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1/LL.B .- Elementary Logic
 LOGIC - PAPER I - PRE-LAW 1ST YEAR
SECTION I : Deductive
I. Nature of Logic - (a) Definition of Logic; (b) Deductive and Inductive argum
(c~ Form and content of an argument; (d) Coneept of logical form; (e) Logic as at; ~nts;
science; (f) Truth and Validity; (g) Inference and Implication; (h) Utility of Logic. ounai
n. Propositi~ns - (a) What is a proposition? (b) Traditional analysis ~f a proposition·
(c) Constituents and components; (d) Proposition and Fact; (e) Proposition a J
SeJ?.tence; (f) Proposition and Judgment. n
m. Terms - (a) What is a Term? (b) Distinction between a word and a term; ·cc) Kinds of
term~ - S~gular and Gene~al; · Positive and Negative; Condrary and Contradictory;
(d) Denotation and Connotation. · · · ·
IV. Traditional Classification· of Propositions - (a) Simple and Compound Propositions· .
'
(b) Categorical and Conditional propositions; (c) Quality of Propositions; (d) Quantity'of
propositions; ,(e) Four-fold classification of propositions; (f) · Singular propositions;
(g) Reduction of sentences to logical form; (h) Distribution of terms in a .Categorical
Proposition. · · ,
V. Modem Classification of Propositions - (a) Defects of traditional classification; ·(b)
Aim and basis of Modem classification; (c) Simple propositions; (d) Compound
proposit~ons; (e) General propositions. · .
VI. Laws of Thought - (a) Law of Identity; (b) Law of (Non) -C.ontradiction; (c) Law of
Excluded Middle; (d) Functions of the Laws of Thought.
VII. Inference and Implication -: (a) Nature of Inference; (b) Difference between _Inference·,
and Implication; (c) Immediate and Mediate Inference. _
VIII. Opposition of Propositions - (a) Types of Opposition;· (b) Inference by Opposition of
Propositions; (c) Opposition of Singular Propositions.
IX. Eductions - Types of Eduction : (a) Converse; (b) Obverse; (c) Obverted Converse;
(d) Contrapositive; (e) Inverse; (f) Other Immediate Inferences.

SECTION II : Inductive
X. Definition - (a) What is a Definition? (b) Purposes of Definition; (c) Kinds of Definition
- Traditional Definition - Fallacies of Definition; Modem DefiniEions.
XI. Division - (a) What is logical Division? (b) Rules of lqgical division; (c) Fallacies of
Division.
· XII. Nature of Induction - (a) Need for Induction; (b) Aristotle's view of Induction; (c) Kinds
of Induction - I~duction per complete Enumeration; Parity of reasoning; Colligatio~ of
Facts; Induction per Simple Enumeration - Fallacy of Illicit (hasty) generalizaoon;
(d) Analogy __: Conditions of a sound analogi~al argument; Importance and v~ue of
analogy.
XIII. Explanation - (a) What is an Explanation? (b) Nature of scieµtific explanation;
(c) Common sense and Scientific explanation; (d) Explanation of facts and law; (e)
Types of Explanation; (f) Limits of Explanation.
Recommended Readings :
1. Introduction to Logic - K. T. Basantani . .
2. An Introduction to Logic - Irving Copi.
(iv)
 LAW (II ND YEAR)
LOGIC - PAPER II PRE-

SECTION I (Deductive) cture of a

Sy llo gism as a for m of mediate Inference; (b) Stru
I. Syllogism : (a) Nature of ; (c) Ru les of syllogism; (d) Figure an
d M oo d of
micf:dle Te rm
syllogism - function of the Fo ur Fig ure s; (f) Enthymeme; (c) Sorit
es.
mo od s of the
a syllogism; (e) Valid (b) Ni ne rules of Inference;. (c)
_Fo rm al
rec t de du cti ve pro of;
Deductive Pr oo f: (a) Di Rule of
II.
of Re pla ce me nt; (e) Ru le of conditional proof; (f)
pr oo f of validity; (d) Rule
Tautologies.
Indirect proof; (g) Pr oo f of : (a) Ru les of Hypothetical-Categ
orical
tiv e Ar gu me nt s
m. Hypothetical and Disjunc sju nc tiv e-c ate go rical ar gu me nt an d fallacies
; (c)
Ru les of Di ; Refutation
Argument an d Fallacies; (b) pe s of Di lem ma; Rebuttal of a dilemma
em ma ? Ty
Dilemma - W ha t is a dil
of dilemma.
of a dilemma; Importance et Nu llo an d the First Figure; (b)
Direct
Di ctu m de Om ni
IV. Reduction : (a) Aristotle's .
direct Reduction (in details)
~.Reduction (briefly); (c) In (a) Sy mm etr ica l, Asymmetrical an d no
n-
Argume nt s :
V. Relations and Relational , · In tra ns iti ve an d No n-transitive relations; (c)
Transit ive
Symmetrical relations; (b)
ess an d Connexity.
Reflexiveness, Aliorelativen du e to am big uit y of lan gu ag e; (c) Fallacies
lacy? (b) Falla cie s
VI. Fa lla cie s: (a) W ha t is a fal
ents.
due to inattention to argum

SECTION II (Inductive) e of
Pr inc ipl e of Un ive rsi ty of Nature; (b) Principl
ction : (a) ty of ·
VII. Postulates of Indu tio n of ca us e; (d) M ill's theory of cause; (e) Plurali
se no
Causation; (c) Co mm on sen ts.
us es an d Intermixture of Effec
causes; (f) Conjuction ofca ho d:
is and th e Hy pothetico-Deductive M et
VIII. Hy po th es
un d hy po thesis; (c) Stages of the
(b) Co nd iti on s of a so
a) W ha t is a hypothesis? pothesis;
d; (d} Ve rifica tio n of a hypothesis; (e) Pr oo f of a hy
hypothetico-deductive metho
(f) Types of hypothesis. ree me nt; (b) M eth od of Differen
ce;
: (a) M eth od of Ag
Methods n; .
IX. Mill's Experimental ffe ren ce; (d) M eth od of Co nc om ita nt V~riatio
an d Di
(c) Method of Agreement .
Ev aluation of Mill's methods
(e) Method of Residues; (f)

Pre-Law (Ilnd Year)

Recommended Books for
Basantani
I. Second Course in Logic - K. T.
L.S. Stebbing
2. Modem Introduction to Logic -

(v)
 PAR T-I
DEDUCTION

1-6
/ Prop ositio n 17-2 4

/ . " ; ,_e rms 25-31

- / . Trad ition al Classification of Propo sition s 32-S t

/ Mode rn Classification of Propo sition s 52-65

6. Quan tifica tion and General Propo sition s 66-7 3

Oppo sition of Prop ositio ns 74-8 0

/
81-9 4
~ Educ tions and Othe r lmme diate lnfer ences
95 -113
9. Syllogism
114- 132

D
10. Dedu ctive Proo f
133- 143
11. Non- form al Fa1lacies
144- 152
12. Redu ction
153 -165
1.3. / Hypo thetic al ~nd Disjunctive Argu ment s DiJe~ ma
166 - 172
14. Relat ions and Relat ional Argu ment s
173- 176
~ he Laws of Thou ght

·PART - II

INDUCTION AND METHOD.OLOGY OF SC(ENCE

179- 192
~ D~finitiort
193 - 200
fl Division
201- 219
~ Nature and Kinds of Induc tion
220 - 227
19. Notion of Caus e
228- 243
20. Hypo thetic o-De ducti ve Meth od and Hypo thesi s
244- 257
21. Mill's Expe rimen tal Meth ods
258 - 265
f i sci~ntific E~pl anati on
266- 271
23. Justif icatio n of Induc tion
272 - 282
Solutions to Selec ted·Test Ques tions
(vi)
.. DEDU.CTlON
Natt1-rf of Logic

NATURE OF LOGIC

DO YOU KNOW THAT .....~ ...

* whether you are a mathematician, scientist, poet,
. actor, or lawyer, .you are bound to follow r11:les of
logic? ·
* we all use rules of logic - logic merely makes us aware
of them?
* your reasoning can be correct even when. your
conclusion is false ?
* an uneducated man may reason as well as a
logician?
* logic would h,elp us to detect errors in· reasoning ? .

j 1. INTRODUCING LOGIC
The essential fea.t ure which distinguishes man from other creatures is his ability
to ,reason. This reasoning ability is revealed when men infer, argue or demand proofs.
Men sometimes reason well, and sometime_s badly. We use various expressions to
indicate this. The words 'correct', 'valid' and 'logical' stand for good reasoning, and the
words 'incorrect', 'invalid' and 'illogical' stand for bad reasoning. The science which
enables us to draw these distinctions is logic. Logic furn.i shes principles and methods
for distinguishing between correct and incorrect reasonings.
We are familiar with the process of drawing conclusion from the data. The terms
'inference' and 'reasoning' are used for this process. 1 In an inference the thinker
passes on from on~ or more given statements, accepted as true, to another statement,
which follows from them. The given statements are called the premises. The statement
which follows from them is·called the conclusion. Let us take an example.
All honest men are trust ed.
All good men are honest .
All good men are trust ed.
1 .
'vVe sha U ignore the. distinction betwee n infe rence a nd reasoning.
 ...... . Elementa.ry Logic (L L
. ' . -13,)
Here the _statemen ts "AU hon.est men are trusted and "All goocl, men are hon.est"
II

the premises. The statemen t "All good men are trw1ted "is the conclusion. are

It. INFERE NCEAND IMPLICA TION :==:J

In an inference the thinker proceeds from the premises to the conclusion. He d .
'80, because_he bel~eves ~at !here is a_ cert_ain _relationship between the premises : :.
the. oonclus10n. This relation 1s that of 1mplicat1on.
The relation of implicatio n holds between two (or more) statement s. These ar
called implicans and implicate : Implicans ~s the statemen t (or statement s) whic~
implies some other statement . Implicate is the statemen t which follows from the
implicans . Let us take examples. · ·
1. A is red implies--A is coloured.
2. If A is a father, then he is a man.
In the first example, "A is red" is the implicaps. It implies the statement "A is
coloured." The statemen t "A is coloured" is the.implic ate. It follows from _the statement
"A is red." In the second example, "A is a father" is the implicans , while "He (A) is a
man" is the implicate.
. In the relation of implication, if the implicans is true, the implicate must be true.
If {he relation between the premises and the conclusion of an inference is that of
2

implication, then it could not be the case that the conclusion is false when the premises
are true. This means, when the premises are true, the conclusion must also be true.
In an inference the conclusion follows from the premises, because the thinker
knows that the premises imply the conclusion. If the relation between the premises
and the conclusion were not that of implication, the conclusion could ~ot be drawn
from the premises. This will be clear from the following -examples:
1. This wall is white.
:. This wall is not not-white.
In the above inference, the premise "This wall is white" implies the conclusion
"This wall is not not-white. Due to this relatiori, it is impossible that the conclusion
II

"This wall is not not-white" be false if the premise "This wall is white" is true ..Such a
relation between the ·premise and the conclusion is said to be that of implication. It is
because of the relation of implication that the thinker is able to draw the conclusion
from the premise. Now look to the following inference :
2. A is the brother of B.
:. Bis the brother of A.
In this inference· the premise does not imply the conclusion. The conclusion may
be false even if the premise is true. 3 In fact, the premise implies that ''B is either the
brother or the sister of A." Since it may be the case that B is the sister of A, the above
conclusion cannot be drawn.
It is to be noted that implicatio n is a logical relation _between propositions as such.
(A proposition is a statemen t which is either true or f~lse.) It does not depend up~n
the thinker. The implicatio ns of a propositio n are its logical consequences. These will
remain the same whether the thinker knows them or not. Thus, the relation betwe.en
implicatio n and infer~nce is one-sided . While every inference .depen~s upon an
implicatio n, the relation of implicatio n does not depend upon drawing the mference.

· · d · · " d not imply thc

2
Her e the referen ce is to deduct ive infe rence. The pre mises of an m uctive 101erence o
conclusion. (See Section 4 below.)
~ "Broth er of" is a non- sy mmetrica l re lation. (See Ch. 14 .)
1
 5
Natu rt of Logic

js. DEFINITION OF LOGIC

different, thou gh rela_ted, lines. One
The science of logic has developed alon g two
the doc trin es of Aris totl e. The oth er line of
line of dev elop men t has bee n infl uen ced by
in mat hem atic s. The logical doc trin es of
developme.n t was due to cert ain adv anc es
, are call ed Traditional Logic, whi le th~
Aris totle , and thos e who followed him ed
e infl uen ced by mat hem atic s are call
doc trin es of thos e logicians who wer , the ir
cians mak e gre ater use of symbols
Mathematical Logic. As the mat hem atic al logi c
trea tme nt is also call ed Symbolic Log
ic. Symbolic logic or mat hem atic al logi
commonly call ed Modern Logic. We sho uld
developed in mod ern tim es. The refo re, it is a
differ radi call y from trad itio nal logic. It is
bea r in min d tha t mod ern logic does not
es of trad itio nal logic.
dev elop men t and exte nsio n of the prin cipl
nce which investigates the general
Traditionally, logic was defined as the scie
inqu iry into thes e prin cipl es. It prov ides
principles of v.alid thought. It is a syst ema tic
4

es whi ch will ena ble a pers on to dist ingu ish betw een corr ect and inco rrec t
prin cipl · ,,,
argu men ts.
the sub ject -ma tter of logic. The term
The above defi niti on rega rds thin king as
men tal processes. These include not only
'thin king ' is too wide. It app lies to sev eral
ng and. remembering. All thes e proc esse s
reasoning, but also imagining, daydreami
be the con cern of the logi cian . Log ic dea ls with reas onin gs alon e. Its task is to
can not
g and bad .
stud y the difference betw een good reas onin
eov er, thin king , b~in g a men tal proc ess, is subjective. It_ is som ethi ng tha t
Mor of
not con side r this proc ess from the poin t
occ urs in the min d of the thin ker. We can
we dete rmi ne whe ther our day drea ms are
view of its vali dity . For inst anc e, how can
t the above defi nitio n is ~na ccep tabl e.
vali d or inva lid? The se objections sho w tha
c of logic is imp lica tion . They define
Coh en and Nag el hold tha t the cen tral topi ed on suc h_-implication). '15
lica tion , or of vali d infe rence (bas
logic as "the Science of imp
The above defi niti on too_is not acceptable.
It app lies to ded ucti ve arg ume nts oniy.
logi c incl ude s indu ctiv e argu men ts too. In view of this , toda y logi cian s _gen eral ly
Bµt stu dy
agre e· tha t logic dea ls with vali d argu men ts. So we ma y def ine log ic as the
6 . .
o{ the for ms of val id arg um ent s.
med tha t the conclusion follows from
·v alid arg um ent : In an arg ume nt it is clai
evidence for the conclusion? And if they do,
the prem ises . But do the prem ises provide
this with the help of exa mpl es.
is the evi~ence ade qua te? Let us und erst and
1. -All Hin dus are men.
All Bra hmi ns are Hin dus .
All Bl'.ahmins are men .
· 2. Ram is olde r tha n Gopal.
·Go pal is olde r tha n Ashok.
Ram is olde r tha n Ashok.
3. A, Ban d Car e Jew s.
A, B and C are inte llig ent.
All Jew s are inte llig ent.

al Logic, Four th Ed ition , p. 1.

4
J.N. Keyn es, Stud ies and Exercises in Form
5 Cohe n and Nagel, An Introduction t.o Logic and Scientific Method,
1964, p.13.
not used in exac tly the sam e sens e. But, in this
6 The words "inference", "reas onin g" and "arg ume nt" are
" and "reasoning"
minor differences. So, the word s "inference
elem enta ry text, we sha ll ignore t hese
as the word "arg ume nt".
appe ar. they sha ll have the same mea ning
 • .,,... Elementary Logic (L.L.B.)
6
of Hindu s, alld
In the first argum ent the class of Brahm ins is includ ed in the class
assert s that the
the class of Hindu s is included in the class of men. So the conclusi_on
ses of the ~econd
c}ass of Brahm ins is includ ed in the class of men. The premi
has the relatio ? of
argum ent assert a certai n relatio n betwe en indi~duals._ Ram
Ashok. Thus: 1t is
"being older than" to Gopal, and Gopal has this relatio n to
ents the evidence
concluded that Ram has this relatio n to Ashok. In both these argum
be true. But this is
is sufficient. That is, if the premi ses are true, the conclusion must
true, and yet the_conclusion
notth e case with the third argum ent. Its prepii ses may be
ver, m real life,
may be false. However, we do not come across such clear cases. Moreo
men, ·a black cat
even about ciear cases, people do have different feelings. To some
cause of their ill
crossing the way is sufficient to make them believe that it was the
what we happe n to
luck. To others , the reason ing sound s silly. Now logic canno t go by
er an argument
feel about the evidence. It must provide metho ds for determ ining wheth
is valid (correct) or invali d (incorrect).
nship between
The validity of an argum ent is determ ined by the natt!-re of relatio
" evidence . for the
its premi ses and its conclusion. If the premi ses provide ."good
is regard ed as
conclusion, the argum ent is valid. 7 If not, it is invali d. However, what
ce" in the case of
"good" evidence depends upon the type of argum ent. "Good eviden
tive argum ents.
inductive argum ents differs from "good evidence" with regard to deduc
"good" only if the relation
For deductive argum ents, evidence is considered to be
betwe en the premi ses and the conclusion is that of jmplication.
I 4. DEDUCTIVE AND !NDUCTIVE ARGUMENTS
eductive). The
Arguments may be classified into .deductive and induct ive (non-d
·prem ises and the ,
classification is based upon the nature of relatio nship betwe en the
sion. As ·such, the
conclusion. In a deductive argum ent the premises imply the conclu
ing argum ent is
conclusion canno t be · false, if the premises . are . true. The follow
deductive:
All birds have feathe rs.
All crows are birds. ·
All crows have feathers.
they provide
Since the premi ses of a deductive argum e.n t imply the conclusion,
g ·more is requir ed to
sufficient evidence for it (the conclusion). That is, · nothin ·
.
demon strate the conclusion.
e sufficient
We also come across argum ents in which the premise~ do not provid
induct ive. Consi der the
evidence for the conclusion. Such argum ents are said to be ·
following inductive argum ent: ·
Socra tes, Plato and other men (who have died so far) are morta l.
:. All men are morta l.
have rued in the
The evidence for the conclusion consists of the cases of those men who
not occur in future .
past. Now it is possible that what has occurred in the past may
This shows that the evidence is not sufficient.
is certain,
It follows from the above that the conclusion of a deductive argum ent
proba ble chara cter
while that of an induct ive argum ent is probable. To bring out the
ical probability
of induct ive argum ents, Benne t_ and Baylis call them "empir
tive argum ents.
arguments". 8 This expres sion is used to show that sciences use induc

7 inducti ve (non-de ductive) a rgu ments-

This defin.iti.o n of "valid argume nt" covers both deductive" a nd
described as valid argume nts.
: ut, strictly speaking, only correct dec1uctive argume n ts can be
Bennet t a nd Baylis, Formal Logic, p. 7.
 7
Noll,rv of Loti,c
Different inductive argume nts have different degrees of probability. And the
scientific value of an argume nt depends upon its degree of probability.
For testing the validity of deductive argume nts, it is possible to find exact criteria .
These criteria can be applied mechanically. But there are no such criteria for
9
determining the scientific value of inductive argume nts.
We may bring uut the difference between deductive -and inductive argume nts in
another way too. Since in a deductive argume nt the premise s imply the conclusion,
the conclusion cannot go beyond the premises. On the other hand, the conclusion of an
inductive argume nt goes beyond the premises. As a consequence, the premise s of an
inductive argume nt may be true, and yet its conclusion may be false. This cannot be
the case with a deductive argume nt. ·
According to the modern logicians, logic is a science of deductive systems. So they
do not include induction in the scope of logic. However, today logicians hold that logic
must include inductive argume nts too. Our de~nition of logic has taken this .into
consideration.

js. FORM AND CONTENT OF ARGUMENT I

Each inference is about a certain subject matter. This is called its content . Apart ·
from its content, it has certain other characteristics. These are said to be its form. Let
us illustra te.

L Pawar is a Mahara shtrian .

All Mahara shtrian s are Indians .
Pawar is an Indian.
2. Sunil Dutt is an actor.
All actors are artists.
Sunil Dutt is an artist.

It is obvious that these two inferences differ in their content. However, they are
very similar. They have the same form. In both of them an individ ual (Pawar , Sunil
Dutt) is stated to be a member of a class. This class is included in a wider class. From
s
these, it is concluded that the individual is a membe r of.the wider class. The diagram
at Figs.- 1.1 and 1.2 clearly bring out that their form is the same. Now take the
following inference:
3. All Mahara shtrian s are Indians .
All Indians are men .
. All Mahara shtrian s are men.
The third inference has a different form. (See Fig. 1.3.) It makes no reference to
an in.dividual. It expresses relation s betwee n three classes. · One class
0fahara shtrian s) is included in another class (Indians). This class (Indians) is
mcluded in a still wider . class (men). So it is concluded that the first class
(Mahar ashtrian s) is included in the third class (men).

.
9
of inductive
Carney and Scheer (Fundam entals of Logic, 1964, p. 189) ta lk about the "conectness"
a rgum ents. I ha ve substituted the expressio n "scientifi c value" for "correctn ess".
 .J
Elementary Logic (L.l.8

Actors
Mahar.ashtrians
Sunil Dutt
Pawar

Men
Artists

8 8
Indians

Pawar

Fig. 1.2 Fi g. 1.3

Fig. 1.1 e lo~ician
fo rm s of va lid in ~erenc:s. To do so, th
id, st ud ie s th e hi m to
Logic, as we have sa d w hi ch in va lid . Th is .w ou ld en ab le
forms ar e valid, an nc es is to be de te rm
in ed :
m us t find ou t which e va lid ity of in fe re
es by which th it y. In
ar riv e at th e principl di ff er en t se ns es 9f va lid
In section s: we sh al l see th at th
l see th at deductive in
er e ·ar
fe
e
re
tw
nc
o
es ar e sa id to be fo rm al ly valid, wh
m en ts ".
ile

th at Section, we sh al scribed as "good ar gu

correct non-deductive
inferences ca n be pr op
_
er ly
---
de
-,_____
____ --=-_r
c_1E_N_ _
c_E
:.....::A-=--=-Fo.::...;R=.:..:MA=_L__;_s_ co nt en t and
L.: ~.__:L:.::::_:o=-a=-=1:..:c:.....::A=s
16
ve se en th at ar gu m en ts ha ve a 'ce rta in s of
In th e preceding sect
ion we ha
w he t
_ he r lo gi c is co nc er ne d w ith form
we ha ve to discus s
a certain form. Now contents.
arguments or with th
ei r d invalid
to di st in gu is h be tw ee n· va lid an
for logi c is rm. It is
The specific problem ) _o f an ar gu m en t depern;ls up on its fo
ity (or correctness m th e following
arguments. The valid th e ar gu m en t. Th is become cl ea r fro
ntent of
not affected by th e co
ex am pl es :
1.. A is a table.
A is not a chair.
If A is a table, A is
not a chair.
2.
A is a table.
A is not a chair. tru e. B ut th ey re tr
ue for
gu m en ts ar e cl ea rly fro.Ill
both these ar not a ch ai r" follows
. The conclusions of th e co nc lu sio n "A is
the fir st ar gu m en t m ea ni ng s of th e wor
ds "table" and
different reasons. In us e we kn ow th e in g the
the premise "A is a
table':, beca
th ~ co nc lu sio n de pends upon ou r kn ow th'e
y, the tr ut h of nd , th e conclusion of
"chair" . Th at i~ to sa t. On th e ot he r ha
atter) of th e ar gu m en know th e m ea ni ng s
of th e words
content (or subJect-m en if we di d no t t. This
ll be · tr·ue ev pe nd en t or 'it s co nt en
second ~rgument wi is ar gu m en t is in de
e correctness of th t w ith certain
'table' an d :chair'. Th co nt en t of th e second ar gu m en
by replac in g th e is a chair",
can be easily ~hown "it is a ta bl e" an d th e symbol 'q' for "it
symbols. By usmmgen the symbol 'p' for
the seco nd ar gu t would be :
 9
Natun of Logir:
If p, then not q
p
not q
Let us supply some other content in place of 'p' and 'q', but keep the form of the
a rgument same.
S. If I work hard, I shall not fail.
I work hard.
I shall not fail.
Here "I work hard" is put in place of the symbol 'p'; "I shall fail" is put in place of
the symboJ 'q'. Like the argument (2) above, this argument (argument 3) is also
correct. The contents of the two arguments are clearly different. Therefore, their
correctness does not depend upon their content. Since the form is the . same, the
correctness of the arguments must be due to their for_m.
· · Since the validity of an argument depends upon it.s form, logic is said to be a
formal science. Moreover, it would be impossible for logic to examine the contents of
all the actual and possible arguments. That is why logic abstracts, from the context,
forms of propositions and arguments a:n.d then finds out the valid argument forms. In
this way, logic supplies methods and principles for distinguishing between valid and
invalid ar~ments.
The formal nature of logic becomes clear from the fact that logic is concerned with
~cessary propositions. 10 On the other hand, all the other sciences (with the exception
of mathematics) are concerned with contingent (or empirical). propqsitions. Let us see
what necessary and contingent propositions are. A necessary proposition is one whose
· truth does not depend upon experience. Its truth can be known by examining the
pr.oposition itself. On the other hand, a contingent proposition is one whose truth
depends upon -experience. Let us understand the nature of necessary and cqntingent
propositions •with the help of the following two sets of propositions :
Set I
1. If trains are late, railway stations are crowded.
2. Signal lights are either red or green . .
Set II
1. If it is gree.n, then it is not not-green.
2. Either America won the war in Viet Nam or it did not.
The propositions of the first set are contingent, while thos·e of the second set are
necessary. We can determine the truth of the propositions of the first set by appealing
to experien_ce. But the 'propositions of . the second set . are true, irrespective of
experience. They are true on a~count of their form.
The propositions of logic are true in virtue of their form. No matter what the word
"green" means, the proposition "If it is _green, then it is not not-green" will be true. Its
truth can be known by examining the proposition itself. ·
I7. THE NOTION OF LOGICAL FORM
Common sense distinguishes between the matter and the for m of a thing. A ten-
paise coin has a certain form or shape; and it is made of a certain ki nd of ma terial
Similarly, the statue of a person may be made of marble, bronze," silver or gold; yet i~
may have the same form. For the common man, the fo r m of a thing is its shape. This
is not the correct notion of form . Th e notion of-form is wider tha n that of shape. Shape

10
Ambrose a nd Lazerowit z. Funda mentals of Symbolic Logic, pp. 18-19.
 Efomentary Logic (L.L.B.)
IO 9 •9•9 • . . .
. l Non- hysical things, like music and
is physical, while form may not be ~hysif£~ca · t _P s • Raga is the form of music.
£ M • ay be m d eren , ra ga - .
poetry, also have 1orm. usic m · lik h zal' 'nazm' and 'raba i '.
We are also familiar with the forms of poetry e g a ' . . 'th tructure 11 Th
. . h f f form by comparing it w1 s . e
Susanne Langer explams t. e _no ion °
t d It is the organization of parts having
struct ure of a thing is the way it is construe el ·. th structure of a chair is the
• mu t ua1 re1a f 10ns · To take an examp e, - e1 the structure . of a proposition ..
certain k 8-.1 11
f ·t 1 rms seat and bac • m ar Y, :::;.-"'"
arrangemen t o 1 s egs, a • . . , A h k . handsome, is-composed of the subject
is its various elements. The proposition ns o is . . ,. ,
Ashok', the predicate 'handsome' and the sign of relationship ~s · · .
The structure of the different kinds of propositions is different; Let us consider
the following propositions :
1. Indira Gandhi is the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru. '
2. Indira Gandhi is tall.
The first pr~position asserts a relation between two individuals, viz._ .Indira
Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. The second proposition asserts that the attribute of
tallness is possessed by the individual 'Indira Gandhi'.
Not oJ?ly propositions, but arguments also, may differ in their structure and, thus,
in their form.
In Section 5, we have seen that the first two arguments differ ·in their structure
from the third argument. All the three propositions of the third argument assert that
one class is included in another class. But only the first proposition of the first and the
second argument asserts this relation. The other two propositions express that an
individual is a·meinber of a class.
The notion of logical form can be further clarified (a) by comparing logical form of
a proposition with the grammatical form of a sentence, (b) by means of blanks, and
(c) by referring to the use of constants and variables.
Form of proposition and form of sentence: Grammar classifies sentences into
indicative, interrogative, exclamatory, optative, etc. Now, the form of an interrogativ e
sentence differs froni that of an exclamatory sentence. But all interrogativ e sentences,
whatever their contents, have the same form.
1. Where were you yesterday ?
2. Why did you leave the classroo~?
3. What is your name?
All these sentences ask for information. Therefore, they have the same form.
Propositions may also have the same form, though they may differ in their contents.
Consider the following propositions :
1. Ram is honest.
2. Socrates was wise.
3. Taj Mahal is beautiful.
In ~II these propositions the subject is an individual, while the predicate is an
attribute. The propositions state that an attribute is possessed by an individual.
f bl Form12as revealed by blanks: Max Black explains the notion of form by the use
; . da~ks. _ We fill forms in which blanks (.. ..... ) are provided. These blanks are to be
111
e ~n ': 1t~ the ~equired_ information. Different persons filling the same form would
~~1{? 1 1 1 0
J ·ddiff~re~ t f
rmat10~. To clarify the ide1;1 of blanks, some columns from al
ege a misswn or m are given below :
1
11 ·
12 S usa nn e La nget, ln trodu.ction lo Symbolic Logic, pp. 11- 16.
l\ lax Bl ,1c: k. Critical 1'hi1! ki11 g, Second Edition, pp. 48-50.
 11
Nature of Logic
Name ............................ ..
Religion ........................... .
Age .......... Dat e of birt h .......... ..
sup ply diff eren t info rma tion in thes e
Diff eren t pers ons _seek ing adm issi on will
, with its colu mns , will rem ain the sam e.
blan ks, but the patt ern of the adm issi on form
form is furt her clar ifie d by the use of
Con stan ts and var iab les : The noti on of s.
bols . Mo dern logi c use s two kind s of symbols. The se are con stan ts and vari able
sym
in logic are sim ilar to thei r mea ning s in
The mea ning s of 'con stan t' and 'var iabl e'
mea ns tha t whi ch rem ains the sam e, and
common use. ·In com mon use con stan t
vari able mea ns tha t whi ch cha nge s.
e any fixed mea ning The y may be
Variables are those symbols which do not half k
are sim ilar to blan ks in a form. As a blan
give n any valu e. In this resp ect, vari able s .
able may be repl ace d by any con tent . We
may be filled in with any info rma tion , a vari
and see wha t con stan ts and vari able s they
sha ll exa min e the following prop osit ions
invo lve:
1. If it rain s, then road s will be wet.
2. If the day is hot, then we pers pire .
.
3. Ram is eith er inte llig ent or hard wor king
4. He is eith er a poe t or a philosopher.
n and a con sequ enc e tha t follows from
The firs t two prop osit ions stat e a con ditio e
this . The last two pro pos itio ns stat
it. The exp ress ion "if-then" exp ress es
rnat iyes . The exp ress ion "eit her- or" asse rts rela tion betw een alte rnat ives .
alte .
in thei r con tent s, and so do the last two
However, the firs t two prop osit ions differ
tent s, the form of the firs t two. pro pos itio ns
Sup pos e we leav e blan ks in plac e of the con
of the last two prop osit ions will be "eit her
will be "If ... '. ..... then ......... ", while tha t
ks, we may plac e cert ain sym bols (wh ich
......... or ......... ". Now, inst ead of leav ing-blan we
se ·symbols will be call ed vari able s. ~ If
3

· are lett ers of the Eng lish alph abe t). The ·
uld be:
place vari able s, the a}?ove propositions_·wo
1. If p, then q:.
2. If p, then q. _
3. Eith er p or q.
4. Eith er p or q.
n and 'q' for the consequence. In the last
In the firs t two, 'p' stan ds for the con ditio
. The symbols 'p' and 'q' are vari able s.
two, 'p' and _'q' stan d for the two alte rnat ives
"if-then" and "eit her- or" are call ed
In _the above prop osit ions the exp ress ions
stan ts. 14
The se con stan ts hav e alw ays the sam e ~ea nin g. In fact, the form of the
con
the sam e con stan t oceurs in them . Sim ilar
firs t two propositions is the sam e, bec ause
. Thi s shows tha t the form of a prop osit ion
is the case with the last two prop osit ions
form) is reve aled by vari able s. Var iabl es
dep end s on the con stan ts. However, it (the
15
es no difference to its form.
show tha t the con tent of a prop osit ion mak
Js. TRUTH AND VA LiD ITY
es confused wit h the trut h of its
The ·vali dity of an argu men t is som etim
two sep arat e aspe cts of an argu men t.
conclusion. However , vali dity and trut h are

13
The reference is to propositional varia bles.
.
indiv idua l cons tants or pred icate cons tants
Reference is to logical cons tants , a nd not to
14

proposition.
The refer ence is to the form of a compound
15

2/L.L. B.- Elementary Logic

 1a ...... Element ary Logic (L.L,B.J

Trut h is the proper ty of a propos ition. A true propos ition represe nts facts, while a
false propos ition does not. Consid er the following propos itions :
1. The earth is rou.nd.
2. Gold is heavie r than silver.
8. There are golden mounta ins in India.
4. Man can live withou t oxygen. .
----
Obviou sly. the first two propos itions here are true, while the last two are false
This is becaus e the first two propos itions represe nt fact, but the last two do not.
·
When we talk about the truth and falsity of an argume nt, we are really referring
to the truth and falsity of the conclus ion of the argume nt. Now the conclus ion depends
the
upon the premis es. Therefo re, we shall see later, how the truth and falsity of
conclus ion is related to the truth. and falsity of the premis es.
.

Validit y of an argum ent depend s upon the nature of relatio nship betwee n its
premis es and its conclusion. An argum ent is vq,lid, when its conclus ion is .a logical
nt
consequence of its premis es. To put it differently, when the premis es ·o f an argume
imply its conclusion, the argum ent is valid.
A v~lid _a rgume nt makes no claim regardi ng the truth or falsity of either the
premis es or the conclusion. However, careful thinker s would like their argume nts to
16 As we
be both valid and true. Such argume nts may be called 'sound argum ents'.
is
have already seen, when the premis es of a valid argume nt are true, its conclusion
also true. Therefo re, a sound argume nt will have true conclusion.
In a valid argum ent the relatio n betwee n the premis es and the conclusion is that
the
of implica tion. The relation of implica tion guaran tees only this. It is imposs ible for
conclusion to be false ·w hen the premis es· are true. Thus, an argum ent will be invalid
only when the premis es are true, but the conclusion is false.
It may seem surpris ing that even when the premis es and the conclusion are false,
the argum ent may be valid. Really, .there is nothing surpris ing about this, because
nt
truth and validity are two separa te aspects of ari argume nt. Let us take an argume
in which the premis es as well as the conclusion are false, and yet the argume
nt is
valid. ·
All men are immor tal.
All monke ys are men.
All ·m onkeys are immor tal.
This argum ent is valid, becaus e its conclusion follows from the premis es.
Now we are in a positio n to .discus s whethe r logic is concern ed with truth or with
of
validit y. Argum ents have a conten t and a form. We determ ine the truth or falsity
the
an .argum ent by examin ing its conten t. We determ ine its validity by examin ing
pattern of
nature of relatio nship betwee n the premis es and the conclusion. The
relatio nship betwee n the premis es and the conclusion is the form of argume nt. Since
logic is a formal science, it is concerned with validity , and not with truth.
There are other reason s too why logic is not concern ed with the factual problem of
It
truth. Argum ents in all the branch es of knowle dge fall within the scope of logic.
would be imposs ible for the logicia n to find out the _truth or falsity of propos itions in
~f
all sphere s of knowle dge. Moreov er, the subjec t-matte r of logic is merely the forms
logic
argum ents, and not any particu lar argum ent or its conten t. This also shows that
is concer ned with validit y only.

V, p. 13.
16 Albert E . B lumber g in E ncyclopa edia of Ph ilosophy (Collier Macmill a n, 1967), Vol. .
.
 9•11•11• 19
Nott,re of Logic
Validi ty of induct ive infere nces : Logicia ns usually reserve the term "valid
use
inference" for correct deducti ve inferen ces. So, for the sake of clearne ss, we shall
._and
the express ion "good argume nt" for a correct inducti ve (non-de ductive ) inferen ce,
"bad argume nt" for an incorre ct one.
We cannot determ ine the "validity" of inducti ve inferen ces in the same way in
ve
which we determ ine-the validity of deducti ve inferen ces. The premfa es of an inducti
inferen ce do not imply its conclusion. So we cannot say that, in a good argume nt, if the
premis es are true, the conclus ion must be true. Rather , we can say that if the evidenc
;e
in the premises (of an inducti ve inference) makes it reasonable to believe the conclus ion,
the argume nt is good. If not, it is bad.
To determ ine whethe r an inducti ve inferen ce is "good" or "bad", we have to
-.
conside r the conten t of its premis es. That is why some logician s say that a correct
inferen ce
inducti ve inferen ce is "mater ially valid". Thus, the "validit y" of an inducti ve
is determ ined by the amoun t of evidenc e in the premis es. So, if there is change
in the
evidence, the reliabil ity of the argume nt will be affected. Take the following three
cases:
a) Mr. 'A' is 25. So he will be alive next year. (This is a good argume nt. Its
conclus ion is quite likely to be true. The availab le evidenc e shows that very
few people who are 25 years old die before the age of 26.)
b) Mr. 'A', a truck driver, is 25. He loves fast driving ; and ·has had many
acciden ts in the past. · When he was driving ~t high speed, his truck hit
anothe r one. From these facts, it is conclud ed that he will be alive next year.
(This argume nt is bad. On the basis of the evidenc e in the_premis es, it is not
reasona ble to believe .th€ conclusion.)
c) While 'D' was on -his way to keep an import ant appoin tment, a black cat
crossed his path. This made him conclude that he· will meet with bad luck.
(Here the premis e is irrelev ant to the conclusion. As such, . it cannot be
regarde d as the evidenc e for the conclu~ion. So the argume nt is a bad one.)
We may further add that an argume nt may become a bad one if too much is
-claimed in the condus ion. Suppos e we know that "P" is a Jain. ·Froµi this we may infer
it
that he is likely to be a vegetar ian. Since we know that most Jains are vegeta rians,
say
is reasona ble to accept the conclusion. So the argume nt is good. Now suppos e we
would-b ecome a bad
"He is a Jain, and. so he is sure to be a vegetar ian", the argume nt
one.
An argume nt is judged to be good or bad on the basis of the availab le evidence. So
e
even if the conclus ion tur1:1s out to be false, the argume nt may be good. Let us suppos
say
that it has been raining every evening for the last ten days. Newsp aper reports
we
that this is due to an area of depress ion in the Indian Ocean. From this evidenc e
the
infer that it is likely to rain that evening too. But if it does not rain that evening ,
conclusion would be false. Yet at the time we inferre d the con~lusion, we had good
reasons for doing so. Therefo re, the argume nt is a good one.
We cannot determ ine whethe r an inducti ve inferen ce is good or bad by applyin g
ones ,
· the rules of formal logic. About commo n sense inferen ces, such as the above
in all fields of
there is no particu lar difficulty. But we find inducti ve inferen ces
knowledge. Here only an expert can judge whethe r an argum ent is good or bad.
A
ics, and so
botanis t can examin e argume nts in Bota ny, an econom ist those in Econom
on.
Truth and validit y of induct ive infere nces : As in the case of deduct ive
two
inferen ces, so also in the case of inducti ve inferences, truth and validity are
premis es and
separa te aspects . An inferen ce may be a bad one even when its
g
conclus ion happen to be true. To illustra te, ta ke t he exa mple of a black cat crossin
 Elemerttm:y Logic (L.l.I J.)
14
mee ts with bad luck . Let us say, he is
D's pat h. Now sup pos e, sho rtly afte rwa rds, 'D' argu men t
AIT @te d for hoa rdin g rice . The n the
con clus ion wou ld be true . How eve r, the
irre leva nt to the con clus ion.
wou ld still be bad ; bec aus e the prem ise is
_ ]
j9. UT IUT Y OF LO GIC
out the gen eral prin cipl es whi ch are
The prim ary con cern of logic is to find of
not inte rest ed in the prac tica l app lica tion
exh ibit ed in vali d argu men ts. Logic is usef ul
logi cian whe ther thes e prin cipl es are
thes e prin cipl es. It doe s not mat ter to the ty,
Stil l we can not say tha t logic has no utili
for dete rmi ning the vali dity of argu men ts.
logic.
One ben efit s by kno win g the prin cipl es of
l valu e. The theo reti cal valu e of logic
Logic has theo reti cal as wel l as prac tica d, to
sist s in givi ng us kno wle dge of vali d arg ume nt form s. As Man sel has _obs erve
con
sho w tha t wha t it teac hes is true .
just ify the stud y of logic, it is suff icie nt to
c has pra ctic al util ity. Me n ofte n hold
Apa rt from this theo reti cal valu e, logi ry
tha t if they acce pt one of the con trad icto
con trad icto ry beliefs. The y do not real ize
suc h beli efs as "All good men are honest"
beli efs, they mus t reje ct the othe r. We hold To
out kno win g tha t they are inco nsis tent .
and "So me good men are not hon est" , with
ons to the gen eral rule is not a sati sfac tory
say tha t the latt er beli ef indi cate s exc epti ,
us of inco nsis tenc ies in his beli efs. Also
exp lana tion . Logic mak es a pers on con scio ·
nsis tent .
logic sho ws why a part icul ar beli ef is inco
out inco nsis tend es in our bel~efs and
It is som etim es poin ted out tha t we can find es
e the corr ectn ess and inco rrec tnes s of reas onin g, with out kno win g the prin cipl
judg the
mak es us con scio us of the reas ons for
of logic. We don 't den y this . Logic only
_Wit h the help of logic, we can find out why
corr ectn ess or inco rrec tnes s-of argu men ts. a
nam e the falla cy it com mits . Mor eov er, .
a part icul ar reas onin g is inco rrec t and can
mor e like ly to reas on corr ectl y.
pers on who kno ws the prin cipl es -of logic is
t. No dou bt, a scie ntis t can judg e the
Logic is especially help ful to the scien·tis a
ar theo ry bett er tha n a logi cian can . But
wei ght of evid ence in sup por t of a part icul h
so, if he kno ws the gen eral con diti ons whic
scie ntis t will be in a bett er pos ition to do prov ides this
t· type s of infe renc e. And logic
dete rmi ne the prob abµ ity of the diff eren
kno wle dge .
inte llec tual disc ipli ne is also to be
Las tly, the valu e of logic as a gen eral is
the pow er of abs trac t thou ght, and this
rem emb ered . The stud y of logic cult ivat es
help ful in all sph eres of life. ·

SUM MA RY
renc e (i.e. ded ucti ve infe renc e) the
Infe ren ce and imp lica tion : In an infe
con clus ion. · Thi s is bec aus e the prem ises
thin ker pas ses on from the prem ises to the · ·
cal rela tion betw een prop osit ions .
imp ly the conclusion. Imp lica tion is a logi
defi niti ons of "logic laid emp has is on
Def init ion of logi c : The trad itio nal d
as "the scie nce of imp lica tion , or of vali
thin king . Coh en and Nag el define logic
s defi niti on too is not suit able . Tod ay logic
~nference (bas ed on suc h imp lica tion )." Thi
s of vali d infe renc e.
1s gen eral ly defi ned as the stud y of the form
In a ded uctive arg ume nt the prem ises
. Ded uct ive a~d ind uct ive arg um ent s :
suff icie nt evid enc e for the con clus ion. But
imp ly the conclus10n. As such , they prov ide ts
not suff icie nt. Howeve r , indu ctive a rgu men
i~ an ~nduct_ive argu men t the evid ence is ·
diff er m then ' deg rees of prob abil ity.
ry arg ume nt is rega rdin g a cert ain
. For m and c?n_te~it ~f arg um ent : Eve t
also a cert ain form. The form of an argu men
subJ ~ct- mat ter. Thi~ 1s its con tent . It has
ch are inde pen den t of its con tent .
con sist s of thos e logical cha ract eris tics whi
 11•11•11• 15
Nature of Logic
cal; but even non-
Notio n of form : Form is not the same as shape . Shap e is physi
notio n of form by comp aring
physi cal thing s have form. Susa nne Lang er expla ins the
ied by (a) comp aring logic al
it with struc ture. The notio n of logical form is also clarif
nce, (b) by mean s of blank s
form of a propo sition with the gram matic al form of a sente
and (c) by refer ring to the use of const ants and varia bles.
nds upon its form,
Logi c as a form al scien ce: The valid ity of an argum ent depe
-s-, logic is conce rned with
rathe r than upon its conte nt. Moreover, like mathematiG
sition is not deter mine d
neces sary propo sition s. And the truth of a neces sary· propo
a form al science.
with refere nce to facts. In view of these , logic is said to be
argum ents are eithe r
Trut h and valid ity : Propo sition s are eithe r true or false;
is impli ed by its prem ises.
va_lid or inval id. An argum ent is valid when its concl usion
it is said to be a soun d
When an argum ent is valid and ·its concl usion is true,
argument.
truth upon its conte nt.
Valid ity of an argum ent depen ds upon its form, and its
and not with truth .
Since logic is a form al science, it is conce rned with valid ity,
utilit y. It make s us
Utili ty of logic : Thou gh logic is not an art, it has a certa in
be benef ited, if he know s the ·
conscious of incon sisten cies in our beliefs. A scien tist will
diffe rent types of infer ences .
gene ral condi tions whic h deter mine the proba bility of the
Moreover, logic has value as a gene ral intell ectua l discip line.

TEST QUESTIONS
1. Defin e Logic and bring out its natur e.
and show why induc tive
2. Take exam ples of deduc tive and induc tive argum ents
argum ents are proba ble.
defin ition indic ate the real
3. "Logic is the scien ce of valid thoug ht." Does this ·
natur e -of logic? -·
ss the view that logic al
4. Disti nguis h betw een infere nce and impli catio n. Discu
impli catio n is forma l.
exam ples.
5. Disti nguis h betw een form and matt er (content). Give
6. Expla in the notio n of form.
7. What is mean t by sayin g that logic is a form al scien ce?
ent said to be true?
8. Expla in the term s 'truth ' and 'validity'. When is an argum
. Why?
9. It is said that logic deals with valid ity, and_not with truth
10. What is the utilit y of logic?
11. Define the following term s :
i) Logic ii) Infer ence
iii) Prem ise iv) Conc lusio n
v) Deductive infer ence · vi) Induc tive infer ence
vii) Form al valid ity viii) Good induc tive argum ent
12. Disti nguis h betw een the following :
i) Deductive and induc tive argum ents.
ii) Truth and valid ity.
:
13. Give reaso ns for the following in one or two sente nces
infere nce imply its
i) Why is it sa id that the prem ises of a va lid dedu cti\'e
conclusion?
ii) Wh y is it said that the conclusion of a valid deduc tive
infe rence can be false?
16
,,.,,.,,. Elementa.ry Logic (L.L.B,)
iii) Why are deductive inferen~es said to have formal validity?
iv) Why do inductive inferences not have formal validity?
14. Answer the following in one or two sentences :
i) On what basis are inferences classified into ·d eductive and inductive?
ii) When is an inference said to be deductive?
iii) When is a deductive inference said to be valid?
iv) When is a~ inductive inference said to be a good argument?
15. Give technical terms used in logic for the following groups of words :
i) The field of knowledge whose main task is to study the difference between
good reasoning and bad.
ii) A statement which forms evidence for the conclusi01;1.
iii) A statement which follows from the premises. _
. . .
iv) An inference in which the premises claim to provide sufficient evidence for the
conclusion . ·
v) An inference in which the premises imply the conclusion .
vi) The relation between the premises and the conclus_ion sucli that -the conclusion
cannot be false µ the premises are true.
16. State whether the following statement s are true or false:
i) When the relation between the premise and the conclusion is t~at of
impli~atio n, then if the premise is false, the conclusion mus~ be false.
ii) When the_ relation between the premise and the conclusion is that of
implicatio n, th~n if the _premise is true, the .c onclusion must be true.
iii) The conclusion of a sound argument is true.
iv) The form of an argument has nothing to do with its subject matter.
· v) The conciusion of a valid argument can be false.
vi) All inductive arguments are equally probable;
1 7. Fill in th~ blanks with the suitable alternative :
i) A propositio n whose truth is known by examining its content is called a _ _
proposition . (necessary /contingen t/verbal/re al)
ii) _ _ _ (All/Some) necessary propositio ns are ___ (true/false )
iii) ___ (All/Some) contingen t propositio ns are ___ (true/false )
iv) ___ determine the f~>rm of a propositio n. (Constant sNariables )
v) Logic is a ___ science. (formal/.em pirical/nor mative/app lied)
vi) Form is ___ shape. (the same as /different from)
 Pmp osilion

• .?- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -- -~

PROPOSITION:

DO YO U KN OW THAT~·······
* while every proposition is a sentence, every sentence is
not a proposition?
* a proposition cannot be both tru.e and false?
* some questions give information?
* even exclamations ma y express propositions? positions
*· whi le· jud gm ent s are not propositions, pro
are pro due ts of jud gm ent s?
I

.
S_A _P_R _O_P_ O_S_ IT_I_O_N_?_ _ _ _ _ __ _---,--_ _ _ __ _ ___,/
1_._W_HA _T_I_ ' upo n
The val idit y of an arg um ent dep end s
I
L ....

Log ic dea ls wit h val idit y of arg um ent s.

es and the
mis es and its con clus ion . The pre mis
the nat ure of rela tion bet ~ee n it$ pre pos itio n.
ion1?, Thu s, the bas ic uni t of logic is pro
.' con clu sion of an arg um ent are proposit
r the pro pos itio ns it con tain s.
-Le t us tak e an arg um ent and con side
All boy s are tall .
Ashok. is a boy.
Ash ok is tall . .. .

kes us abo ut the pro pos itio ns in the abo ve arg um ent ? We
Now , wh at is it tha t stri tem ent s ..
itio ns exp ress eith er true or fals e sta
notice two thin gs. Firstly , the se pro pos ma y be
sta tem ent is tru e, and the thir d one
The firs t sta tem ent is fals e, the sec ond re,
e or fals e. Sec ond ly, all the pro pos itio ns are exp res sed in wor ds. The y a
eith er tru se are :
we have to con sid er t wo pro ble ms. The
wha t gra mm ar calls, sen ten ces . Thu s, ten ce?
(1) Wh at is a pro pos itio n?( -?) Is pro
pos itio n the sam e as gra mm a tica l sen
dra ws
r uth a nd fals ity of propos itio ns. He
The thin k~r is ·concer ned wit h t he t e. Sin ce
given pro positio ns (pre mis es) are tru
infe renc es on the a ssu mp tion tha t the
exp ress ion (of a pro pos itio n) doe s not affe ct the val idit y of a n arg um ent , the
the ver bal posit ion.
tru th or fals ity is the ess ence of a pro
thin ker is not con cer ned wit h it. Thu s, wh ich is eith er tru e or fals e .
ine pro pos itio n as a sta tem ent
So, w~ ma y def
Let us tak ~ exa mp les.
r

Elementary Logic (L.L.8.)

18

1. Tagore was a great poet.

2. Mickey Mouse appears in Walt Disney's cartoons.
3.. Oogs do not dance.
4. If Panchatantra contains fables, it is interesting to read.
5. Either Bangladesh or Burma has an atom bomb. ·
The following are the main characteristics of proposition. a
i) Every proposition is~her true or false. It cannot be both true and false.
Let us illustrate. The proposition "India has Congress gover_nment" a_J>pear~ _to ~e
true for some years, and false for some other years. However, this wrong impre_s~ion ~s
created, because the proposition has not been expressed fully. A pr?positlon 1s
asserted with reference to a given date. And with reference to that date, ~t,,can~ot be
both true and false. The above proposition would be fully expressed thus · India has
Congress government in July 1995." If it is so express~d, it cannot be both true and
false .
ii) The truth or falsity ·of a proposition is definit~. It always remains th~ same; it
cannot change. Of course, we may not know whether a given statement 1s true· or
false. For example, today we cannot .say ~hether the statement "There are living
beings on the Planet Mars" is true. Further, we may even hold wrong belief about its
truth or falsity. But neither absence of knowledge nor wrong belief affects the truth or
falsity of a statement. · A. true statement will continue to remain true; and a false
statement will always be false. .l
There are some statements which look like propositions, but which are not
propositions. Consider the following statements :
1. A foot consists of twelve inches.
2. A kilogram consists of one thousand grams.
These sentences appear to express propositions. Really, they do not. While
asserting these statements, we are .no~ raisi11-g the question of their truth or falsity.
We are merely saying that the words "foot" and "kilogram" are to be .used in these
ways. Of course, the answer to the question "Do we use these words in the above
senses" may be true or false . But such propositions are about the use of wo.rds, and not
a.bout the objects for which the.words stand.h ·
/2. PROPOSITION AND FACT ]
What determines the truth or fals ity of a proposition? It is the facts. If a
proposition ~epresents the facts as they are, it is true. If it does not, it is false. "Butter
melts in heat" is a true proposition, while "A horse has _two legs" is a false proposition.
Though ·a proposition claims to represent a fact, it is differe~t from a fact. If it
were not so, there would be no possibility of error. We walk across a street, and see
something Jong and dark. We say that it is a snake. Really, it is a rope. This shows
t hat we made a mistake. This mistake would hot have been possible; if the proposition
"This is a snake" were not different from the fact. A proposition claims to represent
facts. This claim may or may not be justified. If it is justified, the proposition is true;
otherwise, it is false. · ·
13-. P
--=_ O
R_ _P_ I
-=-
OB T-
- I _N
O _ _
AN D JU
__ _ _
D M
G_ _E _T
_N _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Propositions are often. confused with the mental act of judgin·g. In fact, sorne
logicians call propositions judgments. This confusion is due to ambiguity in the use of
the term 'judgment '. Sometimes the term 'judgment' is used in the sense of the mental

; f'ohen and Ncgel. An lnt rodnction to Logic and Scientific Method, 1964 . p. 29.
 ....... .. 19
n....- ~· ' - - -
I r upv<>&tl,( ),t,
the two a~e
act of judgin g, and somet imes in the sense of what is judged . Howe ver,
(e.g. what 1s
differe nt. The menta l act of judgin g is differe nt from the result of this act
judgin g), they
judged ). While propo sitions are a result of thinki ng (the menta l act of
with what is
are not to be identi fied with this thinki ng activi ty. Logic is conce rned
Of course , the
judged . It is only this that can be consid ered to be either true or false.
ring Ram and
thinke r arrive s at the propo sition "Ram is taller than Gopal ", by compa
ent "Ram is
Gopal in respec t of their height . But what is true or false is the judgm
.
taUer than Gopal ", and not the menta l act by which this judgm ent is passed
ent (or
If the term 'judgm ent' is under stood in the sense of a produ ct of judgm
the produ ct
what is judged ), the logicia n is·con cerned .with it. But he is conce rned with
find that a
of judgm ent' only when it has assum ed a fixed and defini te form. We
ag_e. When a
judgm ent assum es a fixed and defini te form, when it is expres sed in langu,
to avoid
judgm ent is expres sed in langua ge, it is called a propo sition. Thus,
misun dersta nding , it is better to say that logic deals.with propo sitions .
14. PROPOSITION AND SENTENCE
in the
Some logicia ns use the terms "proposition", "state ment" and "sente nce"
we shall use
same way. IJut, to maint ain the usual meani ng of "sente nce",
nce". Howe ver,
"proposition" and ."state ment" in a narrow er sense-than the term "sente
.
for us, therew iU-be rio distin ction betwe en "propo sition" and "sta,te ment"
same as a
A propo sition ·is expres sed in the form of a senten ce. But it is not the
ces. Let us
senten ce. The same propo sition may be expres sed by differ ent senten
h people use
illustr ate. For the Englis h expres sion "callin g a spade a spade" , the Frenc
one in Hindi
the expres sion "callin g a cat a cat". Simila rly, a· senten ce in Englis h. and
is becau se
~ay ·differ as senten ces. Yet they may expres s the same propo sition. This
in which the
propo sition (state ment) is what a senten ce states , and not the words
statem ent is .made .
But the
As _we have stated in Sectio n, a propo sition is either true or false.
(or indica tive)
· questi on of truth or falsity arises only with regard to what declar ative
ative (o:r;
senten ces say. There fore, . in. a direct, or straig htforw ard,"' way declar
ces, e.g. those
indica tive) senten ces alone expres s· propo sitions . Oth~r kinds of senten
t be used to
expres sing questi ons, · feelings, w~sp.es, comm ands, reques ts, etc.- canno
sition s :
make statem ents. For examp le, the following senten ces do not expres s propo
1. Why do people believ e in astrolo gers?
2. Hurra h! We won the match .
3. I wish man had wings .
4. Shoot!
5 . . Please give me your pen.
on or
Somet imes we come across senten ces which are in the form . of a questi
er two such
exclam ation, but which are really ·decla rative senten ces. Let us consid
senten ces:
a) What thief would trust a thief?
b) Thiefl
deman d
Obviously, the first senten ce is not a real questi on. It does not
a thief. The
inform ation; it gives inform ation. It states that no thief would trust
Since these
second senten ce too gives inform ation. The speak er is pointi ng to a thief.
that every
senten ces give inform ation, they expres s propos itions. Thus, we see
form of a
sentence does not express a proposition, but every propo sition is in the
sentence.
 Eltmentory Logic (L.L,B.J
_
, ,...,,. . . d waves; when written
20 h ken it is soun , t '
. . . h sical existence. W en spo , osition is what a sen en~
A sentence hasp y . rface On the other hand~ a prop 'ly seen that sentence,-
. . rks or signs on a su . . . It can be eas1 B
it is ma t h s no physical existence. h . length shows so. ut w,,
says . The _s talte~e~nc: The fact that we can talk albout t e:~ort This is because I
have phys1ca exis .. .t' n is either ong or . .
. that a given propos1 10
cannot say h · 1existence · · T
, roposition does not have ·P ys1ca . 'd t the form of a proposition. he
P The form of a sentence · is not a prope~ gu: :e;ent that a propositi?n expresses.
lo ·cal form of a proposition depends _upon t e i::d by various considerations. Some of
,,:: gram,mati~l form of a s~nte~c~ is ~e:oe::ation. To illustrate, often _proverb~ ?nd
these have nothing to do w:1th giving ~ h . not a part of their logical meamng.
'diomatic expressions have a force w ic is d d'vided we fall." This expression .
i . "U:nited we stan ' 1 .
-Consider the expression . . ren th and disunity is a weakness. .
emphasizes the fact that unity is st g ' d t e i·n traditional logic : If Wf
•t· an sen enc -
Distinction between propos1 i_o~ o~ld find certain further differences
accept the traditional view of propos1t10n, we w
· •r . d sentence . These
between propOSl ion an .
are:
.b t
.
grammatical sentence may
·
.• · single statement u a · -
1. A proposition contains a ' t'cal sentence is .reduced to the
. t t t When a gramma 1
contain more than one s a emen . . ntence contains is e;xpressed by a
logical form :-of proposition, every stateme~: ~at_a sesecular State where people of all
separate propositi~n. T~us, the sen_tence n Ia lS a Th '£O re 'it will be reduced to
religions_are treated equally" contams two statements. ere . ,
two propositions. These are :
a) India is a 13ecular State.
b) People of-all.religions are treate·d equally in India_.
2 The grammatical order of subject and predicate· is often different from _the
logic~l subject and predicate. In the .senten~e "~l~ssed a~e the poor", the logical
subject is 'the poor', while the grammatical subJect 1s blessed.
Thus we see that there are important differences between proposition and
sentence.' Yet there is an intimate connection between t~e two. Logic deals with
propositions only when they have- a definite and fixed fori:n. This definite for~ ~s n~t
possible, till a proposition is expressed in language. Thus, only when a propos1t1on 1s
expressed by a sentence, its form becomes definite.
/5. CONSTITUENTS AND COMPONENTS =
Though proposition is the basic unit of logic, it can be analyzed i:r;ito its elements.
However, the elements into whic_h a proposition is analyzed have no existence apart
from the proposition.
The. elements into which a proposition can be analyzed are called its constituents.
The constituents of a proposition are what the proposition is ·a:bout. The proposition
"Brutus killed Caesar" is about "Brutus", "Caesar" and "killing".
A constituent is any element of a proposition. It may or may not be its subject. In
the proposition "Sheela is . honest", the constituent 'She~la' is the subject of the
proposition, but the constituent 'being honest' is not the· subject.
In every proposition there is one element which combines the other elements,
This combining element is called component. In the proposition "Ram loved Sita", the
constituent 'loved' is a component. Without this combining element, ther~ would be no
proposition. "Ram-Sita" is not a proposition. The component "is" is required to make it
a proposition. .
-Component and other constituents : A component and other constituents
differ in the following respects :
 Proposi.tio"· ,,.,,.,,. 21

1. A component is universal, while the constituents it combines can be

particulars. That is why, the ·c onstituents it combines inay be changed, and yet the
proposition would be meaningful. We shall change the individuals combined by the
component 'loved', and see what happens.
1. Majnu loved Laila.
2. Yusuf loved Zulekha.
3. Farhad loved Shereen.
In these propositions the combining element 'loved' has rem&ined the same, even-
-though the other constituents have changed. Now, this combining element 'loved'
cannot be replaced by an individual. Thus, we may say that a particular can occur as
a constituent, but it cannot be a component.
2. Every proposition is about a certain content . (or subject-matter). The
constituents are what the proposition is about. So, the constituents indicate the
content of a proposition. Since the contents of propositions differ, their constituents too
differ. However, even though propositions differ in their constituents, they may have
the same forpi. Col}sider the following propositions:
1. :Ram is honest.:
2. Savitri is clever. ·
3. This mango is ripe . .
All the above propositions assert that an individual possesses a quality. Thus, we
see that · though the above propositions have different constituents, the relation
between the constituents is the same. To put it differently, in all the above
propositions the component is the same. This component is predication (that is,
assertion of a quality about an individual)..
3. The form of a proposition depends ·upon the way the constituents are combined.
That is to say, it depends upon the component. However, a _component is not to be
identified with the words through which .it is expressed. The following propositions
have different components, though in all of them the component is expressed by the
same word, namely "is••:
1. John is intelligent.
2. Lata Mangeshkar is a singer.
3. A peacock is a bird.
· In the first proposition, the component is predication. The attribute of intelligence
is affirmed of John. In the s~cond proposition, the component is membership of a class.
Lata Mangeshkar is a member of .the class of singers. In the last proposition, the
component is class-inclusion. The class of peacocks is included in the class of birds. As
the components in thes·e propositions are different, these propositions 9,re of different
forms.
s.
1 TRADITIONAL ANALYSIS OF PROPOSITION
The traditional logicians maintained that every proposition has two constituents.
These were called the subject and the predicate of the proposition. The subject is that
about which something is said. The predi9ate is that which is affirmed or denied of the
subject. In the proposition "This paper is white", 'this paper' is the subject and 'white'
is the predicate. The subject and the predicate of a proposition are called
terms.
A proposition consists of only two t~rms. These terms stand in a certain r elation
to one another. The relationship is that of affirmation or negatjon. This relationship is
expressed by the copula. Thus, copula is that element wh·ich expresses affirmation or
·denial. When the predicate is affirmed of th e subject, the copula is affirm ative; when
22 . . ..,,. Elementary Logic (L.L.B.)

it is denied of the subject, the copula is negative. Let us see the copula in the following
·propositions :
1. All kings are men.
2. John is a Christian.
· 3. No men are perfect.
4. Peter is not reliable.
The first two propositions express agreement between the subject and the
predicate. Therefore, the copula is affirmative. The last two propositions express
disagreement between the two terms. Therefore, the copula is negative.
· In the third proposition above, it may appear as if the copula is not negative. This
is because the word 'no', which is a part of the copula, occurs before the _subject. While
dMling with the traditional classification of propositions (in Chapter 4), we shall see
why the sign of negation is placed before the subject. ·
Copula is not to be considered a link between the subject and the predicate. It is
only a sign of predication (that is, asserting a quality). It shows ,that·the predicate is
eit~er affirmed or denied of the subject;
The traditional logicians maintained that the copula must be •in 'the present tense
of the verb 'to be'. That is, it must be 'is', 'am' or 'are'. However, the rea_l copula is not
the word 'is' or 'am'. It is predication. That means, it is the act of affirming or denying
the predicate of the subject. In the proposition " What cannot be cured must be
endured ", the verb 'is' or 'are' does not occur. Yet there is a copula. This copula is the
relationship between the subject 'things that cannot be cured' and the predicate
'things that must be endured'. The traditional logicians would bring this proposition to
. its logical form thus: ''All things that cannot be cured are those which must be endured.
" The function of the copula is the same as that .of the component. ln fact,
copula is a component. It is that element which unites the terms. However, the
traditional logicians did not realize that there are various ways in which the copula
unites the terms. Some of these are:
1. prep.ication (that is, asserting an attribute of an individual); e.g. "This table is
polished."
...
2. membership of a class; e.g. "John is a Christian."
3. inclusion of sme class in another class; e.g. "All kings are men"; "Sonie teachers
are respected;" ·
The traditional logicians believed that there is only one kind of rel~tio~ between

~--=
terms, namely predicatio~. That is why their classification of p~opositions is defective.
We sh~ll see how this is so in Chapter 5. ·

~ - - - - - - - - -S_U_M_MA _ R_Y_ _ __ _ _
Proposition is a statement which is either true or false. But its truth or falsity
may not be known. A proposition is true when it represents a fact; it is false when ii
does not. Some statements took like propositions; but they aren't propositions.·
Proposition and sentence : A propositfon cannot be identified with sente11ce-
Only indicative sentences exp_ress propositions, beeause they give information~ A
sentence has physical existence, but we cannot say so about a proposition. Further,
the form of a sentence is not a proper guide _to the form of a proposition.
The traditional logicians maintained that a sentence is to be reduced to as u1anY
propositions as there are statements in it. Also, the gram1,I1atical subject and predicate
a t'e sometimes different from the logical subject and predicate.
 23

Constituents and components : According to ' the modern_ logic~ans, a

propositioil can be analyzed into its constituents, The constituent wh1c_h unites the
other constituents is called component. A component is universal, while t_h~ other
constituents can be particulars. Constituents indicate the content of a propos1t10n; the
component its form. .
The traditional logicians analyzed a proposition into subject, . copula and
predicate. Suhject and predicate are called terms. The function of the copula is the
same as that of the component. Copula expresses agreement or disagreement between
the two terms.

[ TEST QUESTIONS
1. What is a proposition? ·.,
2. What determines the truth or falsity of a proposition? Can the same proposition
be both true and false?
3. · How does a proposition differ from a fact and a judgment? _
4. Distinguish between a proposition and a grammatical sentence.
5. A proposition is expressed in the form of an indicative sentence. Why is _it so ?
6. What is a constituent? Take two propositions and point out their constituents.
7. Distinguish between a constituent and a component. Is copula a component?
8 . . What is the copula? What is its function?
9. Define the following terms :
(1) Proposition (2) Constituent (3) Com,ponent (4) Copula.
10. State whether the following statements are true or false:
1. The sentences "Two is twelve" and "Unity is strength" express the same
proposition.
2. "Mahatma. Gandhi was an American" is a proposition.
3.. If we do not know the truth or falsity .of a statement, the statement is not a
proposition. •
4. A false statement is not a proposition.
5. A proposition is identical with an indicative sentence.
· 6. Copula is a link between the subject and the predicate.
7. Every proposition has two constituents and a component.
11. Fill in the blanks with appropriate alternatives:
l. The truth or falsity of.a proposition depends upon _ _ . (our knowledge/our
feelings/facts) · .
2. _ _ interrogative sentences express propositions. (All/ Some/No)
3. A proposition _ _ physical existence. (has/does not/have)
4. The _ _ unites the other elements in a proposition.
(constituent/component/existential quantifier/universal quantifier)
5. A component is _ _ ·universal. (always/never/sometimes)
6. A constituen·t 1s _ _ . (always particular/nev~r particular/sometimes
particular) '
7. Copula is (a component/a constituent/either a component ·o r a
constituent/neither a coniponent nor a constituent)
~4 r,•t1•11• · Elementa.ry Logic (L.L.B.)

8. Copula expresses _ _ between the subject and the predicate. ·

"(agreementJdisagreement/either agreement or disagreement/neither
agreement nor disagreement)
12. State,.with reasons, whether the following sentences express propositions:
(This exercise is based on the _d istinction between proposition and sentence. Only
indicative -sentences express propositions. However, if a question or an
exclamatfon gives information, it ex-presses a propos"ition. It is preferable· to solve
this exercise after _going through both the modern and . the traditional
classification of propositions.) · ·
1. Joso Meiffr~t rode a bicycle at 1·16"miles per hour.in 1961. .
2. Alas ! ·Russell is dead.
3. What a beautiful rose !
4. Jose Meiffret wished he were able to ride a bicycle at 200 miles an hour.
5. If whale has warm blood, tt is not a fish.
6. Isn't love blind ?
7. · Run! • '
8. Pirates!
9. May God rest his soul in peace!
10. I disbelieve what you say.
11. Musicians are generally moody.
12. It is false that pain and death are avoidabl~.
1:3. Why do peoJ?le consult palmists?
14. Perhaps black magic is practised even today. -