Concept

Concepts are defined as abstract ideas or

general notions that occur in the mind, in
speech, or in thought. They are understood
to be the fundamental building blocks of
thoughts and beliefs. They play an
important role in all aspects of
cognition.[1][2] As such, concepts are
studied by several disciplines, such as
linguistics, psychology, and philosophy,
and these disciplines are interested in the
logical and psychological structure of
concepts, and how they are put together to
form thoughts and sentences. The study
of concepts has served as an important
flagship of an emerging interdisciplinary
approach called cognitive science.[3]

In contemporary philosophy, there are at

least three prevailing ways to understand
what a concept is:[4]

Concepts as mental representations,

where concepts are entities that exist in
the mind (mental objects)
Concepts as abilities, where concepts
are abilities peculiar to cognitive agents
 (mental states)
Concepts as Fregean senses (see sense
and reference), where concepts are
abstract objects, as opposed to mental
objects and mental states

Concepts can be organized into a

hierarchy, higher levels of which are
termed "superordinate" and lower levels
termed "subordinate". Additionally, there is
the "basic" or "middle" level at which
people will most readily categorize a
concept.[5] For example, a basic-level
concept would be "chair", with its
superordinate, "furniture", and its
subordinate, "easy chair".
When the mind makes a generalization such as the
concept of tree, it extracts similarities from numerous
examples; the simplification enables higher-level
thinking.

A concept is instantiated (reified) by all of

its actual or potential instances, whether
these are things in the real world or other
ideas.
Concepts are studied as components of
human cognition in the cognitive science
disciplines of linguistics, psychology and,
philosophy, where an ongoing debate asks
whether all cognition must occur through
concepts. Concepts are used as formal
tools or models in mathematics, computer
science, databases and artificial
intelligence where they are sometimes
called classes, schema or categories. In
informal use the word concept often just
means any idea.

Ontology of concepts
A central question in the study of concepts
is the question of what they are.
Philosophers construe this question as
one about the ontology of concepts—what
kind of things they are. The ontology of
concepts determines the answer to other
questions, such as how to integrate
concepts into a wider theory of the mind,
what functions are allowed or disallowed
by a concept's ontology, etc. There are two
main views of the ontology of concepts:
(1) Concepts are abstract objects, and (2)
concepts are mental representations.[6]

Concepts as mental representations …

The psychological view of concepts …

Within the framework of the

representational theory of mind, the
structural position of concepts can be
understood as follows: Concepts serve as
the building blocks of what are called
mental representations (colloquially
understood as ideas in the mind). Mental
representations, in turn, are the building
blocks of what are called propositional
attitudes (colloquially understood as the
stances or perspectives we take towards
ideas, be it "believing", "doubting",
"wondering", "accepting", etc.). And these
propositional attitudes, in turn, are the
building blocks of our understanding of
thoughts that populate everyday life, as
well as folk psychology. In this way, we
have an analysis that ties our common
everyday understanding of thoughts down
to the scientific and philosophical
understanding of concepts.[7]

The physicalist view of concepts …

In a physicalist theory of mind, a concept

is a mental representation, which the brain
uses to denote a class of things in the
world. This is to say that it is literally, a
symbol or group of symbols together
made from the physical material of the
brain.[8][9] Concepts are mental
representations that allow us to draw
appropriate inferences about the type of
entities we encounter in our everyday
lives.[9] Concepts do not encompass all
mental representations, but are merely a
subset of them.[8] The use of concepts is
necessary to cognitive processes such as
categorization, memory, decision making,
learning, and inference.[10]

Concepts are thought to be stored in long

term cortical memory,[11] in contrast to
episodic memory of the particular objects
and events which they abstract, which are
stored in hippocampus. Evidence for this
separation comes from hippocampal
damaged patients such as patient HM.
The abstraction from the day's
hippocampal events and objects into
cortical concepts is often considered to be
the computation underlying (some stages
of) sleep and dreaming. Many people
(beginning with Aristotle) report memories
of dreams which appear to mix the day's
events with analogous or related historical
concepts and memories, and suggest that
they were being sorted or organised into
more abstract concepts. ("Sort" is itself
another word for concept, and "sorting"
thus means to organise into concepts.)
Concepts as abstract objects …

The semantic view of concepts suggests

that concepts are abstract objects. In this
view, concepts are abstract objects of a
category out of a human's mind rather
than some mental representations. [6]

There is debate as to the relationship

between concepts and natural language.[4]
However, it is necessary at least to begin
by understanding that the concept "dog" is
philosophically distinct from the things in
the world grouped by this concept—or the
reference class or extension.[8] Concepts
that can be equated to a single word are
called "lexical concepts".[4]

Study of concepts and conceptual

structure falls into the disciplines of
linguistics, philosophy, psychology, and
cognitive science.[9]

In the simplest terms, a concept is a name

or label that regards or treats an
abstraction as if it had concrete or
material existence, such as a person, a
place, or a thing. It may represent a natural
object that exists in the real world like a
tree, an animal, a stone, etc. It may also
name an artificial (man-made) object like a
chair, computer, house, etc. Abstract ideas
and knowledge domains such as freedom,
equality, science, happiness, etc., are also
symbolized by concepts. It is important to
realize that a concept is merely a symbol,
a representation of the abstraction. The
word is not to be mistaken for the thing.
For example, the word "moon" (a concept)
is not the large, bright, shape-changing
object up in the sky, but only represents
that celestial object. Concepts are created
(named) to describe, explain and capture
reality as it is known and understood.

A priori concepts …
Kant maintained the view that human
minds possess pure or a priori concepts.
Instead of being abstracted from
individual perceptions, like empirical
concepts, they originate in the mind itself.
He called these concepts categories, in
the sense of the word that means
predicate, attribute, characteristic, or
quality. But these pure categories are
predicates of things in general, not of a
particular thing. According to Kant, there
are twelve categories that constitute the
understanding of phenomenal objects.
Each category is that one predicate which
is common to multiple empirical concepts.
In order to explain how an a priori concept
can relate to individual phenomena, in a
manner analogous to an a posteriori
concept, Kant employed the technical
concept of the schema. He held that the
account of the concept as an abstraction
of experience is only partly correct. He
called those concepts that result from
abstraction "a posteriori concepts"
(meaning concepts that arise out of
experience). An empirical or an a posteriori
concept is a general representation
(Vorstellung) or non-specific thought of
that which is common to several specific
perceived objects (Logic, I, 1., §1, Note 1)
A concept is a common feature or
characteristic. Kant investigated the way
that empirical a posteriori concepts are
created.

The logical acts of the

understanding by which
concepts are generated as to
their form are:

1. comparison, i.e., the

likening of mental images
to one another in relation
to the unity of
consciousness;
 2. reflection, i.e., the going
back over different mental
images, how they can be
comprehended in one
consciousness; and finally
3. abstraction or the
segregation of everything
else by which the mental
images differ ...

In order to make our mental

images into concepts, one must
thus be able to compare, reflect,
and abstract, for these three
logical operations of the
understanding are essential and
general conditions of generating
any concept whatever. For
example, I see a fir, a willow,
and a linden. In firstly
comparing these objects, I notice
that they are different from one
another in respect of trunk,
branches, leaves, and the like;
further, however, I reflect only
on what they have in common,
the trunk, the branches, the
leaves themselves, and abstract
from their size, shape, and so
 forth; thus I gain a concept of a
tree.

— Logic, §6

Embodied content …

In cognitive linguistics, abstract concepts

are transformations of concrete concepts
derived from embodied experience. The
mechanism of transformation is structural
mapping, in which properties of two or
more source domains are selectively
mapped onto a blended space (Fauconnier
& Turner, 1995; see conceptual blending).
A common class of blends are metaphors.
This theory contrasts with the rationalist
view that concepts are perceptions (or
recollections, in Plato's term) of an
independently existing world of ideas, in
that it denies the existence of any such
realm. It also contrasts with the empiricist
view that concepts are abstract
generalizations of individual experiences,
because the contingent and bodily
experience is preserved in a concept, and
not abstracted away. While the perspective
is compatible with Jamesian pragmatism,
the notion of the transformation of
embodied concepts through structural
mapping makes a distinct contribution to
the problem of concept formation.
Realist universal concepts …

Platonist views of the mind construe

concepts as abstract objects.[12] Plato was
the starkest proponent of the realist thesis
of universal concepts. By his view,
concepts (and ideas in general) are innate
ideas that were instantiations of a
transcendental world of pure forms that
lay behind the veil of the physical world. In
this way, universals were explained as
transcendent objects. Needless to say this
form of realism was tied deeply with
Plato's ontological projects. This remark
on Plato is not of merely historical interest.
For example, the view that numbers are
Platonic objects was revived by Kurt Gödel
as a result of certain puzzles that he took
to arise from the phenomenological
accounts.[13]

Sense and reference …

Gottlob Frege, founder of the analytic

tradition in philosophy, famously argued
for the analysis of language in terms of
sense and reference. For him, the sense of
an expression in language describes a
certain state of affairs in the world,
namely, the way that some object is
presented. Since many commentators
view the notion of sense as identical to the
notion of concept, and Frege regards
senses as the linguistic representations of
states of affairs in the world, it seems to
follow that we may understand concepts
as the manner in which we grasp the
world. Accordingly, concepts (as senses)
have an ontological status.[6]

Concepts in calculus …

According to Carl Benjamin Boyer, in the

introduction to his The History of the
Calculus and its Conceptual Development,
concepts in calculus do not refer to
perceptions. As long as the concepts are
useful and mutually compatible, they are
accepted on their own. For example, the
concepts of the derivative and the integral
are not considered to refer to spatial or
temporal perceptions of the external world
of experience. Neither are they related in
any way to mysterious limits in which
quantities are on the verge of nascence or
evanescence, that is, coming into or going
out of existence. The abstract concepts
are now considered to be totally
autonomous, even though they originated
from the process of abstracting or taking
away qualities from perceptions until only
the common, essential attributes
remained.
Notable theories on the
structure of concepts

Classical theory …

The classical theory of concepts, also

referred to as the empiricist theory of
concepts,[8] is the oldest theory about the
structure of concepts (it can be traced
back to Aristotle[9]), and was prominently
held until the 1970s.[9] The classical theory
of concepts says that concepts have a
definitional structure.[4] Adequate
definitions of the kind required by this
theory usually take the form of a list of
features. These features must have two
important qualities to provide a
comprehensive definition.[9] Features
entailed by the definition of a concept
must be both necessary and sufficient for
membership in the class of things covered
by a particular concept.[9] A feature is
considered necessary if every member of
the denoted class has that feature. A
feature is considered sufficient if
something has all the parts required by the
definition.[9] For example, the classic
example bachelor is said to be defined by
unmarried and man.[4] An entity is a
bachelor (by this definition) if and only if it
is both unmarried and a man. To check
whether something is a member of the
class, you compare its qualities to the
features in the definition.[8] Another key
part of this theory is that it obeys the law
of the excluded middle, which means that
there are no partial members of a class,
you are either in or out.[9]

The classical theory persisted for so long

unquestioned because it seemed
intuitively correct and has great
explanatory power. It can explain how
concepts would be acquired, how we use
them to categorize and how we use the
structure of a concept to determine its
referent class.[4] In fact, for many years it
was one of the major activities in
philosophy—concept analysis.[4] Concept
analysis is the act of trying to articulate
the necessary and sufficient conditions for
the membership in the referent class of a
concept. For example, Shoemaker's
classic "Time Without Change" explored
whether the concept of the flow of time
can include flows where no changes take
place, though change is usually taken as a
definition of time.

Arguments against the classical theory …

Given that most later theories of concepts

were born out of the rejection of some or
all of the classical theory,[12] it seems
appropriate to give an account of what
might be wrong with this theory. In the
20th century, philosophers such as
Wittgenstein and Rosch argued against
the classical theory. There are six primary
arguments[12] summarized as follows:

It seems that there simply are no

definitions—especially those based in
sensory primitive concepts.[12]
It seems as though there can be cases
where our ignorance or error about a
class means that we either don't know
the definition of a concept, or have
incorrect notions about what a definition
of a particular concept might entail.[12]
Quine's argument against analyticity in
Two Dogmas of Empiricism also holds
as an argument against definitions.[12]
Some concepts have fuzzy membership.
There are items for which it is vague
whether or not they fall into (or out of) a
particular referent class. This is not
possible in the classical theory as
everything has equal and full
membership.[12]
Rosch found typicality effects which
cannot be explained by the classical
theory of concepts, these sparked the
prototype theory.[12] See below.
 Psychological experiments show no
evidence for our using concepts as
strict definitions.[12]

Prototype theory …

Prototype theory came out of problems

with the classical view of conceptual
structure.[4] Prototype theory says that
concepts specify properties that members
of a class tend to possess, rather than
must possess.[12] Wittgenstein, Rosch,
Mervis, Berlin, Anglin, and Posner are a few
of the key proponents and creators of this
theory.[12][14] Wittgenstein describes the
relationship between members of a class
as family resemblances. There are not
necessarily any necessary conditions for
membership; a dog can still be a dog with
only three legs.[9] This view is particularly
supported by psychological experimental
evidence for prototypicality effects.[9]
Participants willingly and consistently rate
objects in categories like 'vegetable' or
'furniture' as more or less typical of that
class.[9][14] It seems that our categories
are fuzzy psychologically, and so this
structure has explanatory power.[9] We can
judge an item's membership of the referent
class of a concept by comparing it to the
typical member—the most central member
of the concept. If it is similar enough in the
relevant ways, it will be cognitively
admitted as a member of the relevant
class of entities.[9] Rosch suggests that
every category is represented by a central
exemplar which embodies all or the
maximum possible number of features of
a given category.[9] Lech, Gunturkun, and
Suchan explain that categorization
involves many areas of the brain. Some of
these are: visual association areas,
prefrontal cortex, basal ganglia, and
temporal lobe.

The Prototype perspective is proposed as

an alternative view to the Classical
approach. While the Classical theory
requires an all-or-nothing membership in a
group, prototypes allow for more fuzzy
boundaries and are characterized by
attributes.[15] Lakeoff stresses that
experience and cognition are critical to the
function of language, and Labov's
experiment found that the function that an
artifact contributed to what people
categorized it as.[15] For example, a
container holding mashed potatoes versus
tea swayed people toward classifying
them as a bowl and a cup, respectively.
This experiment also illuminated the
optimal dimensions of what the prototype
for "cup" is.[15]
Prototypes also deal with the essence of
things and to what extent they belong to a
category. There have been a number of
experiments dealing with questionnaires
asking participants to rate something
according to the extent to which it belongs
to a category. [15]This question is
contradictory to the Classical Theory
because something is either a member of
a category or is not.[15] This type of
problem is paralleled in other areas of
linguistics such as phonology, with an
illogical question such as "is /i/ or /o/ a
better vowel?" The Classical approach and
Aristotelian categories may be a better
descriptor in some cases.[15]
Theory-theory …

Theory-theory is a reaction to the previous

two theories and develops them further.[9]
This theory postulates that categorization
by concepts is something like scientific
theorizing.[4] Concepts are not learned in
isolation, but rather are learned as a part
of our experiences with the world around
us.[9] In this sense, concepts' structure
relies on their relationships to other
concepts as mandated by a particular
mental theory about the state of the
world.[12] How this is supposed to work is
a little less clear than in the previous two
theories, but is still a prominent and
notable theory.[12] This is supposed to
explain some of the issues of ignorance
and error that come up in prototype and
classical theories as concepts that are
structured around each other seem to
account for errors such as whale as a fish
(this misconception came from an
incorrect theory about what a whale is like,
combining with our theory of what a fish
is).[12] When we learn that a whale is not a
fish, we are recognizing that whales don't
in fact fit the theory we had about what
makes something a fish. Theory-theory
also postulates that people's theories
about the world are what inform their
conceptual knowledge of the world.
Therefore, analysing people's theories can
offer insights into their concepts. In this
sense, "theory" means an individual's
mental explanation rather than scientific
fact. This theory criticizes classical and
prototype theory as relying too much on
similarities and using them as a sufficient
constraint. It suggests that theories or
mental understandings contribute more to
what has membership to a group rather
than weighted similarities, and a cohesive
category is formed more by what makes
sense to the perceiver. Weights assigned
to features have shown to fluctuate and
vary depending on context and
experimental task demonstrated by
Tversky. For this reason, similarities
between members may be collateral rather
than causal.[16]

Ideasthesia
According to the theory of ideasthesia (or
"sensing concepts"), activation of a
concept may be the main mechanism
responsible for creation of phenomenal
experiences. Therefore, understanding
how the brain processes concepts may be
central to solving the mystery of how
conscious experiences (or qualia) emerge
within a physical system e.g., the sourness
of the sour taste of lemon.[17] This
question is also known as the hard
problem of consciousness.[18][19] Research
on ideasthesia emerged from research on
synesthesia where it was noted that a
synesthetic experience requires first an
activation of a concept of the inducer.[20]
Later research expanded these results into
everyday perception.[21]

There is a lot of discussion on the most

effective theory in concepts. Another
theory is semantic pointers, which use
perceptual and motor representations and
these representations are like symbols.[22]

Etymology
The term "concept" is traced back to
1554–60 (Latin conceptum – "something
conceived").[23]

See also
Abstraction
Categorization
Class (philosophy)
Concept and object
Concept map
Conceptual blending
Conceptual framework
Conceptual history
Conceptual model
 Conversation theory
Definitionism
Formal concept analysis
Fuzzy concept
Hypostatic abstraction
Idea
Ideasthesia
Noesis
Notion (philosophy)
Object (philosophy)
Process of concept formation
Schema (Kant)

References
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on Biology and Cognition (pp. 257-
291). Hillsdale, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum
Associates.
3. https://bcs.mit.edu/research/cognitive
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4. Eric Margolis; Stephen Lawrence.
"Concepts" . Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy. Metaphysics Research
Lab at Stanford University. Retrieved
6 November 2012.
5. Eysenck. M. W., (2012) Fundamentals
of Cognition (2nd) Psychology Taylor &
Francis.
. Margolis, Eric; Laurence, Stephen
(2007). "The Ontology of Concepts—
Abstract Objects or Mental
Representations?". Nous. 41 (4): 561–
593. CiteSeerX 10.1.1.188.9995 .
doi:10.1111/j.1468-
0068.2007.00663.x .
 7. Jerry Fodor, Concepts: Where
Cognitive Science Went Wrong
. Carey, Susan (2009). The Origin of
Concepts. Oxford University Press.
ISBN 978-0-19-536763-8.
9. Murphy, Gregory (2002). The Big Book
of Concepts. Massachusetts Institute
of Technology. ISBN 978-0-262-13409-
5.
10. McCarthy, Gabby (2018) "Introduction
to Metaphysics". pg. 35
11. Eysenck. M. W., (2012) Fundamentals
of Cognition (2nd) Psychology Taylor &
Francis
12. Stephen Lawrence; Eric Margolis
(1999). Concepts and Cognitive
Science. in Concepts: Core Readings:
Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. pp. 3–83. ISBN 978-0-
262-13353-1.
13. 'Godel's Rationalism', Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy
14. Brown, Roger (1978). A New Paradigm
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Linguistic Theory .
1 . Murphy, Gregory L.; Medin, Douglas L.
(1985). "The role of theories in
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(2014) Semantic mechanisms may be
responsible for developing
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23. "Homework Help and Textbook
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Further reading
Armstrong, S. L., Gleitman, L. R., & Gleitman,
H. (1999). what some concepts might not be.
In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, Concepts
(pp. 225–261). Massachusetts: MIT press.
Carey, S. (1999). knowledge acquisition:
enrichment or conceptual change? In E.
Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 459–489). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
Fodor, J. A., Garrett, M. F., Walker, E. C., &
Parkes, C. H. (1999). against definitions. In E.
Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 491–513). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
Fodor, Jerry; Lepore, Ernest (1996). "The red
herring and the pet fish: Why concepts still
can't be prototypes". Cognition. 58 (2): 253–
270. doi:10.1016/0010-0277(95)00694-X .
PMID 8820389 . S2CID 15356470 .
Hume, D. (1739). book one part one: of the
understanding of ideas, their origin,
composition, connexion, abstraction etc. In
D. Hume, a treatise of human nature.
England.
Murphy, G. (2004). Chapter 2. In G. Murphy, a
big book of concepts (pp. 11 – 41).
Massachusetts: MIT press.
Murphy, G., & Medin, D. (1999). the role of
theories in conceptual coherence. In E.
Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 425–459). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
Prinz, Jesse J. (2002). Furnishing the Mind.
doi:10.7551/mitpress/3169.001.0001 .
ISBN 9780262281935.
Putnam, H. (1999). is semantics possible? In
E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 177–189). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
Quine, W. (1999). two dogmas of empiricism.
In E. Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 153–171). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
Rey, G. (1999). Concepts and Stereotypes. In
E. Margolis, & S. Laurence (Eds.), Concepts:
Core Readings (pp. 279–301). Cambridge,
Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Rosch, E. (1977). Classification of real-world
objects: Origins and representations in
cognition. In P. Johnson-Laird, & P. Wason,
Thinking: Readings in Cognitive Science
(pp. 212–223). Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Rosch, E. (1999). Principles of
Categorization. In E. Margolis, & S. Laurence
(Eds.), Concepts: Core Readings (pp. 189–
206). Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press.
Schneider, Susan (2011). "Concepts: A
Pragmatist Theory". The Language of
Thought. pp. 159–182.
doi:10.7551/mitpress/9780262015578.003.
0071 . ISBN 9780262015578.
Wittgenstein, L. (1999). philosophical
investigations: sections 65–78. In E.
Margolis, & S. Lawrence, concepts: core
readings (pp. 171–175). Massachusetts: MIT
press.
The History of Calculus and its Conceptual
Development, Carl Benjamin Boyer, Dover
Publications, ISBN 0-486-60509-4
The Writings of William James, University of
Chicago Press, ISBN 0-226-39188-4
Logic, Immanuel Kant, Dover Publications,
ISBN 0-486-25650-2
A System of Logic, John Stuart Mill, University
Press of the Pacific, ISBN 1-4102-0252-6
Parerga and Paralipomena, Arthur
Schopenhauer, Volume I, Oxford University
Press, ISBN 0-19-824508-4
Kant's Metaphysic of Experience, H. J. Paton,
London: Allen & Unwin, 1936
Conceptual Integration Networks . Gilles
Fauconnier and Mark Turner, 1998. Cognitive
Science. Volume 22, number 2 (April–June
1998), pp. 133–187.
The Portable Nietzsche, Penguin Books, 1982,
ISBN 0-14-015062-5
Stephen Laurence and Eric Margolis
"Concepts and Cognitive Science" . In
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Hjørland, Birger (2009). "Concept theory".
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External links

Look up concept in Wiktionary, the free

dictionary.
Wikisource has the text of the 1911
Encyclopædia Britannica article
Concept.

Concept at PhilPapers
Zalta, Edward N. (ed.). "Concepts" .
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Concept at the Indiana Philosophy
Ontology Project
"Concept" . Internet Encyclopedia of
Philosophy.
"Theory–Theory of Concepts" . Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
"Classical Theory of Concepts" . Internet
Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
 Blending and Conceptual Integration
Conceptual Science and Mathematical
Permutations
Concept Mobiles Latest concepts
v:Conceptualize: A Wikiversity Learning
Project
Concept simultaneously translated in
several languages and meanings
TED-Ed Lesson on ideasthesia (sensing
concepts)

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