Redefining accountability in a strategic perspective to enhance performance

Raphael Zumofen
PhD Student
IDHEAP | Institut de hautes études en administration publique
Swiss Graduate School of Public Administration
Université de Lausanne
Bâtiment IDHEAP | CH-1015 Lausanne
+41(0) 21 557 40 86 | +41 (0) 79 567 18 22
[email protected] | www.unil.ch/idheap

Paper prepared for the 2015 International Research Society for Public Management
(IRSPM) conference

Panel L 101 – Open Panel - University of Birmingham, 30 March - 1 April 2015

___________________________________________________________________________

Abstract

In contemporary society, accountability and performance have obtained a new status of golden concepts.
While accountability has expanded and diversified, performance worries have become more prevalent guiding
policies towards the reinforcement of the first concept to stimulate the latter. It is thus worth questioning the
normative assumption that more accountability is necessarily “good” by asking whether there is a danger of
too much accountability or too many accountability relationships. In order to make it work, it seems that
accountability has to dealt with under certain circumstances and with specific managerial and strategic
processes. The objective of this article is to redefine the accountability process in strategic and managerial way
in order for it to contribute positively to performance. This paper will first look at accountability on the
conceptual side, going through the various traditional models. It will then detail the managerial and strategic
aspects too often forgotten while defining the concept. It will then describe the conceptual and practical
difficulties encountered by public organization while trying to maximize accountability and performance at the
same time. The last part of this paper will suggest a conceptual model based on a new definition and explain
each stage of this new model that could be used in a strategic manner by various organizations.

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1. Introduction

During the last three decades, reforms in the public sectors have been numerous and
intense. New Public Management (NPM) reforms started in the 1980s and were focused on
institutional autonomy. The outcomes of decentralization have been somewhat paradoxical,
producing unintended consequences and even reverse effects (Gregory, 2007; Hood &
Peters, 2004; Norman, 2003). They were followed by the post-NPM reforms in the 1990s that
reintroduced somewhat political control in order to counteract the effects of fragmented
government (Christensen & Lægreid, 2014).

NPM-type reforms have rendered governmental systems more complex and embody strong
emphasis on managerial accountability (Hughes, 1998). Accountability issues were central to
the justificatory rhetoric that surrounded NPM reforms (Gregory, 2009). Those reforms also
included the concept of efficiency and the effective use of resources (Rutgers & van der
Meer, 2010; Sinclair, 1995). Public managers have always faced highly complex tasks,
however, since the NPM reforms, these complex tasks are complemented by evenly complex
accountability demands (Ossege, 2012).

Accountability is one of the several concepts that have long been central to public
administrative theory and practice (Chan & Rosenbloom, 2010). It is a word that was used
only rarely and had a relatively restricted meaning a few decades ago (M. Dubnick, 1998). It
now crops up everywhere performing all manner of analytical and rhetorical tasks and
carrying most of the major burdens of democratic governance (Mulgan, 2000). Despite the
growing regularity with which this term has been used, its sense remains elusive (Koppell,
2005). It could be a virtue as well as a mechanism depending on your administrative tradition
and academic perception. For some, it is now associated with good governance (O'Kelly &
Dubnick, 2014) or has become its icon (Frølich, 2011). Some authors such as Strydom
(1999) goes as far as saying that studying governance today is, in reality, studying
accountability.

On the other hand, performance is also a complex concept, extremely difficult to define and
even more difficult to measure. As Schick (2003) underlined, performance is a deceptively
simple idea: simple because it is easy to express key concepts and objectives; deceptive
because it is hard to apply these ideas in government. Various NPM initiatives were based
on the assumption that enhanced accountability would improve performance (Christensen &
Lægreid, 2014). But the empirical evidence that this has happened is inconclusive (Laegreid
& Verhoest, 2010). After three decades of reforms in the public sector in many countries, it is
rather evident that the relationship between accountability and performance continues to be
contested (Lægreid, 2013). On the one hand, accountability is one of those golden concepts
that no one can be against (Bovens, Schillemans, & Hart, 2008) and aims to contribute to an
effective an legitimate public administration (Ossege, 2012). On the other hand, however, it
brings about negative implications as demonstrated in some studies (Christensen & Lægreid,
2014; Smith, 1995). By looking at specific forms of accountability, several researchers
noticed that some of them can be detrimental to the organization. For example when
accountability is used as a set of unconnected binary relationships rather than as a system of
relations or as short-term and rule-following behavior rather than as a means to longer-term
social change (Ebrahim, 2005).Too much accountability seems to hinder organizations in
achieving their missions and could chill learning and innovation. Accountability is even
reported to decrease rather than increase performance (Pollitt, 2003). Hence, accountability

2
should not be equated with always being good (Lindberg, 2013). The increase and
simultaneous shift in accountability seems to have led to the so-called “accountability
paradox” (M. J. Dubnick, 2005; Halachmi, 2002a). Despite the centrality of accountability in
public administrative practice and debate, the specific reasons for these heterogeneous
effects remains in the dark (Ossege, 2012).

This research will focus its attention on the two concepts trying first to define them precisely
taking into account the various evolutions in the literature. It will start with a state of the art
and rapidly move towards new tendencies and recent evolutions. It will formulate some path
to follow in both cases to consider some new conceptions. The work will then present the
various conceptual and practical problems preventing accountability and performance to be
maximized at the same time. Finally, the work will then move to the construction of a
conceptual model that would be useful in order to manage accountability and organizational
performance in the case of public organizations.

2. Conceptual considerations

2.1 Accountability and tradition

Anyone studying accountability will soon discover that it can mean many different things to
many different people (Behn, 2001). Sometimes defined as a mechanism, accountability
could also be a virtue, a social relation, a function or sometimes it is just used as the
synonym of transparency. Unfortunately, no attempt has been made to provide a concrete
practical framework for the organization. Many analytical frameworks exist and provide the
practitioners with theoretical foundations to work on but no tool to manage the stakeholders
as efficiently as possible. Most of the authors still address accountability in different ways
and therefore contribute to the ever-expanding sense of the concept. Instead of focusing on
the forums themselves, they focus on the concept contributing to extend its meaning and to
redefine it constantly.

Some frameworks such as the classification of Romzek and Dubnick (1987), Kearns (1994),
Bovens (2007) or more recently Lindberg (2013) have contributed to defining or redefining
the concept but this frameworks often lack the notion that accountability goes beyond the
chain of delegation and almost always beyond the notion of delegation itself.

As underlined by O'Kelly and Dubnick (2014), we can fundamentally distinguish four models
of accountability: the mechanism, the function, the behavior or the relationship. For each
model, a relevant theory can be used to make sense of the concept:

Accountability as : Relevant theory:

Mechanism Principal-Agent Theory
Function Institutionnalist
Comportement Social psychology ; cultural
Relation Moral theory
Figure 1: Four models of Accountability

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For and foremost, each and every actor should base its typology on the idea that
accountability means different things to different forums and should accordingly be dealt with
differently. Accountability in its traditional sense is based on the idea of power transmission.
When decision making power is transferred from a principal to an agent, there must be a
mechanism in place for holding the agent to account for their decision and if necessary for
imposing sanctions, ultimately by removing the agent from power (Lindberg, 2013). This old
view of accountability comes from its roots in accounting when agent had to refer to
regulations and instructions (Barton, 2006; Normanton, 1966). The obligation that lied upon
the actor can be formal or informal. The relationship always consists of at least three stages
or elements (Bovens, 2007):

1. The actor is obliged to inform the forum about his or her conduct
2. The forum can question the adequacy of the information or the legitimacy of the conduct
3. The forum may pass judgment on the conduct of the actor

This framework defined by Bovens (2007), delimitate quite clearly the limits of the concept.
Even though some authors have taken another road to analyze and assess accountability,
Bovens’ classification followed by Lindberg’s one have taken the option to separate the
accountability types by the source of control, the nature of the forum, the nature of the actor
the nature of the obligation, the strength of control and the direction of the mechanisms.
Hence, accountability could be classified into categories or type. This classification has
progressed over the years starting with four exclusive categories in the case of Romzek and
Dubnick (1987) to fifteen non-exclusive categories in the case of Bovens (2007) and twelve
exclusive in the case of Lindberg (2013).

2.2 The need to go beyond the chain of delegation

In a brilliant article, Strøm (2000) described the idea of delegation and accountability in
parliamentary democracies. In his article, Strøm (2000) considers the policy process in
contemporary democracies, from voters all the way to the civil servants that ultimately
implement the public policy. He gave the name of chain of delegation to this process in which
those authorized to make political decisions conditionally designate others to make such
decisions in their name and place. Delegation takes place because the agent has certain
kinds of information or skills, or simply time that the principal lacks (Strøm, 2000).

It is possible to identify at least four different steps in the chain of delegation:

1. From voters to elected representatives

2. From legislators to the executive branch, specifically to the head of governments
3. From the head of the government to the heads of different executive departments
4. From the head of different executive departments to civil servants

The chain of delegation is mirrored by a corresponding chain of accountability that runs it the
opposite direction (Strøm, 2000)1. In order to be fully capable of responding to the ever-
growing demands in terms of accountability that publics have to face, we should consider
1
In the same issue as the one in which Strøm published his article, Müller (2000), Huber (2000),
Mitchell (2000) and Saalfeld (2000) analyzed each every step of this chain of delegation or
accountability depending on the perspective. Those articles gave more details about the specificities
related to each stage of this chain.

4
going beyond this logic of chain of delegation. Some new forums have appeared and should
be considered as being part of the environment of accountability. Some recent articles have
detailed those newcomers recently and introduced them to the logic of the chain of
delegation.

Forums such as political parties (Müller, 2000), the medias (Cooper, 2002; Örebro, 2002;
Reddy, 2006) or interest groups (Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999) could not be ignored
and should be dealt with. With that in mind, the chain of delegation seems obsolete in order
to treat properly the logic of accountability of a public servant or a public organization. A new
conceptual model needs to go further by delimitating a complete environment of
accountability in which the public organization or the public servant himself could encompass
the various accountabilities with which it has to deal. The environment of accountability has
to consider the forum as the central piece of interest and accountability types should be
defined according to each and every forum in order to offer a framework that would be
useful.

2.3 Historical classifications

In the historical classifications described below, there are some distinctions that are
necessary in order to distinguish the different kinds of accountability. Those classifications
take into account three different parameters that are fundamental when trying to organize an
accountability environment.

The first parameter is the source of control. The accountability holder can either be internal
or external to the one being held to account (Gormley & Balla, 2004; Radin & Romzek, 1996;
Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). This distinction goes back to identifying to whom the account
should be rendered. It is just once the source of control has been identified and positioned
towards the organization that the latter can start to develop a strategy to be accountable.

The second is the degree of control. The degree of control could be very different from one
forum to another starting with a very low intensity going to a total control. There are some
fundamental differences between a strong bureaucratic high degree of control from an
internal source or a political low degree of control from an internal source, sometimes
extremely difficult and unreliable to measure. The attitude of the actor towards the forums will
vary considerably according to the degree of control.

Internal source of control External source of control

High degree of control Bureaucratic Legal
Low degree of control Professional Political
Figure 2: Romzek and Dubnick’s classification

The third distinction is the direction of the mechanisms or more broadly of the social
relationship2. Bovens (2007) bases his analysis on the nature of the obligation to define this
parameter. Accountability can either be horizontal or vertical : horizontal when it is
considered to be “among equals” (O'Donnell, 1998) or vertical when a hierarchy of some
sorts is involved. On the vertical side, the direction can also be distinguished. Vertical

2
If we consider it as a social relationship as it is the case in this article

5
accountability can either be downwards, directed towards the lower echelons on the chain of
delegation, or upwards, directed towards the higher echelons on the chain of delegation. A
last possibility introduced by some authors is the diagonal accountability that could be
described as an indirect two-step relation with a forum, in the shadow of hierarchy (Bovens,
2007).

Source of control Intensity of Vertical Horizontal

control Upward Downward
Internal High Business Bureaucratic Audit
Low Client - Patron Patron - Client Peer Professional
External High Representative Fiscal Legal
Low Societal Political Reputational
Figure 3: Lindberg’s classification

2.4 Revisiting Kearn’s framework in order to redefine accountability

In order to manage accountability in a way that is positive for performance and performance
management, a new framework should imperatively include some ideas described by Kearns
(1994). Kearn’s framework focuses his attention on two different parameters to describe
accountability dimensions according to different angles. In Kearn’s view, the internal
response systems as well as the origins of the mandate for external control are essential
parameters in order to define the type of accountability the organization or the civil servant is
facing. The author presented a totally different analytical framework differing in several
respects from other frameworks presented at the time, especially the one of Romzek and
Dubnick (1987). This framework introduced four different (not new) dimensions that could
also categorize accountability.

Mandate for external control

Implicit (De Facto) Explicit (De Jure)
Reactive (tactical) Negociated accountability Compliance accountability
Internal response
Professional/discretionary Anticipatory/positioning
system Proactive (strategic)
accountability accountability
Figure 4: Kearn’s classification

This framework includes three essential conceptions that are lacking in most of the
frameworks existing today. The first is the idea is the distortion of temporality in the process
of accountability. In If we go back to the definition of Bovens (2007), it starts with the notion
of relationship between a forum and an actor in which the actor has the obligation to inform
the forum about his or her conduct and may face consequences afterwards. This temporality,
has been more largely described by Brandsma and Schillemans (2012) in their article on the
cube of accountability. The phases are three: information, discussion and consequences
always disposed in this order. Arguably, the heart of the accountability process (if a process
it is) is the assessment of information, where provided data are set against predetermined or
emergent norms, where accountability forums can question the agent’s behavior whereas the
actor can use the opportunity to explain, justify and defend his action (Brandsma, 2010).

This temporality is today overtaken by a new model where accountability or more precisely
“being accountable” can be done without the chain of the three phases. In fact, actor may

6
face consequences by some forums without having had the opportunity of informing them or
discussing. Going in the same direction, the phase of discussion is often excluded from the
whole process leaving the actor with the only possibility to present a report and then face the
consequences. The framework of Kearns encompasses the idea that some accountability
mechanisms are sometimes anticipatory or strategic in order to position the organization in a
good light. Those mechanisms do not follow the rigid rules of accountability as defined by
some authors event though they are produced by the organization in order to “be
accountable”. The time-line of accountability, presented by Lindberg (2013) for example, is
also an example where the process is described in four time t. The first is the transfer of
decision-making from the principal to the agent, the second the use of discretionary power by
the agent, the third the request from the principal, the fourth the adhesion of the agent and
the last the sanction (if applicable) of the principal. This timeline seems not to be respected
by some forums in certain cases. For example, there is not always a transfer of decision-
making or a request of information and justification from the principal. The timeline is today
distorted with the simple fact that the organization or the civil servant sometimes has to
anticipate the potential demands or to meet standards from forums that did not transfer any
decision-making power.

The second idea that is fundamental in Kearn’s work is the distinction between formal
accountability and informal accountability and its inclusion in the framework itself. Even if
some definitions mention the fact that accountability may be informal, they never include this
aspect in the framework they present afterwards. The conception of Kearns distinguishes
clearly the implicit (De Facto) and implicit (De Jure) mandate even though the author limits
himself to external control no mentioning internal control.

The third and last idea that should not be forgotten is the place of the response by the actor
and its characterization. In Kearn’s view, reactive and proactive accountability should
imperatively be distinguished and consequently condition the internal response system that
will be activated in order to satisfy the requirements of the forums.

Each and every classification has always considered the actor to be the center of interest
differentiating the types of accountability that were requested from him in a global sense. The
idea of a framework to be developed is to place the response to the forum3 as the
centerpiece and to integrate the numerous dimensions that have long been forgotten or
treated separately in one and unique framework. The first step towards this framework is a
redefinition of the ever-broadening concept of accountability as a relational process.
Consequently, accountability can be defined as a relational process that is either implicit or
explicit, between an actor and one or multiple forum, in which the actor has to provide a
response, either reactive or proactive, to a demand or a potential demand from the forum
concerning a task that has been delegated to him and may face consequences if the task
has not been realized according to the expectations of the forum(s).

3
The recent conference paper from O'Kelly and Dubnick (2014) encourages us to go beyond the concept of
“forum by considering to notion of “agora” and “bazaar”. The idea is to broaden the relational account through
a focus on that which underpins all “relationality” (agora) and through a focus on an alternative accountability
space that might emerge (bazaar) (O'Kelly & Dubnick, 2014).

7
A relational process qualifies as a case of accountability when :

1. There is relational process

2. that may be implicit or explicit,
3. between an actor and one or multiple forum
4. In which the actor has to provide a response,
5. either reactive or proactive
6. to a demand or a potential demand from the forum
7. concerning a task that has been delegated to him
8. and may face consequences if the task has not been realized according to the
expectations of the forum(s).

Figure 5: Accountability as a relational process

As in Kearn’s view, this definition places the response of the organization or the civil servant
as an essential element, if not the most important one in the relational process.

3. Accountability and performance: Potential disorders

To understand the possible conflict between the effort to promote accountability and the
effort to enhance performance, one must recognize that accountability can be established
only under conditions of certainty and linearity (Halachmi, 2002b). According to the
proponents of accountability-centered reforms, accountability will enhance transparency
(O'Donnell, 1998; Schedler, Diamond, & Plattner, 1999), access to impartial areas where
abuses of authority can be challenged und judged (Ambos, 2000; Borneman, 1997; Elster,
2004), appropriate behavior on the part of public officials (Anechiarico & Jacobs, 1994; M. J.
Dubnick, 2003; Gray & Jenkins, 1993; Morgan & Reynolds, 1997) and improvement in the
quality of government services (M. J. Dubnick, 2005). M. J. Dubnick (2006) summarized
those elements in the form of promises: justice, democracy, ethical behavior and
performance.

In the case of performance4, it is assumed that individual or group held to account for their
behavior and its consequences perform better (Bolton, 2003; Forsythe, 2001; Halachmi,
2002a, 2002b; Ingraham, Selden, & Moynihan, 2000; Leeuw, 1996; Roberts, 1997). This
trend is directly reflected in the globalized approach to administrative reform that links the
various NPM programs as well the emergence of what some are calling the “enterprising
state” or the “hollow state” (M. J. Dubnick, 2006). Hence, various NPM initiatives were based
on the assumption that enhanced accountability would improve performance (Barberis, 1998)
but the empirical evidence that this has happened is inconclusive (Laegreid & Verhoest,
2010). Thus there is a tension between accountability and performance and more
accountability does not necessary produce better government (Christensen & Lægreid,
2014). The relationship between accountability and performance is characterized by
tensions, ambiguities and contradictions (Bouckaert & Halligan, 2008). Accountability is not a

4
The literature that has emerged on the concept of performance in the public sector is extremely vast,
especially since the NPM reforms. Trying to cover the concept in a few lines or even a few chapters in this
paper is impossible and would leave some areas unexplored a unconsidered. In consequence, I will focus my
attention on general definition of performance. Thus, performance is defined as the evaluation of the resulting
of a set of coordinated and intentional actions from an organization with the objective the realization of
predetermined goals

8
tool of governance but rather a condition of being governed, it is the object of the instrument
rather than the instrument itself (M. J. Dubnick, 2006). Let’s have a look at the most common
encountered by practitioners while trying to reach a better performance and satisfying
multiple, sometimes conflicting, accountability expectations.

3.1 The paradox of accountability

M. J. Dubnick (2005) argues that the idea that accountability increases performance has
been accepted without careful scrutiny and that has led to an accountability paradox in which
more accountability actually diminishes organizational performance. In fact, the pursuit of
accountability, particularly in a rapidly changing environment, can be dysfunctional for
productivity improvement (Halachmi, 2002b). Accountability involves substantial transaction
costs (Schillemans & Bovens, 2011). An increase in the number and variety of accountability
arrangements naturally implies an increase in the costs of accountability (Schillemans &
Bovens, 2011). This cost may be excessive as underlined by some authors such as Pollitt
(2003) and may appear in different forms such as the opportunity cost (Halachmi, 2002b) for
example. The individuals often concerns with accountability procedures are the highest
ranking who need to spare resources.

There is an inherent tension between accountability and performance on an operational level

as well as logically: increasing efforts to improve performance through accountability tends to
have the opposite effect (M. J. Dubnick, 2005). Rather than acting as a driver for desired
levels of improved performance, accountability tends to be a breaker by either slowing down
or stopping the improvements (M. J. Dubnick, 2005). The phenomenon called the paradox of
accountability by some authors such as Halligan (2007) or Willems and Van Dooren (2011)
makes sense if we think about the resources involved in the accountability mechanisms. In
fact, accountability consumes the energy and the time of the actor than would otherwise be
devolved to activities probably more productive and contributing to performance
improvement. Whereas accountability is about staying within the four corners of the contract,
performance is often about getting outside the box (Halachmi, 2002a). The improvement of
performance often goes through radical or incremental innovation. Thus, managers in the
position of taking crucial decisions need to enjoy some flexibility and autonomy in order to be
able to steer the organization towards performance improvement. It is precisely these
flexibility and autonomy that public managers are lacking when they need to fulfill multiple
accountability obligations. The prospect of additional paperwork discourages deviation and
thus strategic thinking (Halachmi, 2002a).

Performance may thus suffer when, for accountability reasons, managers are reluctant to
make necessary adjustments to operations midcourse (Halachmi, 2002b). This phenomenon,
signifies that by imposing a too strong accountability pressure on public managers in order to
attain higher performance, the results is that the performance is actually diminished by lack
of power to act or by lack of willingness to go through complex processes to transform
operations.

9
3.2 Accountability dilemmas

Behn (2001) claims that there is an accountability dilemma. Today sees complex systems of
multiple, overlapping and sometimes competing forms of accountability operate. Those
multiples accountability systems produce some expected and unexpected effects, some of
which could be problematic for the performance of public organizations.

The first effect is the problem of the conflicting expectations for the actor. On the one side,
some forums expect some pieces of information while others are looking at different
processes or results within the organization. Combining different expectations may be
difficult especially when the organization lacks the resources to satisfy all of them and has to
choose which obligations it wishes to honour. Romzek and Dubnick (1998) refer to this
problem as the accountability dilemma. The dilemma is between the many forums that are
involved with the organization and the conflicting expectations produced by this need to
satisfy all of them. The conflicting demands and expectations of the various forums may have
a paralyzing effect on the actors. Koppell (2005) calls this problem the “multiple
accountabilities disorder”. It happens mainly when the organizations are trying to meet
conflicting expectations finally pleasing no one while trying to please everyone.

The multiplication of forums may even result in a loss of control and an increase of autonomy
seized by the actor. In fact, while being unable to meet the various and numerous demands
from the forums, the plurality of accountability claims leaves them more room to manoeuvre
(Schillemans & Bovens, 2011). The addition of forum makes it more difficult to control the
actor, as it is the case in the logic of principal-agent (Miller, 2005; Moe, 1984).

3.3 Blame game, negativism and symbolism

Finally, accountability overloads my results in some other phenomenons such as a blame

game, negativism and symbolic accountability. All of those consequences are the results of
accountability systems not designed in a proper way or organizations overtaken by too
numerous, conflicting and time-consuming demands.

Accountability can create some negativism when it evolves into fault-finding missions
(Mulgan, 2003). This negativism could rapidly impairs the inclination of public managers to
take risks and seek improvements (Behn, 2001). This phenomenon goes back to the
accountability paradox but represent the early phase of it. Hence, in time of crisis, multiple
accountability may evolve in a blame game with multiple players (Schillemans & Bovens,
2011). Delegation is often seen as a form of blame-shifting (Hood, 2002; Thatcher & Sweet,
2002). In most of the public organizations where the tasks are diluted across multiple
divisions, it is often difficult to hold someone responsible for the failure of an entire mission.
The contributions are sometimes not substantial enough to hold those people accountable
creating this blame-game process.

At some point, the accountability mechanisms may also attain a symbolic status, they are
mere rituals (Halachmi, 2002a). This is the case when the multiplicity of demands becomes
too difficult to handle resulting in symbolic processes. The processes then become routines
accomplished to satisfy the various forums without putting any efforts into it. The status of
those processes or mechanisms becomes symbolic but still consumes resources.

10
4. The formulation of a framework: Redefining accountability in a strategic perspective

In order to respond appropriately to the willingness to be accountable and performant at the

same time and to answer all demands in terms of accountability as well as continuously
improve organizational performance, the framework articulated in this paper has to take into
account the elements explained previously. In particular, it wants to mix the various
framework described introducing the parameters studied in Kearns (1994) in the more
traditional views on accountability. It especially wants to consider the strategic response of
the organization as being part of the process of accountability. The strategic response is
consequently the core of the analysis as well as the idea to maximize the use of tools and
processes in order to have mechanisms responding to categories of forums. Thus,
accountability is not divided in three phases anymore, as it was the case in the analysis of
Brandsma and Schillemans (2012), but will now be divided in seven different steps. The
steps will be described individually and the parameters explained in order to obtain a
complete framework that could be used in each and every organization as a management
tool.

The 7 steps are the following:

1. Identification of the forums 5. Definition of the strategic response

2. Identification of the demands 6. Selection of the mechanisms to respond
3. Classification of the forums and demands 7. Outcome of the realization
4.The evaluation of the accountability
environment

Figure 6: The seven steps of accountability

4.1 Seven steps to meet accountability demands while maximizing performance

The steps described below distort the traditional view on accountability that divided the
concept in three phases of almost equal importance5. As a management tool, this framework
had to reconsider the importance of each phase and judged that the discussion phase to be
a form of illusion is some cases. In fact, even if accountability was born on public places
where public figures were called to account for their actions and could justified themselves,
this view is not valid anymore considering today’s international and evolving environment. In
today’s accountability cases, accountability intervenes under the form of report or
performance audit. The discussion phase is thus removed and replaced by a final judgment
stating if the forum is satisfied with the report (or audit) or will consider enacting
consequences6.

The classification proposed in this paper focuses its attention on the management processes
put in place at each and every stage of the process of accountability. It tries to organize each
stage appropriately in order to meet accountability demands and maximize performance at
the same time. This paper will now describe each step and give more details about the
management processes involved.

5
Information, discussion and consequences
6
In some cases, a discussion is part of the process but it is a declining tendency

11
 1. Identification of the forums

The first step to consider for the organization is the identification of the forums. The literature
about the subject is quite abundant and involves the article of Considine (2002), O'Connell,
Yusuf, and Hackbart (2008), Brandsen, Oude Vrielink, Schillemans, and van Hout (2011) or
Verschuere, Verhoest, Meyers, and Peters (2006). The traditional views on accountability
tend to equate the forum with the government, a single body with a hierarchical power over
the actor. In the age of multi-stakeholders governance, this conception cannot be sustained
and each accountability framework has to take into account the new forms of accountability
directed downwards or situated out of the notion of hierarchy.

Thus, the first step for the actor is to identify all the forums that he has or will have to deal
with. This phase is crucial in order to be able to respond to all demands, potential demands
or obligations. This phase will allow the organization to create two first distinct categories: the
forum that declared themselves as such and the forums considered by the organization as
being forum but without clear demands. This first distinction will then permit some form of
prioritization in extreme cases when, for example, all demands could not be met. The
potential consequences resulting from such a situation could be problematic and may be
very different if the forum were known by the organization or just consider themselves as
forums7.

2. Identification of their demands

The second step to consider for the organization, after having identified the forums, is to
identify the various demands of those forums. The demands are potentially very diversified
and thus should be treated differently and accordingly. Two major distinctions have to be
made in order to divide the demands and classify them under different categories.

The first concerns the type of demands. Demands could be formulated clearly by existing
and known forums or could simply be identified by the actor. Hence, it is the duty of the actor
to anticipate some demands and satisfy them even if the forum did not declare himself as
such and did not formulate clear requests. The second major distinction concerns the degree
of obligation. Each demand has to be considered but the actor cannot always satisfy all of
them. Thus, the actor will judge the degree of obligation associated with each demand. The
actor could judge the fulfillment of some demands mandatory or in contrary, based on good
willing. In order to determinate which demand to prioritize, the actor will probably base his
judgment on potential consequences.

Consequences can range from the simple negative comment to the stopping of the
interruption (temporary or permanent) of the activity delegated. It could also have potential
effects on the reputation as it is often the case with the forums external to the chain of
delegation.

7
The author is not stating that the consequences in the case of declared forum are more detrimental for the
organization than the consequences of identified forums. Only that they have to be treated differently because
of this element.

12
 3. Classification of the forums according to their demands

The third step for the organization is to exploit the data collected in the two first step in order
to define the strategic response of the organization. The actor has to classify the forums
according to their demands and could potentially gather some forums under the same
category if the demands are similar or could be satisfied with similar processes.

By categorizing the forums according to their demands, the actor could potentially spare
resources when responding to them through mechanisms. Demands have to be divided
according to the criterias mentioned before and could be prioritized accordingly. Once the
demands prioritized, the forums concerned by those demands are also classified and the
organization can now focus on the strategic response it wants to offer. This third phase is
essential to define the accountability environment in which the actor evolves and to gather
the necessary pieces of information in order to prepare an adequate strategic organizational
response.

4. The evaluation of the accountability environment

The fourth step is an evaluation of the accountability environment in a strategic perspective.

According to Kearns (1996), the organization should ask itself a few questions such as what
the legal or regulatory standards to which we are held accountable, what are the informal or
implicit standards to which we are held accountable, who are the opinions leaders who
defines these standards, is our accountability environment changing, what are the tactics or
strategies available to help ensure the organization’s accountability and what has been the
experience of comparable organization.

By asking itself these questions, the organization, after having identified the forums and their
demands, can position itself in a strategic manner and select the right tools to define a
adequate strategic response. Basically, it helps identifying the accountability position in the
managerial strategy. This evaluation of the accountability environment is not only necessary
to satisfy the demands of various forums, it could also be used as the base of a strategic
thinking in order to identify the tendencies and anticipate the future demands of the various
existing or potentially emerging forums.

5. Definition of the strategic response of the organization to the forums

The fifth step is crucial in the framework explained in this paper because it focuses on the
strategic response of the organization. The forums are classified under categories according
to their demands and the organization can now decide two fundamental parameters of its
strategic response.

The first is the degree of activity it wants to produce. The organization can either be reactive
or proactive. It can wait for a clear demand from the forums or anticipate this demand by
being proactive. The reactivity is defined by Kearns (1994) as tactical while the proactivity is
seen as strategic. The proactivity, completely forgotten in recent framework, can be a
powerful strategic tool in the case of accountability. It has an anticipatory power. Hence, by

13
anticipating potential demands and being proactive, the actor can diminish his future
accountability obligations (for example, Kearns (1994) explains that being proactive can have
a role in shaping and defining the standards that will, later in time, be imposed). The perfect
example of proactivity for some public organization is the close monitoring and participation
in legislative or regulatory activities defining the standards of accountability asked to public
bodies. The second parameter that the organization should define is the degree of formality
that it wants to use in the organizational response. The response can either be very formal or
completely informal. This decision has to be based on the best way to convey the message
as well as on the accountability strategy of the organization.

6. Selection of the mechanisms to respond accordingly

The sixth step is to determine and select which mechanism of accountability the organization
will select in order to fulfill the requirements of each category of forums. This selection has to
consider the various characteristics of each mechanism. The first question to ask concerns
the type of mechanism: tool or processes. Accountability tools refer to discrete devices or
techniques used to achieve accountability (Ebrahim, 2003). Tools include reports and
disclosure statements, performance assessments and evaluation. They are often applied
over a limited period of time, can be tangibly documented and can be repeated (Ebrahim,
2003). Processes are generally more broad and multifaceted than tools, while also being less
tangible and time-bound, although each may utilize a set of tools for achieving accountability
(Ebrahim, 2003). Processes include participation, self-regulation and social audits.

The organization has also to consider some forums that may impose the mechanism to
adopt. In that case, this phase of selection do not exist because the requirements are already
set and the organization cannot decide which mechanism would be the best in accordance to
the demands and the strategic demand it wants to give. Ebrahim (2003) detailed the
characteristics of each accountability mechanism for NGO. The table below has been
adapted for public organization. It details the accountability mechanism, the forums generally
concerned and the organizational response favoured.

Accountability Forums Organizational response

mechanism
Disclosure report Oversight division or agencies Primarily tactical
Citizens or members of the
chain of delegation
Performance Oversight division or agencies Primarily tactical
assessment and Citizens or members of the
evaluation chain of delegation
External to medias
Participation Citizens or members of the Primarily tactical
chain of delegation Strategic if it involves increasing
Internally bargaining power
Self-regulation To similar bodies Strategic
Citizens or members of the
chain of delegation
Social auditing To similar bodies Tactical or strategic
External to medias
Figure 7: Characteristics of accountability mechanisms

14
As already mentioned before, a parameter that may vary from one accountability mechanism
to another is the notion of discussion and possibility of explanation. Some mechanism may
include the debate and some justifications coming from the actor on the basis of the reaction
of the forum. Other mechanisms do not include this possibility. Some conceptions of
accountability still divide accountability in those three phases but today’s reality is very
different. In most of the cases, the actor does not have the chance to explain himself. He is
judged on the basis of the content of the mechanism and potentially faces consequences
based solely on it.

7. Outcome of the realization of the mechanism

The last phase of the whole process is the outcome of the realization of the mechanism. Two
different aspects have to be taken into account. The first is the degree of satisfaction of the
forum with the potential consequences and the various means to correct it if a forum is not
satisfied. The second is the learning process.

The forum could either be satisfied with the content of the accountability mechanism or be
disappointed. The judgment of the forum will then have potential consequences, some may
have been mentioned in a contract or they could just appear as soon as the forum judges the
actor. The worst consequences for an actor would be to face consequences that may force
his activity to stop or simply that shut him down. From forum external to the chain of
delegation, most of the consequences have to do with reputation and could impair it to some
degree. It seems likely that, in the case of harsh consequences coming from forums external
to the chain of delegation, consequences will then extend on the forum of the chain with
sanctioning power and possibility for operational sanctions. The presence of external forum
is thus to be considered very carefully because a breach in satisfying their legitimate
requirement could result in significant consequences coming from them but also from other
forums that would be informed.

The learning process that comes with accountability can either concern the accountability
mechanism itself and its efficiency or the content of accountability. The accountability
mechanism could be improved by transforming some of the parameters. The content could
be convincing but a breach in the mechanism could impair the whole process, especially in
the case of external forum. Some may be waiting for this breach to create a scandal out of
the blue when the legitimacy of some organization is weak.

In the case of the content, accountability mechanisms give the opportunity to the actor to
reflect on his practices and find ways to improve them. Performance assessment or
disclosure reports are good ways to identify which elements are lacking and which side of
performance could be improved. Participation, self-regulation and social auditing give the
opportunity to the actor to be challenged by forums or beneficiaries of their action and to
integrate them in the reflections about production process. Such approaches are extremely
good and effective ways to improve different sides of the operations for the actor.

15
5. Conclusion

The framework formulated above replaces performance as a central concern of

accountability by including strategic concerns in the strategic accountability process. The
strategic and proactive sides in the accountability process transform accountability as a new
way to improve performance. Accountability is no longer an obligation but is now part of the
day-to-day operational activity of the organization. Thus, manager should no longer think that
accountability is a side activity that the organization has the obligation to accomplish and that
forms a precondition to any power devolution or autonomy. They should include it in the
strategy as a part of the operations and as a way to improve performance.

Hence, accountability should no longer be perceived as a constraint but as a learning tool

useful to improve the operational processes and to reflect about the ways to attain a better
performance. If the whole accountability process is organized as an operational routine
where resources can be spared and activities maximized, accountability will evolve in such a
way that will be beneficial to performance. The two concept will no longer be in competition
with the maximization of the first impairing the realization of the other. If embarked in the
same operational routine and considered as equals, accountability and performance will go
in the same direction with a simultaneous maximization that would be possible.

The fundamental idea is that accountability has to be introduced in the strategic management
of the organization and thus every strategic decision should consider accountability
consequences and ways to handle them. In order to do that, Kearns (1996) encourages the
decision makers in the organization to scan the accountability environment and to use
strategic management processes while handling accountability questions. The redefinition of
accountability in seven phases attempted in this paper aims at including Kearn’s concerns
and describing the whole process of accountability started with the identification of the forum
and that ends with an evaluation of both the process and the content of accountability. The
central part of this definition concerns the strategic components included in the framework
and the need to look further than the delegation chain. Hence, today, most of the forums do
not belong to the delegation chain and need to be considered differently. By redesigning the
whole accountability process, this paper gives a practical way to manage those new forums
and to make sure accountability is handled in an appropriate way. Including accountability in
the day-to-day routines and making it part of the organizational strategy, the process
becomes a powerful learning tool as well as a too useful to structure the tasks within the
organization.

16
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