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THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 124074. January 27, 1997.]

RESEARCH and SERVICES REALTY, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS

and MANUEL S. FONACIER, JR., Respondents.

Manuel M. Lazaro and Felipe S. Aldana for Petitioner.

Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., for Private Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL ETHICS; LAWYER-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP; COMPENSATION OF

ATTORNEYS; AGREEMENT AS TO FEES; CONTRACT OF RETAINER IN CASE
AT BAR; CONSTRUED. — An analysis of the contract clearly shows that it was a
general retainer since its primary purpose was to secure beforehand the services of the
private respondent for any legal problem which might afterward arise. The fixed retaining
fee was P800.00 a month. A retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to ensure and secure a
lawyer’s future services, to remunerate him for being deprived by being retained by one
party, of the opportunity of rendering services to the other party and of receiving pay
from him. In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, the retaining fee is neither made
nor received in consideration of the services contemplated; it is apart from what the client
has agreed to pay for the services which he has retained him to perform. In the retainer
contract in question, there was no intention to make the retaining fee as the attorney’s fees
for the services contemplated. This is evident from the provision allowing additional
attorney’s fees in collection cases consisting of (1) a "contingent fee" and (2) whatever
the petitioner might recover as attorney’s fees in each case. The latter could only refer to
the attorney’s fees which the court might award to the petitioner in appropriate cases.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; THE ABSENCE OF THE STIPULATION OF ADDITIONAL
ATTORNEY’S FEES IN CASE AT BAR CANNOT BE CONSTRUED AS A BAR TO
THE COLLECTION OF ADDITIONAL ATTORNEY’S FEES IN NON-COLLECTION
CASES; APPLICABLE PRINCIPLES. — While the contract did not mention non-
collection cases, it is, nevertheless, clear therefrom that such cases were not excluded
from the retainership, as borne out by the provision requiring the private respondent to
"make appearances in court for cases involving the corporation or any allied cases
pertaining to the latter." As to such cases, there was no specific stipulation of additional
attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, nothing therein shows that the private respondent agreed to
render professional service in such cases gratuitously. The absence then of the stipulation
of additional attorney’s fees cannot be construed as a bar to the collection of additional
attorney’s fees in non-collection cases. Two basic principles come into play. The first is
as stated earlier, viz., that the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration
of the services contemplated unless the contract itself so provides. The second is that,
unless expressly stipulated, rendition of professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or
compensation and is not gratuitous. This is implicit from the opening clause of Section
24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which states that "[a]n attorney shall be entitled to
have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services,
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. . ." and by virtue of the innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give), as
enunciated by this Court in Corpus v. Court of Appeals. Accordingly, as to non-collection
cases where the petitioner was either a plaintiff or a defendant, the private respondent
could still collect attorney’s fees, apart from his regular retaining fee, on the basis of any
supplemental agreement or, in its absence, under the principle of quantum meruit. There
was no such supplemental agreement in this case.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; FEE "ON CONTINGENT BASIS"; UNWARRANTED IN CASE
AT BAR; REASONS. — We cannot sustain the private respondent’s theory that he could
collect attorney’s fees on contingent basis because in the other "non- collection" cases he
handled for the petitioner, he was paid on contingent basis at the rate of 10% of what was
awarded to the petitioner. In the first place, Civil Case No. 612 is still unresolved, and no
judgment has yet been rendered in favor of the petitioner. The amount in the
memorandum of agreement could not be made the basis of a "contingent fee" in the said
case for at least three reasons. First, in his own Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of
Attorney’s Fees and/or Register Attorney’s Charging Lien, the private respondent based
the contingent fee not only in Civil Case No. 612 but in a "multitude of peripheral cases,"
and the contingent fee would become due and collectible only if and when the petitioner
obtains a judgment in his favor in Civil Case No. 612. Second, the amount of P28 million,
which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was not a judgment or award in favor of the
petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. It was the consideration of the assignment, transfer, and
conveyance to Filstream of all the petitioner’s "rights, interest and participation embodied
and specified in the Joint Venture Agreement (Annex "A") and all the eight hundred
seventy-five (875) parcels of land comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision . . .
The plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 612 were not parties to the memorandum of agreement
and there is no showing that they agreed to the assignment of the petitioner’s rights,
interest, and participation in the Joint Venture Agreement. While paragraph 10 of the
memorandum of agreement provides that the petitioner shall cause to sign a JOINT
MOTION TO DISMISS, together with the CARREONS regarding Civil Case No. 612 of
the Regional Trial Court of Makati and to further DISMISS, the case filed against PNB
docketed as Civil Case No. 6918 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati . . . [and] shall
obtain the dismissal of all cases filed by lot buyers against it now pending with the
HLURB the fact remains that no such motion to dismiss has been filed yet in Civil Case
No. 612, and there is no assurance whatsoever that the plaintiffs therein will sign a joint
motion to dismiss. Third, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the private respondent had
no participation in the negotiations leading to, and in the preparation of, the memorandum
of agreement. Indisputably then, the private respondent’s attorney’s fee on "contingent
basis" in Civil Case No. 612 is unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to
attorney’s fees on quantum meruit basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31
March 1993. Quantum meruit simply means "as much as he deserves." In no case,
however, must a lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable, pursuant to
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES TO BE CONSIDERED IN DETERMINING

THE REASONABLENESS OF A CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY’S FEES; CASE AT BAR.
— This court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees: (1) the amount and
character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
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the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in
the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured; (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not. Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
enumerates the factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees. It was
incumbent upon the private respondent to prove the reasonable amount of attorney’s fees,
taking into account the foregoing factors or circumstances. The records before us and the
trial court’s 11 October 1993 order do not confirm that the private respondent proved by
either testimonial or documentary evidence that the award of P600,000.00 was
reasonable. The private respondent’s testimony thereon was crucial. Yet, it does not
appear from the 11 October 1993 order that he took the witness stand. From the Minutes
of the trial court attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV NO. 44839, it appears that only
Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony on the motion. It necessarily follows
then that the 11 October 1993 order has insufficient factual basis, and the trial court
committed grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the private respondent’s
attorney’s fees at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said order by the Court of Appeals
premised on the provision in the retainer contract regarding contingent fee is thus fatally
flawed.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court questions the
propriety of the award for, and the reasonableness of the amount of, attorney’s fees
granted in favor of the private respondent by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati
City, Branch 64, 1 in Civil Case No. 612, 2 which the Court of Appeals affirmed in its
decision 3 of 31 March 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839.

The undisputed facts are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

On 3 November 1969, the petitioner entered into a Joint Venture Agreement with Jose,
Fidel, and Antonia Carreon. Under the said agreement, the petitioner undertook to
develop, subdivide, administer, and promote the sale of the parcels of land owned by the
Carreons. The proceeds of the sale of the lots were to be paid to the Philippine National
Bank (PNB) for the landowner’s mortgage obligation, and the net profits to be shared by
the contracting parties on a 50-50 basis.

On 4 April 1983, the Carreons and a certain Patricio C. Sarile instituted before the RTC
of Makati City an action against the petitioner for rescission of the Joint Venture
Agreement. They prayed therein that pending the hearing of the case, a writ of
preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the petitioner from selling the lots subject of
the agreement and that after hearing, the writ be made permanent; the agreement be
rescinded; and the petitioner be ordered to pay the PNB the stipulated 15% per annum of
the outstanding obligation and to pay the plaintiffs attorney’s fees, exemplary damages,
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expenses of litigation, and costs of suit. This case was docketed as Civil Case No. 612 at
Branch 64 of the said court.

In its answer, which was prepared and signed by Atty. Apolonio G. Reyes, the petitioner
sought the denial of the writ of preliminary injunction, the dismissal of the complaint, and
payment in its favor of (a) P10 million by way of actual damages; (b) P5 million by way
of return to the petitioner of the amount advanced to the Carreons, payments to the PNB,
and cost of the work on the subdivision; (c) P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages;
(d) any and all damages up to the amount of P4,638,420.00 which the petitioner may
suffer under the terms of its Performance Bond in favor of the National Housing
Authority; (e) P50,000.00 as attorney’s fees; and (f) costs of suit.

On 9 April 1985, the petitioner engaged the services of private respondent Atty. Manuel
S. Fonacier, Jr., 4 who then entered his appearance in Civil Case No. 612.

While the said case was pending, or on 24 July 1992, the petitioner, without the
knowledge of the private respondent, entered into a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA)
5 with another land developer, Filstream International, Inc. (hereinafter Filstream). Under
this MOA, the former assigned its rights and obligations under the Joint Venture
Agreement in favor of the latter for a consideration of P28 million, payable within twenty
four months.

On 31 March 1993, the petitioner terminated the legal services of the private respondent.
At the time the petitioner had already received P7 million from Filstream.

Upon knowing the existence of the MOA, the private respondent filed in Civil Case No.
612 an Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register Attorney’s
Charging Lien praying, among other things, that the petitioner be ordered to pay him the
sum of P700,000.00 as his contingent fee in the case. 6

After hearing the motion, the trial court issued an order dated 11 October 1993 directing
the petitioner to pay the private respondent the sum of P600,000.00 as attorney’s fees on
the basis of quantum meruit.

The trial court justified the award in this manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Insofar as material to the resolution of this motion the records of this case show that
movant Atty. Fonacier became the counsel of defendant Research in May 1985 while this
case has been in progress. (Records, p. 770). By this time also, the defendant Research
has been enjoined by the Court from executing Contracts To Sell involving Saranay
Homes Subdivision . . . (Order dated December 3, 1984, Records pp. 625-626). However,
the said counsel for defendant Research prepared for the latter various pleadings and
represented it in Court (See Records after May 1985). Until his services were terminated
the lawyer client relationship between Atty. Fonacier and Research was governed by a
"contract" embodied in a letter addressed to Atty. Fonacier on April 19, 1985 [sic], the
pertinent portion of which is reproduced below, as follows . . .

x         x          x

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Soon after said letter, cases were referred to him including this case. In accordance with
their agreement, there were instances that Research gave Atty. Fonacier ten (10%) percent
of the amount received as the latter’s attorney’s fees pursuant to their agreement.

The instant case in which defendant is praying to be awarded attorney’s fees, is an action
for rescission of the Joint Venture Agreement between plaintiffs, Patricio Sarile, Et Al.,
as owners of a parcel of land and defendant Research & Service Realty, Inc., as developer
of the land. At the time Atty. Fonacier entered his appearance as counsel for defendant
Research, the Court has issued a preliminary injunction against Research. Thus all
developmental and commercial activities of defendant had to stop. In this regard, Atty.
Fonacier did spade work towards persuading the plaintiffs to agree to the relaxation of the
effects of the injunction to pave the way to a negotiation with a third-party, the Filstream.
Atty. Fonancier’s efforts were complemented by the efforts of his counterpart in the
plaintiff’s side. The third-party Filstream Inc., became the assignee of defendant
Research. In this connection, a memorandum of agreement was entered into between
them. By the terms of agreement, defendant Research will be receiving from the third
party Filstream International, Inc. (Filstream) the following amount. . . .

x         x        x

The termination of the legal services of Atty. Fonacier was made definite on March 31,
1993 at which time the Memorandum of Agreement which Research entered into with
Filstream, Inc., has already been effective. By this time also, defendant Research has
already received the first two stipulated consideration of the agreement in the total sum of
Six Million (P6,000,000.00). The necessary and legal consequence of said "Memorandum
of Agreement" is the termination of the case insofar as plaintiff Patricio Sarile, Et Al. and
defendant Research is concerned. The conclusion of the Memorandum of Agreement
insofar as the cause of Research is concerned, is a legal victory for defendant Research.
What could have been a loss in investment has been turned to a legal victory. Atty.
Fonancier’s effort contributed to defendant’s victory, albeit outside the Court which
would not have been possible without the legal maneuvering of a lawyer.

The dismissal of the case before this Court will come in a matter of time considering that
plaintiffs, with the assumption by the third party, Filstream Inc., of what were supposed to
be the obligations to them of defendant Research pursuant to their Joint Venture
Agreement, is no longer interested in pursuing the rescission.

It is a matter of record that Atty. Fonacier is the last of the three lawyers who handled this
case. Moreover it is Atty. Fonacier who contributed to the forging of the memorandum of
agreement as testified to by Atty. Rogel Atienza one of the two retained counsels of
plaintiffs.

Considering the importance which is attached to this case, certainly it would not be fair
for Atty. Fonacier if his attorney’s fees in this case would be equated only to the measly
monthly allowance of (P800.00) Pesos and office space and other office facilities
provided by defendant Research. Ten (10%) per cent of the amount which Research had
received from Filstream at the time of the termination of a lawyer-client relationship
between Atty. Fonacier and Research or P600,000.00 will be a just and equitable
compensation for Atty. Fonancier’s legal services, by way of quantum meruit (See
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Cabildo v. Provincial Treasurer, Ilocos Norte, Et Al., 54 SCRA 26). 7

In its Order 8 of 12 January 1994, the trial court denied the petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the above order.

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. In its Appellant’s Brief, 9 the petitioner
alleged that the private respondent was not entitled to attorney’s fees under the retainer
contract. Moreover, the private respondent did not exert any effort to amicably settle the
case, nor was he even present during the negotiations for the settlement of the same.
There was, therefore, no legal and factual justification for the private respondent’s
"fantastic and unreasonable claim for attorney’s fees of P600,000.00."cralaw virtua1aw
library

On the other hand, the private respondent asserted that he was assured by the petitioner
that non-collection cases were included in the contingent fee arrangement specified in the
retainer contract wherein there was to be contingent compensation for any award arising
from any lawsuit handled by him. According to him, Civil Case No. 612 was not the only
"non-collection" case he handled for the petitioner. There was a "right of way" dispute
where the petitioner was awarded P50,000.00, and the latter paid him P5,000.00, or 10%
of the award as attorney’s fees. He thus stressed that since under the memorandum of
agreement the petitioner was to receive P28 million, he should be entitled to 10% thereof
or P2.8 million as attorney’s fees. chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary

In its decision 10 of 31 March 1995, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged order
of the trial court. It ratiocinated as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Movant-appellee, on the other hand, correctly argues that it was the clear intention of
appellant and counsel to compensate the latter for any legal services rendered by him to
the former. Stated otherwise, it was never the intention of the parties in the instant appeal
that counsel’s services shall be free or to be rendered ex gratia.

x         x          x

It must in addition be underscored that the retainer contract of April 9, 1985 is the law
that governs the relationship between appellant and appellee. In fact, the following
provisions squarely and categorically supports the award of P600,000.00 to counsel, to
wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees and collection cases (case to
case basis) aside from the attorney’s fee recovered from any law suit.

(Paragraph 3, Retainer Contract)

In an American jurisprudence on this point cited in local annotation on the Canon of

Professional Ethics, it was held that "if a lawyer renders valuable services to one who
receives the benefits thereof, a promise to pay a reasonable value is presumed, unless
such services were intended to be gratuitous" (Young v. Buere, 78 Cal. Am. 127) In
effect, to compensate a lawyer, we are faced with the pivotal question: "was the legal
services intended to be free or not?" If it is not free, then, appellant must simply pay. The
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10% contingent fee of the amount collected and/or to be collected in Civil Case No. 612
of the lower court, is, to Our mind fair and reasonable. As ruled by the Supreme Court in
the case of Cosmopolitan Insurance Co. v. Angel Reyes (G.R. L-20199, Nov. 23, 1995)
15% was even deemed reasonable. 11

The petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration 12 on the ground among other things,
that the decision is contrary to the evidence, as the trial court granted the claim for
attorney’s fees based on quantum meruit, yet, the Court of Appeals granted the same on a
contingent basis which it based on an erroneous quotation and comprehension of the
following provision of the retainer contract:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Minimal allowance of P800.00 per month plus contingent fees on collection cases (case to
case basis) aside from the attorney’s fees recovered from any law suit. (Emphasis ours)
13

In its decision, the Court of Appeals substituted the word "on" after "contingent fees"
with the word "and." Under the aforequoted paragraph, the private respondent was
entitled to attorney’s fees on contingent basis in collection cases only. In non collection
cases, he was entitled only to the attorney’s fees that might be recovered in the lawsuit. 14
Since Civil Case No. 612 is not a collection case but an action for rescission of a contract,
then the aforequoted paragraph is not applicable as a basis for awarding attorney’s fees to
the private respondent. 15

Finding nothing new in the motion for reconsideration, the Court of Appeals denied it in
the resolution 16 of 15 February 1996.

The petitioner then came to us via this petition for review wherein it contends that

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAD DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN

ACCORD WITH LAW AND THE UNDISPUTED FACTS OF THE CASE.

II

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF

DISCRETION IN AWARDING ON CONTINGENT BASIS RESPONDENT-
APPELLEE’S ATTORNEY’S FEES ON THE BASIS OF A MEMORANDUM OF
AGREEMENT IN WHICH HE HAD NO PARTICIPATION IN THE NEGOTIATION
AND PREPARATION THEREOF.

III

RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN

AWARDING EXCESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE ATTORNEY’S FEES.

IV
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THE TRIAL COURT AND THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS HAVE NO

JURISDICTION TO SATISFY ATTORNEY’S CHARGING LIEN ON A SUM OF
MONEY THAT THE COURT HAD NO AUTHORITY TO DISPOSE OF AND OVER
WHICH THE TRIAL COURT HAD MADE NO FINAL ADJUDICATION.

The petitioner’s more important argument in support of the first error is the Court of
Appeals’ misquotation of the provision in the retainer contract regarding attorney’s fees
on contingent basis, which the petitioner had stressed in its motion for reconsideration.
The petitioner maintains that under the contract, attorney’s fees on contingent basis could
only be awarded in collection cases, and Civil Case No. 612 is not a collection case.
Hence, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the award on that basis, while the trial
court was correct in applying the principle of quantum meruit.

In its second assigned error, the petitioner asserts that the private respondent admitted in
his Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register Attorney’s
Charging Lien that he had not participated in the negotiations and preparation of the
memorandum of agreement, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Despite the dishonest concealment, by the light of Providence coupled with a streak of
good luck, counsel discovered in the first week of March 1993 that the parties had
respectively entered into a meaningful agreement with a third-party as early as July 27,
1992, which in the case of client, case in the form of a "Memorandum of Agreement"
(MOA) . . . 17

The third assigned error is but a logical consequence of the second, and the petitioner
maintains that since the private respondent "did not do anything spectacular or out of the
ordinary" in Civil Case No. 612, "except to ask for the suspension or postponement of the
proceedings thereof from 1985 to 1993," the P600,000.00 attorney’s fees, whether on
contingent basis or quantum meruit, is excessive and unreasonable.

In the fourth imputed error, the petitioner argues that the memorandum of agreement was
never submitted to the trial court, and the trial court never made any disposition or
adjudication over the proceeds of the said agreement. What would eventually happen then
is the dismissal of Civil Case No. 612, as the trial court itself had intimated in its
challenged order. Necessarily then, there would be no money adjudication in favor of the
petitioner as the defendant therein. Since such lien is collectible only from an award of
money that a court would adjudicate in a judgment rendered in favor of the attorney’s
client pursuant to Section 37, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, it would follow that no
attorney’s charging lien could be validly entered.

We uphold the petitioner, but not necessarily on the strength of its arguments.

The parties are in agreement that the lawyer-client relationship between the petitioner and
the private respondent, Atty. Manuel S. Fonacier, Jr., was governed by a retainer contract
dated 9 April 1985. The petitioner’s undertakings thereunder are outlined as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

I. CORPORAT[ION]:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

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1. Corporation will provide the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

a. Office space — airconditioned

b. Furnishings, tables, executive chairs, visitor’s chair & steel filing cabinet

c. Telephone facilities and partial secretarial services.

2. Legal service referrals by the corporation to its clients for additional income of the
lawyer.

3. Minimal allowance of P800 per month plus contingent fees on contingent fees on
collection cases (case to case basis) aside from the attorney’s fees recovered from any
lawsuit.

4. That in case of legal problems to be attended to outside Metro Manila and Suburbs, the
corporation shall defray expenses for transportation, lodging and other legal expenses
incidental in the case. 18

An analysis of the contract clearly shows that it was a general retainer, since its primary
purpose was to secure beforehand the services of the private respondent for any legal
problem which might afterward arise. 19 The fixed retaining fee was P800.00 a month. A
retaining fee is a preliminary fee paid to ensure and secure a lawyer’s future services, to
remunerate him for being deprived, by being retained by one party, of the opportunity of
rendering services to the other party and of receiving pay from him. In the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, the retaining fee is neither made nor received in consideration
of the services contemplated; it is apart from what the client has agreed to pay for the
services which he has retained him to perform. 20

In the retainer contract in question, there was no intention to make the retaining fee as the
attorney’s fees for the services contemplated. This is evident from the provision allowing
additional attorney’s fees in collection cases consisting of (1) a "contingent fee" and (2)
whatever the petitioner might recover as attorney’s fees in each case. The latter could
only refer to the attorney’s fees which the court might award to the petitioner in
appropriate cases.

While the contract did not mention non-collection cases, it is, nevertheless, clear
therefrom that such eases were not excluded from the retainership, as borne out by the
provision requiring the private respondent to "make appearances in Court for eases
involving the corporation or any allied cases pertaining to the latter." As to such cases,
there was no specific stipulation of additional attorney’s fees. Nevertheless, nothing
therein shows that the private respondent agreed to render professional service in such
cases gratuitously. The absence then of the stipulation of additional attorney’s fees cannot
be construed as a bar to the collection of additional attorney’s fees in non-collection
cases.

Two basic principles come into play. The first is as stated earlier, viz., that the retaining
fee is neither made nor received in consideration of the services contemplated unless the
contract itself so provides. The second is that, unless expressly stipulated, rendition of
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professional services by a lawyer is for a fee or compensation and is not gratuitous. This
is implicit from the opening clause of Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, which
states that "[a]n attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client no more than
a reasonable compensation for his services . . .," and by virtue of the innominate contract
of facio ut des (I do and you give), as enunciated by this Court in Corpus v. Court of
Appeals, 21 thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Moreover, the payment of attorney’s fees . . . may also be justified by virtue of the
innominate contract of facio ut des (I do and you give) which is based on the principle
that "no one shall unjustly enrich himself at the expense of another." Innominate contracts
have been elevated to a codal provision in the New Civil Code by providing under Article
1307 that such contracts shall be regulated by the stipulations of the parties, by the
general provisions or principles of obligations and contracts, by the rules governing the
most analogous nominate contracts, and by the customs of the people. The rationale of
this article was stated in the 1903 case of Perez v. Pomar (2 Phil. 682).

In Perez v. Pomar, 22 this Court stated:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

[B]ut whether the plaintiff’s services were solicited or whether they were offered to the
defendant for his assistance, inasmuch as these services were accepted and made use of
by the latter, we must consider that there was a tacit and mutual consent as to the
rendition of the services. This gives rise to the obligation upon the person benefited by the
services to make compensation therefor, since the bilateral obligation to render service as
interpreter, on the one hand, and on the other to pay for the services rendered, is thereby
incurred. (Arts. 1088, 1089, and 1262 of the Civil Code).

Accordingly, as to non-collection cases where the petitioner was either a plaintiff or a

defendant, the private respondent could still collect attorney’s fees, apart from his regular
retaining fee, on the basis of any-supplemental agreement or, in its absence, under the
principle of quantum meruit. There was no such supplemental agreement in this case.

We cannot sustain the private respondent’s theory that he could collect attorney’s fees on
contingent basis because in the other "non-collection" cases he handled for the petitioner’
he was paid on contingent basis at the rate of 10% of what was awarded to the petitioner.
In the first place, Civil Case No. 612 is still unresolved, and no judgment has yet been
rendered in favor of the petitioner. The amount in the memorandum of agreement could
not be made the basis of a "contingent fee" in the said case for at least three reasons. First,
in his own Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register
Attorney’s Charging Lien, the private respondent based the contingent fee not only in
Civil Case No. 612 but in a "multitude of peripheral cases," and the contingent fee would
become due and collectible only if and when the petitioner obtains a judgment in his
favor in Civil Case No. 612. The second paragraph of page 3 of the said motion reads as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

Hence, from May 1985 and continuously thru the years without interruption and
surviving a series of no less than five (5) changes of Presiding Judges, the undersigned
counsel labored tirelessly in handling the defense of client. In addition to the instant
lawsuit, a multitude of peripheral cases, civil, criminal and administrative, arising from
the non-delivery of titles by client on fully paid lots in the subdivision project were also
filed as a consequence, not only against defendant but also against its President and Chief
 Page 11 of 13

Executive Officer (CEO). Needless to state, the undersigned was designated to handle
majority of these cases for both, where he appeared and conducted trial without any
"appearance fees" for more than eight (8) long years solely relying on the contingent fee
in case of recovery in the instant main case. 23 (Emphasis supplied)

Second, the amount of P28 million, which Filstream agreed to pay the petitioner, was not
a judgment or award in favor of the petitioner in Civil Case No. 612. It was the
consideration of the assignment, transfer, and conveyance to Filstream of all the
petitioner’s "rights, interest and participation embodied and specified in the Joint Venture
Agreement (Annex "A") and in all the eight hundred seventy-five (875) parcels of land
comprising the SARANAY HOMES subdivision. . . ." The plaintiffs in Civil Case No.
612 were not parties to the memorandum of agreement, and there is no showing that they
agreed to the assignment of the petitioner’s rights, interest, and participation in the Joint
Venture Agreement. While paragraph 10 of the memorandum of agreement provides that
the petitioner

shall cause to sign a JOINT MOTION TO DISMISS, together with the CARREONS
regarding Civil Case No. 612 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati and to further
DISMISS, the case filed against PNB docketed as Civil Case No. 6918 of the Regional
Trial Court of Makati . . . [and] shall obtain the dismissal of all cases filed by lot buyers
against it now pending with the HLURB

the fact remains that no such motion to dismiss has been filed yet in Civil Case No. 612,
and there is no assurance whatsoever that the plaintiffs therein will sign a joint motion to
dismiss. Third, as correctly posited by the petitioner, the private respondent had no
participation in the negotiations leading to, and in the preparation of, the memorandum of
agreement.

Indisputably then, the private respondent’s attorney’s fee on "contingent basis" in Civil
Case No. 612 is unwarranted. If at all, he could only be entitled to attorney’s fees on
quantum meruit basis as of the expiration of his retainer contract on 31 March 1993.

Quantum meruit simply means "as much as he deserves." 24 In no case, however, must a
lawyer be allowed to recover more than what is reasonable pursuant to Section 24, Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, which provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorneys, agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be

entitled to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for
his services, with a view to the importance of the subject-matter of the controversy, the
extent of the services rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court
shall be bound by the opinion of attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper
compensation, but may disregard such testimony and base its conclusion on its own
professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control the amount to be
paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.

This Court had earlier declared the following as circumstances to be considered in

determining the reasonableness of a claim for attorney’s fees: (1) the amount and
character of the service rendered; (2) labor, time, and trouble involved; (3) the nature and
importance of the litigation or business in which the services were rendered; (4) the
responsibility imposed; (5) the amount of money or the value of the property affected by
 Page 12 of 13

the controversy or involved in the employment; (6) the skill and experience called for in
the performance of the services; (7) the professional character and social standing of the
attorney; (8) the results secured; and (9) whether the fee is absolute or contingent, it being
recognized that an attorney may properly charge a much larger fee when it is contingent
than when it is not.25cralaw:red

Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility enumerates the following
factors which should guide a lawyer in determining his fees:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library

(a) The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

(b) The novelty and difficulty of the questions involved;

(c) The importance of the subject matter;

(d) The skill demanded;

(e) The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered
case;

(f) The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter
to which he belongs;

(g) The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from
the service;

(h) The contingency or certainty of compensation;

(i) The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

(j) The professional standing of the lawyer.

It was incumbent upon the private respondent to prove the reasonable amount of
attorney’s fees, taking into account the foregoing factors or circumstances. The records
before us and the trial court’s 11 October 1993 order do not confirm that the private
respondent proved by either testimonial or documentary evidence that the award of
P600,000.00 was reasonable. The private respondent’s testimony thereon was crucial.
Yet, it does not appear from the 11 October 1993 order that he took the witness stand.
From the Minutes of the trial court attached to the Rollo of CA-G.R. CV No. 44839, 26 it
appears that only Atty. Atienza and Mr. Suazo gave oral testimony on the motion.

It necessarily follows then that the 11 October 1993 order has insufficient factual basis,
and the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion in arbitrarily fixing the private
respondent’s attorney’s fees at P600,000.00. The affirmance of the said order by the
Court of Appeals premised on the provision in the retainer contract regarding contingent
fee is thus fatally flawed.

The interest for both the petitioner and the private respondent demands that the trial court
should conduct further proceedings in Civil Case No. 612 relative to the private
 Page 13 of 13

respondent’s motion for the payment of attorney’s fees and, thereafter, fix it in light of
Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court; Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially established guiding principles in
determining attorney’s fees on quantum meruit basis.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision of 31 March

1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 44839 and the Order of 11 October
1993 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 64, in Civil Case No. 612 are hereby
SET ASIDE. The trial court is further DIRECTED to set for further hearing the private
respondent’s Urgent Motion to Direct Payment of Attorney’s Fees and/or Register
Attorney’s Charging Lien and thereafter to fix the private respondent’s attorney’s fees in
Civil Case No. 612 as of 31 March 1993 when his contract with the petitioner was
effectively terminated, taking into account Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court;
Rule 20.1, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and the jurisprudentially
established guiding principles in determining attorney’s fees on quantum meruit
basis.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.