North American Philosophical Publications

Identity Is Simple
Author(s): Ken Akiba
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Source: American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37, No. 4 (Oct., 2000), pp. 389-404
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American Philosophical Quarterly
Volume 37, Number 4, October 2000

IDENTITY IS SIMPLE

Ken Akiba

In On the Plurality of Worlds (pp. 192 fact something else is; second, people tend
3), David Lewis says: to speak of identity when they are actually
is utterly dealing with something else, in particular,
Identity simple and unproblematic.
is identical to itself; nothing is mere coincidence. In the next few pages,
Everything
ever identical to anything else except itself. then, we shall encounter various examples
There is never any problem about what of these two kinds, although much more
makes something identical to itself; nothing of the second than the first. The discussion
can ever fail to be. And there is never any will reveal that even
if an object has some
problem about what makes two things iden? for instance, even if it
puzzling features,
tical; two things never can be identical. has (spaciously, or modally)
temporally,
One can readily agree that identity is a indeterminate borderlines, that does not

simple, obvious relation. But then why do affect the simplicity of its identity, and this
we have various identity puzzles such as claim is not refuted by the various argu?
puzzles about identity, personal ments that have been made against it, such
mind-body
and the identity of material ob? as Evans's (1978). At the end of this essay,
identity,
we shall confront
jects through time? Some of us claim that critically Kripke's argu?
the identity of things depends on time or ment in Naming and Necessity against the
the world in which they are located, and mind-body identity theory. Although
that there are temporary or contingent iden? Kripke has contributed more than anybody
tities. Some also claim that identity is not else to the clarification of the issues sur?
such a clear-cut matter because it is some? rounding identity, he has failed to see some
times indeterminate whether a is identical subtler points, and a major revision is nec?
to b; in other words, identities are some? essary for his theory to take them into
times vague. Is identity not really as simple account. Or so it is argued.
a relation as Lewis claims it to be? Some of the materials presented here (es?
Indeed it is a simple relation, and the pecially those in Section III) are already
main task of this paper is to show that those familiar to many. But the reader will see
who think otherwise are confused. There those familiar bits and pieces integrated
are at least two ways in which identity is into a unified picture concerning identity;
mistakenly considered to be a substantial in particular, the unification of the issues
and problematic subject: first, identity is about temporal and contingent identity
considered to be the main issue when in (Section III) and vague identity (Sections

389
 390 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

IV and V) will be of great significance. My once you give up Leibniz's Law, you are

hope is that the reader can obtain from this not talking about identity anymore.
article a better overall view of the issues This Law, the indiscernibility of
surrounding identity and related notions. identicals, must be clearly distinguished
from its contrary, the identity of
I. Preliminaries indiscernibles:

Before into the main If a and b share all properties, then they
launching argu?
it seems to mention a are identical
ment, necessary ~ -
of that are presumably (i.e., V*VyV(M[4> (x) $ (y)] x=y}).
couple things
unproblematic on the nature of identity. This principle is often considered not as
First, identity is a relation that can be ex? obviously true as Leibniz's Law,2 and need

pressed in an identity statement, a not be assumed for the purposes of this

statement whose standard formalization essay.
involves an identity sign "=." So, for in? We are now ready to examine the two
stance, "The flying
object sighted in ways mentioned above in which identity
Albuquerque yesterday is a spaceship from is mistakenly considered to be a problem?
Mars" is not a statement of identity; even atic relation.

though it involves the term "is," this "is"

is an "is" of predication. You may think II. Identity Puzzles

that this is a rather trivial point, and it cer? Let us consider briefly cases of the first
tainly is; but, as we shall see shortly, it is
kind, namely cases in which identity is
also very important because there is an?
mistakenly regarded as the main issue
other sense of identity in which the issues
when in fact something else should be.
about identity do not necessarily involve
Shortly after the passage just quoted, Lewis
identity relations.
(p. 193) makes an important observation:
Second, Leibniz's Law, the
of holds We do state plenty of genuine problems in
indiscernibility identicals, always
terms of identity. But we needn't state them
for identity:
so. Therefore they are not problems about
If a is identical to b, then for any property
identity.
(J),a has (|>if and only if b has (|)
(i.e., \/x\/yV${x=y
-
[^ (x)
-
$ (y)]}).
Lewis says this in the context of sorting
out good from bad questions about possible
Obviously f must be restricted to non
worlds, and he does not elaborate the point;
epistemic properties if you think that there
but what he says is true of most of the so
are such things as epistemic properties.1 called identity puzzles.
Suppose that that issue can be dealt with
As one of many examples, consider first
in a satisfactory manner. Then one should
personal identity. Demonstrably, the prob?
consider that Leibniz's Law is constitutive
lem of personal identity is not a problem
of the meaning of "identity"; it is, as it
about identity at all, at least not in the sense
were, an analytic truth. If two things are of identity relations. that Sally's
Suppose
identical, they must share all properties. Or, brain and Johnny's brain are switched in a
to put it the other way around, if there is at
surgery. Let us call the person who emerges
least one property a has and b does not,
after the surgery with Sally's brain and
then a and b are distinct. My view is that
Johnny's body "Jolly," and the person who
has Sally's body and Johnny's brain
 IDENTITYIS SIMPLE / 391

"Sanny." Then
the question is, Is Sally dered JFK, we say that we do not know
identical to Jolly or Sanny? Thus stated, the identity of the murderer. But the propo?
the question we are interested in seems to sition that Oswald murdered Kennedy does
be a genuine question about identity. But not involve an identity relation, so if we
it isn't really, because we can state the do not know whether Oswald murdered
question without using the notion of iden? Kennedy or not, what we do not know does

tity: Is Sally going to retain her brain or not concern any identity relation. This
body after the surgery?3 Thus stated, the loose usage is not at all confined to the

question turns out to be about just one per? identity of persons. Consider the term
son, Sally. You may, if you want, still say "UFO" (Unidentified Flying Object). We
that the question is about Sally's identity, do not know a UFO
what is (what it does,
in a loose sense of the word, but it is surely where it comes
from, etc.). This "is" need
not about identity relations. You can ask not be an "is" of identity relation: it may
analogous questions about Johnny, Jolly, as well be an "is" of predication. If you
and Sanny. Of course, if we conclude that have determined that the flying object
Sally is going to retain her brain after the sighted in Albuquerque yesterday was a
surgery, then since Jolly will have the same spaceship from Mars, then you may be said
brain and it is unlikely that two distinct to have determined the identity of the pre?
people have one and the same brain, we viously unidentified flying object, but no
may concludethat Sally is identical to (or identity relation is involved here. "Iden?
at least coincident with)4 Jolly. But this is tity" in this sense is similar to "nature." It
just an insignificant corollary of the genu? would be futile to object to this loose us?
inely significant conclusion that Sally is age from a philosophical standpoint, but it
going to retain her brain rather than her certainly seems to have contributed to the
body. Indeed, we do not have to introduce mistaken idea that
identity is a problem?
Jolly and Sanny into the story to consider atic relation. Indeed, as we shall see, it has
the crucial question. Even if we pose the made quite a number of
philosophers con?

question as
the question of identity be? fused between issues about objects and
tween Sally and Jolly or Sanny, what we issues about their identity. To repeat an
are really interested in, and what is diffi? earlier point, in this essay "identity" means
cult to answer, is not their identity or "identity relation," not what is caught in
non-identity but the question about what the loose sense of identity.
properties Sally is going to have after the Going back to Lewis's observation, a
surgery. We can deal with all similar second illustration of his general point is
thought experiments about personal iden? the identity of material objects through
tity in the same manner, i.e., without asking time. Take the famous Theseus's Ship for
about identity relations between persons or example. This Greek ship is at sea for a
even without introducing any extra persons long time and losing planks little by little.
into the picture. Whenever a plank is lost, a new plank is
We just saw an instance of the loose us? put to the same place. After a while, all the
age of the word "identity," according to planks are replaced with new ones, and the
which the question about Sally is the ques? Repaired Ship is still at sea. In the mean?
tion about Sally's identity. This loose usage time, all the old planks are gathered and
seems quite common. For instance, instead reassembled to make another which
ship,
of saying that we do not know who mur is subsequently exhibited in a museum.
392 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

Then the question is, Is Theseus's Ship about an identity relation, namely, whether
identical to the Repaired Ship or the Reas? or not Oswald is identical to John Doe (or
sembled Ship? At first sight, our main the murderer of JFK). But generally it is
interest in posing this question seems to not identity relations themselves that pose
be in the identity between the ships, but it difficult questions. There is no question
is not, because, again, the question we are about identity because it is such a simple
genuinely interested in can be stated without and obvious relation. What is difficult to
using the notion
of identity: Is Theseus's Ship answer, what is puzzling about the so

going all those new planks and stay

to have called identity puzzles, are not questions
at sea, or is it going to have the old planks about identity but questions about proper?
and be exhibited in a museum? ties of objects. In general, issues
Similarly, in the case of mind-body iden? concerning "identity conditions" or "cri?

tity, instead of asking if my mind is teria of identity" are not about identity
identical to my brain, we can ask if my relations at all.
mind has all those neurological (including
and ifmy brain III. Temporary and Contingent
spatio-temporal) properties
has all those mental Identity
properties. And instead
of asking if a certain mental property is
So much for the first of the two ways in
identical to some physical property, we can
which people mistakenly consider identity
ask if the former has certain second-order
to be a complicated and problematic rela?
physical properties that the latter is sup?
tion. The remainder of this essay will focus
posed to have. Once these issues about
on examples of the second way, that is,
properties are settled, then, together with cases in which people claim to be talking
certain plausible assumptions that we shall
about identity but they are not. Two ex?
discuss later, the identity or non-identity
between the mind and the body, or between amples will be considered in this section,
and a remaining example in the next two
the mental property and the physical prop?
sections. What will be discussed in this sec?
erty, follows as an immediate corollary.
tion may not be to many;
very new
The general point should be obvious by
however, in addition theto making
present
now. When we are interested in the ques?
study complete, it should prepare the reader
tion whether object a has property P, we
for what will come next, that is, the dis?
often give a name, say "&," to the object
cussion about vague identity and the
that has P (if it does not already have that
criticism of Kripke's theory; in particular,
name), and ask if a is identical to b, be?
it willbe shown that the argument against
cause, assuming that nothing in the
temporary and contingent identity can be
neighborhood distinct from b can have P,5
carried over to vague identity.
answering the identity6 question between
The friends of temporary or contingent
a and b virtually amounts to answering the
about a's For identity, such as George Myro (1986),
original question property.
Andr? Gallois (1998), and Allan Gibbard
instance, when we are interested in the
(1975), claim to respect Leibniz's Law but
question whether Oswald murdered JFK,
maintain that identity relations can change
we may give the person who murdered JFK
the name "John Doe" of
with respect to time or possible worlds. An
(or "the murderer
example often used to make this point is
JFK"); then instead of asking if Oswald the story of a statue and a piece of clay
murdered JFK, we may ask a question
that makes up the statue. In the temporal
 IDENTITY IS SIMPLE / 393

version of the story, a statue of a giant is In response to such claims, Kripke (1980,
created with a piece of clay. The statue is p. 3) gave a simple but conclusive proof
called "Goliath," and the whole piece of that there can be no such thing as contin?
clay is called "Lumpl." When the statue is gent identity; that identity is necessary.7
created at time
tv
Goliath is identical to The proof goes as follows: Take any ob?

Lumpl. But later at time Goliath loses jects a and b. that they are
tv Suppose
its right hand. The statue
is still Goliath, identical. (So they are actually not two
but since a part of the clay is gone, and the objects but one.) Obviously, any object is
whole piece of clay is Lumpl, Lumpl does necessarily identical to itself. So, in par?
not exist anymore. So at
t2,
Goliath is not ticular, a is necessarily identical to a. But

Lumpl. Or, in another scenario, Goliath is we have Leibniz's Law: if a and b are iden?
flattened at
tr Goliath does not exist any? tical, then
for any property <|>,a has <|>if
more, but Lumpl still exists, although in a and only if b has <|>. Take ? as being neces?
different shape. So, again, at f, Goliath is sarily identical to a. a has this property,
not Lumpl. In sum, at Goliath is identi? and b is identical to a; so b also must have
tv
cal to Lumpl; at f, Goliath is not identical this property. Therefore, b must be neces?
to Lumpl. The identity relation changes: sarily identical to a. This shows that if a
the identity between Goliath and Lumpl is and b are identical, then they must be nec?

temporally indeterminate. essarily identical; that it is impossible for

We can make a similar
story for modal potentially two objects to be identical but
indeterminacy. In this case, the top half of only contingently so. Contingent identity
Goliath is made of one piece of clay, and is impossible.
the bottom half is made of another piece. We can give
an analogous proof that tem?
Then at are put together for
tv these pieces porary identity is impossible. Just replace
the first time. Again, the statue is called "necessarily" in Kripke's proof with "eter?
"Goliath" and the whole piece of clay is nally." Assuming that a exists, a is
called "Lumpl." Later at tv is the statue eternally identical to a. So if b is identical
smashed into pieces. Goliath does not ex? to a, then, by Leibniz's Law, b also must
ist anymore, nor does Lumpl. In this case, be eternally identical to a. Thus temporary
Goliath exists exactly as long as Lumpl identity is impossible.
does; so Goliath is eternally, not just tem? These proofs are conclusive. But then
porarily, identical to Lumpl. However, we what are the friends of temporary or con?
can imagine a possible world in which tingent identity doing? They are in fact
Goliath does not have its right hand; that dealing with relations different from iden?
part of
clay is missing. In this possible tity. It is partly a terminological issue
world, Goliath still exists but not Lumpl. whether or not those relations are to be
In another possible world, Lumpl exists but called temporary and contingent identity.
as another statue, and there is no Goliath. use a better term:
Philosophers nowadays
In this possible world, Lumpl exists but not (temporary and modal) coincidence.*
Goliath. Therefore, Goliath is identical to Goliath and Lumpl temporally coincide at
Lumpl in the actual world but distinct in tx
in the first story, and modally coincide
some other possible worlds; the identity in the actual world in the second story.
between Goliath and Lumpl is modally in? Whatever these relations are called, they
determinate, or, in other words, it is a are not genuine, or strict, identity.9 For ease

contingent identity. of understanding, consider physical objects

394 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

as if they were four-dimensional, spatio On the standard view of

vagueness,
temporal hunks of matter for the first story. vagueness exists only in language and
Goliath and Lumpl, though overlapping at thought, not in the non-linguistic world;
are distinct hunks of matter. For the sec? vagueness a complex
is basically form of
tv
ond story, we need to add to the picture referential indeterminacy. Predicates such
the fifth, modal dimension. Then consider as "is bald," "is red," and "is tall" and sin?
five-dimensional hunks of matter. Again, gular terms such as "the East Coast" and
Goliath and Lumpl are distinct hunks of "Clinton's body" are vague because it is
matter. (Here no stance against three indeterminate which
precise extensions or
dimensionalism being istaken; referents they should
have. Suppose that I
three-dimensionalists can interpret the situ? have a shaggy cat called "Tibbies." Tibbies
ations in their own terms.) To be identical, is shedding her hair all the time. Even if
two things must be completely indiscern? we focuson one particular moment, it is
ible: two must be one. Goliath
and Lumpl quite unclear which hair belongs to Tibbies
are indiscernible at or in the actual world, and which does not at that moment. The
tx
but not completely. The existence of tem? name "Tibbies" should refer to some ma?

porally or modally coincident objects, thus, terial mass, but which hairs of the cat
does not show that identity can be indeter? should be counted as a part of the material
minate. What is here called coincidence is mass and which should not? There is no

by no means a dubious relation; it is a per? determinate answer. So the name "Tibbies"

fectly intelligible relation. It is just not the is an indeterminate singular term. On the
same as identity. Identical things ought to standard view, this just shows that the sin?
be coincident at every moment or in every gular term "Tibbies" involves referential

possible world. Coincidence and non-iden? indeterminacy: it may refer to a precise

tity (or identity) can coexist in harmony.10 material mass including one set of hairs,
or itmay refer to another precise material
IV. Vague Identity mass another set of hairs, and so
including
on. There is no fact of the matter which
Identity cannot be temporally or modally
material mass it definitely refers to.
indeterminate. But some people, such as
The advocates of vague objects take ex?
Terence Parsons (1987), Peter Woodruff
ception to this view and claim that the term
(Parsons and Woodruff 1995, Woodruff and
"Tibbies" is vague because the cat Tibbies
Parsons 1997), Peter van Inwagen (1988,
is a vague object, a feline physical object
1990), andMichael Tye (1990), claim that whose boundaries are
can be indeterminate or vague in spatio-temporal
identity
vague. (They do not need to deny that there
another way, namely when indeterminate
is vagueness also in language. Their point
or vague objects are involved. For instance,
is that vagueness is not confined to lan?
in the paper titled "Entities without iden?
guage.) if cats and dogs
But are vague
tity" (p. 2), Parsons advocates the view
objects, so are humans; we constantly gain
"that there can be entities to which iden?
and lose cells. And so are many inanimate
tity sometimes fails to apply," the view
physical objects, such as tables and chairs,
"according to which there is sometimes no
because they also lose and even gain some
answer to the question whether or not x and
molecules, and it is quite unclear which
y are the same." We now turn to this view.
molecules on the surfaces of these objects
In what follows the words "vague" and "in?
belong to the objects and which do not. It
determinate" will be used interchangeably.
 IDENTITYIS SIMPLE / 395

is just a matter of degree how vague these tity. Take the three-valued system devel?
objects are. Thus the world is full of vague oped by Parsons and Woodruff, which is

objects. arguably the most complete theory of the

Many advocates of vague objects, such kind now available to us.12 In the system
as Parsons and Woodruff,11 furthermore Parsons and Woodruff give the following
contend that the identity of vague objects definition of indeterminate identity:
can itself be vague. More precisely, they it is indeterminate whether a is identical to
contend that the identity statement "a is b iff there is no property such that a has it
identical to b" can be indeterminate in truth and b lacks it (or vice versa), and there is
value if "a" or "&" is a name of a vague some property that one of them has or lacks
object. and such that the other is indeterminate with

Certainly can be sympathetic

one to the respect to having it. (Parsons and Woodruff
view that there are vague objects in the 1995, p. 181; see also Woodruff and Parsons

world, but disagree with the claim that the 1997, p. 327)

identity of such objects can be vague or This definition is quite as a

inappropriate
indeterminate. A version of Kripke's proof definition of identity. According to this
shows that the latter claim cannot be cor? definition, it can be indeterminate whether
rect. Just replace "necessarily" in Kripke's a vague object is identical to a precise ob?
original proof with "determinately." Sup? ject; but, of course, no vague blob can be
pose that a is identical to b. a is identical to a precise blob. Generally, a
identical to a.
determinately So, by conception of indeterminate identity of this
Leibniz's Law, b also must be determi? kind invites the following counter-argu?
nately identical to a. Thus the identity ment: that the only difference
Suppose
between a and b cannot be indeterminate. between objects a and b is that a has a cer?
The existence of vague objects and the tain property P, while b is indeterminate
vagueness of their identity are distinct is? with respect to having P. Then according
sues, to be treated separately. The to the Parsons-Woodruff definition,
following example suggests that these is? whether a is identical to b or not is inde?
sues are indeed distinct, and that even if terminate. But, on reflection, there is a
there are vague objects, their identity can? property b has and a
lacks, namely the
not be vague. Imagine a blob that has no of being indeterminate with re?
property
clear boundary and fades into the back? spect to having P. So, after all, a and b must
ground. Still, this blob is identical only to be distinct.
itself and distinct from any blob, precise Gareth Evans's (1978) famous reductio
or vague, that is distinguishable from this indeterminate is
argument against identity
blob. Even a blob with a slightest differ? in fact just a special instance of this gen?
ence in fading is distinct from this blob. If eral argument: Suppose that it is
we find one object in the neighborhood, indeterminate whether a is identical to b.
that object is determinately identical to it? But it is determinate that a is identical to
self, whereas if we find two objects, they a. So there is a property
indeed a has and
are determinately distinct from each other. b lacks, namely the property of being de?
This is true whether those objects are pre? identical to a.13 Therefore, a
terminately
cise or vague. and b must be distinct, after all.14
Let us consider how these observations As the title of Evans's "Can there
paper
apply to an actual theory of vague iden be vague Evans took
objects?" suggests,
 396 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

his argument to show that vague or inde? whether Theseus's Ship is identical to the
terminate objects are impossible, but it Repaired Ship. These claims are intended
does not show that; it only shows that in? to mean not just that we do not know the
determinate identity is impossible. Note answer, but that there is no fact of the mat?
that Evans's argument is in fact just the ter whether the two things in question are

contrapositive of the Kripkean proof dis? identical or not.

cussed earlier. Kripke's proof is completely Admittedly, we do say such things, but

general and does not concern what kinds there is a good analysis of those statements
of objects there are; consequently, it does that does not commit us to indeterminate
not demonstrate the impossibility of vague identity: When we
say, for instance, that it

objects. Neither can Evans's proof show is indeterminate whether or not Sally is
that vague objects are impossible. identical to Jolly, what we are saying is not

Why do so many people fail to distin? that the proposition that Sally is identical

guish the issue of vague objects and the to Jolly is indeterminate in truth value, but
issue of vague identity? The answer seems rather that the sentence "Sally is identical
to be that many people simply tend to to Jolly" is indeterminate. That is, our
conflate these issues in the first place, in a
claim is metalinguistic claim.
major part because of the two senses of To see that this is the correct analysis,
identity discussed earlier. In the loose, let us ask ourselves what the name "Sally"

popular sense of identity, the issue of vague refers to. More specifically, what four-di?

objects is the issue of their vague identity. mensional hunk of matter does"Sally"
But this draws
people into
thinking that refer to? The name cannot to just a
refer
vague objects must have vague identity in four-dimensional hunk of matter17 whose
the other, relational sense of identity, the temporal dimensionextends only as far as
sense we are concerned with in this essay. the time of
the surgery, because if it did,
It seems that Evans was also a victim of then, of course, the hunk of matter that the
this fallacious reasoning.15 This fallacy was name "Sally" referred to would be defi?
further reinforced because Evans's argu? nitely distinct from the hunk of matter that
ment has attracted so much attention, and the name "Jolly" referred to, the extension
many people have fallen into Evans's path. of the latter covering some period after the
Parsons and Woodruff are hardly the only surgery. So the name "Sally" should refer
ones who made this mistake; everyone in? to a hunk of matter that extends even fur?
volved in this issue seems to have made ther than the time of the surgery. But
the same mistake.16 exactly how does it extend? The truth is:
there is no fact of the matter about it.
V Indeterminacy in Sentence and One thing we learned from the Kripke
Proposition Putnam of reference is that the
type theory
world must cooperate with us when we
My claim that no identity statement is
make a successful reference. We can call
indeterminate in truth value may seem
the clear liquid in a glass "water" and re?
counterintuitive. You may say that in some
fer to all aggregates in the world,
cases, such as Sally's case and the case of H20
partly because the liquid in the glass is an
Theseus's Ship, it is indeed indeterminate
aggregate, and all those aggregates are
whether or not two are identical: it H20
things the same stuff.18 When we first called a
is indeterminate whether or not Sally is
heavenly body "Hesperus," we did not
identical to Jolly, and it is indeterminate
 IDENTITY IS SIMPLE / 397

know to what four-dimensional hunk of and if you find two blobs, though maybe
matter we referred. Hadwe known, we overlapping each other, you will say that
would have known right then and there that Sally is definitely distinct from Jolly.
Hesperus was identical to Phosphorus. This Let us consider one more example, taken
kind of ignorance is common, because from David Lewis (1988), that helps us
when we
refer to something, we usually do understand the difference between
linguis?
not know all its aspects, all the facts that tic andobjective determinacy. The

pertain to it. Nonetheless, by the word assumption of the example is that while

"Hesperus," we could refer to the four-di? Princeton Borough is a precise area,

mensional hunk of matter created by the Princeton is not. Now, consider the sen?

trajectory of the planet Venus, partly be? tence "Princeton is identical to Princeton
cause it is a part of that hunk that we were Borough"; is it determinate? The answer
to in the evening when we uttered depends on how you think of the word
pointing
the word "Hesperus" for reference, and that "Princeton." On the one hand, if you think
hunk is made of basically the same stuff. that Princeton is itself a vague area and the
In Sally's case, however, the world does word "Princeton" determinately refers to
not cooperate; there is no obvious four-di? this area, then
the sentence expresses a
mensional hunk that extends further than single proposition and is determinately
the time of the
surgery. As a result, the false, because no vague area can be identi?
name "Sally" does not have a determinate cal to a precise area, i.e., Princeton
reference. Nor does the name "Jolly." Thus Borough. On the other hand, if you think
the sentence "Sally is identical to Jolly" that the word "Princeton" indeterminately
does not express a single precise proposi? refers to various areas,
precise then the
tion and can be true or false depending on sentence does not express a single propo?
what "Sally" and "Jolly" refer to. That is, sition, and whether it is true or not is
the sentence "Sally is identical to Jolly" is indeterminate because it is true if the word
indeterminate in truth value. And this must "Princeton" refers to the same area
be what you mean when you say, some? "Princeton Borough" refers to, but is false
what carelessly, that it is indeterminate otherwise. This fits the intuition we gen?
whether Sally is identical to Jolly, because, erally have that when we say that Princeton
as you now must agree, you are not using is (definitely) different from Princeton
the terms "Sally" and "Jolly" determinately. Borough, we are talking about the areas
The fact that the indeterminacy in ques? themselves, whereas when we say that it
tionis linguistic rather than objective can is indeterminate whether or not Princeton
be made more obvious by the following is identical to Princeton Borough, we are
consideration: Suppose that we fix the ref? somehow talking not about the areas them
erents of the names "Sally" and "Jolly" by selves but the usage of the words

explicit stipulation. The boundaries of "Princeton" and "Princeton

Borough," say?
those referents may be vague. Then, will ing that they can be used to refer not only
you still say that it is indeterminate whether to one and the same area but also to differ?

Sally is identical to Jolly? No, you won't, ent areas.

because even if Sally and Jolly are vague In sum, an identity sentence can be inde?
four-dimensional blobs, if you find only terminate in truth value if it involves
one blob in the neighborhood, you will say referential indeterminacy and thus does not
that Sally is definitely identical to Jolly, express a single proposition, but no identity
398 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

proposition can be indeterminate in truth just by considering the nature of identity

value even if it involves references to in? statements, we can say something substan?
determinate objects.19 tive about the subject matter; for instance,
that a C-fiber stimulation cannot have men?
VI. Against Kripke tal properties.

Having observed this, we move on to two

Our full use
of Kripke's proof counts
more significantpoints: First, many of the
against the advocates of less-than-strict
identity questions that Kripke discusses,
identities. But at the same time their
even taken as they are, are not genuine
claims, taken as pertaining to coincidence,
questions about identity but actually ques?
are unaffected by Kripke's argument. It
tions about coincidence in the actual world.
seems that Kripke (1980) failed to appre?
Second, the rigidity of proper names does
ciate the significance of coincidence, and,
not help answer genuine identity questions.
as a result, overestimated the force of his
Hesperus and Phosphorus are indeed
own theory. To end this essay, I would like
genuinely identical, but this is a special,
to show that Kripke's theory of proper
though not uncommon, case. It is easy to
names has much less significance than is
see why. For the sake of discussion, sup?
often believed for the issues involving
pose again that Goliath is a statue and
identity. Arguably, many of the identity
Lumpl is a piece of clay. Suppose also that
questions that Kripke discusses are not
Smith has two pieces of clay, which he
genuine questions about identity but actu?
believes will acquire a horrifying magical
ally questions about coincidence. As a
power when combined, and he calls the
consequence of this confusion, Kripke's
resulting piece "Lumpl." A sculptor steals
argument against the mind-body identity
these two pieces of clay and, as in the sec?
theory fails. One of Kripke's main theses,
ond case before, makes the top half and the
the claim that proper names are just mean?
bottom half of the giant, creating Goliath
ingless "tags," cannot be sustained either.
by putting them together. Smith discovers
Kripke discusses many identity ques?
the statue and wonders, Is Goliath Lumpl?
tions: Is Hesperus to Phosphorus?
identical
Smith later finds out that it is, and smashes
Is the length of stick 5 one meter? Is G?del
the statue. In this case, finding out that
the man who discovered the incomplete?
Goliath is Lumpl is just like finding out
ness of arithmetic? Is pain identical to a
that Hesperus is Phosphorus, but what
C-fiber stimulation? and so on. My
prelimi?
Smith finds out is not really the identity of
nary remark is that all or at least most of
Goliath and Lumpl but merely their coin?
those questions can actually be recast with?
cidence because, as we saw, they are not
out mentioning identity, as observed
identical but only coincident. Note that the
earlier. For instance, instead of asking, Is
term "coincident" is a technical term that
G?del identical to the man who discovered
interprets some of our mundane uses of the
the incompleteness of arithmetic? we can
term "is" or "is identical to": when we say
ask, Did G?del discover the incomplete? "a is, or is identical to, b" we may be just
ness of arithmetic? Instead of asking, Is
saying that they are coincident in the ac?
Hesperus identical to Phosphorus? we can
tual world, or, for short, actually
ask, Do we see Hesperus near the east ho?
coincident.
rizon just before the sunrise? Does
The alleged fact that the terms "Goliath"
Hesperus draw such and such a trajectory?
and "Lumpl" are proper names and thus
and so on.20 So it is hard to believe that
 IDENTITY IS SIMPLE / 399

rigid designators does not help. According use the statement "S* is one meter" to fix
to Kripke, a singular term is a rigid desig? the reference of "one meter." This state?
nator if and only if it refers to the same ment, although flanked by two rigid
object in all possible worlds, and all proper designators, is a true but contingent state?
names are rigid designators. "Goliath" and ment. The reason is that this statement is

"Lumpl" are presumably rigid designators intended not as a statement of identity but
because "Goliath" refers to the same statue rather as a statement of coincidence: 5* and
and "Lumpl" refers to the same piece of one meter coincide in the actual world but

clay in all possible worlds. Each of them not in other worlds where the stick is longer
refers to the same object throughout the or shorter than it actually is. In general, if
worlds but the objects to which they refer we fix the reference of a term (as opposed
are different. The rigidity of proper names to giving it a meaning) by using some ob?
does not make actually coincident objects ject, the referent and the reference-fixer
identical. coincide in the actual world without nec?
Doubtless, even in the Hesperus/Phos? essarily being identical. And it is irrelevant

phorus case, what we discovered initially how the reference-fixer to, for
is referred
is that Hesperus and Phosphorus are coin? instance, whether it is referred to by a defi?
cident in the actual world. But what is nite description or a proper name.
different in this case is that the term Kripke's failure in appreciating coinci?

"Hesperus" is understood as referring to dence is most vivid in his treatment of the

the same heavenly body in all possible mind-body identity theory. Kripke's gen?
worlds and the term "Phosphorus" is also eral strategy for rebutting the identity
understood as referring to the same heav? theory is as follows: He first notes that al?
enly body in all possible worlds. Usually though the identity theorists claim that the
no distinct heavenly bodies coincide. So identity between themind and the body is
we conclude that Hesperus and Phospho? contingent, this claim cannot be correct,
rus must be identical. because no genuine identity statement, a
We cansay something similar about statement flanked by two rigid designators,
Kripke's famous "stick S" example. We fix is contingent. If the mind and the body are
the reference of "one meter" by using the identical, they must be necessarily so. Then

special stick, stick S, and declaring "The Kripke gives an argument that the mind and
length of 5 at time t is one meter long." the body are not necessarily identical.
Kripke claims that this is a contingent a Therefore, Kripke concludes, they are not
priori statement, although, as we have identical.
seen, according to Kripke, no true identity We do not need to evaluate Kripke's
here
statement is contingent. Kripke justifies the argument against the necessary identity of
contingency of this apparent identity state? the mind and the body. The more impor?
ment by saying that the expression "the tant point in the present context is that
length of S at t" is not a rigid designator. although identity is necessary, as Kripke
But this justification is inadequate. Why points out, coincidence is not; the identity
can we not give a proper name to the length theorists' claim that the identity between
of S at There is no reason we cannot. the mind and the body is contingent can
txl
Suppose that we call the length of S at be, and should be, understood as a claim
tx
"S*."21 We assume that "one meter" is also not of identity but of coincidence. The
a rigid designator. Then imagine that we mind and the body coincide in the actual
400 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

world, if not in some other worlds?this is the worlds, or two actually coincident but
the most natural interpretation of the iden? distinct things. If, as Kripke claims, proper
tity theory. And, as we saw, the rigid names are just meaningless tags that di?
references to the mind and the body do not rectly attach to their referents, how can this
eliminate this possibility. We can save the happen? The truth is that proper names are
identity theory from Kripke's attack just not suchtags. What kinds of things they
by interpreting the claims of the theory are to refer to are up their sleeves.
about identity as those pertaining to coin? This assertion is not particularly origi?
cidence. Whether the identity theory, thus nal. Alan Sidelle (1989,1992a, 1992b) has
understood, is plausible or not is a matter been arguing for essentially the same point
that goes beyond the scope of this essay for some time. Also a number of people,
and cannot be discussed here.22 such as Papineau (1979), Dupr? (1981),
Even one of Kripke's main theses suf? Devitt (1981), and Sterelny (1983), have
fers from his inattention to coincidence. As pointed out a similar problem, often called
we saw, the rigidity of proper names does the "qua problem":23 when we introduce a
not help determine the identity of actually proper name in a "baptizing" ceremony,
coincident objects. Goliath and Lumpl can our causal (e.g., perceptual) contact with
coincide without being identical because an object is not sufficient to fix the object
Goliath is a statue while
Lumpl is a piece as the referent of the name because we have
of clay, and a statue and a piece of clay causal contact with many different objects
can just coincide. Hesperus and Phospho? in such a situation (similarly for natural
rus cannot just coincide without being kind terms). So a pure causal theory of ref?
identical because both are heavenly bod? erence grounding cannot be sustained;
ies, and no two heavenly bodies can just what we intend to refer to when we intro?
coincide. Generally, even if a and b actu? duce a name seems to matter.
ally coincide, and even if terms "a" and Therefore, Kripke's theory of proper
"&" are rigid designators and thus refer to names is neither correct nor effective in
the same things in all possible worlds, we solving the problems it claims to solve. It
may not know whether a is identical to b has been argued here that identity itself is
or not unless and until the question "Same a simple, unproblematic relation. But this
whatT is answered. "Hesperus," as well does not mean that the problems often as?
as "Phosphorus," refers to the same heav? sociated with identity will disappear. They
enly body; "Goliath" refers to the same arise in other forms, for instance, as prob?
statue; "Lumpl" refers to the same piece lems for coincidence. It is nonetheless

of clay; "S*" refers to the length of the important to locate correctly the sources
same stick; "one meter" refers to the same of the problems. Hopefully, this essay has
abstract length. Depending on what kinds shown that they are not in the notion of
of things two names refer to, they can re? identity.24
fer to one and the same thing throughout
University of Missouri?Columbia
 IDENTITYIS SIMPLE / 401

NOTES

1. For instance, although Hesperus is identical to Phosphorus, Hesperus does, and Phosphorus
does not, have the putative epistemic property being believed by everybody to be identical to
Hesperus.

2. The principle may still be true, but even in that case we need a substantive argument for it. See,
e.g., Black (1952).
3. If you think that the term "her" (i.e., Sally's) in the phrase "in her brain or body" might be
tacitly appealing to the notion of identity, then just replace the phrase with "that brain or that
body," and point to the brain and the body Sally has before the surgery while uttering this phrase.
Alternatively, you may give proper names to the brain and the body.

4. The difference will be explained later.

5. Because of this extra assumption, the question about the identity between a and b will not be
equivalent to the question about a9s property.

6. Again, we set aside, for the moment, the question whether this is indeed identity or just coin?
cidence.

7. Marcus (1961) gave the same proof earlier.

8. People also use the terms "co-location" and "(material) constitution." In my usage, "coinci?
dence" and "co-location" are synonymous and stand for a symmetric relation, but not
"constitution": if a coincides (or co-locates) with b, then b coincides (co-locates) with a. "Con?
stitution" implies coincidence (or co-location), but means something more.

9. For arguments to this effect, see, e.g., Wiggins (1968), Thompson (1983), and Johnston (1992).
Some, such as Burke (1992), Heller (1990), van Inwagen (1990), and Zimmerman (1995), try to
throw doubt on the possibility of coincidence by posing the following question: How can two
things indiscernible at one moment (such as Goliath and Lumpl) have different persistence con?
ditions (Goliath surviving, and Lumpl not surviving the loss of ? ?^rt of the clay)? They find the
answer "By belonging to different sorts (Goliath to the sort statue and Lumpl to the sort hunk,
say)" unsatisfactory. Admittedly, if one just gives this answer and does not say what each sort
consists in, i.e., the essential features of the sort, as these critics assume, then the answer is

unsatisfactory. But we can give an account of such features, so this objection is not at all con?
For a somewhat similar response, as well as responses to some other to
vincing. objections
coincidence, see Rea (1997a).
10. One may question our exclusion initial
of epistemic properties from Leibniz's Law: If
modal properties
alethically two otherwise make indiscernible objects distinct, why do not
epistemically modal properties (assuming that they exist) do the same? However, my point here
is a rather innocent one: we should distinguish different degrees (or kinds) of indiscernibility.
Indiscernible at a time and indiscernible in a possible world are weaker than the indiscernibility
attributed to identical things, whereas indiscernible in all epistemically possible worlds is stron?
ger. (Hesperus and Phosphorus are identical but, one might claim, not indiscernible in all
epistemically possible worlds, i.e., it is possible that one believes that Hesperus and Phosphorus
are distinct.) If you like, you may call the indiscernibility in all epistemically possible worlds
(say) "super-identity." Which notion is properly called "identity" should at least partly be based
on the factual question about people's opinion about the use of the term, and it seems certain that
they would agree with the use defended here.
402 / AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICALQUARTERLY

11. True, Parsons and Woodruff (see, e.g., 1995, note 3) avoid using the term "vague object"
because it suggests only objects that have fuzzy spatio-temporal boundaries. In this essay vague
objects are understood very broadly, as objects that are indeterminate with respect to having
some precise properties. (For a discussion of circularity involved in this informal definition, see
Akiba 2000.) Objects with fuzzy spatio-temporal boundaries are typical, but not the only, vague
objects. On this broad interpretation of vague objects, then, Parsons andWoodruff can be consid?
ered foremost advocates of vague objects.

12. For instance, van Inwagen (1990, pp. 294-5, note 87), who developed another system earlier
(1988), concedes the superiority of Parsons's (1987) system, which is a precursor of the system
under discussion.

13. Conversely, you can say that there is a property b has and a lacks, namely the property of
being indeterminate with respect to being identical to a. This may make clearer the fact that
Evans's argument is a special instance of the general argument given above.
14. Parsons and Woodruff do not give an adequate response to Evans's argument. They point out
that Evans's argument uses not Leibniz's Law itself but its contrapositive, and they propose to
give up the latter. But this reply is inadequate. The contrapositive of Leibniz's Law, i.e., if there
is at least one property a has and b lacks, then a and b are distinct, is as essential to identity as
Leibniz's Law itself. We do not make a distinction between the Law and the contrapositive sim?
ply because they are equivalent in classical logic. In addition, the Kripkean argument noted earlier
makes use of Leibniz's Law itself, not the contrapositive. As we saw earlier, if you give up
Leibniz's Law, or its contrapositive in this regard, then you are not talking about identity any
more. So Parsons and Woodruff's theory, interesting as it is, is not about identity. My view is that
they are dealing with some kind of coincidence, although this claim cannot be justified here. In
Akiba (2000) I put forth the idea that vagueness can be treated as a kind of coincidence. The
system developed there endorses supervaluationism rather than three-valued logic, but it seems
that the Parsons-Woodruff system can be interpreted in a similar manner.
15. A more charitable reading of Evans may be possible, however. Evans (p. 208) prefaces his
argument with the following remark:

It is sometimes said that the world might itself be vague. Rather than vagueness being a defi?
ciency in our mode of describing the world, it would then be a necessary feature of any true
description of it. It is also said that amongst the statements which may not have a determinate
truth value as a result of their vagueness are identity statements. Combining these two views we
would arrive at the idea that the world might contain certain objects about which it is a fact that
they have fuzzy boundaries. But is this idea coherent?

On the charitable reading, Evans may be thought to be just operating on the assumption that these
common opinions are correct without really committing himself to them. However, Evans does
not indicate even a slightest doubt about these opinions. This inclines me to think that he indeed
believed in their correctness.

16. In response to this provocative claim, a reviewer wonders if a more charitable interpretation
is again possible: "But it seems to me that Parsons et al might respond as follows: Look, we are
not interested in identity in the strict sense of Lewis; that is an obvious and uninteresting rela?
tion. We are interested in a looser sense of identity (something like coincidence) because questions
of identity in the loose sense are interesting (because their answers are not obvious). . . .This
seems certainly more plausible than supposing that just about everybody was confused." The
problem with this interpretation is that nobody has actually said anything like that, and nobody
(except Akiba 2000) has made the distinction between the strict and loose senses of identity.
(Incidentally, this loose sense is different from the one discussed in Section II.) On the contrary,
 IDENTITY IS SIMPLE / 403

when people talked about the possibility of vague identity, they talked as if they were talking
about one familiar thing, i.e., identity. So I stand by my uncharitable interpretation.
17. Again, three-dimensionalists can make the same point in their own terms, so there is no
commitment to four-dimensionalism here.

18. This is just a part of the story, and, as we shall see later, the mechanism of referring to the
same thing (or stuff) is not that simple because there can be different senses of "the same thing."
But that complication will not affect my point here: the world also must cooperate for a success?
ful reference.

19. One additional

point is that there is another interpretation of "it is indeterminate whether
Sally to
is identicalJolly," which is to interpret "is identical to" not as strict identity but as a kind
of coincidence, along the line suggested in note 14. Then the proposition expressed in the sen?
tence will be true. See Akiba (2000) for details.

20. To repeat the previous point, this does not make the positive answer to the former question of
identity equivalent to the conjunction of the answers to the latter questions.

21. Nothing in Kripke's theory prevents us from introducing rigid designators as we wish. In?
deed, Kripke himself freely introduces rigid designators whenever necessary. To give just one
example, Kripke (p. 149) says "if 'C-fibers' is not a rigid designator, simply replace it by one
which is, or suppose it used as a rigid designator in the present context."

22. In note 74 (p. 145) Kripke mentions Wiggins's (1968) view on coincidence, but his comment
is too brief to be fully intelligible. Kripke says that a further discussion must be left for another
place, but I am unaware of any such later discussion by Kripke.
23. Geach (1957,1962) maintained a similar view before the development of the causal theory of
reference. In note 58 (pp. 115-6) Kripke discusses Geach's view, but, here again, the discussion
is regrettably compressed.

24.1 thank Tomoji Shogenji, Lisa Warenski, and the editor and referees of The American Philo?
sophical Quarterly for valuable comments. I have come to know Sider (1999) after finishing this
essay.

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