Strocheker vs. Ramirez - G.R. No. 18700 - September 26, 1922

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[No. 18700.

September 26, 1922]

INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER, appellee, vs. ILDEFONSO


RAMIREZ, creditor and appellant. WILLIAM EDMONDS, assignee.

ROMUALDEZ, J.:

FACTS:

There were three mortgagees each of whom claimed preference. The half-interest in the
business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on 10 March 1919,
and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage was made with
Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower
court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over
that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal,
but Ramirez did.

ISSUE: Whether or the not half-interest over Antigua Botica Ramirez is considered as personal
property. (YES)

RULING:

An interest in a business may be the subject of mortgage, for it is a personal property, being
capable of appropriation, and not included among the real properties enumerated in article 335
of the Civil Code.

Where the description of the chattel mortgaged is such as to enable the parties to the mortgage
or any other person to identify the same after a reasonable investigation or inquiry, the
description is sufficient. Thus, if the thing is described as the half interest of the debtor in the
drug business known as Antigua Botica Ramirez (owned by a certain person therein named and
the mortgagor) located at Nos. 123 and 125, Calle Real, District of Intramuros, Manila, P. I., the
description meets the requirements of the law.

The vendor of a chattel, who is a creditor for the purchase price, has no preference over a
creditor holding a mortgage on that chattel where the vendor is not in possession of the thing
mortgaged. A junior mortgage can have no preference over a senior mortgage by the mere fact
that prior to said junior mortgage a personal security had been stipulated between the junior
mortgagee and the debtor, because the second mortgage cannot be given effect as of the date the
personal security was stipulated. The judgment appealed from is affirmed with costs against the
appellant. So ordered.

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