2 Ladlad v. COMELEC

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010.]
ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON

REMOTO , petitioner, vs . COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS , respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO , J : p
. . . [F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter much. That
would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its substance is the right to
differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing order.
Justice Robert A. Jackson
West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 1
One unavoidable consequence of everyone having the freedom to choose is that
others may make different choices — choices we would not make for ourselves,
choices we may disapprove of, even choices that may shock or offend or anger us.
However, choices are not to be legally prohibited merely because they are different, and
the right to disagree and debate about important questions of public policy is a core
value protected by our Bill of Rights. Indeed, our democracy is built on genuine
recognition of, and respect for, diversity and difference in opinion.
Since ancient times, society has grappled with deep disagreements about the
de nitions and demands of morality. In many cases, where moral convictions are
concerned, harmony among those theoretically opposed is an insurmountable goal. Yet
herein lies the paradox — philosophical justi cations about what is moral are
indispensable and yet at the same time powerless to create agreement. This Court
recognizes, however, that practical solutions are preferable to ideological stalemates;
accommodation is better than intransigence; reason more worthy than rhetoric. This
will allow persons of diverse viewpoints to live together, if not harmoniously, then, at
least, civilly.
Factual Background
This is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, with an
application for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, led by Ang Ladlad LGBT
P a r t y (Ang Ladlad) against the Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) dated November 11, 2009 2 (the First Assailed Resolution) and December
16, 2009 3 (the Second Assailed Resolution) in SPP No. 09-228 (PL) (collectively, the
Assailed Resolutions). The case has its roots in the COMELEC's refusal to accredit Ang
Ladlad as a party-list organization under Republic Act (RA) No. 7941, otherwise known
as the Party-List System Act. 4 CDAHaE
Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs).
Incorporated in 2003, Ang Ladlad rst applied for registration with the COMELEC in
2006. The application for accreditation was denied on the ground that the organization
CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com
had no substantial membership base. On August 17, 2009, Ang Ladlad again led a
Petition 5 for registration with the COMELEC.
Before the COMELEC, petitioner argued that the LGBT community is a
marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly disadvantaged because
of their sexual orientation and gender identity; that LGBTs are victims of exclusion,
discrimination, and violence; that because of negative societal attitudes, LGBTs are
constrained to hide their sexual orientation; and that Ang Ladlad complied with the 8-
point guidelines enunciated by this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections. 6 Ang Ladlad laid out its national membership base
consisting of individual members and organizational supporters, and outlined its
platform of governance. 7
On November 11, 2009, after admitting the petitioner's evidence, the COMELEC
(Second Division) dismissed the Petition on moral grounds, stating that:
. . . This Petition is dismissible on moral grounds. Petitioner de nes the Filipino
Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender (LGBT) Community, thus:
. . . a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly

disadvantaged because of their sexual orientation and gender identity.
and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:
. . . refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and

sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals of a
different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender."
This de nition of the LGBT sector makes it crystal clear that petitioner tolerates
immorality which offends religious beliefs. In Romans 1:26, 27, Paul wrote:
For this cause God gave them up into vile affections, for even their women
did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And likewise
also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and
receiving in themselves that recompense of their error which was meet.
In the Koran, the hereunder verses are pertinent:
For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women "ye are indeed a
people transgressing beyond bounds." (7.81) "And we rained down on
them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of those who
indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84) "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me
against people who do mischief" (29:30).
As correctly pointed out by the Law Department in its Comment dated October 2,
2008: CcADHI
The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in

the Petition's par. 6F: 'Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays
and lesbians who are already of age'. It is further indicated in par. 24 of the
Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007, Men Having Sex with Men or
MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000 (Genesis 19 is the
history of Sodom and Gomorrah).
Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,

relationship, or accreditation. Hence, pertinent provisions of the Civil Code
and the Revised Penal Code are deemed part of the requirement to be
complied with for accreditation.
ANG LADLAD collides with Article 695 of the Civil Code which de nes
nuisance as 'Any act, omission, establishment, business, condition of
property, or anything else which . . . (3) shocks, de es; or disregards
decency or morality . . .
It also collides with Article 1306 of the Civil Code: 'The contracting parties
may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy. Art. 1409 of the Civil Code provides
that 'Contracts whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals,
good customs, public order or public policy' are inexistent and void from
the beginning.
Finally to safeguard the morality of the Filipino community, the Revised Penal
Code, as amended, penalizes 'Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibitions and indecent shows' as follows:
Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and

indecent shows. — The penalty of prision mayor or a ne ranging from six
thousand to twelve thousand pesos, or both such imprisonment and ne,
shall be imposed upon:
1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly

contrary to public morals;
2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their

knowledge in any form; the editors publishing such literature; and the
owners/operators of the establishment selling the same;
(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,

exhibit indecent or immoral plays, scenes, acts or shows, it being
understood that the obscene literature or indecent or immoral plays,
scenes, acts or shows, whether live or in film, which are prescribed by virtue
hereof, shall include those which: (1) glorify criminals or condone crimes;
(2) serve no other purpose but to satisfy the market for violence, lust or
pornography; (3) offend any race or religion; (4) tend to abet tra c in and
use of prohibited drugs; and (5) are contrary to law, public order, morals,
good customs, established policies, lawful orders, decrees and edicts.
3. Those who shall sell, give away or exhibit lms, prints, engravings,
sculpture or literature which are offensive to morals.THADEI
Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating

immoral doctrines but likewise for not being truthful when it said that it "or any of
its nominees/party-list representatives have not violated or failed to comply with
laws, rules, or regulations relating to the elections."
Furthermore, should this Commission grant the petition, we will be exposing our
youth to an environment that does not conform to the teachings of our faith.
Lehman Strauss, a famous bible teacher and writer in the U.S.A. said in one article
that "older practicing homosexuals are a threat to the youth." As an agency of the
government, ours too is the State's avowed duty under Section 13, Article II of the
Constitution to protect our youth from moral and spiritual degradation. 8
When Ang Ladlad sought reconsideration, 9 three commissioners voted to
overturn the First Assailed Resolution (Commissioners Gregorio Y. Larrazabal, Rene V.
Sarmiento, and Armando Velasco), while three commissioners voted to deny Ang
Ladlad's Motion for Reconsideration (Commissioners Nicodemo T. Ferrer, Lucenito N.
Tagle, and Elias R. Yusoph). The COMELEC Chairman, breaking the tie and speaking for
the majority in his Separate Opinion, upheld the First Assailed Resolution, stating that:
I. The Spirit of Republic Act No. 7941
Ladlad is applying for accreditation as a sectoral party in the party-list system.
Even assuming that it has properly proven its under-representation and
marginalization, it cannot be said that Ladlad's expressed sexual orientations per
se would benefit the nation as a whole.
Section 2 of the party-list law unequivocally states that the purpose of the party-
list system of electing congressional representatives is to enable Filipino citizens
belonging to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties, and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will
bene t the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives.
If entry into the party-list system would depend only on the ability of an
organization to represent its constituencies, then all representative organizations
would have found themselves into the party-list race. But that is not the intention
of the framers of the law. The party-list system is not a tool to advocate tolerance
and acceptance of misunderstood persons or groups of persons. Rather, the
party-list system is a tool for the realization of aspirations of
marginalized individuals whose interests are also the nation's — only
that their interests have not been brought to the attention of the nation because of
their under representation. Until the time comes when L a dl a d is able to
justify that having mixed sexual orientations and transgender identities
is bene cial to the nation, its application for accreditation under the
party-list system will remain just that .
II. No substantial differentiation

In the United States, whose equal protection doctrine pervades Philippine
jurisprudence, courts do not recognize lesbians, gays, homosexuals, and
bisexuals (LGBT) as a "special class" of individuals. . . . Signi cantly, it has also
been held that homosexuality is not a constitutionally protected fundamental
right, and that "nothing in the U.S. Constitution discloses a comparable intent to
protect or promote the social or legal equality of homosexual relations," as in the
case of race or religion or belief. EcHTCD
xxx xxx xxx
Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is

elevated, there can be no denying that Ladlad constituencies are still males and
females, and they will remain either male or female protected by the
same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike .
xxx xxx xxx
IV. Public Morals

. . . There is no question about not imposing on Ladlad Christian or Muslim
religious practices. Neither is there any attempt to any particular religious group's
moral rules on Ladlad. Rather, what are being adopted as moral parameters and
precepts are generally accepted public morals. They are possibly religious-based,
but as a society, the Philippines cannot ignore its more than 500 years
of Muslim and Christian upbringing, such that some moral precepts
espoused by said religions have sipped [sic] into society and these are
not publicly accepted moral norms .
V.Legal Provisions
But above morality and social norms, they have become part of the law of the
land. Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code imposes the penalty of prision mayor
upon "Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly contrary to
public morals." It penalizes "immoral doctrines, obscene publications and
exhibition and indecent shows." "Ang Ladlad" apparently falls under these legal
provisions. This is clear from its Petition's paragraph 6F: "Consensual
partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who are already of age. It is
further indicated in par. 24 of the Petition which waves for the record: 'In 2007,
Men Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated as 670,000.
Moreoever, * Article 694 of the Civil Code defines "nuisance" as any act, omission .
. . or anything else . . . which shocks, de es or disregards decency or morality . . .
." These are all unlawful. 1 0
On January 4, 2010, Ang Ladlad filed this Petition, praying that the Court annul the
Assailed Resolutions and direct the COMELEC to grant Ang Ladlad's application for
accreditation. Ang Ladlad also sought the issuance ex parte of a preliminary mandatory
injunction against the COMELEC, which had previously announced that it would begin
printing the final ballots for the May 2010 elections by January 25, 2010.
On January 6, 2010, we ordered the O ce of the Solicitor General (OSG) to le
its Comment on behalf of COMELEC not later than 12:00 noon of January 11, 2010. 1 1
Instead of ling a Comment, however, the OSG led a Motion for Extension, requesting
that it be given until January 16, 2010 to Comment. 1 2 Somewhat surprisingly, the OSG
later led a Comment in support of petitioner's application. 1 3 Thus, in order to give
COMELEC the opportunity to fully ventilate its position, we required it to le its own
comment. 1 4 The COMELEC, through its Law Department, led its Comment on
February 2, 2010. 1 5
In the meantime, due to the urgency of the petition, we issued a temporary
restraining order on January 12, 2010, effective immediately and continuing until further
orders from this Court, directing the COMELEC to cease and desist from implementing
the Assailed Resolutions. 1 6
Also, on January 13, 2010, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) led a
Motion to Intervene or to Appear as Amicus Curiae, attaching thereto its Comment-in-
Intervention. 1 7 The CHR opined that the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition on moral
grounds violated the standards and principles of the Constitution, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR). On January 19, 2010, we granted the CHR's motion to
intervene. DcaECT
On January 26, 2010, Epifanio D. Salonga, Jr. led his Motion to Intervene 18
which motion was granted on February 2, 2010. 1 9
The Parties' Arguments
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justi ed the
exclusion by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the
establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and
equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines'
international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.
The OSG concurred with Ang Ladlad's petition and argued that the COMELEC
erred in denying petitioner's application for registration since there was no basis for
COMELEC's allegations of immorality. It also opined that LGBTs have their own special
interests and concerns which should have been recognized by the COMELEC as a
separate classi cation. However, insofar as the purported violations of petitioner's
freedom of speech, expression, and assembly were concerned, the OSG maintained
that there had been no restrictions on these rights.
In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete
and genuine national political agenda to bene t the nation and that the petition was
validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the rst time that the LGBT
sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that
petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national
existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC's field personnel.
Our Ruling
We grant the petition.
Compliance with the Requirements of
the Constitution and Republic Act No.
7941
The COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's application for registration on the ground
that the LGBT sector is neither enumerated in the Constitution and RA 7941, nor is it
associated with or related to any of the sectors in the enumeration.
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for
the proposition that only those sectors speci cally enumerated in the law or related to
said sectors (labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)
may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong
Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, 2 0 "the enumeration of
marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive". The crucial element is not
whether a sector is speci cally enumerated, but whether a particular organization
complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.
Respondent also argues that Ang Ladlad made untruthful statements in its
petition when it alleged that it had nationwide existence through its members and
a liate organizations. The COMELEC claims that upon veri cation by its eld
personnel, it was shown that "save for a few isolated places in the country, petitioner
does not exist in almost all provinces in the country." 2 1
EaISTD
This argument that "petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it
alleged its national existence" is a new one; previously, the COMELEC claimed that
petitioner was "not being truthful when it said that it or any of its nominees/party-list
representatives have not violated or failed to comply with laws, rules, or regulations
relating to the elections." Nowhere was this ground for denial of petitioner's
accreditation mentioned or even alluded to in the Assailed Resolutions. This, in itself, is
quite curious, considering that the reports of petitioner's alleged non-existence were
already available to the COMELEC prior to the issuance of the First Assailed Resolution.
At best, this is irregular procedure; at worst, a belated afterthought, a change in
respondent's theory, and a serious violation of petitioner's right to procedural due
process.
Nonetheless, we find that there has been no misrepresentation. A cursory perusal
of Ang Ladlad's initial petition shows that it never claimed to exist in each province of
the Philippines. Rather, petitioner alleged that the LGBT community in the Philippines
was estimated to constitute at least 670,000 persons; that it had 16,100 a liates and
members around the country, and 4,044 members in its electronic discussion group. 2 2
Ang Ladlad also represented itself to be "a national LGBT umbrella organization with
affiliates around the Philippines composed of the following LGBT networks:"
• Abra Gay Association
• Aklan Butterfly Brigade (ABB)-Aklan
• Albay Gay Association

• Arts Center of Cabanatuan City-Nueva Ecija
• Boys Legion-Metro Manila
• Cagayan de Oro People Like Us (CDO PLUS)
• Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila

• Cebu Pride-Cebu City
• Circle of Friends
• Dipolog Gay Association-Zamboanga del Norte
• Gay, Bisexual, & Transgender Youth Association (GABAY)
• Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)-Metro

Manila
• Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila

• Gay United for Peace and Solidarity (GUPS)-Lanao del Norte
• Iloilo City Gay Association-Iloilo City
• Kabulig Writer's Group-Camarines Sur
• Lesbian Advocates Philippines, Inc. (LEAP)
• LUMINA-Baguio City
• Marikina Gay Association-Metro Manila
• Metropolitan Community Church (MCC)-Metro Manila
• Naga City Gay Association-Naga City
• ONE BACARDI AaITCS
• Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila

• PUP LAKAN
• RADAR PRIDEWEAR
• Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.-Metro Manila

• San Jose del Monte Gay Association-Bulacan
• Sining Kayumanggi Royal Family-Rizal
• Society of Transexual Women of the Philippines (STRAP)-Metro Manila
• Soul Jive-Antipolo, Rizal
• The Link-Davao City

• Tayabas Gay Association-Quezon
• Women's Bisexual Network-Metro Manila
• Zamboanga Gay Association-Zamboanga City 2 3
Since the COMELEC only searched for the names ANG LADLAD LGBT or LADLAD
LGBT, it is no surprise that they found that petitioner had no presence in any of these
regions. In fact, if COMELEC's ndings are to be believed, petitioner does not even exist
in Quezon City, which is registered as Ang Ladlad's principal place of business.
Against this backdrop, we nd that Ang Ladlad has su ciently demonstrated its
compliance with the legal requirements for accreditation. Indeed, aside from
COMELEC's moral objection and the belated allegation of non-existence, nowhere in the
records has the respondent ever found/ruled that Ang Ladlad is not quali ed to register
as a party-list organization under any of the requisites under RA 7941 or the guidelines
in Ang Bagong Bayani. The difference, COMELEC claims, lies in Ang Ladlad's morality, or
lack thereof.
Religion as the Basis for Refusal to
Accept Ang Ladlad's Petition for
Registration
Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that "[n]o law shall be made
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." At
bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is "government neutrality in
religious matters." 2 4 Clearly, "governmental reliance on religious justi cation is
inconsistent with this policy of neutrality." 2 5 We thus nd that it was grave violation of
the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad.
Rather than relying on religious belief, the legitimacy of the Assailed Resolutions
should depend, instead, on whether the COMELEC is able to advance some justi cation
for its rulings beyond mere conformity to religious doctrine. Otherwise stated,
government must act for secular purposes and in ways that have primarily secular
effects. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 2 6
. . . The morality referred to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not
religious as the dissent of Mr. Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as
expressed in public debate may in uence the civil public order but public moral
disputes may be resolved only on grounds articulable in secular terms."
Otherwise, if government relies upon religious beliefs in formulating public
policies and morals, the resulting policies and morals would require conformity to
what some might regard as religious programs or agenda. The non-believers
would therefore be compelled to conform to a standard of conduct buttressed by
a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled religion," anathema to religious freedom.
Likewise, if government based its actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly
approve or endorse that belief and thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary
religious or non-religious views that would not support the policy. As a result,
government will not provide full religious freedom for all its citizens, or even make
it appear that those whose beliefs are disapproved are second-class citizens.
In other words, government action, including its proscription of immorality as
expressed in criminal law like concubinage, must have a secular purpose. That is,
the government proscribes this conduct because it is "detrimental (or dangerous)
to those conditions upon which depend the existence and progress of human
society" and not because the conduct is proscribed by the beliefs of one religion
or the other. Although admittedly, moral judgments based on religion might have
a compelling in uence on those engaged in public deliberations over what
actions would be considered a moral disapprobation punishable by law. After all,
they might also be adherents of a religion and thus have religious opinions and
moral codes with a compelling in uence on them; the human mind endeavors to
regulate the temporal and spiritual institutions of society in a uniform manner,
harmonizing earth with heaven. Succinctly put, a law could be religious or Kantian
or Aquinian or utilitarian in its deepest roots, but it must have an articulable and
discernible secular purpose and justi cation to pass scrutiny of the religion
clauses. . . . Recognizing the religious nature of the Filipinos and the elevating
in uence of religion in society, however, the Philippine constitution's religion
clauses prescribe not a strict but a benevolent neutrality. Benevolent neutrality
recognizes that government must pursue its secular goals and interests but at the
same time strive to uphold religious liberty to the greatest extent possible within
exible constitutional limits. Thus, although the morality contemplated by laws is
secular, benevolent neutrality could allow for accommodation of morality based
on religion, provided it does not offend compelling state interests. 2 7
Public Morals as a Ground to Deny

Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration
Respondent suggests that although the moral condemnation of homosexuality
and homosexual conduct may be religion-based, it has long been transplanted into
generally accepted public morals. The COMELEC argues: aIcCTA
Petitioner's accreditation was denied not necessarily because their group consists
of LGBTs but because of the danger it poses to the people especially the youth.
Once it is recognized by the government, a sector which believes that there is
nothing wrong in having sexual relations with individuals of the same gender is a
bad example. It will bring down the standard of morals we cherish in our civilized
society. Any society without a set of moral precepts is in danger of losing its own
existence. 2 8
We are not blind to the fact that, through the years, homosexual conduct, and
perhaps homosexuals themselves, have borne the brunt of societal disapproval. It is
not di cult to imagine the reasons behind this censure — religious beliefs, convictions
about the preservation of marriage, family, and procreation, even dislike or distrust of
homosexuals themselves and their perceived lifestyle. Nonetheless, we recall that the
Philippines has not seen t to criminalize homosexual conduct. Evidently, therefore,
these "generally accepted public morals" have not been convincingly transplanted into
the realm of law. 2 9
The Assailed Resolutions have not identi ed any speci c overt immoral act
performed by Ang Ladlad. Even the OSG agrees that "there should have been a nding
by the COMELEC that the group's members have committed or are committing
immoral acts." 3 0 The OSG argues:
. . . A person may be sexually attracted to a person of the same gender, of a
different gender, or more than one gender, but mere attraction does not translate
to immoral acts. There is a great divide between thought and action. Reduction ad
absurdum. If immoral thoughts could be penalized, COMELEC would have its
hands full of disquali cation cases against both the "straights" and the gays."
Certainly this is not the intendment of the law. 3 1
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or
why special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC
condescended to justify its position that petitioner's admission into the party-list
system would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society. We,
of course, do not suggest that the state is wholly without authority to regulate matters
concerning morality, sexuality, and sexual relations, and we recognize that the
government will and should continue to restrict behavior considered detrimental to
society. Nonetheless, we cannot countenance advocates who, undoubtedly with the
loftiest of intentions, situate morality on one end of an argument or another, without
bothering to go through the rigors of legal reasoning and explanation. In this, the notion
of morality is robbed of all value. Clearly then, the bare invocation of morality will not
remove an issue from our scrutiny.
We also nd the COMELEC's reference to purported violations of our penal and
civil laws imsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code de nes a
nuisance as "any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, de es, or disregards decency or morality," the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. 3 2 A violation of Article 201 of the Revised
Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a
criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation
of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace the
institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or
culpability. SDIaCT
As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a su cient

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad's registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a
tool to further any substantial public interest. Respondent's blanket justi cations give
rise to the inevitable conclusion that the COMELEC targets homosexuals themselves as
a class, not because of any particular morally reprehensible act. It is this selective
targeting that implicates our equal protection clause.
Equal Protection
Despite the absolutism of Article III, Section 1 of our Constitution, which provides
"nor shall any person be denied equal protection of the laws," courts have never
interpreted the provision as an absolute prohibition on classi cation. "Equality," said
Aristotle, "consists in the same treatment of similar persons." 3 3 The equal protection
clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the same
protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances. 3 4
Recent jurisprudence has a rmed that if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the classi cation as long as it bears a
rational relationship to some legitimate government end. 3 5 In Central Bank Employees
Association, Inc. v. Banko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 3 6 we declared that "[i]n our jurisdiction,
the standard of analysis of equal protection challenges . . . have followed the 'rational
basis' test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classi cations and a
reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal
breach of the Constitution." 3 7
The COMELEC posits that the majority of the Philippine population considers
homosexual conduct as immoral and unacceptable, and this constitutes su cient
reason to disqualify the petitioner. Unfortunately for the respondent, the Philippine
electorate has expressed no such belief. No law exists to criminalize homosexual
behavior or expressions or parties about homosexual behavior. Indeed, even if we were
to assume that public opinion is as the COMELEC describes it, the asserted state
interest here — that is, moral disapproval of an unpopular minority — is not a legitimate
state interest that is su cient to satisfy rational basis review under the equal
protection clause. The COMELEC's differentiation, and its unsubstantiated claim that
Ang Ladlad cannot contribute to the formulation of legislation that would bene t the
nation, furthers no legitimate state interest other than disapproval of or dislike for a
disfavored group.
From the standpoint of the political process, the lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender have the same interest in participating in the party-list system on the same
basis as other political parties similarly situated. State intrusion in this case is equally
burdensome. Hence, laws of general application should apply with equal force to
LGBTs, and they deserve to participate in the party-list system on the same basis as
other marginalized and under-represented sectors.
It bears stressing that our nding that COMELEC's act of differentiating LGBTs
from heterosexuals insofar as the party-list system is concerned does not imply that
any other law distinguishing between heterosexuals and homosexuals under different
circumstances would similarly fail. We disagree with the OSG's position that
homosexuals are a class in themselves for the purposes of the equal protection clause.
3 8 We are not prepared to single out homosexuals as a separate class meriting special
or differentiated treatment. We have not received su cient evidence to this effect, and
it is simply unnecessary to make such a ruling today. Petitioner itself has merely
demanded that it be recognized under the same basis as all other groups similarly
situated, and that the COMELEC made "an unwarranted and impermissible
classification not justified by the circumstances of the case."
Freedom of Expression and
Association
Under our system of laws, every group has the right to promote its agenda and
attempt to persuade society of the validity of its position through normal democratic
means. 3 9 It is in the public square that deeply held convictions and differing opinions
should be distilled and deliberated upon. As we held in Estrada v. Escritor: 4 0
In a democracy, this common agreement on political and moral ideas is distilled
in the public square. Where citizens are free, every opinion, every prejudice, every
aspiration, and every moral discernment has access to the public square where
people deliberate the order of their life together. Citizens are the bearers of
opinion, including opinion shaped by, or espousing religious belief, and these
citizens have equal access to the public square. In this representative democracy,
the state is prohibited from determining which convictions and moral judgments
may be proposed for public deliberation. Through a constitutionally designed
process, the people deliberate and decide. Majority rule is a necessary principle in
this democratic governance. Thus, when public deliberation on moral judgments
is nally crystallized into law, the laws will largely re ect the beliefs and
preferences of the majority, i.e., the mainstream or median groups. Nevertheless,
in the very act of adopting and accepting a constitution and the limits it speci es
— including protection of religious freedom "not only for a minority, however small
— not only for a majority, however large — but for each of us" — the majority
imposes upon itself a self-denying ordinance. It promises not to do what it
otherwise could do: to ride roughshod over the dissenting minorities.
Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

democratic society, and this freedom applies not only to those that are favorably
received but also to those that offend, shock, or disturb. Any restriction imposed in this
sphere must be proportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. Absent any compelling
state interest, it is not for the COMELEC or this Court to impose its views on the
populace. Otherwise stated, the COMELEC is certainly not free to interfere with speech
for no better reason than promoting an approved message or discouraging a
disfavored one. aAcDSC
This position gains even more force if one considers that homosexual conduct is
not illegal in this country. It follows that both expressions concerning one's
homosexuality and the activity of forming a political association that supports LGBT
individuals are protected as well.
Other jurisdictions have gone so far as to categorically rule that even
overwhelming public perception that homosexual conduct violates public morality does
not justify criminalizing same-sex conduct. 41 European and United Nations judicial
decisions have ruled in favor of gay rights claimants on both privacy and equality
grounds, citing general privacy and equal protection provisions in foreign and
international texts. 4 2 To the extent that there is much to learn from other jurisdictions
that have re ected on the issues we face here, such jurisprudence is certainly
illuminating. These foreign authorities, while not formally binding on Philippine courts,
may nevertheless have persuasive influence on the Court's analysis.
In the area of freedom of expression, for instance, United States courts have
ruled that existing free speech doctrines protect gay and lesbian rights to expressive
conduct. In order to justify the prohibition of a particular expression of opinion, public
institutions must show that their actions were caused by "something more than a mere
desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasantness that always accompany an
unpopular viewpoint." 4 3
With respect to freedom of association for the advancement of ideas and beliefs,
in Europe, with its vibrant human rights tradition, the European Court of Human Rights
(ECHR) has repeatedly stated that a political party may campaign for a change in the
law or the constitutional structures of a state if it uses legal and democratic means and
the changes it proposes are consistent with democratic principles. The ECHR has
emphasized that political ideas that challenge the existing order and whose realization
is advocated by peaceful means must be afforded a proper opportunity of expression
through the exercise of the right of association, even if such ideas may seem shocking
or unacceptable to the authorities or the majority of the population. 4 4 A political group
should not be hindered solely because it seeks to publicly debate controversial political
issues in order to nd solutions capable of satisfying everyone concerned. 4 5 Only if a
political party incites violence or puts forward policies that are incompatible with
democracy does it fall outside the protection of the freedom of association guarantee.
46
We do not doubt that a number of our citizens may believe that homosexual
conduct is distasteful, offensive, or even de ant. They are entitled to hold and express
that view. On the other hand, LGBTs and their supporters, in all likelihood, believe with
equal fervor that relationships between individuals of the same sex are morally
equivalent to heterosexual relationships. They, too, are entitled to hold and express that
view. However, as far as this Court is concerned, our democracy precludes using the
religious or moral views of one part of the community to exclude from consideration
the values of other members of the community.
Of course, none of this suggests the impending arrival of a golden age for gay
rights litigants. It well may be that this Decision will only serve to highlight the
discrepancy between the rigid constitutional analysis of this Court and the more
complex moral sentiments of Filipinos. We do not suggest that public opinion, even at
its most liberal, re ect a clear-cut strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims and
we neither attempt nor expect to affect individual perceptions of homosexuality
through this Decision.
The OSG argues that since there has been neither prior restraint nor subsequent
punishment imposed on Ang Ladlad, and its members have not been deprived of their
right to voluntarily associate, then there has been no restriction on their freedom of
expression or association. The OSG argues that:
There was no utterance restricted, no publication censored, or any assembly
denied. [COMELEC] simply exercised its authority to review and verify the
quali cations of petitioner as a sectoral party applying to participate in the party-
list system. This lawful exercise of duty cannot be said to be a transgression of
Section 4, Article III of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx
A denial of the petition for registration . . . does not deprive the members of the
petitioner to freely take part in the conduct of elections. Their right to vote will not
be hampered by said denial. In fact, the right to vote is a constitutionally-
guaranteed right which cannot be limited.
As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that

the denial of Ang Ladlad's petition has the clear and immediate effect of limiting,
if not outrightly nullifying the capacity of its members to fully and equally
participate in public life through engagement in the party list elections.
This argument is puerile. The holding of a public o ce is not a right but a
privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. . . . 4 7
The OSG fails to recall that petitioner has, in fact, established its quali cations to
participate in the party-list system, and — as advanced by the OSG itself — the moral
objection offered by the COMELEC was not a limitation imposed by law. To the extent,
therefore, that the petitioner has been precluded, because of COMELEC's action, from
publicly expressing its views as a political party and participating on an equal basis in
the political process with other equally-quali ed party-list candidates, we nd that there
has, indeed, been a transgression of petitioner's fundamental rights.
Non-Discrimination and International
Law
In an age that has seen international law evolve geometrically in scope and
promise, international human rights law, in particular, has grown dynamically in its
attempt to bring about a more just and humane world order. For individuals and groups
struggling with inadequate structural and governmental support, international human
rights norms are particularly signi cant, and should be effectively enforced in domestic
legal systems so that such norms may become actual, rather than ideal, standards of
conduct.
Our Decision today is fully in accord with our international obligations to protect
and promote human rights. In particular, we explicitly recognize the principle of non-
discrimination as it relates to the right to electoral participation, enunciated in the UDHR
and the ICCPR. SIaHDA
The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as

follows:
Article 26
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled without any discrimination to
the equal protection of the law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any
discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.
In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general

application relating to elections be applied equally to all persons, regardless of sexual
orientation. Although sexual orientation is not speci cally enumerated as a status or
ratio for discrimination in Article 26 of the ICCPR, the ICCPR Human Rights Committee
has opined that the reference to "sex" in Article 26 should be construed to include
"sexual orientation." 4 8 Additionally, a variety of United Nations bodies have declared
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation to be prohibited under various
international agreements. 4 9
The UDHR provides:
Article 21.
(1) Everyone has the right to take part in the government of his country,
directly or through freely chosen representatives.
Likewise, the ICCPR states:

Article 25
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity, without any of the
distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly or through freely
chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elections which shall be by
universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the
free expression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his
country.
As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to

electoral participation is elaborated by the Human Rights Committee in its General
Comment No. 25 (Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote) as follows:
1. Article 25 of the Covenant recognizes and protects the right of every citizen
to take part in the conduct of public affairs, the right to vote and to be elected and
the right to have access to public service. Whatever form of constitution or
government is in force, the Covenant requires States to adopt such legislative and
other measures as may be necessary to ensure that citizens have an effective
opportunity to enjoy the rights it protects. Article 25 lies at the core of democratic
government based on the consent of the people and in conformity with the
principles of the Covenant.
xxx xxx xxx
15. The effective implementation of the right and the opportunity to stand for
elective o ce ensures that persons entitled to vote have a free choice of
candidates. Any restrictions on the right to stand for election, such as minimum
age, must be justi able on objective and reasonable criteria. Persons who are
otherwise eligible to stand for election should not be excluded by unreasonable or
discriminatory requirements such as education, residence or descent, or by reason
of political a liation. No person should suffer discrimination or disadvantage of
any kind because of that person's candidacy. States parties should indicate and
explain the legislative provisions which exclude any group or category of persons
from elective office. 5 0
We stress, however, that although this Court stands willing to assume the
responsibility of giving effect to the Philippines' international law obligations, the
blanket invocation of international law is not the panacea for all social ills. We refer now
to the petitioner's invocation of the Yogyakarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity),
5 1 which petitioner declares to reflect binding principles of international law.
At this time, we are not prepared to declare that these Yogyakarta Principles
contain norms that are obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlined in said Principles which are not re ective of the current state of
international law, and do not nd basis in any of the sources of international law
enumerated under Article 38 (1) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. 5 2
Petitioner has not undertaken any objective and rigorous analysis of these alleged
principles of international law to ascertain their true status. ATDHSC
We also hasten to add that not everything that society — or a certain segment of
society — wants or demands is automatically a human right. This is not an arbitrary
human intervention that may be added to or subtracted from at will. It is unfortunate
that much of what passes for human rights today is a much broader context of needs
that identi es many social desires as rights in order to further claims that international
law obliges states to sanction these innovations. This has the effect of diluting real
human rights, and is a result of the notion that if "wants" are couched in "rights"
language, then they are no longer controversial.
Using even the most liberal of lenses, these Yogyakarta Principles, consisting of
a declaration formulated by various international law professors, are — at best — de
lege ferenda — and do not constitute binding obligations on the Philippines. Indeed, so
much of contemporary international law is characterized by the "soft law"
nomenclature, i.e., international law is full of principles that promote international
cooperation, harmony, and respect for human rights, most of which amount to no more
than well-meaning desires, without the support of either State practice or opinio juris.
53
As a nal note, we cannot help but observe that the social issues presented by
this case are emotionally charged, societal attitudes are in ux, even the psychiatric and
religious communities are divided in opinion. This Court's role is not to impose its own
view of acceptable behavior. Rather, it is to apply the Constitution and laws as best as it
can, unin uenced by public opinion, and con dent in the knowledge that our democracy
is resilient enough to withstand vigorous debate.
WHEREFORE , the Petition is hereby GRANTED . The Resolutions of the
Commission on Elections dated November 11, 2009 and December 16, 2009 in SPP
No. 09-228 (PL) are hereby SET ASIDE . The Commission on Elections is directed to
GRANT petitioner's application for party-list accreditation.
SO ORDERED .
Puno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Bersamin, Villarama, Jr.,
Perezand Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., Pls. see dissenting opinion.
Carpio Morales, Nachura and Peralta, JJ., join concurring opinion of J. Abad.
Brion, J., joins dissent of J. Corona.
Abad, J., I certify that J. Abad wrote a separate concurring opinion.
Separate Opinions
PUNO , C.J., concurring :
I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr.

Justice Mariano C. del Castillo. Nonetheless, I respectfully submit this separate opinion
to underscore some points that I deem significant. EScIAa
FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run

afoul of the non-establishment clause 1 of the Constitution. There was cypher effort on
the part of the COMELEC to couch its reasoning in legal — much less constitutional —
terms, as it denied Ang Ladlad's petition for registration as a sectoral party principally
on the ground that it "tolerates immorality which offends religious (i.e., Christian 2 and
Muslim 3 ) beliefs." To be sure, the COMELEC's ruling is completely antithetical to the
fundamental rule that "[t]he public morality expressed in the law is necessarily
secular [,] for in our constitutional order, the religion clauses prohibit the state from
establishing a religion, including the morality it sanctions ." 4 As we explained in
Estrada v. Escritor , 5 the requirement of an articulable and discernible secular
purpose is meant to give esh to the constitutional policy of full religious freedom for
all, viz.:
Religion also dictates "how we ought to live" for the nature of religion is not just to
know, but often, to act in accordance with man's "views of his relations to His
Creator." But the Establishment Clause puts a negative bar against establishment
of this morality arising from one religion or the other, and implies the a rmative
"establishment" of a civil order for the resolution of public moral disputes. This
agreement on a secular mechanism is the price of ending the "war of all sects
against all"; the establishment of a secular public moral order is the social
contract produced by religious truce.
Thus, when the law speaks of "immorality" in the Civil Service Law or "immoral" in
the Code of Professional Responsibility for lawyers, or "public morals" in the
Revised Penal Code, or "morals" in the New Civil Code, or "moral character" in the
Constitution, the distinction between public and secular morality on the one hand,
and religious morality, on the other, should be kept in mind. The morality referred
to in the law is public and necessarily secular, not religious as the dissent of Mr.
Justice Carpio holds. "Religious teachings as expressed in public debate may
in uence the civil public order but public moral disputes may be resolved only on
grounds articulable in secular terms." Otherwise, if government relies upon
religious beliefs in formulating public policies and morals, the resulting policies
and morals would require conformity to what some might regard as religious
programs or agenda. The non-believers would therefore be compelled to conform
to a standard of conduct buttressed by a religious belief, i.e., to a "compelled
religion;" anathema to religious freedom. Likewise, if government based its
actions upon religious beliefs, it would tacitly approve or endorse that belief and
thereby also tacitly disapprove contrary religious or non-religious views that
would not support the policy. As a result, government will not provide full religious
freedom for all its citizens, or even make it appear that those whose beliefs are
disapproved are second-class citizens. Expansive religious freedom therefore
requires that government be neutral in matters of religion; governmental reliance
upon religious justi cation is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. 6
(citations omitted and italics supplied)
Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the

constitutional directive that no religious test shall be required for the exercise of
civil or political rights . 7 Ang Ladlad's right of political participation was unduly
infringed when the COMELEC, swayed by the private biases and personal prejudices of
its constituent members, arrogated unto itself the role of a religious court or worse, a
morality police.
The COMELEC attempts to disengage itself from this "excessive entanglement" 8
with religion by arguing that we "cannot ignore our strict religious upbringing, whether
Christian or Muslim" 9 since the "moral precepts espoused by [these] religions have
slipped into society and . . . are now publicly accepted moral norms." 1 0 However, as
correctly observed by Mr. Justice del Castillo, the Philippines has not seen t to
disparage homosexual conduct as to actually criminalize it. Indeed, even if the State has
legislated to this effect, the law is vulnerable to constitutional attack on privacy
grounds. 1 1 These alleged "generally accepted public morals" have not, in reality,
crossed over from the religious to the secular sphere.
Some people may nd homosexuality and bisexuality deviant, odious, and
offensive. Nevertheless, private discrimination, however unfounded, cannot be
attributed or ascribed to the State. Mr. Justice Kennedy, speaking for the United States
(U.S.) Supreme Court in the landmark case of Lawrence v. Texas , 1 2 opined:
It must be acknowledged, of course, that the Court in Bowers was making the
broader point that for centuries there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral. The condemnation has been shaped by
religious beliefs, conceptions of right and acceptable behavior, and respect for the
traditional family. For many persons these are not trivial concerns but profound
and deep convictions accepted as ethical and moral principles to which they
aspire and which thus determine the course of their lives. These considerations
do not answer the question before us, however. The issue is whether the majority
may use the power of the State to enforce these views on the whole society
through operation of the . . . law. "Our obligation is to de ne the liberty of all, not
to mandate our own moral code." 1 3
SECOND. The COMELEC capitalized on Ang Ladlad's de nition of the term
"sexual orientation," 1 4 as well as its citation of the number of Filipino men who have sex
with men, 1 5 as basis for the declaration that the party espouses and advocates sexual
immorality. This position, however, would deny homosexual and bisexual
individuals a fundamental element of personal identity and a legitimate
exercise of personal liberty . For, the "ability to [independently] de ne one's identity
that is central to any concept of liberty" cannot truly be exercised in a vacuum; we all
depend on the "emotional enrichment from close ties with others." 1 6 As Mr. Justice
Blackmun so eloquently said in his stinging dissent in Bowers v. Hardwick 1 7
(overturned by the United States Supreme Court seventeen years later in Lawrence v.
Texas ): 1 8
Only the most willful blindness could obscure the fact that sexual intimacy is "a
sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family life, community
welfare, and the development of human personality[.]"1 9 The fact that individuals
de ne themselves in a signi cant way through their intimate sexual relationships
with others suggests, in a Nation as diverse as ours, that there may be many
"right" ways of conducting those relationships, and that much of the richness of a
relationship will come from the freedom an individual has to choose the form and
nature of these intensely personal bonds. 2 0 AEITDH
In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of

giving individuals freedom to choose how to conduct their lives is acceptance of
the fact that different individuals will make different choices. For example, in
holding that the clearly important state interest in public education should give
way to a competing claim by the Amish to the effect that extended formal
schooling threatened their way of life, the Court declared: "There can be no
assumption that today's majority is 'right' and the Amish and others like them are
'wrong.' A way of life that is odd or even erratic but interferes with no rights or
interests of others is not to be condemned because it is different." 2 1 The Court
claims that its decision today merely refuses to recognize a fundamental right to
engage in homosexual sodomy; what the Court really has refused to recognize is
the fundamental interest all individuals have in controlling the nature of their
intimate associations with others. (italics supplied)
It has been said that freedom extends beyond spatial bounds. 2 2 Liberty
presumes an autonomy of self that includes freedom of thought, belief, expression, and
certain intimate conduct. 2 3 These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the due process clause. 2 4 At the heart
of liberty is the right to de ne one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life. 2 5 Beliefs about these matters could not
de ne the attributes of personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.
2 6 Lawrence v. Texas 2 7 is again instructive:

To say that the issue in Bowers was simply the right to engage in certain sexual
conduct demeans the claim the individual put forward, just as it would demean a
married couple were it to be said marriage is simply about the right to have sexual
intercourse. The laws involved in Bowers and here are, to be sure, statutes that
purport to do no more than prohibit a particular sexual act. Their penalties and
purposes, though, have more far-reaching consequences, touching upon the most
private human conduct, sexual behavior, and in the most private of places, the
home. The statutes do seek to control a personal relationship that, whether or not
entitled to formal recognition in the law, is within the liberty of persons to choose
without being punished as criminals.
This, as a general rule, should counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to
de ne the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a
person or abuse of an institution the law protects. It su ces for us to
acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this relationship in the
con nes of their homes and their own private lives and still retain their dignity as
free persons. When sexuality nds overt expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice. (italics supplied)
THIRD. The ponencia of Mr. Justice del Castillo refused to characterize
homosexuals and bisexuals as a class in themselves for purposes of the equal
protection clause. Accordingly, it struck down the assailed Resolutions using the most
liberal basis of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, according to which government
need only show that the challenged classi cation is rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest.
I humbly submit, however, that a classi cation based on gender or sexual
orientation is a quasi-suspect classi cation , as to trigger a heightened level of
review .
Preliminarily, in our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection
challenges in the main have followed the rational basis test, coupled with a deferential
attitude to legislative classi cations and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is
a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. 2 8 However, Central
Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas , 2 9 carved out
an exception to this general rule, such that prejudice to persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution requires stricter judicial scrutiny than mere rationality,
viz.:
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classi cation, and its
policies should be accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice
except when they run afoul of the Constitution. The deference stops where the
classi cation violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded
special protection by the Constitution. When these violations arise, this Court
must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.
Rational basis should not suffice. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Considering thus that labor enjoys such special and protected status under our
fundamental law, the Court ruled in favor of the Central Bank Employees Association,
Inc. in this wise:
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power,
we hold that the enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and- le
employees of other GFIs leeched all validity out of the challenged proviso. IEHTaA
xxx xxx xxx

According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653
is also violative of the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the
charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS were also amended, but the personnel of
the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage of the SSL. Thus, within the
class of rank-and- le personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and- le are also
discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in
1993, Congress also undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP,
DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs, from 1995 to 2004, viz.:
xxx xxx xxx

It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven
other GFIs share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees
from the coverage of the SSL, expressly or impliedly . . .
xxx xxx xxx

The abovementioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute signi cant
changes in circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act
No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to more serious scrutiny. This time, the
scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classi cation — albeit made
indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws — between the
rank-and- le of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classi cation must not
only be reasonable, but must also apply equally to all members of the class. The
proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in appearance but it cannot be
grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make unjust
distinctions between persons who are without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions:
Given that Congress chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the
coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the rank-and- le employees of the BSP
stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress did not exclude
the rank-and- le employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so
unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because
the inequity manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but
gradually and progressively, through seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right
to equal protection of the law bounded in time and space that: (a) the right can
only be invoked against a classi cation made directly and deliberately, as
opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several
other acts; and (b) is the legal analysis con ned to determining the validity within
the parameters of the statute or ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is
articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-Ã -vis the grouping, or the lack
thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justi ed on

the mere assertion that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests
"on a policy determination by the legislature." All legislative enactments
necessarily rest on a policy determination — even those that have been declared
to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection
challenges would ever prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy
determination made by Congress or by the Executive; it cannot run riot and
overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the
SSL, there are no characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-
le so as to justify the exemption which BSP rank-and- le employees were denied
(not to mention the anomaly of the SEC getting one). The distinction made by the
law is not only super cial, but also arbitrary. It is not based on substantial
distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and- le and the
seven other GFIs.
xxx xxx xxx
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and- le and the rank-and- le of the
other seven GFIs de nitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious
discrimination — no one can, with candor and fairness, deny the discriminatory
character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven other GFIs
from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as
unalikes without any rational basis.
xxx xxx xxx

Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision,
and its conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence
and in consonance with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in
international law. There should be no hesitation in using the equal protection
clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the
Constitution, coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor,
compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and
international law, we held in International School Alliance of Educators v.
Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond
contention. Our Constitution and laws re ect the policy against these evils.
The Constitution in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts
Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that
protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil
Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the
performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and
observe honesty and good faith." DAEIHT
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise

proscribes discrimination. General principles of law include principles of
equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test
of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation — all embody the general principle against
discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The Philippines,
through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its
national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often
skewed in favor of capital, inequality and discrimination by the employer
are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution speci cally provides that labor is entitled to "humane
conditions of work." These conditions are not restricted to the physical
workplace — the factory, the o ce or the eld — but include as well the
manner by which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment
opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall
"ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would
be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in
spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment
opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and
conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of

everyone to the enjoyment of just and [favorable] conditions of
work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a
minimum, with:
i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of
equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of
work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction
the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who
work with substantially equal quali cations, skill, effort and responsibility,
under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
xxx xxx xxx

Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding
questions of constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress
in exercising its legislative power. Judicial scrutiny would be based on the
"rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be given deferential
treatment.

But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental
right, or the perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution
with special protection, judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and
watered down view would call for the abdication of this Court's solemn duty to
strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the rights it enshrines. This
is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person or
the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck
down regardless of the character or nature of the actor.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary
grade or o cer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic
class and status, with the higher grades as recipients of a bene t speci cally
withheld from the lower grades. O cers of the BSP now receive higher
compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer,
low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The
implications are quite disturbing: BSP rank-and- le employees are paid the strictly
regimented rates of the SSL while employees higher in rank — possessing higher
and better education and opportunities for career advancement — are given higher
compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that majority, if not
all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are
less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the
o cers — who have the real economic and nancial need for the adjustment.
This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to free the people from
poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs
counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster. (citations omitted and italics supplied)
Corollarily, American case law provides that a state action questioned on equal
protection grounds is subject to one of three levels of judicial scrutiny. The level of
review, on a sliding scale basis, varies with the type of classi cation utilized and the
nature of the right affected. 3 0 ATaDHC
If a legislative classi cation disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon

the exercise of a "fundamental right," then the courts will employ strict scrutiny and the
statute must fall unless the government can demonstrate that the classi cation has
been precisely tailored to serve a compelling governmental interest. 3 1 Over the years,
the United States Supreme Court has determined that suspect classes for equal
protection purposes include classi cations based on race, religion, alienage, national
origin, and ancestry. 3 2 The underlying rationale of this theory is that where legislation
affects discrete and insular minorities, the presumption of constitutionality fades
because traditional political processes may have broken down. 3 3 In such a case, the
State bears a heavy burden of justi cation, and the government action will be closely
scrutinized in light of its asserted purpose. 3 4
On the other hand, if the classi cation, while not facially invidious, nonetheless
gives rise to recurring constitutional di culties, or if a classi cation disadvantages a
"quasi-suspect class," it will be treated under intermediate or heightened review. 3 5 To
survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justi cation for the
classi cation must be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations. 3 6
Noteworthy, and of special interest to us in this case, quasi-suspect classes include
classifications based on gender or illegitimacy. 3 7

If neither strict nor intermediate scrutiny is appropriate, then the statute will be
tested for mere rationality. 3 8 This is a relatively relaxed standard re ecting the Court's
awareness that the drawing of lines which creates distinctions is peculiarly a legislative
task and an unavoidable one. 3 9 The presumption is in favor of the classi cation, of the
reasonableness and fairness of state action, and of legitimate grounds of distinction, if
any such grounds exist, on which the State acted. 4 0
Instead of adopting a rigid formula to determine whether certain legislative
classi cations warrant more demanding constitutional analysis, the United States
Supreme Court has looked to four factors, 4 1 thus:
(1) The history of invidious discrimination against the class burdened by
the legislation; 4 2
(2) Whether the characteristics that distinguish the class indicate a
typical class member's ability to contribute to society; 4 3
(3) Whether the distinguishing characteristic is "immutable" or beyond
the class members' control; 4 4 and
(4) The political power of the subject class. 4 5
These factors, it must be emphasized, are n o t constitutive essential
element s of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, as to individually demand a certain
weight. 4 6 The U.S. Supreme Court has applied the four factors in a exible manner; it
has neither required, nor even discussed, every factor in every case. 4 7 Indeed, no single
talisman can de ne those groups likely to be the target of classi cations offensive to
the equal protection clause and therefore warranting heightened or strict scrutiny;
experience, not abstract logic, must be the primary guide. 4 8
In any event, the rst two factors — history of intentional discrimination and
relationship of classifying characteristic to a person's ability to contribute — have
always been present when heightened scrutiny has been applied. 4 9 They have been
critical to the analysis and could be considered as prerequisites to concluding a group
is a suspect or quasi-suspect class. 5 0 However, the last two factors — immutability of
the characteristic and political powerlessness of the group — are considered simply to
supplement the analysis as a means to discern whether a need for heightened scrutiny
exists. 5 1
Guided by this framework, and considering further that classi cations based on
sex or gender — albeit on a male/female, man/woman basis — have been previously
held to trigger heightened scrutiny, I respectfully submit that classi cation on the basis
of sexual orientation (i.e., homosexuality and/or bisexuality) is a quasi-suspect
classification that prompts intermediate review.
The rst consideration is whether homosexuals have suffered a history of
purposeful unequal treatment because of their sexual orientation. 5 2 One cannot, in
good faith, dispute that gay and lesbian persons historically have been, and continue to
be, the target of purposeful and pernicious discrimination due solely to their sexual
orientation. 5 3 Paragraphs 6 and 7 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration for party-
list accreditation in fact state: TaCDIc
6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence

perpetuated against the LGBT Community, among which are:
(a) Effeminate or gay youths being beaten up by their parents and/or
guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of
behavior;
(b) Fathers and/or guardians who allow their daughters who are butch
lesbians to be raped[, so as] to "cure" them into becoming straight
women;
(c) Effeminate gays and butch lesbians are kicked out of school,
NGOs, and choirs because of their identity;
(d) Effeminate youths and masculine young women are refused
admission from (sic) certain schools, are suspended or are
automatically put on probation;
(e) Denial of jobs, promotions, trainings and other work bene ts once
one's sexual orientation and gender identity is (sic) revealed;
(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who

are already of age, are broken up by their parents or guardians using
the [A]nti-kidnapping [L]aw;
(g) Pray-overs, exorcisms, and other religious cures are performed on
gays and lesbians to "reform" them;
(h) Young gays and lesbians are forcibly subjected to psychiatric
counseling and therapy to cure them[,] despite the de-listing (sic) of
homosexuality and lesbianism as a mental disorder by the
American Psychiatric Association;
(i) Transgenders, or individuals who were born mail but who self-
identity as women and dress as such, are denied entry or services in
certain restaurants and establishments; and
(j) Several murders from the years 2003-3006 were committed against
gay men, but were not acknowledged by police as hate crimes or
violent acts of bigotry.
7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testi ed

that as a young gay person in the Philippines, he was subjected to a variety of
sexual abuse and violence, including repeated rapes[,] which he could not report
to [the] police [or speak of] to his own parents.
Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden

placed on lesbian and gay people as a class is "more likely than others to re ect deep-
seated prejudice rather than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate
objective." 5 4
A second relevant consideration is whether the character-in-issue is related to
the person's ability to contribute to society. 5 5 Heightened scrutiny is applied when the
classi cation bears no relationship to this ability; the existence of this factor indicates
the classi cation is likely based on irrelevant stereotypes and prejudice. 5 6 Insofar as
sexual orientation is concerned, it is gainful to repair to Kerrigan v. Commissioner of
Public Health , 5 7 viz.:
The defendants also concede that sexual orientation bears no relation to a
person's ability to participate in or contribute to society, a fact that many courts
have acknowledged, as well. . . . If homosexuals were a icted with some sort of
impediment to their ability to perform and to contribute to society, the entire
phenomenon of 'staying in the [c]loset' and of 'coming out' would not exist; their
impediment would betray their status. . . . In this critical respect, gay persons
stand in stark contrast to other groups that have been denied suspect or quasi-
suspect class recognition, despite a history of discrimination, because the
distinguishing characteristics of those groups adversely affect their ability or
capacity to perform certain functions or to discharge certain responsibilities in
society. 5 8
Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears

no relation at all to [an] individual's ability to contribute fully to society." 5 9 Indeed,
because an individual's homosexual orientation "implies no impairment in
judgment, stability, reliability or general social or vocational capabilities"; 6 0 the
observation of the United States Supreme Court that race, alienage and national
origin — all suspect classes entitled to the highest level of constitutional
protection — "are so seldom relevant to the achievement of any legitimate state
interest that laws grounded in such considerations are deemed to re ect prejudice
and antipathy" 6 1 is no less applicable to gay persons. (italics supplied)
Clearly, homosexual orientation is no more relevant to a person's ability to
perform and contribute to society than is heterosexual orientation. 6 2 DECSIT
A third factor that courts have considered in determining whether the members
of a class are entitled to heightened protection for equal protection purposes is
whether the attribute or characteristic that distinguishes them is immutable or
otherwise beyond their control. 6 3 Of course, the characteristic that distinguishes gay
persons from others and quali es them for recognition as a distinct and discrete group
is the characteristic that historically has resulted in their social and legal ostracism,
namely, their attraction to persons of the same sex. 6 4
Immutability is a factor in determining the appropriate level of scrutiny because
the inability of a person to change a characteristic that is used to justify different
treatment makes the discrimination violative of the rather "'basic concept of our
system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility.'"
6 5 However, the constitutional relevance of the immutability factor is not reserved to
those instances in which the trait de ning the burdened class is absolutely impossible
to change. 6 6 That is, the immutability prong of the suspectness inquiry surely is
satis ed when the identifying trait is "so central to a person's identity that it would be
abhorrent for government to penalize a person for refusing to change [it]." 6 7
Prescinding from these premises, it is not appropriate to require a person to
repudiate or change his or her sexual orientation in order to avoid discriminatory
treatment, because a person's sexual orientation is so integral an aspect of one's
identity. 6 8 Consequently, because sexual orientation "may be altered [if at all] only at
the expense of signi cant damage to the individual's sense of self," classi cations
based thereon "are no less entitled to consideration as a suspect or quasi-suspect
class than any other group that has been deemed to exhibit an immutable
characteristic." 6 9 Stated differently, sexual orientation is not the type of human trait
that allows courts to relax their standard of review because the barrier is temporary or
susceptible to self-help. 7 0
The nal factor that bears consideration is whether the group is "a minority or
politically powerless." 7 1 However, the political powerlessness factor of the level-of-
scrutiny inquiry does not require a showing of absolute political powerlessness. 7 2
Rather, the touchstone of the analysis should be "whether the group lacks su cient
political strength to bring a prompt end to the prejudice and discrimination through
traditional political means." 7 3
Applying this standard, it would not be di cult to conclude that gay persons are
entitled to heightened constitutional protection despite some recent political progress.
7 4 The discrimination that they have suffered has been so pervasive and severe — even
though their sexual orientation has no bearing at all on their ability to contribute to or
perform in society — that it is highly unlikely that legislative enactments alone will
suffice to eliminate that discrimination. 7 5 Furthermore, insofar as the LGBT community
plays a role in the political process, it is apparent that their numbers re ect their status
as a small and insular minority. 7 6
It is therefore respectfully submitted that any state action singling lesbians, gays,
bisexuals and trans-genders out for disparate treatment is subject to heightened
judicial scrutiny to ensure that it is not the product of historical prejudice and
stereotyping. 7 7
In this case, the assailed Resolutions of the COMELEC unmistakably fail the
intermediate level of review. Regrettably, they betray no more than bigotry and
intolerance; they raise the inevitable inference that the disadvantage imposed is born of
animosity toward the class of persons affected 7 8 (that is, lesbian, gay, bisexual and
trans-gendered individuals). In our constitutional system, status-based classi cation
undertaken for its own sake cannot survive. 7 9
FOURTH. It has been suggested that the LGBT community cannot participate in
the party-list system because it is not a "marginalized and underrepresented sector"
enumerated either in the Constitution 8 0 or Republic Act No. (RA) 7941. 8 1 However, this
position is belied by our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
COMELEC , 8 2 where we clearly held that the enumeration of marginalized and
underrepresented sectors in RA 7941 is not exclusive .
I likewise see no logical or factual obstacle to classifying the members of the
LGBT community as marginalized and underrepresented, considering their long history
(and indeed, ongoing narrative) of persecution, discrimination, and pathos. In my
humble view, marginalization for purposes of party-list representation
encompasses social marginalization as well . To hold otherwise is tantamount to
trivializing socially marginalized groups as "mere passive recipients of the State's
benevolence" and denying them the right to "participate directly [in the mainstream of
representative democracy] in the enactment of laws designed to bene t them." 8 3 The
party-list system could not have been conceptualized to perpetuate this injustice.
Accordingly, I vote to grant the petition.
CORONA , J., dissenting :
Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I

believe the basic issue here is simple: does petitioner Ang Ladlad LGBT Party qualify,
under the terms of the Constitution and RA 7941, as a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the party-list system? IaHCAD
The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks

accreditation by the respondent Commission on Elections as a political organization of
a marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. Finding that
petitioner is not a marginalized sector under RA 7941, the Commission on Elections
denied its petition.
A SYSTEM FOR MARGINALIZED
AND UNDERREPRESENTED SECTORS
The party-list system is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. It is essentially a
tool for the advancement of social justice with the fundamental purpose of affording
opportunity to marginalized and underrepresented sectors to participate in the shaping
of public policy and the crafting of national laws. It is premised on the proposition that
the advancement of the interests of the marginalized sectors contributes to the
advancement of the common good and of our nation's democratic ideals.
But who are the marginalized and underrepresented sectors for whom the party-
list system was designed?
THE TEXTS OF THE CONSTITUTION
AND OF RA 1 7941
The resolution of a constitutional issue primarily requires that the text of the
fundamental law be consulted. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution directs the
course of our present inquiry. It provides:
SEC. 5.. . .
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the
total number of Representatives including those under the party-list. For three
consecutive terms after the rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats
allocated to party-list representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by
selection or election from the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous
cultural communities, women, youth, and such other sectors as may be
provided by law, except the religious sector . (emphasis supplied)
The Constitution left the matter of determining the groups or sectors that may
qualify as "marginalized" to the hands of Congress. Pursuant to this constitutional
mandate, RA 7941 or the Party-List System Act was enacted in 1995. The law provides:
Section 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote proportional
representation in the election of representatives to the House of Representatives
through a party-list system of registered national, regional and sectoral parties or
organizations or coalitions thereof, which will enable Filipino citizens belonging
to marginalized and under-represented sectors, organizations and
parties , and who lack well-de ned political constituencies but who could
contribute to the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation
that will bene t the nation as a whole , to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and guarantee a full,
free and open party system in order to attain the broadest possible representation
of party, sectoral or group interests in the House of Representatives by enhancing
their chances to compete for and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide
the simplest scheme possible.
xxx xxx xxx
Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a

party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with
the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed
by its president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system
as a national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such
parties or organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or
program of government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant
information as the COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall
include labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas
workers, and professionals .
The COMELEC shall publish the petition in at least two (2) national newspapers
of general circulation.
The COMELEC shall, after due notice and hearing, resolve the petition within
fteen (15) days from the date it was submitted for decision but in no case not
later than sixty (60) days before election.
Section 6. Refusal and/or Cancellation of Registration. — The COMELEC may,
motu propio or upon veri ed complaint of any interested party, refuse or cancel,
after due notice and hearing, the registration of any national, regional or sectoral
party, organization or coalition on any of the following grounds:
(1) It is a religious sect or denomination, organization or association,
organized for religious purposes;
(2) It advocates violence or unlawful means to seek its goal;
(3) It is a foreign party or organization; AcSHCD
(4) It is receiving support from any foreign government, foreign

political party, foundation, organization, whether directly or through any of
its o cers or members or indirectly through third parties for partisan
election purposes;
(5) It violates or fails to comply with laws, rules or regulations relating
to elections;
(6) It declares untruthful statements in its petition;
(7) It has ceased to exist for at least one (1) year; or

(8) It fails to participate in the last two (2) preceding elections or fails
to obtain at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast under the party-list
system in the two (2) preceding elections for the constituency in which it
has registered. (emphasis supplied)
THE COURT'S PREVIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS

As the oracle of the Constitution, this Court divined the intent of the party-list
system and defined its meaning in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission
on Elections: 2
That political parties may participate in the party-list elections does not
mean, however, that a n y political party — or any organization or group
for that matter — may do so. The requisite character of these parties or
organizations must be consistent with the purpose of the party-list
system, as laid down in the Constitution and RA 7941 . . . .
The Marginalized and Underrepresented to Become Lawmakers Themselves
[Section 2 of RA 7941] mandates a state policy of promoting proportional
representation by means of the Filipino-style party-list system, which will "enable"
the election to the House of Representatives of Filipino citizens,
1. who belong to marginalized and underrepresented sectors,
organizations and parties; and
2. who lack well-defined constituencies; but
3. who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole .
The key words in this policy are "proportional representation," "marginalized and
underrepresented," and "lack [of] well-defined constituencies."
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a

particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
as exempli ed by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law; namely,
"labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5 . Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
Finally, "lack of well-de ned constituenc[y]" refers to the absence of a traditionally
identi able electoral group, like voters of a congressional district or territorial unit
of government. Rather, it points again to those with disparate interests identi ed
with the "marginalized or underrepresented."
In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those
Filipinos who are "marginalized and underrepresented" become
members of Congress under the party-list system , Filipino-style. ECTHIA
The intent of the Constitution is clear: to give genuine power to the people, not
only by giving more law to those who have less in life, but more so by enabling
them to become veritable lawmakers themselves. Consistent with this intent, the
policy of the implementing law, we repeat, is likewise clear: "to enable Filipino
citizens belonging to marginalized and underrepresented sectors, organizations
and parties, . . ., to become members of the House of Representatives." Where the
language of the law is clear, it must be applied according to its express terms.
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under

the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941 , which
states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register

as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition veri ed by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals."
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is
not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system . It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, quali ed or specialized by those in
immediate association.
xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, the law crafted to address the peculiar disadvantages of Payatas hovel
dwellers cannot be appropriated by the mansion owners of Forbes Park. The
interests of these two sectors are manifestly disparate; hence, the OSG's position
to treat them similarly de es reason and common sense. In contrast, and with
admirable candor, Atty. Lorna Patajo-Kapunan admitted during the Oral Argument
that a group of bankers, industrialists and sugar planters could not join the party-
list system as representatives of their respective sectors.
While the business moguls and the mega-rich are, numerically speaking, a tiny
minority, they are neither marginalized nor underrepresented, for the stark reality
is that their economic clout engenders political power more awesome than their
numerical limitation. Traditionally, political power does not necessarily emanate
from the size of one's constituency; indeed, it is likely to arise more directly from
the number and amount of one's bank accounts.
It is ironic, therefore, that the marginalized and underrepresented in our midst are
the majority who wallow in poverty, destitution and in rmity. It was for them that
the party-list system was enacted — to give them not only genuine hope, but
genuine power; to give them the opportunity to be elected and to represent the
speci c concerns of their constituencies; and simply to give them a direct voice in
Congress and in the larger affairs of the State. In its noblest sense, the party-list
system truly empowers the masses and ushers a new hope for genuine change.
Verily, it invites those marginalized and underrepresented in the past —
the farm hands, the sher folk, the urban poor, even those in the
underground movement — to come out and participate , as indeed many of
them came out and participated during the last elections. The State cannot now
disappoint and frustrate them by disabling and desecrating this social justice
vehicle.
xxx xxx xxx
Verily, allowing the non-marginalized and overrepresented to vie for the

remaining seats under the party-list system would not only dilute , but
also prejudice the chance of the marginalized and underrepresented ,
contrary to the intention of the law to enhance it. The party-list system is a tool for
the bene t of the underprivileged; the law could not have given the same tool to
others, to the prejudice of the intended beneficiaries.
This Court, therefore, cannot allow the party-list system to be sullied

and prostituted by those who are neither marginalized nor
underrepresented . It cannot let that icker of hope be snuffed out. The clear
state policy must permeate every discussion of the quali cation of political
parties and other organizations under the party-list system. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
Hence, in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the Court stressed that the party-
list system is reserved only for those sectors marginalized and underrepresented in
the past (e.g., labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and
even those in the underground movement who wish to come out and participate). They
are those sectors traditionally and historically marginalized and deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy although their sectoral
interests are also traditionally and historically regarded as vital to the
national interest . That is why Section 2 of RA 7941 speaks of "marginalized and
under-represented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well-de ned
political constituencies but who could contribute to the formulation and enactment of
appropriate legislation that will benefit the nation as a whole ."
How should the matter of whether a particular sectoral interest is vital to national
interest (and therefore beneficial to the nation as a whole) be determined? Chief Justice
Reynato S. Puno's opinion 3 in Barangay Association for National Advancement and
Transparency (BANAT) v. Commission on Elections 4 offers valuable insight:
. . . Similarly, limiting the party-list system to the marginalized and excluding the
major political parties from participating in the election of their representatives is
aligned with the constitutional mandate to "reduce social, economic, and political
inequalities, and remove cultural inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and
political power for the common good"; the right of the people and their
organizations to effective and reasonable participation at all levels of social,
political, and economic decision-making; the right of women to opportunities that
will enhance their welfare and enable them to realize their full potential in the
service of the nation; the right of labor to participate in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and bene ts in keeping with its role as a
primary social economic force; the right of teachers to professional advancement;
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to the consideration of their
cultures, traditions and institutions in the formulation of national plans and
policies, and the indispensable role of the private sector in the national economy.
DIECTc
As such, the interests of marginalized sectors are by tradition and history vital to
national interest and therefore bene cial to the nation as a whole because the
Constitution declares a national policy recognizing the role of these sectors in the
nation's life. In other words, the concept of marginalized and underrepresented sectors
under the party-list scheme has been carefully re ned by concrete examples involving
sectors deemed to be signi cant in our legal tradition. They are essentially sectors with
a constitutional bond, that is, speci c sectors subject of speci c provisions in the
Constitution, namely, labor, 5 peasant, 6 urban poor, 7 indigenous cultural communities,
8 women, 9 youth, 1 0 veterans, 1 1 sherfolk, 1 2 elderly, 1 3 handicapped, 1 4 overseas
workers 1 5 and professionals. 1 6
The premise is that the advancement of the interests of these important yet
traditionally and historically marginalized sectors promotes the national interest. The
Filipino people as a whole are benefited by the empowerment of these sectors.
The long-mu ed voices of marginalized sectors must be heard because their
respective interests are intimately and indispensably woven into the fabric of the
national democratic agenda. The social, economic and political aspects of
discrimination and marginalization should not be divorced from the role of a particular
sector or group in the advancement of the collective goals of Philippine society as a
whole. In other words, marginalized sectors should be given a say in governance
through the party-list system, not simply because they desire to say something
constructive but because they deserve to be heard on account of their traditionally and
historically decisive role in Philippine society.
A UNIFYING THREAD
Fidelity to the Constitution requires commitment to its text. Thus, in the exercise
of its function as o cial interpreter of the Constitution, the Court should always bear in
mind that judicial prudence means that it is safer to construe the Constitution from
what appears upon its face. 1 7
With regard to the matter of what quali es as marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system, Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution mentions "the labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
women, youth, and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious
sector." On the other hand, the law speaks of "labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor,
indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans,
overseas workers, and professionals." 1 8
Surely, the enumeration of sectors considered as marginalized and
underrepresented in the fundamental law and in the implementing law (RA 7941)
cannot be without signi cance. To ignore them is to disregard the texts of the
Constitution and of RA 7941. For, indeed, the very rst of Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party's eight guidelines for screening party-list participants is this: the parties,
sectors or organizations "must represent the marginalized and underrepresented
groups identified in Section 5 of RA 7941." 1 9
For this reason, I submit the majority's decision is cryptic and wanting when it
makes short shrift of the issue of whether petitioner is a marginalized and
underrepresented sector in the following manner:
The crucial element is not whether a sector is speci cally enumerated, but
whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the
Constitution and RA 7941.
The resolution of petitions for accreditation in the party-list system on a case-to-

case basis not tethered to the enumeration of the Constitution and of RA 7941 invites
the exercise of unbridled discretion. Unless rmly anchored on the fundamental law and
the implementing statute, the party-list system will be a ship oating aimlessly in the
ocean of uncertainty, easily tossed by sudden waves of ux and tipped by shifting
winds of change in societal attitudes towards certain groups. Surely, the Constitution
and RA 7941 did not envision such kind of a system.
Indeed, the signi cance of the enumeration in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941 is clearly explained in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW
Labor Party:
"Proportional representation" here does not refer to the number of people in a
particular district, because the party-list election is national in scope. Neither does
it allude to numerical strength in a distressed or oppressed group. Rather, it
refers to the representation of the "marginalized and underrepresented"
as exempli ed by the enumeration in Section 5 of the law ; namely,
"labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
workers, and professionals."
However, it is not enough for the candidate to claim representation of the

marginalized and underrepresented, because representation is easy to claim and
to feign. The party-list organization or party must factually and truly
represent the marginalized and underrepresented constituencies
mentioned in Section 5 . Concurrently, the persons nominated by the party-list
candidate-organization must be "Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties."
xxx xxx xxx
The marginalized and underrepresented sectors to be represented under

the party-list system are enumerated in Section 5 of RA 7941 , which
states:
"SEC. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register
as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by
ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election
a petition veri ed by its president or secretary stating its desire to
participate in the party-list system as a national, regional or sectoral party
or organization or a coalition of such parties or organizations, attaching
thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of government, list of
o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, that the sector shall include labor,
peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and
professionals." cITaCS
While the enumeration of marginalized and underrepresented sectors is

not exclusive, it demonstrates the clear intent of the law that not all
sectors can be represented under the party-list system . It is a fundamental
principle of statutory construction that words employed in a statute are
interpreted in connection with, and their meaning is ascertained by reference to,
the words and the phrases with which they are associated or related. Thus, the
meaning of a term in a statute may be limited, quali ed or specialized
by those in immediate association . 2 0 (emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
More importantly, in de ning the concept of a "sectoral party," Section 3 (d) of RA

7941 limits "marginalized and underrepresented sectors" and expressly refers to the
list in Section 5 thereof:
Section 3. Definition of Terms. — . . .
(d) A sectoral party refers to an organized group of citizens belonging to
any of the sectors enumerated in Section 5 hereof whose principal
advocacy pertains to the special interest and concerns of their sector, . . . .
(emphasis supplied)
Petitioner does not question the constitutionality of Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA

7941. (Its charges of violation of non-establishment of religion, equal protection, free
speech and free association are all leveled at the assailed resolutions of the
Commission on Elections.) Thus, petitioner admits and accepts that its case must rise
or fall based on the aforementioned provisions of RA 7941.
Following the texts of the Constitution and of RA 7941, and in accordance with
established rules of statutory construction and the Court's pronouncement in Ang
Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party, the meaning of "marginalized sectors" under the party
list system is limited and quali ed . Hence, other sectors that may qualify as
marginalized and underrepresented should have a close connection to the sectors
mentioned in the Constitution and in the law. In other words, the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors quali ed to participate in the party-list system refer only to
the labor, peasant, sherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly,
handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, professionals and other
related or similar sectors .
This interpretation is faithful to and deeply rooted in the language of the
fundamental law and of its implementing statute. It is coherent with the mandate of the
Constitution that marginalized sectors quali ed to participate in the party-list system
but not mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI are "such other sectors as may be
provided by law" duly enacted by Congress . It is also consistent with the basic
canon of statutory construction, ejusdem generis, which requires that a general word or
phrase that follows an enumeration of particular and speci c words of the same class,
the general word or phrase should be construed to include, or to be restricted to
persons, things or cases, akin to, resembling, or of the same kind or class as those
speci cally mentioned. 2 1 Moreover, it reins in the subjective elements of passion and
prejudice that accompany discussions of issues with moral or religious implications as
it avoids the need for complex balancing and undue policy-making.
What is the unifying thread that runs through the marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system? What are the family
resemblances that would characterize them? 2 2
Based on the language of the Constitution and of RA 7941 and considering the
pronouncements of this Court in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT, the
following factors are significant:
(a) they must be among, or closely connected with or similar to, the
sectors mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941;
(b) they must be sectors whose interests are traditionally and
historically regarded as vital to the national interest but they have long
been relegated to the fringes of society and deprived of an
opportunity to participate in the formulation of national policy;
(c) the vinculum that will establish the close connection with or similarity
of sectors to those expressly mentioned in Section 5 of RA 7941 is a
constitutional provision speci cally recognizing the special
signi cance of the said sectors (other than people's organizations,
unless such people's organizations represent sectors mentioned in
Section 5 of RA 7941) 2 3 to the advancement of the national interest;
and
(d) while lacking in well-de ned political constituencies, they must have
regional or national presence to ensure that their interests and
agenda will be beneficial not only to their respective sectors but, more
importantly, to the nation as a whole.
FOR PURPOSES OF THE PARTY-LIST SYSTEM,
PETITIONER IS NOT A MARGINALIZED SECTOR
In this case, petitioner asserts that it is entitled to accreditation as a
marginalized and underrepresented sector under the party-list system. However, the
Commission on Elections disagrees.
The majority reverses the Commission on Elections. While it focuses on the
contentious issues of morality, religion, equal protection, and freedom of expression
and association, by granting the petition, the majority effectively rules that petitioner is
a quali ed marginalized and underrepresented sector, thereby allowing its
accreditation and participation in the party-list system.
I disagree. cTECIA
Even assuming that petitioner was able to show that the community of lesbians,
gays, bisexuals and transsexuals (LGBT) is underrepresented, it cannot be properly
considered as marginalized under the party-list system. First, petitioner is not included
in the sectors mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution and Section 5 of
RA 7941. Unless an overly strained interpretation is resorted to, the LGBT sector cannot
establish a close connection to any of the said sectors. Indeed, petitioner does not
even try to show its link to any of the said sectors. Rather, it represents itself as an
altogether distinct sector with its own peculiar interests and agenda.
Second, petitioner's interest as a sector, which is basically the legal recognition
of its members' sexual orientation as a right, cannot be reasonably considered as an
interest that is traditionally and historically considered as vital to national interest. At
best, petitioner may cite an emergent awareness of the implications of sexual
orientation on the national human rights agenda. However, an emergent awareness is
but a con rmation of lack of traditional and historical recognition. 2 4 Moreover, even
the majority admits that there is no "clear cut consensus favorable to gay rights
claims." 2 5
Third, petitioner is cut off from the common constitutional thread that runs
through the marginalized and underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. It
lacks the vinculum, a constitutional bond, a provision in the fundamental law that
speci cally recognizes the LGBT sector as specially signi cant to the national interest.
This standard, implied in BANAT, is required to create the necessary link of a particular
sector to those sectors expressly mentioned in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the
Constitution and Section 5 of RA 7941.
Finally, considering our history and tradition as a people, to consider the
promotion of the LGBT agenda and "gay rights" as a national policy as bene cial to the
nation as a whole is debatable at best. Even the majority (aside from extensively
invoking foreign practice and international conventions rather than Philippine laws)
states:
We do not suggest that public opinion, even at its most liberal, re ect a clear cut
strong consensus favorable to gay rights claims. . . . 2 6
This is so unlike the signi cance of the interests of the sectors in Section 5 of RA 7941
which are, without doubt, indisputable.
Regardless of the personal beliefs and biases of its individual members, this
Court can only apply and interpret the Constitution and the laws. Its power is not to
create policy but to recognize, review or reverse the policy crafted by the political
departments if and when a proper case is brought before it. Otherwise, it will tread on
the dangerous grounds of judicial legislation.
In this instance, Congress, in the exercise of its authority under Section 5 (2),
Article VI of the Constitution, enacted RA 7941. Sections 2, 3 (d) and (5) of the said law
instituted a policy when it enumerated certain sectors as quali ed marginalized and
underrepresented sectors under the party-list system. Respect for that policy and
delity to the Court's duty in our scheme of government require us to declare that only
sectors expressly mentioned or closely related to those sectors mentioned in Section 5
of RA 7941 are quali ed to participate in the party-list system. That is the tenor of the
Court's rulings in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party and BANAT. As there is no
strong reason for the Court to rule otherwise, stare decisis compels a similar
conclusion in this case.
The Court is called upon to exercise judicial restraint in this case by strictly
adhering to, rather than expanding, legislative policy on the matter of marginalized
sectors as expressed in the enumeration in Section 5 of RA 7941. The Court has no
power to amend and expand Sections 2, 3 (d) and 5 of RA 7941 in the guise of
interpretation. The Constitution expressly and exclusively vests the authority to
determine "such other [marginalized] sectors" quali ed to participate in the party-list
system to Congress. Thus, until and unless Congress amends the law to include the
LGBT and other sectors in the party-list system, deference to Congress' determination
on the matter is proper.
A FINAL WORD
To be succinctly clear about it, I do not say that there is no truth to petitioner's
claim of discriminatory and oppressive acts against its members. I am in no position to
make that claim. Nor do I claim that petitioner has no right to speak, to assemble or to
access our political departments, particularly the legislature, to promote the interests
of its constituency. Social perceptions of sexual and other moral issues may change
over time, and every group has the right to persuade its fellow citizens that its view of
such matters is the best. 2 7 But persuading one's fellow citizens is one thing and
insisting on a right to participate in the party-list system is something else. Considering
the facts, the law and jurisprudence, petitioner cannot properly insist on its entitlement
to use the party-list system as a vehicle for advancing its social and political agenda.
While bigotry, social stereotyping and other forms of discrimination must be
given no place in a truly just, democratic and libertarian society, the party-list system
has a well-de ned purpose. The party-list system was not designed as a tool to
advocate tolerance and acceptance of any and all socially misunderstood sectors.
Rather, it is a platform for the realization of the aspirations of marginalized sectors
whose interests are, by nature and history, also the nation's but which interests have not
been su ciently brought to public attention because of these sectors'
underrepresentation.
Congress was given by the Constitution full discretion to determine what sectors
may qualify as marginalized and underrepresented. The Court's task is to respect that
legislative determination by strictly adhering to it. If we effectively and unduly expand
such congressional determination, we will be dabbling in policy-making, an act of
political will and not of judicial judgment. TAaCED
Accordingly, I respectfully vote to dismiss the petition.

ABAD , J.:
I have to concur only in the result set forth in the well-written ponencia of Justice
Mariano C. Del Castillo because I arrived at the same conclusion following a different
path.
I also felt that the Court needs, in resolving the issues in this case, to say more
about what the Constitution and Republic Act (R.A.) 7941 intends in the case of the
party-list system to abate the aggravations and confusion caused by the alarming
overnight proliferation of sectoral parties.
The underlying policy of R.A. 7941 or The Party-List System Act is to give the
marginalized and underrepresented sectors of society an opportunity to take a direct
part in enacting the laws of the land. In Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v.
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), 1 the Court laid down guidelines for
accreditation, but these seem to leave the COMELEC like everyone else even more
perplexed and dumbfounded about what organizations, clubs, or associations can pass
for sectoral parties with a right to claim a seat in the House of Representatives. The
Court can, in adjudicating this case, unravel some of the difficulties.
Here, I fully agree that the COMELEC erred when it denied Ang Ladlad's petition
for sectoral party accreditation on religious and moral grounds. The COMELEC has
never applied these tests on regular candidates for Congress. There is no reason for it
to apply them on Ang Ladlad. But the ponencia already amply and lucidly discussed this
point.
What I am more concerned about is COMELEC's claim in its comment on the
petition that the Ang Ladlad sectoral party was not marginalized and underrepresented
since it is not among, or even associated with, the sectors speci ed in the Constitution
and in R.A. 7941. 2 Ang Ladlad, it claims, did not qualify as a marginalized and
underrepresented group of people like those representing labor, peasant, sherfolk,
urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. This is effectively the COMELEC's frame
of mind in adjudicating applications for accreditation.
But, the COMELEC's proposition imposes an unwarranted restriction which is
inconsistent with the purpose and spirit of the Constitution and the law. A reading of
Ang Bagong Bayani will show that, based on the Court's reading, neither the
Constitution nor R.A. 7941 intends the excessively limited coverage that the COMELEC
now suggests. In fact, the Court said in that case that the list in R.A. 7941 is not
exclusive. Thus, while the party-list system is not meant for all sectors of society, it was
envisioned as a social justice tool for the marginalized and underrepresented in general.
As it happened, the only clue that the Constitution provides respecting the
identity of the sectors that will make up the party-list system is found in the examples it
gives, namely, the labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities,
the women, and the youth segments of society. Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987
Constitution provides:
(2) The party-list representative shall constitute twenty per centum
of the total number of representatives including those under the party
list. For three consecutive terms after the rati cation of this
Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list representatives
shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the
labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women,
youth , and such other sectors as may be provided by law, except the
religious sector ." (Underscoring supplied.)
Getting its bearing from the examples given above, the Congress provided in
Section 2 of R.A. 7941 a broad standard for screening and identifying those who may
qualify for the party-list system. Thus:
Sec. 2. Declaration of policy. — The State shall promote
proportional representation in the election of representatives to the
House of Representatives through a party-list system of registered
regional and sectoral parties or organizations or coalitions thereof,
w h i c h will enable Filipino citizens belonging to marginalized and
underrepresented sectors, organizations and parties, and who lack well
de ned political constituencies but who could contribute to the
formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation that will bene t
the nation as a whole, to become members of the House of
Representatives. Towards this end, the State shall develop and
guarantee a full, free and open party system or group interests in the
House of Representatives by enhancing their chances to compete for
and win seats in the legislature, and shall provide the simplest scheme
possible. (Underscoring supplied.)
The above speaks of "marginalized and underrepresented sectoral parties or

organizations . . . lack well de ned political constituencies . . . who could contribute to
the formulation and enactment of appropriate legislation." But, as the Court said in Ang
Bagong Bayani, the whole thing boils down to ascertaining whether the party seeking
accreditation belongs to the "marginalized and underrepresented." 3
Unfortunately, Congress did not provide a de nition of the term "marginalized
and underrepresented." Nor did the Court dare provide one in its decision in Ang
Bagong Bayani. It is possible, however, to get a sense of what Congress intended in
adopting such term. No doubt, Congress crafted that term — marginalized and
underrepresented — from its reading of the concrete examples that the Constitution
itself gives of groupings that are entitled to accreditation. These examples are the
labor, the peasant, the urban poor, the indigenous cultural minorities, the women, and
the youth sectors. Fortunately, quite often ideas are best described by examples of
what they are, which was what those who drafted the 1987 Constitution did, rather than
by an abstract description of them.
For Congress it was much like looking at a gathering of "a dog, a cat, a horse, an
elephant, and a tiger" and concluding that it is a gathering of "animals." Here, it looked at
the samples of quali ed groups (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural
minorities, women, and youth) and found a common thread that passes through them
all. Congress concluded that these groups belonged to the "marginalized and
underrepresented."
So what is the meaning of the term "marginalized and underrepresented?" The
examples given (labor, peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural minorities, women, and
youth) should be the starting point in any search for de nition. Congress has added six
others to this list: the sherfolk, the elderly, the handicapped, the veterans, the overseas
workers, and the professionals. 4 Thus, the pertinent portion of Section 5 of R.A. 7941
provides: HcTSDa
Sec. 5. Registration. — . . . Provided, that the sector shall include

labor, peasant, fisherfolk , urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
elderly, handicapped , women, youth, veterans , overseas workers, and
professionals .
If one were to analyze these Constitutional and statutory examples of quali ed

parties, it should be evident that they represent the working class (labor, peasant,
sherfolk, overseas workers), the service class (professionals), the economically
d e p r ive d (urban poor), the social outcasts (indigenous cultural minorities), the
vulnerable (women, youth) and the work impaired (elderly, handicapped, veterans).
This analysis provides some understanding of who, in the eyes of Congress, are
marginalized and underrepresented.
The parties of the marginalized and underrepresented should be more than just
lobby or interest groups. They must have an authentic identity that goes beyond mere
similarities in background or circumstances. It is not enough that their members
belong to the same industry, speak the same dialect, have a common hobby or sport, or
wish to promote public support for their mutual interests. The group should be
characterized by a shared advocacy for genuine issues affecting basic human rights as
these apply to their groups. This is in keeping with the statutory objective of sharing
with them seats in the House of Representatives so they can take part in enacting
beneficial legislation.
It should be borne in mind, however, that both the Constitution and R.A. 7941
merely provide by examples a sense of what the quali ed organizations should look
like. As the Court acknowledged in Ang Bagong Bayani, these examples are not
exclusive. For instance, there are groups which are pushed to the margin because they
advocate an extremist political ideology, such as the extreme right and the extreme left
of the political divide. They may be regarded, if the evidence warrants, as quali ed
sectors.
Further, to qualify, a party applying for accreditation must represent a narrow
rather than a speci c de nition of the class of people they seek to represent. For
example, the Constitution uses the term "labor," a narrower de nition than the broad
and more abstract term, "working class," without slipping down to the more speci c
and concrete de nition like "carpenters," "security guards," "microchips factory
workers," "barbers," "tricycle drivers," and similar sub-groupings in the "labor" group. See
the other illustrations below.
Broad *Narrow Specifically Defined Groups
Definition Definition
Working Class Labor Carpenters, security guards, microchip
factory workers, barbers, tricycle drivers
Economically Urban Informal settlers, the jobless, persons
Deprived Poor displaced by domestic wars
The Vulnerable Women Working women, battered women, victims of
slavery
Work Impaired Handi- Deaf and dumb, the blind, people on
Capped wheelchairs
* The definition that the Constitution and R.A. 7941 use by their examples.
Obviously, the level of representation desired by both the Constitution and R.A.
7941 for the party-list system is the second, the narrow de nition of the sector that the
law regards as "marginalized and underrepresented." The implication of this is that, if
any of the sub-groupings (the carpenters, the security guards, the microchips factory
workers, the barbers, the tricycle drivers in the example) within the sector desires to
apply for accreditation as a party-list group, it must compete with other sub-groups for
the seat allotted to the "labor sector" in the House of Representatives. This is the
apparent intent of the Constitution and the law.
An interpretation that will allow concretely or speci cally de ned groups to seek
election as a separate party-list sector by itself will result in riot and redundancy in the
mix of sectoral parties grabbing seats in the House of Representatives. It will defeat
altogether the objectives of the party-list system. If they can muster enough votes, the
country may have a party-list of pedicab drivers and another of tricycle drivers. There
will be an irrational apportionment of party-list seats in the legislature.
In addition, Section 5 of R.A. 7941 provides that parties interested in taking part
in the party-list system must state if they are to be considered as national, regional, or
sectoral parties. Thus: ESCDHA
Sec. 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register

as a party, organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list
system by ling with the COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days
before the election a petition veri ed by its president or secretary
stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a national,
regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties
or organizations, . . . .
This provision, taken alongside with the territorial character of the sample
sectors provided by the Constitution and R.A. 7941, indicates that every sectoral party-
list applicant must have an inherently regional presence (indigenous cultural
minorities) or a national presence (all the rest).
The people they represent are not bound up by the territorial borders of
provinces, cities, or municipalities. A sectoral group representing the sugar plantation
workers of Negros Occidental, for example, will not qualify because it does not
represent the inherently national character of the labor sector.
Finally, as the Court held in Ang Bagong Bayani, it is not enough for a party to
claim that it represents the marginalized and underrepresented. That is easy to do. The
party must factually and truly represent the marginalized and underrepresented. It must
present to the COMELEC clear and convincing evidence of its history, authenticity,
advocacy, and magnitude of presence. The COMELEC must reject those who put up
building props overnight as in the movies to create an illusion of sectoral presence so
they can get through the door of Congress without running for a seat in a regular
legislative district.
In sum, to qualify for accreditation:
One, the applying party must show that it represents the "marginalized and
underrepresented," exempli ed by the working class, the service class, the
economically deprived, the social outcasts, the vulnerable, the work impaired, or some
such similar class of persons.
Two, the applying party should be characterized by a shared advocacy for
genuine issues affecting basic human rights as these apply to the sector it represents.
Three, the applying party must share the cause of their sector, narrowly de ned
as shown above. If such party is a sub-group within that sector, it must compete with
other sub-groups for the seat allocated to their sector.
Four, the members of the party seeking accreditation must have an inherent
regional or national presence.
And five, except for matters the COMELEC can take judicial notice of, the party
applying for accreditation must prove its claims by clear and convincing evidence.
In this case, Ang Ladlad represents men and women who identify themselves as
lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or trans-gendered persons (LGBTs). Applying the universally
accepted estimate that one out of every 10 persons is an LGBT of a certain kind, 5 the
Filipino LGBTs should now stand at about 8.7 million. Despite this, however, they are by
and large, subtly if not brutally, excluded from the mainstream, discriminated against,
and persecuted. That the COMELEC denied Ang Ladlad's petition on religious and moral
grounds is proof of this discrimination.
Ang Ladlad claims that many cases of intolerance and violence against LGBTs
have been documented. At home, effeminate or gay youths are subjected to physical
abuse by parents or guardians to make them conform to standard gender norms of
behavior, while lesbian youths are raped to cure them of their perceived a iction.
LGBTs are refused admission from certain schools, or are suspended and put on
probation. Meanwhile, in the workplace, they are denied promotions or bene ts which
are otherwise available to heterosexuals holding the same positions. There is bigotry
for their group.
Ang Ladlad has amply proved that it meets the requirements for sectoral party
accreditation. Their members are in the vulnerable class like the women and the youth.
Ang Ladlad represents a narrow de nition of its class (LGBTs) rather than a concrete
and speci c de nition of a sub-group within the class (group of gay beauticians, for
example). The people that Ang Ladlad seeks to represent have a national presence.
The lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-gendered persons in our communities
are our brothers, sisters, friends, or colleagues who have suffered in silence all these
years. True, the party-list system is not necessarily a tool for advocating tolerance or
acceptance of their practices or beliefs. But it does promise them, as a marginalized
and underrepresented group, the chance to have a direct involvement in crafting
legislations that impact on their lives and existence. It is an opportunity for true and
effective representation which is the very essence of our party-list system. cIETHa
For the above reasons, I vote to GRANT the petition.

Footnotes
1.319 U.S. 624, 640-42 (1943).
2.Rollo, pp. 33-40.
3.Id. at 41-74.
4.An Act Providing for the Election of Party-List Representatives Through the Party-List System,
and Appropriating Funds Therefor (1995).
5.Rollo, pp. 89-101.
6.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
7.Ang Ladlad outlined its platform, viz.:
As a party-list organization, Ang Ladlad is willing to research, introduce, and work for the
passage into law of legislative measures under the following platform of government:

a) introduction and support for an anti-discrimination bill that will ensure equal rights for
LGBTs in employment and civil life;
b) support for LGBT-related and LGBT-friendly businesses that will contribute to the national
economy;
c) setting up of micro- nance and livelihood projects for poor and physically challenged
LGBT Filipinos;
d) setting up of care centers that will take care of the medical, legal, pension, and other needs
of old and abandoned LGBTs. These centers will be set up initially in the key cities of the
country; and
e) introduction and support for bills seeking the repeal of laws used to harass and legitimize
extortion against the LGBT community. Rollo, p. 100.
8.Id. at 36-39. Citations omitted. Italics and underscoring in original text.
9.Id. at 77-88.
* Note from the Publisher: Copied verbatim from the official copy.
10.Id. at 50-54. Emphasis and underscoring supplied.
11.Id. at 121.
12.Id. at 129-132.
13.Id. at 151-283.
14.Id. at 284.
15.Id. at 301-596.
16.Id. at 126.
17.Id. at 133-160.
18.Id. at 288-291.
19.Id. at 296.
20.Supra note 6.
21.It appears that on September 4, 2009, the Second Division directed the various COMELEC
Regional O ces to verify the existence, status, and capacity of petitioner. In its
Comment, respondent submitted copies of various reports stating that ANG LADLAD
LGBT or LADLAD LGBT did not exist in the following areas: Batangas (October 6, 2009);
Romblon (October 6, 2009); Palawan (October 16, 2009); Sorsogon (September 29,
2009); Cavite, Marinduque, Rizal (October 12, 2009); Basilan, Maguindanao, Lanao del
Sur, Sulu, Tawi Tawi (October 19, 2009); Biliran, Leyte, Southern Leyte, Samar, Eastern
Samar, Northern Samar (October 19, 2009); Albay, Camarines Sur, Camarines Norte,
Catanduanes, Masbate, Sorsogon (October 25, 2009); Ilocos Sur, Ilocos Norte, La Union,
Pangasinan (October 23, 2009); North Cotabato, Sarangani, South Cotabato, Sultan
Kudarat (October 23, 2009); Aklan, Antique, Iloilo and Negros Occidental (October 25,
2009); Bohol, Cebu, Siquijor (October 24, 2009); Negros Oriental (October 26, 2009);
Cordillera Administrative Region (October 30, 2009); Agusan del Norte, Agusan del Sur,
Dinagat Islands, Surigao del Norte, Surigao del Sur (October 26, 2009); Cagayan de Oro,
Bukidnon, Camiguin, Misamis Oriental, Lanao del Norte (October 31, 2009); Laguna
(November 2, 2009); Occidental Mindoro, Oriental Mindoro (November 13, 2009); Quezon
(November 24, 2009); Davao City, Davao del Sur, Davao del Norte, Compostela Valley,
Davao Oriental (November 19, 2009); Caloocan, Las Piñas, Makati, Mandaluyong,
Manila, Marikina, Muntinlupa, Navotas, Parañaque, Pasay, Pasig, Pateros, Quezon City,
San Juan, Taguig, Valenzuela (December 16, 2009). Rollo, pp. 323-596.
22.Id. at 96.
23.Id. at 96-97.
24.BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 346 (2009).
25.Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003), citing Smith, S., "The Rise and Fall of Religious
Freedom in Constitutional Discourse", 140 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW
REVIEW, 149, 160 (1991).
26.455 Phil. 411 (2003).
27.Id. at 588-589.
28.Rollo, p. 315.
29.In Anonymous v. Radam, A.M. No. P-07-2333, December 19, 2007, 541 SCRA 12, citing
Concerned Employee v. Mayor, A.M. No. P-02-1564, 23 November 2004, 443 SCRA 448,
we ruled that immorality cannot be judged based on personal bias, speci cally those
colored by particular mores. Nor should it be grounded on "cultural" values not
convincingly demonstrated to have been recognized in the realm of public policy
expressed in the Constitution and the laws. At the same time, the constitutionally
guaranteed rights (such as the right to privacy) should be observed to the extent that
they protect behavior that may be frowned upon by the majority.
30.Rollo, pp. 178.
31.Id. at 179-180.
32.CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Art. 699.
33.POLITICS VII. 14.

34.Abakada Guro Party v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 168056, September 1, 2005, 2005, 469
SCRA 1, 139.
35.In BERNAS, THE 1987 CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY 139-140
(2009), Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J. writes:
For determining the reasonableness of classi cation, later jurisprudence has developed three
kinds of test[s] depending on the subject matter involved. The most demanding is the
strict scrutiny test which requires the government to show that the challenged
classi cation serves a compelling state interest and that the classi cation is necessary
to serve that interest. This [case] is used in cases involving classifications based on race,
national origin, religion, alienage, denial of the right to vote, interstate migration, access
to courts, and other rights recognized as fundamental.
Next is the intermediate or middle-tier scrutiny test which requires government to show that
the challenged classi cation serves an important state interest and that the
classi cation is at least substantially related to serving that interest. This is applied to
suspect classifications like gender or illegitimacy.
The most liberal is the minimum or rational basis scrutiny according to which government
need only show that the challenged classi cation is rationally related to serving a
legitimate state interest. This is the traditional rationality test and it applies to all
subjects other than those listed above.
36.487 Phil. 531, 583 (2004).
37.Id. at 584. See also Mid-States Freight Lines v. Bates, 111 N.Y.S. 2d 568.
38.The OSG argues that "[w]hile it is true that LGBTs are immutably males and females, and
they are protected by the same Bill of Rights that applies to all citizens alike, it cannot be
denied that as a sector, LGBTs have their own special interests and concerns." Rollo, p.
183.
39.Article III, Section 4 of the Constitution provides that "[n]o law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, of expression, or of the press, or the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances."
40.Supra note 26.
41.In Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), the US Supreme Court rst upheld the
constitutionality of a Georgia sodomy law that criminalized oral and anal sex in private
between consenting adults when applied to homosexuals. Seventeen years later the
Supreme Court directly overruled Bowers in Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003),
holding that "Bowers was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today."
In Lawrence, the US Supreme Court has held that the liberty protected by the Constitution
allows homosexual persons the right to choose to enter into intimate relationships,
whether or not said relationships were entitled to formal or legal recognition.
Our prior cases make two propositions abundantly clear. First, the fact that the governing
majority in a State has traditionally viewed a particular practice as immoral is not a
su cient reason for upholding a law prohibiting the practice; neither history nor tradition
could save a law prohibiting miscegenation from constitutional attack. Second,
individual decisions by married persons, concerning the intimacies of their physical
relationship, even when not intended to produce offspring, are a form of "liberty"
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, this
protection extends to intimate choices by unmarried as well as married persons.
The present case does not involve minors. It does not involve persons who might be injured
or coerced or who are situated in relationships where consent might not easily be
refused. It does not involve public conduct or prostitution. It does not involve whether the
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual persons
seek to enter. The case does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from
each other, engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle. The
petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot demean their
existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual conduct a crime. Their
right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their
conduct without intervention of the government. "It is a promise of the Constitution that
there is a realm of personal liberty which the government may not enter." The Texas
statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the
personal and private life of the individual.
In similar fashion, the European Court of Human Rights has ruled that the avowed state
interest in protecting public morals did not justify interference into private acts between
homosexuals. In Norris v. Ireland, the European Court held that laws criminalizing same-
sex sexual conduct violated the right to privacy enshrined in the European Convention.
The Government are in effect saying that the Court is precluded from reviewing Ireland's
observance of its obligation not to exceed what is necessary in a democratic society
when the contested interference with an Article 8 (Art. 8) right is in the interests of the
"protection of morals". The Court cannot accept such an interpretation. . . . .
. . . The present case concerns a most intimate aspect of private life. Accordingly, there must
exist particularly serious reasons before interferences on the part of public authorities
can be legitimate . . . .
. . . Although members of the public who regard homosexuality as immoral may be shocked,
offended or disturbed by the commission by others of private homosexual acts, this
cannot on its own warrant the application of penal sanctions when it is consenting
adults alone who are involved. (Norris v. Ireland (judgment of October 26, 1988, Series A
no. 142, pp. 20-21, Â§ 46); Marangos v. Cyprus (application no. 31106/96, Commission's
report of 3 December 1997, unpublished)).
The United Nations Human Rights Committee came to a similar conclusion in Toonen v.
Australia (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess., U.N. Doc.
CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)), involving a complaint that Tasmanian laws
criminalizing consensual sex between adult males violated the right to privacy under
Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The Committee
held:
. . . it is undisputed that adult consensual sexual activity in private is covered by the concept
of 'privacy' . . . any interference with privacy must be proportional to the end sought and
be necessary in the circumstances of any given case.
42.See Toonen v. Australia, (Comm. No. 488/1992 U.N. GAOR Hum. Rts. Comm., 50th Sess.,
U.N. Doc. CCPR/c/50/D/488/1992 (1994)); Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. H.R.
Rep. 52 (1981) (decision by the European Court of Human Rights, construing the
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms); Norris v. Ireland,
13 Eur. Ct. H.R. 186 (1991); Modinos v. Cyprus, 16 Eur. H.R. Rep. 485 (1993). See also, L.
and V. v. Austria (2003-I 29; (2003) 36 EHRR 55) and S.L. v. Austria (2003-I 71; (2003) 37
EHRR 39), where the European Court considered that Austria's differing age of consent
for heterosexual and homosexual relations was discriminatory; it 'embodied a
predisposed bias on the part of a heterosexual majority against a homosexual minority',
which could not 'amount to sufficient justification for the differential treatment any more
than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race, origin or colour'.
43.See Fricke v. Lynch, 491 F. Supp. 381 (1980) and Gay Student Services v. Texas A&M
University, 737 F. 2d 1317 (1984).
44.Case of the United Macedonian Organisation Ilinden and Others v. Bulgaria Application No.
5941/00; Judgment of January 20, 2006. Note that in Baczkowski and Others v. Poland,
Application No. 1543/06; Judgment of May 3, 2007, the ECHR unanimously ruled that
the banning of an LGBT gay parade in Warsaw was a discriminatory violation of Article
14 of the ECHR, which provides:
The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in [the] Convention shall be secured
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status.
It also found that banning LGBT parades violated the group's freedom of assembly and
association. Referring to the hallmarks of a "democratic society", the Court has attached
particular importance to pluralism, tolerance and broadmindedness. In that context, it
has held that although individual interests must on occasion be subordinated to those of
a group, democracy does not simply mean that the views of the majority must always
prevail: a balance must be achieved which ensures the fair and proper treatment of
minorities and avoids any abuse of a dominant position.
45.Case of Freedom & Democracy Party (OZDEP) v. Turkey, Application No. 23885/94;
Judgment of December 8, 1999.
46.Article 11 of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (European Convention) provides:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and to freedom of association
with others, including the right to form and to join trade unions for the protection of his
interests.
2. No restrictions shall be placed on the exercise of these rights other than such as are
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of
health or morals or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. This article
shall not prevent the imposition of lawful restrictions on the exercise of these rights by
members of the armed forces, of the police or of the administration of the State.
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 213
U.N.T.S. 222, entered into force September 3, 1953, as amended by Protocols Nos. 3, 5, 8,
and 11 which entered into force on September 21, 1970, December 20, 1971, January 1,
1990, and November 1, 1998, respectively.
* Note that while the state is not permitted to discriminate against homosexuals, private
individuals cannot be compelled to accept or condone homosexual conduct as a
legitimate form of behavior. In Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group
of Boston, Inc. (515 U.S. 557 (1995)), the US Supreme Court discussed whether anti-
discrimination legislation operated to require the organizers of a private St. Patrick's Day
parade to include among the marchers an Irish-American gay, lesbian, and bisexual
group. The court held that private citizens organizing a public demonstration may not be
compelled by the state to include groups that impart a message the organizers do not
want to be included in their demonstration. The court observed:
"[A] contingent marching behind the organization's banner would at least bear witness to the
fact that some Irish are gay, lesbian, or bisexual, and the presence of the organized
marchers would suggest their view that people of their sexual orientations have as much
claim to unquali ed social acceptance as heterosexuals . . . . The parade's organizers
may not believe these facts about Irish sexuality to be so, or they may object to
unquali ed social acceptance of gays and lesbians or have some other reason for
wishing to keep GLIB's message out of the parade. But whatever the reason, it boils
down to the choice of a speaker not to propound a particular point of view, and that
choice is presumed to lie beyond the government's power to control."
So, too, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (530 U.S. 640 [2000]), the US Supreme Court held
that the Boy Scouts of America could not be compelled to accept a homosexual as a
scoutmaster, because "the Boy Scouts believe that homosexual conduct is inconsistent
with the values it seeks to instill in its youth members; it will not "promote homosexual
conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
When an expressive organization is compelled to associate with a person whose views the
group does not accept, the organization's message is undermined; the organization is
understood to embrace, or at the very least tolerate, the views of the persons linked with
them. The scoutmaster's presence "would, at the very least, force the organization to
send a message, both to the youth members and the world, that the Boy Scouts accepts
homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behavior."
47.Rollo, pp. 197-199.
48.In Toonen v. Australia, supra note 42, the Human Rights Committee noted that "in its view
the reference to 'sex' in Articles 2, paragraph 2, and 26 is to be taken as including sexual
orientation."
49.The Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has dealt with the matter
in its General Comments, the interpretative texts it issues to explicate the full meaning of
the provisions of the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In General
Comments Nos. 18 of 2005 (on the right to work) (Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 18: The right to work, E/C.12/GC/18, November
24, 2005), 15 of 2002 (on the right to water) (Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 15: The right to water, E/C.12/2002/11, November
26, 2002) and 14 of 2000 (on the right to the highest attainable standard of health)
(Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 14: The right
to the highest attainable standard of health, E/C.12/2000/4, August 14, 2000), it has
indicated that the Covenant proscribes any discrimination on the basis of, inter-alia, sex
and sexual orientation.
The Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC) has also dealt with the issue in a General
Comment. In its General Comment No. 4 of 2003, it stated that, "State parties have the
obligation to ensure that all human beings below 18 enjoy all the rights set forth in the
Convention [on the Rights of the Child] without discrimination (Article 2), including with
regard to ''race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national, ethnic
or social origin, property, disability, birth or other status''. These grounds also cover [ inter
alia] sexual orientation". (Committee on the Rights of the Child, General Comment No. 4:
Adolescent health and development in the context of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child, July 1, 2003, CRC/GC/2003/4).
The Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW), has, on a
number of occasions, criticized States for discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation. For example, it also addressed the situation in Kyrgyzstan and
recommended that, "lesbianism be reconceptualized as a sexual orientation and that
penalties for its practice be abolished" (Concluding Observations of the Committee on
the Elimination of Discrimination Against Women regarding Kyrgyzstan, February 5,
1999, A/54/38 at par. 128).
50.General Comment No. 25: The right to participate in public affairs, voting rights and the right
of equal access to public service (Art. 25) December 16, 1996. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7.
51.The Yogyakarta Principles on the Application of International Human Rights Law in relation
to Sexual Orientation and Gender Identity is a set of international principles relating to
sexual orientation and gender identity, intended to address documented evidence of
abuse of rights of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals. It contains
29 Principles adopted by human rights practitioners and experts, together with
recommendations to governments, regional intergovernmental institutions, civil society,
and the United Nations.
52.One example is Principle 3 (The Right to Recognition Before the Law), which provides:
Everyone has the right to recognition everywhere as a person before the law. Persons of
diverse sexual orientations and gender identities shall enjoy legal capacity in all aspects
of life. Each person's self-de ned sexual orientation and gender identity is integral to
their personality and is one of the most basic aspects of self-determination, dignity and
freedom. No one shall be forced to undergo medical procedures, including sex
reassignment surgery, sterilization or hormonal therapy, as a requirement for legal
recognition of their gender identity. No status, such as marriage or parenthood, may be
invoked as such to prevent the legal recognition of a person's gender identity. No one
shall be subjected to pressure to conceal, suppress or deny their sexual orientation or
gender identity.
States shall:
a) Ensure that all persons are accorded legal capacity in civil matters, without discrimination
on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity, and the opportunity to exercise that
capacity, including equal rights to conclude contracts, and to administer, own, acquire
(including through inheritance), manage, enjoy and dispose of property;
b) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to fully
respect and legally recognise each person's self-defined gender identity ;
c) Take all necessary legislative, administrative and other measures to ensure that
procedures exist whereby all State-issued identity papers which indicate a
person's gender/sex — including birth certi cates, passports, electoral
records and other documents — re ect the person's profound self-de ned
gender identity ;
d) Ensure that such procedures are e cient, fair and non-discriminatory, and respect the
dignity and privacy of the person concerned;
e) Ensure that changes to identity documents will be recognized in all contexts where the
identification or disaggregation of persons by gender is required by law or policy;
f) Undertake targeted programmes to provide social support for all persons experiencing
gender transitioning or reassignment. (Emphasis ours)
53.See Pharmaceutical and Health Care Association of the Philippines v. Secretary of Health,
G.R. No. 173034, October 9, 2007, 535 SCRA 265, where we explained that "soft law"
does not fall into any of the categories of international law set forth in Article 38, Chapter
III of the 1946 Statute of the International Court of Justice. It is, however, an expression
of non-binding norms, principles, and practices that in uence state behavior. Certain
declarations and resolutions of the UN General Assembly fall under this category.
PUNO, C.J., concurring:
1.Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution states: "No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. The free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or preference,
shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or
political rights."
2.The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passage from the
Bible to support its holding: "For this cause God gave them up into vile affections: for
even their women did change the natural use into that which is against nature: And
likewise also the men, leaving the natural use of the woman, burned in their lust one
toward another; men with men working that which is unseemly, and receiving in
themselves that recompense of their error which was meet." (Romans 1:26-27)
3.The November 11, 2009 Resolution of the COMELEC cited the following passages from the
Koran to support its holding:
• "For ye practice your lusts on men in preference to women: ye are indeed a people
transgressing beyond bounds." (7:81)
• "And we rained down on them a shower (of brimstone): Then see what was the end of
those who indulged in sin and crime!" (7:84)
• "He said: "O my Lord! Help Thou me against people who do mischief!" (29:30)
4.Estrada v. Escritor, 455 Phil. 411 (2003).
5.Id.
6.Id.
7.Section 5, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.
8.Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
9.COMELEC's Comment, p. 13.
10.Id.
11.See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 123 S. Ct. 2472.
12.Id.
13.Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 850, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120
L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).
14.Ang Ladlad de ned "sexual orientation" as a person's capacity for profound emotional,
affectional and sexual attraction to, and intimate and sexual relations with, individuals
of a different gender, of the same gender, or more than one gender." (italics supplied)
15.Paragraph 24 of Ang Ladlad's Petition for Registration stated, in relevant part: "In 2007, Men
Having Sex with Men or MSMs in the Philippines were estimated at 670,000."
16.Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S.Ct. 3244, as cited in the Dissenting
Opinion of Mr. Justice Blackmun in Bowers v. Hardwick, infra.
17.478 U.S. 186, 106 S.Ct. 2841.
18.Supra note 11.
19.Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 63, 93 S.Ct. 2628, 2638, 37 L.Ed.2d 446 (1973);
See also Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 685, 97 S.Ct. 2010,
2016, 52 L.Ed.2d 675 (1977).
20.See Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 Yale L.J. 624, 637 (1980); cf. Eisenstadt
v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, 92 S.Ct. 1029, 1038, 31 L.Ed.2d 349 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S., at 153, 93 S.Ct., at 726.
21.Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 223-224, 92 S.Ct. 1526, 1537, 32 L.Ed.2d 15 (1972).
22.Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 11.

23.Id.
24.Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, supra note 13.
25.Id.

26.Id.
27.Supra note 11.
28.Central Bank Employees Association, Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 487 Phil. 531, 583
(2004).
29.Id.
30.Pace Membership Warehouse, Div. of K-Mart Corp. v. Axelson, 938 P.2d 504.
31.16B Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law Â§ 857, citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 108 S. Ct.
1910, 100 L. Ed. 2d 465 (1988); Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n., 460
U.S. 37, 103 S. Ct. 948, 74 L. Ed. 2d 794, 9 Ed. Law Rep. 23 (1983); Christie v. Coors
Transp. Co., 933 P.2d 1330 (Colo. 1997); Baker v. City of Ottumwa, 560 N.W.2d 578
(Iowa 1997); Zempel v. Uninsured Employers' Fund, 282 Mont. 424, 938 P.2d 658 (1997);
Hovland v. City of Grand Forks, 1997 ND 95, 563 N.W.2d 384 (N.D. 1997).
32.Murray v. State of Louisiana, 2010 WL 334537. See Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Ford, 112 S.Ct.
2184, 2186 (1992) (holding classi cation based on religion is a suspect classi cation);
Graham v. Richardson, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852 (1971) (holding classi cation based on
alienage is a suspect classi cation); Loving v. Virginia, 87 S.Ct. 1817, 1823 (1967)
(holding classi cation based on race is a suspect classi cation); Oyama v. California,
68 S.Ct. 269, 274-74 (1948) (holding classi cation based on national origin is a suspect
classification); Hirabayashi v. U.S., 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943) (holding classification based on
ancestry is a suspect classification).
33.Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 94 S. Ct. 1160, 39 L. Ed. 2d 389 (1974).
34.Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 92 S. Ct. 995, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274 (1972); Hunter v. Erickson,
393 U.S. 385, 89 S. Ct. 557, 21 L. Ed. 2d 616 (1969); McLaughlin v. State of Fla., 379 U.S.
184, 85 S. Ct. 283, 13 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1964).
35.Supra note 31.
36.United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 2275, 135 L.Ed.2d 735, 751
(1996).
37.Murray v. State of Louisiana, supra note 32. See Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan,
102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336 (1982) (holding classi cations based on gender calls for
heightened standard of review); Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S.Ct. 1459, 1463 (1977) (holding
illegitimacy is a quasi-suspect classification).
38.Supra note 31.

39.Ohio Bureau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 97 S. Ct. 1898, 52 L. Ed. 2d
513 (1977); Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S. Ct. 2562, 49
L. Ed. 2d 520 (1976); Costner v. U.S., 720 F.2d 539 (8th Cir. 1983).
40.Plyler v. Moore, 100 F.3d 365 (4th Cir. 1996); Cornerstone Christian Schools v. University
Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d 127, 243 Ed. Law Rep. 609 (5th Cir. 2009); Independent
Charities of America, Inc. v. State of Minn., 82 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 1996); Bah v. City of
Atlanta, 103 F.3d 964 (11th Cir. 1997).
41.Varnum v. Brien, 763 N.W.2d 862 (2009) citing the following passage from Plyler v. Doe, 457
U.S. 202, 216, 102 S.Ct. 2382, 2394, 72 L.Ed.2d 786, 799 (1982):
Several formulations might explain our treatment of certain classi cations as "suspect."
Some classi cations are more likely than others to re ect deep-seated prejudice rather
than legislative rationality in pursuit of some legitimate objective. Legislation predicated
on such prejudice is easily recognized as incompatible with the constitutional
understanding that each person is to be judged individually and is entitled to equal
justice under the law. Classi cations treated as suspect tend to be irrelevant to any
proper legislative goal. Finally, certain groups, indeed largely the same groups, have
historically been "relegated to such a position of political powerlessness as to command
extraordinary protection from the majoritarian political process." The experience of our
Nation has shown that prejudice may manifest itself in the treatment of some groups.
Our response to that experience is re ected in the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Legislation imposing special disabilities upon groups
disfavored by virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests the kind of "class or
caste" treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.
42.See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. at 531-32, 116 S.Ct. at 2274-75, 135 L.Ed.2d at 750
(observing "long and unfortunate history of sex discrimination" (quoting Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684, 93 S.Ct. 1764, 1769, 36 L.Ed.2d 583, 590 (1973)
(Brennan, J., plurality opinion)); Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638, 106 S.Ct. 2727, 2729,
91 L.Ed.2d 527, 533 (1986) (noting subject class had "not been subjected to
discrimination"); City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 at 443, 105 S.Ct. at
3256, 87 L.Ed.2d at 332 (mentally retarded not victims of "continuing antipathy or
prejudice"); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 313, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 2567, 49
L.Ed.2d 520, 525 (1976) (considering "history of purposeful unequal treatment" (quoting
San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 28, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1294, 36
L.Ed.2d 16, 40 (1973)).
43.See Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. at 3254, 87 L.Ed.2d at 320 (certain
classifications merely "reflect prejudice and antipathy"); Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan,
458 U.S. 718, 725, 102 S.Ct. 3331, 3336, 73 L.Ed.2d 1090, 1098 (1982) ("Care must be
taken in ascertain-ing whether the statutory objective itself re ects archaic and
stereotypic notions."); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313, 96 S.Ct. at 2566, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525
(considering whether aged have "been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of
stereotyped characteristics not truly indicative of their abilities"); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
686, 93 S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion) ("[T]he sex
characteristic frequently bears no relation to ability to perform or contribute to society.").
44.Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives "do not exhibit
obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that de ne them as a discrete
group"); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. at 3255-56, 87 L.Ed.2d at 322
(mentally retarded people are different from other classes of people, "immutably so, in
relevant respects"); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220, 102 S.Ct. at 2396, 72 L.Ed.2d at 801 (children
of illegal aliens, unlike their parents, have "legal characteristic[s] over which children can
have little control"); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 96 S.Ct. 2755, 2762, 49
L.Ed.2d 651, 660 (1976) (status of illegitimacy "is, like race or national origin, a
characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual");
Frontiero, 411 U.S. at 686, 93 S.Ct. at 1770, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591 (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) ("[S]ex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic determined
solely by the accident of birth. . . .").
45.Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at 2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (close relatives of primary
household are "not a minority or politically powerless"); Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. at
445, 105 S.Ct. at 3257, 87 L.Ed.2d at 324 (refusing to nd "that the mentally retarded are
politically powerless"); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 28, 93 S.Ct. at 1294, 36
L.Ed.2d at 40 (considering whether minority and poor school children were "relegated to
such a position of political powerlessness as to command extraordinary protection from
the majoritarian political process").
46.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, 289 Conn. 135,
957 A.2d 407 (2008).
47.Varnum v. Brien, id., citing, among others, Palmore v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433-34, 104 S.Ct.
1879, 1882-83, 80 L.Ed.2d 421, 426 (1984) (foregoing analysis of political power);
Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1, 9 n. 11, 97 S.Ct. 2120, 2125 n. 11, 53 L.Ed.2d 63, 71 n. 11
(1977) (jettisoning immutability requirement and scrutinizing classi cation of resident
aliens closely despite aliens' voluntary status as residents); Mathews, 427 U.S. at 505-06,
96 S.Ct. at 2762-63, 49 L.Ed.2d at 660-61 (according heightened scrutiny to
classi cations based on illegitimacy despite mutability and political power of
illegitimates); Murgia, 427 U.S. at 313-14, 96 S.Ct. at 2567, 49 L.Ed.2d at 525 (omitting
any reference to immutability); San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist., 411 U.S. at 25, 93 S.Ct. at
1292, 36 L.Ed.2d at 38 (omitting any reference to immutability); Frontiero, 411 U.S. at
685-88, 93 S.Ct. at 1770-71, 36 L.Ed.2d at 591-92 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion)
(scrutinizing classi cation based on gender closely despite political power of women);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 91 S.Ct. 1848, 1852, 29 L.Ed.2d 534, 541-42
(1971) (foregoing analysis of immutability); see also Lyng, 477 U.S. at 638, 106 S.Ct. at
2729, 91 L.Ed.2d at 533 (referring to whether members of the class "exhibit obvious,
immutable, or distinguishing characteristics that define them as a discrete group").
48.Concurring and Dissenting Opinion of Mr. Justice Thurgood Marshall in Cleburne v.
Cleburne Living Center, Inc., infra.
49.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41.
50.Id.
51.Id.
52.Id.; Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
53.Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, id.
55.Id.
56.Id.
57.Supra note 46.
58.See, e.g., Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 442, 105 S.Ct. 3249 (for
purposes of federal constitution, mental retardation is not quasi-suspect classi cation
because, inter alia, "it is undeniable . . . that those who are mentally retarded have a
reduced ability to cope with and function in the everyday world"); Massachusetts Board
of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. at 315, 96 S.Ct. 2562 (age is not suspect classi cation
because, inter alia, "physical ability generally declines with age"); see also Gregory v.
Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 472, 111 S.Ct. 2395, 115 L.Ed.2d 410 (1991) ("[i]t is an
unfortunate fact of life that physical [capacity] and mental capacity sometimes diminish
with age").
59.L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (2d Ed. 1988) Â§ 16-33, p. 1616.
60.Jantz v. Muci, 759 F.Supp. 1543, 1548 (D.Kan.1991) (quoting 1985 Resolution of the
American Psychological Association), 976 F.2d 623 (10th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508
U.S. 952, 113 S.Ct. 2445, 124 L.Ed.2d 662 (1993).
61.Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. at 440, 105 S.Ct. 3249.
62.Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
63.Id.
64.Id.
66.Id.
67.Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.

68.Id. citing In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 442.
69.Id. citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note 46.
70.Id.
72.Varnum v. Brien, supra note 41, citing Kerrigan v. Commissioner of Public Health, supra note
46.
73.Id.
75.Id.
76.Id.
77.Id.
78.Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 116 S.Ct. 1620.
79.Id.
80.Section 5 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution states, in relevant part:
SECTION 5. . . .
(2) The party-list representatives shall constitute twenty per centum of the total number of
representatives including those under the party list. For three consecutive terms after the
rati cation of this Constitution, one-half of the seats allocated to party-list
representatives shall be lled, as provided by law, by selection or election from the labor,
peasant, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities, women, youth, and such other
sectors as may be provided by law, except the religious sector. (italics supplied)
81.On the other hand, Section 5 of RA 7941 provides:
SECTION 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a party,
organization or coalition for purposes of the party-list system by ling with the
COMELEC not later than ninety (90) days before the election a petition veri ed by its
president or secretary stating its desire to participate in the party-list system as a
national, regional or sectoral party or organization or a coalition of such parties or
organizations, attaching thereto its constitution, by-laws, platform or program of
government, list of o cers, coalition agreement and other relevant information as the
COMELEC may require: Provided, That the sectors shall include labor, peasant, fisherfolk,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals. (italics supplied)
82.G.R. No. 147589, June 26, 2001, 359 SCRA 698.
83.Id.
CORONA, J., dissenting:
1.Republic Act.
2.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
3.The Chief Justice's stance is the o cial stance of the Court on the matter because majority
of the members of the Court sided with him on the issue of disallowing major political
parties from participating in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.
4.G.R. No. 179271, 21 April 2009, 586 SCRA 210, 258-259.
5.Section 18, Article II; Section 3, Article XIII.

8.Section 22, Article II; Section 5, Article XII.
10.Section 13, Article II; Section 3 (2), Article XV.
11.Section 7, Article XVI.
12.Paragraph three of Section 2, Article XII, Section 7, Article XIII.

13.Section 11, Article XIII.
14.Sections 11 and 13 XIII.
16.Section 14, Article XII.
17.Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, 22 February 1991, 194 SCRA
317, 337.
18.See proviso of the first paragraph of Section 5, RA 7941.
19.Supra note 2 at 342.
20.Supra note 2.
21.Miranda v. Abaya, 370 Phil. 642, 658 (1999).
22.The notion of family resemblances (familienÃ¤hnlichkeit) was introduced by the leading

analytic philosopher, Ludwig Wittgenstein, in his book Philosophical Investigations. As
used in this opinion, however, family resemblances speci cally refer to the DNA, the
basic component unit, that identi es a sector as a member of the family of marginalized
and underrepresented sectors enumerated in Section 5 (2), Article VI of the Constitution
and Section 5 of RA 7941.
23.The reason behind this exception is obvious. If all people's organizations are automatically
considered as marginalized and underrepresented, then no sector or organization may
be disquali ed on the grounds of non-marginalization and lack of underrepresentation.
The Court's guidelines in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party would have been
unnecessary after all and, worse, the constitutional requirement that the sectors qualified
to participate in the party-list system be determined by law would have been merely
superfluous and pointless.
24.Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), (Scalia, J., dissenting).
25.Decision, p. 23.
26.Id.
27.Lawrence v. Texas, supra note 29 (J. Scalia, dissenting).
ABAD, J.:
1.412 Phil. 308 (2001).
2.Comment, pp. 2-6.
3."In the end, the role of the Comelec is to see to it that only those Filipinos who are
"marginalized and underrepresented" become members of Congress under the party-list
system, Filipino style." Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on
Elections, supra note 1, at 334.
4.Section 5. Registration. — . . . Provided, that the sector shall include labor, peasant, sherfolk,
veterans, overseas workers, and professionals.
5.http://www.aglbical.org/2STATS.htm.

2 Ladlad v. COMELEC

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EN BANC

[G.R. No. 190582. April 8, 2010.]

ANG LADLAD LGBT PARTY represented herein by its Chair, DANTON

Ang Ladlad is an organization composed of men and women who identify

. . . a marginalized and under-represented sector that is particularly

and proceeded to define sexual orientation as that which:

. . . refers to a person's capacity for profound emotional, affectional and

The ANG LADLAD apparently advocates sexual immorality as indicated in

Laws are deemed incorporated in every contract, permit, license,

Art. 201. Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions, and

1. Those who shall publicly expound or proclaim doctrines openly

2. (a) The authors of obscene literature, published with their

(b) Those who, in theaters, fairs, cinematographs or any other place,

Petitioner should likewise be denied accreditation not only for advocating

II. No substantial differentiation

xxx xxx xxx

Thus, even if society's understanding, tolerance, and acceptance of LGBT's is

IV. Public Morals

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

• Albay Gay Association

• Can't Live in the Closet, Inc. (CLIC)-Metro Manila

• Gay and Lesbian Activists Network for Gender Equality (GALANG)-Metro

• Gay Men's Support Group (GMSG)-Metro Manila

• ONE BACARDI AaITCS

• Order of St. Aelred (OSAe)-Metro Manila

• Rainbow Rights Project (R-Rights), Inc.-Metro Manila

• The Link-Davao City

Public Morals as a Ground to Deny

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a su cient

Freedom of expression constitutes one of the essential foundations of a

As to its right to be elected in a genuine periodic election, petitioner contends that

The principle of non-discrimination is laid out in Article 26 of the ICCPR, as

In this context, the principle of non-discrimination requires that laws of general

Likewise, the ICCPR states:

As stated by the CHR in its Comment-in-Intervention, the scope of the right to

I concur with the groundbreaking ponencia of my esteemed colleague, Mr.

FIRST. The assailed Resolutions of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) run

Consequently, the assailed resolutions of the COMELEC are violative of the

In a variety of circumstances we have recognized that a necessary corollary of

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justi ed on

xxx xxx xxx

xxx xxx xxx

International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of

xxx xxx xxx

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

If a legislative classi cation disadvantages a "suspect class" or impinges upon

CD Technologies Asia, Inc. 2018 cdasiaonline.com

6. There have been documented cases of discrimination and violence

(f) Consensual partnerships or relationships by gays and lesbians who

7. In the recent May 2009 US asylum case of Philip Belarmino, he testi ed

Accordingly, this history of discrimination suggests that any legislative burden

Unlike the characteristics unique to those groups, however, "homosexuality bears

Stripped of the complicated and contentious issues of morality and religion, I

The relevant facts are likewise relatively uncomplicated. Petitioner seeks

Section 5. Registration. — Any organized group of persons may register as a