HAZOP Tutorial

Section I: Introduction

A Hazard and Operability Study, commonly referred to as a HAZOP study, is a structured analysis
of process design to identify process safety incidents that a facility is vulnerable to. A HAZOP
study uses guide words to systematically determine possible failures that could result from
operation of equipment outside of design conditions. This “out of design” condition can occur due
to possible mal-operation or mal-function of individual items of equipment, instruments or control
system.

A list of necessary actions and recommendations to improve the safety and mitigate the
consequences of hazards will be prepared in the form of HAZOP Report.

This module includes a HAZOP study example for the explosion at the Caribbean Petroleum
Company (CAPECO), as seen in the first Material & Energy Balance Module. A HAZOP study
could have exposed flaws in the design and prevented the incident.

Section II: HAZOP Process

The first step in a HAZOP study is to select a piece of equipment and then identify each process
parameter that is relevant to that equipment’s operation. These process parameters may include
temperature, pressure, flow rate, pH, concentration, viscosity, volume, etc. Figure 1 shows a tank
selected as the piece of equipment to analyze. One of the process parameters is the inlet flow rate.

Figure 1. Select Equipment and Process Parameter

With the process parameter in mind, the next step is to use Guide Words to systematically
consider all abnormal operating scenarios. Appropriate Guide Words must be systematically
applied to the process parameter to analyze whether or not the scenario is possible. The HAZOP
team then look into the Cause, Consequence, Safeguards provided, and any additional safeguard
required. The guide words can be seen below in Table 1.

Table 1. HAZOP Guide Words and Definitions

No. Guide Words Meaning Process Parameter Deviation

1 No or Not Did not occur to any extent Flow

2 More Quantity greater than expected Flow, Temp, Pressure, Level

3 Less Quantity less than expected Flow, Temp, Pressure, Level

4 As Well As Occurred in addition to Quality

5 Part Of Occurred to some extent, less than whole Quality

6 Reverse Opposite of design intention Flow

7 Other Than Complete Substitution Quality

8 Early Event occurrence sooner than expected Applicable mainly for Batch
Process
9 Later Event occurrence later than expected Applicable mainly for Batch
Process
10 Before Step occurred too soon in the sequence Applicable mainly for Batch
Process
11 After Step occurred too late in the sequence Applicable mainly for Batch
Process
12 Others General issues Start-up/Shut-down, Corrosion,
Leak, Utility failure (Power,
Instrument Air, Cooling water)
etc.

Using the guideword and parameter, we can analyze the deviations from normal operating
conditions that the equipment could incur, as described by the graphic below. A deviation is any
divergence from normal operating behavior. For example, a potential deviation in a tank is high
pressure.

Guide Word + Parameter → Deviation[5]

After considering all deviations that could result from one guide word, the next guide word is
addressed. The intent is to identify every deviation caused by a parameter paired with a guide
word. Appendix A shows some of the possible causes of deviation.

Note: Not every guide word will apply to each scenario. For example, there is no physical meaning
to a temperature reading being “part of”.
Section III: HAZOP Implementation

The HAZOP study forces engineers to consider all deviations from normal operating conditions
and the associated hazards. After completing a HAZOP study, the next step is to implement
protections or safeguards. Each safeguard must be capable of independently preventing the
deviation.

While HAZOP is a qualitative study, a Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA) is semi-quantitative.

Engineers implement protections to the equipment that prevent the mathematically highest impact
scenarios in terms of risk and probability. Please see the LOPA Tutorial for more information here.

A typical HAZOP worksheet looks like this:

Note: Following causes are not considered in HAZOP study:

1. Simultaneous occurring of two unrelated incidents.

2. Simultaneous failure of more than one independent protection devices

3. Natural Calamity (Earthquake, Flood, Cyclones etc.)

4. Sabotage

Section IV: HAZOP Application to CAPECO Example

In the CAPECO explosion, the main gasoline storage tank was full, so an additional shipment of
gasoline had to be transferred to four smaller tanks through a manual process. One of the tanks
had a broken level transmitter so fill time was manually calculated and unfortunately
overestimated. The tank overfilled and the gasoline found a spark and rapidly exploded. Watch the
video here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=41QMaJqxqIo.

This section will investigate how a HAZOP study performed at the CAPECO facility could have
exposed flaws in the facility’s protective systems. Exposing these hazards may have resulted in
actions to close gaps and prevent the tank overfill that resulted in the catastrophic explosion.

1. Identify System

The system in the CAPECO example is the secondary gasoline storage tank. This is the vessel
overfilled and resulted in the explosion.

2. Identify Process Parameter

The process parameter is the inlet flow rate from the tanker vessel to the gasoline storage tank.

3. Apply Guide Word

Guide Word #1: No

The engineer would first consider a scenario where there was no flow from the tanker vessel to
the storage tank. They would need to assess what a no flow scenario means and what are the safety
implications. In order to address this scenario, consider the HAZOP worksheet below.

No Low tank Inlet Line Release of Float level Alarmed

level Rupture flammable gauge pressure
material transmitter on
Inlet Line inlet
blockage
Guide Word #2: More

A guide word more would describe an incident where more gasoline than expected was
offloaded into the tank. This was the scenario that occurred in the CAPECO example.

More Overfill Level Release of Float Level Automatic flow

tank Transmitter flammable Gauge diverter
failure material
Dike Total organic
Miscalculat content detector
e time to in Water
fill tank Treatment
facility

This tank was not equipped with an automatic overfill protection system that would have stopped
the flow as soon as it detected overfill or diverted the flow to another tank. After considering
each deviation caused by more flow, the engineers at the CAPEO facility may have determined
that their facility is ill-equipped to measure and react to additional flow.

More + Inlet Flow Rate → Overfill Tank

4. Gap Identification & Next Steps

Once we have identified all hazards, the next step is to apply a Layers of Protection Analysis
(LOPA) to the highest risk and impact scenario. These safeguards could include any of the
following:

1. Functional level transmitter communicating with an automatic flow diverter

2. Alarm system alerting when there is a high level in the tank
 3. Alternative secondary containment besides the diked region
4. Gas detector in the vicinity of the tank farm
5. Total organic carbon (TOC) composition detectors on inlet to water treatment facility

If implemented, each of these layers of protection could have prevented this event from occurring.
More information on how to conduct a LOPA can be found in the LOPA Tutorial here.

References

[1] “HAZOP.” Creative Safety Supply, 27 Jan. 2017,

www.creativesafetysupply.com/articles/hazop/.

[2] Maher, Steven T, et al. “Preparing for a Successful HAZOP/LOPA.” AIChE 2018 Spring
Meeting, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 22 Apr. 2018, www.rmpcorp.com/wp-
content/uploads/2018/04/513595.PreparingForASuccessful.HAZOP_.LOP A_.GCPS-
2018.P APER_.Rev_.2018.04.25.pdf.

[3] “Training Guide: Hazard & Operability Analysis (HAZOP).” Risk Management Training
Guides, Product Quality Research Institute, pqri.org/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/pdf/HAZOP_Training_Guide.pdf.

[4] “Risk Assessment.” Chemical Process Safety: Fundamentals With Applications, by Daniel A.
Crowl and Joseph F. Louvar, 3rd ed., Pearson, 2011, pp. 525–526.

[5] Haugen, Stein, and Marvin Rausand. “Risk Assessment.” 9. HAZOP. Department of
Production and Quality Engineering. Norwegian University of Science and Technology,
Department of Production and Quality Engineering. Norwegian University of Science and
Technology, https://www.ntnu.edu/documents/624876/1277591044/chapt09-
hazop.pdf/9e85796d-dc7f-41f8-9f04-9e13a4ce3893

Appendix A

Deviation Typical causes

No flow Valve Closed; Pump failure; Incorrect

pressure difference, Major leakage etc

Less flow Pump cavitation, Fouling, partial blockage etc

More flow Valve full open, Increased pump speed,
Increased pressure differential etc

Reverse flow Pump trip, Incorrect differential pressure,

NRV passing

High Pressure Closed discharge, pressure control failure,

excessive re-boiling, loss of reflux

Less pressure Pump/compressor failure

More temperature Heater control failure, Runaway reaction

Less temperature Loss of heating, Fouled exchanger

More level Level control failure, More input than output

Less level Level control failure, Less input than output

Composition Change Leaking exchanger tubes, Feed Change,

Wrong additives, additional reactions

Prepared in collaboration with Maeve Gillis