosenko. in Hong Kong. Epstein went there as well, and traced
Now, using multiple sources, is he right about Snowden? Snowden’s actions. Epstein soon discovered anomalies
in the timeline Snowden had provided and discrepancies
The central theme of How America Lost Its Secrets is in the events he claimed had taken place; for example,
how and why Snowden violated his oath and stole clas- although he told journalists who interviewed him that he
sified information that he gave to journalists and foreign had been at the Mira Hotel since his arrival on 20 May
nations. A corollary question is whether he was also a 2013, hotel records showed he had not checked in until
source of classified material for Chinese and Russian 1 June. Where had he been in the interim? One of his
intelligence. Hong Kong lawyers, Albert Ho, said Snowden stayed at
“a residence arranged for him by a party Snowden knew
With those issues in mind, Epstein turns to Snowden’s prior to his arrival.” (82) Epstein suggests it is not unrea-
credentials: Snowden was a high school dropout who sonable to assume that during this time, the Chinese man-
failed to complete army basic training; at CIA, a “de- aged “to drain the contents of the laptop that Snowden
rogatory” performance rating forced his resignation. He brought to Hong Kong.” He cites several other sources
cheated on the entrance exam when he applied to NSA who reached the same conclusion. (180)
and demanded a senior ranking position (which was not
granted). He lied about his educational achievements, By the time Snowden decided to leave Hong Kong, his
embellished the titles of various positions he had held, credit cards had been nullified and his passport cancelled.
and faked illnesses when convenient. Nonetheless, he was Yet after meeting with Russian officials—and without
an accomplished “hacktivist” who managed to retain his hindrance from the Chinese—he boarded an Aeroflot
clearances and become a computer systems administrator flight with neither a visa nor a valid passport. After arriv-
with Dell Corporation, where he began to steal classified ing in Moscow, Snowden spent several weeks incommu-
material. nicado. Surely, Epstein suggests, he was being debriefed
by Russian intelligence and security services.
Epstein examines Snowden’s carefully planned
chronology of theft. His research for the book confirms Prior to leaving Hong Kong, Snowden provided some
50 million documents to journalists Glenn Greenwald
and Laura Poitras taken from the Dell downloads, which
a. See for example: Nicholas Lemann, “Is Edward Snowden a Greenwald and Poitras then began releasing to the media;
Spy? A New Book Calls Him One,” New York Times, 9 January however, Snowden claimed he did not release the more
2017; Mike (“Mish”) Shedlock, “Superhero Snowden Trashed in
classified material acquired from BAH. In fact, according
Ab-surd WSJ Op-Ed,” Mishtalk.com (blog), 2 January 2017; Seth
Rosenfeld, “‘How America Lost Its Secrets,’ by Jay Epstein,” San to one report, he claimed to have destroyed the files for
Francisco Chronicle 20 January 2017. patriotic reasons. Yet months after arriving in Moscow, a

Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  87


Intelligence in Public Literature

story alleging that German chancellor Angela Merkel’s the persistent assertions by the media that Snowden was
mobile phone had been monitored appeared in Der Spie- just a splendid whistleblower are implausible. Put another
gel, (287) a fact that was not in the Dell documents. way, it is unlikely that the Chinese and Russians were
aiding Snowden as a humanitarian gesture. The history of
How America Lost Its Secrets analyzes these events these intelligence services suggests Snowden earned their
and Snowden’s relations with the press, and explores a protection because he was a valuable source and gave or
variety of possible motivations. While Epstein sees some allowed them access to all his stolen files. Few counterin-
benefit from the selected disclosures, he concludes that telligence officers would disagree.

Spy Sites of Washington, DC, by Robert Wallace and H. Keith Melton with Henry R. Schlesinger. (Washington, DC:
Georgetown, University Press, 2017) 332, photos, appendices, maps, index.

Pamela Kessler set the precedent with her 1992 book, OSS agent Elizabeth Thorpe, clad only in a necklace and
Undercover Washington: Touring the Sites Where Famous high heels, stole codes from the embassy safe. (87–88)
Spies Lived, Worked and Loved (EPM Publications) that Several British intelligence officers serving in America
included about 100 entries. In the 25 years since then, are also mentioned, one of whom was Roald Dahl, who
many new espionage cases have become public and new would later author the beloved children’s book, Charlie
details about previous ones discovered. In Spy Sites of and the Chocolate Factory. (107)
Washington, retired CIA officer Robert Wallace and espio-
nage historian H. Keith Melton account for these changes Among the many Cold War entries is one for Ash-
in 220 entries that contain crisp commentary, color pho- ford Farm, a once-top secret, Maryland safehouse where
tos, and maps that locate each site. many Soviet defectors and U-2 pilot Gary Powers were
debriefed. (138) This was also the time of early NSA pen-
Spy Sites contains seven chapters, each encompass- etrations, and the section contains an entry about Soviet
ing a historical period beginning with the Revolutionary spy and NSA employee Jack Dunlop, whose sad end as a
War and ending in the post-Cold War era. Each chapter suicide is particularly morbid.
contains familiar topics, such as Washington’s intelli-
gence contributions, and some less well-known entries, The later Cold War period section includes the story
such as Dolly Madison’s efforts to save White House of the hapless former CIA officer Edwin Moore, who at-
treasures during the War of 1812, including her rescue of tempted to peddle documents to the KGB and was caught
the Gilbert Stuart painting of Washington. (6) The seldom when the KGB didn’t believe him and notified the FBI.
mentioned exploits of Daniel Webster are also included. (192–194) A more uplifting entry deals with the first CIA
(7–8) To the Civil War era, Spy Sites adds the story of female chief of station, Eloise Page, (158) and a photo
Confederate spy Benjamin Franklin Stringfellow and of the first National Photographic Interpretation Center
points out locations used by spies from both sides in the (NPIC) building in the District. (163) Even Congress got
war, many of which are still standing. (26–28) into the act when Soviet officer Aleksandr Mikheyev at-
tempted to recruit an aide to then-Congresswoman Olym-
The post-Civil War period section includes an entry pia Snow, who reported the pitch to the FBI. The aide
for the elite Alibi Club, where OSS officer David Bruce wore a recorder to the next meeting, ending Mikheyev’s
and DCI Allen Dulles were among the elite membership tour in America. (231)
(limited to 50). (46) The story of Agnes Meyer Driscoll,
a groundbreaking cryptographer, runs through the World The final chapter includes the much publicized 21st
War I and World War II sections covering the period dur- century cases. In addition to the narrative, Spy Sites adds
ing which she worked on the Japanese naval codes, until locations and other less well-known details. For example,
her retirement from NSA in 1952. (57–58) it identifies the parks where Brian Regan, the NRO
would-be spy who couldn’t spell, hid stolen classified
The WWII chapter contains many OSS-related loca- documents and then forgot where he had hidden them.
tions, including a photo of the French embassy where (251) Then there is the Alexandria, Virginia, restaurant

88  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)

 
Intelligence in Public Literature

on the Potomac River where a US diplomat met his area. (261) The final entry lists intelligence officers who
Taiwanese handler, while the FBI observed the exchange are buried in Arlington National Cemetery. (272)
of documents. (256) And then there is the case of the 11
Russian illegals, three of whom lived in the Washington If you want proof that the Washington area has been
the crossroads of international espionage, follow the paths
laid out in Spy Sites and see for yourself.

HISTORICAL

Agent 110: An American Spymaster and the German Resistance in WWII, by Scott Miller. (Simon & Schuster,
2017) 342, endnotes, bibliography, index.

To some, Agent 110 may be the surprise book of the Miller deals at length with the principal agents re-
year—not because of its content, but because it was writ- cruited, the most important being a German foreign
ten at all. After two lengthy biographies, Dulles’s own ministry officer, Fritz Kolbe (code named George Wood),
recollections about one part of his wartime OSS adven- who had been rejected by the local Brits. Kolbe’s re-
tures, and a 10-page summary of his career on the CIA ports were considered valuable by OSS and MI6, though
website, what more is there to say about Allen Dulles? a, b thanks to Philby, the British took the credit within their
Veteran foreign correspondent Scott Miller answers, with organization. It was Kolbe’s reporting that revealed a
the first account that focuses mainly on Dulles’s service as penetration—codenamed CICERO by the Germans—in
OSS chief of station, Bern. the British embassy in Turkey, though he was not initially
believed by MI6. Only after Dulles convinced Roosevelt
Agent 110 begins with a review of Dulles’s introduc- that CICERO had provided data about D-Day—that the
tion to intelligence during World War I. Miller then tracks Germans ignored—was Churchill informed.
the events that led to Dulles’s OSS recruitment by William
Donovan in June 1941, and ultimately his assignment to Some of the most vexing challenges for Dulles
Bern. Dulles didn’t go through any tradecraft training; involved requests for support from Germans plotting
none existed at the time, and it isn’t likely he would have to assassinate Hitler, but because of the “unconditional
considered it necessary. Moreover, there was no formal surrender” policy of the Allies, they were rebuffed by
relationship between OSS and the State Department. Thus Washington. After the unsuccessful assassination attempt
his ad hoc administrative and operational procedures in on 20 July 1944, one of the participants, Hans Bernd Gi-
Bern were developed on the job—but they worked. Miller sevius, a principal Dulles agent, was trapped in Berlin and
tells how he set up his station, acquired local support staff, Dulles arranged a complicated but successful exfiltration.
and hired a reports officer secretary—the married daughter
of the editor of the Wall Street Journal—with whom he Perhaps the most complex and controversial covert
had an affair. To encourage potential agents, he put out the action Dulles facilitated was dubbed Operation Sunrise,
word in Bern that he was Roosevelt’s personal representa- which involved dealing directly with SS general Karl
tive. While establishing safehouses throughout Switzer- Wolff to obtain the early surrender of German forces in
land, he developed a liaison arrangement with the Swiss Italy. The Russians were not told of the early contacts,
intelligence service and the Allied representatives in Bern, which precipitated an angry exchange among Roosevelt,
and then began recruiting agents who could inform him Churchill, and Stalin. In the end, it was a success and
about events in Germany. lives were saved.

Miller describes Dulles’s brief post-war assignments

a. Peter Grose, Gentleman Spy: The Life of Allen Dulles (Houghton in Germany after the surrender, and his efforts to help
Mifflin, 1994); James Srodes, Allen Dulles, Master of Spies (Regn- his former agents—Kolbe in particular—even after he
ery Publishing, 1999).
returned to civilian life. For those who want a good sum-
b. Mark Murphy, “The Exploits of Agent 110,” Studies in Intelli- mary of Dulles’s wartime experiences, Agent 110 is the
gence 37, no. 1 (1993), 25–32; available online at https://www.cia.
best single source.
gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol37no1/
html/v37i1a05p_0001.htm.

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Deep Under Cover: My Secret Life & Tangled Allegiances as a KGB Spy in America, by Jack Barsky with Cindy
Coloma. (Tyndale Momentum, 2017) 339, photos, no index.

Albrecht Dittrich’s makeover began in September went to New York and assumed his identity: Jack Barsky
1970 while he was studying chemistry at university was reborn.
in Jena, East Germany; at the time, he was headed for
academia. Then came “a life changing knock” on his Following instructions, Barsky learned New York
dorm door. (67) The stranger who entered asked him City, first as a bike messenger, then as a college student at
intriguing questions that indicated he knew a great deal Columbia, and then as a MetLife computer programmer.
about Albrecht’s life and capabilities. Albrecht assumed After eight years, he married and had a second child. All
he was Stasi. When invited to Moscow for further train- the while he maintained contact with his KGB masters by
ing, he realized he was dealing with the KGB. Years of coded radio messages, secret writing letters, and periodic
training to be an illegal followed. Albrecht developed trips to Moscow. Crunch time arrived in December 1988,
a legend, polished his English, learned espionage tra- when he noticed an emergency danger signal at a prear-
decraft, and studied imperialist Western societies. Then ranged location: he was to return immediately—but he
he was dispatched to Canada, where he acquired the birth didn’t. In 1997, he was contacted by the FBI.
certificate of Henry van Randall of California and a US
How did the FBI learn about him? Was he doubled
passport under that name. When the certificate arrived
against the KGB? Did he avoid KGB retaliation? What
marked “Deceased,” Albrecht realized the incongruity and
about his families in Germany and America? How did he
returned to Moscow immediately; someone had not done
become an American citizen? The answers to these ques-
his or her homework.
tions are what make Deep Under Cover an engrossing
While waiting for the KGB to straighten things out, book. In addition, Barsky includes the details of his exten-
Albrecht married his Berlin sweetheart and she was read sive KGB tradecraft training and fieldwork as an illegal.
in to the program; she would bear his first child. When the He also points out some surprising errors the KGB made
KGB rezidentura in New York obtained the birth certifi- in his control procedures, while he was overseas. Deep
cate of a Staten Island boy who died in 1955, Albrecht Under Cover is a valuable contribution to the literature.

Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World’s Best Writers, by Joel Whitney. (OR Books, 2016) 329, endnotes, sources,
photos, index.

The irony of the early Cold War influence opera- ties like George Plimpton, Arthur Schlesinger, Ernest
tions conducted by the KGB and the CIA to promote the Hemingway, Arthur Koestler, Vladimir Nabokov, Irving
cultural benefits offered respectively by communism and Kristol, Arthur Miller, James Baldwin, Stephen Spender,
democracy is striking: those working for the KGB knew and Boris Pasternak—to name just a few—are woven into
their masters, while the well-known writers, poets, artists, the narrative. He also addresses charges of censorship—
historians, scientists, and critics, who were supported he is on shaky ground here—and undue influence on
indirectly by the CIA to display Western values and op- some writers, especially those thought to be too sympa-
portunities, for the most part did not. thetic to the communists.

Finks: How the CIA Tricked the World’s Best Writers Whitney’s choice of a title is a tad misleading: the
devotes little space to the Soviet propaganda operations world’s best writers were not “tricked” and the pejora-
that were the genesis for what became the CIA-sponsored tive term “fink”—an unpleasant or contemptible person
responses. Instead, journalist Joel Whitney dwells on the who informs on people to the authorities—is ambiguous
“liberal hawks, non-aligned leftist novelists, and Rus- in application. Whitney writes that “the finks the book is
sian dissidents” whose writings and other artistic gifts named for” are those who attempted to thwart exposure of
portrayed life in the Western democracies. (5) Personali-

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the CIA relationship with the Congress of Cultural Free- vides short biographies of the principals—artists and CIA
dom (CCF) and its ancillary organizations. (5) officers—as they sought to conduct international CCF
publishing programs, exhibits, and conferences.
The basic story of the CIA’s role in the CCF has been
told before but Whitney adds new details based on recent- But to assert, as Whitney does, that “the Congress of
ly discovered letters and other archival documents.a His Cultural Freedom was CIA’s new propaganda front” is
storyline describes how the idea of countering the per- disingenuous. (15) Many of the contributions supported
sistent communist propaganda originated among liberal over more than 15 years were anything but propaganda
Western writers and artists, many with firsthand knowl- and reflected the genuine views of the authors.
edge of the Soviet truth. It also reveals how their need for
funds and publishing venues coincided with the nation’s In the end, the book’s implicit assumption that the CIA
need to counter the communist version of events. While role in the CCF was somehow immoral and ultimately
he identifies the key players, his discussion of CIA organi- unproductive is problematic, when viewed in the Cold
zational structure and management is not quite right. War context—a topic Whitney tends to downplay, if not
ignore. The final chapter attempts to extend this argument
The CCF supported writers, books, and magazines to post-Cold War CIA operations. There he discusses the
throughout the world. (37) Nevertheless, Whitney’s Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, preposterously asserting
central focus is on the Americans. To that end, he pro- that “the United States lured them there,” (262) and that
the CIA attempted to propagandize the Afghans. More
recent examples include what he considers the inappropri-
a. See Francis Stoner Saunders, Who Paid The Piper: The CIA and
the Cultural Cold War (Granta Books, 2000); Michael Warner, ate CIA influence on motion pictures such as Zero Dark
“Origins of the Congress for Cultural Freedom 1949–50, Studies In Thirty and Argo. His arguments leave room for alternative
Intelligence 38, no. 5 (1995), 80–98. interpretations.

The Gestapo: The Myth and Reality of Hitler’s Secret Police, by Frank McDonough. (Skyhorse Publishing, 2017)
309, endnotes, bibliography, photos, glossary, index.

In 1946, American opponents of a central intelli- that representing the Gestapo as an omnipotent force that
gence service argued that the United States didn’t need monitored and harshly punished citizens for anti-Nazi acts
a Gestapo, the notorious German secret police of Nazi is inaccurate.
era fame. Movies of the era—O.S.S. (1946, starring Alan
Ladd), 13 Rue Madeleine (1947), another O.S.S., (1947, After reviewing the origins of the Gestapo, Mc-
starring James Cagney) and later The Diary Of Anne Donough presents examples of how ordinary citizens who
Frank (1952)—perpetuated an image of the Gestapo as criticized or denounced to the Gestapo received fair, even
the acme of Nazi terror. In Berlin today, a museum called lenient, treatment. The organization, he suggests, was
the “Topography of Terror” on the site of WWII Gestapo only about 15,000 strong and could only deal with serious
headquarters on Prinz-Albrecht-Straße (now Niederkirch- threats to the regime.
nerstraße) displays torture cells, and photos of Gestapo
In what McDonough calls “history from below,” he
treatment of communists, Jehovah’s Witnesses, uncoop-
uses recently discovered Gestapo files covering opera-
erative Catholics, the mentally ill, gypsies, homosexuals,
tions in the Düsseldorf region of Germany to support his
and Jews.
position. But even if he is right about domestic opera-
Frank McDonough’s The Gestapo doesn’t refute these tions, it is still hard not to conclude that the Gestapo’s
images, but it does attempt to show that some historians control of the concentration camps and its treatment of
have exaggerated reality when dealing with ordinary Ger- anti-fascists at home justify its well-earned reputation as
man citizens in domestic matters. In short, he concludes an evil organization.

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Lawrence of Arabia’s War: The Arabs, The British and the Remaking of the Middle East in WWI, by Neil Faulkner.
(Yale University Press, 2016) 528, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

In 1910, aspiring Oxford academic, archeologist, and cially at Gallipoli and Armenia. The Great War cost them
author, Thomas E. Lawrence, selected a title—Seven millions of dead and wounded.
Pillars of Wisdom—for a contemplated travel book based
on seven Middle Eastern cities. World War I interrupted Faulkner’s analysis of the conventional land war under
those plans and he discarded the idea for the book—but Wavell (General Sir A. P. Wavell, Commander in Chief,
not its title. He would later use it for his personal account South West Pacific) is straightforward, though his accep-
of the Arab Revolt, which curiously makes no mention of tance of Richard Meinertzhagen’s so-called Haversack
pillars of any kind. Ruse is surprising, since it was discredited by Lockman.a

Lawrence of Arabia’s War is a less misleading title The Arab Revolt is given detailed attention as
than Seven Pillars, especially when taking the subtitle Faulkner describes its failures and successes, like the
into account. But it is not just another biography of Aqaba battle depicted in the David Lean film, Lawrence
Lawrence and his role in the Arab Revolt—there have of Arabia. Lawrence’s capture in Deraa where he was
been more than 100 to date—although major, familiar on an intelligence gathering mission is briefly described.
parts of those topics are covered. Marxist archeologist and Faulkner accepts Lawrence’s account, given in Seven
historian Neil Faulkner correlates Lawrence’s story with Pillars, that he was “sexually abused” (367) by the Turks,
the conventional war operations in the Middle East during without commenting on other authors’ speculation that the
World War I. Fought on two parallel fronts, this hybrid event never happened. He discusses his conclusion that
war saw the Turks defeated in the West by a conventional the Deraa experience and the British acceptance of the
army commanded by Gen. Edmund Allenby. Success, Sykes-Picot Agreement that denied the Arabs the fruits of
however, had little to do with Lt. Col. Richard Meinertz- their victorious revolt were to have a lifelong psychologi-
hagen’s so-called Haversack Ruse, as Faulkner claims. cal impact on Lawrence.
(299) and in the east by “a tribal insurgency of camel-
Lawrence of Arabia’s War provides a broad view of
mounted guerrillas.” (xiii)
the Arab Revolt and the war in the Middle East during
Faulkner looks at both, factoring in strategic conflicts World War I. Ironically, as Faulkner observes, the Turks
in the British War ministry between those whose priority lost their war, but ended up with a stable secular state.
was the European front and those favoring the Middle The Arabs who defeated the Turks and entered Damascus
East to protect the gateway to India—the Suez Canal— victorious eventually submitted to a contrived geopolitical
while tying down Germans supporting the Turks. Using solution that remains in disarray to this day. A fascinating
results from an archeological study, Faulkner concludes story, well told and well documented.
the Turk’s defensive efforts to protect the railway were
far more sophisticated than is portrayed in some popular a. In his published post-war diaries, Meinertzhagen claimed to have
accounts. He also shows that the Turks, motivated by placed false war plans in a haversack that successfully deceived the
religion more than nationalism, were not the incompetent Turks as to the location of the main attack into Palestine. Lockman
showed that to be a false claim, but the myth has persisted. See J.
peasants and farmers some made them out to be, espe- N. Lockman, Meinertzhagen’s Diary Ruse: False Entries on T. E.
Lawrence (1870; reprinted by Cornerstone Publications, 1995).

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Operation Blunderhead: The Incredible Adventures of a Double Agent in Nazi-Occupied Europe, by David Gor-
don Kirby. (The History Press, 2015) 223, end of chapter notes, bibliography, photos, index.

Intelligence and Espionage: An Analytical Bibliog- Using archival documents, Kirby shows that Seth
raphy (Westview Press, 1983), by the late OSS veteran never performed any acts of sabotage. In fact, he gave
George C. Constantinides, remains the best critical treat- himself up to the Germans shortly after landing, and he
ment of the literature written before 1982. He was espe- never contacted SOE by radio. Then, after being officially
cially unforgiving when it came to popular but unreliable presumed dead, British intelligence learned he had been
books, a notorious example of which was Ronald Seth’s “captured.” In 1944, he was spotted wearing a Luftwaffe
Encyclopedia of Espionage (New English Library, 1975). uniform in Paris. Later the same year, British received a
Constantinides described the book as “abounding in er- report signed “Blunderhead,” written, the author claimed,
rors, poorly prepared, needing editing and cluttered with in an SS hospital in Paris. Further reports from Blunder-
inane and trivial material . . . experts will not be happy head and others indicated that he had been in several
with the results.” (406–407) Seth had already written 25 POW camps, where he was viewed as a stool pigeon. The
equally dubious books on espionage and fancied him- ultimate surprise occurred when he turned himself in to
self an expert. Were they unreliable, too? Constantinides the British minister in Switzerland where he claimed to be
thought so, and Operation Blunderhead explains the back a double agent, returning to England with written peace
story. proposals from Heinrich Himmler, meant for the British
government. (203–204)
British historian David Kirby encountered Ronald Seth
while studying the history of the Baltic countries—Esto- Seth was returned to London and interrogated by MI5,
nia in particular—where Seth was a very popular English among others. Kirby shows that much of Seth’s explana-
lecturer for three years prior to World War II. In his 1952 tion regarding how he avoided execution and where he
memoir, A Spy Has No Friends (Arnold Deutsch), Seth had really been could not be documented. Complicating
tells how he returned to England and joined the Royal Air matters, Seth exhibited a pattern of embellishment and
Force when war broke out. Seconded to the Special Op- fabrication that confounded his interrogators. In the end,
erations Executive (SOE) in 1942, he volunteered to para- there was no evidence that he had cooperated, except to
chute in to Estonia on a sabotage mission to destroy shale fool the Nazis. No charges were ever brought; he was
oil processing plants. The book contained no references honorably discharged and received back pay. Kirby
and disguised many names. Thus, when Kirby checked re- questions why SOE ever allowed Seth to undertake the
cently released SOE files, he found Seth’s story “often at mission. He concludes the “soubriquet ‘Blunderhead’ was
variance with the evidence available in the archives.” (16) a mocking comment on the entire show.” (201) But Seth
Operation Blunderhead sorts out the facts and fantasies in viewed himself as a successful agent and resorted to writ-
Seth’s wartime record. Kirby also establishes a pattern of ing creatively embellished or just inaccurate espionage
behavior that explains why Seth’s postwar writings were stories. Operation Blunderhead reaffirms Constantinides
unswervingly unreliable. judgment: Ronald Seth was no avatar of truth.

Rogue Heroes: The History of the SAS, Britain’s Secret Special Forces Unit That Sabotaged the Nazis and
Changed the Nature of War, by Ben Macintyre. (Crown, 2016) 380, bibliography, appendices, photo, index.

In July 1941, while newly appointed Coordinator of skeptical generals that his idea of a small, highly trained
Information (COI) William Donovan was setting up his unit operating behind enemy lines in North Africa could
new organization, British Lt. David Stirling was in a mili- wreak havoc on German airfields, lines of supply, and
tary hospital in Egypt recovering from a near-disastrous communications. And second, Rogue Heroes describes
first parachute jump and planning an elite Special Forces the operations in unforgiving African deserts that proved
unit that would become the Special Air Service (SAS). him right.
Rogue Heroes first tells how he managed to convince

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Stirling exits the battlefield saga in late 1942 after his was Capt. Robert “Paddy” Mayne, a Northern Irishman
capture by a German officer—“the unit dentist”—while characterized as “unexploded ordinance.” (209) A moody,
on a mission in Tunisia. (197) One of his cell mates, heavy drinker “given to violent explosions of temper .
nominally, “Capt. John Richards,” proved to be Private . . and insubordination,” (38) Mayne was a dedicated,
Theodore Schurch, the only British soldier executed for effective fighter and controlled his demons when neces-
treachery during the war. (351) Stirling was not fooled. sary; he would lead his troops until the end of the war.
And although he proved adept at escaping on four occa- More in Stirling’s mold was a subordinate, Capt. George
sions, he was equally susceptible to being captured and he Jellicoe, 2nd Earl Jellicoe, the self-deprecating son of the
spent the balance of the war in Colditz prison. World War I admiral. He would go on to become the first
commander of the Special Boat Service (SBS), an SAS
What was, by the end of the Africa campaign, an SAS wartime spin-off.
regiment did not collapse after Stirling’s capture. It did,
however, undergo reorganization and was temporarily For reasons not mentioned, Macintyre does not include
stalled before reinstatement. And as demands for Special source notes in his account. He does acknowledge the
Forces services grew, a second regiment was formed— contribution of the SAS War Diary (Extraordinary Edi-
commanded by Stirling’s somewhat less colorful brother, tions, Ltd., 2011; facsimile of original diary, 1946), a
Bill. monumental volume that lists all wartime missions, and
these are included in an appendix.
Rogue Heroes is initially concerned with SAS mis-
sions in Libya that destroyed aircraft and supplies behind Rogue Heroes concludes with a summary of the post-
enemy lines, after attacking from the desert (which few war lives of the regiment’s survivors. Stirling, among
thought could be done). Modifying its tactics as needed, other activities, helped train security units in Arab and
the regiment would go on to serve in Egypt, Italy, France, African countries, and was knighted in 1990. (345) One
and Germany. Macintyre’s account of these exploits survivor became a pub owner, while Paddy Mayne turned
weaves in perceptive narrative portraits of the eccentric, to exploring but never came to terms with his demons.
aristocratic dilettante Stirling and his maverick, malcon-
tent “Dirty Dozen” colleagues. All were self-reliant vol- As with all Ben Macintyre’s books, he tells his story
unteers and most contemptuous of traditional army con- wonderfully, and in Rogue Heroes he has made another
ventions and formalities. Stirling’s successor to command significant contribution to WWII Special Forces and intel-
ligence history.

Shattered Illusions: KGB Cold War Espionage in Canada, by Donald G. Mahar. (Rowman & Littlefield, 2017) 221,
endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

The era of “the great illegals,” wrote Cambridge and Col. Rudolf Abel of Bridge of Spies fame followed
historian Christopher Andrew, occurred before World War that path; years later, Yevgeni Brik tried to do the same.
II.a These KGB officers, operating in foreign countries Shattered Illusions tells his story.
without diplomatic or other official protection, recruited
and handled some of the most successful Soviet agents. After two years of tradecraft training in Moscow, Po-
The Cambridge Five are well-known examples. After the land, and Czechoslovakia, Brik arrived in Canada under
war those illegal officers had either been eliminated by a false name that he abandoned immediately, assuming
Stalin himself or neutralized by Western services, thanks another—David Soboloff (a long dead Canadian)—as his
to defectors and the VENONA decrypts. Thus the KGB operational identity. Brik’s instructions were “to take a fa-
attempted to recreate new illegal networks in the West. miliarization trip across Canada” and continue to Toronto
Canada was a useful entry point on the road to America, to acquire an intimate knowledge of the city where the
real Soboloff had lived. (25) Ultimately, he would, “at a
time chosen by Moscow, immigrate to the United States,”
a. Christopher Andrew, The Mitrokhin Archive: The KGB in Europe where he would join Rudolf Abel. (29) Things did not go
and the West (Penguin, 2000), 11. as planned.

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Brik took a variety of jobs to establish an employment assigned him instead to support agents in Canada. Brik
record before he received approval to take a photography even envisioned becoming the illegal rezident there. (29)
course in New York. He would later start a photography
studio in the Verdun suburb of Montreal as his cover; Then in August 1955, Brik left on a scheduled trip
Moscow’s plan that he become a watchmaker proved to Moscow via Rio, and disappeared. Shattered Illu-
unfeasible. sions explains how they later learned GIDEON had been
betrayed by a Security Service officer to the KGB. He
Before starting his business, Brik needed to travel to was presumed dead until 1991, when an old man walked
other towns where Soboloff had lived or visited. It was into the British embassy in Vilnius, asking to see the MI6:
on a trip to Winnipeg that he met and began an affair Brik was back.
with Larissa Cunningham, the wife of a Canadian army
corporal, to whom he eventually revealed his “illegal” se- After confirming Brik’s identity, Donald Mahar, a
cret—and his life changed irrevocably. She suggested that retired Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) of-
he turn himself in to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police ficer, was assigned to help implement the exfiltration. He
(RCMP), and he did just that. Brik was given the code- explains what happened to Brik when he was arrested and
name GIDEON, and the RCMP Security Service began interrogated by the KGB, and how he managed to avoid
Operation KEYSTONE. execution.

Although his relationship with Larissa didn’t work After his return, Brik spent 19 often contentious, even
out, Brik’s dual role with the Security Service went well. prickly years in Canada, unbothered by the SVR (the Rus-
Things even improved a bit when Moscow Centre—KGB sian Foreign Intelligence Service). This is a famous case
headquarters—decided not to send him to assist Abel and in Canadian intelligence history, and Mahar has provided
a fine account of its complexities.

Sikunder Burnes: Master of the Great Game, by Craig Murray. (Birlinn, Ltd, 2016) 437, endnotes, bibliography,
photos, maps, index.

The “Great Game,” a term popularized but not origi- ic Society, and write a best-selling, three-volume account
nated by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim, refers to of his travels from India to Bokhara and another book
19th-century intelligence operations between Britain and about his service in Kabul during the First Afghan War.a
Russia when the former saw a threat from the latter. Al-
exander Burnes was a British military intelligence officer, Ambassador Murray acquired the details for his book
a gifted linguist, and an active participant in the Great by visiting long unexplored archives in India, Afghani-
Game. Sikunder Burnes tells his story. stan, and London that revealed documents discussing
Burnes’s travels on intelligence missions throughout
Author and former British ambassador to Uzbeki- India, Afghanistan, and neighboring regions. He often
stan, Craig Murray, learned of Sir Alexander Burnes traveled in disguise while in unknown territory using
while studying history at the University of Dundee. A the name “Sikunder Kahn” (“Sikunder” is Persian for
great-nephew of the famed Scottish poet Robert Burns, Alexander). Facilitated by his gift for linguistics, Burnes
Sir Alexander had an impressive record of his own: as a met with tribal officials on nominally political matters
15-year-old cadet, Burnes arrived in India on 31 October while collecting military and geographic intelligence. His
1821 and before his death in Kabul just 20 years later, he reports included hand-drawn maps and fortress details
would enjoy audiences with British monarch, be knighted that were sent to London and contributed to his growing
for service to the crown, honored by the Royal Geograph- reputation.

a. Alexander Burnes, Travels to Bokhara and a Voyage on the Indus

(John Murray, 1834); Lt. Col. Sir Alexander Burnes, Cabool: Being
A Personal Narrative of A Journey To, and Residence in That City,
in the Years 1836, -7, and -8 (John Murray, 1842).

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Perhaps the most surprising result of Murray’s re- Some historians concluded Burnes was killed because of
search was his discovery of Burnes’s portrait in the sexual affairs with native women, but Murray explains
Mumbai Asiatic Society archive; the portrait is included that Burnes observed the Afghan rules about such matters
in the book. Burnes’s books featured a frontispiece of and traveled with his own harem. (170)
him in a turban, but this was not his true likeness: he had
insisted on a distorted rendition to protect his anonymity. There are two interesting sub-themes in Sikunder
(128–129) Burnes. In the first, Murray find parallels with his own
foreign officer career and, from time to time, points them
Burnes was not a solitary intelligence officer: Murray out in the narrative, which interrupts the flow a bit. Then
introduces the reader to a number of his espionage col- there are his digressions concerning Alexander and his
leagues, while describing their often contentious relation- brother, James—a doctor, also in India for a while—and
ships, exploits, and awkward communication methods. their connection with the myths that link the Knights
Templar and Scottish Freemasonry. Murray ponders
Of his many assignments, Burnes’s mission to Kabul whether this connection supports the conspiracy theories
as liaison to the Afghan leader Dost Mohammed was of “Da Vinci Code.”
the most challenging. He “recruited spies in the Afghan
court” (204) to monitor the threatening alliances con- Sikunder Burnes is the first biography of Burnes’s
templated and formed with the Persians, Russians, and extraordinary life. Whether, as some historians have
the region’s many factions. When the Indian government claimed, there was no genuine Russian threat to India at
decided to replace Dost, rejecting Burnes’s recommenda- the time, it is clear the British thought there was. What
tion to support him, Burnes reluctantly agreed and his they did to counter it will confound those who follow
friend Dost was replaced by a British surrogate. The result events in Afghanistan today; there are many analogous
was the first disastrous Afghan war and Burnes’s violent mistakes. A fine and important book that reveals how
death and that of his younger brother Charles, who had intelligence was practiced “back in the day,” and, to some
followed him to India, in the courtyard of Burnes’s home. extent, how the practice continues.

Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis—The Most Remarkable Agent of the Second World War, by Mihir Bose.
(Fonthill Press, 2016) 350, endnotes, bibliography, appendix, photos, maps, no index.

Peter Fleming graduated from Eton and Oxford before Talwar so impressed the Italian ambassador that he
joining the Army at the start of World War II. His younger recruited him to provide details on anti-British activities
brother, Ian, chose the Navy. While serving in India as in India. On his return to India, unwilling to betray his
chief of intelligence under General Sir A. P. Wavell, Com- country or the communists, Talwar established a fictitious
mander in Chief, South West Pacific, Peter recruited an secret organization—the All-India National Revolution-
Indian agent to report on local anti-British movements ary Committee—and on his next trip to Kabul convinced
and codenamed him SILVER (his true name was Bhagat the ambassador that it was the source of the information
Ram Talwar). he began supplying, for which the ambassador began
paying. When the ambassador passed the information
Talwar’s true pedigree was unknown to Fleming. A to his Nazi colleagues, they were equally impressed and
popular and dedicated communist, Talwar had been cho- also recruited him. When Hitler invaded Russia, ending
sen by the Party in early 1941 to escort Subhas Bose (no the Hitler-Stalin pact, Talwar, ever the loyal communist,
relation to the author), the well-known Indian anti-British offered his services to the Soviets in Kabul. He would spy
communist, to Kabul, Afghanistan. Bose planned to go for them throughout the war without telling the Nazis,
to Germany and seek foreign help to free India from the the Italians, or the British. Later in the war, Fleming sent
British, but when a visa proved difficult to acquire, the Talwar to Kabul—one of 12 trips he made during the
astute Talwar made friends with the Italian ambassador, war—to discover how the Japanese were colluding with
and soon Bose was on his way. the Germans. Talwar managed to convince the Japanese
he could be of help to them and was recruited. To speed

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communications, the Germans provided Talwar with a competed for control of SILVER without alerting the Ger-
radio. Unbeknownst to him, the British at Bletchley Park mans, who thought of him as their agent. All this amidst
were intercepting German communications and learned a war and the volatile political situation in pre-indepen-
some of what SILVER was doing. dence India that influenced SILVER’s allegiance.

Inevitably, Talwar had confidants who knew aspects As to the value of his contribution, British deception
of his activities, if not their ultimate purpose and control- historian Sir Michael Howard found SILVER “compa-
lers. This led to suspicions about him from all sides. The rable with GARBO a himself.” (24) This account does not
author describes how he managed to survive through art- entirely support this judgment, since he had much less
ful lying. But at least one case pestered him after the war, impact on the outcome of World War II. Nevertheless,
when he was suspected of having betrayed his former though Talwar’s exploits are mentioned in passing in the
colleague, Subhas Bose, to the British. literature from time to time, Silver: The Spy Who Fooled
the Nazis is the first full treatment of his contributions.
Silver: The Spy Who Fooled the Nazis is a compli-
cated, occasionally convoluted though very readable
account of Talwar’s adventures as he struggled to keep his
a. Juan Pujol, codenamed GARBO, is considered the most impor-
multiple masters satisfied. They, on the other hand, had tant of the British Double Cross agents run during World War II.
their own difficulties dealing with SILVER. The author For his story, see Tomás Harris, GARBO: The Spy Who Saved D-
explains how the British and Soviets cooperated and Day (The National Archives, UK, and Dundurn Press, 2000).

Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy: Ernest Hemingway’s Secret Adventures, 1935–1961, by Nicholas Reynolds. (Harper-
Collins, 2017) 357, endnotes, bibliography, photos, index.

At the annual OSS dinners in Washington, DC, vet- by the US Army for poor eyesight, he volunteered to the
erans toast the late OSS Col. David Bruce and his friend Red Cross as an ambulance driver and was sent to Italy in
Ernest Hemingway in honor of their ‘liberation’ of the June 1918. On 8 July, he was badly wounded by a mortar
Ritz Hotel bar in Paris in 1944. In 2010, Nicholas Reyn- round and was hospitalized. After his recovery, he mar-
olds, then-CIA museum historian recalled that story while ried, found work with Toronto Star Weekly as its Europe-
working on the Agency’s OSS exhibit and wondered an correspondent, and returned to Paris, where he became
whether Hemingway was also in OSS. a member of the so-called lost generation “of talented
writers” that included Ezra Pound, James Joyce, Gertrude
A search of the National Archives OSS collection Stein, and Ford Madox Ford.
revealed there was, in fact, a file on Hemingway. It
showed that his wife—Martha Gellhorn—“had lobbied By 1935, he had published two best sellers, The Sun
OSS to put him on the payroll,” but he had never joined. Also Rises and A Farewell To Arms, was living in Key
(xviii) Further research into the open literature, however, West with his second wife, and “was so successful that
disclosed an astonishing fact: Hemingway had “an official he was on his way to becoming a touchstone for every
Soviet file” that exposed him as an NKVD agent!b (xix) American writer.” (2) It was also when his left-leaning
Was he also an American traitor? Writer, Sailor, Soldier, thinking surfaced in print, in an anti-New Deal article
Spy answers that question and weighs how Hemingway’s published in the communist supported magazine, New
links to spying influenced his work. Masses. While the piece wasn’t “left” enough to label him
a communist, it “attracted attention in . . . Moscow . . .
Reynolds begins the story with brief allusions to the probably the first time that anyone in the NKVD . . . took
18-year-old Hemingway’s WWI experiences. Rejected any interest in Hemingway . . . he was now on the NKVD
radar.” (12–14)
b. See Allen Weinstein and Alexander Vassiliev, The Haunted
Wood: Soviet Espionage In America—The Stalin Era (Random Reynolds is unsure whether the NKVD influenced
House, 1999) and John Earl Haynes, Harvey Klehr, and Alexander Hemingway’s assignment by the North American News-
Vassiliev, Spies: The Rise and Fall of the KGB in America (Yale paper Alliance to Spain in 1937. But there is no doubt his
University Press, 2009).

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reporting from the Republican government’s side—fight- Hemingway did become involved in two intelligence
ing Franco and his Nationalists—exhibited a growing anti- actions concerning Cuba, however, before he went to Eu-
fascism. This view was also evident in a film he narrated rope to report on the war. One was a cockamamie coun-
about the Nationalists in the war; in his anti-fascist play, terintelligence operation called “The Crook Factory” that
The Fifth Column; and his articles for Pravda. (48) Reyn- Hemingway designed and implemented to “keep an eye
olds also names other American communists, like Milton on actual or potential Axis sympathizers.” (123) The other
Wolff of the International Brigade, Hemingway met in was a bizarre scheme in which Hemingway, accompanied
Spain and would encounter later in his career. He also met by local recruits, would employ his boat—the Pilar—to
NKVD officers. Hemingway’s best known account of the search for and even sink Axis submarines. As Reynolds
war, of course, was his book For Whom the Bell Tolls, notes, Hemingway had official sanction for these efforts
which was based on his reporting experiences in Spain. It from the US embassy in Cuba, apparently took them seri-
was there that he had become friends with and received ously, and received much praise (the limited results not-
help from the head of the NKVD in Spain, Alexander Or- withstanding). Reynolds considers the possible motiva-
lov, and on whom he modeled the character Varloff. (17) tions and the impact they may have had on Hemingway’s
patriotism.
When Hemingway realized the Republican cause was
all but lost, writes Reynolds, “although he was fond of In 1943, with the Axis Caribbean threat diminished,
saying he had signed on for the duration,” (52) Heming- Hemingway left for Europe, where he would meet the
way left for the States a few months before the war ended lady who would become his fourth wife. In 1944 he
in April 1939. In short order, Hemingway divorced his would follow the troops to France and there undertake
second wife, remarried, moved to Cuba, began work on another self-generated, quasi-intelligence mission. The
For Whom the Bell Tolls, defended the Nazi-Soviet Pact, latter involved his independent efforts to identify the best
(77) and made plans for a trip to China after the book was route to Paris for the Army, during which he met David
published in 1940. Then an unexpected event occurred. Bruce—and they went on to liberate the Ritz. He was sub-
sequently involved in some actual fighting in the field, for
In late 1940, although “the contact details remain a which he was nearly court-martialed. For his “combat”
mystery,” (77), writes Reynolds, Hemingway met Jacob efforts, he thought a Distinguished Service Cross ap-
Golos, the veteran NKVD case officer in New York. (79) propriate; he later received a Bronze Star.a Reynolds uses
Reynolds then cites a NKVD report stating that, “before these anecdotes to reflect on Hemingway’s courageous
he left for China, Hemingway was recruited for our work character and his desire to be part of the action—without
on ideological grounds.” (81) More specifically, after assuming all the responsibility.
several meetings with Golos, “by January, the American
novelist agreed to work with Moscow.” (88) It was during the combat events that he met Gen.
Charles “Buck” Lanham, who became a close friend for
Based on his professional knowledge, Reynolds con- the rest of his life. As part of their continuing correspon-
jectures sensibly about the nature of these initial contacts dence, he once wrote to Lanham that “he had done odd
and what they may have meant to both sides. He also adds jobs for the Soviets in Spain and, after the Civil War,
some interesting facts. After the German invasion of the stayed in touch with ‘Russkis’ who shared secrets with
Soviet Union, Hemingway “received a telegram from the him.” (86, 211)
Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov . . . invit-
ing him to visit the Soviet Union.” (125) He never made Hemingway tired of the war once the end was in sight
the trip, but the NKVD didn’t give up. Hemingway was and returned to his home in Cuba in early 1945. There he
contacted by the NKVD several times during and after followed the congressional hearings on communist espio-
the war. Reynolds also found message traffic between the nage and continued his literary life. The former “kept him
NKVD rezidency in Washington and Moscow inquiring on edge,” (215) and he worried that his own case might
about ARGO—Hemingway’s codename—as late as 1950. surface in defectors’ testimony—but it never did. Reyn-
(215) But he found no evidence that Hemingway was ever
a participating NKVD agent.
a. A Bronze Star is the only Army award allowed for a non-military
participant in war.

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olds found no evidence in the archives or in Hemingway’s subject of interest because of his leftish tendencies, but he
many letters to Lanham that he ever admitted to anyone was never under surveillance. (263)
he had met with the NKVD. It was equally clear, how-
ever, that he retained his sympathy for Stalin—who “had Nicholas Reynolds’s fine intelligence biography of
to be ruthless in order to protect the Soviet Union from Ernest Hemingway adds much to the story of this famous
enemies like Hitler.” (193) man. As a writer, Hemingway succeeded by any mea-
sure. As an amateur sailor, in addition to writing The Old
Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy follows Hemingway’s reac- Man and the Sea, Hemingway used his nautical skills in
tions to the major events of the early Cold War. He con- attempts at gathering intelligence and assisting in covert
tinued writing and was awarded the Nobel Prize, but did operations, droll examples of which Reynolds does not
not go to Sweden to accept it. He was also increasingly fail to provide. His portrait of Hemingway as the “vet-
concerned that the FBI was bugging his phones and moni- eran” soldier shows that that particular image was more
toring him—more so as his health gradually deteriorated in Hemingway’s mind than it was rooted in reality. But
and he was hospitalized several times. The diagnosis was Hemingway’s role as an NKVD spy remains curiously
“depression complicated by paranoia.” (253) He “tried at ambiguous, though Reynolds makes a strong case that—
least twice to kill himself,” (258) and on 2 July 1961, he at heart—he was a patriot.
succeeded. In 1980, when the FBI released its Heming-
way file, it emerged that Hemingway had been partially Writer, Sailor, Soldier, Spy is a thoroughly docu-
right: the Bureau file showed he had been a continuing mented, positive contribution to the intelligence literature
and a thoughtful contribution to the reputation of Ernest
Hemingway.

INTELLIGENCE ABROAD
Intelligence Governance and Democratisation: A Comparative Analysis of the Limits of Reform, by Peter Gill.
(Routledge, 2016) 225, end of chapter notes, references, index.

What is “intelligence governance and democratisa- border region—argues in favor of “the proposition that
tion”? British intelligence scholar Peter Gill suggests that there are, indeed, general issues of governing intelligence
intelligence governance has to do with the organization, that transcend national peculiarities.” (81) His lengthy
control, and oversight of an intelligence community by treatment of democratization issues includes the notion
legitimate authorities. Democratization on the other hand, that “the implementation of a ‘deeper’ democratization
is “concerned with the process by which intelligence in of intelligence by means of moving from ‘thinner’ to
former authoritarian regimes in Europe and Latin America ‘thicker’ versions of the rule of law is from the perspec-
have become more democratic, or not.” (3) Intelligence tive of ‘culture’: specifically the attitudes and values to-
Governance and Democratisation examines the evolution ward intelligence work that exist in the broader
of these concepts, the operational problems encountered, society.” (149) On the subject of external oversight, Gill
and the options for reform. It also extends the discussion notes that it “does not just refer to reviewing or
beyond nation-states to include private and corporate overseeing the work of others but also to an unintentional
security elements and non-state entities. failure to notice or do something.” (163) He offers
examples of oversight problems in a number of countries.
Gill summarizes the historical precedents that led to Allowing that “some progress has been made in achieving
the necessity for reform in democratic and authoritarian oversight of state agencies, the vexed issue of overseeing
regimes and the difficulties encountered in implemen- international intelligence cooperation remains, and the
tation. In the process, he cites the work of many other corporate and para-state sectors remain effectively
academics that resulted in conceptual models like se- untouched.” (191)
curitism, which illustrates various forms of intelligence
and security relationships. The chapter on “Kosovo and If these admittedly selective but typically phrased con-
Amexica”—the latter refers to the American-Mexican cepts seem esoteric, it is because Intelligence Governance
and Democratisation is an academic assessment written
Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)  99

Intelligence in Public Literature

mainly for academics. While practitioners will agree that Gill’s complex treatment fails to persuade readers that the
reform and oversight are ongoing components in demo- existing mechanisms should be replaced.
cratic and would-be democratic intelligence organizations,

Swedish Military Intelligence: Producing Knowledge, by Gunilla Eriksson. (Edinburgh University Press, 2016) 228,
end of chapter notes, bibliography, index.

Dr. Gunilla Eriksson is a political scientist with six The book includes a foundational discussion of ana-
years’ experience as an intelligence analyst with the Swed- lytical views expressed by CIA analyst Sherman Kent and
ish Military Intelligence and Security Service (Militära Roger Hilsman, former director of the Bureau of Intelli-
Underrättelse-och Säkerhetstjänsten—the MUST). Now a gence and Research (INR) in the State Department, which
post-doctoral researcher in the Department of War Stud- Eriksson draws into her inquiry of “the characteristics of
ies at the Swedish National Defense University, she finds intelligence knowledge.” (8) As is typical of a political
“intelligence-related research . . . [an] exciting topic.” (1) scientist, there is a chapter on the need for an intelligence
theory that answers the question, “In theory, how should
In Swedish Military Intelligence, Eriksson considers it work?” Here she introduces the concept of “critical
intelligence “a special kind of knowledge,” what she calls discourse analysis,” where she argues that “discourse and
“intelligence knowledge”—is a kind of unique database discursive practices can further our understanding of intel-
within an intelligence entity that is “more than empirical ligence knowledge by uncovering and conceptualizing the
data alone” and forms the foundation of judgments that manner in which meaning is assigned and interpreted.”
“help security policymakers to make informed decisions.” (24–25) She devotes several chapters to expanding her
(1–2) A critical requirement for intelligence knowledge, theory, using MUST as the exemplar organization.
she argues, is that it be based on unbiased, explicit rather
than implied, evidence and assumptions. That these condi- A less theoretical viewpoint is expressed in the chap-
tions are not always met, she suggests, may explain why ter on “creating knowledge” that assesses how MUST
assessments reach the wrong conclusions. analysts function. It is based mainly on interviews with
practitioners. She concludes that, “If assessments are
Eriksson’s approach to a system intended to pre- not put into use by various kinds of decision makers, the
vent failure is described in the answers to the following knowledge is irrelevant.” (111) This is a bit surprising
questions: “What kind of knowledge does intelligence since the assertion appears to conflict with her previously
produce?” Are there current paradigms of analysis “that articulated concept of “intelligence knowledge.” Eriksson
might obstruct or at least hamper the emergence of valid then turns to how efforts to keep intelligence knowledge
descriptions of explanations?” “Are there some traits in objective and unbiased can be influenced by the analyst’s
the social context of knowledge production (inherent or the institution’s overall worldview. She discusses
norms and values, routines, or organizational patterns) examples involving relations with NATO, Russia, and
that might constrain or hamper the emergence of valid terrorism, still using MUST as a reference point. She
knowledge?” (2) concludes by cautioning against the risks of “a collective
of thought and a style of thought”—perhaps a kind of
Eriksson formulated these questions during her work
group-think—that can unintentionally and inappropriately
in MUST, where she concluded that they hadn’t been
shape results. (207)
adequately addressed. Thus, at the National Defense Uni-
versity, using strategic estimates produced at MUST, she Some new terms and unfamiliar concepts in Swedish
investigated their “intellectual and substantial content” as Military Intelligence should stimulate thinking while pro-
well as the “social milieu and social context of knowledge viding a look at how Swedish military analysts function.
production.” (3) Her overall purpose is “to examine the Eriksson’s prose is at times intellectually and semantically
characteristics of knowledge in intelligence analysis and challenging, but seeking to grasp her meaning is worth the
also to investigate how that knowledge is affected by the effort. A very interesting, stimulating contribution to the
social context of its production, the military service.” (11) intelligence literature.
Swedish Military Intelligence presents the results. v v v

100  Studies in Intelligence Vol. 61, No. 2 (Extracts, June 2017)