CONCEPTIONS OF NOTHINGNESS

IN ASIAN PHILOSOPHY

Editors:
JeeLoo Liu, California State University, Fullerton
Douglas L. Berger, Southern Illinois University, Carbondale

A Book Prospectus

OVERVIEW

While the history of Western philosophy began with concerns involving being and existence, the
notion of nothingness or emptiness plays a central role in Asian philosophy from the start. A
variety of ideas about nothingness gained profound philosophical prominence in a number of
South and East Asian traditions in the course of their developments, and have remained central
for them to this day. In Buddhist thought, the notion emptiness signifies the ultimate reality of
the world and the ultimate truth about our transient existence. In Daoism, it is argued that the
word “nothing” may best characterize the origin of the entire cosmological order. In Hinduism,
the ultimate and unitary nature of reality was often described negatively, as “not this and not
that” with respect to all the differentiated phenomena that we could speak about. In the view
expressed by philosophers of the Japanese Kyoto School, the idea of Absolute Nothingness
represents the root of the self and of the world. Furthermore, all these philosophical traditions
employed ideas of “nothingness” not only to depict grand metaphysical principles, but also to
explain things of everyday life, such as how we experience loss in our temporal and very
impermanent existence, how space combined with matter forms physical things, how we can
speak in terms of negation, and how we become aware that things are not where we were
expecting to find them. The idea of nothingness or emptiness further develops into a philosophy
of life. The philosophy of nothingness has an ethical import and a transformative power. Once
people understand that ultimate reality is Nothingness or Emptiness, they gain a different
perspective on their mundane existence. This enlightenment enables people to transcend their
ordinary concerns in life. In all these respects, the major philosophical traditions of Asia shared
the insight that, in order to explain both great mysteries and mundane facts about our experience,
ideas of “nothingness” must play a central role.

The collection of essays in this proposed book brings together the work of twenty-one of the
world’s prominent scholars of Hindu, Buddhist, Daoist, Neo-Confucian, Japanese and Korean
thought to illuminate fascinating philosophical conceptualizations of “nothingness” in both
classical and modern Asian traditions. The collection we propose here is, in the field of
literature, unique in that it brings together a host of accomplished scholars who provide in
concert a panoramic representation of all the most significant ways in which ideas of
“nothingness” played crucial roles in Asian traditions, in both traditional and contemporary
formulations, sometimes putting Asian traditions into dialogue with one another and sometimes
with classical and modern Western thought. This combined effort will be serviceable to
everyone in the fields of Asian and comparative philosophy who recognizes the great importance
of these philosophical resonances of “nothingness.”

OUTSTANDING FEATURES OF THIS BOOK

1. This book is the first of its kind that focuses on notions of nothingness and emptiness in
Asian philosophy.
2. The book comprehensively covers all the different resonances of the notion of
nothingness (or emptiness) in Indian, Chinese, Japanese and Korean philosophy,
including their metaphysical, epistemological, semantic, ethical and psychological
dimensions.
3. The book aims to be clear, accessible and engaging, focusing on philosophical problems
rather than merely explicating historical views.
4. Most chapters in this book will also take a comparative approach, relating the
philosophical positions discussed to other philosophical issues or traditions.
5. All the chapters in this book are original contributions, never before published, by
accomplished scholars in all the respective fields of research.
6. The book will have a comprehensive Introduction that presents the penetrating themes
running through all the chapters as well as giving a synopsis of each chapter, so that
readers may easily navigate through the book and the issues it covers.

CONTENTS: SUMMARY OF CHAPTERS

Conceptions of Nothingness in Asian Philosophy

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION. Conceptions of Nothingness in Asian Philosophy

Chapter 1. Roy Sorensen, Nothing in Common: Comparing Western and Asian

Conceptions of Nothingness

Abstract: What does Western philosophy share with Asian philosophy? In the beginning,
nothing.
They both had a motley of religion, myth, and poetry. Some of it was of sufficient
generality to bear on questions that could be retrospectively regarded as philosophical. A
common factor does emerge when a second generation of philosophers reacted to this proto-
philosophy. They apply a variety of dialectical techniques involving negation. Where there is
negation, double-negation cannot be far behind. Debaters will distinguish mere gainsaying from
refutation. Someone starts keeping score. Logic is on the way.
I will argue that this negative aspect of philosophy provides a unity to Asian and Western
philosophy. Some of the unity will be traced to the psycholinguistics of negation – a human
universal evident from developmental psychology. Special attention will be devoted to how this
negative aspect has shaped the Western conception of nothingness.
 Indian Philosophy

Chapter 2. Jay Garfield, Empty of What? Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti as Realists, Not
Nihilists

Abstract: The assertion of Mādhyamikas such as Nāgārjuna and Candrakīrti that all phenomena
are empty has been read as a kind of nihilism, denying the reality of the world. In this paper, I
argue that this nihilistic reading of Nāgārjuna is unjustified, and that Nāgārjuna is in fact a robust
realist, offering an analysis, not a refutation, of existence. My focus will be on Nāgārjuna’s
famous tetralemmas. Through careful analysis, I will show that the negative tetralemma is in
fact a profound logical and rhetorical device for exploring the positive ontological significance
of the Madhyamaka doctrine that all phenomena are empty of intrinsic nature. Since emptiness
itself is empty, this amounts to the claim that the everyday world is as real as anything ever could
be. It is emptiness that makes sense of conventional reality, and conventional reality that
explains emptiness. From the standpoint of Madhyamaka, to be empty is not to be nonexistent,
but rather is the only possible way to exist. Madhyamaka is hence realism.

Chapter 3. Koji Tanaka, On Nāgārjuna’s Ontological Paradox and Semantic Paradox

Abstract: In his Mūlamadhyamakakārikā, Nāgārjuna sets out to refute the ontology of essence.
He presents numerous arguments to show that things don’t exist essentially – that is, that things
are empty (of essence or inherent existence). According to Garfield and Priest, Nāgārjuna
presents an ontological paradox by means of his arguments for emptiness. They argue that,
because to be empty is to have emptiness, emptiness is the nature of all things. This, however,
seems to be a claim about fundamental ontology, the possibility of which Nāgārjuna sets out to
refute.
In this paper, I shall examine Garfield and Priest’s argument for Nāgārjuna’s ontological
paradox. I will articulate the ontological and semantic presuppositions that Garfield and Priest
would have to make in order to embrace this paradox. It will be shown that Nāgārjuna’s
ontological paradox is based on a semantic principle that cannot be attributed to Nāgārjuna. By
examining the underlying semantic principle, I will question the legitimacy of attributing an
ontological paradox to Nāgārjuna.

Chapter 4. Bronwyn Finnigan, Can We Live with Nothing? Exploring the Implications of
Madhyamaka for Ethics

Abstract: The central feature of a Madhyamaka analysis of metaphysics involves rejecting the
idea that things possess svabhāva (inherent or intrinsic existence). The concept of emptiness
(śūnyata) articulates this negated idea. To be empty (śūnya) is to be devoid of svabhāva. It is a
matter of dispute, however, whether a Mādhyamika can positively infer anything about the
ontological status of what lacks svabhāva (and thus a matter of dispute as to how best to
characterize the philosophy of emptiness; viz. śūnyavāda). Significantly, most Madhyamaka
thinkers make positive assertions about the value of certain modes of conduct (good and bad). In
this paper, I shall address the question of whether a Mādhyamika could have any substantive
views about the nature of ethical practice, and whether ethical life can be adequately
characterized without positive ontological commitment. In particular, I shall query the epistemic
presuppositions that underlie Buddhist ethical practice and explore whether they are consistent
with Madhyamaka views on metaphysics.

Chapter 5. Graham Priest, Speaking of the Ineffable

Abstract: Later Mahayana Buddhism holds there to be an ineffable ultimate reality, sometimes
called ‘emptiness’. Daoism also holds that there is an ultimate ineffable principle, the dao.
When Chinese Buddhism emerges, influenced as it was by Daoism, these two things are merged
into something that is often described as ‘nothingness’. An obvious feature of all these traditions
is that they talk about this ineffable something – crucially, for example, they explain why it is
ineffable. It might be thought that this renders such views incoherent. However, this paradoxical
situation can be seen as of a piece with self-referential paradoxes of expressability to be found in
modern Western logic, such as Koenig’s paradox and Berry’s paradox. And the techniques of
modern paraconsistent logic can be applied to show how one can coherently, but inconsistently,
talk about the ineffable. The paper shows how.

Chapter 6. Arindam Chakrabarti, Absence, Non-existence and the Empty Subject

Abstract: There has been much wooly thinking about ‘nothing’ since Parmenides warned
against it and Heidegger disregarded the warning. This paper will draw attention to some
important distinctions ignoring which has led to part of the wooliness.
Independently of the negation-devices in language, certain things or features are lacking
in certain places. There are no snakes in Hawaii, and no color in air. These lacks are absences.
Neither the snakes nor colors need to be non-existent like Santa Claus or his elves in order to be
absent in a place. In Sanskrit, absences are called “abhāva”-s; non-existent entities would be
termed “asat” or “alīka”. Turtle-body-hair is a typical asat. But the abhāva of hair on a turtle-
shell is not asat but sat. Different from both total non-existent(s) and absences, is the highly
popular śūnya and its abstract cousin śūnyatā (emptiness). Emptiness could be achieved by a
reasoned rejection of all disputations in philosophy (by, e.g. Nāgārjuna or Śrīharşa) or through
the contemplative non-conceptual ineffable experience of 'being no one", beyond the four logical
options. Though distinctions themselves are a form of absence of sameness, the paper hopes to
go beyond just an analytical clarification of these distinctions. Following the work of K.C.
Bhattacharya – a 20th century phenomenologist of subjectivity, indeterminacy and negation – it
would conclude by hinting at the deep significance of the feeling of an absent feeling for the
debate between self-ism and no-self-ism. What it is like to miss something or be missing from
the world is as important for logic and metaphysics as for poetry and spiritual life.

Chapter 7. Sthaneshwar Timalsina, Semantics of Nothingness: Negation in the Philosophy

of Bhartṛhari and Nāgeśa

Abstract: This paper first explores the ways negation, and particularly the negation of utterly
non-existent entities, are analyzed by classical and medieval Indian philosophers Bhartṛhari (5th
C.) and Nāgeśa (1670-1750 CE). It then examines alternative positions to the problem of
describing negations. The battle over the meaning of the negative particle na (no, nicht, nada)
first emerges in the issue of sentence meaning. The holists, such as Bhartṛhari and the
Prābhākaras, and the particularists, such as Naiyāyikas or the Bhāṭṭas, wrestled over what the
term ‘na’ negates. Even when we engage the position of the particularists who state that
negation relates to specific terms in a sentence, there are four ways the negative particle can be
analyzed: (1) what we negate is the cognition of the existence of what has been negated, (2)
negation affirms the falsity of cognition, (3) negation not only denotes itself but also its
substratum, and (4) negation in a sentence indicates the sense communicated by the word with
which the negative particle is linked.
Although the semantic issue of comprehending negation is a complex one, what makes it
interesting is the classical analysis of the instances such as ‘I cannot be nobody,’ ‘It is not
nothing,’ or the cases such as, ‘round squares do not exist.’ The debate over the epistemology of
negation has far-reaching consequences in ontologies and theologies. This paper concludes by
briefly analyzing the ontological and theological consequences of such positions. The way
negation is understood implies the way the absolute is conceived. This is an ontological issue.
The way negation functions in discovering the higher truth demonstrates theological dilemma.
Hence, half the power that language has in describing reality rests on a single syllable ‘na.’

Chapter 8. Douglas L Berger, Seeing Not: Jayanta Bhatta on the Perception of Absences

Abstract: This chapter focuses on one of the most interesting construals of nothingness in the
Indian philosophical tradition as absence (abhāva). In even our most common experiences, we
can find ourselves aware that things and persons are absent from our immediate surroundings.
However, if something is not present, how exactly can we become aware of it? The classical
school of Brāhminical Logic, Nyāya, embraces the position that we can directly see definite
absences, such that, when there are no elephants or lost items in a room, we actually perceive
these absences just as we perceive items that are there. Nyāya philosophers maintained that
perception (pratyāksa) quite literally required the contact between a sense organ and an object.
To their contemporaries, such a formulation seemed to have made the direct perception of absent
things impossible, since an object’s not being in a place would preclude sense organs’ contact
with it. To solve this problem, Mīmamsā philosophers such as Kumārila posited an entirely
separate means of knowing, pramāna, for becoming aware of absences. He maintains that
pramāṇa is activated when no other means of knowledge are triggered (anupalabdhi). Buddhist
thinkers such as Dharmakīrti, on the other hand, argued that our awareness of absent things was
based on special forms of inference. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, a Nyāya philosopher of the late ninth
century, set out to defend his school’s position on the direct perception of absences. In his
treatise Nyāyamaṅjarī, Jayanta reexamines the notion of the contact (sannikarṣa) of the sense
organs in the perception of absences. He argues that so long as the sense organs come into
contact with a certain locus (dharmin) wherein we expect to find something, when that thing is
not there, we are perceptually aware of its absence and need recourse to no additional inference
in order to be aware of those absences. For Jayanta, absences are not merely ethereal
abstractions; they palpably exist in determinate places, wherein we do not just fail to see them,
but we see them as being there.

Chapter 9. Zhihua Yao, The Cognition of Nonexistent Objects: Five Yogācāra Arguments

Abstract: Ever since Leibniz, the fundamental problem of metaphysics is considered to be “why
is there something rather than nothing?” But before we can start to ponder on this problem, we
should have some sense of “being” (or “what there is”) and “nothing” (or “what there is not”).
Philosophers throughout history have devoted themselves in these two subjects by developing
the field of ontology. If, however, we are not satisfied with the traditional speculative
metaphysics, we should ask a more fundamental question, that is, “how do we know what there
is or what there is not?” While the question “how do we know what there is?” makes perfect
sense and brought out the fruitful field of epistemology, the question “how do we know what
there is not?” encountered skepticism from the very beginning. A natural and even more
fundamental question is: “Can we know what there is not?” or “How is it possible to know what
there is not?”
The extreme view that expels nonbeing or nonexistence from the realms of knowledge
and ontology has been very influential in the history of Western and Eastern philosophy and
developed into various different versions. An apparent alternative answer to the question is yes.
A quick assertion to support this answer is that whatever knowable includes both being and
nonbeing, hence thought equals being plus nonbeing. This way makes knowability (jñeyatva) or
potential intentional objects a more fundamental ontological concept than being or nonbeing.
Therefore, we can know nonbeing or what there is not as well as being or what there is. But the
issue is how to prove this assertion. Several Buddhist philosophical schools also attempted to
prove this assertion by developing various arguments against the extreme views of their main
opponent Sarvāstivāda. In this chapter, I will focus on the five arguments as developed by the
Yogācārins and evaluate how successfully they have established their object view of
intentionality.

Chapter 10. Rajam Raghunathan, On Nothing in Particular: Greek and Indian

Conceptions of Nothing

Abstract: “On Nothing in Particular” identifies one of the constraints involved in

conceptualizing nothing through a comparative analysis of Indian Nyāya and Ancient Greek
philosophical sources. While Nyāya philosophical texts distinguish between different categories
of absence, Ancient Greek sources distinguish between senses of the term ‘nothing.’ Both of
these categorization schemes, however, require a concept of nothing characterized by
particularity. For both of these traditions, thinking nothing involves the negation of some
delimited individual entity or set of entities. In addition to this analytical conceptualizing of
nothing in well-defined and delimited terms, however, both traditions also imply another sense
of nothing, one that resists philosophical categorization and even challenges apprehension. This
second sense of nothing is one that lacks particularity and is instead characterized by a lack of
limitation and boundlessness. From the cross-cultural historical analysis of the concept of
nothing in terms of Greek and Indian sources, I conclude that both philosophical traditions
identify particularity as a necessary condition for thinking nothing.

Japanese Philosophy

The Kyoto School

Kitarō Nishida, Keiji Nishitani, Hajime Tanabe

Chapter 11. John Krummel, Nishida, Anontology, and the Issue of Being and Nothing
Abstract: This chapter will explicate what Nishida means by “nothing” (mu 無), as well as
“being” (yū 有), through an exposition of his concept of the “place of nothing” (mu no basho).
We do so through an investigation of his exposition of “the place of nothing” vis-à-vis the self,
the world, and God, as it shows up in his epistemology, metaphysics, theology and religious
ethics during the various periods of his oeuvre – in other words, his understanding of nothingness
that he takes to be the root of the self, the world, and the religious notion of an absolute or God.
We will also indicate some of the sources of his notion from the Eastern and the Western
traditions. What unites his view to nothing from the different periods is an existential praxis, and
what I call an “anontology” that avoids reduction to either opposites of being and non-being (on-
mēon).

Chapter 12. Yasuo Deguchi, Emptiness as Image and Emptiness as Concept: The Later
Philosophy of Keiji Nishitani

Abstract: ‘Emptiness’ is the key word of Nishitani’s philosophy. In his later work, he began to
distinguish two aspects of emptiness: emptiness as image and emptiness as concept. In its aspect
of image, his notion of emptiness can be contrasted with Nishida’s idea of nothingness or
absolute nothingness. He was inspired by the double meaning of a Chinese word ‘空 (kong/ku)’;
i.e. ‘emptiness’ and ‘sky or heaven’. As ‘emptiness’ means ‘sky’, he claimed, emptiness is
perceivable as a visual image of the sky, and therefore can be directly given to us as a concrete
particular rather than an abstract idea. He thus explored the philosophical significance of
emptiness as image. This paper compares the later Nishitani’s thoughts on emptiness with those
of Chinese Buddhism, especially with the works of Jinzan, the leading figure of Chinese
Madhyamaka. It further argues that they shared some ideas that can be summarized in terms of
modern philosophy and logic as follows. On their view, there are two kinds of truth:
conventional truth and ultimate truth, the latter of which is true proposition about emptiness. In
this scheme, while negation in the realm of conventional truth indicates falsity, the negation of
ultimate truth is true. These ideas can be made sense of within the framework of contemporary
non-classical logic, especially the system of three-valued paraconsistent logic. They are thus
neither nonsensical nor irrational.

Chapter 13. Makoto Ozaki, On Tanabe's Dialectic of Absolute Nothingness

Abstract: Tanabe's Dialectic of Species is revised after World War II with the introduction of
the moment of repentance for evil. Contrary to Hegel, who regards the state’s (a political state or
nation) existence as the Kingdom of God realized in history, Tanabe asserts that the state’s
existence is inevitably involved in radical evil – what Kant calls human beings’ inescapable
innate tendency towards evil. Tanabe criticizes Hegel for his optimistic affirmation of the given
historical actuality as the self-manifestation of God without the full function of negation within
his dialectical system. For Tanabe, the state is not the realization of eternal truth in the actual
world, but is, in its authentic form of the realized universality, sustained through the individual's
subjective action mediated by Absolute Nothingness. Radical evil is inherently lurking in the
individual as well as in the state, and is to be negated and purified by the religious practice based
upon Absolute Nothingness. Human beings can realize Absolute Nothingness by understanding
their own nothingness. However, Absolute Nothingness does not directly operate upon the
individual, but only through the mediation of the state. The state’s existence as such is not
absolute, but is relative in the form of mediating balance between the ideal and the real, or
between the universal and the individual.
In Tanabe’s dialectic of Genus, Species, and the Individual, Absolute Nothingness
(genus), the state (species) and the individual are reciprocally intermediated. The state’s
existence qua the species-substratum has the duality of the realization of the genus-like
universality and the self-estrangement from it. The construction of the state’s existence is
negative in character, and as far as the state is perpetually renewed in and through its reformative
practice, it is made to exist through the mediation of the individual’s act of repentance for evil.

Japanese Zen

Chapter 14. Gereon Kopf, Strategies of Detachment: Dōgen, Ikkyū, Hakuin, and Menzan
on the Conception of 'Nothingness

Abstract: The philosophies associated with the Zen Buddhist tradition are generally known for
their subversive character. Throughout history, Zen Buddhist thinkers have developed linguistic
strategies designed to discourage dogmatism and the reification of concepts. To this end, they
utilize formula and phrases that reflect the impermanence of reality and communicate an attitude
of detachment. In this paper, I propose to analyze specifically the thought of four of the most
influential thinkers of the Japanese Zen Buddhist tradition representing both Rinzai Zen (Ikkyū
and Hakuin) and Sōtō Zen (Dōgen and Menzan) as well as the two most formative time periods
in Japanese Zen Buddhism, the Kamakura period (1185–1333) (Dōgen and Ikkyū) and the Edo
period (1603-1868) (Hakuin and Menzan). The goal of the paper will be to trace the effect of
these linguistic strategies on Zen metaphysics, psychology, and ethics.

Chinese Philosophy

Chinese Daoism

Chapter 15. JeeLoo Liu, Was There Something in Nothingness? The Debate on the
Primordial State between Daoism and Neo-Confucianism

Abstract: The notion of nothingness (wu) can be taken as either a cosmological or an

ontological concept. As a cosmological concept, it is contrasted with something and the issue is
whether there was something or nothing at the beginning of the cosmos. As an ontological
notion, it is contrasted with being and is closely associated with such notions as non-being and
emptiness. This paper deals with nothingness in the cosmological sense. In Daodejing, ‘wu’ is
sometimes used to signify something vague, elusive, formless, shapeless, inaudible, invisible,
and nameless. This undifferentiated something, which existed before heaven and earth, is what
Laozi calls “Dao.” It can be understood as nothingness since there was no object, no thing, no
shape nor form; however, it is not primordial absolute nothingness. Some neo-Daoists as well as
neo-Confucians identify this primordial something as “primordial qi” (yuan qi). This paper
examines whether there really could be primordial absolute nothingness.
Chapter 16. Chris Fraser, Using the Heart Like a Mirror: Applied Emptiness in the
Zhuangzi

Abstract: Previous research has identified three roles attributed to empty, vacant, or blank
psychological states in the early Daoist anthology Zhuangzi. Such “psychological emptiness” is
variously treated as instrumental to efficacious action, as an intrinsically valuable component of
a good life, and as a core feature of the radical ideal of the perfected agent who wholly merges
with nature. The present paper applies Foucault’s analytical framework of ethical relations to
examine the role of emptiness in the ascetic element in Zhuangist thought—what Foucault calls
the “ethical work.” For Foucault, “ethical work” comprises the “technologies of the self” by
which agents subject themselves to norms and transform themselves into ethical adepts. The
paper proposes that psychological emptiness is a core feature of a broadly Zhuangist conception
of ethical work. It then explores four questions: (1) What exactly are the “technologies of the
self” by which different parts of the Zhuangzi propose to undertake “ethical work”? (2) By what
processes or mechanisms do these technologies purport to function? (3) What are their supposed
psychological effects or results? (4) How do these effects have the instrumental and normative
consequences claimed for them? The Zhuangzi’s own analogy of “using the heart like a mirror”
proves helpful in articulating various Zhuangist views on these questions. The paper will include
both a descriptive reconstruction and a preliminary critical evaluation of these views.

Chapter 17. Xiaogan Liu, The Notion of Wu as Root of Universe and Guidance for Life

Abstract: The Chinese term “wu,” usually translated as “non-being,” is used in various ways in
ordinary language and in philosophical texts. The ancient Chinese philosophical text Laozi (also
known as Daodejing) is the first classical text that presents the notion of wu with multiple
philosophical meanings, in both metaphysical and non-metaphysical senses.
There are three major meanings of wu developed in the Laozi:
1) The origin or original state of the universe;
2) A feature of Dao (or the Way) as the opposition of you (being), which is simultaneously also a
feature of Dao. The combination of both wu and you constitutes the major character of Laozi’s
Dao;
3) The foundation of the guidance for real life, which opposes the values represented by you
(being) and its attendant harmful effects that are ignored and neglected by most people.
Generally speaking, there is no Platonic dichotomy between metaphysical kingdom and
empirical world in Chinese tradition. We should understand Daoist wu from both metaphysical
and experiential fields. Common interpretation of Daoist concept of wu was led by Wang Bi, the
most important commentator of the Laozi in ancient time, to a concept of absolute non-being,
which is the essence and another name of Dao that sustains all individual things, as beings. It
provides a new and important theory of wu.

Chapter 18. Alan K. L. Chan, On Embracing Nothingness in Neo-Daoist Philosophy

Abstract: The concept of nothingness (wu) forms a central thread in Daoist philosophy. At the
ethical level, it translates into a vision of an ideal sage who “embodies nothingness” (ti wu) and
is without affects (wuqing). This distinguishes sharply the Daoist from the Confucian view of
the sage. The interpretation of that ideal fueled the development of “Neo-Daoist” philosophy in
early medieval China. This chapter offers an analysis of a) the seminal ideas about the affectless
nature of the sage in Laozi and Zhuangzi, and b) the interpretation of several key leaders of the
Neo-Daoist movement, principally those of He Yan (d. 249 C.E.), Wang Bi (226–249 C.E.) and
Guo Xiang (d. 312 C.E.). The differences between them attest to the richness and complexity of
Neo-Daoist philosophy.

Chinese Buddhism

Chapter 19. Whalen Lai, Zero, One, All, and the Infinite

Abstract: Indian Mahayana Buddhism is founded upon the transcendental wisdom of “All is
Empty” (none, nil, zero, nothing). ‘Sunya’ (zero) is India’s gift to the world – a notion unknown
to Greek or Arabic mathematicians. Chinese Buddhists expanded on its meaning, indirectly
drawing on the Chinese tradition of Dao, Non-Being, and Yin-Yang Harmony. They could see
how universal Emptiness has successfully negated the Hinayana world that postulates as real the
many atomistic particulars. But they also accepted higher vistas expanding on this negative
sounding Emptiness. In Chinese Buddhism, there is a shift from the negative Emptiness to a
positive Absolute. The shift came about through an intermediate teaching of Non-Duality found
in the Vimalakirti Sutra.
The more positive truth of the One is established in the teaching of the One Vehicle of
the Lotus Sutra. This “Oneness” is presented as an all-inclusive Unity that subsumes the
traditional Three Vehicles. Instead of separating three modes or degrees in attaining
enlightenment, the Lotus Sutra conceives the Buddha as omniscient (knowing all), omnipresent
(present in unison of the past, present, and future), and all-powerful (in enabling everyone to
become enlightened). It thus posits a universal Buddha-Nature inherent in everyone. In the
wisdom formula of “Three is One, One is Three,” the One is, as it is in Plotinus, not a number
(among other numbers) but the source of all numbers.
The Huayan Sutra further turns the “One is Three; Three is One” formula into the
teaching of “All is One, One is All” – a still more grandiose worldview. This teaching evokes
the Infinite wherein every tiny part is at once the total whole. Under this view, a part of infinity
is itself no less infinite.
The essay will explain how this shift from the finite Many, via the Empty and the One, to
the Infinite came about.

Chapter 20. Chien-hsing Ho, Emptiness as Subject-Object Unity: Sengzhao on the Way
Things Truly Are

Abstract: Sengzhao, an early Chinese Mādhyamika, contends that all things are empty, and that
emptiness is not nonexistence. In addition, all things are deeply the same as supreme emptiness
(zhixu) qua the way things truly are. Sengzhao equates emptiness with ultimate truth, the way
(dao), nirvana, and even nonattachment. Now, does the notion of supreme emptiness refer to
some higher metaphysical reality? Is it a therapeutic expedient to cure our illness of attachment?
This paper explores Sengzhao’s notion of supreme emptiness, to show that the notion is not
metaphysical nor purely therapeutic. Instead, the notion points to a subject-object unity wherein
both oneself and the myriad objects are conceptually undifferentiated and harmoniously one.
Emptiness in this sense surely differs from nonexistence, yet questions arise regarding how to
view the relationships between oneself, the unity, and things in the world. The paper then
discusses the philosophical import of the notion as well as its implications for Sengzhao’s
Madhyamaka philosophy.

Korean Philosophy

Chapter 21. Halla Kim, Three Kinds of Nothingness in Korean Buddhism

Abstract: Since the late 14th century, there has been a growing consensus among the leading
Neo-Confucian scholars in Korea that Buddhism is fundamentally mistaken from the outset
because the Korean Buddhists’ emphasis on nothingness (Kong 空 or Mu 無) undermined the
very doctrinal foundations not only of Buddhism but also of Korean society. This paper is an
examination of the notion of nothingness in the thought of three important Buddhist philosophers
in Korea in this light.
For Wonhyo (617-686), everything in the world can be characterized as nothingness
(śūnyatā). Furthermore, our own nature as Thatagathagarbha can also be described as
nothingness, but here this characterization rather expresses the principle for liberating our souls
from the shackles of the mundane, material world. In this way, Wonhyo provided a fertile ground
for a metaphysic of nothingness. This is the first kind of nothingness in Korean Buddhism. Next,
Chinul (1158-1210), an eminent Zen master in the Koryŏ dynasty, calls the nature of the reality
that Zen seeks “the true mind (Chinshim 真心).” This can be characterized as ‘empty,’ but a
more positive characterization can be given by the concept of mysterious knowledge (Yŏngchi
靈知). The nature of the true mind is empty, serene, and knowledgeable. Chinul’s Zen Buddhism
thus placed the highest emphasis on the positive elements of nothingness. This is the second kind
of emptiness. Finally, while advocating the non-duality (不二) of everything, Bo’u (1301-1381),
also from the Koryŏ period, employs the Kanhwasŏn practice of observing a Hwadu 話頭
focusing on Mu (無) for the purpose of meditation.
I conclude that (i) the notion of nothingness played an important role in various schools
of Korean Buddhism, and that (ii) the Neo-Confucian attack on nothingness is ultimately
unfounded.

THE MARKET AND INTENDED AUDIENCE

This book is intended for adoption in advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in Asian
philosophy, metaphysics, comparative philosophy and religious studies. We are committed to
making not only the breadth of Asian philosophical discussions of “nothingness” available to
readers, but also to working with our contributors to make their individual essays accessible to
large audiences.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS: (By alphabetical order)

Douglas L. Berger, Associate Professor, Southern Illinois University Carbondale
Arindam Chakrabarti, Professor, University of Hawaii, Manoa
Alan K. L. Chan, Professor, Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Yasuo Deguchi, Professor, Kyoto University, Japan
Bronwyn Finnigan, Assistant Professor, Marquette University
Chris Fraser, Associate Professor, Hong Kong University, Hong Kong
Jay Garfield, Professor, Smith College, University of Melbourne, and Central University of
Tibetan Studies
Chien-hsing Ho, Associate Professor, Nanhua University, Taiwan
Halla Kim, Associate Professor, University of Nebraska at Omaha
Gereon Kopf, Associate Professor, Luther College
John Krummel, Assistant Professor, Hobart & William Smith Colleges
Whalen Lai, Professor, University of California, Davis
JeeLoo Liu, Associate Professor, California State University
Xiaogan Liu, Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong
Makoto Ozaki, Professor, Sanyo Gakuen University, Japan
Graham Priest, Professor, University of Melbourne, CUNY Graduate Center
Rajam Raghunathan, Assistant Professor, University of Hawaii, Manoa
Roy Sorensen, Professor, Washington University in St. Louis
Koji Tanaka, Senior Lecturer, University of Auckland
Sthaneshwar Timalsina, Associate Professor, San Diego State University
Zhihua Yao, Associate Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong