2020 PRE-BAR REVIEW NOTES

IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
By: Judge ESTELA ALMA SINGCO-CARUSO

ARTICLE I
NATIONAL TERRITORY

The 1987 Constitution defines the national territory as

comprised of: (1) the Philippine archipelago, including the
islands and the internal waters, referring to waters around,
between, and connecting the islands of the archipelago,
irrespective of breadth and dimension; and (2) all other territories
over which the Philippines has sovereignty or jurisdiction.
This includes the territorial sea, seabed, subsoil, insular shelves
and other submarine areas, as well as the country’s terrestrial,
fluvial, and aerial domains.Territories by which the Philippines has
sovereignty or jurisdiction include those recognized under
international law.

- Archipelago as defined by Article 46 of UNCLOS:

A group of islands, including parts of the islands,
interconnecting waters and other natural features which are
closely interrelated that such islands, waters, and other
natural resources form an intensive geographical, economic,
political entity or to have historically regarded as an
archipelago.

- Archipelagic State- means a State constituted wholly by

one or more archipelagos and may include other islands.

- Archipelagic baselines:

In archipelagic State may draw straight archipelagic

baselines joining the outermost points of the outermost
islands and drying reefs of the archipelago provided that
within such baselines are included the main islands and an
area in which the ratio of the area of the water to the area of
the land.

Philippine laws defining baselines:

1. RA 3046 (1961)-the waters around, between and

connecting the various islands of the Philippines archipelago,
irrespective of their width or dimension, have always been
considered as necessary appurtenances of the land territory,
forming part of the inland or internal waters of the
Philippines
 2. RA 5446 (1968)-The definition of the baselines of the
territorial sea of the Philippine Archipelago as provided for
in this Act is without prejudice to the delineation of the
baselines of the territorial sea around the territory of Sabah,
situated in North Borneo, over which the Republic of the
Philippines has acquired dominion and sovereignty.

3. RA 9522 (2009)- shortened one baseline, optimized the

location of some basepoints around the Philippine
archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
“regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones.

- The Maritime Baselines Law (R.A. No. 9522)- In 2009,

Republic Act No. 9522 amended certain provisions of
RA 3046 as amended by RA 5446, defining the
archipelagic baseline of the Philippines. The law
was crafted primarily in compliance with the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
which the country ratified in February 1984. To date,
this is the only legislation in recent years specifically
pertaining to Philippine territory.

- In 1961, Congress passed Republic Act No. 3046 (RA 3046)

demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
archipelagic State. This law followed the framing of the
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone
in 1958 (UNCLOS I), codifying, among others, the sovereign
right of States parties over their “territorial sea,” the breadth
of which, however, was left undetermined. Attempts to fill
this void during the second round of negotiations in Geneva
in 1960 (UNCLOS II) proved futile. Thus, domestically, RA
3046 remained unchanged for nearly five decades, save for
legislation passed in 1968 (Republic Act No. 5446 [RA
5446]) correcting typographical errors and reserving the
drawing of baselines around Sabah in North Borneo.

- In March 2009, Congress amended RA 3046 by enacting RA

9522. The change was prompted by the need to make RA
3046 compliant with the terms of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III), which the
Philippines ratified on 27 February 1984. Among others,
UNCLOS III prescribes the water-land ratio, length, and
contour of baselines of archipelagic states like the
Philippines and sets the deadline for the filing of application
for the extended continental shelf. Complying with these
requirements, RA 9522 shortened one baseline, optimized
the location of some basepoints around the Philippine

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 archipelago and classified adjacent territories, namely, the
Kalayaan Island Group (KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal, as
“regimes of islands” whose islands generate their own
applicable maritime zones. (Professor Merlin M.
Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011, En Banc
[Carpio])

- Law professors, students, and several party-list representatives

assailed the constitutionality of the law, fearing that it set
aside the territorial demarcations set by the Constitution and
ancillary treaties and practically abandoned the country’s
claim over territories such as Sabah. They also contended
that by referring to Philippine waters as archipelagic, the law
opened waters landward of the baselines to maritime passage
and aircraft overflight, undermining Philippine sovereignty
and national security (Magallona, et al. v. Executive
Secretary, G.R No. 187167, July 16, 2011). RA 9522 is
not unconstitutional. It is a statutory tool to demarcate the
country’s maritime zones and continental shelf under UNCLOS
III, not to delineate Philippine territory.

- Upholding the validity of the archipelagic baselines law,

the Supreme Court noted that neither the UNCLOS nor the
law had anything to do with the acquisition,
enlargement, or diminution of the Philippine territory.
Baselines laws such as RA 9522 are not
unconstitutional because they are merely statutory
mechanisms for UNCLOS III states to delimit with
precision the extent of their maritime zones and
continental shelves. “In fact, the demarcation of the
baselines enables the Philippines to delimit its exclusive
economic zone, reserving solely to the Philippines the
exploitation of all living and non-living resources within
such zone,” noted the High Court (Magallona, et al. v.
Executive Secretary, 2011). The baselines law, according to
the Supreme Court, is at its essence a notice to the
international community of the scope of the country’s maritime
space and maritime areas within which it exercises treaty-based
rights.

- It redrew the country’s baseline to comply with the

UNCLOS requirements for archipelagic state, in the process
excluding the disputed Kalayaan Island Group and the
Scarborough shoal from the main archipelago and classifying
them instead as “regime of islands”. They excluded from the
baselines. The national territory constitutes a roughly
triangular delineation which excludes large areas of waters

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 within 600 miles by 1,200 miles rectangular enclosing the
Philippine archipelago as defined in the Treaty of Paris.

- UNCLOS III and RA 9522 are not incompatible with the

Constitution’s delineation of internal waters.- Whether
referred to as Philippine “internal waters” under Article I of
the Constitution or as “archipelagic waters” under UNCLOS
III (Article 49[1]), the Philippines exercises sovereignty over
the body of water lying landward of the baselines, including
the air space over it and the submarine areas underneath.

- UNCLOS III has nothing to do with the acquisition or loss of

territory. It is a multi-lateral treaty regulating, among others,
sea use rights over maritime zones (i.e. the territorial waters
(12 nautical miles from the baselines), contiguous zone (24
nautical miles from the baseline), exclusive economic zones
(200 nautical miles from the baselines) and continental
shelves that UNCLOS III was the culmination of decades
long negotiation among UN members to codify norms
regulating the conduct of States in the world’s oceans and
submarine areas, recognizing coastal and archipelagic States
graduated authority over a limited span of waters and
submarine lands along their coasts.

- Thus, baselines laws are nothing but statutory mechanisms

for UNCLOS III States- parties to delimit with precision the
extent of their maritime zones and continental shelves. In
turn, this gives notice to the rest of the international
community of the scope of the maritime space and submarine
areas within which States parties exercise treaty-based rights,
namely: the exercise of sovereignty over territorial waters
(Article 2), the jurisdiction to enforce customs, fiscal,
immigration and sanitation laws in the contiguous zone
(Article 33), and the right to exploit the living and non-living
resources in the exclusive economic zone (Article 56) and
continental shelf (Article 77). (Professor Merlin M.
Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])

- UNCLOS III and its ancillary baselines laws play no role in

the acquisition, enlargement or diminution of territory.
Under traditional international law typology, states acquire
(or conversely, lose) territory through occupation, accretion,
cession and prescription, not by executing multilateral
treaties on the regulation of sea-use rights or enacting
statutes to comply with the treaty’s terms to delimit
maritime zones and continental shelves. Territorial claims
to land features are outside UNCLOS IIII, and are instead
governed by the rules on general international law.

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 (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v. Hon. Eduardo
Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA 476, August 16,
2011, En Banc [Carpio])

- RA 9522’s use of the framework of Regime of Islands to

determine the maritime zones of the Kalayaan Island Group
(KIG) and the Scarborough Shoal is not inconsistent with the
Philippines’ claim of sovereignty over these areas.

- Petitioners’ assertion of loss of “about 15,000 square nautical

miles of territorial waters” under RA 9522 is similarly
unfounded both in fact and law. On the contrary, RA 9522,
by optimizing the location of basepoints, increased the
Philippines’ total maritime space (covering its internal
waters, territorial sea and exclusive economic zone) by
154,216 square nautical miles x x x.

- Further, petitioners’ argument that the KIG now lies outside

Philippine territory because the baselines that RA 9522
draws do not enclose the KIG is negated by RA 9522 itself.
Section 2 of the law commits to text the Philippines’
continued claim of sovereignty and jurisdiction over the KIG
and the Scarborough Shoal x x x

- Had Congress in RA 9522 enclosed the KIG and the

Scarborough Shoal as part of the Philippine archipelago,
adverse legal effects would have ensued. The Philippines
would have committed a breach of two provisions of
UNCLOS III. X x x

- Although the Philippines has consistently claimed

sovereignty over the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal for
several decades, these outlying areas are located at an
appreciable distance from the nearest shoreline of the
Philippine archipelago, such that any straight baseline loped
around them from the nearest basepoint will inevitably
“depart to an appreciable extent from the general
configuration of our archipelago.”

- [T]he amendment of the baselines law was necessary to

enable the Philippines to draw the outer limits of its maritime
zones including the extended continental shelf provided by
Article 47 of [UNCLOS III].

- Hence, far from surrendering the Philippines’ claim over the

KIG and the Scarborough Shoal, Congress’ decision to
classify the KIG and the Scarborough Shoal as “’Regime[s]
of Islands’ under the Republic of the Philippines consistent

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 with Article 121” of UNCLOS III manifests the Philippine
State’s responsible observance of its pacta sunt servanda
obligation under UNCLOS III. Under Article 121 of
UNCLOS III, any “naturally formed area of land, surrounded
by water, which is above water at high tide,” such as portions
of the KIG, qualifies under the category of “regime of
islands,” whose islands generate their own applicable
maritime zones. (Professor Merlin M. Magallona, et al. v.
Hon. Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 187167, 655 SCRA
476, August 16, 2011, En Banc [Carpio])

- UNCLOS III defines major zones where different standards,

rights and rules are applicable:

- internal waters : all waters landward of the baselines (e.g.

low-water line)and all harbours (Any law in force in the
country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
internal waters and the airspace above its internal waters.
The right of innocent passage does generally not exist in the
internal waters.)

- territorial waters : the sea within a distance of 12 nautical

miles (22 km) from the baselines (Any law in force in the
country, including the common law, shall also apply in its
territorial waters and the airspace above its territorial waters.
The right of innocent passage shall exist in the territorial
waters. In the territorial sea, submarines and other
underwater vehicles are required to navigate on the surface
and to show their flag.)

- contiguous zone : the sea beyond the territorial waters but

within a distance of twenty-four nautical miles (~44 km)
from the baselines (Within its contiguous zone and the
airspace above it, the country shall have the right to exercise
all the powers which may be considered necessary to prevent
contravention of any fiscal law or any customs, emigration,
immigration or sanitary law and to make such contravention
punishable.)

- maritime cultural zone : the sea beyond the territorial

waters but within a distance of twenty-four nautical miles (44
km) from the baselines (Subject to any other law the country
shall have, in respect of objects of an archaeological or
historical nature found in the maritime cultural zone, the
same rights and powers as it has in respect of its territorial
waters.)

- exclusive economic zones (EEZ): the sea beyond the

territorial waters but within a distance of two hundred

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 nautical miles (367 km) from the baselines (Subject to any
other law the country shall have, in respect of all natural
resources in the exclusive economic zone, the same rights
and powers as it has in respect of its territorial waters.)

- continental shelf : comprises the seabed and subsoil of the

submarine areas that extend beyond its territorial sea
throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the
outer edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200
nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of
the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the
continental margin does not extend up to that distance.

- EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE:

An exclusive economic zone (EEZ) is a sea zone prescribed

by the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea over which a state has special rights regarding the
exploration and use of marine resources, including energy
production from water and wind. It stretches from the
baseline out to 200 nautical miles (nmi) from its coast. In
colloquial usage, the term may include the continental shelf.
The term does not include either the territorial sea or the
continental shelf beyond the 200 nmi limit. The difference
between the territorial sea and the exclusive economic zone
is that the first confers full sovereignty over the waters,
whereas the second is merely a "sovereign right" which
refers to the coastal state's rights below the surface of the sea.

- Define Exclusive Economic Zone (Rights of a Coastal

State)

1. PD 1599-

- Sec. 2. Without prejudice to the rights of the Republic of the

Philippines over it territorial sea and continental shelf, it shall
have and exercise in the exclusive economic zone established
herein the following;

(a) Sovereignty rights for the purpose of exploration and

exploitation, conservation and management of the natural
resources, whether living or non-living, both renewable and non-
renewable, of the sea-bed, including the subsoil and the
superjacent waters, and with regard to other activities for the
economic exploitation and exploration of the resources of the
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents
and winds;

(b) Exclusive rights and jurisdiction with respect to the

establishment and utilization of artificial islands, off-shore

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 terminals, installations and structures, the preservation of the
marine environment, including the prevention and control of
pollution, and scientific research;

(c) Such other rights as are recognized by international law or

state practice.

- Sec. 3. Except in accordance with the terms of any agreement

entered into with the Republic of the Philippines or of any license
granted by it or under authority by the Republic of the
Philippines, no person shall, in relation to the exclusive economic
zone:
(a) explore or exploit any resources;

(b) carry out any search, excavation or drilling operations:

(c) conduct any research;

(d) construct, maintain or operate any artificial island, off-shore

terminal, installation or other structure or device; or

(e) perform any act or engage in any activity which is contrary

to, or in derogation of, the sovereign rights and jurisdiction herein
provided.

2. UNCLOS III- These extend 200 nautical miles (370 kilometres;

230 miles) from the baseline. Within this area, the coastal nation
has sole exploitation rights over all natural resources. In casual
use, the term may include the territorial sea and even the
continental shelf. The EEZs were introduced to halt the
increasingly heated clashes over fishing rights, although oil was
also becoming important. The success of an offshore oil platform
in the Gulf of Mexico in 1947 was soon repeated elsewhere in the
world, and by 1970 it was technically feasible to operate in waters
4,000 metres deep. Foreign nations have the freedom of
navigation and overflight, subject to the regulation of the coastal
states. Foreign states may also lay submarine pipes and cables.

- Kalayaan Islands (constituted under RA 1596)- part of

Region IV-B, Province of Palawan but under the custody of
DND. Found some 380 miles west of the southern end of
Palawan. Spratly Archipelago- international reference to the
entire archipelago wherein the Kalayaan chain of islands is
located. The Philippines essentially claims only the western
section of Spratlys, which is nearest to Palawan.

- Scarborough shaol (Bajo de Masinloc)- also known as

scarborough reef, Panatag Shoal and Huangyan Dao. Found
in the South China Sea or West Philippine Sea, part of the
province of Zambales. A shaol is a triangle shaped chain of
reefs and islands (but mostly rocks. 55 kilometers around

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 with an area of 150 square kilometer. Its 123 miles west of
Subic Bay. Basis: terra nullius; 200 EEZ

- * Arigo vs. Swift GR No. 206510, September 16, 2014- a foreign

warship’s unauthorized entry into our internal waters with
resulting damage to marine resources is one situation in which
Articles 30 & 31 may apply. Even if US a non member of
UNCLOS, it does not mean it will disregard the rights of the
Philippines as a coastal state over its internal waters and territorial
sea.

- Key Points on Permanent Court of Arbitration’s Verdict on

the PH-China Dispute over Scarborough Shoal: In Permanent
Court of Arbitration (PCA) Case No. 2013-19 (In the
Matter of the South China Sea Arbitration between the
Republic of the Philippines and the People’s Republic of
China), decided on 12 July 2016, the arbitration court
declared “as between the Philippines and China, China’s
claims to historic rights, or other sovereign rights or
jurisdiction, with respect to the maritime areas of the South
China Sea encompassed by the relevant part of the ‘nine-
dash line’ are contrary to the Convention and without lawful
effect to the extent that they exceed the geographic and
substantive limits of China’s maritime entitlements under the
Convention; and further DECLARES that the Convention
superseded any historic rights, or other sovereign rights
or jurisdiction, in excess of the limits imposed therein”
(emphasis in original).

- The arbitral tribunal agreed unanimously with the Philippines. In

its award, it concluded that there is no evidence that China had
historically exercised exclusive control over the waters or
resources, hence there was "no legal basis for China to claim
historic rights" over the nine-dash line. The tribunal also
judged that China had caused "severe harm to the coral reef
environment", and that it had violated Philippines’ sovereign
rights in its exclusive economic zone by interfering with
Philippine fishing and petroleum exploration, for example
restricting the traditional fishing rights of Filipino fishermen at
Scarborough Shoal.

- China’s claim to historic rights to resources was incompatible

with the detailed allocation of rights and maritime zones in the
Convention and concluded that to the extent China had historic
rights to resources in the waters of the South China Sea, such
rights were extinguished by the entry into force of the Convention
to the extent that were incompatible with the Convention’s system
of maritime zones.

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- Claims over Benham Rise/Philippine Rise- The Philippine
Rise, formerly called the Benham Rise, is a seismically active
undersea region and extinct volcanic ridge located in the
Philippine Sea approximately 250 km (160 mi) east of the
northern coastline of Dinapigue, Isabela. The Rise has been
known to the people of Catanduanes as Kalipung-awan since pre-
colonial times, which literally means 'loneliness from an isolated
place'.

- Under the Philippine Sea lie a number of basins including the West
Philippine Sea Basin, inside of which is located the Central Basin
Fault (CBF).The Benham Plateau is located in the CBF and its
basement probably is a micro-continent. Several scientific surveys
have been made on the feature to study its nature and its impact on
tectonic subduction, including one about its effects on the 1990
Luzon earthquake. The Philippines claimed this feature as part of
its continental shelf in a claim filed with the United Nations
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf on April 8,
2009, and which was approved under the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 2012.

- It is designated as a "protected food supply exclusive zone" by the

Philippine government in May 2017. Mining and oil exploration is
banned in the Benham Plateau as a protected area. On May 16,
2017, President Rodrigo Duterte signed Executive Order No. 25
renaming the feature to “Philippine Rise”, and later allowed
international vessels to conduct research on the Rise.

- Despite its proximity to the archipelago, the plateau was previously

not included in the territory of the Philippines. On April 8, 2009,
the Republic of the Philippines lodged a partial territorial waters
claim with the United Nations Commission on the Limits of the
Continental Shelf in relation to the continental shelf in the region
of Benham Rise. It was submitted as part of petition expanding the
archipelago's baselines and exclusive economic zone through a law
that also included other claims involving disputed territories of the
Kalayaan Islands (Spratly Islands) and Scarborough Shoal.
Although the landform, in itself, is not disputed, the petition still
received some criticism from China. According to the
government's claim, based on a set of guidelines by the
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, the area
satisfies the 350-mile constraint line since the outer limits of the
continental shelf are located landward of the constraint line, which
is located 350 miles from the baselines where the measurement of
the breadth of the territorial sea begins.

- The Philippines filed its claim for Benham Rise in 2008 in

compliance with the requirements of the [[United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Seas. The UN officially approved

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 the claim in April 2012, the first claim of the Philippines approved
by an international body since the colonial era.China released a
statement saying that they do not recognize the ruling and that
China seeks to claim the Benham Rise in the near future as it is
part of a so-called 'Chinese second-chain islands'. However, there
are no existing islands within the Benham Rise.

- Basis of claim over Sabbah: under Section 2 of RA 5446-The

definition of the baselines of the territorial sea of the Philippine
Archipelago as provided in this Act is without prejudice to the
delineation of the baselines of the territorial sea around the
territory of Sabah, situated in North Borneo, over which the
Republic of the Philippines has acquired dominion and
sovereignty.

- Bangsamoro Juridical Entity Concept (Province of North

Cotabato vs. GRP, G.R. No. 183591 October 14 2008)-The
issue of territorial integrity was again raised in The Province
of North Cotabato v. GRP Peace Panel (G.R. No. 183591,
October 14, 2008), following the crafting of the Memorandum
of Agreement on Ancestral Domains (MOA-AD) which was
then to be signed by the representatives of the Republic of
the Philippines and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.
The MOA-AD was touted to be the culmination of a long
process of negotiation between government and the rebel
group who were engaged in a protracted war since 1984. The
MOA-AD provided, among others, PANAO 23the creation and
recognition of a Bangsamoro Juridical Entity with an
“associative” relationship with the national government. The
concept of association, however, is nowhere recognized in the
constitution. According to the High Court, the Bangsamoro
juridical entity is a far more powerful entity than the
autonomous region contemplated in the Constitution. It is not
a mere expansion of the Autonomous Region of Muslim
Mindanao but possesses all the criteria of a state. Moreover,
even though the MOA-AD would not necessarily sever any
portion of Philippine territory, its spirit, as implied by the
concept of association, undermines the national sovereignty
and territorial integrity of the Philippine state.

- No province, city, or municipality, not even the ARMM, is

recognized under our laws as having an “associative” relationship
with the national government. Indeed, the concept implies powers
that go beyond anything ever granted by the Constitution to any
local or regional government. It also implies the recognition of the
associated entity as a state. The Constitution, however, does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the Philippine
State, much less does it provide for a transitory status that aims to
prepare any part of Philippine territory for independence.

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 - The BJE is a far more powerful entity than the autonomous region
recognized in the Constitution. It is not merely an expanded
version of the ARMM, the status of its relationship with the
national government being fundamentally different from that of the
ARMM. Indeed, BJE is a state in all but name as it meets the
criteria of a state laid down in the Montevideo Convention,
namely, a permanent population, a defined territory, a government,
and a capacity to enter into relations with other states.

ARTICLE II
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE
POLICIES

* All provisions of the Constitution are self-executing unless

otherwise intended. The exception to this rule are provisions
which merely lay down a general principle, such as those laid
down in the declaration of principles and state policies (Espina v.
Zamora, G.R. No. 143855, September 21, 2010). Since they are
not self-executing, they require implementing legislations.

But there are state policies that are inherently self-executory,

such as the following:
1. Right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Oposa v.
Factoran, G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993);
2. Promotion and protection of health in Article II, Section 15
(Imbong v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 204819, April 8,
2014);
3. Right to information under Article III, Section 7
(Legaspi v. CSC, G.R. No. L-72119, May 29, 1987);
4. Filipino First Policy (Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, G.R. No.
122156, February 3, 1997.

STATE PRINCIPLES

- Republicanism

- Immunity of the State from Suit

-- Exceptions: with its Consent: expressly or impliedly
- Express: by law: general (CA 327 as amended by PD 1445)
or special

- Implied: 1. Initiates filing of a complaint

2. Engages in business
3. Enters into commercial contracts (What is the
Restrictive Doctrine of State Immunity from

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 Suit?- The restrictive application of State immunity is
proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions
of the foreign sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs.
Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of
an individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to
be sued only when it enters into business contracts. It does not apply
where the contracts relate to the exercise of its sovereign functions. In
this case the projects are an integral part of the naval base which is
devoted to the defense of both the United States and the Philippines,
indisputably a function of the government of the highest order; they are
not utilized for nor dedicated to commercial or business purposes.”
(Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693, Nov. 11, 1993
[Vitug])
4. EPG Construction Co. vs. Vigilar, 354 SCRA
566, March 16, 2001 [The doctrine should not
used to perpetrate an Injustice on a citizen.]

- Arigo v. Swift, 735 SCRA 102 (2014)-A petition filed for the
issuance of a Writ of Kalikasan directed against the
Commander of the US Pacific Fleet for the destruction of our
corrals in Tubbataha reef (a protected area system under the
NIPAS [National Integrated Protected Areas System] and a
UN declared World Heritage Site because of its rich marine
bio-diversity) in the Sulu Sea caused by the USS Guardian, an
American naval vessel when it ran aground there in the course
of its voyage to Indonesia from its base in Okinawa, Japan,
will not prosper for lack of jurisdiction following the doctrine
of sovereign equality of all States. In effect, the suit is a suit
against the US government and, therefore, should be
dismissed.

- The waiver of immunity from suit of the US under the

Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) applies only to waiver
from criminal jurisdiction, so that if an American soldier
commits an offense in the Philippines, he shall be tried by
Philippine courts under Philippine laws. The waiver did not
include the special civil action for the issuance of a Writ of
Kalikasan.

- Also, the demand for compensation for the destruction of our

corrals in Tubbataha reef has been rendered moot and
academic. After all, the US already signified its intention to
pay damages, as expressed by the US embassy officials in the
Philippines, the only request is that a panel of experts
composed of scientists be constituted to assess the total
damage caused to our corrals there, which request is not
unreasonable.

- Government Funds may not be subject to Garnishment-

The funds of the UP are government funds that are public in
character. They include the income accruing from the use of

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 real property ceded to the UP that may be spent only for the
attainment of its institutional objectives. Hence, the funds
subject of this action could not be validly made the subject of
writ of execution or garnishment. The adverse judgment
rendered against the UP in a suit to which it had impliedly
consented was not immediately enforceable by execution
against the UP, because suability of the State did not j679
SCRA 54, 23 August 2012, 1st Div. [Bersamin])

- INCORPORATION CLAUSE -By the doctrine of

incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted
principles of international law, which are considered to be
automatically part of our own laws.[Tanada vs. Angara,
May 2, 1997]

- Incorporated: 1. Treaties duly ratified (Pimente vs.

Ermita, 462 SCRA 622, July 6, 2005)
2. norms of general or customary laws
3. treaties which have become part of
customary law (Mejoff vs. Director of
Prisons; Kuroda vs. Jalandoni

- Mijares, et al. vs. Javier, et al., April 12, 2005- There is no

obligatory rule derived from treaties or conventions that
requires the Philippines to recognize foreign judgments, or
allow a procedure for the enforcement thereof. However,
generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of
the incorporation clause of the Constitution, form part of the
laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty
obligations. The classical formulation in international law
sees those customary rules accepted as binding result from
the combination two elements: the established,
widespread, and consistent practice on the part of States;
and a psychological element known as the opinion juris
sive necessitates (opinion as to law or necessity). Implicit in
the latter element is a belief that the practice in question is
rendered obligatory by the existence of a rule of law
requiring it.

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 221697, March 8,

2016 - Foundlings are likewise citizens under international
law. Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can
become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method
requires that an international law be transformed into a
domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as
local legislation. On the other hand, generally accepted
principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation
clause of the Constitution, form part of the laws of the land

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 even if they do not derive from treaty obligations. Generally
accepted principles of international law include international
custom as evidence of a general practice accepted as law, and
general principles of law recognized by civilized nations.
International customary rules are accepted as binding as
a result from the combination of two elements: the
established, widespread, and consistent practice on the
part of States; and a psychological element known as the
opinion juris sive necessitates (opinion as to law or
necessity). Implicit in the latter element is a belief that the
practice in question is rendered obligatory by the
existence of a rule of law requiring it. "General principles
of law recognized by civilized nations" are principles
"established by a process of reasoning" or judicial logic,
based on principles which are "basic to legal systems
generally," such as "general principles of equity, i.e., the
general principles of fairness and justice," and the "general
principle against discrimination" which is embodied in the
"Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination, the Convention Against
Discrimination in Education, the Convention (No. 111)
Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation." These are the same core principles which
underlie the Philippine Constitution itself, as embodied in the
due process and equal protection clauses of the Bill of Rights

- The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of

the Republic of the Philippines Peace Panel, GR No.
183591, October 14, 2008)- The Right to Self-Determination
of Peoples- has gone beyond mere treaty or convention. In
fact, it has now been elevated into the status of a generally
accepted principle of international law.

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No.190582,

April 8, 2010- At this time, we are not prepared to declare
that these Yogyarta Principles (the Application of
International Human Rights Law In Relation to Sexual
Orientation and Gender Identity), contain norms that are
obligatory on the Philippines. There are declarations and
obligations outlines in said Principles which are not reflective
of the current state of international law, and do not find basis
in any of the sources of international law enumerated under
Article 38(1) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice. Xxx Using even the most liberal lenses, these
Yogyarta Principles, consisting of a declaration formulated by
various international law professors, are – at best - de lege
refenda- and do not constitute binding obligations on the

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 Philippines. Indeed, so much of contemporary international
law is characterized by the soft law nomenclature, i.e.,
international law is full of principles that promote
international cooperation, harmony, and respect for human
rights, most of which amounts to no more than well-meaning
desires, without support of either State practice or opinio
juris.

- Lim vs. Exec. Sec., April 11, 2002 – generally accepted

principles of International Law, the provisions of a treaty are
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent
law, or that it is subject to the police power of the State.

- The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever

municipal tribunals (or local courts) are confronted with
situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a
rule of international law and the provisions of the constitution
or statute of the local state. Efforts should first be exerted to
harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it is to be
presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard
for the generally accepted principles of international law in
observance of the Incorporation Clause in the above-cited
constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996
ed., p. 55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is
irreconcilable and a choice has to be made between a rule
of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence
dictates that municipal law should be upheld by the
municipal courts (Ichong vs. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155
[1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In re:
Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts
are organs of municipal law and are accordingly bound by it
in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap, op. cit., p. 13). The fact
that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international
law over national or municipal law in the municipal sphere.
The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in most countries,
decrees that rules of international law are given equal
standing with, but are not superior to, national legislative
enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex posterior derogat
priori takes effect – a treaty may repeal a statute and a
statute may repeal a treaty. In states where the
constitution is the highest law of the land, such as the
Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may
be invalidated if they are in conflict with the constitution
[Sec. of Justice vs. Lantion]

- Civilian supremacy over the military-Article II, Section 3

is not a new provision although it is more elaborate
than Section 8 of the 1973 Constitution. Compulsory

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 military service contemplated in Article II, Section 4 is
also not new. Of interest, however, is how the present
Constitution digresses from the 1973 Constitution in
defining the prime duty of the government as one
towards the service and protection of the people and not
just the defense of the state.

- People v. Lagman (G.R. No. L-45893, July 13, 1938)

is an old case whose case point has not been
superseded. Here, it was clarified that the right of the
government to require compulsory military services is a
consequence of its duty to defend the state and is
reciprocal with its duty to defend the life, liberty, and
property of its citizens. Republic Act No. 9163
establishing a National Service Training Program amends
RA 7077 and institutionalizes citizen training to
encompass not just military preparedness but also literacy
and civic welfare.

- Aquino v. Esperon (G.R. No. 174994, August 31, 2007)-

Article 70 of the Articles of War grants discretion to military
authorities over the imposition of arrest or confinement of
persons subject to military law charged with crime or with
serious offense.

- Kapunan v. Quisumbing (G.R. Nos. 148213–17A, March

13, 2009) general grant of amnesty exonerates the accused
(former military personnel) for their participation in the 1987
and 1989 coup attempts, but not for murder (in this case, the
murder of Kilusang Mayo Uno leader Rolando Olalia and his
driver Leonor Alay-ay).

- Trillanes v. Pimentel (G.R. No. 179817, June 27, 2008)-

Former military officer charged with rebellion but later
elected as senator, cannot invoke doctrine of condonation, as
it pertains to administrative misconduct not criminal felony
(rebellion is a capital offense under the Revised Penal Code).

- Gudani and Balutan v. Senga (G.R. No. 170165, August

15, 2006)- The president can refuse to allow members of the
AFP to appear before Congress, not on the basis of executive
privilege, but as commander in chief of the armed forces (See
also Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No. 169777)

- IBP v. Zamora (G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000)-

Civilian authority (Section 3, Article II) is not defeated in a
joint task force between the PNP and the Philippine Marines
for the enforcement of law and order in Metro Manila as long
as control is left to the PNP

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 STATE POLICIES

- Separation of the Church and State- Estrada vs. Escritor,

June 22, 2006- It is indubitable that benevolent neutrality-
accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is the
spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine
Constitution. Benevolent neutrality could allow for
accommodation of morality based on religion, provided it
does not offend “compelling state interest”.

- Islamic Da’Wah Council of the Philippines vs. Office of

the Executive Secretary, July 9, 2003. Only the prevention
of an immediate and grave danger to the security and
welfare of the community can justify the infringement of
religious freedom. If the government fails to show the
seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is
constitutionally unacceptable. In a society with a democratic
framework like ours, the State must minimize its interference
with the affairs of its citizens and instead allow them to
exercise reasonable freedom of personal and religious
activity.

- The Filipino First Policy-In the grant of rights, privileges

and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified
Filipinos (Sec. 10, 2nd par., Art. XII of the Constitution)

- Manila Prince Hotel v. GSIS, 267 SCRA 408 (1997)

(Bellosillo)- In this case, the SC ruled that this provision is
self-executing. It was also in this case where the Court
clarified that the rule now is that all provisions of the
Constitution are presumed to be self-executing, rather than
non-self-executing. Elaborating, the Court explained that if a
contrary presumption is adopted, the whole Constitution shall
remain dormant and be captives of Congress, which could
have disastrous consequences. Also, in this case the SC held
that “patrimony” simply means “heritage.” Thus, when we
speak of “national patrimony,” we refer not only to the
natural resources of the Philippines but as well as the
cultural heritage of the Filipino people.

- Filipinization of Public Utilities- Wilson P. Gamboa v.

Finance Secretary Margarito B. Teves, et al., G./R. No.
176579, June 28, 2011, En Banc (Carpio) Section 11,

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 Article XII (National Economy and Patrimony) of the 1987
Constitution mandates the Filipinization of public utilities.

- The 1987 Constitution provides for the Filipinization of

public utilities by requiring that any form of authorization for
the operation of public utilities should be granted only to
citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations
organized under the laws of the Philippines at least sixty per
centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. The
provision is [an express] recognition of the sensitive and vital
position of public utilities both in the national economy and
for national security. The evident purpose of the citizenship
requirement is to prevent aliens from assuming control of
public utilities, which may be inimical to the national
interest. This specific provision explicitly reserves to
Filipino citizens control of public utilities, pursuant to an
overriding economic goal of the 1987 Constitution: to
conserve and develop our patrimony and ensure a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos.

- Any citizen or juridical entity desiring to operate a public

utility must therefore meet the minimum nationality
requirement prescribed in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution. Hence, for a corporation to be granted authority
to operate a public utility, at least 60 percent of its capital
must be owned by Filipino citizens.

- The crux of the controversy is the definition of the term

capital. Does the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the
Constitution refer to common shares or to the total
outstanding capital stock (combined total of common and
non-voting preferred shares)?

- To construe broadly the term capital as the total outstanding

capital stock, including both common and non-voting
preferred shares, grossly contravenes the intent and letter of
the Constitution that the State shall develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by
Filipinos. A broad definition unjustifiably disregards who
owns the all-important voting stock, which necessarily
equates to control of the public utility.

- Indisputably, construing the term capital in Section 11,

Article XII of the Constitution to include both voting and
non-voting shares will result in the abject surrender of our
telecommunications industry to foreigners, amounting to a
clear abdication of the States constitutional duty to limit
control of public utilities to Filipino citizens. Such an

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 interpretation certainly runs counter to the constitutional
provision reserving certain areas of investment to Filipino
citizens, such as the exploitation of natural resources as well
as the ownership of land, educational institutions and
advertising businesses. The Court should never open to
foreign control what the Constitution has expressly
reserved to Filipinos for that would be a betrayal of the
Constitution and of the national interest. The Court must
perform its solemn duty to defend and uphold the intent
and letter of the Constitution to ensure x x x a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled
by Filipinos.

- Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution, like other

provisions of the Constitution expressly reserving to Filipinos
specific areas of investment, such as the development of
natural resources and ownership of land, educational
institutions and advertising business, is self-executing.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-
executing provisions of the Constitution. X x x

- [We] rule that the term capital in Section 11, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution refers only to shares of stock
entitled to vote in the election of directors, and thus in the
present case only to common shares, and not to the total
outstanding capital stock (common and non-voting
preferred shares.)

- Although the Constitution explicitly recognizes the

primacy of labor as a social economic force, it
does not imply degrading the role of capital in
economic production. The underlying policy, in fact,
has always been towards balancing the rights of labor
with the interests of workers in economic activities (Panao
and De Leon 2018). Section 20 of Article II provides:
“The State recognizes the indispensable role of the
private sector, encourages private enterprise, and
provides incentives to needed investments.” This
protection can even be characterized as exclusive and
Filipino-oriented, as Section 19 provides: “The State
shall develop a self-reliant and independent national
economy effectively controlled by Filipinos.” This
‘Filipino first’ policy was reiterated in Manila Prince
Hotel v. Government Service Insurance System (GSIS)
(G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997) where the high
court upheld the right of Manila Prince Hotel to match
the winning bid for GSIS shares on the Manila Hotel
Corporation after losing earlier to Malaysian firm
Renong Berhad. As Manila Hotel lost, GSIS declined

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 to PANAO surrender the shares so Manila Prince
brought the suit to the high court arguing Manila Hotel
is part of national patrimony and invoking the right to
preferential concession under the ‘Filipino First’ policy.

- The high court also ruled that provisions covering

Article XIII (National Economy and Patrimony) are self-
executing and require no enabling law. However, in recent
years and after a number of landmark enactments, the
‘Filipino First’ policy has been relaxed to afford aliens
greater economic participation.

- Republic Act No. 8179 is a landmark as it liberalizes

the extent foreign business entities can invest in the
Philippines. Before its passage, the general rule
restricts foreign investments to 40 percent. Under the
new law, however, foreign investors are allowed
up to 100% equity in companies engaged in almost
all types of business activities, provided (a) the
enterprises are not on the Negative List, (b) the
country or state of the foreign investor also allows
Filipinos and their corporations to do business in
those countries (reciprocity), and (c) if the foreign
investor is investing in a domestic enterprise, the
domestic enterprise must have a paid-in capital
equivalent to USD 200,000.

- Republic Act No. 10881, on the other hand,

specifies the enterprises that fall under the Negative
List. Be that as it may, foreign equity is still not
allowed in mass media except recording; practice of
professions; retail trade enterprises with paid-up
capital of not less than US$2,500,000.00;
cooperatives; private security agencies; utilization of
marine resources in archipelagic waters, territorial
sea, and exclusive economic zone; ownership, operation
and management of cockpits; manufacture, repair,
stockpiling and/or distribution of nuclear weapons;
manufacture, repair, stockpiling and/or distribution of
biological, chemical and radiological weapons and anti-
personal mines; and manufacture of firecrackers and other
pyrotechnic devices.

- Foreign corporations can own immovable property,

including condominium units, as long as foreign
equity in the corporation does not exceed 40 percent.

- Foreign corporations can also participate in the

bidding of projects of the Philippine government.

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- Also, the practice of professions by aliens are allowed in
many instances provided the latter’s country extends such
privilege (reciprocity) to qualified Filipino practitioners (see
Board of Medicine v. Ota, G.R. No. 166097, July 14,
2008).

- The Right to Life of the Unborn from Conception- The

Philippine national population program has always been
grounded on two cornerstone principles: “principle of no-
abortion” and the “principle of non-coercion.” These
principles are not merely grounded on administrative policy,
but rather, originates from the constitutional protection which
expressly provided to afford protection to life and guarantee
religious freedom.

- When Does Life Begin?- Majority of Members of the Court

are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this
stage, without proper hearing and evidence. During the
deliberations, however, it was agreed upon that the individual
members of the Court could express their own views on this
matter. In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view
that life begins at fertilization.

- Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn

from conception. This is undisputable because before
conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it
is no surprise that the Constitution is mute as to any
proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The
problem has arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters
who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving
the view that life begins at implantation. Hence, the issue of
when life begins.

- In conformity with the above principle, the traditional

meaning of the word “conception” which, as described
and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means
that life begins at fertilization. From the deliberations
above-quoted, it is apparent that the framers of the
Constitution emphasized that the State shall provide equal
protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the
earliest opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon
the union of the male sperm and the female ovum. X x x

- Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the

Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives for being
unconstitutional. From the discussions above, contraceptives

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 that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that
actually prevent the union of the male sperm and the female
ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization
should be deemed non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally
permissible. (James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N.
Ochoa, Jr., et al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc
[Mendoza])

- Section 7 of RH law which excludes parental consent in cases

where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or
has had miscarriage is anti-family and violates Section 12 of
Art. II. Also, Section 23(a)(ii) is unconstitutional as it denies
the right of parental authority in cases where what is involved
is “non-surgical procedures”.

- Are the Curfew Ordinances unconstitutional because

they deprive parents of their natural and primary right in
the rearing of the youth without due process? (SPARK
vs. Quezon City, et al)

- No. Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates

the State's policy relative to the rights of parents in the rearing
of their children. The rearing of children (i.e., referred to as
the "youth") for civic efficiency and the development of their
moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. While parents have the primary
role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when
actions concerning the child have a relation to the public
welfare or the well-being of the child, the State may act to
promote these legitimate interests."

- As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to

support parents in the exercise of these rights and duties. State
authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather,
complementary to parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,
this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens patriae
in protecting minors. To it is cast the duty of protecting the
rights of persons or individual who because of age or
incapacity are in an unfavorable position, vis-a-vis other
parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
them, they have the political community to look after their
welfare. As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and
duty to aid parents in the moral development of their children,
and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations.

- The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions

designed to aid parents in their role of promoting their

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 children's well-being. At this juncture, it should be
emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the
minors are not - whether actually or constructively (as will be
later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. In all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew
Ordinances affects is the parents' prerogative to allow minors
to remain in public places without parental accompaniment
during the curfew hours.

- The Curfew Ordinances only amount to a minimal - albeit

reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his
or her child. Finally, it may be well to point out that the
Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides
parents with better opportunities to take a more active role in
their children's upbringing.

- Balanced & Healthful Ecology- The right to a balanced and

healthful ecology is a fundamental legal right that carries with
it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the
environment. This right implies, among other things, the
judicious management and conservation of the country’s
resources, which duty is reposed in the DENR. ( Prov. of
Rizal vs. Exec. Sec., December 13, 2005)

- The precautionary principle applies when the following

conditions are met:

1. There exist considerable scientific uncertainties;

2. There exist scenarios (or models) of possible harm that are
scientifically reasonable (that is based on some scientifically
plausible reasoning);
3. Uncertainties cannot be reduced in the short term without
at the same time increasing ignorance of other relevant factors
by higher levels of abstraction and idealization;
4. The potential harm is sufficiently serious or even
irreversible for present or future generations or otherwise
morally unacceptable;
5. There is a need to act now, since effective counteraction
later will be made significantly more difficult or costly at any
later time.

- The Rules (of Procedure for Environmental Cases)

likewise incorporated the principle in Part V, Rule 20,
which states:

PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE

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 Sec. 1. Applicability. – When there is a lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity
and environmental effect, the court shall apply the
precautionary principle in resolving the case before it. The
constitutional right of the people to a balanced and healthful
ecology shall be given the benefit of the doubt.

- SEC. 2. Standards for application. – In applying the

precautionary principle, the following factors, among others,
may be considered: (1) threats to human life or health; (2)
inequity to present or future generations; or (3) prejudice to
the environment without legal consideration of the
environmental rights of those affected.

- Under this Rule, the precautionary principle finds direct

application in the evaluation of evidence in cases before the
courts. The precautionary principle bridges the gap in cases
where scientific certainty in factual findings cannot be
achieved. By applying the precautionary principle, the court
may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action
or inaction, with the goal of preserving and protecting the
environment. This may be further evinced from the second
paragraph where bias is created in favor of the constitutional
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology. In
effect, the precautionary principle shifts the burden of
evidence of harm away from those likely to suffer harm and
onto those desiring to change the status quo. An application
of the precautionary principle to the rules on evidence will
enable courts to tackle future environmental problems before
ironclad scientific consensus emerges. (Annotation to the
Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases)

- International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech

Applications. Inc. v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia
(Philippines), et al., December 8, 2015- Precautionary
Principle- expressing the normative idea that governments
are obligated to “foresee and forestall” harm to the
environment. Under this rule, the precautionary principle
finds direct application in the evaluation of evidence in cases
before the courts. Bias is created in favor of the
constitutional right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology. It shifts the burden of evidence of harm
away from those likely to suffer harm and onto those desiring
to change the status quo. For purposes of evidence, the
precautionary principle should be treated as a principle of last
resort of the regular Rules of Evidence would cause in an
inequitable result for the environmental plaintiff when: 1.
Settings in which the risks of harm are uncertain; 2.
Settings in which harm might be irreversible and what is

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 lost is irreplaceable; and 3. Settings in which the harm
that might result would be serious. When in doubt, cases
must be resolved in favor of the constitutional right to a
balanced and healthful ecology.

- Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers & Exporters

Association, Inc., et al., GR No. 189185, August 16, 2016-
The Supreme Court did not find the presence of the elements
for the precautionary principle to apply.

- Resident Marine Mammals of the Protected Seascape

Tanon straits, et al. v. Secretary Angelo Reyes, et al., GR
No.180771, April 21, 2016- Marine mammals were joined
by human beings as “stewards of nature”. The stewards
having shown in their petition that there may be possible
violations of laws concerning the habitat of the resident
marine mammals, are declared to have the legal standing to
file the petition. The Supreme Court ruled instead that the
issue of whether these marine mammals have locus standi to
file the petition had been eliminated because of Section 5,
Rules for the Enforcement of Environmental Laws, which
allows any citizen to file a petition for the enforcement of
environmental laws (Citizen’s Suit) and, in their petition,
these marine mammals were joined by human beings as
“stewards of nature.”

- Local Autonomy ( Basco vs. Pagcor)- the power of local

government to impose taxes and fees is always subject to
limitations which Congress may provide by law. The
principle of local autonomy under the 1987 constitution
simply means decentralization. It does not make local
governments sovereign within the state of an “imperium
in imperio” (unlike in a Federal System). The matter of
regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a
State concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State
to retain it or delegate it to local governments.

- Province of North Cotabato vs. GRP Peace Panel, (GR

No. 183591, Oct. 14, 2008)- The Constitution does not
contemplate any state in this jurisdiction other than the
Philippine State much less does it provide for a transitory
status that aims to prepare any part of the Philippine territory
for independence.

- An association is formed when two states of unequal power

voluntarily establish durable links. Xxx In international
practice, the associated state arrangement has usually been
used as a transitional device of former colonies on their way

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 to full independence. Xxx The concept of Association is not
recognized under the 1987 constitution.

- Abas Kida vs. Senate of the Philippines, 659 SCRA 270- It

should be emphasized that autonomy granted to local
governments is not to be understood as independence.

ARTICLE IV
CITIZENSHIP

- Citizenship is not a matter of convenience. It is a badge of

identity that comes with attendant civil and political rights
accorded by the State to its citizens. It likewise demands the
concomitant duty to maintain allegiance to one’s flag and
country. (Casan Macode Maquiling v. COMELEC, et al.,
G.R. No. 195649, April 16, 2013, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

- The Jus Sanguinis Principle on Citizenship- The Philippine

law on citizenship adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis.
Thereunder, a child follows the nationality or citizenship of
the parents regardless of the place of his/her birth, as opposed
to the doctrine of jus soli which determines nationality or
citizenship on the basis of place of birth. (Valles v.
COMELEC, 337 SCRA 543, Aug. 9, 2000, En Banc
[Purisima])

- Natural-born Citizens- Natural-born citizens are those who

are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect their Philippine
citizenship. Those who elect Philippine citizenship in
accordance with paragraph (3), Section 1 hereof shall be
deemed natural-born citizens. (Section 2, Article IV, 1987
Constitution)

- In general, there are only two (2) kinds of Filipino citizens,

i.e., natural-born and naturalized. There is no third category.
If one did not have to undergo the cumbersome process of
naturalization, it means that he is natural-born. (Antonio
Bengson III v. HRET, G.R. No. 142840, May 7, 2001, En
Banc [Kapunan])

- Is a Foundling a Natural-born Citizen? To deny full

Filipino citizenship to all foundlings and render them stateless
just because there may be a theoretical chance that one among
the thousands of these foundlings might be the child of not
just one, but two, foreigners is downright discriminatory,
irrational, and unjust. It just doesn’t make any sense. Given

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 the statistical certainty 99.9% - that any child born in the
Philippines would be a natural-born citizen, a decision
denying foundlings such status is effectively a denial of their
birthright. There is no reason why this Honorable Court
should use an improbable hypothetical to sacrifice the
fundamental political rights of an entire class of human
beings. Your Honor, constitutional interpretation and the use
of common sense are not separate disciplines.

- As a matter of fact, foundlings are as a class, natural-born

citizens. While the 1935 Constitution’s enumeration is silent
as to foundlings, there is no restrictive language which would
definitely exclude foundlings either. Because of silence and
ambiguity in the numeration with respect to foundlings, there
is a need to examine the intent of the framers. X x x

- [T]he deliberations of the 1934 Constitutional Convention

show that the framers intended foundlings to be covered by
the enumeration. X x x

- Though the Rafols amendment was not carried out, it was not
because there was any objection to the notion that persons of
“unknown parentage” are not citizens but only because their
number was not enough to merit specific mention. X x x

- In other words, the constitutional silence is fully explained in

terms of linguistic efficiency and the avoidance of
redundancy. The policy is clear: it is to recognize foundlings,
as a class, as Filipinos, under Article IV, Section 1(3) of the
1935 Constitution. This inclusive policy is carried over into
the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. X x x

- Domestic laws on adoption also support the principle that

foundlings are Filipinos. These laws do not provide that
adoption confers citizenship upon the adoptee. Rather, the
adoptee must be a Filipino in the first place to be adopted. X x

- Foundlings are likewise citizens under international law.

Under the 1987 Constitution, an international law can become
part of the sphere of domestic law either by transformation or
incorporation. X x x

- The common thread of the UDHR (Universal Declaration of

Human Rights), UNCRC (UN Convention on the Rights of
the Child) and ICCPR (International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights) is to obligate the Philippines to grant
nationality from birth and ensure that no child is stateless.
This grant of nationality must be at the time of birth, and it
cannot be accomplished by the application of our present

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 naturalization laws, Commonwealth Act No. 473, as
amended, and R.A. No. 9139, both of which require the
applicant to be at least eighteen (18) years old.

- The principles found in two conventions, while yet

ungratified by the Philippines, are generally accepted
principles of international law. The first is Article 14 of the
1930 Hague Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the
Conflict of Nationality Laws under which a foundling is
presumed to have the “nationality of the country of birth,” x x
x.

- A foundling is, until the contrary is proved, presumed to have

been born on the territory of the State in which it was found.

- The second is the principle that a foundling is presumed born

of citizens of the country where he is found, contained in
Article 2 of the 1961 United Nations Convention on the
Reduction of Statelessness x x x.

- In sum, all of the international law conventions and

instruments on the matter of nationality of foundlings were
designed to address the plight of a defenseless class which
suffers from a misfortune not of their making. We cannot be
restrictive as to their application if we are a country which
calls itself civilized and a member of the community of
nations. (Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares v.
COMELEC, G R. No. 221697, March 8, 2016, En Banc
[Perez])

- Natural born: Under Article IV, Section 2 "Natural-born

citizens are those who are citizens of the Philippines from
birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship." In the first place, "having to
perform an act" means that the act must be personally done by
the citizen. In this instance, the determination of foundling
status is done not by the child but by the authorities.
Secondly, the object of the process is the determination of the
whereabouts of the parents, not the citizenship of the child.
Lastly, the process is certainly not analogous to naturalization
proceedings to acquire Philippine citizenship, or the election
of such citizenship by one born of an alien father and a
Filipino mother under the 1935 Constitution, which is an act
to perfect it.

- Casan Macode Maquiling vs. COMELEC, et al., GR No.

195649, April 16, 2013-The act of using a foreign passport is
not one of the acts enumerated in CA No. 63 constituting
renunciation and loss of Philippine citizenship, it is

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 nevertheless an act which repudiates the very oath of
renunciation required for a former Filipino citizen who is also
a citizen of another country to be qualified to run for a local
elective position. Xxx The citizenship requirement for
elective public office is a continuing one. It must be
possessed not just at the time of the renunciation of the
foreign citizenship but continuously. Any act which violates
the oath of renunciation opens citizenship issue to attack.

- Edison So vs. Republic, GR No. 170603, January 29, 2007-

Naturalization signifies the act of formally adopting a
foreigner into the political body of a nation by clothing him or
her the privileges of a citizen. Xxx Under current and existing
laws, there are three ways by which an alien may become a
citizen by naturalization: (a) administrative naturalization
pursuant to RA No. 9139; (b) judicial naturalization pursuant
to CA No. 473 , as amended; and (c) legislative naturalization
in the form of a law enacted by Congress bestowing
Philippine citizenship to an alien.

- R.A. No. 9139 may be availed of only by native-born aliens

who lived here in the Philippines all their lives, who never
saw any other country and all along thought that they were
Filipinos; who have demonstrated love and loyalty to the
Philippines and affinity to the customs and traditions of the
Filipino people. To reiterate, the intention of the legislature
in enacting R.A. No. 9139 was to make the process of
acquiring Philippine citizenship less tedious, less technical
and more encouraging which is administrative rather than
judicial in nature. What the legislature had in mind was
merely to prescribe another mode of acquiring Philippine
citizenship which may be availed of by native born aliens.
The only implication is that, a native born alien has the choice
to apply for judicial or administrative naturalization, subject
to the prescribed qualifications and disqualifications.

- Co vs . HRET, 199 SCRA 692- An attack on a person’s

citizenship may be done through a direct action for its nullity.

- Re: Vicente Ching, 316 SCRA 1- There are two conditions

in order that the election of Philippine citizenship is
effective:
1. the mother of the person making the
election must be citizen of the
Philippines; and
2. said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.

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- Ma v. Fernandez, July 26, 2010, GR No. 183133 - the
“evolvement from election of Philippine citizenship upon reaching
the age of majority under the 1935 Philippine Constitution to
dispensing with the election requirement under the 1973 Philippine
Constitution to express classification of these children as natural-
born citizens under the 1987 Constitution towards the conclusion
that the omission of the 1941 statutory requirement of registration
of the documents of election should not result in the obliteration of
the right to Philippine citizenship.

- The Court concluded that, “having a Filipino mother is permanent.

It is the basis of the right of the petitioners to elect Philippine
citizenship. Petitioners elected Philippine citizenship in form and
substance. The failure to register the election in the civil registry
should not defeat the election and negate the permanent fact that
they have a Filipino mother. The lacking requirements may still be
complied with subject to the imposition of appropriate
administrative penalties, if any.”

- Republic of Phil vs. Nora Fe Sagun (Feb 15, 2011)- there is no

specific statutory or procedural rule which authorizes the direct
filing of a petition for declaration of election of Philippine
citizenship before the courts. CA 625- election within reasonable
time is 3 years from reaching the age of majority

- Bengson vs. HRET, May 7, 2001- Repatriation may be had

under various statutes by those who lost their citizenship due
to: 1) desertion of the AFP; 2) served in the armed forces of the
allied forces in WWII; 3) service in the AF of the US at any other
time; 4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien; 5) political and
economic necessity.

- R.A. No. 8171, which has lapsed into law on 23 October

1995, is an act providing for the repatriation (a) of Filipino
women who have lost their Philippine citizenship by marriage
to aliens and (b) of natural-born Filipinos who have lost their
Philippine citizenship on account of political or economic
necessity. To claim the benefit of RA 8171, the children
must be of minor age at the time of the petititon for
repatriation was filed by the parent [Angat vs. RP,
September 14, 1999; Tabasa vs. CA, GR. No. 125793,
August 29, 2006- no showing that Tabasa’s parents lost their
Philippine citizenship “on account of political or economic
necessity”].

- Repatriation simply consists of the taking of an oath of

allegiance to the RP and registering said oath in the Local

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 Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned
resides or last resided.

- Altarejos vs. COMELEC, 441 SCRA 655- In addition to the

taking the oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines, the registration of the Certificate of Repatriation
in the proper civil registry and the Bureau of Immigration
is a prerequisite in effecting the repatriation of a citizen.

- Repatriation retroacts to the date of the filing of one’s

application for repatriation. Supra.

- Repatriation results in the recovery of the original

nationality. If he was originally a natural born citizen before
he lost his citizenship, he will be restored to his former status
as natural born Filipino.

- NATURAL BORN- Read Sections 2 and 4 of RA 9225,

amending CA 63, otherwise known as Citizenship
Retention and Reacquisition Act (August 29, 2003)-
including citizens repatriated and unmarried children,
whether legitimate or illegitimate or adopted, below 18
years of age of those repatriated.

- DUAL CITIZENSHIP- Read: Mercado vs. Manzano, 307

SCRA 630- The phrase “dual citizenship” in RA 7160 must
be understood as referring to dual allegiance (especially for
naturalized citizens). In filing a certificate of candidacy, the
person with dual citizenship effectively renounces his
foreign citizenship. The oath of allegiance contained in the
certificate of candidacy constitutes sufficient renunciation of
his foreign citizenship.

- The phrase “dual citizenship in RA 7160, Section 40(d) of the

LGC must be understood as referring to “dual allegiance”.
Consequently, persons with dual citizenship do not fall under
this disqualification. It should suffice if, upon filing of their
certificate of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to
terminate their status as persons with dual citizenship.

- Corodora v. COMELEC, GR No. 176947, February 19,

2009- The Supreme Court recently ruled that a natural-born
Filipino, who also possesses American citizenship having
been born of an American father and a Filipino mother, is
exempt from the twin requirements of swearing to an Oath of
Allegiance and executing a Renunciation of Foreign
Citizenship under the Citizenship Retention and Reacquisition
Act (RA 9225) before running for public office. The Supreme

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 Court En Banc held that that it has applied the twin
requirements to cases “which involve natural-born Filipinos
who later became naturalized citizens of another country and
thereafter ran for elective office in the Philippines. In the
present case, [private respondent Gustavo S.] Tambunting, a
natural-born Filipino, did not subsequently become a
naturalized citizen of another country. Hence, the twin
requirements in RA No. 9225 do not apply to him.”

- LOPEZ VS. COMELEC, G.R. No. 182701, July 23, 2008 –

Valles and Mercado Doctrines do not apply is one reacquires
his citizenship under RA 9225 and runs for public office. To
comply with the provisions of Section 5 (2) of RA 9225, it is
necessary that the candidate for public office must state in
clear and unequivocal terms that he is renouncing all foreign
citizenship.

- Jacot vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 179848, November 27,

2008 – Mercado case was decided under Section 40 of LGC
re dual allegiance, and that time RA 9225 was not yet
enacted.

- Manuel B. Japzon vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180088,

January 19, 2009- It bears to point out that Republic Act
No. 9225 governs the manner in which a natural-born Filipino
may reacquire or retain his Philippine citizenship despite
acquiring a foreign citizenship, and provides for his rights and
liabilities under such circumstances. A close scrutiny of said
statute would reveal that it does not at all touch on the matter
of residence of the natural-born Filipino taking advantage of
its provisions. Republic Act No. 9225 imposes no residency
requirement for the reacquisition or retention of Philippine
citizenship; nor does it mention any effect of such
reacquisition or retention of Philippine citizenship on the
current residence of the concerned natural-born Filipino.
Clearly, Republic Act No. 9225 treats citizenship
independently of residence. This is only logical and
consistent with the general intent of the law to allow for dual
citizenship. Since a natural-born Filipino may hold, at the
same time, both Philippine and foreign citizenships, he may
establish residence either in the Philippines or in the foreign
country of which he is also a citizen. Residency in the
Philippines only becomes relevant when the natural-born
Filipino with dual citizenship decides to run for public office.
Under Republic Act No. 9225, to run for public office, he
must: (1) meet the qualifications for holding such public
office as required by the Constitution and existing laws; and
(2) make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all

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 foreign citizenships before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath.

- Roseller de Guzman vs. COMELEC, GR No. 180048,

June 19, 2009- R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow re-
acquisition and retention of Philippine citizenship for: 1)
natural-born citizens who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a
foreign country; and 2) natural-born citizens of the
Philippines who, after the effectivity of the law, become
citizens of a foreign country. The law provides that they are
deemed to have re-acquired or retained their Philippine
citizenship upon taking the oath of allegiance. However, it
must be emphasized that R.A. No. 9225 imposes an
additional requirement on those who wish to seek elective
public office, as follows: Section 5. Civil and Political
Rights and Liabilities. – Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine Citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and
political rights and be subject to all attendant liabilities and
responsibilities under existing laws of the Philippines and the
following conditions:

- x x x x (2)Those seeking elective public office in the

Philippines shall meet the qualifications for holding such
public office as required by the Constitution and existing laws
and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all
foreign citizenship before any public officer authorized to
administer an oath. The filing of a certificate of candidacy
does not ipso facto amount to a renunciation of his foreign
citizenship under R.A. No. 9225. The rulings in the cases of
Frivaldo and Mercado are not applicable because R.A. No.
9225 provides for more requirements.

- BM No. 1678, Petition for Leave to Resume the Practice of

Law, Benjamin M. Dacanay, December 17, 2007- Dual
citizens may practice law in the Philippines by leave of the
Supreme Court and upon compliance with the requirements,
which will restore their good standing as members of the
Philippine Bar.

- Effective nationality principle (Nottebohm case)- The

Nottebohm case cited by the petitioner invoked the
international law principle of effective nationality which is
clearly not applicable to the case at bar. This principle is
expressed in Article 5 of the Hague Convention of 1930 on
the Conflict of Nationality Laws as follows: Art. 5. Within a

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 third State a person having more than one nationality shall be
treated as if he had only one. Without prejudice to the
application of its law in matters of personal status and of any
convention in force, a third State shall, of the nationalities
which any such person possesses, recognize exclusively in its
territory either the nationality of the country in which he is
habitually and principally resident or the nationality of the
country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in
fact most closely connected. Nottebohm was a German by
birth but a resident of Guatemala for 34 years when he
applied for and acquired naturalization in Liechtenstein one
month before the outbreak of World War II. Many members
of his family and his business interests were in Germany. In
1943, Guatemala, which had declared war on Germany,
arrested Nottebohm and confiscated all his properties on the
ground that he was a German national. Liechtenstein
thereupon filed suit on his behalf, as its citizen, against
Guatemala. The International Court of Justice held
Nottebohm to be still a national of Germany, with which he
was more closely connected than with Liechtenstein.

*Read: Frivaldo vs. COMELEC, GR No. 87193, June 23,

1989

- AASJS, Calilung vs. Datumanong, GR No. 160869, May 11,

2007- It is clear that the intent of the legislature in drafting Rep.
Act No. 9225 is to do away with the provision in Commonwealth
Act No. 63 which takes away Philippine citizenship from natural-
born Filipinos who become naturalized citizens of other countries.
What Rep. Act No. 9225 does is allow dual citizenship to
natural-born Filipino citizens who have lost Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country. On its face, it does not recognize dual allegiance. By
swearing to the supreme authority of the Republic, the person
implicitly renounces his foreign citizenship. Plainly, from Section
3, Rep. Act No. 9225 stayed clear out of the problem of dual
allegiance and shifted the burden of confronting the issue of
whether or not there is dual allegiance to the concerned foreign
country. What happens to the other citizenship was not made a
concern of Rep. Act No. 9225. xxx To begin with, Section 5,
Article IV of the Constitution is a declaration of a policy and it is
not a self-executing provision. The legislature still has to enact the
law on dual allegiance. In Sections 2 and 3 of Rep. Act No. 9225,
the framers were not concerned with dual citizenship per se, but
with the status of naturalized citizens who maintain their allegiance
to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Congress
was given a mandate to draft a law that would set specific
parameters of what really constitutes dual allegiance. Until this
is done, it would be premature for the judicial department,

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 including the Supreme Court, to rule on issues pertaining to
dual allegiance.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 148; Velez vs. Poe and
Fornier vs. COMELEC, March 3, 2004- Under the Philippine
Bill of 1902, a “citizen of the Philippines” was one who was an
inhabitant of the Philippines, and a Spanish subject on the 11th day
of April 1899. The term “inhabitant” was taken to include 1) a
native-born inhabitant, 2) an inhabitant who was a native of
Peninsular Spain, and 3) an inhabitant who obtained Spanish
papers on or before 11 April 1899. Whether or not respondent
FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether
or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself
been a Filipino citizen and, in the affirmative, whether or not the
alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after
the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on
the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from
the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo
would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the
Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos,
Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the
absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of
residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have
benefited from the “en masse Filipinization” that the Philippine
Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if
acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of
respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime
respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all
persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether
such children are legitimate or illegitimate.

- As Section 3, Article IV of the 1935 Constitution does not

distinguish between legitimate child and illegitimate child of a
Filipino father, we should not make a distinction. The civil
status of legitimacy or illegitimacy, by itself, is not
determinative of the Philippine citizenship.

- Moy Ya Lim Yao vs. Commissioner Immigration, 41 SCRA

292- When citizenship is raised as an issue in judicial or
administrative proceedings, the resolution or decision thereon is
generally not considered as res judicata in any subsequent
proceeding challenging the same.

- Burca vs. Republic, 51 SCRA 248- EXCEPTIONS (to res

judicata principle) 1.) a person’s citizenship be raised as a material
issue in a controversy where the person is a party; 2.) the Solicitor
General or his authorized representative took active part in the
resolution thereof; and 3.) the finding on citizenship is affirmed by
the Supreme Court.

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- Administrative Naturalization (R.A. No. 9139) – grants
Philippine citizenship by administrative proceedings to aliens born
and residing in the Philippines. They have the choice to apply for
judicial or administrative naturalization, subject to the prescribed
qualifications and disqualifications.

- Kilosbayan vs. Ermita, GR No. 177721, July 3, 2007 . The

alleged subsequent recognition of his natural-born status by
the Bureau of Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the
final decision of the trial court stating that respondent Ong
and his mother were naturalized along with his father.

- JOCELYN SY LIMKAICHONG VS. COMELEC, G.R. No.

179120, April 1, 2009- Clearly, under the law and jurisprudence, it
is the - State, through its representatives designated by statute, that
may question the illegally or invalidly procured certificate of
naturalization proceedings. It is not a matter that maybe raised by
private persons in an election case involving the naturalized
citizen’s descendant.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino

citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes an abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The “green card” status in the USA is a renunciation
on one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.

ARTICLE V
(SUFFRAGE)

- The right of suffrage is not absolute. The exercise of the right is

subject to existing substantive and procedural requirements
embodied in our Constitution, statute books and other repositories
of law.

- The right of citizen to vote is necessarily conditioned upon

certain procedural requirements he must undergo, among others
the process of registration under RA 8189 (Voter’s Registration
Act of 1996).

- Kabataan Party-list, et al., v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 221318, December 16, 2015, En Banc (Perlas-Bernabe)-
“With these considerations in mind, petitioners’ claim that
biometrics validation imposed under RA 10367, and implemented
under COMELEC Resolution Nos. 9721, 9863, 10013, must
perforce fail. To reiterate, this requirement is not a “qualification”
to the exercise of the right of suffrage, but a mere aspect of the

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 registration procedure, of which the State has the right to
reasonably regulate. It was institutionalized conformant to the
limitations of the 1987 Constitution and is a mere complement to
the Existing Voter’s Registration Act of 1996. X x x

- “Thus, unless it is shown that a registration requirement rises to the

level of a literacy, property or other substantive requirement as
contemplated by the Framers of the Constitution – that is, one
which propagates a socio-economic standard which is bereft of any
rational basis to a person’s ability to intelligently cast his vote and
to further the public good – the same cannot be struck down as
unconstitutional, as in this case.”

- Applying the Strict Scrutiny Test to RA 10367, “Petitioners assert

that biometrics validation gravely violates the Constitution,
considering that, applying the strict scrutiny test, it is not poised
with compelling reason for state regulation and hence, an
unreasonable deprivation of the right to suffrage. X x x.
“Contrary to petitioners’ assertion, the regulation passes the
strict scrutiny test.” “In terms of judicial review of statutes or
ordinances, strict scrutiny refers to the standard for determining the
quality and the amount of governmental interest brought to justify
the regulation of fundamental freedoms. Strict scrutiny is used
today to test the validity of laws dealing with the regulation of
speech, gender, or race as well as other fundamental rights as
expansion from its earlier applications to equal protection. X x x
the United States Supreme Court has expanded the scope of
scrutiny to protect fundamental rights such as suffrage, judicial
access, and interstate travel.

- “Applying strict scrutiny, the focus is on the presence of

compelling, rather than substantial, governmental interest and on
the absence of less restrictive means for achieving that interest, and
the burden befalls upon the State to prove the same.

- “In this case, respondents have shown that the biometrics

validation requirement under RA 10367 advances a compelling
state interest. It was precisely designed to facilitate the conduct of
orderly, honest, and credible elections by containing – if not
eliminating, the perennial problem of having flying voters, as well
as dead and multiple registrants. X x x the objective of the law
was to cleanse the national voter registry so as to eliminate
electoral fraud and ensure that the results of the elections were
truly reflective of the genuine will of the people. The foregoing
consideration is unquestionably a compelling state interest.

- “Also, it was shown that the regulation is the least restrictive

means for achieving the above-said interest. Section 6 of
Resolution 9721 sets the procedure for biometrics validation x x x.

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 It is, in effect, a manner of updating one’s registration for those
already registered under RA 8189, or a first-time registration for
new registrants. The re-registration process is amply justified by
the fact that the government is adopting a novel technology like
biometrics in order to address the bane of electoral fraud that has
enduringly plagued the electoral exercises in this country. While
registrants may be inconvenienced by waiting in long lines or by
not being accommodated on certain days due to heavy volume of
work, these are typical burdens of voting that are remedied by
bureaucratic improvements to be implemented by the COMELEC
as an administrative institution. By and large, the COMELEC has
not turned a blind eye to these realities. It has tried to account for
the exigencies x x x.

- “That being said, the assailed regulation on the right to suffrage

was sufficiently justified as it was indeed narrowly tailored to
achieve the compelling state interest of establishing a clean,
complete, permanent and updated list of voters, and was
demonstrably the least restrictive means in promoting that
interest.

- Makalintal vs. COMELEC, July 10, 2003- The interpretation of

residence is synonymous to domicile. An absentee remains
attached to his residence in the Philippines, as residence is
considered synonymous with domicile. Domicile means an
individual’s permanent home or a place to which, whenever absent
for business or for pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on
facts and circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent.

- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC- Three basic rules on domicile:

1) a man must have a residence or domicile somewhere; (2)
domicile, once established, remains until a new one is validly
acquired; (3) a man can have but one residence or domicile at any
given time.

- Absentee voting – under Section 2 of RA 9189 – is an exception

to the six-month/one-year residency requirement.

- Lewis vs. COMELEC, August 4, 2006- There is no provision in

the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 - requiring "duals" to
actually establish residence and physically stay in the
Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On
the contrary, R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that “duals”
are most likely non-residents, grants under its Section 5(1) the
same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee voter under
R.A. 9189 (election for president, v-pres., senators). It cannot be
overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence, to enfranchise
as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the

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 residency requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under
ordinary conditions, are qualified to vote.

- Residence is equated with domicile. In election law, residence is

synonymous to “domicile,” not necessarily with a person’s home
address. A man may have several places of residence but has only
one domicile. Or he may be a nomad or travelling salesman with
no permanent home. Nonetheless, the law recognizes one domicile
for him.

- There are three kinds of domicile: 1) domicile of origin—that is,

a child follows the domicile of the parents; 2) domicile by
operation of law; and 3) domicile of choice made freely by a
person of legal age.

- Domicile of choice “imports not only the intention to reside in one

fixed place but also personal presence in that place, coupled with
conduct indicative of such intention. Domicile denotes a fixed
permanent residence to which, when absent for business or
pleasure or for like reasons, one intends to return.” Makalintal vs.
COMELEC, July 10, 2003. In short, domicile of choice is a
question of fact. One intends to return, and depends on facts and
circumstances in the sense that they disclose intent (animus
revertendi).

- Settled jurisprudence recognizes three rules to determine a

person’s domicile: First, everyone must always have one of the
three kinds of domicile; second, once established, a domicile
remains the same until a new one is acquired; and third, a person
can have only one domicile at any given time.

- Llamanzares vs. COMELEC- There are three requisites to

acquire a new domicile: 1. Residence or bodily presence in a new
locality; 2. an intention to remain there; and 3. an intention to
abandon the old domicile. To successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must demonstrate an actual removal or an actual
change of domicile; a bona fide intention of abandoning the former
place of residence and establishing a new one and definite acts
which correspond with the purpose. In other words, there must
basically be animus manendi coupled with animus non revertendi.
The purpose to remain in or at the domicile of choice must be for
an indefinite period of time; the change of residence must be
voluntary; and the residence at the place chosen for the new
domicile must be actual.

- Applied to Poe. As a foundling found in Jaro, Iloilo, she acquired

the domicile (and citizenship) of her parents who, according to
“generally-accepted principles of law,” are presumed to be
Filipinos. So, her domicile of origin is Jaro, Iloilo. After she

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 married an American and moved to and worked in the United
States, she lost her domicile of origin and followed the domicile of
her husband in America. When she and her husband moved back
for good here after the death of Fernando Poe Jr., she acquired a
new domicile of choice in the Philippines. As to when she
acquired it depends, on her clear intention, conduct and
physical presence in the new location.

- In Marcos vs Comelec (Sept. 18, 1995), the Supreme Court held

that “the fact of residence, not a statement in a certificate of
candidacy, [is] decisive in determining whether or not an
individual has satisfied the Constitution’s residence qualification
requirement.” The Supreme Court said that Mrs. Imelda Marcos
made an honest mistake in writing “seven months residence” in her
certificate of candidacy for a congressional seat, a period less than
the constitutional requirement of “not less than one year” for that
position.

- Recent jurisprudence. Cordora vs Comelec (Feb. 19, 2009) held

that residency is not dependent on citizenship because even a
foreigner can establish a Philippine domicile.

- More clearly, Japson vs Comelec (Jan. 19, 2009) ruled that a

former Filipino who was naturalized abroad may choose to
reestablish his/her domicile here even prior to the reacquisition of
citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law.

- Said the Supreme Court: “[I]n order to acquire a new domicile

by choice, there must concur: 1) residence or bodily presence
in the new locality, 2) an intention to remain there, and 3) an
intention to abandon the old domicile. “The purpose to remain in
or at the domicile of choice must be for an indefinite period of
time; the change of residence must be voluntary; and the residence
at the place chosen for the new domicile must be actual.”

- Moreover, Jalosjos vs Comelec (Oct. 19, 2010) ruled that the

abandonment of a home in Australia, renunciation of Australian
citizenship, reacquisition of Philippine citizenship and settling
down in Zamboanga Sibugay show an “intent to change domicile
for good.”

- Maquiling vs Comelec (April 16, 2013) clarified, though, that the

use of an American passport after a renunciation of American
citizenship effectively reverses such renunciation and disqualifies
one who reacquired citizenship under the Dual Citizenship Law
from being elected to a public office.

- (References: Columns of Fr. J.Bernas and Justice A. Panganiban)

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- Ugdoracion, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 552 SCRA 231- A Filipino
citizen’s acquisition of permanent resident status abroad
constitutes abandonment of his domicile and residence in the
Philippines. The green card status in the USA is a renunciation of
one’s status as a resident of the Philippines.

- But: Q. Does reacquisition of Filipino citizenship under RA

9225 have the effect of restoring his Philippine domicile?

- A. No. To reacquire domicile, he must provide proof of intent to

stay in the Philippines. After he does that, his occasional absence
from the recovered domicile does not have the effect of removing
him from the domicile for as long as he manifests animus manendi
et revertendi (Japzon vs. Ty, January 19, 2009)

ARTICLE VI
(LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT)

- Non-Delegation of legislative power ( Abakada Guro Party List

vs. Executive Secretary, September 1, 2005; Epira case-Gerochi
vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007).

- Permissible delegation:
1. tariff powers of the President (Sec. 28 (2) Art. VI)
2. emergency power of the President (Sec. 23 (2) of Art. VI
3. people (Sec. 32 of Art. VI; Sec. 10 of Art. X, Sec. 2 of
Art. XVII; RA 6735)
4. local governments (Art X)
5. administrative bodies (power of subordinate legislation

- Tests of valid delegation:

- 1. completeness test * Gerochi vs. DOE, July 17, 2007
2. sufficient standard *Santiago vs. COMELEC, 3/19/97;
Abakada Guro Party List vs. Exec. Sec.

- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr. et al. vs. The Secretary of Justice,

GR No. 203335, February 11, 2014- In order to determine
whether there is undue delegation of legislative power, the
Court has adopted two tests: the completeness test and the
sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the
legislature such that when it reaches the delegate, the only
thing to do is to enforce it. The second test mandates adequate
guidelines or limitations in the law to prevent the delegation
from running riot.

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- Garcia vs, Drilon, GR No. 179267, June 25, 2013- the
issuance of Barangay Protection Order by the Barangay
officials is purely executive in nature, consistent with his
duty under the LGC to enforce all laws and ordinances and to
maintain public order in the barangay.

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, G. R. No. 178413, March 13,

2008- in elections for President, V-President, Senators and
Members of the House of Representatives, the general rule
still is that pre-proclamation cases on matters relating to the
preparation, transmission, receipt, custody and appreciation of
election returns or certificates of canvass are prohibited. As
with other general rules, there are recognized exceptions to he
prohibition namely: (1) correction of manifest errors; (2)
questions affecting the composition of proceeding of the
board of canvassers; and (3) determination of the authenticity
and the due execution of certificates of canvass as provided in
Section 30 of RA 7166, as amended by RA No. 9369.

- Non delegation of legislative power

- Gerochi vs. DOE, GR. No. 159796, July 17, 2007 - Under
the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and
conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it
reaches the delegate, the only thing he will have to do is to
enforce it. The second test mandates adequate guidelines or
limitations in the law to determine the boundaries of the
delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. The Court finds that the EPIRA, read and appreciated in
its entirety, in relation to Sec. 34 thereof, is complete in all its
essential terms and conditions, and that it contains sufficient
standards. xxx In the past, accepted as sufficient standards the
following: "interest of law and order;" "adequate and efficient
instruction;" "public interest;" "justice and equity;" "public
convenience and welfare;" "simplicity, economy and
efficiency;" "standardization and regulation of medical
education;" and "fair and equitable employment practices."
Provisions of the EPIRA such as, among others, “to ensure
the total electrification of the country and the quality,
reliability, security and affordability of the supply of electric
power” and “watershed rehabilitation and management” meet
the requirements for valid delegation, as they provide the
limitations on the ERC’s power to formulate the IRR. These
are sufficient standards.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice- Being a mere

constituent unit of the Department of Justice, the Bureau of
Corrections could not promulgate a manual that would not
bear the imprimatur of the administrative superior, the

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 Secretary of Justice as the rule making authority under RA
No. 8177.

- EASTERN SHIPPING LINES V. POEA, 166 SCRA 533-

Power of Subordinate Legislation – with this power,
administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid
down in a statute by “filling” the details which Congress may
not have the opportunity or competence to provide. This is
effected by their promulgation of what are known as
supplementary regulations, such as the implementing rules
issued by DOLE on the new Labor Code. These regulations
have the force and effect of law.

- ABAKADA GURO PARTY LIST vs. EXECUTIVE

SECRETARY, September 1, 2005- No undue delegation of
legislative power. It is simply a delegation of ascertainment
of facts upon which enforcement and administration of the
increase rate under the law is contingent. The legislature has
made the operation of the 12% rate effective January 1, 2006,
contingent upon a specified fact or condition. It leaves the
entire operation or non-operation of the 12% rate upon factual
matters outside of the control of the executive.

- Congress did not delegate the power to tax to the

President.- The intent and will to increase the VAT rate to
12% came from Congress and the task of the President is
simply to execute the legislative policy.

- Abakada Guro vs. Purisima, 562 SCRA 251- The

requirement that the implementing rules of a law be subjected
to approval by Congress as a condition for their effectivity
violates the cardinal constitutional principles of bicameralism
and the rule of presentment. A valid exercise of legislative
power requires the act of both chambers. It can be exercised
neither solely by one of the two chambers nor by a committee
of either or both chambers.

- The President’s Ordinance Power is the Executive’s rule-

making authority in implementing and executing
constitutional or statutory powers. Indisputably, there are
constitutional powers vested in the Executive that are self-
executory.

- Secretary of Finance, et al. vs. La Suerte Cigar, GR No.

166498, June 11, 2009- Unless expressly granted to the BIR,
the power to reclassify cigarette brands remains a prerogative
of the Legislature which cannot be usurped by the former.

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- Review Center Assos. of the Philippines vs. Ermita, GR
No. 180046, April 2, 2009- The President has no inherent or
delegated legislative power to amend the functions of the
CHED under RA 7722.

- SEMA VS. COMELEC, G. R. No. 177597, July 16, 2008-

Congress cannot validly delegate to the ARMM Regional
Assembly the power to create legislative districts. The power
to increase the allowable membership in the House of
Representatives and to reapportion legislative districts is
vested exclusively in Congress.

- PARTY-LIST SYSTEM- BA-RA 7941 vs. COMELEC, GR No.

1777271, May 4, 2007- No national security or like concerns is
involved in the disclosure of the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups in question. Doubtless, the Comelec committed
grave abuse of discretion in refusing the legitimate demands of the
petitioners for a list of the nominees of the party-list groups subject
of their respective petitions. Mandamus, therefore, lies. xxx The
last sentence of Section 7 of R.A. 7941 reading: “[T]he names of
the party-list nominees shall not be shown on the certified list” is
certainly not a justifying card for the Comelec to deny the
requested disclosure. To us, the prohibition imposed on the
Comelec under said Section 7 is limited in scope and duration,
meaning, that it extends only to the certified list which the same
provision requires to be posted in the polling places on election
day. To stretch the coverage of the prohibition to the absolute is to
read into the law something that is not intended. As it were, there
is absolutely nothing in R.A. No. 7941 that prohibits the Comelec
from disclosing or even publishing through mediums other than the
“Certified List” the names of the party-list nominees. The Comelec
obviously misread the limited non-disclosure aspect of the
provision as an absolute bar to public disclosure before the May
2007 elections. The interpretation thus given by the Comelec
virtually tacks an unconstitutional dimension on the last sentence
of Section 7 of R.A. No. 7941. xxx Comelec has a constitutional
duty to disclose and release the names of the nominees of the
party-list groups

- Veterans Federation Party vs. COMELEC, 342 SCRA 244,

October 6, 2000; Partido Ng Manggagawa vs. COMELEC,
March 15, 2006 – Section VI 5(2) of Article of the Constitution is
not mandatory. It merely provides a ceiling for the party-list seats
in the House of Representatives. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Constitution and RA 7941 mandate at least 4 inviolable
parameters: (1) the 20% allocation: the combined number of all
party-list congressmen shall not exceed 20% of the total

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 membership of the House of Representatives; (2) the 2% threshold:
only those parties garnering a minimum of 2% of the total votes
cast for the party list system are qualified to a have a seat in the
House; (3) the three seat limit: each qualified party, regardless of
the number of votes it actually obtained, is entitled to a maximum
of three seats, i.e., one qualifying and two additional; and (4)
proportional representation: the additional seats which a qualified
party is entitled to shall be computed “in proportion to their total
number of votes”.

- BANAT vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 179271, April 21, 2009- 2%

threshold in relation to the distribution of additional seats as found
in the second clause of Section 11(b) of R.A. No. 7941 is declared
unconstitutional. The two percent threshold presents an
unwarranted obstacle to the full implementation of Section 5(2),
Article VI of the Constitution and prevents the attainment of “the
broadest possible representation of party, sectoral or group
interests in the House of Representatives.

- In determining the allocation of seats for party-list representatives

under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7941, the following procedure shall
be observed:

- (1) The parties, organizations, and coalitions shall be ranked from

the highest to the lowest based on the number of votes they
garnered during the elections. (2)The parties, organizations, and
coalitions receiving at least two percent (2%) of the total votes cast
for the party-list system shall be entitled to one guaranteed seat
each. (3) Those garnering sufficient number of votes, according to
the ranking in paragraph 1, shall be entitled to additional seats in
proportion to their total number of votes until all the additional
seats are allocated. (4) Each party, organization, or coalition shall
be entitled to not more than three (3) seats.

- In computing the additional seats, the guaranteed seats shall

no longer be included because they have already been
allocated, at one seat each, to every two-percenter. Thus, the
remaining available seats for allocation as “additional seats” are
the maximum seats reserved under the Party List System less the
guaranteed seats. Fractional seats are disregarded in the absence of
a provision in R.A. No. 7941 allowing for a rounding off of
fractional seats.

- In declaring the two percent threshold unconstitutional, we do not

limit our allocation of additional seats in Table 3 below to the two-
percenters. The percentage of votes garnered by each party-list
candidate is arrived at by dividing the number of votes
garnered by each party by 15,950,900, the total number of
votes cast for party-list candidates. There are two steps in the

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 second round of seat allocation. First, the percentage is
multiplied by the remaining available seats, 38, which is the
difference between the 55 maximum seats reserved under the
Party-List System and the 17 guaranteed seats of the two-
percenters. The whole integer of the product of the percentage
and of the remaining available seats corresponds to a party’s share
in the remaining available seats. Second, we assign one party-list
seat to each of the parties next in rank until all available seats
are completely distributed. We distributed all of the remaining
38 seats in the second round of seat allocation. Finally, we apply
the three-seat cap to determine the number of seats each qualified
party-list candidate is entitled.

- Participation of Major Political Parties in Party-List Elections:

The Constitutional Commission adopted a multi-party system that
allowed all political parties to participate in the party-list
elections.

- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 prohibits major

political parties from participating in the party-list system. On the
contrary, the framers of the Constitution clearly intended the
major political parties to participate in party-list elections
through their sectoral wings. In fact, the members of the
Constitutional Commission voted down, 19-22, any permanent
sectoral seats, and in the alternative the reservation of the party-list
system to the sectoral groups. In defining a “party” that
participates in party-list elections as either “a political party or a
sectoral party,” R.A. No. 7941 also clearly intended that major
political parties will participate in the party-list elections.
Excluding the major political parties in party-list elections is
manifestly against the Constitution, the intent of the Constitutional
Commission, and R.A. No. 7941. This Court cannot engage in
socio-political engineering and judicially legislate the exclusion of
major political parties from the party-list elections in patent
violation of the Constitution and the law.

- Read together, R.A. No. 7941 and the deliberations of the

Constitutional Commission state that major political parties are
allowed to establish, or form coalitions with, sectoral
organizations for electoral or political purposes. There should
not be a problem if, for example, the Liberal Party participates in
the party-list election through the Kabataang Liberal ng Pilipinas
(KALIPI), its sectoral youth wing. The other major political
parties can thus organize, or affiliate with, their chosen sector
or sectors. To further illustrate, the Nacionalista Party can
establish a fisherfolk wing to participate in the party-list
election, and this fisherfolk wing can field its fisherfolk
nominees. Kabalikat ng Malayang Pilipino (KAMPI) can do
the same for the urban poor.

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- Neither the Constitution nor R.A. No. 7941 mandates the
filling-up of the entire 20% allocation of party-list
representatives found in the Constitution. The Constitution, in
paragraph 1, Section 5 of Article VI, left the determination of the
number of the members of the House of Representatives to
Congress: “The House of Representatives shall be composed of
not more than two hundred and fifty members, unless otherwise
fixed by law, x x x.” The 20% allocation of party-list
representatives is merely a ceiling; party-list representatives
cannot be more than 20% of the members of the House of
Representatives. However, we cannot allow the continued
existence of a provision in the law which will systematically
prevent the constitutionally allocated 20% party-list representatives
from being filled. The three-seat cap, as a limitation to the number
of seats that a qualified party-list organization may occupy,
remains a valid statutory device that prevents any party from
dominating the party-list elections. Seats for party-list
representatives shall thus be allocated in accordance with the
procedure used in Table 3 above.

- However, by a vote of 8-7, the Court decided to continue the ruling

in Veterans disallowing major political parties from participating
in the party-list elections, directly or indirectly.

- ATONG PAGLAUM, INC. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 203646,

April 2, 2013- In determining who may participate in the coming
13 May 2013 and subsequent party-list elections, the COMELEC
shall adhere to the following parameters:

- 1. Three different groups may participate in the party-list system:

(1) national parties or organizations, (2) regional parties or
organizations, and (3) sectoral parties or organizations.

- 2. National parties or organizations and regional parties or

organizations do not need to organize along sectoral lines and do
not need to represent any “marginalized and underrepresented”
sector.

- 3. Political parties can participate in party-list elections provided

they register under the party-list system and do not field candidates
in legislative district elections. A political party, whether major or
not, that fields candidates in legislative district elections can
participate in party list elections only through its sectoral wing that
can separately register under the party-list system. The sectoral
wing is by itself an independent sectoral party, and is linked to a
political party through a coalition.

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- 4. Sectoral parties or organizations may either be “marginalized
and underrepresented” or lacking in “well-defined political
constituencies.” It is enough that their principal advocacy pertains
to the special interest and concerns of their sector. The sectors that
are “marginalized and underrepresented” include labor, peasant,
fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,
handicapped, veterans, and overseas workers. The sectors that lack
“well-defined political constituencies” include professionals, the
elderly, women, and the youth.

- 5. A majority of the members of sectoral parties or organizations

that represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” must
belong to the “marginalized and underrepresented” sector they
represent. Similarly, a majority of the members of sectoral parties
or organizations that lack “well-defined political constituencies”
must belong to the sector they represent. The nominees of sectoral
parties or organizations that represent the “marginalized and
underrepresented,” or that represent those who lack “well-defined
political constituencies,” either must belong to their respective
sectors, or must have a track record of advocacy for their
respective sectors. The nominees of national and regional parties or
organizations must be bona-fide members of such parties or
organizations.

- 6. National, regional, and sectoral parties or organizations shall not

be disqualified if some of their nominees are disqualified, provided
that they have at least one nominee who remains qualified.

- The COMELEC excluded from participating in the 13 May 2013

partylist elections those that did not satisfy these two criteria: (1)
all national, regional, and sectoral groups or organizations must
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented” sectors, and (2)
all nominees must belong to the “marginalized and
underrepresented” sector they represent. Petitioners may have been
disqualified by the COMELEC because as political or regional
parties they are not organized along sectoral lines and do not
represent the “marginalized and underrepresented.” Also,
petitioners' nominees who do not belong to the sectors they
represent may have been disqualified, although they may have a
track record of advocacy for their sectors. Likewise, nominees of
non-sectoral parties may have been disqualified because they do
not belong to any sector. Moreover, a party may have been
disqualified because one or more of its nominees failed to qualify,
even if the party has at least one remaining qualified nominee. As
discussed above, the disqualification of petitioners, and their
nominees, under such circumstances is contrary to the 1987
Constitution and R.A. No. 7941.

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- Ang Bagong Bayani – OFW Labor Party v. COMELEC- The
religious sector is expressly prohibited from participating in
party-list elections (Sec. 5, 2nd par., Art. VI, 1987 Constitution).
Religious denominations and sects are even prohibited from being
registered as political parties in the COMELEC (Sec. 2, par. 5, Art.
IX-C, 1987 Constitution).

- However, the Supreme Court clarified, based on the intent of the

framers of the 1987 Constitution, that what is prohibited is the
registration of a religious sect as a political party; there is no
prohibition against a priest running as a candidate.

- Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010- The act of the
COMELEC of not allowing the registration of Ang Ladlad-LGBT
Party as a political party to participate in party-list elections on the
ground that its members are “immoral,” citing verses from the
Bible and the Koran, is tainted with grave abuse of discretion as it
violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion and,
therefore, should be nullified. Under this non-establishment clause
of freedom of religion, the COMELEC, as an agency of the
government, is not supposed to use religious standards in its
decisions and actions.

- Aquino vs. COMELEC, GR No. 189793, April 7, 2010- There is

no specific provision in the Constitution that fixes 250,000
minimum population that must compose legislative district. For
while a province is entitled to at least a representative with nothing
mentioned about a population, a city must first meet a population
minimum of 250,000 in order to be similarly situated.

- Aldaba, et al. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188078, January 25,

2010- In this case, there is no official record that the population of
the City of Malolos will be at least 250,000, actual or projected
prior to the May 2010 elections. Thus, the City of Malolos is not
qualified to have a legislation district of its own under Section
5(3), Art. VI of the Constitution.

- Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC, GR No. 190582, April

8, 2010 - that Ang Ladlad, an organization composed of men and
women who identify themselves as lesbians, gays, bisexuals, or
trans-gendered individuals (LGBTs), has satisfied the exacting
standards that the “marginalized and underrepresented sector must
demonstrate (1) past subordination or discrimination suffered by
the group; (2) an immutable or distinguishing characteristic,
attribute, or experience that define them as a discrete group; and
(3) present political and/or economic powerlessness.”

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- The Court said that Ang Ladlad has shown “that the LGBT sector
has been historically disadvantaged and discriminated against
because of negative public perception, and has even alleged acts of
violence perpetrated against members of the LGBT community by
reason of their sexual orientation and gender identity.” It added
that the magnitude of opposition against petitioner’s participation
in the party list system is, by itself, demonstrative of the sector’s
lack of political power; so, too, is the fact that proposed
legislations seeking to prohibit discriminatory treatment against
LGBTs have been languishing in Congress.

- LEGISLATIVE PERKS – (PP vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA

689) – The history of the provision granting Senators and
Congressmen immunity from arrest and detention shows
that the privilege has always been granted in a restrictive
sense.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, June 27, 2008- presumption of

innocence does not necessarily carry with it the full
enjoyment of civil and politicsl rights.

- Trillanes vs. Marigomen, G.R. No. 179817, March 14,

2018- Parliamentary non-accountability cannot be invoked
when the lawmaker's speech or utterance is made outside
sessions, hearings or debates in Congress, extraneous to the
"due functioning of the (legislative) process." To participate
in or respond to media interviews is not an official function of
any lawmaker; it is not demanded by his sworn duty nor is it a
component of the process of enacting laws. Indeed, a
lawmaker may well be able to discharge his duties and
legislate without having to communicate with the press. A
lawmaker's participation in media interviews is not a
legislative act, but is "political in nature," outside the ambit
of the immunity conferred under the Speech or Debate Clause
in the 1987 Constitution. Contrary to petitioner's stance,
therefore, he cannot invoke parliamentary immunity to cause
the dismissal of private respondent's Complaint. The privilege
arises not because the statement is made by a lawmaker, but
because it is uttered in furtherance of legislation.

- Parliamentary immunity guarantees the legislator complete

freedom of expression without fear of being made responsible
in criminal or civil actions before the courts or any other
forum outside of the Congressional Hall. However, it does not
protect him from responsibility before the legislative body
itself whenever his words and conduct are considered by the
latter disorderly or unbecoming of a member thereof (Osmeña
vs. Pendatun).

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- Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009- Richard
Gordon did not relinquish his Senatorial post despite his
election to and acceptance of the post Chairman of the
Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of Governors.
PNRC is a “private organization merely performing public
functions”, and that the “PNRC Chairman is not a
government official or employee.” Not being a government
office, the PNRC Chairmanship may be held by any
individual, including a Senator or Member of the House of
Congress. NRC is “autonomous, neutral and independent” of
the Philippine Government. It is a voluntary organization that
“does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress”. The PNRC is
not a part of any of the government branches. PNRC
Chairmanship is not a government office or an office in a
GOCC for purposes of the prohibition in the 1987
Constitution.” Senator Gordon can validly serve as the
Chairman of the PNRC without giving up his senatorial
position.

Avelino vs. Cruz- When the constitution declares that a

majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, it does not
mean all the members. The base in computing majority is
normally the total membership of the body, within the
coercive power of the House.

Santiago vs. Guingona (298 SCRA 756)- The term majority

simply means the greater number or more than half. Who
shall sit as officers is the sole prerogative of the Senate.
(Note: splitting of term between Senate President Drilon and
another Senator). When the Constitution provides that the
Senate President shall be elected by the majority it does
not delineate who comprises the majority or the minority.
The defeated senator (s) in the election for the Senate
presidency are not necessarily the minority.

- RULES OF PROCEEDINGS- Arroyo vs. De Venecia,

277 SCRA 268- Courts cannot inquire into the allegations
that in enacting a law, a House of Congress failed to comply
with its own rules in the absence of showing that there was
violation of a constitutional provision or private rights.
Parliamentary rules are mere procedures which may be
waived or disregarded by the legislative body.

- Baguilat vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 227757, July 25, 2017-

Under Section 16 of Article VI, the Speaker of the House of
Representatives shall be elected by a majority vote of its
entire membership. Said provision also states that the House

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 of Representatives may decide to have officers other than the
Speaker, and that the method and manner as to how these
officers are chosen is something within its sole control. In the
case of Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, which involved a
dispute on the rightful Senate Minority Leader during the
11th Congress (1998-2001), the Supreme Court observed that
"[w]hile the Constitution is explicit on the manner of electing
x x x [a Speaker of the House of Representative,] it is,
however, dead silent on the manner of selecting the other
officers [of the Lower House]. All that the Charter says is that
'[e]ach House shall choose such other officers as it may deem
necessary.' [As such], the method of choosing who will be
such other officers is merely a derivative of the exercise of
the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Therefore, such method must be
prescribed by the [House of Representatives] itself, not by
[the] Court."

- Corollary thereto, Section 16 (3), Article VI of the

Constitution vests in the House of Representatives the sole
authority to, inter alia, "determine the rules of its
proceedings." These "legislative rules, unlike statutory laws,
do not have the imprints of permanence and obligatoriness
during their effectivity. In fact, they 'are subject to revocation,
modification or waiver at the pleasure of the body adopting
them.' Being merely matters of procedure, their observance
are of no concern to the courts, for said rules may be waived
or disregarded by the legislative body at will, upon the
concurrence of a majority [of the House of Representatives]."
Hence, as a general rule, "[t]his Court has no authority to
interfere and unilaterally intrude into that exclusive realm,
without running afoul of [C]onstitutional principles that it is
bound to protect and uphold x x x. Constitutional respect and
a becoming regard for the sovereign acts of a coequal branch
prevents the Court from prying into the internal workings of
the [House of Representatives]."

- DISCIPLINING MEMBERS- Osmeña vs Pendatun, The

House of Representatives is the judge of what constitutes
disorderly behavior. The courts will not assume jurisdiction in
any case which will amount to an interference by the judicial
department with the legislature.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689- His election as

congressman did not thereby amount to a condonation of his
offense; neither does it entitle him, pending appeal of his
case, to be free from confinement and to be allowed to attend
sessions of congress, for the people elected him with full

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 awareness of the limitations on his freedom of action and
movement.

- It was never the intention of the framers of the constitution to

shield a member of congress from the consequences of his
wrongdoings. A member of Congress could only invoke the
immunity from arrests for relatively minor offenses,
punishable at most by correctional penalties.

- Paredes vs. Sandiganbayan- suspension imposed by

Congress to a colleague is distinct from suspension spoken in
Section 13 of RA 3019 which is not a penalty but a
preliminary preventive measure, prescinding from the fact
that the latter is not being imposed for misbehavior as a
member of Congress.

- ELECTORAL TRIBUNALS- Vera vs. Avelino- The

members of the Senate validly suspended the oath-taking of
the 3 senators elect. This does not fall within the powers of
the electoral tribunal. The latter has jurisdiction only over
electoral contests in which contestant seeks not only to
oust the intruder, but also have himself inducted into
office.

- Composition: The presence of the 3 justices in the HRET is

meant to tone down the political nature of the cases involved
and to do away with the impression that party interests play a
part in the decision.

- Reyes vs. HRET, October 16, 2018: Constitutionality of the

following provisions of the 2015 HRET Rules:

Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order

to constitute a quorum:

- Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices
indispensable members to constitute a quorum but ensures
that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative
departments are present to constitute a quorum.

- The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987

Constitution also provides that "[t]he senior Justice in the
Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that
only a Justice can chair the Electoral Tribunal. As such, there
should always be one member of the Tribunal who is a Justice.
If all three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the
Supreme Court will designate another Justice to chair the
Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of
the 1987 Constitution.

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- In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction
between the Justices of the Supreme Court and the members
of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-
members while there are six Legislator-members of the
HRET. Hence, there is a valid classification. The
classification is justified because it was placed to ensure the
presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative
branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is
no violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.

- The HRET states that it only has jurisdiction over a member

of the House of Representatives. To be considered a Member
of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence
of the following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a
proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Hence, the
requirement of concurrence of these three requisites is within
the power of the HRET to make.

- LIMKAICHONG vs. COMELEC; Biraogo vs. Nograles;

Paras vs. Nograles & Villando vs. COMELEC, April 1,
2009- once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken
his oath, and assumed office as member of the House of
Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over the election
contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications,
ends and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. The
proclamation of a winning candidate divests the
COMELEC of its jurisdiction over matters pending
before it at the time of the proclamation.

- RONALD F. VILLANDO vs. HRET, Limkaichong, et al. -

clearly under law and jurisprudence, it is the State thru
its reps. Designated by statute, that may question the
illegally or invalidly procured certificate of naturalization
in the appropriate denaturalization proceedings. HRET
no matter how complete and exclusive, does not carry
with it authority to delve into the legality of the judgment
of naturalization in the pursuit of disqualifying
Limkaichong. To rule otherwise would operate as a
collateral attack on the citizenship of the father which is
not permissible. (Aug. 23, 2011).

- Accordingly, after the proclamation of the winning candidates

in the congressional elections, the remedy of those who may
assail one’s eligibility or ineligibility, qualification or
disqualification is to file before the HRET a petition for an
election protest, or a petition for quo warranto, within the
period provided by the HRET Rules.

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- Codilla vs. De Venecia, GR No. 150605, December 10,
2002- Since petitioner (Codilla) seasonably filed a Motion
for Reconsideration of the Order of the Second Division
suspending the proclamation and disqualifying him, the
COMELEC en banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to
review the validity of the said Order of the 2nd Division. The
said Order was yet unenforceable as it has not attained
finality, the timely filing of the motion for reconsideration
suspends the execution. It cannot, thus, be used as the basis
for the assumption in office of the respondent (Locsin) as the
duly elected representative of the 4th District of Leyte.

- At the time of the proclamation of respondent Locsin, the

validity of the Resolution of the COMELEC 2nd Division was
seasonably challenged by the petitioner (Codilla) in his
motion for reconsideration. The issue was still within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the COMELEC en banc to resolve.
Hence, the HRET cannot assume jurisdiction over the matter.

- Barbers vs. COMELEC, June 22, 2005- The phrase

“election, returns and qualifications” should be interpreted in
its totality as referring to all matters affecting the validity of
the contestee’s title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can
say that “election” referred to the conduct of the polls,
including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes;
“returns” to the canvass of the returns and the proclamation
of the winners, including questions concerning the
composition of the board of canvassers and the authenticity of
the election returns; and “qualifications” to matters that
could be raised in a quo warranto proceeding against the
proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or
the inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

- Chavez vs. COMELEC- While the COMELEC has

exclusive jurisdiction over pre-proclamation controversies
involving local elective officials (Sec. 242, Omnibus Election
Code), nevertheless, pre-proclamation cases are not
allowed in elections for President, V-President, Senator
and Members of the House of Representatives.

What is allowed is the correction of “manifest errors” in

the certificate of canvass or election returns”. To be
manifest, the errors must appear on the face of the certificates
of canvass or election returns sought to be corrected and/or
objections thereto must have been made before the board of
canvassers and specifically noted in the minutes of their
respective proceedings.

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 Where the petition calls for the correction of manifest
errors in the certificates of canvass, COMELEC has
jurisdiction. If it calls for the re-opening and appreciation
of ballots, the Electoral Tribunal has jurisdiction.

- This Supreme Court’s jurisdiction to review decisions and

resolutions of HRET operates only upon a showing of grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the Tribunal tantamount to
lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion
implies capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic
exercise of power because of passion or personal hostility
(Angara vs. Electoral Commission; Pena vs. HRET).

- Bondoc vs. Pineda- Members of the HRET as sole judge of

congressional election contests are entitled to security of
tenure just as members of the judiciary enjoy security of
tenure under our Constitution.

- Robles vs. HRET- Jurisdiction of HRET once acquired is

not lost upon the instance of the parties but continues
until the case is terminated.

- Tañada vs. HRET, GR 217012 March 1, 2016-HRET lacks

the authority to rule whether a candidate is indeed a nuisance
candidate. xxx Under the HRET Rules, the electoral tribunal
only has jurisdiction over two types of election contests:
election protests and quo warranto cases. xxx An election
protest is the proper remedy against acts or omissions
constituting electoral frauds or anomalies in contested polling
precincts, and for the revision of ballots. xxx On the other
hand, the eligibility of a member representative is impugned
in a quo warranto case. But the HRET Rules do not
prescribe procedural guidelines on how the COC of a
political aspirant can be cancelled on the ground that he
or she is a nuisance candidate. Rather, this remedial
vehicle is instituted in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure,
particularly Rule 245 thereof, by virtue of Sec. 69 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

- xxx HRET is not vested with appellate jurisdiction over

rulings on cancellation cases promulgated by the COMELEC
en banc. It is the SC which has jurisdiction and the power to
review such rulings from the Commission. xxx The
jurisdiction of the HRET, as circumscribed under Article VI,
Section 17 of the Constitution, is limited to the election,
returns, and qualification of the members of the House of
Representatives. Thus, it cannot rule over an election protest
involving a non-member. xxx To be considered a member of

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 the Lower House, there must be a concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation, (2) a proper
oath, and (3) assumption of office.

- Abubakar vs. HRET, March 7, 2007- The Supreme Court’s

jurisdiction to review decisions and resolutions of HRET
operates only upon a showing of grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Tribunal tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Such grave abuse of discretion implies
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to
lack of jurisdiction, or arbitrary and despotic exercise of
power because of passion or personal hostility. The grave
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion or refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law. It
is absent in this case.

- Abayon vs. HRET; Palparan vs. HRET, GR 189466 &

189506, respectively, February 11, 2010- Since party-list
nominees are considered as “elected members” of the House,
the HRET has jurisdiction to hear and pass upon their
qualifications.

- Lokin, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, GR No. 193808,

June 26, 2012- RA 7941 (Party-List System Act) vested the
COMELEC with “jurisdiction over the nomination of party-
list representatives and prescribing the qualifications of each
nominee” and that no grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed to the COMELEC’s First Division and COMELEC
En Banc which had declared President Villanueva the proper
party to submit CIBAC’s Certificate of Nomination instead of
Perla, who allegedly served as acting secretary-general. As
provided in Atienza v. Commission of Elections, COMELEC
also possesses the authority to resolve intra-party disputes as
a necessary tributary of its constitutionally mandated power to
enforce election laws and register political parties. “The
power to rule upon questions of party identity and leadership
is exercised by the COMELEC as an incident to its
enforcement powers,” the Court declared

- Pimentel III vs. COMELEC, Zubiri, March 13, 2008 - It is

the SET which has exclusive jurisdiction to act on the
complaint of Pimentel involving, as it does, a contest relating
to the election of Zubiri, now a member of the Senate.

- DAZA V. SINGSON, 180 SCRA 496- The House of

Representatives is authorized to change its representation in
the Commission on Appointments to reflect at any time the
changes that may transpire in the political alignments of its
membership. The changes must be PERMANENT and do

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 not include temporary alliances or factional divisions not
involving severance of political loyalties or formal
disaffiliation and permanent shifts of allegiance from one
political party to another.

- The provision on Section 18 on proportional representation is

mandatory in character and does not leave any discretion to
the majority party in the Senate to disobey or disregard. A
political party must have at least two senators to be able to
have a representative in the Commission on Appointments, so
that any number less than 2 will not entitle such party a
membership in the CA. (Guingona v. Gonzales, 214 SCRA
789).

- Pimentel, Jr. vs. House of Representatives, 11/19/02- Even

assuming that party-list representatives comprise a sufficient
number and have agreed to designate common nominees to
the HRET and the CA, their primary recourse clearly rests
with the House of Representatives and not with this Court.
Under Sections 17 and 18, Article VI of the Constitution,
party-list representatives must first show to the House that
they possess the required numerical strength to be entitled to
seats in the HRET and the CA. Only if the House fails to
comply with the directive of the Constitution on proportional
representation of political parties in the HRET and the CA
can the party-list representatives seek recourse to this Court
under its power of judicial review. Under the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction, prior recourse to the House is necessary
before petitioners may bring the instant case to the court.
Consequently, petitioners’ direct recourse to this Court is
premature. The discretion of the House to choose its members
to the HRET and the CA is not absolute, being subject to the
mandatory constitutional rule on proportional representation.

- APPROPRIATION- it is vested in the Legislature, subject to

the requirement that appropriations bills original exclusively
in the House of Representatives with the option of the Senate
to propose or concur with amendments.

- While there may be no specific amount earmarked for

the IAD-ODESLA from the total amount appropriated
by Congress in the annual budget for the Office of the
President, the necessary funds for the IAD-ODESLA
may be properly sourced from the President's own
office budget without committing any illegal
appropriation. After all, there is no usurpation of the
legislature'ʹs power to appropriate funds when the
President simply allocates the existing funds previously
appropriated by Congress for his office (Pichay v.

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 Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary for Legal
Affairs Investigative and Adjudication Division, 667
SCRA 408).

The “Pork Barrel” System:

- Considering petitioners’ submission and in reference to its

local concept and legal history, the Court defines the Pork
Barrel System as the collective body of rules and practices
that govern the manner by which lump-sum, discretionary
funds, primarily intended for local projects, are utilized
through the respective participations of the Legislative and
Executive branches of government, including its members.
The Pork Barrel System involves two (2) kinds of lump-sum,
discretionary funds:

- First, there is the Congressional Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund wherein
legislators, either individually or collectively organized into
committees, are able to effectively control certain aspects of
the fund’s utilization through various post-enactment
measures and/or practices; and

- Second, there is the Presidential Pork Barrel which is herein

defined as a kind of lump-sum, discretionary fund which
allows the President to determine the manner of its utilization.
X x x the Court shall delimit the use of such term to refer only
to the Malampaya Funds and the Presidential Social Fund.
(Belgica v. Ochoa, G.R. No. 208566, 710 SCRA 1, 105-106,
Nov. 19, 2013, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe])

- In Philconsa, the Supreme Court upheld the authority of

individual menbers of Congress to propose and identify
priority projects because this was merely recommendatory in
nature and is also recognized that individual members of
Congress far more than the President and their congressional
colleagues were likely to be knowledgeable about the needs
of their respective constituents and the priority to be given
each project (LAMP vs. DBM Secretary, GR No. 164987,
April 24, 2012)

- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November

19, 2013- Pork barrel- commonly referred as lump-sum,
discretionary funds of the members of the Legislature,
although its usage would evolve in reference to certain funds
of the Executive. Xxx declared unconstitutional in view of
the inherent defects in the rules within which it operates.
Insofar as it has allowed legislators to wield, in varying
gradations, non-oversight, post enactment authority in vital

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 areas of budget execution, the system has violated the
principle of separation of powers; insofar as it has conferred
unto the legislators the power of appropriation by giving them
personal, discretionary funds from which they are able to fund
specific projects which they themselves determine, it has
similarly violated the principle of non-delegability of
legislative power; insofar as it has created a system of
budgeting wherein items are not textualized into the
appropriation bills, it has flouted the prescribed procedure
of presentment and, in the process denied the President
the power to veto items; insofar as it has diluted the
effectiveness of congressional oversight by giving legislators
a stake in the affairs of budget execution, an aspect of
governance which they may be called to monitor and
scrutinize, the system has equally impaired public
accountability; insofar as it has authorized legislators, who
are national officers, to intervene in affairs of purely local
nature, despite the existence of capable local institutions, it
has likewise subverted genuine local autonomy; and again
insofar as it has conferred to the President the power to
appropriate funds intended by law for energy related purposes
only to other purposes he may deem fit as well as other public
funds under the broad classification of “priority infrastructure
development projects”, it has once transgressed the
principle of non delegability.

- Belgica, et al. vs. Ochoa, et al., GR No.208566, November

19, 2013- Pork barrel

- In this recent per curiam ruling, meaning a ruling of the court

as a whole, the SC said the PDAF case clearly distinguished a
legal lump-sum from a prohibited lump-sum, and that the
2014 lump-sum funds followed the rules.

- A lump-sum fund is legal if it has singular correspondence.

- "(It means) an allocation of a specified singular amount for a

specified singular purpose, otherwise known as a line-item. This
treatment not only allows the item to be consistent with its
definition as a "specific appropriation of money" but also ensures
that the President may discernibly veto the same," said the 2013
PDAF ruling.

- Here are the reasonings of the SC why the 2014 lump-sum

funds were constitutional :

- 1. Unprogrammed Fund - "It specifically identified the public

purposes for which the fund may be used and contained singularly
corresponding purposes."

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- 2. Contingent Fund - "Its purpose was to cover the funding
requirement of new or urgent projects that need to be implemented
during the year, and the foreign travel expenses of the Office of
the President which were not and could not have been anticipated
during budget preparation and authorization. Hence, the same
cannot be itemized."

- 3. E-Government Fund- "Its nature as a cross-agency fund

required it to be subject to the determination by the administrative
agencies of the ongoing strategic information and communication
technology projects in the priority sectors identified by the
Legislature in the budget."

- 4. Local Government Support Fund - "It provided sufficient

standards which set the limits of the Executive’s authority to
disburse the LGSF, the legislative policy behind the fund, and
identified the conditions under which the fund may be utilized."

- The SC said that it applied another rule from the 2013

PDAF ruling, which said: "An appropriation may be validly
apportioned into component percentages or values; however,
it is crucial that each percentage or value must be allocated
for its own corresponding purpose for such component to be
considered as a proper line-item.”

- The Power of Augmentation- Araullo vs. Aquino, GR No.

209287, July 1, 2014- the transfer of appropriated funds, to
be valid under section 25(5), must be made upon a
concurrence of the following requisites, namely: (1) there is
law authorizing the President, the President of the Senate,
the Speaker of the HR, the Chief Justice and the heads of
the Constitutional Commissions to transfer funds within
their respective offices; (2) the funds to be transferred are
saving generated from the appropriations of their
respective offices; and (3) the purpose of the transfer is to
augment an item in the general appropriations law for
their respective offices. The following were declared
unconstitutional: 1) The withdrawal of unobligated allotments
from the implementing agencies, and the declaration of the
withdrawn unobligated allotments and unreleased
appropriations as savings prior to the end of the fiscal year
and without complying with the statutory definition of
savings contained in the GAA; 2) the cross-border transfers of
the savings of the executive to augment the appropriations of
other offices outside the Executive; 3) The use of
unprogrammed funds despite the absence of a certification by
the National Treasurer that the revenue collections exceeded

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 the revenue targets for non compliance with the conditions
provided in the relevant GAA (Araullo, MR Feb. 3, 2015).

- The Secretary of Budget shall recommend to the

President the year’s program of expenditure for each
agency of the government on the basis of authorized
appropriations. The approved expenditure program shall
constitute the basis for fund release during the fiscal
period, subject to such policies, rules and regulations
as may be approved by the President. [TECHNICAL
EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT
AUTHORITY (TESDA), v. THE COMMISSION ON
AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR;
COMMISSIONER JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND
COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN
BUENAVENTURA, G.R. No. 196418, February 10,
2015]

- Impoundment- refusal of the president for whatever reason

to spend funds made available by Congress.xxx there was no
instance of executive impoundment in the DAP.
Impoundment is prohibited by the GAA, unless there will be
an unmanageable government budget deficit.

- Suplico, et al. vs. Romulo Neri, et al, GR No. 178830, July 14,
2008- Any government expenditure without the corresponding
appropriation from Congress is unconstitutional. There can be no
dispute that the proceeds of foreign loans, whether concluded or
not, cannot be obligated in a procurement contract without a prior
appropriation from Congress. When the executive branch secures a
loan to fund a procurement of goods or services, the loan proceeds
enter the National Treasury as part of the general funds of the
government. Congress must appropriate by law the loan proceeds
to fund the procurement of goods or services, otherwise the loan
proceeds cannot be spent by the executive branch. When the loan
falls due, Congress must make another appropriation law
authorizing the repayment of the loan out of the general funds in
the National Treasury. This appropriation for the repayment of the
loan is what is covered by the automatic appropriation.

- Congressional Investigations: There are two (2) kinds of

congressional investigations, i.e., inquiry in aid of legislation
(Section 21, Article VI, 1987 Constitution); and the question hour
(Section 22, Article VI, 987 Constitution).

- LEGISLATIVE INQUIRY- Bengzon vs. Senate Blue Ribbon

(203 SRCA 76)- An investigation that seeks the determination
whether a law has been violated is not in aid of legislation but in
aid of prosecution, and therefore, violative of separation of powers.

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 To allow the Committee to investigate the matter would create the
possibility of conflicting judgments; and that the inquiry into the
same justiceable controversy would be an encroachment on the
exclusive domain of judicial jurisdiction that had set in much
earlier (investigation was not in aid of legislation).

- Subjudice rule restricts comments and disclosures pertaining to

judicial proceedings to avoid prejudging the issue, influencing the
court, or obstructing the administration of justice (Romero II vs.
Estrada, GR No. 174105, April 2, 2009).

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on Banks, GR

No. 167173, December 27, 2007- the mere filing of a criminal or
an administrative complaint before a court or quasi-judicial body
should not automatically bar the conduct of legislative inquiry,
otherwise, it would be extremely easy to subvert any intended
inquiry by Congress through the convenient ploy of instituting a
criminal or an administrative complaint.

- The exercise by Congress or by any of its Committee of the power

to punish contempt is based on the principle of self-preservation as
the branch of government vested with the legislative power,
independently of the judicial branch, it can assert its authority and
punish contumacious acts against it. Except only when the
Congress and/or its Committee exercise the power of contempt, it
cannot penalize violators even if there is overwhelming evidence
of criminal culpability. It can only recommend measures to address
or remedy whatever irregularities may be unearthed during the
investigation, although it may include in its Report a
recommendation for the criminal indictment of persons who may
appear liable.

- EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE- is the implied constitutional power

of the President to withhold information requested by other
branches of the government. The Constitution does not expressly
grant this power to the President but courts have long recognized
implied Presidential powers if “necessary and proper” in
carrying out powers and functions expressly granted to the
Executive under the Constitution. xxx In this jurisdiction,
several decisions have recognized executive privilege starting with
the 1995 case of Almonte v. Vasquez, and the most recent being
the 2002 case of Chavez v. Public Estates Authority and the
2006 case of Senate v. Ermita.

- As Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces and as Chief

Executive, the President is ultimately responsible for military and
national security matters affecting the nation. In the discharge of
this responsibility, the President may find it necessary to withhold

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 sensitive military and national security secrets from the
Legislature or the public.

- As the official in control of the nation’s foreign service by virtue of

the President’s control of all executive departments, bureaus and
offices, the President is the chief implementer of the foreign policy
relations of the State. The President’s role as chief implementer of
the State’s foreign policy is reinforced by the President’s
constitutional power to negotiate and enter into treaties and
international agreements. In the discharge of this responsibility,
the President may find it necessary to refuse disclosure of sensitive
diplomatic secrets to the Legislature or the public. Traditionally,
states have conducted diplomacy with considerable secrecy. There
is every expectation that a state will not imprudently reveal secrets
that its allies have shared with it.

- There is also the need to protect the confidentiality of the internal

deliberations of the President with his Cabinet and advisers.
To encourage candid discussions and thorough exchange of views,
the President’s communications with his Cabinet and advisers
need to be shielded from the glare of publicity. Otherwise, the
Cabinet and other presidential advisers may be reluctant to discuss
freely with the President policy issues and executive matters
knowing that their discussions will be publicly disclosed, thus
depriving the President of candid advice.

- Executive privilege, however, is not absolute. The interest of

protecting military, national security and diplomatic secrets, as
well as Presidential communications, must be weighed against
other constitutionally recognized interests. There is the
declared state policy of full public disclosure of all transactions
involving public interest, the right of the people to information
on matters of public concern, the accountability of public
officers, the power of legislative inquiry, and the judicial
power to secure testimonial and documentary evidence in
deciding cases.

- The balancing of interests – between executive privilege on one

hand and the other competing constitutionally recognized
interests on the other hand - is a function of the courts. The
courts will have to decide the issue based on the factual
circumstances of each case. This is how conflicts on executive
privilege between the Executive and the Legislature, and between
the Executive and the Judiciary, have been decided by the courts.

- Akbayan vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 170516, July 16, 2008 -Applying
the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while
the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually
confidential – since there should be “ample opportunity for

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 discussion before [a treaty] is approved” – the offers exchanged by
the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even
after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the
Japanese representatives submitted their offers with the
understanding that “historic confidentiality” would govern the
same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the
Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign
governments in future negotiations. xxx Diplomatic
negotiations, therefore, are recognized as privileged in this
jurisdiction, the JPEPA negotiations constituting no exception. It
bears emphasis, however, that such privilege is only presumptive.
For as Senate v. Ermita holds, recognizing a type of information as
privileged does not mean that it will be considered privileged in all
instances. Only after a consideration of the context in which the
claim is made may it be determined if there is a public interest that
calls for the disclosure of the desired information, strong enough to
overcome its traditionally privileged status.

- “Operational Proximity Test” (Neri vs. Senate Committee,

G.R. No. 180643, March 25, 2008)- The communications elicited
by the three (3) questions [a) Whether the President followed up
the (NBN) project? b) Were you dictated to prioritize the ZTE?
c) Whether the President said to go ahead and approve the
project after being told about the alleged bribe?] are covered by the
presidential communications privilege. First, the
communications relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
power” of the President, i.e. the power to enter into an executive
agreement with other countries. This authority of the President to
enter into executive agreements without the concurrence of the
Legislature has traditionally been recognized in Philippine
jurisprudence. Second, the communications are “received” by a
close advisor of the President. Under the “operational proximity”
test, petitioner can be considered a close advisor, being a member
of President Arroyo’s cabinet. And third, there is no adequate
showing of a compelling need that would justify the limitation of
the privilege and of the unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority.

LIMITATIONS:

- Conduct of legislative inquiries must be in accordance with

published rules.

- Philcomsat Holdings Corporation vs. Senate of the Philippines,

GR No. 180308, June 19, 2012- the wide latitude given to the
Congress in the conduct of legislative inquiries and would not fault
the Senate for approving the resolution on the very same day that it
was submitted. The court also held that the petitioners were

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 invited as resource persons at the inquiry, and as such, they do
not have the constitutional right to counsel.

- In the matter of the petition for issuance of writ of habeas

corpus of Camilo Sabio- GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006-
The Congress’ power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses
everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well
as proposed or possibly needed statutes. It even extends “to
government agencies created by Congress and officers whose
positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even
abolish.” PCGG belongs to this class. xxx So long as the
constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his
Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate
Committees, it is their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts
to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The
unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae,
to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to
testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper
investigation

- Miguel vs. Gordon, GR No. 174340, October 17, 2006- a mere

provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of
Congress in the absence of constitutional basis.

- Senate vs. Ermita (E.O. 464), April 20, 2006- Ultimately, the
power of Congress to compel the appearance of executive officials
under Section 21 and the lack of it under Section 22 find their basis
in the principle of separation of powers. While the executive
branch is a co-equal branch of the legislature, it cannot frustrate the
power of Congress to legislate by refusing to comply with its
demands for information.

- Varieties of Executive Privilege

1. state secrets invoked by Presidents, if disclosed would subvert
crucial military or diplomatic objective.
2. informer’s privilege- not to disclose the identity of
persons who furnish information of violations of law to
officers charged with the enforcement of that law.
3. generic privilege for internal deliberations- attach to
intragovernmental documents reflecting advisory opinions,
recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are
formulated.

- Congress undoubtedly has a right to information from the

executive branch whenever it is sought in aid of legislation. If
the executive branch withholds such information on the
ground that it is executive privileged, it must so assert it

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 and state the reason therefore and why it must be
respected.

- When Congress exercises its power of inquiry, the only

way for department heads to exempt themselves
therefrom is by a valid claim of privilege. They are not
exempt by the mere fact that they are department heads.
Only one executive official may be exempted from this power
— the President on whom executive power is vested, hence,
beyond the reach of Congress except through the power of
impeachment. It is based on her being the highest official of
the executive branch, and the due respect accorded to a co-
equal branch of government which is sanctioned by a long-
standing custom.

- The absence of any reference to inquiries in aid of legislation,

must be construed as limited in its appearance of department
heads in the question hour contemplated in Section 22 of
Article VI, the objective of which is to obtain information
in pursuit of Congress’ oversight function.
- PHILCOMSAT vs. Senate, June 19, 2012

- The right to be assisted by counsel can only be invoked by a

person under custodial investigation suspected for the
commission of a crime, and therefore attaches only during
such custodial investigation. Since petitioners Locsin and
Andal were invited to the public hearings as resource persons,
they cannot therefore validly invoke their right to counsel.

- Balag vs. Senate, July 3, 2018-The Court finds that the

period of imprisonment under the inherent power of contempt
by the Senate during inquiries in aid of legislation should only
last until the termination of the legislative inquiry under
which the said power is invoked.

- The legislative inquiry of the Senate terminates on two

instances:

- 1. upon the approval or disapproval of the Committee

Report. Sections 22 and 23 of Senate Rules state:

- 2. Sec. 22. Report of Committee. Within fifteen (15) days

after the conclusion of the inquiry, the Committee shall
meet to begin the consideration of its Report.

The Report shall be approved by a majority vote of all its

members. Concurring and dissenting reports may likewise be
made by the members who do not sign the majority report within

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 seventy-two (72) hours from the approval of the report. The
number of members who sign reports concurring in the
conclusions of the Committee Report shall be taken into account
in determining whether the Report has been approved by a
majority of the members: Provided, That the vote of a member
who submits both a concurring and dissenting opinion shall not be
considered as part of the majority unless he expressly indicates his
vote for the majority position.

- The Report, together with any concurring and/or dissenting

opinions, shall be filed with the Secretary of the Senate, who shall
include the same in the next Order of Business.

- Sec. 23. Action on Report. The Report, upon inclusion in the

Order of Business, shall be referred to the Committee on Rules for
assignment in the Calendar.

- The power of oversight embraces all activities undertaken

by Congress to enhance its understanding of and influence
over the implementation of legislation it has enacted. Clearly,
oversight concerns post-enactment measures undertaken by
Congress (a) to monitor bureaucratic compliance with
program objectives; (b) to determine whether agencies are
properly administered; (c) to eliminate executive waste and
dishonesty; (d) to prevent executive usurpation of legislative
authority; and (e) to assess executive conformity with the
congressional perception of public interest.

- What is a Legislative Veto? A disapproval by Congress, or

by an oversight committee of Congress, of an administrative
regulation promulgated by an administrative body or
agency.

- The acts done by Congress purportedly in the exercise of its

oversight powers may be divided into three categories,
namely: scrutiny; investigation and supervision.

- ENROLLED BILL DOCTRINE – Abakada Guro Party

List, et al. vs. Ermita, ed al., October 18, 2005 – the signing
of a bill by the Speaker of the House and the Senate President
and the certification of the Secretaries of both houses of
Congress that it was passed are conclusive of its due
enactment.

- A bill originating in the House may undergo such

extensive changes in the Senate that the result may be a
rewriting of the whole, a distinct bill may be produced.
The power of the Senate to propose amendments, it cal

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 propose its own version even with respect to bills which are
required by the Constitution to originate in the House.

- Principle of Bicameralism: BICAMERAL

CONFERENCE COMMITTEE- It is a mechanism for
compromising differences between the Senate and the House
of Representatives. By the nature of its function, a Bicameral
Conference Committee is capable of producing unexpected
results – results which sometimes may even go beyond its
own mandate. (Philippine Judges Association v. Secretary
Prado; Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance) The Supreme
Court recognizes the long standing legislative practice of
giving said conference ample latitude for compromising
differences between the Senate and the House. It can
propose amendment in the nature of a substitute, so long
as the amendment is germane to the subject of the bills
before the committee. After all, its report was not final but
needed the approval of both houses of Congress to become
valid as an act of the legislative department.

- Lung Center vs. Quezon City, G.R. No. 144104, June 29,
2004 – Under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions and RA 7160
in order to be entitled to the exemption, the petitioner is
burdened to prove, by clear and unequivocal proof, that (a) it
is a charitable institution; and (b) its real properties are
actually, directly, and exclusively used for charitable
purposes. “Exclusive” is defined as possessed and enjoyed to
the exclusion of others; debarred from participation or
enjoyment, and exclusively is defined, in a manner to
exclude; as enjoying a privilege exclusively. The words
“dominant use” or “principal use” cannot be substituted for
the words “used exclusively” without doing violence to the
Constitution and the law. Solely is synonymous with
exclusively

ARTICLE VII
(PRESIDENT)

- It has already been established that there is one repository of

executive powers, and that is the President of the Republic.
This means that when Section 1, Article VII of the
Constitution speaks of executive power, it is granted to the
President and no one else. Corollarily, it is only the
President, as Chief Executive, who is authorized to
exercise emergency powers as provided under Section 23,
Article VI, of the Constitution, as well as what became known
as the calling-out powers under Section 18, Article VII

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 thereof. (Jamar Kulayan v. Gov. Abdusakur Tan, G.R.
No. 187298, July 3, 2012, En Banc [Sereno, CJ]),

- The duty to protect the State and its people must be carried
out earnestly and effectively throughout the whole territory of
the Philippines in accordance with constitutional provision on
national territory. Hence, the President of the Philippines, as
the sole repository of executive power, is the guardian of
the Philippine archipelago, including all the islands and
waters embraced therein and all other territories over
which the Philippines and sovereignty or jurisdiction. X x
x To carry out this important duty, the President is equipped
with authority over the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), which is the protector of the people and the state. X x
x. In addition, the Executive is constitutionally empowered to
maintain peace and order, protect life, liberty, and property,
and promote the general welfare. In recognition of these
powers, Congress has specified that the President must
oversee, ensure, and reinforce our defensive capabilities
against external and internal threats and, in the same vein,
ensure that the country is adequately prepared for all national
and local emergencies arising from natural and man-made
disasters. To be sure, this power is limited by the Constitution
itself. X x x (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426,
Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

- The Faithful Execution Clause - This Court has interpreted

the faithful execution clause as an obligation imposed on
the President, and not a separate grant of power. Section
17, Article VII of the Constitution, expresses this duty in
no uncertain terms and includes it in the provision
regarding the President’s power of control over the
executive department x x x. Hence, the duty to faithfully
execute the laws of the land is inherent in executive power
and is intimately related to the other executive functions. X x
x

- These obligations are as broad as they sound, for a President

cannot function with crippled hands, but must be capable of
securing the rule of law within all territories of the Philippine
Islands and be empowered to do so within constitutional
limits. Congress cannot, for instance, limit or take over the
President’s power to adopt implementing rules and
regulations for a law it has enacted.

- More important, this mandate is self-executory by virtue of its

being inherently executive in nature. xxx The import of this

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 characteristic is that the manner of the President’s execution
of the law, even if not expressly granted by the law, is
justified by necessity and limited only by law, since the
President must “take necessary and proper steps to carry
into execution the law.” X x x

- In light of this constitutional duty, it is the President’s

prerogative to do whatever is legal and necessary for
Philippine defense interests. It is no coincidence that the
constitutional provision on the faithful execution clause was
followed by that on the President’s commander-in-chief
powers, which are specifically granted during extraordinary
events of lawless violence, invasion, or rebellion. And this
duty of defending the country is unceasing, even in times
when there is no state of lawless violence, invasion, or
rebellion. At such times, the President has full powers to
ensure the faithful execution of the laws.

- It would therefore be remiss for the President and repugnant

to the faithful-execution clause of the Constitution to do
nothing when the call of the moment requires increasing the
military’s defensive capabilities, which could include forging
alliances with states that hold a common interest with the
Philippines or bringing an international suit against an
offending state.

- This approach of giving utmost deference to presidential

initiatives in respect of foreign affairs is not novel to the
Court. The President’s act of treating EDCA as an executive
agreement is not the principal power being analyzed x x x.
Rather, the preliminary analysis is in reference to the
expansive power of foreign affairs. We have long treated this
power as something the Courts must not unduly restrict. x x x

- Understandably, this Court must view the instant case with

the same perspective and understanding, knowing full well
the constitutional and legal repercussions of any judicial
overreach. (Rene A.V. Saguisag, et al. v. Executive
Secretary Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al., G.R. No. 212426,
Jan. 12, 2016, En Banc [Sereno, CJ])

- PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY- The immunity enjoyed by a

sitting president evolved through case law.

- It is settled in jurisprudence that the President enjoys

immunity from suit during his or her tenure of office
or actual incumbency. Conversely, this presidential
privilege of immunity cannot be invoked by a non-

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 -sitting president even for acts committed during his or
her tenure (Lozada v. Arroyo, 670 SCRA 545;
Estrada v. Disierto, 356 SCRA 108).

- Soliven vs. Makasiar- The privilege pertains to the President

by virtue of the office. There is nothing in our laws that
would prevent the President from waiving the privilege. The
choice of whether to exercise the privilege or to waive it is
solely the President’s prerogative.

- Estrada vs. Desierto- There is no basis in the contention that

the immunity of the President extends to the end of the term
to which he was elected notwithstanding his resignation. It is
clear that the immunity of the President from suit is
concurrent only with his tenure (representing the period
during which the incumbent actually holds office) and not his
term (the time during which the officer may claim to hold
office as a matter of right).

- Romualdez vs. Sandiganbayan, 435 SCRA 371- Executive

immunity applied only during the incumbency of a President.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita, et al., April 20, 2006 – It is not

proper to implead President Arroyo as respondent. Settled is
the doctrine that the President, during his tenure of office or
actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal
case, and there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution
or law.

- Former President cannot use the presidential immunity

from suit to shield himself/herself from judicial scrutiny
that would assess whether, within the context of
amparo proceedings, she was responsible or accountable
for the abduction of a person (Rodriguez v.
Macapagal Arroyo, 660 SCRA 84).

- Amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the

extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or
omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b)
accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be
addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the
enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their
complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii)
who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced
disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii)
those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of
extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced
disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of

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 criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the doctrine of
command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to
ascertain responsibility and accountability within these
foregoing definitions.

- Doctrine of command responsibility is applicable in

amparo proceedings. The president, as commander-
-‐‐in--‐‐chief of the military, can be held responsible or
accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. To hold someone liable under the
doctrine of command responsibility, the following
elements must obtain: a. the existence of a
superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as
superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate; b. the superior knew or had reason to
know that the crime was about to be or had been
committed; and c. the superior failed to take the
necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the
criminal acts or punish the perpetrators thereof (Ibid).
Commanders may therefore be impleaded – not actually
on the basis of command responsibility – but rather
on the ground of their responsibility, or at least
accountability (Balao v. Macapagal-Arroyo, 662 SCRA
312).

- SUPREME COURT AS PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL- Lopez vs. Roxas, 17 SCRA 755- When the
law grants the Supreme Court the power to resolve an election
contest between or among presidential candidates, no new or
separate court is created. The law merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral
Tribunal.

- The power of Congress to declare who, among the candidates

for President and/or Vice-President has obtained the largest
number of votes, is entirely different in nature from and not
inconsistent with the jurisdiction vested in the Presidential
Electoral Tribunal by RA 1793. Congress merely acts as
national board of canvassers, charged with the ministerial
and executive duty to make said declaration, on the basis
of the election returns duly certified by provincial and city
boards of canvassers. Upon the other hand, the
Presidential Electoral tribunal has the judicial power to
determine whether or not said duly certified election
returns have been irregularly made or tampered with or
reflect the true results of the elections in the areas covered
by each and, if not, to recount the ballots cast, and
incidentally thereto, pass upon the validity of each ballot
or determine whether the same shall be counted, and, in

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 the affirmative, in whose favor, which Congress has no
power to do.

- In assuming the Office of Senator protestant Santiago has

effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest to the election
protestee Ramos as President. (Santiago v. Ramos, 253
SCRA 559).

- Citing Defensor Santiago v. Ramos, the PET stressed that

Legarda effectively abandoned or withdrawn her protest when
she ran in the Senate, which term coincides with the term of
the Vice-Presidency 2004-2010. (Min. Res., PET Case No.
003, Legarda v. De Castro, February 12, 2008.

- Macalintal vs. PET, G.R. No. 191618 | 2011-06-07- A plain

reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals
a grant of authority to the Supreme Court sitting en banc. In
the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme
Court exercises this authority is not specified in the provision,
the grant of power does not contain any limitation on the
Supreme Court's exercise thereof. The Supreme Court's
method of deciding presidential and vice-presidential election
contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted
constitutional provision. Thus, the subsequent directive in the
provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for
the purpose."

- It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET,

resolves a presidential or vice-presidential election contest, it
performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark
case of Angara v. Electoral Commission, Justice Jose P.
Laurel enucleated that "it would be inconceivable if the
Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to
direct the course of government along constitutional
channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution
is a definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that
time, the 1935 Constitution did not contain the expanded
definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1,
paragraph 2 of the present Constitution.

- Tecson vs. COMELEC, 424 SCRA 277- The actions

contemplated in Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution are
post election remedies, namely, regular election contests and
quo warranto. The word “contest” means that the jurisdiction
of the Supreme Court only be invoked after the election and

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 proclamation of the President or Vice-President – there can be
no “contest” before a winner is proclaimed.

- TERM OF OFFICE- Pormento vs. Estrada (GR No.

191988, August 31, 2010)- Estrada was not elected President
the second time he ran. Since the issue will be premised on
the second election as President, there is no case or
controversy to be resolved in this case.

- VACANCY IN THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT-

Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001- Also Read:
TEMPORARY DISABILITY OF PRESIDENT- The
question whether the claimed temporary inability of Estrada is
a political question beyond the Supreme Court’s power of
review. The decision that President Arroyo is the dejure
President made by a co-equal branch of government
cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

POLITICAL QUALIFIED AGENCY (ALTER-EGO

DOCTRINE) - The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency-
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a
single executive, all executive and administrative
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department, the
heads of the various executive departments are assistants and
agents of the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act
in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act
personally, the multifarious executive and administrative
functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and promulgated
in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or
reprobated by the Chief Executive presumably the acts of the
Chief Executive. (Resident Marine Mammals of the
Protected Seascape Tanon Strait, et al. v. Secretary
Angelo Reyes, et al., GR Nos. 180771 and 181527, April
21, 2015, En Banc [Leonardo-De Castro])

- Constantino vs. Cuisia, G.R. No. 106064, October 13,

2005- Nevertheless, there are powers vested in the President
by the Constitution which may not be delegated to or
exercised by an agent or alter ego of the President. Justice
Laurel, in his ponencia in Villena, makes this clear: Withal, at
first blush, the argument of ratification may seem plausible
under the circumstances, it should be observed that there are
certain acts which, by their very nature, cannot be validated
by subsequent approval or ratification by the President. There

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 are certain constitutional powers and prerogatives of the Chief
Executive of the Nation which must be exercised by him in
person and no amount of approval or ratification will validate
the exercise of any of those powers by any other person.
Such, for instance, in his power to suspend the writ of habeas
corpus and proclaim martial law (PAR. 3, SEC. 11, Art. VII)
and the exercise by him of the benign prerogative of mercy
(par. 6, sec. 11, idem]. These distinctions hold true to this
day. There are certain presidential powers which arise out of
exceptional circumstances, and if exercised, would involve
the suspension of fundamental freedoms, or at least call for
the supersedence of executive prerogatives over those
exercised by co-equal branches of government. The
declaration of martial law, the suspension of the writ of
habeas corpus, and the exercise of the pardoning power
notwithstanding the judicial determination of guilt of the
accused, all fall within this special class that demands the
exclusive exercise by the President of the constitutionally
vested power. The list is by no means exclusive, but there
must be a showing that the executive power in question is of
similar gravitas and exceptional import. We cannot conclude
that the power of the President to contract or guarantee
foreign debts falls within the same exceptional class.
Indubitably, the decision to contract or guarantee foreign
debts is of vital public interest, but only akin to any
contractual obligation undertaken by the sovereign, which
arises not from any extraordinary incident, but from the
established functions of governance.

- Resident Marine Mammals v. Reyes GR No. 180771, April

21, 2015- The doctrine of qualified political agency may not
be validly invoked if it is the Constitution itself that provides
that the act should be performed by the President no less,
especially since what are involved are natural resources.

- APPOINTING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT-

Sarmiento vs. Mison; Bautista vs. Salonga; Bermudez vs.
Torres; Calderon vs. Carale- Congress cannot expand the
constitution by increasing those officers who need prior
confirmation by the CA.

- Election Ban (Midnight Appointments) GR No. 191002,

De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191032, Soriano v. JBC; GR
No. 191057, PHILCONSA v. JBC; AM No. 10-2-5-SC, In
Re Applicability of Sec. 15, Art. VII of the Constitution to
Appointments to the Judiciary; GR No. 191149, Peralta v.
JBC; GR No. 191342, Tolentino, Jr. v. JBC; GR No.
191420, Philippine Bar Association, Inc. v. JBC; March

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 17, 2010, April 20, 2010)- the prohibition under Article VII,
Section 15 of the Constitution against presidential
appointments immediately before the next presidential
elections and up to the end of the term of the outgoing
President does not apply to vacancies in the High Tribunal.
“Although Valenzuela came to hold that the prohibition
covered even judicial appointments, it cannot be disputed that
the Valenzuela dictum did not firmly rest on the deliberations
of the Constitutional Commission. Thereby, the confirmation
made to the JBC by then Senior Associate Justice Florenz D.
Regalado of this Court, a former member of the
Constitutional Commission, about the prohibition not being
intended to apply to the appointments to the Judiciary, which
confirmation Valenzuela even expressly mentioned, should
prevail.“ Had the framers intended to extend the prohibition
contained in Section 15, Article VII to the appointment of
members of the Supreme Court, they could have explicitly
done so.

- Province of Aurora vs. Marco, GR 202331 April 22,

2015-The prohibition under Article VII, Sec 15 applies only
to presidential appointments, and not to those made by local
executives. In this case, the appointment is valid because
there is no law that prohibits local elective officials from
making appointments during the last days of his/her tenure.

- Binamira vs. Garucho; Matibag vs. Benipayo, April 2,

2002- An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and can no
longer be withdrawn by the President once an appointee has
qualified into office. The fact that it is subject to confirmation
by the CA does not alter its permanent character. It is
effective until disapproved by the CA or until the next
adjournment of Congress. It is extended only during a
recess of Congress. If disapproved by CA, appointee can
no longer be extended a new appointment. If by-passed,
the President is free to renew the ad-interim appointment.

- Pimentel, Jr. v. Office of the Executive Secretary, 462

SCRA 622, July 6, 2005- The law allows the President to
make such acting appointment. The President may even
appoint in acting capacity a person not yet in the government
service, as long as the President deems that person competent.

- Acting appointment- It is temporary in nature. It is a stop-

gap measure intended to fill an office for a limited time until
the appointment of a permanent occupant to the office. In
case of vacancy in an office occupied by an alter ego of her

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 choice as acting secretary before the permanent appointee of
her choice could assume office. It may be extended any time
there is vacancy, given while Congress is in session.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, G. R. No. 139554, July 21¬ 2006-

Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, the
President appoints three groups of officers. The first group
refers to the heads of the Executive departments,"
ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, officers of
the armed forces from the rank of colonel or naval captain,
and other officers whose appointments are vested in the
President by the Constitution. The second group refers to
those whom the President may be authorized by law to
appoint. The third group refers to all other officers of the
Government whose appointments are not otherwise provided
by law. Under the same Section 16, there is a fourth group
of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards. xxx The President appoints the first
group of officers with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the second and third
groups of officers without the consent of the Commission on
Appointments. The President appoints the third group of
officers if the law is silent on who is the appointing power,
or if the law authorizing the head of a department,
agency, commission, or board to appoint is declared
unconstitutional.

- Agyao vs. CSC, GR No. 182591, January 8, 2011- The position

of department manager such as Director Manager II of PEZA is
not a third level position and does not require presidential
appointment.

- CABINET SECRETARIES, UNDERSECRETARIES

AND THEIR ASSISTANT SECRETARIES are prohibited
from holding multiple positions and receiving compensation
therefrom- BITONIO VS. COA, 425 SCRA 437, March 12,
2004.

- CONTROL OF EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENTS- Buklod

ng Kawaning EIIB vs. Zamora, July 10, 2001- The general
rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office
is lodged with the legislature. The exception, however, is
that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive
department are concerned, the President’s power of control
may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular
office, or certain laws may grant him broad authority to carry
out reorganization measures. The chief executive, under our

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 laws, has the continuing authority to reorganize the
administrative structure of the Office of the President.

- Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission, GR No.

192935, December 7, 2010- The creation of the Philippine
Truth Commission finds justification under Section 17,
Article VII of the Constitution, imposing upon the President
the duty to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed. The
President's power to conduct investigations to aid him in
ensuring the faithful execution of laws - in this case,
fundamental laws on public accountability and transparency -
is inherent in the President's powers as the Chief Executive.
Suffice it to say that there will be no appropriation but only an
allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. Accordingly, there is no usurpation on the part
of the Executive of the power of Congress to appropriate
funds.

- Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the

Philippines, Inc. (MEWAP) vs. Romulo, GR No. 160093,
July 31, 2007 – The President has the authority to carry out a
reorganization of the Department of Health under the
Constitution and statutory laws. This authority is an adjunct
of his power of control under Article VII, Sections 1 and 17
of the 1987 Constitution. The President’s power to
reorganize the executive branch is also an exercise of his
residual powers under Section 20, Title I, Book III of E.O.
No. 292 which grants the President broad organization
powers to implement reorganization measures. Be that as it
may, the President must exercise good faith in carrying out
the reorganization of any branch or agency of the executive
department. Reorganization is effected in good faith if it is for
the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more
efficient.

- Presidential Decree No. 1772 which amended Presidential

Decree No. 1416. These decrees expressly grant the
President of the Philippines the continuing authority to
reorganize the national government, which includes the
power to group, consolidate bureaus and agencies, to
abolish offices, to transfer functions, to create and classify
functions, services and activities and to standardize
salaries and materials. The validity of these two decrees
[is]"unquestionable. The 1987 Constitution clearly provides
that “all laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations,
letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed or revoked.

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- Domingo vs. Zamora, GR No. 142283, February 6, 2003 –
The President’s power (EO 292) to reorganize offices
outside of the Office of the President Proper is limited
merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office
of the President to Departments or Agencies and vice-
versa. The DECS is indisputably a Department of the
Executive Branch. Even if the DECS is not part of the Office
of the President, Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292 clearly
authorizes the President to transfer any function or agency of
the DECS to the Office of the President. Under its charter,
the Philippine Sports Commission (PSC), is attached to the
Office of the President. Therefore, the President has the
authority to transfer the “functions, programs and activities of
DECS related to sports development” to the PSC, making EO
81 a valid presidential issuance.

- Rufino vs. Endriga, GR No. 113956, July 21, 2006- The

presidential power of control over the Executive branch of
government extends to all executive employees from the
Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk. This constitutional
power of the President is self-executing and does not require any
implementing law. Congress cannot limit or curtail the President’s
power of control over the Executive branch. xxx In mandating that
the President “shall have control of all executive x x x offices,”
Section 17, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution does not exempt
any executive office — one performing executive functions outside
of the independent constitutional bodies — from the President’s
power of control. xxx The President’s power of control applies to
the acts or decisions of all officers in the Executive branch. This is
true whether such officers are appointed by the President or by
heads of departments, agencies, commissions, or boards. The
power of control means the power to revise or reverse the acts or
decisions of a subordinate officer involving the exercise of
discretion.

- COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE AFP– (Lacson vs.

Perez, May 10, 2001)- The declaration by the President of
‘state of rebellion” during or in the aftermath of the May 1,
2001 seige of Malacanang is not violative of the separation of
powers doctrine. The President, as Commander in chief of
Armed Forces of the Philippines, may call upon such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion.

- Sanlakas vs. Executive Committee, 421 SCRA 656,

February 3, 2004- The President’s authority to declare a
state of rebellion springs in the main from her powers as chief
executive and, at the same time draws strength from her

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 Commander-in-Chief powers pursuant to her calling out
power.

- Calling out power of the president. President as

Commander-in-Chief has a vast intelligence network to
gather information, some of which may be classified as
highly confidential or affecting the security of the
state. In the exercise of the power to call, on- the- spot
decisions may be imperatively necessary in emergency
situations to avert great loss of human lives and mass
destruction of property. Indeed, the decision to call out
the military to prevent or suppress lawless violence
must be done swiftly and decisively if it were to have
any effect at all. Such a scenario is not farfetched
when we consider the present situation in Mindanao,
where the insurgency problem could spill over the
other parts of the country. The determination of the
necessity for the calling out power if subjected to
unfettered judicial scrutiny could be a veritable
prescription for disaster, as such power may be unduly
straitjacketed by an injunction or a temporary restraining
order every time it is exercised (Integrated Bar of
The Philippines v. Zamora, 338 SCRA 81).

- Ampatuan vs. Puno, GR No. 190259, June 7, 2011- The

President does not need any congressional authority to
exercise his calling out power.

- While it is true that the Supreme Court may inquire into the
factual bases for the President’s exercise of these powers it
would generally defer to her judgment on the matter. Unless it
is shown that such determination was attended by grave abuse
of discretion, the Supreme Court will accord respect to the
President’s judgment.

- Is the President’s power to call out the armed forces as

their Commander-in-Chief in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion subject to
judicial review, or is it a political question? When the
President calls the armed forces to prevent or suppress
lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, he necessarily
exercises a discretionary power solely vested in his wisdom.
This is clear from the intent of the framers and from the text
of the Constitution itself. The Court, thus, cannot be called
upon to overrule the President's wisdom or substitute its own.
However, this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional
limits or whether it was exercised in a manner constituting
grave abuse of discretion. In view of the constitutional intent

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 to give the President full discretionary power to determine the
necessity of calling out the armed forces, it is incumbent upon
the petitioner to show that the President's decision is totally
bereft of factual basis. The present petition fails to discharge
such heavy burden as there is no evidence to support the
assertion that there exists no justification for calling out the
armed forces. There is, likewise, no evidence to support the
proposition that grave abuse was committed because the
power to call was exercised in such a manner as to violate the
constitutional provision on civilian supremacy over the
military. In the performance of this Court's duty of
“purposeful hesitation” before declaring an act of another
branch as unconstitutional, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the
President's judgment. To doubt is to sustain. (Integrated
Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Ronaldo B. Zamora, G.R.
No. 141284, Aug. 15, 2000, En Banc [Kapunan])

- That the authority of the President to conduct peace

negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly
mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she
has no such authority. Similarly, the President'ʹs power
to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in
her powers as Chief Executive and Commander--‐‑ in-
-‐‑Chief. As Chief Executive, the President has the
general responsibility to promote public peace, and as
Commander--‐‑in--‐‑Chief, she has the more specific
duty to prevent and suppress rebellion and lawless
violence (The Province of North Cotabato v. The
Government of the Republic of the Philippines Peace
Panel on Ancestral Domain, 568 SCRA 402).

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- It is on the President

that the Constitution vests the title as commander-in-chief and
all the prerogatives and functions appertaining to the position.
Again, the exigencies of military discipline and the chain of
command mandate that the President’s ability to control the
individual members of the armed forces be accorded the
utmost respect. Where a military officer is torn between
obeying the President and obeying the Senate, the Supreme
Court will without hesitation affirm that the officer has to
choose the President. After all, the Constitution prescribes
that it is the President, and not the Senate, who is the
commander-in-chief of the armed forces. if the President or
the Chief of Staff refuses to allow a member of the AFP to
appear before Congress, the legislative body seeking such
testimony may seek judicial relief to compel the attendance.

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- Integrated Bar of the Philippines vs. Zamora – The
President has full discretion to call the military when in his
judgment it is necessary to do so in order to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. There is no
equivalent provision dealing with the revocation or review of
the President’s action to call out the armed forces.

- David, et al. vs. Executive Secretary Ermita, May 3, 2006-

PP 1017 constitutes the call by the President for the AFP to
prevent or suppress lawless violence. However, PP 1017’s
extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied
power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct AFP to enforce
obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless
violence as well as decrees promulgated by the president; and
(3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior
restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. In
the absence of legislation, the President cannot take over
privately-owned public utility and private business affected
with public interest.

- The President can validly declare the existence of a state of

national emergency even in the absence of congressional
enactment. But the exercise of emergency powers requires a
delegation from Congress.

- Colmenares, et al. vs. Department of National Defense

Secretary, et al., GR No. 212426-212244- January 12,
2016- Under the calling-out power, the President may
summon the armed forces to aid him in suppressing lawless
violence, invasion and rebellion. This involves ordinary
police action. But every act that goes beyond the President’s
calling-out power is considered illegal or ultra vires. For this
reason, a President must be careful in the exercise of his
powers. He cannot invoke a greater power when he wishes
to act under a lesser power. There lies the wisdom of our
Constitution, the greater the power, the greater are the
limitations.

- EMERGENCY POWER GRANT TO PRESIDENT-

Requisites: 1) there must be a war or other emergency; 2) the
delegation must be for a limited period only; 3) the delegation
must be subject to such restrictions as Congress may
prescribe and 4) the emergency powers must be exercised to
carry out a national policy declared by Congress.

- David, et al. vs. Ermita- It may be pointed out that the

second paragraph of the above provision refers not only to
war but also to other national emergency. If the intention of
the Framers of our Constitution was to withhold from the

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 President the authority to declare a state of national
emergency pursuant to Section 18, Article VII (calling-out
power) and grant it to Congress (like the declaration of the
existence of a state of war), then the Framers could have
provided so. Clearly, they did not intend that Congress
should first authorize the President before he can declare a
state of national emergency. The logical conclusion then is
that President Arroyo could validly declare the existence of a
state of national emergency even in the absence of a
Congressional enactment. But the exercise of emergency
powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public
utility or business affected with public interest, is different
matter. This requires a delegation from Congress.

- Kulayan v. Tan, GR No. 187298, July 3, 2012 - the calling

out powers contemplated under the Constitution is exclusive
to the President of the Philippines as Commander-in-Chief
and that a provincial governor is not endowed with the power
to call upon the Armed Forces at its own bidding. It ruled that
only the President is authorized to exercise emergency powers
as provided under Section 23, Article VI and the calling out
powers under Section 7, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution.
While the President exercises full supervision and control
over the police, a local chief executive, such as a provincial
governor, only exercises operational supervision over the
police, and may exercise control only in day-to-day
operations. As discussed in the deliberation of the
Constitutional Commission, only the President has “full
discretion to call the military when in his judgment it is
necessary to do so in order to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion,” the Court stressed.

- To Declare martial Law/Suspend the Privilege of the Writ

of Habeas Corpus- Lagman vs. Medialdea, July 4, 2017,
G.R. No. 231658- The Court may strike down the
presidential proclamation in an appropriate proceeding filed
by any citizen on the ground of lack of sufficient factual
basis. On the other hand, Congress may revoke the
proclamation or suspension, which revocation shall not be set
aside by the President.

- In reviewing the sufficiency of the factual basis of the

proclamation or suspension, the Court considers only the
information and data available to the President prior to or at
the time of the declaration; it is not allowed to "undertake an
independent investigation beyond the pleadings." On the
other hand, Congress may take into consideration not only
data available prior to, but likewise events supervening the
declaration. Unlike the Court, it which does not look into the

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 absolute correctness of the factual basis as will be discussed
below, Congress could probe deeper and further; it can delve
into the accuracy of the facts presented before it.

- In addition, the Court's review power is passive; it is only

initiated by the filing of a petition "in an appropriate
proceeding" by a citizen. On the other hand, Congress' review
mechanism is automatic in the sense that it , may be activated
by Congress itself at any time after the proclamation or
suspension was made.

- The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review

with, and independently from, the power to revoke by
Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the
part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.

- Among the three extraordinary powers, the calling out power

is the most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that
he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a
manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact,
"the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is
xx x not subject to judicial review.

- Thus, the power to review by the Court and the power to

revoke by Congress are not only totally different but likewise
independent from each other although concededly, they have
the same trajectory, which is, the nullification of the
presidential proclamation. Needless to say, the power of the
Court to review can be exercised independently from the
power of revocation of Congress.

- The Court can simultaneously exercise its power of review

with, and independently from, the power to revoke by
Congress. Corollary, any perceived inaction or default on the
part of Congress does not deprive or deny the Court of its
power to review.

- The three extraordinary powers, the calling out power is the

most benign and involves ordinary police action. The
President may resort to this extraordinary power whenever it
becomes necessary to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion, or rebellion. "[T]he power to call is fully
discretionary to the President;" the only limitations being that
he acts within permissible constitutional boundaries or in a

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 manner not constituting grave abuse of discretion. In fact,
"the actual use to which the President puts the armed forces is
x x x not subject to judicial review."

- The extraordinary powers of suspending the privilege of the

writ of habeas corpus and/or declaring martial law may be
exercised only when there is actual invasion or rebellion, and
public safety requires it. The 1987 Constitution imposed the
following limits in the exercise of these powers: "(1) a time
limit of sixty days; (2) review and possible revocation by
Congress; [and] (3) review and possible nullification by the
Supreme Court."

- The framers of the 1987 Constitution eliminated insurrection,

and the phrase "imminent danger thereof' as grounds for the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or
declaration of martial law. They perceived the phrase
"imminent danger" to be "fraught with possibilities of abuse;"
besides, the calling out power of the President "is sufficient
for handling imminent danger."

- The powers to declare martial law and to suspend the

privilege of the writ of habeas corpus involve curtailment and
suppression of civil rights and individual freedom. Thus, the
declaration of martial law serves as a warning to citizens that
the Executive Department has called upon the military to
assist in the maintenance of law and order, and while the
emergency remains, the citizens must, under pain of arrest
and punishment, not act in a manner that will render it more
difficult to restore order and enforce the law. As such, their
exercise requires more stringent safeguards by the Congress,
and review by the Court.

- A state of martial law is peculiar because the President, at

such a time, exercises police power, which is normally a
function of the Legislature. In particular, the President
exercises police power, with the military’s assistance, to
ensure public safety and in place of government agencies
which for the time being are unable to cope with the condition
in a locality, which remains under the control of the State.

- In David v. President Macapagal-Arroyo, the Court, quoting

Justice Vicente V. Mendoza's (Justice Mendoza) Statement
before the Senate Committee on Justice on March 13, 2006,
stated that under a valid declaration of martial law, the
President as Commander-in-Chief may order the "(a) arrests
and seizures without judicial warrants; (b) ban on public
assemblies; (c) [takeover] of news media and agencies and

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 press censorship; and (d) issuance of Presidential Decrees x x
x".

- Worthy to note, however, that the above-cited acts that the

President may perform do not give him unbridled discretion
to infringe on the rights of civilians during martial law. This
is because martial law does not suspend the operation of the
Constitution, neither does it supplant the operation of civil
courts or legislative assemblies. Moreover, the guarantees
under the Bill of Rights remain in place during its pendency.
And in such instance where the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus is also suspended, such suspension applies only to
those judicially charged with rebellion or offenses connected
with invasion.

- This so called "graduation of powers" does not dictate or

restrict the manner by which the President decides which
power to choose. It is thus beyond doubt that the power of
judicial review does not extend to calibrating the President's
decision pertaining to which extraordinary power to avail
given a set of facts or conditions.

- The 1987 Constitution, by providing only for judicial review

based on the determination of the sufficiency of the factual
bases, has in fact done away with the test of arbitrariness as
provided in Lansang.

- The parameters for determining the sufficiency the/actual

basis/or the declaration of martial law and/or the
suspension of the privilege of the writ habeas corpus: 1.
Actual invasion or rebellion; 2. public safety requires it;
the two requirements must concur; and 3. there is
probable cause for the President to believe that there is
actual rebellion or invasion.

- In determining the sufficiency of the factual basis of the

declaration and/or the suspension, the Court should look into
the full complement or totality of the factual basis, and not
piecemeal or individually. Neither should the Court expect
absolute correctness of the facts stated in the proclamation
and in the written Report as the President could not be
expected to verify the accuracy and veracity of all facts
reported to him due to the urgency of the situation. To require
precision in the President's appreciation of facts would unduly
burden him and therefore impede the process of his decision-
making. Such a requirement will practically necessitate the
President to be on the ground to confirm the correctness of
the reports submitted to him within a period that only the
circumstances obtaining would be able to dictate.

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- In determining the existence of rebellion, the President only
needs to convince himself that there is probable cause or
evidence showing that more likely than not a rebellion was
committed or is being committed.

- Lagman vs. Pimentel, GR Nos. 235935, 236061, 236145,

236155 February 6, 2018- The Court ruled that they cannot
review the rules promulgated by Congress on the manner re
President’s request for extension in the absence of any
constitutional violation.

- What is clear is that the ONLY limitations to the exercise of

the congressional authority to extend such proclamation or
suspension are (1) that the extension should be upon the
President’s initiative; (2) that it should be grounded on
the persistence of the invasion or rebellion and the
demands of public safety; and (3) that it is subject to the
Court’s review of the sufficiency of its factual basis upon
the petition of any citizen.

- The Congress the authority to decide on its duration; thus, the

provision states that that the extension shall be “for a period
to be determined by the Congress.

- PARDONING POWER- Drilon vs. CA, 202 SCRA 370-

The pardoning power of the President is final and
unappealable.

- Former President Estrada was granted an absolute

pardon that fully restored all his civil and political
rights, which naturally includes the right to seek public
elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The
wording of the pardon extended to former President
Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified.
It is likewise unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective,
and constitutional interpretation of the language of the
pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles
36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. Recall that the
petition for disqualification filed by Risos--‐‐Vidal
against former President Estrada, docketed as SPA No.
13--‐‐211 (DC), was anchored on Section 40 of the
LGC, in relation to Section 12 of the OEC, that is,
having been convicted of a crime punishable by
imprisonment of one year or more, and involving moral
turpitude, former President Estrada must be disqualified
to run for and hold public elective office notwithstanding
the fact that he is a grantee of a pardon that includes
a statement expressing "ʺhe is hereby restored to

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 his civil and political rights."ʺ Risos--‐‐Vidal theorizes
that former President Estrada is disqualified from
running for Mayor of Manila in he May 13, 2013
Elections, and remains disqualified to hold any local
elective post despite the presidential pardon extended to
him in 2007 by former President Arroyo for the reason
that it (pardon) did not expressly provide for the
remission of the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification, particularly the restoration of his
(former President Estrada) right to vote and be voted
upon for public office. She invokes Articles 36 and 41
of the Revised Penal Code as the foundations of her
theory. (ATTY. ALICIA RISOS--‐‐VIDAL,
ALFREDO S. LIM, vs. COMMISSION ON
ELECTIONS and JOSEPH EJERCITO ESTRADA,
G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015)

- AMNESTY- Kapunan, Jr. vs. CA, 51 SCRA 42, March

13, 2009.- The text of Proclamation No. 347 then issued by
President Fidel V. Ramos covered the members of the AFP- it
extends to all persons who committed the particular acts
described in the provision, and not just rebels or insurgents.

- TREATY MAKING POWER- Bayan vs. Zamora, 342

SCRA 449-It is inconsequential whether the United States
treats the VFA only as an executive agreement because, under
international law, an executive agreement is as binding as a
treaty. (Also read USAFFE Veterans Ass. v. Treasurer 105
Phil. 1030) In the field of negotiation, the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.

- Akbayan vs. Aquino - The doctrine in PMPF v. Manglapus

that the treaty-making power is exclusive to the President,
being the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, was
echoed in BAYAN v. Executive Secretary where the Court
held:
By constitutional fiat and by the intrinsic nature of his office,
the President, as head of State, is the sole organ and authority in the
external affairs of the country. In many ways, the President is the
chief architect of the nation's foreign policy; his "dominance in the
field of foreign relations is (then) conceded." Wielding vast powers
and influence, his conduct in the external affairs of the nation, as
Jefferson describes, is “executive altogether.”

As regards the power to enter into treaties or international

agreements, the Constitution vests the same in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two thirds vote of all the
members of the Senate. In this light, the negotiation of the VFA and
the subsequent ratification of the agreement are exclusive acts which
pertain solely to the President, in the lawful exercise of his vast
executive and diplomatic powers granted him no less than by the

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fundamental law itself. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude, and Congress itself is powerless to invade it. x x x (Italics in
the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The same doctrine was reiterated even more recently in

Pimentel v. Executive Secretary where the Court ruled:

In our system of government, the President, being the head of

state, is regarded as the sole organ and authority in external relations
and is the country's sole representative with foreign nations. As the
chief architect of foreign policy, the President acts as the country's
mouthpiece with respect to international affairs. Hence, the President is
vested with the authority to deal with foreign states and governments,
extend or withhold recognition, maintain diplomatic relations, enter
into treaties, and otherwise transact the business of foreign relations.
In the realm of treaty-making, the President has the sole authority
to negotiate with other states.

Nonetheless, while the President has the sole authority to

negotiate and enter into treaties, the Constitution provides a
limitation to his power by requiring the concurrence of 2/3 of all the
members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty entered into by
him. x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

It has long been recognized that the power to enter into

treaties is vested directly and exclusively in the President,
subject only to the concurrence of at least two-thirds of all the
Members of the Senate for the validity of the treaty. In this
light, the authority of the President to enter into trade
agreements with foreign nations provided under P.D. 1464
may be interpreted as an acknowledgment of a power
already inherent in its office. It may not be used as basis
to hold the President or its representatives accountable to
Congress for the conduct of treaty negotiations.

This is not to say, of course, that the President’s power to

enter into treaties is unlimited but for the requirement of
Senate concurrence, since the President must still ensure that
all treaties will substantively conform to all the relevant
provisions of the Constitution. It follows from the above
discussion that Congress, while possessing vast legislative
powers, may not interfere in the field of treaty
negotiations. While Article VII, Section 21 provides for
Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the validity of
the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct of
negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate.

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- Pimentel, Jr. vs. Executive Secretary, July 6, 2005-Under
our Constitution, the power to ratify is vested in the
President, subject to the concurrence of the Senate. The
role of the Senate, however, is limited only to giving or
withholding its consent, or concurrence, to the ratification.
Hence, it is within the authority of the President to refuse to
submit a treaty to the Senate or, having secured its consent for
its ratification, refuse to ratify it. Although the refusal of a
state to ratify a treaty which has been signed in its behalf
is a serious step that should not be taken lightly, such
decision is within the competence of the President alone,
which cannot be encroached by this Court via a writ of
mandamus. The Supreme Court has no jurisdiction over
actions seeking to enjoin the President in the performance of
his official duties. The Court, therefore, cannot issue the writ
of mandamus prayed for by the petitioners as it is beyond its
jurisdiction to compel the executive branch of the government
to transmit the signed text of Rome Statute to the Senate.

- The terms “exchange of notes” and “executive

agreements” have been used interchangeably, exchange
of notes being considered a form executive agreement
that becomes binding through executive action. Om the
other hand, executive agreements concluded by the
President sometimes take form of more formal
documents denominated “agreements” or “protocols”.
Under international law, there is no difference between
treatises and executive agreements in terms of their
binding effects on the contracting states concerned, as
long as the negotiating functionaries have remained
within their power (Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641
SCRA 244).

- An executive agreement, according to the Supreme

Court, is a treaty within the meaning of that word in
international law and constitutes enforceable domestic
law (Nicolas v. Romulo,578 SCRA 438). Unlike a
treaty though, an executive agreement does not require
legislative concurrence, is usually less formal and deals
with a narrower range of subjects (China Machinery
and Equipment Corporation v. Sta. Maria, 665
SCRA 189). All that would be required for its
efficacy would be the agreement must be between
states; it must be written; and it must be governed by
international law (Ibid).

- An executive agreement that does not require the

concurrence of the Senate for its ratification may not
be used to amend a treaty that, under the Constitution,

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 is the product of the ratifying acts of the Executive
and the Senate (Ibid).

- POWER TO CLASSIFY PUBLIC LANDS and TO SELL

THE SAME- The power to classify lands as alienable
belongs to the President. Only lands, which have been
classified as alienable, may be sold. There must be a law
authorizing its sale or alienation by the President or by
another officer before conveyance can be executed on behalf
of the government (Section 48, Book I of the 1987
Administrative Code). Laurel vs. Garcia, 187 SCRA 797-
The President may not convey valuable real property of the
government on her sole will. Conveyance must be authorized
by a law enacted by Congress.

- POWER OF SUPERVISION OVER LOCAL

GOVERNMENTS- to ensure that local affairs are
administered according to law. xxx Insofar as existing
legislation authorizes the President (through the Secretary of
Local Government) to proceed against local officials
administratively.

ARTICLE VIII
(JUDICIAL)

- JUDICIAL REVIEW- Joya vs. PCGG; Kilosbayan vs.

Guingona; Oposa vs. Factoran (petitioners-children);
Kilosbayan vs. Morato; IBP vs. Zamora (IBP not proper
party); Gonzales vs. Narvasa (private citizen not proper
party).

- A person suing as a taxpayer must show that the act

complained of directly involves the illegal disbursement
of public funds derived from taxation. Contrary to the
assertion of JKG--‐Power Plates, MVPSP clearly
involves the expenditure of public funds. While the
motor vehicle registrants will pay for the license
plates, the bid documents and contract for MVPSP
indicate, that the government shall bear the burden of
paying for the project. Every portion of the national
treasury, when appropriated by Congress, must be
properly allocated and disbursed. Necessarily, an
allegation that public funds in the amount of P3.851
billion shall be used in a project that has undergone
an improper procurement process cannot be easily
brushed off by the Court. (Reynaldo M. Jacomille, vs.

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 Hon. Joseph Emilio A. Abaya, in his capacity as
Secretary of Transportation and Communications
(DOTC), et.al., G.R. No. 212381, April 22, 2015)

- Araullo vs. Aquino- The previous constitutions equally

recognized the extent of the power of judicial review and the
great responsibility of the judiciary in maintaining the
allocation of powers among the three great branches of the
government.

- The Secretary of Justice vs. Koruga, GR No. 166199,

April 24, 2009- Although the courts are without power to
directly decide matters over which full discretionary authority
has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of
the government and are not empowered to execute absolutely
their own judgment from that of Congress or of the President,
the Court may look into and resolve questions of whether or
not such judgment has been made with grave abuse of
discretion, when the act of the legislative or executive
department is contrary to the constitution, the law or
jurisprudence, or when executed whimsically, capriciously or
arbitrarily out of malice, ill will or personal bias.

- Gudani vs. Senga, August 15, 2006- Courts are empowered,

under the constitutional principle of judicial review, to
arbitrate disputes between the legislative and executive
branches of government on the proper constitutional
parameters of power.

- Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016-

Duterte's decision to have the remains of Marcos interred at
the LNMB involves a political question that is not a
justiciable controversy.

- The High Court also said the petitioners failed to show that
they have suffered or will suffer direct and personal injury as
a result of Marcos' burial at the heroes' cemetery. They
likewise violated the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative
remedies and hierarchy of courts; the SC said the petitioners
should have sought reconsideration of the order for Marcos'
burial with the defense department, or to file the petitions first
with the proper regional trial court.

- PROPER PARTY- In this jurisdiction, the Supreme Court

adopts the “DIRECT INJURY” test. In People vs. Vera, it
held that the person who impugns the validity of a statute
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such
that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.

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- However, being a mere procedural technicality, the
requirement of locus standi may be waived by the
Supreme Court in the exercise of its discretion. Even
when the petitioners have failed to show direct injury, they
have been allowed to sue under the “principle of
transcendental importance”; of overreaching significance
to society or of paramount public interest. DAVID, ET AL
VS. ARROYO; CHAVEZ VS. PEA, 384 SCRA 152;
BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN VS. ZAMORA,
342 SCRA 449; LIM VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, 380
SCRA 739; Biraogo vs. Philippine Truth Commission,
December 7, 2010.

- Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens and legislators may

be accorded standing to sue, provided that the following
requirements are met:
1. the cases involved constitutional issues;
2. for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds or that the tax measure
is unconstitutional;
3. for voters, there must be a showing of obvious
interest in the validity of the election law in
question;
4. for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that
the issues are of transcendental importance which
must be settled early; and
5. for legislators, there must be a claim that the official
action complained of infringes upon their
prerogatives as legislators.

- AIWA vs. Romulo, GR No. 157509, January 18, 2005- For

a citizen to have standing, he must establish that he has
suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the
allegedly illegal conduct of the government; the injury is
fairly traceable to the challenged action; and the injury is
likely to be redressed by a favorable action.

- TELEBAP VS.C OMELEC- proper party

1. registered voter – must show that the action concerns his
right of suffrage
2. taxpayer – he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation.
3. corporate entity- the party suing has substantial relation to
the third party; the third party cannot assert his constitutional
right; the right of the third party will be diluted unless the
party in court is allowed to espouse the third party’s
constitutional claim.

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- As the case involves constitutional questions, the Supreme
Court is not concerned with whether the petitioners are real
parties in interest, but whether they have legal standing. LA
BUGAL-B’LAAN TRIBAL ASS., INC., VS RAMOS, 421
SCRA 148.

- Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department

of Energy, GR 180771 April 21 2015- The Rules of
Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s
suit. A citizen’s suit under this rule allows any Filipino
citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental
law on behalf of minors or generations yet unborn. It is
essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are
not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the
real party in interest.

- Arigo vs. Swift- The public right of citizens to a balanced

and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to
refrain from impairing the environment.

- Ocampo vs. Enriquez, GR No. 225973, November 8, 2016-

Taxpayers have been allowed to sue where there is a claim
that public funds are illegally disbursed or that public money
is being deflected to any improper purpose or that public
funds are wasted through the enforcement of an invalid or
unconstitutional law. As concerned citizens- the issues are of
transcendental significance or of paramount public interest. In
cases involving such issues, the imminence and clarity of the
threat to fundamental constitutional rights outweigh the
necessity for prudence.

- EVEN WHEN THE ISSUES ARE MOOT AND

ACADEMIC, the Court still entertains to adjudicate the
substantive matter if there is a grave violation of the
constitution; to formulate controlling principles to guide the
bench, bar and public and capable of repetition, yet evading
review PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS. ROMULO, 429
SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The moot and academic principle is not a magical formula

that can automatically dissuade the courts in resolving a
case. Courts will decide cases, otherwise moot and academic,
if: first, there is grave violation of the constitution, second,
the exceptional character of the situation and the
paramount public interest is involved, third, when
constitutional issue raised requires formulation of
controlling principles to guide the bench, bar and the
public, and fourth, the case is capable of repetition yet
evading review. DAVID, ET AL. VS. ARROYO, ET AL.;

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 SANLAKAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 421 SCRA 656; ACOP VS.
GUINGONA, JR., 383 SCRA 577; ALBA-A VS.
COMELEC, 435 SCRA 98; Belgica vs. Ochoa, Nov. 19,
2013.

- POLITICAL QUESTIONS- are concerned with issues

dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a particular
measure. QUESTIONS REGARDING ADMINISTRATIVE
ISSUANCES will not preclude the SUPREME COURT from
exercising its power of judicial review to determine whether
or not there was grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction on the part of issuing authority under
its EXPANDED JURISDICTION- BRILLANTES VS.
COMELEC, 432 SCRA 269, June 15 2004.

- KILOSBAYAN VS. ERMITA, GR No. 177721, July 3,

2007 - Petitioners have standing to file the suit simply as
people’s organizations and taxpayers since the matter
involves an issue of utmost and far-reaching Constitutional
importance, namely, the qualification – nay, the citizenship –
of a person to be appointed a member of this Court. xxxx
This case is a matter of primordial importance involving
compliance with a Constitutional mandate. As the body
tasked with the determination of the merits of conflicting
claims under the Constitution, the Supreme Court is the
proper forum for resolving the issue, even as the JBC has
the initial competence to do so. xxx It is clear, therefore,
that from the records of this Court, respondent Ong is a
naturalized Filipino citizen. The alleged subsequent
recognition of his natural-born status by the Bureau of
Immigration and the DOJ cannot amend the final decision
of the trial court stating that respondent Ong and his
mother were naturalized along with his father.

- Effect of Declaration of Unconstitutionality of a

Legislative or Executive Act- The doctrine operative fact
doctrine recognizes the existence of the law or executive
act prior to the determination of its unconstitutionality as
an operative fact that produced consequences that always
be erased, ignored or disregarded. In short, it nullifies the
void law or executive act but sustains its effects. xxx It
applies only to cases where extraordinary circumstances exist
and only when the extraordinary circumstances have met the
stringent conditions that will permit its application. Xxx Its
application to the DAP proceeds from equity and fair play.
The consequences resulting from the DAP and its related
issuances could not be ignored or could no longer be
undone.(Araullo vs. Aquino)

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- As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law;
it confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all. The general rule is
supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which
provides. “Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones,
and their violation or non--‐‐observance shall not be
excused by disuse or custom or practice to the
contrary” (Yap v. Thenamaris Ship’s Management,
G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011). The doctrine of
operative fact serves as an exception to the
aforementioned general rule. The doctrine of operative
fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies
as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the
effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that
the existence of a statute prior to a determination of
unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have
consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past
cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration
(Ibid). The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of
unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on
those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was
applied to a criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it (Ibid).
The Operative Fact Doctrine will not be applied as an
exception when to rule otherwise would be iniquitous
and would send a wrong signal that an act may be
justified when based on an unconstitutional provision of
law (Ibid).

- The Doctrine of Operative Fact Extends as well to a Void

or Unconstitutional Executive Act: The term executive act
is broad enough to include any and all acts of the Executive,
including those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in
nature.

- In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. San Roque Power

Corporation (G.R. No. 187485, October 8, 2013), the
Supreme Court likewise declared that “for the operative act
doctrine to apply, there must be a ‘legislative or executive
measure,’ meaning a law or executive issuance.” Thus, the
Court opined there that the operative fact doctrine did not
apply to a mere administrative practice of the Bureau of
Internal Revenue, x x x.

- It is clear from the foregoing that the adoption and the

implementation of the DAP and its related issuances were

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 executive acts. The DAP itself, as a policy, transcended a
merely administrative practice especially after the Executive,
through the DBM, implemented it by issuing various
memoranda and circulars. (Maria Carolina P. Araullo, et
al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, et al. G.R. No.,
209287, 728 SCRA 1, July 1, 2014, En Banc [Bersamin])

- While the 1987 Constitution has provided the

qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does
not preclude the JBC from having its own set of
rules and procedures and providing policies to
effectively ensure its mandate. The functions of
searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and
incidental to the JBC'ʹs principal function of choosing
and recommending nominees for vacancies in the
judiciary for appointment by the President. However,
the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the
process that the JBC shall follow in determining
applicants'ʹ qualifications. In carrying out its main
function, the JBC has the authority to set the
standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every
vacancy in the judiciary, subject only to the
minimum qualifications required by the Constitution
and law for every position. The search for these long
held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility
in order to determine who is most fit among the
applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not
unbridled license to act in performing its duties.
(FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING
JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA--‐‐NEW BATAAN,
COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, v. JUDICIAL
AND BAR COUNCIL, G.R. No. 211833, April 07,
2015)

- Dulay v. JBC, GR No. 202143, July 3, 2012- the JBC’s

principal function is to recommend appointees to the
Judiciary. For every vacancy, the JBC submits to the
President a list of at least three nominees and the President
may not appoint anybody who is not in the list. Any vacancy
in the SC is required by the Constitution to be filled within 90
days from the occurrence thereof. It cannot, therefore, be
compromised only because the constitutionally named Chair
could not sit in the JBC. Although it would be preferable if
the membership of the JBC is complete, the JBC can still
operate to perform its mandated task of submitting the list of
nominees to the President even if the constitutionally named
ex-officio Chair does not sit in the JBC, the Court stressed.

The Court held that considering that the complete

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 membership in the JBC is preferable and pursuant to its
supervisory power over the JBC, it should not be deprived of
representation. It ruled that the most Senior Justice of the
High Court, who is not an applicant for the position of Chief
Justice, should participate in the deliberations for the
selection of nominees for the said vacant post and preside
over the proceedings in the absence of the constitutionally
named ex-officio chair, pursuant to Section 12 of RA 296, or
the Judiciary Act of 1948, which reads: “In case of vacancy in
the office of the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, or of his
inability to perform the duties and powers of his office, they
shall devolve upon the Associate Justice who is first in
precedence, until such disability is removed, or another Chief
Justice is appointed and duly qualified. This provision shall
apply to every Associate Justice who succeeds to the office of
the Chief Justice.”

- Chavez v. JBC, GR No. 202242, July 17, 2012- The Court

held that the use of the singular letter “a” preceding
“representative of Congress” in Section 8(1), Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution is unequivocal and leaves no room for
any other construction. The word “Congress” is used in its
generic sense. Considering the language of the subject
constitutional provision is clear and unambiguous, there is no
need to resort to extrinsic aids such as the records of the
Constitutional Commission.

- The Court noted that the Framers of the Constitution intended

to create a JBC as an innovative solution in response to the
public clamor in favor of eliminating politics in the
appointment of members of the Judiciary. To ensure judicial
independence, they adopted a holistic approach and hoped
that, in creating a JBC, the private sector and the three
branches of government would have an active role and equal
voice in the selection of the members of the Judiciary. “To
allow the Legislature to have more quantitive influence in the
JBC by having more than one voice speak, whether with one
full vote or one-half a vote each, would, as one former
congressman and member of the JBC put it, ‘negate the
principle of equality among the three branches of government
which is enshrined in the Constitution,’” declared the Court.

- The Court also held that the JBC’s seven-member

composition “serves a practical purpose, that is, to provide a
solution should there be a stalemate in voting.” It further held
that under the doctrine of operative facts where actions prior
to the declaration of unconstitutionality are legally recognized
as a matter of equity and fair play, all JBC’s prior official acts
are valid.

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- The Court ruled that it is not in a position to determine as to
who should remain as sole representative of Congress in the
JBC and that such is best left to the determination of
Congress.

- Jardeleza vs. Sereno, GR No. 213181, August 19, 2014- In

cases where an objection to an applicant’s qualification is
raised, the observance of due process neither negates nor
renders illusory the fulfillment of the duty of the JBC to
recommend. The “unanimity rule” of the JBC-009 resulted in
the deprivation of his right to due process.

- Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Aquino, G.R. No. 224302, February

21, 2017- President Aquino validly exercised his
discretionary power to appoint members of the Judiciary
when he disregarded the clustering of nominees into six
separate shortlists for the vacancies for the 16th, 17th, 18th,
19th, 20th, and 21st Sandiganbayan Associate Justices.
President Aquino merely maintained the well-established
practice, consistent with the paramount Presidential
constitutional prerogative, to appoint the six new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices from the 37 qualified
nominees, as if embodied in one JBC list. This does not
violate Article VIII, Section 9 of the 1987 Constitution which
requires the President to appoint from a list of at least three
nominees submitted by the JBC for every vacancy. To meet
the minimum requirement under said constitutional provision
of three nominees per vacancy, there should at least be 18
nominees from the JBC for the six vacancies for
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice; but the minimum
requirement was even exceeded herein because the JBC
submitted for the President's consideration a total of 37
qualified nominees. All the six newly appointed
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices met the requirement of
nomination by the JBC under Article VIII, Section 9 of the
1987 Constitution. Hence, the appointments of respondents
Musngi and Econg, as well as the other four new
Sandiganbayan Associate Justices, are valid and do not suffer
from any constitutional infirmity.

- QUALIFICATIONS FOR APPOINTMENT TO SC: Aside

from the qualifications for appointments to the SC provided in art
VIII, sec 7(1), there is a new rule issued by the JBC which is the
JBC No. 2020-01 or THE 2020 REVISED RULES OF THE
JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL which provides additional
requirements for the applicants to the judiciary which took effect
June 8, 2020.

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 1. have at least two and one-half (2.5) years remaining to
serve as an Associate Justice or Chief Justice of the Supreme
Court if they have served as

1. Associate Justice or Presiding Justice of an

appellate court
2. Court Administrator;
3. Chairperson of a Constitutional Commission;
4. Solicitor General; or
5. Department Secretary; or

2. have at least five (5) years remaining to serve as an

Associate Justice or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, if
they had not served any of the positions in the
immediately preceding paragraph or if they are private
practitioners.”

- FISCAL AUTONOMY- Bengzon vs. Drilon (G.R. No.

103524, 15 April 1992, 208 SCRA 133, 150)- the Judiciary
has "full flexibility to allocate and utilize (its) resources with
the wisdom and dispatch that (its) needs require". The Chief
Justice must be given a free hand on how to augment
appropriations where augmentation is needed. the Chief
Justice and the Court En Banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits
they extend to justices, judges, court officials and court
personnel within the parameters of the Court’s granted power;
they determine the terms, conditions and restrictions of the
grant as grantor.

- In the context of the grant now in issue, the use of the formula
provided in CFAG Joint Resolution No. 35 is a part of the
Court’s exercise of its discretionary authority to determine the
manner the granted retirement privileges and benefits can be
availed of. Any kind of interference on how these retirement
privileges and benefits are exercised and availed of, not only
violates the fiscal autonomy and independence of the
Judiciary, but also encroaches upon the constitutional duty
and privilege of the Chief Justice and the Supreme Court En
Banc to manage the Judiciary’s own affairs.

- AM No. 11-7-10-SC, July 31, 2012- The Chief Justice and

the Supreme Court en banc determine and decide the who,
what, where, when and how of the privileges and benefits
they may extend to the justices, judges, court officials and
court personnel within the parameters of the court’s granted
power.

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 - PP VS. DY, 395 SCRA 256- Under Article VIII, Section
4(1) of the Constitution, the Supreme Court may sit en banc
or, in its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or seven
members.

- IBP vs. Zamora, deployment of marines – is justiciable- the

problem being one of legality or validity, not its wisdom.

- FARIÑAS VS. EXEC. SEC., 417 SCRA 503- Policy

matters are not the concern of the Supreme Court-
government policy is within the exclusive dominion of the
political branches of the government.

- CHANGE OF VENUE-Larranaga vs. CA, 287 SCRA 581,

A motion to change the venue of (and authority to conduct)
preliminary investigation cannot be taken cognizance by the
courts for lack of jurisdiction. The holding of a preliminary
investigation is a function of the Executive department and
not of the judiciary.

- PP vs. Sola, 103 SCRA 393 (1981)- In case of doubt, it

should be resolved in favor of change of venue.

- PP VS. TUBONGBANUA, GR No. 171271- August 31,

2006- In view of the enactment of Republic Act No. 9346 or
the Act Prohibiting the Imposition of Death Penalty on June
24, 2006, the penalty that should be meted is reclusion
perpetua, thus:

- SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby

prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand One
Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the
Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is hereby repealed.
Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A.
No. 7659), otherwise known as the Death Penalty Law and all other
laws, executive orders and decrees insofar as they impose the death
penalty are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.

- SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be

imposed:(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated
makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code;
or (b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not
make use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the Revised Penal Code.

- The Rule Making Power- PROMULGATE RULES

concerning the protection and enforcement of
constitutional rights, pleading, practice and procedure in
all court, the admission to the practice of law, the IBP,
and legal assistance to the underprivileged. NOTE:
Limitations: simplified and inexpensive procedure; uniform;
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights.

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- GSIS vs. Heirs of Caballero, 632 SCRA 5, October 14,
2010- Unlike the 1935 and 1973 constitutions, which
empowered Congress to repeal, alter or supplement the rules
of the Supreme Court concerning pleading, practice, and
procedure, the 1987 constitution removed this power from
Congress. Hence, the Supreme Court has now the sole
authority to promulgate rules concerning pleading,
practice and procedure in all courts, viewed from this
perspective, the claim of legislative grant of exemption from
the payment of legal fees under Section 39 of RA 8291
necessarily fails.

- Estipona vs. Lobrigo, G.R. No. 226679; August 15, 2017-

Section 23 of RA 9165 is unconstitutional for two reason.
First, it violates the equal protection clause since other
criminals (rapists, murderers, etc.) are allowed to plea bargain
but drug offenders are not, considering that rape and murder
are more heinous than drug offenses. Second, it violates the
doctrine of separation of powers by encroaching upon the
rule-making power of the Supreme Court under the
constitution. Plea-bargaining is procedural in nature and
it is within the sole prerogative of the Supreme Court.

- WRIT OF AMPARO – The right to enforce and protect a

person’s rights guaranteed and recognized by the bill of
rights. It is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened
with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The
writ covers extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or
threats thereof.

- Upon filing of the petition or at anytime before final

judgment, the court, justice or judge may grant any of the
following reliefs:

- (a) Temporary Protection Order. “ The court, justice or

judge, upon motion or motu proprio, may order that the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family be protected in a government agency or by
an accredited person or private institution capable of keeping
and securing their safety. If the petitioner is an organization,
association or institution referred to in Section 3(c) of the
Rule, the protection may be extended to the officers involved.
The Supreme Court shall accredit the persons and private
institutions that shall extend temporary protection to the
petitioner or the aggrieved party and any member of the
immediate family, in accordance with guidelines which it

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 shall issue. The accredited persons and private institutions
shall comply with the rules and conditions that may be
imposed by the court, justice or judge.

- (b) Inspection Order. ” The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession or control of a designated land or other
property, to permit entry for the purpose of inspecting,
measuring, surveying, or photographing the property or any
relevant object or operation thereon. The motion shall state in
detail the place or places to be inspected. It shall be supported
by affidavits or testimonies of witnesses having personal
knowledge of the enforced disappearance or whereabouts of
the aggrieved party. If the motion is opposed on the ground of
national security or of the privileged nature of the
information, the court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing
in chambers to determine the merit of the opposition. The
movant must show that the inspection order is necessary to
establish the right of the aggrieved party alleged to be
threatened or violated. The inspection order shall specify the
person or persons authorized to make the inspection and the
date, time, place and manner of making the inspection and
may prescribe other conditions to protect the constitutional
rights of all parties. The order shall expire five (5) days after
the date of its issuance, unless extended for justifiable
reasons.

- (c) Production Order. “ The court, justice or judge, upon

verified motion and after due hearing, may order any person
in possession, custody or control of any designated
documents, papers, books, accounts, letters, photographs,
objects or tangible things, or objects in digitized or electronic
form, which constitute or contain evidence relevant to the
petition or the return, to produce and permit their inspection,
copying or photographing by or on behalf of the movant. The
motion may be opposed on the ground of national security or
of the privileged nature of the information, in which case the
court, justice or judge may conduct a hearing in chambers to
determine the merit of the opposition. The court, justice or
judge shall prescribe other conditions to protect the
constitutional rights of all the parties.

- (d) Witness Protection Order. “ The court, justice or judge,

upon motion or motu proprio, may refer the witnesses to the
Department of Justice for admission to the Witness
Protection, Security and Benefit Program, pursuant to
Republic Act No. 6981. The court, justice or judge may also
refer the witnesses to other government agencies, or to

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 accredited persons or private institutions capable of keeping
and securing their safety.

- Caram vs. Segui, GR No. 193652, August 5, 2014- A petition

for a writ of amparo is improper remedy to regain parental
authority and custody ove a minor child who was legally put up
for adoption.

- Masangkay vs. del Rosario, G.R. No. 182484, June 17,

2008- To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was
originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise in
the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to
the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to
address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond
those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to
protect concerns that are purely property or commercial.
Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and
uncertain grounds. Where, as in this case, there is an
ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory
dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we
see no point in separately and directly intervening through a
writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie
showing that the right to life, liberty or security – the
personal concern that the writ is intended to protect - is
immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger
or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an
application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by
motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying
by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with
a separately filed criminal case.

- WRIT OF HABEAS DATA- It is a remedy available to any

person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is
violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity
engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
information regarding the person, family, home and
correspondence of the aggrieved party.

- Section 6 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data requires

the following material allegations of ultimate facts in a
petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data:
(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner and the
respondent;
(b) The manner the right to privacy is violated or

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 threatened and how it affects the right to life, liberty or
security of the aggrieved party;
(c) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to
secure the data or information;
(d) The location of the files, registers or databases, the
government office, and the person in charge, in
possession or in control of the data or information, if
known;

(e) The reliefs prayed for, which may include the

updating, rectification, suppression or destruction of
the database or information or files kept by the
respondent.

- Lee vs. Ilagan, GR No. 203254, October 8, 2014- The Rule

requires that the petition must sufficiently allege the manner
in which the right to privacy is violated or threatened with
violation and how such violation, or threats affects the right to
life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

- Marynette Gamboa vs. Chan, GR No.193616, July 24,

2012- The forwarding of information by the PNP to the
Zenarosa Commission was not unlawful act as that violates or
threatens to violate the right to privacy in life, liberty or
security as to entitle the petitioner to the writ of habeas data.

- Vivares vs. St. Therese College, GR No. 202666,

September 29, 2014- petitioners have no reasonable
expectation of privacy that would warrant the issuance of a
writ of habeas data when their daughters shared the
incriminating pictures with their Facebook Friends. Before
one can have an expectation of privacy in his or her Online
Social Network activity, it is necessary that the user in this
case, the sanctioned students, should manifest the intention to
keep certain posts private, through the employment of
measures to prevent access thereto or limit its visibility.

- Aruelo vs. Court of Appeals, 227 SCRA 475- The

COMELEC cannot adopt a rule prohibiting the filing of
certain pleadings in the regular courts. The power to
promulgate rules concerning pleadings, practice and
procedure in all courts is vested on the Supreme Court.

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 16429, December 19,

2005- Congress has the plenary legislative power. The silence
of the Constitution on the subject can only be interpreted as
meaning there is no intention to diminish that plenary power.
RA 8974 which requires full payment before the State may

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 exercise proprietary rights, contrary to Rule 67 which requires
only a deposit was recognized by the Supreme Court.

- PEOPLE VS. MATEO, July 7, 2004 – While the

fundamental law requires mandatory review by the Supreme
Court of cases where the penalty is reclusion perpetua, life
imprisonment, or death, nowhere however, has it proscribed
an intermediate review. The Supreme Court deems it wise and
compelling to provide in these cases a review by the Court of
Appeals before the case is elevated to the Supreme Court.

- Procedural matters, first and foremost, fall more squarely

within the rule making prerogative of the Supreme Court
than the law making power of Congress. The rule allowing
an intermediate review by the Court of Appeals, a subordinate
appellate court, before the case is elevated to the Supreme
Court for automatic review, is such a procedural matter.

- MINUTE RESOLUTION- Komatsu vs. CA, 289 SCRA

604- does not violate Section 14. Resolutions are not
decisions within the constitutional requirement; they merely
hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and
the petition to review decision of the CA is not a matter of
right but of sound judicial discretion, hence, there is no need
to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for one thing, the
facts and the law are already mentioned in the CA decision.

- German Machineries Corporation vs. Endaya, 444 SCRA

329- The mandate under Section 14, Article VIII of the
constitution is applicable only in cases “submitted for
decision”, i.e, given due course and after the filing of the
briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where a
resolution is issued denying due course to a petition and
stating the legal basis thereof.

- Solid Homes, Inc. vs. Laserna, 550 SCRA 613- The

constitutional mandate that “no decision shall be rendered by
any court without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the
facts and the law on which it is bases”, does not preclude the
validity of “memorandum decisions”, which adopt by
reference the finding of fact and conclusions of law contained
in the decisions of inferior tribunals.

- Joaquin-Agregado v. Yama, March 20, 2009, GR No.

181107- The Supreme Court stressed that it has the discretion
to decide whether a “minute resolution” should be used in lieu
of a full-blown decision in any particular case. Further, the
Supreme Court explained that the grant of due course to a
petition for review is not a matter of right, but of sound

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 judicial discretion. When it fails to find any reversible error
committed by the CA, there is no need to fully explain the
Court’s denial as it means that the Supreme Court agrees
with or adopts the findings and conclusions of the CA. “There
is no point in reproducing or restating in the resolution of
denial the conclusions of the appellate court affirmed”.The
constitutional requirement of sec. 14, Art. VIII of a clear
presentation of facts and laws applies to decisions, where
the petition is given due course, but not where the petition
is denied due course, with the resolution stating the legal
basis for the dismissal.

- Oil & National Gas Com. vs. CA, 293 SCRA 26- Section
14 does not preclude the validity of “Memorandum
Decision” which adopt by reference the findings of fact and
conclusions of law contained in the decisions of inferior
tribunals. It is intended to avoid cumbersome reproduction of
the decision (or portions thereof) of the lower court.

ARTICLE IX
(CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSIONS)
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION

- GSIS VS. CSC, 202 SCRA 799- The grant to the Civil
Service Commission of adjudicatory power, or the authority
to hear and adjudge cases, necessarily includes the power to
enforce or order execution of its decisions, resolutions, or
orders. The authority to decide cases would be inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see that what has been
decided is carried out.

- Pangasinan State University vs. CA, 526 SRCA 92- The

CSC is the sole arbiter of controversies relating to the civil
service.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CSC, 528 SCRA 535- since

the responsibility of the establishment, administration and
maintenance of qualification standards lies with the
concerned department or agency, the role of the CSC is
limited to assisting the department agency with respect to
these qualification standards and approving them.

- CSC vs. Sojor, GR No. 168766, May 22, 2008- The

Constitution grants to the CSC administration over the entire
civil service. As defined, the civil service embraces every
branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
government, including every government-owned or controlled

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 corporation. It is further classified into career and non-career
service positions. Career service positions are those where:
(1) entrance is based on merit and fitness or highly technical
qualifications; (2) there is opportunity for advancement to
higher career positions; and (3) there is security of tenure. A
state university president with a fixed term of office
appointed by the governing board of trustees of the
university, is a non-career civil service officer. He was
appointed by the chairman and members of the governing
board of CVPC. By clear provision of law, respondent is
a non-career civil servant who is under the jurisdiction of
the CSC.

- CSC v. Alfonso, GR No. 179452, June 11, 2009,- Even though

the CSC has appellate jurisdiction over disciplinary cases decided
by government departments, agencies, and instrumentalities, a
complaint may be filed directly with the CSC, and the CSC has the
authority to hear and decide the case, although it may in its
discretion opt to deputize a department or an agency to conduct the
investigation, as provided for in the Civil Service Law of 1975. The
Supreme Court also ruled that since the complaints were filed
directly with the CSC and the CSC had opted to assume
jurisdiction over the complaint, the CSC’s exercise of jurisdiction
shall be to the exclusion of other tribunals exercising concurrent
jurisdiction.

- CSC vs. DBM, GR No. 158791, July 22, 2005- The no

“report, no release” policy may not be validly enforced
against offices vested with fiscal autonomy. Being automatic
connotes something mechanical, spontaneous and
perfunctory. It means that no condition to fund releases to it
may be imposed.

- Naseco vs. NLRC, 68 SCRA 122- Employees of GOCCs,

as a general rule, are governed by the Civil Service Law. But
a distinction of the manner the GOCC was created must be
made. If the GOCC was established through an original
charter (or special law), then it falls under the civil service,
e.g., GSIS and SSS. However, corporations which are
subsidiaries of these chartered agencies, e.g., Manila Hotel, is
excluded from the coverage of the civil service.

- Leveriza vs. IAC, 157 SCRA 282- An agency of

government refers to any of the various units of the
government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality or government-owned or controlled
corporation or a local government or a distinct unit therein.
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the national

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 government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed
with some if not all corporate powers, administering special
funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a
charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, institutes and
government-owned or controlled corporations,

- MWSS vs. Hernandez, 143 SCRA 602- If one is

employed in a GOCC, whether regular or not, the civil
service law applies. It is not true either that with respect to
money claims, the Labor Code applies. Regardless of the
nature of employment or claim, an employee in a GOCC with
original charter is covered by the Civil Service Law.

- Dimayuga vs. Benedicto II, 373 SCRA 652 (2002) – the

appointment to the positions in the Career Executive Service
may be considered permanent in which the appointee enjoys
security of tenure.

- Achacoso vs. Macaraig, 195 SCRA 235- permanent

appointment can be issued only to a “person who meets all
the requirements for the position to which he is being
appointed, including the appropriate eligibility prescribed.”
The mere fact that a position belongs to the Career Service
does not automatically confer security of tenure on its
occupant even if he does not possess the required
qualifications. Such right will have to “depend on the nature
of appointment, which in turn depends on his eligibility or
lack of it.

- Fernandez vs. Dela Paz, 160 SCRA 751- Unconsented

transfer of the officer, resulting in demotion in rank or salary
is a violation of the security of tenure clause in the
Constitution.

- Rosales, Jr. vs. Mijares, 442 SCRA 532- A transfer that

aims by indirect method to terminate services or to force
resignation constitutes removal.

- Estrada vs. Escritor, June 22, 2006 – In the area of religious

exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands
accountable to an authority higher than the state, and so the
state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that
its violation will erode the very fabric of the state that will
also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing such
state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the
Infinite.

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- Mateo vs. Court of Appeals, 247 SCRA 284- The party
aggrieved by a decision, ruling, order, or action of an agency
of the government involving termination of services may
appeal to the CSC within 15 days. Thereafter, he could go on
certiorari to the Supreme Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court if he still feels aggrieved by the ruling of the CSC.

- PRIMARILY CONFIDENTIAL- Montecillo vs. CSC, June

28, 2001- The CSC is expressly empowered by the
Administrative Code of 1987 to declare positions in the Civil
Service primarily confidential. (Read: Salazar vs. Mathay, 73
SCRA 285, on two instances when a position may be
considered primarily confidential: (1) President declares the
position to be primarily confidential upon recommendation of
of the CSC; (2) when by the nature of the functions, there
exists close intimacy between the appointee and appointing
authority which ensures freedom of intercourse without
embarrassment or freedom from misgiving or betrayals of
personal trust or confidential matters of state.

HILARIO VS. CSC, 243 SCRA 206, City Legal Officer is

primarily confidential.

PAGCOR VS. RILLORAZA, June 25, 2001, The position

of Casino Operations Manager is not primarily confidential.

- Funa vs Agra, GR 191644 Feb 19 2013-The designation of

Agra as Acting Secretary of Justice concurrently with his
position of Acting Solicitor General violates the constitutional
prohibition under Article VII, Section 13 of the 1987
Constitution.

- It is immaterial that Agra’s designation was in an acting or

temporary capacity. Section 13 plainly indicates that the
intent of the Framers of the Constitution is to impose a stricter
prohibition on the President and the Cabinet Members in so
far as holding other offices or employments in the
Government or in GOCCs is concerned. The prohibition
against dual or multiple offices being held by one official
must be construed as to apply to all appointments or
designations, whether permanent or temporary, because the
objective of Section 13 is to prevent the concentration of
powers in the Executive Department officials, specifically the
President, the Vice-President, the Cabinet Members and their
deputies and assistants.

- Agra’s designation as the Acting Secretary of Justice was not

in an ex officio capacity, by which he would have been
validly authorized to concurrently hold the two positions due

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 to the holding of one office being the consequence of holding
the other.

- Being included in the stricter prohibition embodied in Section

13, Agra cannot liberally apply in his favor the broad
exceptions provided in Article IX-B, Sec 7 (2) of the
Constitution to justify his designation as Acting Secretary of
Justice concurrently with his designation as Acting Solicitor
General, or vice versa. It is not sufficient for Agra to show
that his holding of the other office was “allowed by law or the
primary functions of his position.” To claim the exemption of
his concurrent designations from the coverage of the stricter
prohibition under Section 13, he needed to establish that his
concurrent designation was expressly allowed by the
Constitution.

- RESIGNATION- Estrada vs. Desierto, March 2, 2001, There

must intent to resign and the intent must be coupled by acts of
relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed
by any formal requirement as to form. It can be oral. It can be
written. It can be express. It can implied. As long as the
resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.
- To constitute a complete and operative resignation from
public office, there must be: (1) an intention to relinquish a
part of the term; (2) an act of relinquishment; and (3) an
acceptance by the proper authority. The last one is required
by reason of Article 238 of the Revised Penal Code.
(Sangguniang Bayan of San Andres, Catanduanes vs. CA,
284 SCRA 276, 1997)

- Funa vs. CSC, Nov. 25, 2014- designating the CSC chairman
as board member of GSIS, PHILHEALTH, ECC and HDMF
is unconstitutional for impairing the independence of the
CSC, and for violating the rule against holding of multiple
government positions as well as the concept ex-officio
positions.

- Santos vs. CA, 345 SCRA 553, (2000) – rule on double

compensation not applicable to pension. A retiree receiving
pension or gratuity after retirement can continue to receive
such pension or gratuity if he accepts another government
position to which another compensation is attached.

- PILC vs. Elma, G.R. No. 138965, March 5, 2007 – PCCG

Chair Magdangal Elma is prohibited under the Constitution
from simultaneously serving as Chief Presidential Legal
Counsel. The position of PCCG Chair and CPLC are
incompatible offices since the CPLC reviews actions of the
PCGG Chair. It pointed out that the general rule to hold more

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 than one office is “allowed by law or by the primary functions
of his position”/

- Del Castillo vs. Civil Service Commission, August 21,

1997- When an employee is illegally dismissed, and his
reinstatement is later ordered by the Court, for all legal intents
and purposes he is considered as not having left his office,
and notwithstanding the silence of the decision, he is entitled
to payment of back salaries.

- DOTC vs. Cruz, GR No. 178256, July 23, 2008 –The

Supreme Court follows as a precedent, the DOTC did not effect
Cruz's termination with bad faith and, consequently, no backwages
can be awarded in his favor.

- David vs. Gania GR No. 156030, August 14, 2003- A civil

service officer or employee, who has been found illegally
dismissed or suspended, is entitled to be reinstated and to
back wages and other monetary benefits from the time of
his illegal dismissal or suspension up to his reinstatement,
and if at the time the decision of exoneration is promulgated,
he is already of retirement age, he shall be entitled not only to
back wages but also to full retirement benefits.

- CSC vs. Dacoycoy, April 29, 1999 – The CSC as an

aggrieved party, may appeal the decision of the Court of
Appeals to the Supreme Court. Appeal now lies from a
decision exonerating a civil service employee of
administrative charges.

- CSC vs. Albao, October 13, 2005- The present case partakes
of an act by petitioner CSC to protect the integrity of the civil
service system, and does not fall under the provision on
disciplinary actions under Sec. 47. It falls under the
provisions of Sec. 12, par. 11, on administrative cases
instituted by it directly. This is an integral part of its duty,
authority and power to administer the civil service system
and protect its integrity, as provided in Article IX-B, Sec. 3 of
the Constitution, by removing from its list of eligibles those
who falsified their qualifications. This is to be distinguished
from ordinary proceedings intended to discipline a bona fide
member of the system, for acts or omissions that constitute
violations of the law or the rules of the service.

- SSS Employees Ass. vs. CA, 175 SCRA 686- While the
Constitution and the Labor Code are silent as to whether
government employees may strike, they are prohibited from
striking by express provision of Memorandum Circular

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 No. 6, series of 1997 of the CSC and as implied in E.O.
180.

COMELEC

- REAPPOINTMENT OF COMMISSIONERS- Matibag

vs. Benipayo, April 2, 2002- The phrase “without
reappointment” applies only to one who has been appointed
by the President and confirmed by the Commission on
Appointments, whether or not such person completes his term
of office which could be seven, five or three years. There
must be a confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of the previous appointment before the
prohibition on reappointment can apply.

- ISSUANCE of writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus

only in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.- Relampagos vs.
Cumba, 243 SCRA 690.

- Bedol vs. COMELEC, GR No. 179830, December 3, 2009-

The COMELEC possesses the power to conduct
investigations as an adjunct to its constitutional duty to
enforce and administer all election laws, by virtue of the
explicit provisions of paragraph 6, Section 2, Article IX of the
1987 Constitution, which reads:

Article IX-C, Section 2. xxx

- (6) xxx; investigate and, where appropriate, prosecute cases

of violations of election laws, including acts or omissions
constituting election frauds, offenses, and malpractices.

- The powers and functions of the COMELEC, conferred upon

it by the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code,
may be classified into administrative, quasi-legislative, and
quasi-judicial. The quasi-judicial power of the COMELEC
embraces the power to resolve controversies arising from the
enforcement of election laws, and to be the sole judge of all
pre-proclamation controversies; and of all contests relating to
the elections, returns, and qualifications. Its quasi-legislative
power refers to the issuance of rules and regulations to
implement the election laws and to exercise such legislative
functions as may expressly be delegated to it by Congress. Its
administrative function refers to the enforcement and
administration of election laws. In the exercise of such power,
the Constitution (Section 6, Article IX-A) and the Omnibus
Election Code (Section 52 [c]) authorize the COMELEC to

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 issue rules and regulations to implement the provisions of the
1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code.7

- The quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power is the

power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the
legislative policy is to apply, and to decide in accordance with
the standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The Court, in Dole Philippines
Inc. v. Esteva, described quasi-judicial power in the following
manner, viz:

- Quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power on the

other hand is the power of the administrative agency to
adjudicate the rights of persons before it. It is the power to
hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislative
policy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the
standards laid down by the law itself in enforcing and
administering the same law. The administrative body
exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a
judicial manner an act which is essentially of an executive or
administrative nature, where the power to act in such manner
is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the performance
of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In
carrying out their quasi-judicial functions the administrative
officers or bodies are required to investigate facts or ascertain
the existence of facts, hold hearings, weigh evidence, and
draw conclusions from them as basis for their official action
and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature. Since rights of
specific persons are affected, it is elementary that in the
proper exercise of quasi-judicial power due process must be
observed in the conduct of the proceedings.

- Task Force Maguindanao’s fact-finding investigation – to

probe into the veracity of the alleged fraud that marred the
elections in said province; and consequently, to determine
whether the certificates of canvass were genuine or spurious,
and whether an election offense had possibly been committed
– could by no means be classified as a purely ministerial or
administrative function.

- The COMELEC, through the Task Force Maguindanao, was

exercising its quasi-judicial power in pursuit of the truth
behind the allegations of massive fraud during the elections in
Maguindanao. To achieve its objective, the Task Force
conducted hearings and required the attendance of the parties
concerned and their counsels to give them the opportunity to
argue and support their respective positions.

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- The effectiveness of the quasi–judicial power vested by law
on a government institution hinges on its authority to compel
attendance of the parties and/or their witnesses at the hearings
or proceedings.

- In the same vein, to withhold from the COMELEC the power

to punish individuals who refuse to appear during a fact-
finding investigation, despite a previous notice and order to
attend, would render nugatory the COMELEC’s investigative
power, which is an essential incident to its constitutional
mandate to secure the conduct of honest and credible
elections. In this case, the purpose of the investigation was
however derailed when petitioner obstinately refused to
appear during said hearings and to answer questions regarding
the various election documents which, he claimed, were
stolen while they were in his possession and custody.
Undoubtedly, the COMELEC could punish petitioner for such
contumacious refusal to attend the Task Force hearings.

- Even assuming arguendo that the COMELEC was acting as a

board of canvassers at that time it required petitioner to
appear before it, the Court had the occasion to rule that the
powers of the board of canvassers are not purely ministerial.
The board exercises quasi-judicial functions, such as the
function and duty to determine whether the papers transmitted
to them are genuine election returns signed by the proper
officers.10 When the results of the elections in the province of
Maguindanao were being canvassed, counsels for various
candidates posited numerous questions on the certificates of
canvass brought before the COMELEC. The COMELEC
asked petitioner to appear before it in order to shed light on
the issue of whether the election documents coming from
Maguindanao were spurious or not. When petitioner
unjustifiably refused to appear, COMELEC undeniably acted
within the bounds of its jurisdiction when it issued the
assailed resolutions.

- Grace Poe vs. COMELEC- The COMELEC cannot itself,

in the same cancellation case, decide the qualification or lack
thereof of the candidate.

- The assimilation in Rule 25 of the COMELEC rules of

grounds for ineligibility into grounds for disqualification is
contrary to the evident intention of the law. For not only in
their grounds but also in their consequences are proceedings
for "disqualification" different from those for a
declaration of "ineligibility." "Disqualification"
proceedings, as already stated, are based on grounds
specified in § 12 and §68 of the Omnibus Election Code

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 and in §40 of the Local Government Code and are for the
purpose of barring an individual from becoming a
candidate or from continuing as a candidate for public
office. In a word, their purpose is to eliminate a candidate
from the race either from the start or during its progress.
"Ineligibility," on the other hand, refers to the lack of the
qualifications prescribed in the Constitution or the
statutes for holding public office and the purpose of the
proceedings for declaration of ineligibility is to remove the
incumbent from office.

- Consequently, that an individual possesses the qualifications

for a public office does not imply that he is not disqualified
from becoming a candidate or continuing as a candidate for a
public office and vice versa.

- Bagumbayan-VNP vs COMELEC, GR 222731, March 8

2016- The minimum functional capabilities enumerated under
Section 6 of Republic Act 8436, as amended, are mandatory.
xxx The law is clear that a “voter verified paper audit trail”
requires the following: (a) individual voters can verify
whether the machines have been able to count their votes; and
(b) that the verification at minimum should be paper based.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is empowered to
enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of election, and one of the laws that it must
implement is RA 8346 which requires the automated
election system to have the capability of providing a
VVPAT. The COMELEC’s act of not enabling this
feature runs contrary to why the law requires this feature
in the first place.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS

IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et
al- [G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011- The power to fix the
date of elections is essentially legislative in nature, as evident
from, and exemplified by, the following provisions of the
Constitution:

- Section 8, Article VI, applicable to the legislature, provides:

Section 8.Unless otherwise provided by law, the regular

election of the Senators and the Members of the House of
Representatives shall be held on the second Monday of May.
[Emphasis ours]

Section 4 (3), Article VII, with the same tenor but applicable
solely to the President and Vice-President, states:

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 xxx xxx x x. Section 4.. . . Unless otherwise provided by
law, the regular election for President and Vice-President
shall be held on the second Monday of May. [Emphasis ours
while Section 3, Article X, on local government, provides:

Section 3.The Congress shall enact a local government

code which shall provide for . . . the qualifications, election,
appointment and removal, terms, salaries, powers and
functions and duties of local officials[.] [Emphases ours

- Sema vs. COMELEC, 558 SCRA 700- The COMELEC

does not have the requisite power to call elections, as the
same is part of the plenary legislative power.

- LDP vs. COMELEC, GR No. 151265, February 24, 2004 -

The COMELEC correctly stated that “the ascertainment of
the identity of [a] political party and its legitimate officers” is
a matter that is well within its authority. The source of this
authority is no other than the fundamental law itself, which
vests upon the COMELEC the power and function to enforce
and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an election. In the exercise of such power and in the
discharge of such function, the Commission is endowed with
ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free,
orderly and honest elections.

- LP vs. ATIENZA, ET AL., GR No. 174992- April 17, 2007

– COMELEC has jurisdiction to decide questions of
leadership within a party and to ascertain its legitimate
officers and leaders. xxx The COMELEC is endowed with
ample “wherewithal” and “considerable latitude in adopting
means and methods that will ensure the accomplishment of
the great objectives for which it was created to promote free
and orderly honest elections.

- Atienza vs. COMELEC, GR No. 188920, February 16,

2010- While the question of party leadership has implications
on the COMELEC’s performance of its functions under
Section 2 of Art. IX-C of the constitution, the same cannot be
said of the issue pertaining to Ateinza, et al.’s expulsion from
the LP. Such expulsion is for the moment an issue of party
membership and discipline, in which the COMELEC cannot
interfere, given the limited scope of its power over political
parties.

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- Galang vs. Geronimo and Ramos, (GR No. 192793,
February 22, 2011)- In election cases involving an act or
omission of a municipal or regional trial court, petition for
certiorari shall be filed exclusively with the COMELEC, in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

- Balajonda vs. COMELEC, GR No. 166032, February 28,

2005- Despite the silence of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the
COMELEC’s authority to do so, considering that the
suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of
Procedure which provides that absent any applicable
provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory
character and effect.

- Codilla vs. De Venecia, et al., December 10, 2002- Section

3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution empowers the
COMELEC en banc to review, on motion for reconsideration,
decisions or resolutions decided by a division. Since the
petitioner seasonably filed a Motion for Reconsideration
of the Order of the Second Division suspending his
proclamation and disqualifying him, the COMELEC en
banc was not divested of its jurisdiction to review the
validity of the said Order of the Second Division. The said
Order of the Second Division was yet unenforceable as it has
not attained finality; the timely filing of the motion for
reconsideration suspends its execution. It cannot, thus, be
used as the basis for the assumption in office of the
respondent as the duly elected Representative of the 4th
legislative district of Leyte.

- Sarmiento vs. COMELEC, 212 SCRA 307- The

COMELEC en banc does not have the authority to hear and
decide cases at the first instance. Under the COMELEC
Rules, pre-proclamation cases are classified as Special Cases
and in compliance with the provision of the Constitution, the
two divisions of the COMELEC are vested with the authority
to hear and decide these special cases.

- Santiago vs. COMELEC, March 19, 1997 - COMELEC

cannot validly promulgate rules and regulations to implement
the exercise of the right of the people to directly propose
amendments to the Constitution through the system of
initiative. It does not have that power under R.A. No. 6735.
Reliance on the COMELEC’s power under Section 2(1) of
Article IX-C of the Constitution is misplaced, for the laws

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 and regulations referred to therein are those promulgated by
the COMELEC under (a) Section 3 of Article IX-C of the
Constitution, or (b) a law where subordinate legislation is
authorized and which satisfies the “completeness” and the
“sufficient standard” tests.

- The COMELEC acquires jurisdiction over a petition for

initiative only after its filing. The petition then is the
initiatory pleading. Nothing before its filing is cognizable by
the COMELEC, sitting en banc. The only participation of the
COMELEC or its personnel before the filing of such petition
are (1) to prescribe the form of the petition; (2) to issue
through its Election Records and Statistics Office a certificate
on the total number of registered voters in each legislative
district; (3) to assist, through its election registrars, in the
establishment of signature stations; and (4) to verify, through
its election registrars, the signatures on the basis of the
registry list of voters, voters’ affidavits, and voters’
identification cards used in the immediately preceding
election.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, January 23, 2006- The conduct

of plebiscite and determination of its result have always been
the business of the COMELEC and not the regular courts.
Such a case involves the appreciation of ballots which is best
left to the COMELEC. As an independent constitutional
body exclusively charged with the power of enforcement
and administration of all laws and regulations relative to
the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative,
referendum and recall, the COMELEC has the
indisputable expertise in the field of election and related
laws.” Its acts, therefore, enjoy the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duties.

- Alunan III vs. Mirasol, GR No. 108399, July 31, 1997 –

Contests involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of the COMELEC.

- Loong vs. COMELEC, 305 SCRA 832- The COMELEC

may validly order a manual count notwithstanding the
required automated counting of ballots in R. A. 8436, the law
authorizing the commission to use an automated election
system, if that is the only way to count votes. It ought to be
self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a
COMELEC that cannot count the result of an election.

- Limkaichong vs. COMELEC- Resolution No. 8062 is a

valid exercise of the COMELEC’s constitutionally mandated
power to promulgate its own rules of procedure relative to the

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 conduct of the elections. In adopting such policy-guidelines
for the May 14, 2007 National and Local Elections, the
COMELEC had in mind the objective of upholding the
sovereign will of the people and in the interest of justice and
fair play. Accordingly, those candidates whose
disqualification cases are still pending at the time of the
elections, should they obtain the highest number of votes
from the electorate, shall be proclaimed but that their
proclamation shall be without prejudice to the continuation of
the hearing and resolution of the involved cases.

- Fernandez vs. COMELEC, 556 SCRA 765- The 1987

constitution vests COMELEC appellate jurisdiction over all
contests involving barangay officials decided by the trial
courts of limited jurisdiction.

- Cayetano vs. COMELEC, GR 193846, April 12, 2011-

Final orders of a COMELEC Division denying the affirmative
defenses of petitioner cannot be questioned before the
Supreme Court even via a petition for certiorari.

COMMISSION ON AUDIT

- COA’S AUDITING POWER- Blue Bar Coconut Phils. vs.

Tantuico- Corporations covered by the COA’s auditing
powers are not limited to GOCCs. Where a private
corporation or entity handles public funds, it falls under COA
jurisdiction. Under Sec. 2(1), item, (d), non-governmental
entities receiving subsidies or equity directly or indirectly
from or through the government are required to submit to post
audit.

- DBP vs. COA, January 16, 2002 -The mere fact that private
auditors may audit government agencies does not divest the
COA of its power to examine and audit the same government
agencies. The COA is neither by-passed nor ignored since
even with a private audit the COA will still conduct its usual
examination and audit, and its findings and conclusions will
still bind government agencies and their officials. A
concurrent private audit poses no danger whatsoever of public
funds or assets escaping the usual scrutiny of a COA audit.
Manifestly, the express language of the Constitution, and the
clear intent of its framers, point to only one indubitable
conclusion - the COA does not have the exclusive power to
examine and audit government agencies. The framers of
the Constitution were fully aware of the need to allow
independent private audit of certain government agencies in
addition to the COA audit, as when there is a private

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 investment in a government-controlled corporation, or when a
government corporation is privatized or publicly listed, or as
in the case at bar when the government borrows money from
abroad.

- BSP vs. COA, January 22, 2006 - Retirement benefits

accruing to a public officer may not, without his consent, be
withheld and applied to his indebtedness to the government.

- MISON vs. COA, 187 SCRA 445, The chairman of COA,

acting by himself, has no authority to render or promulgate a
decision for the commission. The power to decide on issues
relating to audit and accounting is lodged in the COA acting
as a collegial body which has the jurisdiction to decide any
case brought before it.

- PHIL. OPERATIONS, INC. vs Auditor General, 94 Phil

868, COA’s power over the settlement of accounts is
different from power over unliquidated claims, the latter
of which is within the ambit of judicial power.

- Santiago vs. COA, 537 SCRA 740- The COA can direct the
proper officer to withhold a municipal treasurer’s salary and
other emoluments up to the amount of her alleged shortage
but no to apply the withheld amount to the alleged shortage
for which her liability is still being litigated.

- NHA vs. COA, 226 SCRA 55, COA can validly disallow the
approval of excess or unnecessary expenditures.

- DELA LLANA VS. COA, ET AL., [G.R. No. 180989. February

7, 2012]- There is nothing in the said provision that requires the
COA to conduct a pre-audit of all government transactions and for
all government agencies. The only clear reference to a pre-audit
requirement is found in Section 2, paragraph 1, which provides that
a post audit is mandated for certain government or private entities
with state subsidy or equity and only when the internal control
system of an audited entity is inadequate. In such a situation, the
COA may adopt measures, including a temporary or special pre-
audit, to correct the deficiencies.

- Hence, the conduct of a pre-audit is not a mandatory duty that this

Court may compel the COA to perform. This discretion on its part
is in line with the constitutional pronouncement that the COA has
the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and
examination. When the language of the law is clear and explicit,
there is no room for interpretation, only application. Neither can
the scope of the provision be unduly enlarged by this Court.

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- GR No. 192791, Funa v. COA Chair, April 24, 2012- The
appointment of members of any of the three constitutional
commissions, after the expiration of the uneven terms of office of
the first set of commissioners, shall always be for a fixed term of
seven years; an appointment for a lesser period is void and
unconstitutional; the appointing authority cannot validly shorten
the full term of seven years in case of the expiration of the term as
this will result in the distortion of the rotational system prescribed
by the Constitution;
- Appointments to vacancies resulting from certain causes (death,
resignation, disability or impeachment) shall only be for the
unexpired portion of the term of the predecessors, but such
appointments cannot be less than the unexpired portion as this will
disrupt the staggering of terms laid down under Sec. 1(2), Art.
IX(D);
- Members of the Commission who were appointed for a full term of
seven years and who served the entire period, are barred from
reappointment to any position in the Commission;

- A commissioner who resigns after serving in the Commission for

less than seven years is eligible for an appointment to the position
of Chair for the unexpired portion of the term of the departing
chair. Such appointment is not covered by the ban on
reappointment, provided that the aggregate period of the length of
service as commissioners and the unexpired period of the term of
the predecessor will not exceed seven years and provided further
that the vacancy in the position of Char resulted from death,
resignation, disability or removal by impeachment; and that
- Any member of the Commission cannot be appointed or
designated in a temporary or acting capacity.

- Nacion vs. COA, GR No. 204757, March 17, 2015- Section 18 of

RA 6758 prohibits officials and employees of COA from
receiving salaries, honoraria, bonuses, allowances or other
emoluments from any government entity, except compensation
paid directly by COA out of its appropriations. This prohibition is
mandatory.

ARTICLE X
(LOCAL GOVERNMENTS)

- Local Autonomy- Local Autonomy means that local

governments have certain powers granted by the
Constitution which may not be curtailed by the
National government, but that outside of these, local
governments may not enact ordinances contrary

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 to statutes (Bernas, 1987 Philippine Constitution,
Reviewer, 2011).

- Veloso, et al. vs. COA, G.R. No. 193677, September 16,

2011- LGUs, though granted local fiscal autonomy, are still
within the audit jurisdiction of the COA.

- In Ganzon v. Court of Appeals, we said that local autonomy

signified "a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a system of
decentralization." The grant of autonomy is intended to
"break up the monopoly of the national government over the
affairs of local governments, x x x not x x x to end the
relation of partnership and interdependence between the
central administration and local government units x x x."
Paradoxically, local governments are still subject to
regulation, however limited, for the purpose of enhancing
self-government.

- Decentralization simply means the devolution of national

administration, not power, to local governments. Local
officials remain accountable to the central government as the
law may provide. The difference between decentralization of
administration and that of power was explained in detail in
Limbona v. Mangelin[16] as follows:

- "Now, autonomy is either decentralization of administration

or decentralization of power. There is decentralization of
administration when the central government delegates
administrative powers to political subdivisions in order to
broaden the base of government power and in the process to
make local governments 'more responsive and accountable.

- Under the Philippine concept of local autonomy, the

national government has not completely relinquished all its
powers over local governments, including autonomous
regions. Only administrative powers over local affairs are
delegated to political subdivisions. The purpose of the
delegation is to make governance more directly responsive
and effective at the local levels. In turn, economic, political
and social development at the smaller political units are
expected to propel social and economic growth and
development. But to enable the country to develop as a whole,
the programs and policies effected locally must be integrated
and coordinated towards a common national goal. Thus,
policy-setting for the entire country still lies in the President
and Congress. As we stated in Magtajas v. Pryce Properties
Corp., Inc., municipal governments are still agents of the
national government.

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- Villafuerte vs. Robredo, G.R. No. 195390, December 10,
2014- At any rate, LGUs must be reminded that the local
autonomy granted to them does not completely severe them
from the national government or turn them into impenetrable
states. Autonomy does not make local governments sovereign
within the state. Notwithstanding the local fiscal autonomy
being enjoyed by LGUs, they are still under the
supervision of the President and maybe held accountable for
malfeasance or violations of existing laws. “Supervision is
not incompatible with discipline. And the power to discipline
and ensure that the laws be faithfully executed must be
construed to authorize the President to order an investigation
of the act or conduct of local officials when in his opinion the
good of the public service so requires.

- Pimentel vs. Ochoa, GR No. 195770, July 17, 2012- While

the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the
functions and responsibilities that have already been
devolved upon them from the national agencies on the
aspect of providing for basic services and facilities in their
respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision
provides a categorical exception of cases involving
nationally funded projects, facilities, programs and services.
The essence of this express reservation of power by the
national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has
no power over a program for which funding has been
provided by the national government under the
annual general appropriations act, even if the program
involves the delivery of basic services within the
jurisdiction of the LGU. xxx The national government is,
thus, not precluded from taking a direct hand in the
formulation and implementation of national development
programs especially where it is implemented locally in
coordination with the LGUs concerned.

- Imbong vs. Ochoa, G.R. No. 204819, April 8, 2014- The

essence of this express reservation of power by the national
government is that, unless an LGU is particularly designated
as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program
for which funding has been provided by the national
government under the annual general appropriations act, even
if the program involves the delivery of basic services within
the jurisdiction of the LGU. A complete relinquishment of
central government powers on the matter of providing basic
facilities and services cannot be implied as the Local
Government Code itself weighs against it. xxx The national
government still has the say when it comes to national priority

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 programs which the local government is called upon to
implement like the RH Law. Moreover, from the use of the
word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to
provide these services. There is nothing in the wording of the
law which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it
cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an undue
encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy
enjoyed by the local governments.

- MAGUINDANAO FEDERATION OF AUTONOMOUS

IRRIGATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., et al., vs. Senate, et al-
[G.R. No. 196271. October 18, 2011]- In the case of the terms of
local officials, their term has been fixed clearly and unequivocally,
allowing no room for any implementing legislation with respect to
the fixed term itself and no vagueness that would allow an
interpretation from this Court. Thus, the term of three years for
local officials should stay at three (3) years as fixed by the
Constitution and cannot be extended by holdover by Congress.

- If it will be claimed that the holdover period is effectively another

term mandated by Congress, the net result is for Congress to create
a new term and to appoint the occupant for the new term. This
view — like the extension of the elective term— is constitutionally
infirm because Congress cannot do indirectly what it cannot do
directly, i.e., to act in a way that would effectively extend the term
of the incumbents. Indeed, if acts that cannot be legally done
directly can be done indirectly, then all laws would be illusory.
Congress cannot also create a new term and effectively appoint the
occupant of the position for the new term. This is effectively an act
of appointment by Congress and an unconstitutional intrusion into
the constitutional appointment power of the President. Hence,
holdover — whichever way it is viewed — is a constitutionally
infirm option that Congress could not have undertaken.

- Jurisprudence, of course, is not without examples of cases where

the question of holdover was brought before, and given the
imprimatur of approval by, this Court. The present case though
differs significantly from past cases with contrary rulings,
particularly from Sambarani v. COMELEC, Adap v. Comelec, and
Montesclaros v. Comelec, where the Court ruled that the elective
officials could hold on to their positions in a hold over capacity.

- The Supreme Court is not empowered to adjust the terms of

elective officials. Based on the Constitution, the power to fix the
term of office of elective officials, which can be exercised only in
the case of barangay officials, is specifically given to Congress.
Even Congress itself may be denied such power, as shown when
the Constitution shortened the terms of twelve Senators obtaining

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 the least votes, and extended the terms of the President and the
Vice-President in order to synchronize elections; Congress was
not granted this same power. The settled rule is that terms fixed by
the Constitution cannot be changed by mere statute. More
particularly, not even Congress and certainly not this Court, has the
authority to fix the terms of elective local officials in the ARMM
for less, or more, than the constitutionally mandated three years
as this tinkering would directly contravene Section 8, Article X of
the Constitution as we ruled in Osmeña.

- The grant to the President of the power to appoint OICs to

undertake the functions of the elective members of the Regional
Legislative Assembly is neither novel nor innovative. We hark
back to our earlier pronouncement in Menzon v. Petilla, etc., et al.:

- It may be noted that under Commonwealth Act No. 588 and the
Revised Administrative Code of 1987, the President is empowered
to make temporary appointments in certain public offices, in case
of any vacancy that may occur. Albeit both laws deal only with
the filling of vacancies in appointive positions. However, in the
absence of any contrary provision in the Local Government
Code and in the best interest of public service, we see no cogent
reason why the procedure thus outlined by the two laws may
not be similarly applied in the present case. The respondents
contend that the provincial board is the correct appointing power.
This argument has no merit. As between the President who has
supervision over local governments as provided by law and the
members of the board who are junior to the vice-governor, we have
no problem ruling in favor of the President, until the law provides
otherwise.

- A vacancy creates an anomalous situation and finds no approbation

under the law for it deprives the constituents of their right of
representation and governance in their own local government.

- In a republican form of government, the majority rules through

their chosen few, and if one of them is incapacitated or absent, etc.,
the management of governmental affairs is, to that extent, may be
hampered. Necessarily, there will be a consequent delay in the
delivery of basic services to the people of Leyte if the Governor
or the Vice-Governor is missing. (Emphasis ours.)

- As in Menzon, leaving the positions of ARMM Governor, Vice

Governor, and members of the Regional Legislative Assembly
vacant for 21 months, or almost 2 years, would clearly cause
disruptions and delays in the delivery of basic services to the
people, in the proper management of the affairs of the regional
government, and in responding to critical developments that may
arise. When viewed in this context, allowing the President in the

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 exercise of his constitutionally-recognized appointment power to
appoint OICs is, in our judgment, a reasonable measure to take.

- TERM OF OFFICE OF ELECTIVE LOCAL OFFICIALS-

Socrates vs. COMELEC, November 12, 2002, What the
Constitution prohibits is an immediate re-election for a fourth term
following three consecutive terms. The Constitution, however,
does not prohibit a subsequent re-election for a fourth term as long
as the reelection is not immediately after the end of the third
consecutive term. A recall election mid-way in the term
following the third consecutive term is a subsequent election
but not an immediate re-election after the third term.

- Aldovino, Jr. vs. COMELEC, GR No. 184836, December 23,

2009- The preventive suspension of public officials does not
interrupt their term for purposes the three-term limit rule under the
Constitution and the Local Government Code. Preventive
suspension, by its nature does not involve an effective interruption
of service within a term and should therefore not be a reason to
avoid the three-term limitation.

- The interruption of a term exempting an elective official from the

three-term limit is one that involves no less than involuntary loss
of the title to office. In all cases of preventive suspension, the
suspended official is barred from performing the functions of his
office and does not vacate and lose title to his office; loss of office
is a consequence that only results upon an eventual finding of guilt
or liability.

- Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, 581 SCRA 786, March 18, 2009-
Bolos was serving his third term as punong barangay when he ran
for Sangguniang Bayan member and upon winning, assumed the
position of SB member, thus, voluntarily relinquishing his office as
punong barangay which the court deems as voluntary renunciation
of said office.

- Adormeo vs. COMELEC, February 4, 2002- The winner in the

recall election cannot be charged or credited with the full term of
three years for purposes of counting the consecutiveness of an
elective official’s terms in office. Thus, in a situation where a
candidate loses in an election to gain a third consecutive term but
later wins in the recall election, the recall term cannot be stitched
with his previous two consecutive terms. The period of time prior
to the recall term, when another elective official holds office,
constitutes an interruption in the continuity of service.

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- Lonzanida vs COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602- Voluntary
renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three-term limit. Conversely, involuntary
severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of
service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the
next mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in
compliance with the legal process of writ of execution issued by
the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from
office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.

- Borja vs. COMELEC, 295 SCRA 157- For the three term-limit
rule to apply, the local official concerned must serve three
consecutive terms as a result of election. The term served must be
one for which he was elected. Thus, if he assumes a position by
virtue of succession, the official cannot be considered to have fully
served the term.

- Ong vs. Alegre, et al., June 23, 2006- assumption of office

constitutes, for Francis Ong, “service for the full term”, and
should be counted as a full term served in contemplation of the
three-term limit prescribed by the constitutional and statutory
provisions, barring local elective officials from being elected and
serving for more than three consecutive terms for the same
position. His continuous exercise of the functions thereof from
start to finish of the term, should legally be taken as service for
a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule,
notwithstanding the subsequent nullification of his proclamation.
There was actually no interruption or break in the continuity of
Francis Ong’s service respecting the 1998-2001 term.

- Navarro vs. Ermita, GR No. 180050, April 12, 2011 - The land
area requirement shall not apply where the proposed province is
composed of one (1) or more islands," is declared VALID.
Accordingly, Republic Act No. 9355 (An Act Creating the
Province of Dinagat Islands) is declared as VALID and
CONSTITUTIONAL, and the proclamation of the Province of
Dinagat Islands and the election of the officials thereof are
declared VALID.

- League of the Cities of the Philippines vs. COMELEC, GR No.

176951, April 12, 2011- All the 16 cityhood laws, enacted after
the effectivity of RA 9009 increasing the income requirement for
cityhood from P20 million to P100 million in sec. 450 of the ,
explicitly exempt the respondent municipalities from the said
increased income requirement. The respondent LGUS had pending
cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and that the year
before the amendatory RA 9009, respondent LGUs had already

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 met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of
1991.

- METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT

AUTHORTY- Its function is limited to the delivery of basic
services. RA 7924 does not grant the MMDA police power, let
alone legislative power. The MMDA is a development authority.
It is not a political unit of government. There is no grant of
authority to enact ordinances and regulations for the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the metropolis. It is the local
government units, acting through their respective legislative
councils, that possess legislative power and police power. (MMDA
vs. BelAir Village Association, 328 SCRA 836).

- Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood

by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the
power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers’ licenses
without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an
unauthorized exercise of police power. The MMDA was intended
to coordinate services with metro-wide impact that transcend local
political boundaries or would entail huge expenditures if provided
by the individual LGUs, especially with regard to transport and
traffic management, and we are aware of the valiant efforts of the
petitioner to untangle the increasingly traffic-snarled roads of
Metro Manila. But these laudable intentions are limited by the
MMDA’s enabling law, which we can but interpret, and petitioner
must be reminded that its efforts in this respect must be authorized
by a valid law, or ordinance, or regulation arising from a
legitimate source (MMDA vs. Danilo Garin, April 15, 2005).

- MMDA vs. Trackworks, GR No. 179554, December 16, 2009-

MMDA has no authority to dismantle billboards and other forms of
advertisements posted on the structures of the Metro Rail Transit 3
(MRT 3), the latter being a private property. MMDA’s powers
were limited to the formulation, coordination, regulation,
implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of
policies, installing a system and administration, and therefore, it
had no power to dismantle the billboards under the guise of police
and legislative power.

- MMDA vs. MenCorp Transport System, G.R. No. 170657,

August 15, 2007- In light of the administrative nature of its powers
and functions, the MMDA is devoid of authority to implement the
Project (Greater Manila Transport System) as envisioned by E.O
179; hence, it could not have been validly designated by the
President to undertake the Project. It follows that the MMDA
cannot validly order the elimination of respondents’ terminals.
Even the MMDA’s claimed authority under the police power must
necessarily fail in consonance with the above-quoted ruling in

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 MMDA v. Bel-Air Village Association, Inc. and this Court’s
subsequent ruling in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority
v. Garin that the MMDA is not vested with police power.

INTERNAL REVENUE ALLOTMENT- IRAs- are items of

income because they form part of the gross accretion of the funds
of the local government unit Alvarez vs. Guingona, 252 SCRA
695).

- LGUS’ SHARE IN THE IRA SHALL BE

AUTOMATICALLY RELEASED WITHOUT ANY
CONDITION OF APPROVAL FROM ANY
GOVERNMENTAL BODY-Section 6, Art. X of the
1987constitution provides that LGUs shall have a just share, as
determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be
automatically released to them. When passed, it would be readily
see that such provision mandates that (1) the LGUs shall have a
“just share” in the national taxes; and (2) “just share” shall be
determined by law; (3) that “just share” shall be automatically
released to the LGUs. PROVINCE OF BATANGAS VS.
ROMULO, 429 SCRA 736, May 27, 2004.

- The legislative is barred from withholding the release of the IRA.

(ACORD vs. Zamora, June 8, 2005)

- AO No. 372 of President Ramos, Section 4 which provides that

“pending the assessment and evaluation by the Development
Budget Coordinating Committee of the emerging fiscal situation,
the amount equivalent to 10% of the internal revenue allotment to
local government units shall be withheld” is declared in
contravention of Section 286 of the LG Code and Section 6 of Art
X of the constitution (Pimentel vs. Aguirre, July 19, 2000).

- LOCAL TAXATION Constitution itself promotes the principles

of local autonomy as embodied in the Local Government Code.
The State is mandated to ensure the autonomy of local
governments, and local governments are empowered to levy taxes,
fees and charges that accrue exclusively to them, subject to
congressional guidelines and limitations. The principle of local
autonomy is no mere passing dalliance but a constitutionally
enshrined precept that deserves respect and appropriate
enforcement by this Court. The GSIS’s tax-exempt status, in sum,
was withdrawn in 1992 by the Local Government Code but
restored by the Government Service Insurance System Act of
1997, the operative provision of which is Section 39. The
subject real property taxes for the years 1992 to 1994 were
assessed against GSIS while the Local Government Code

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 provisions prevailed and, thus, may be collected by the City of
Davao. (City of Davao vs. RTC, Br. 12, August 18, 2005).

- G.R. No. 165827, National Power Corporation vs. Province of

Isabela, represented by Hon. Benjamin G. Dy, Provincial
Governor, June 16, 2006)- the NAPOCOR is not exempt from
paying franchise tax. Though its charter exempted it from the tax,
the enactment of the Local Government Code (LGC) has withdraw
such exemption, the Court said, citing its previous ruling in
National Power Corporation vs. City of Cabanatuan.

- MCCIA vs. Marcos, September 11, 1996- The power to tax is

primarily vested in the Congress; however, in our jurisdiction, it
may be exercised by local legislative bodies, no longer merely by
virtue of a valid delegation as before, but pursuant to direct
authority conferred by Section 5, Article X of the Constitution. An
“agency” of the Government refers to “any of the various units of
the Government, including a department, bureau, office,
instrumentality, or government-owned or controlled corporation, or
a local government or a distinct unit therein;” while an
“instrumentality” refers to “any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework,
vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with
some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and
enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This
term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and
government-owned and controlled corporations.” It had already
become, even if it be conceded to be an “agency” or
“instrumentality” of the Government, a taxable person for such
purpose in view of the withdrawal in the last paragraph of Section
234 of exemptions from the payment of real property taxes, which,
as earlier adverted to, applies to MCIAA.

- PPA vs. Iloilo City, November 11, 2004- The bare fact that the
port and its facilities and appurtenances are accessible to the
general public does not exempt it from the payment of real
property taxes. It must be stressed that the said port facilities and
appurtenances are the petitioner’s corporate patrimonial properties,
not for public use, and that the operation of the port and its
facilities and the administration of its buildings are in the nature of
ordinary business.

- MIAA vs. CA, et al., July 20, 2006- MIAA’s Airport Lands and
Buildings are exempt from real estate tax imposed by local
governments. MIAA is not a government-owned or controlled
corporation but an instrumentality of the National Government
and thus exempt from localh taxation. Second, the real properties
of MIAA are owned by the Republic of the Philippines and thus
exempt from real estate tax. The Airport Lands and Buildings of

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 MIAA are property of public dominion and therefore owned by
the State or the Republic of the Philippines. The Airport Lands
and Buildings are devoted to public use because they are used by
the public for international and domestic travel and
transportation. The Airport Lands and Buildings of MIAA are
devoted to public use and thus are properties of public dominion.
As properties of public dominion, the Airport Lands and
Buildings are outside the commerce of man. Real Property
Owned by the Republic is Not Taxable.

- When local governments invoke the power to tax on national

government instrumentalities, such power is construed strictly
against local governments. The rule is that a tax is never
presumed and there must be clear language in the law imposing the
tax. Any doubt whether a person, article or activity is taxable
is resolved against taxation. This rule applies with greater force
when local governments seek to tax national government
instrumentalities.

- Another rule is that a tax exemption is strictly construed against

the taxpayer claiming the exemption. However, when Congress
grants an exemption to a national government instrumentality
from local taxation, such exemption is construed liberally in
favor of the national government instrumentality.

- PRESIDENT’S SUPERVISION- National Liga vs. Paredes,

September 27, 2004- Like the local government units, the Liga ng
mga Barangay is not subject to control by the Chief Executive or
his alter ego.

- The President can only interfere in the affairs and activities of a

local government unit if he or she finds that the latter has acted
contrary to law. This is the scope of the President’s supervisory
powers over local government units. Hence, the President or any of
his or her alter egos cannot interfere in local affairs as long as the
concerned local government unit acts within the parameters of the
law and the Constitution. Any directive therefore by the President
or any of his or her alter egos seeking to alter the wisdom of a law-
conforming judgment on local affairs of a local government unit is
a patent nullity because it violates the principle of local autonomy
and separation of powers of the executive and legislative
departments in governing municipal corporations. (Dadole vs.
COA, December 3, 2002).

- Leynes vs. COA, 418 SCRA 180- By upholding the power of

LGUs to grant allowances to judges and leaving to their discretion
the amount of allowances they may want to grant, depending on
the availability of local funds, the genuine and meaningful local
autonomy is ensured.

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- Batangas CATV Inc. vs. CA, 439 SCRA 326- In the absence of
constitutional or legislative authorization, municipalities have no
power to grant franchises.

ARTICLE XI
(ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS)

- IMPEACHMENT- Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001Section

3(7) of Article XI provides for the limit and the consequence of an
impeachment judgment. Conviction in the impeachment
proceeding is not required before the public officer subject of
impeachment may be prosecuted, tried and punished for
criminal offenses committed.

- REPUBLIC VS. SERENO (G.R. No. 237428, May 11, 2018)-

Quo warranto as a remedy to oust an ineligible public official may
be availed of when the subject act or omission was committed
prior to or at the time of appointment or election relating to an
official’s qualifications to hold office as to render such
appointment or election invalid. Acts or omissions, even if it
relates to the qualification of integrity being a continuing
requirement but nonetheless committed during the incumbency of
a validly appointed and/or validly elected official cannot be the
subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of impeachment if the
public official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or to disciplinary,
administrative or criminal action, if otherwise.

- The SC have concurrent jurisdiction with the CA and RTC to

issue the extraordinary writs, including quo warranto. A direct
invocation of the SC’s original jurisdiction to issue such writs is
allowed when there are special and important reasons therefor, and
in this case, direct resort to SC is justified considering that the
action is directed against the Chief Justice. Granting that the
petition is likewise of transcendental importance and has far-
reaching implications, the Court is empowered to exercise its
power of judicial review. To exercise restraint in reviewing an
impeachable officer’s appointment is a clear renunciation of a
judicial duty. An outright dismissal of the petition based on
speculation that Sereno will eventually be tried on impeachment is
a clear abdication of the Court’s duty to settle actual controversy
squarely presented before it. Quo warranto proceedings are
essentially judicial in character – it calls for the exercise of the
Supreme Court’s constitutional duty and power to decide cases and
settle actual controversies. This constitutional duty cannot be

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 abdicated or transferred in favor of, or in deference to, any other
branch of the government including the Congress, even as it acts as
an impeachment court through the Senate.

- To differentiate from impeachment, quo warranto involves a

judicial determination of the eligibility or validity of the
election or appointment of a public official based on
predetermined rules while impeachment is a political process
to vindicate the violation of the public’s trust. In quo warranto
proceedings referring to offices filled by appointment, what is
determined is the legality of the appointment. The title to a public
office may not be contested collaterally but only directly, by quo
warranto proceedings. usurpation of a public office is treated as a
public wrong and carries with it public interest, and as such, it shall
be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the
Republic of the Philippines through the Solicitor General or a
public prosecutor. The SolGen is given permissible latitude within
his legal authority in actions for quo warranto, circumscribed only
by the national interest and the government policy on the matter at
hand.

- Quo warranto and impeachment may proceed independently

of each other as these remedies are distinct as to (1) jurisdiction
(2) grounds, (3) applicable rules pertaining to initiation, filing and
dismissal, and (4) limitations. Forum shopping is the act of a
litigant who repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially
founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and
circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues, either
pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court, to
increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one
court, then in another. The test for determining forum shopping is
whether in the two (or more) cases pending, there is identity of
parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought. The crux of
the controversy in this quo warranto proceedings is the
determination of whether or not Sereno legally holds the Chief
Justice position to be considered as an impeachable officer in the
first place. On the other hand, impeachment is for respondent’s
prosecution for certain impeachable offenses. Simply put, while
Sereno’s title to hold a public office is the issue in quo warranto
proceedings, impeachment necessarily presupposes that Sereno
legally holds the public office and thus, is an impeachable officer,
the only issue being whether or not she committed impeachable
offenses to warrant her removal from office.

- Moreover, the reliefs sought are different. respondent in a quo

warranto proceeding shall be adjudged to cease from holding a
public office, which he/she is ineligible to hold. Moreover,
impeachment, a conviction for the charges of impeachable offenses

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 shall result to the removal of the respondent from the public office
that he/she is legally holding. It is not legally possible to impeach
or remove a person from an office that he/she, in the first place,
does not and cannot legally hold or occupy.

- Lastly, there can be no forum shopping because the

impeachment proceedings before the House is not the
impeachment case proper, since it is only a determination of
probable cause. The impeachment case is yet to be initiated by the
filing of the Articles of Impeachment before the Senate. Thus, at
the moment, there is no pending impeachment case against Sereno.
The process before the House is merely inquisitorial and is merely
a means of discovering if a person may be reasonably charged with
a crime.

- The language of Section 2, Article XI of the Constitution does not

foreclose a quo warranto action against impeachable officers:
“Section 2. The President, the Vice-President, the Members of the
Supreme Court, the Members of the Constitutional Commissions,
and the Ombudsman may be removed from office on impeachment
for, and conviction of, culpable violation of the Constitution,
treason, bribery, graft and corruption, other high crimes, or
betrayal of public trust.” The provision uses the permissive term
“may” which denote discretion and cannot be construed as having
a mandatory effect, indicative of a mere possibility, an opportunity,
or an option. In American jurisprudence, it has been held that “the
express provision for removal by impeachment ought not to be
taken as a tacit prohibition of removal by other methods when
there are other adequate reasons to account for this express
provision.”

- The principle in case law is that during their incumbency,

impeachable officers cannot be criminally prosecuted for an
offense that carries with it the penalty of removal, and if they are
required to be members of the Philippine Bar to qualify for their
positions, they cannot be charged with disbarment. The
proscription does not extend to actions assailing the public
officer’s title or right to the office he or she occupies. Even the
PET Rules expressly provide for the remedy of either an election
protest or a petition for quo warranto to question the eligibility of
the President and the Vice-President, both of whom are
impeachable officers.

- Further, that the enumeration of “impeachable offenses” is made

absolute, that is, only those enumerated offenses are treated as
grounds for impeachment, is not equivalent to saying that the
enumeration likewise purport to be a complete statement of the
causes of removal from office. If other causes of removal are
available, then other modes of ouster can likewise be availed. To

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 subscribe to the view that appointments or election of impeachable
officers are outside judicial review is to cleanse their appointments
or election of any possible defect pertaining to the
Constitutionally-prescribed qualifications which cannot otherwise
be raised in an impeachment proceeding. To hold otherwise is to
allow an absurd situation where the appointment of an
impeachable officer cannot be questioned even when, for instance,
he or she has been determined to be of foreign nationality or, in
offices where Bar membership is a qualification, when he or she
fraudulently represented to be a member of the Bar.

- Anent the sixth issue: The Supreme Court’s exercise of its

jurisdiction over a quo warranto petition is not violative of the
doctrine of separation of powers.

- The Court’s assumption of jurisdiction over an action for quo

warranto involving a person who would otherwise be an
impeachable official had it not been for a disqualification, is not
violative of the core constitutional provision that impeachment
cases shall be exclusively tried and decided by the Senate. Again,
the difference between quo warranto and impeachment must be
emphasized. An action for quo warranto does not try a person’s
culpability of an impeachment offense, neither does a writ of quo
warranto conclusively pronounce such culpability. The Court’s
exercise of its jurisdiction over quo warranto proceedings does not
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative of
determining probable cause for impeachment, to craft and transmit
the Articles of Impeachment, nor will it preclude Senate from
exercising its constitutionally committed power of impeachment.

- However, logic, common sense, reason, practicality and even

principles of plain arithmetic bear out the conclusion that an
unqualified public official should be removed from the position
immediately if indeed Constitutional and legal requirements were
not met or breached. To abdicate from resolving a legal
controversy simply because of perceived availability of another
remedy, in this case impeachment, would be to sanction the
initiation of a process specifically intended to be long and arduous
and compel the entire membership of the Legislative branch to
momentarily abandon their legislative duties to focus on
impeachment proceedings for the possible removal of a public
official, who at the outset, may clearly be unqualified under
existing laws and case law.

- For guidance, the Court demarcates that an act or omission

committed prior to or at the time of appointment or election
relating to an official’s qualifications to hold office as to render
such appointment or election invalid is properly the subject of a
quo warranto petition, provided that the requisites for the

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 commencement thereof are present. Contrariwise, acts or
omissions, even if it relates to the qualification of integrity, being a
continuing requirement but nonetheless committed during the
incumbency of a validly appointed and/or validly elected official,
cannot be the subject of a quo warranto proceeding, but of
something else, which may either be impeachment if the public
official concerned is impeachable and the act or omission
constitutes an impeachable offense, or disciplinary, administrative
or criminal action, if otherwise.

- Anent the seventh issue: Prescription does not lie against the
State. The rules on quo warranto provides that “nothing contained
in this Rule shall be construed to authorize an action against a
public officer or employee for his ouster from office unless the
same be commenced within one (1) year after the cause of such
ouster, or the right of the petitioner to hold such office or position,
arose”. Previously, the one-year prescriptive period has been
applied in cases where private individuals asserting their right of
office, unlike the instant case where no private individual claims
title to the Office of the Chief Justice. Instead, it is the government
itself which commenced the present petition for quo warranto and
puts in issue the qualification of the person holding the highest
position in the Judiciary.

- Section 2 of Rule 66 provides that “the Solicitor General or a

public prosecutor, when directed by the President of the
Philippines, or when upon complaint or otherwise he has good
reason to believe that any case specified in the preceding section
can be established by proof must commence such action.” It may
be stated that ordinary statutes of limitation, civil or penal, have no
application to quo warranto proceeding brought to enforce a public
right. There is no limitation or prescription of action in an action
for quo warranto, neither could there be, for the reason that it was
an action by the Government and prescription could not be plead
as a defense to an action by the Government.

- That prescription does not lie in this case can also be deduced
from the very purpose of an action for quo warranto. Because quo
warranto serves to end a continuous usurpation, no statute of
limitations applies to the action. Needless to say, no prudent and
just court would allow an unqualified person to hold public office,
much more the highest position in the Judiciary. Moreover, the
Republic cannot be faulted for questioning Sereno’s qualification·
for office only upon discovery of the cause of ouster because even
up to the present, Sereno has not been candid on whether she filed
the required SALNs or not. The defect on Sereno’s appointment
was therefore not discernible, but was, on the contrary, deliberately
rendered obscure.

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- Anent the eighth issue: The Court has supervisory authority
over the JBC includes ensuring that the JBC complies with its
own rules. Section 8(1), Article VIII of the Constitution provides
that “A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby created under the
supervision of the Supreme Court.” The power of supervision
means “overseeing or the authority of an officer to see to it that the
subordinate officers perform their duties.” JBC’s absolute
autonomy from the Court as to place its non-action or improper·
actions beyond the latter’s reach is therefore not what the
Constitution contemplates. What is more, the JBC’s duty to
recommend or nominate, although calling for the exercise of
discretion, is neither absolute nor unlimited, and is not
automatically equivalent to an exercise of policy decision as to
place, in wholesale, the JBC process beyond the scope of the
Court’s supervisory and corrective powers. While a certain leeway
must be given to the JBC in screening aspiring magistrates, the
same does not give it an unbridled discretion to ignore
Constitutional and legal requirements. Thus, the nomination by the
JBC is not accurately an exercise of policy or wisdom as to place
the JBC’s actions in the same category as political questions that
the Court is barred from resolving.

- With this, it must be emphasized that qualifications under the

Constitution cannot be waived or bargained by the JBC, and one of
which is that “a Member of the Judiciary must be a person of
proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.
“Integrity” is closely related to, or if not, approximately equated to
an applicant’s good reputation for honesty, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical
standards.” Integrity is likewise imposed by the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Professional Responsibility. The
Court has always viewed integrity with a goal of preserving the
confidence of the litigants in the Judiciary. Hence, the JBC was
created in order to ensure that a member of the Supreme Court
must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and
independence.

- Anent the ninth issue: The filing of SALN is a constitutional and

statutory requirement. Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution
states that “A public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of
office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a
declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth.” This
has likewise been required by RA 3019 and RA 6713. “Failure to
comply” with the law is a violation of law, a “prima facie evidence
of unexplained wealth, which may result in the dismissal from
service of the public officer.” It is a clear breach of the ethical
standards set for public officials and employees. The filing of the
SALN is so important for purposes of transparency and

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 accountability that failure to comply with such requirement may
result not only in dismissal from the public service but also in
criminal liability. Section 11 of R.A. No. 6713 even provides that
non-compliance with this requirement is not only punishable by
imprisonment and/or a fine, it may also result in disqualification to
hold public office.

- Because the Chief Justice is a public officer, she is constitutionally

and statutorily mandated to perform a positive duty to disclose all
of his assets and liabilities. According to Sereno herself in her
dissenting opinion in one case, those who accept a public office do
so cum onere, or with a burden, and are considered as accepting its
burdens and obligations, together with its benefits. They thereby
subject themselves to all constitutional and legislative provisions
relating thereto, and undertake to perform all the duties of their
office. The public has the right to demand the performance of those
duties. More importantly, while every office in the government
service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on
moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the Judiciary.

- Noncompliance with the SALN requirement

indubitably·reflects on a person’s integrity. It is not merely a
trivial or a formal requirement. The contention that the mere non-
filing does not affect Sereno’s integrity does not persuade
considering that RA 6713 and RA 3019 are malum prohibitum and
not malum in se. Thus, it is the omission or commission of that act
as defined by the law, and not the character or effect thereof, that
determines whether or not the provision has been violated. Malice
or criminal intent is completely immaterial.

- Anent the tenth issue: Sereno chronically failed to file her

SALNs and thus violated the Constitution, the law, and the
Code of Judicial Conduct. In Sereno’s 20 years of government
service in UP Law, only 11 SALNs have been filed. Sereno could
have easily dispelled doubts as to the filing or nonfiling of the
unaccounted SALNs by presenting them before the Court. Yet,
Sereno opted to withhold such information or such evidence, if at
all, for no clear reason. The Doblada case, invoked by Sereno,
cannot be applied, because in the Doblada case, there was a letter
of the head of the personnel of the branch of the court that the
missing SALN exists and was duly transmitted and received by the
OCA as the repository agency. In Sereno’s case, the missing
SALNs are neither proven to be in the records of nor was proven to
have been sent to and duly received by the Ombudsman as the
repository agency. The existence of these SALNs and the fact of
filing thereof were neither established by direct proof constituting
substantial evidence nor by mere inference. Moreover, the
statement of the Ombudsman is categorical: “based on records on

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 file, there is no SALN filed by [Sereno] for calendar years 1999 to
2009 except SALN ending December 1998.” This leads the Court
to conclude that Sereno did not indeed file her SALN.

- For this reason, the Republic was able to discharge its burden of
proof with the certification from UP HRDO and Ombudsman, and
thus it becomes incumbent upon Sereno to discharge her burden of
evidence. Further, the burden of proof in a quo warranto
proceeding is different when it is filed by the State in that the
burden rests upon the respondent.

- In addition, contrary to what Sereno contends, being on leave does

not exempt her from filing her SALN because it is not tantamount
to separation from government service. The fact that Sereno did
not receive any pay for the periods she was on leave does not make
her a government worker “serving in an honorary capacity” to be
exempted from the SALN laws on RA 6713. [yourlawyersays]

- Neither can the clearance and certification of UP HRDO be taken

in favor of Sereno. During the period when Sereno was a professor
in UP, concerned authorized official/s of the Office of the
President or the Ombudsman had not yet established compliance
procedures for the review of SALNs filed by officials and
employees of State Colleges and Universities, like U.P. The
ministerial duty of the head of office to issue compliance order
came about only on 2006 from the CSC. As such, the U.P. HRDO
could not have been expected to perform its ministerial duty of
issuing compliance orders to Sereno when such rule was not yet in
existence at that time. Moreover, the clearance are not substitutes
for SALNs. The import of said clearance is limited only to clearing
Sereno of her academic and administrative responsibilities, money
and property accountabilities and from administrative charges as of
the date of her resignation.

- Neither can Sereno’s inclusion in the matrix of candidates with

complete requirements and in the shortlist nominated by the JBC
confirm or ratify her compliance with the SALN requirement. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of candidates for the position of Chief
Justice does not negate, nor supply her with the requisite proof of
integrity. She should have been disqualified at the outset.
Moreover, the JBC En Banc cannot be deemed to have considered
Sereno eligible because it does not appear that Sereno’s failure to
submit her SALNs was squarely addressed by the body. Her
inclusion in the shortlist of nominees and subsequent appointment
to the position do not estop the Republic or this Court from looking
into her qualifications. Verily, no estoppel arises where the
representation or conduct of the party sought to be estopped is due
to ignorance founded upon an innocent mistake

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- Anent the eleventh issue: Sereno failed to properly and
promptly file her SALNs, again in violation of the
Constitutional and statutory requirements. Failure to file a
truthful, complete and accurate SALN would likewise amount to
dishonesty if the same is attended by malicious intent to conceal
the truth or to make false statements. The suspicious circumstances
include: 1996 SALN being accomplished only in 1998; 1998
SALN only filed in 2003; 1997 SALN only notarized in 1993;
2004-2006 SALNs were not filed which were the years when she
received the bulk of her fees from PIATCO cases, 2006 SALN was
later on intended to be for 2010, gross amount from PIATCO cases
were not reflected, suspicious increase of P2,700,000 in personal
properties were seen in her first five months as Associate Justice. It
is therefore clear as day that Sereno failed not only in complying
with the physical act of filing, but also committed dishonesty
betraying her lack of integrity, honesty and probity. The Court
does not hesitate to impose the supreme penalty of dismissal
against public officials whose SALNs were found to have
contained discrepancies, inconsistencies and non-disclosures.

- Anent the twelfth issue: Sereno failed to submit the required

SALNs as to qualify for nomination pursuant to the JBC rules.
The JBC required the submission of at least ten SALNs from those
applicants who are incumbent Associate Justices, absent which, the
applicant ought not to have been interviewed, much less been
considered for nomination. From the minutes of the meeting of the
JBC, it appeared that Sereno was singled out from the rest of the
applicants for having failed to submit a single piece of SALN for
her years of service in UP Law. It is clear that JBC did not do away
with the SALN requirement, but still required substantial
compliance. Subsequently, it appeared that it was only Sereno who
was not able to substantially comply with the SALN requirement,
and instead of complying, Sereno wrote a letter containing
justifications why she should no longer be required to file the
SALNs: that she resigned from U.P. in 2006 and then resumed
government service only in 2009, thus her government service is
not continuous; that her government records are more than 15
years old and thus infeasible to retrieve; and that U.P. cleared her
of all academic and administrative responsibilities and charges.

- These justifications, however, did not obliterate the simple fact that
Sereno submitted only 3 SALNs to the JBC in her 20-year service
in U.P., and that there was nary an attempt on Sereno’s part to
comply. Moreover, Sereno curiously failed to mention that she did
not file several SALNs during the course of her employment in
U.P. Such failure to disclose a material fact and the concealment
thereof from the JBC betrays any claim of integrity especially from
a Member of the Supreme Court.

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- Indubitably, Sereno not only failed to substantially comply with
the submission of the SALNs but there was no compliance at all.
Dishonesty is classified as a grave offense the penalty of which is
dismissal from the service at the first infraction. A person aspiring
to public office must observe honesty, candor and faithful
compliance with the law. Nothing less is expected. Dishonesty is a
malevolent act that puts serious doubt upon one’s ability to
perform his duties with the integrity and uprightness demanded of
a public officer or employee. For these reasons, the JBC should no
longer have considered Sereno for interview.

- Moreover, the fact that Sereno had no permit to engage in private

practice while in UP, her false representations that she was in
private practice after resigning from UP when in fact she was
counsel for the government, her false claims that the clearance
from UP HRDO is proof of her compliance with SALNs
requirement, her commission of tax fraud for failure to truthfully
declare her income in her ITRs for the years 2007-2009, procured a
brand new Toyota Land Cruiser worth at least P5,000,000, caused
the hiring of Ms. Macasaet without requisite public bidding,
misused P3,000,000 of government funds for hotel accommodation
at Shangri-La Boracay as the venue of the 3rd ASEAN Chief
Justices meeting, issued a TRO in Coalition of Associations of
Senior Citizens in the Philippines v. COMELEC contrary to the
Supreme Court’s internal rules, manipulated the disposition of the
DOJ request to transfer the venue of the Maute cases outside of
Mindanao, ignored rulings of the Supreme Court with respect to
the grant of survivorship benefits which caused undue delay to the
release of survivorship benefits to spouses of deceased judges and
Justices, manipulated the processes of the JBC to exclude then
SolGen, now AJ Francis Jardeleza, by using highly confidential
document involving national security against the latter among
others, all belie the fact that Sereno has integrity.

- Anent the thirteenth issue: Sereno’s failure to submit to the

JBC her SALNs for several years means that her integrity was
not established at the time of her application. The requirement
to submit SALNs is made more emphatic when the applicant is
eyeing the position of Chief Justice. On the June 4, 2012, JBC En
Banc meeting, Senator Escudero proposed the addition of the
requirement of SALN in order for the next Chief Justice to avoid
what CJ Corona had gone through. Further, the failure to submit
the required SALNs means that the JBC and the public are
divested of the opportunity to consider the applicant’s fitness or
propensity to commit corruption or dishonesty. In Sereno’s case,
for example, the waiver of the confidentiality of bank deposits
would be practically useless for the years that she failed to submit
her SALN since the JBC cannot verify whether the same matches
the entries indicated in the SALN.

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- Anent the fourteenth issue: Sereno’s ineligibility for lack of
proven integrity cannot be cured by her nomination and
subsequent appointment as Chief Justice. Well-settled is the rule
that qualifications for public office must be possessed at the time
of appointment and assumption of office and also during the
officer’s entire tenure as a continuing requirement. The voidance
of the JBC nomination as a necessary consequence of the Court’s
finding that Sereno is ineligible, in the first place, to be a candidate
for the position of Chief Justice and to be nominated for said
position follows as a matter of course. The Court has ample
jurisdiction to do so without the necessity of impleading the JBC
as the Court can take judicial notice of the explanations from the
JBC members and the OEO. he Court, in a quo warranto
proceeding, maintains the power to issue such further judgment
determining the respective rights in and to the public office,
position or franchise of all the parties to the action as justice
requires.

- Neither will the President’s act of appointment cause to qualify

Sereno. Although the JBC is an office constitutionally created, the
participation of the President in the selection and nomination
process is evident from the composition of the JBC itself.

- An appointment is essentially within the discretionary power of

whomsoever it is vested, subject to the only condition that the
appointee should possess the qualifications required by law. While
the Court surrenders discretionary appointing power to the
President, the exercise of such discretion is subject to the non-
negotiable requirements that the appointee is qualified and all other
legal requirements are satisfied, in the absence of which, the
appointment is susceptible to attack.

- Anent the fifteenth issue: Sereno is a de facto officer removable

through quo warranto. The effect of a finding that a person
appointed to an office is ineligible therefor is that his presumably
valid appointment will give him color of title that confers on him
the status of a de facto officer. For lack of a Constitutional
qualification, Sereno is ineligible to hold the position of Chief
Justice and is merely holding a colorable right or title thereto. As
such, Sereno has never attained the status of an impeachable
official and her removal from the office, other than by
impeachment, is justified. The remedy, therefore, of a quo
warranto at the instance of the State is proper to oust Sereno from
the appointive position of Chief Justice.

- READ: Francisco, et al. vs. House of Representatives,

November 10, 2003- definition of “TO INITIATE

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 IMPEACHMENT”- proceeding is initiated or begins, when a
verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on
Justice.

- Gutierrez vs. The House of Representatives Committee on

Justice, GR No. 193459, February 15, 2011- The proceeding is
initiated or begins, when a verified complaint is filed and referred
to the Committee on Justice for action. This is the initiating step
which triggers the series of steps that follow.

- A vote of 1/3 of all the members of the House shall be necessary

either to affirm a favorable resolution with the Articles of
Impeachment of the Committee or override its contrary resolution,
De Castro vs. Committee on Justice, Batasan Pambansa,
September 3, 1995.

- Resignation by an impeachable official does not place him beyond

the reach of impeachment proceedings; he can still be impeached.

- Salumbides vs. Ombudsman, GR No. 180917, April 23, 2010-

The doctrine of condonation cannot be extended to reappointed
coterminous employees like petitioners as in their case, there is
neither subversion of the sovereign will nor disenfranchisement of
the electorate. The unwarranted expansion of the Pascual doctrine
would set a dangerous precedent as it would, as respondents posit,
provide civil servants, particularly local government, with blanket
immunity from administrative liability that would spawn and breed
abuse of bureaucracy.

- The 1987 Constitution, the deliberations thereon, and the opinions

of constitutional law experts all indicate that the Deputy
Ombudsman is not an impeachable officer. (Office of the
Ombudsman vs. Court of Appeals and former Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica, March 4, 2005).

- Marquez vs. Desierto, June 27, 2001- there must be a pending

case before a court of competent jurisdiction before inspection of
bank accounts by Ombudsman may be allowed.

- OMB’S POWER TO PROSECUTE, Uy vs. Sandiganbayan,

March 20, 2001- The power to prosecute granted by law to the
Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and
those cognizable by regular courts.

- Gonzales III vs. Office of the President, GR No. 196231,

September 4, 2012 January 28, 2014- Sec. 8(2) of RA 6770
providing that the President may remove a deputy ombudsman is
unconstitutional because it would violate the independence of the

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 Office of the Ombudsman. It is the Ombudsman who exercises
administrative disciplinary jurisdiction over her deputies.

- Sulit vs. Ochoa, GR No. 196232, January 28, 2014- By clear

constitutional design, the Tanodbayan or the Office of the Special
Prosecutor is separate from the Office of the Ombudsman. The
inclusion of the Office of the Special Prosecutor with the Office of
the Ombudsman does not ipso facto mean that it must be afforded
the same levels of constitutional independence as that of the
Ombudsman and the Deputy Ombudsman.

- Ombudsman vs. Valera, September 30, 2005- The Court has

consistently held that the Office of the Special Prosecutor is merely
a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act
under the supervision and control and upon authority of the
Ombudsman. xxx However, with respect to the grant of the power
to preventively suspend, Section 24 of R.A. No 6770 makes no
mention of the Special Prosecutor. The obvious import of this
exclusion is to withhold from the Special Prosecutor the power
to preventively suspend.

- Honasan II vs. Panel of Investigating Prosecutors of DOJ,

April 13, 2004- The power of the Ombudsman to investigate
offenses involving public officers or employees is not exclusive
but is concurrent with other similarly authorized agencies of
the government such as the provincial, city and state
prosecutors. DOJ Panel is not precluded from conducting any
investigation of cases against public officers involving violations
of penal laws but if the cases fall under the exclusive jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan, then respondent Ombudsman may, in the
exercise of its primary jurisdiction take over at any stage.

- Pichay vs. IAD-ODESLA- Contrary to petitioner's contention, the

IAD-ODESLA did not encroach upon the Ombudsman's primary
jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the complaint affidavit
filed against him notwithstanding the earlier filing of criminal and
administrative cases involving the same charges and allegations
before the Office of the Ombudsman. The primary jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute cases refers to
criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and not to
administrative cases. It is only in the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction that the Ombudsman may, at any time, take over the
investigation being conducted by another investigatory agency.
xxx While the Ombudsman's function goes into the determination
of the existence of probable cause and the adjudication of the
merits of a criminal accusation, the investigative authority of the
IAD- ODESLA is limited to that of a fact-finding investigator
whose determinations and recommendations remain so until acted

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 upon by the President. As such, it commits no usurpation of the
Ombudsman's constitutional duties.

- Ledesma vs. CA, July 29, 2005 - Ombudsman has the authority
to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and com the head of the office or
agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In other
words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the
Ombudsman’s functions and not its jurisdiction.

- Office of the Ombudsman vs. CA, et al.,GR No. 160675 , June

16, 2006- the Court similarly upholds the Office of the
Ombudsman’s power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault, in the exercise of its
administrative disciplinary authority. The exercise of such power
is well founded in the Constitution and Republic Act No. 6770.
xxx The legislative history of Republic Act No. 6770 thus bears
out the conclusion that the Office of the Ombudsman was
intended to possess full administrative disciplinary authority,
including the power to impose the penalty of removal,
suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution of a public
officer or employee found to be at fault. The lawmakers
envisioned the Office of the Ombudsman to be “an activist
watchman,” not merely a passive one.

- No Writ of Injunction shall be issued by any Court to delay an

Investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman:

“No writ of injunction shall be issued by any court to

delay an investigation being conducted by the
Ombudsman under this Act, unless there is a prima
facie evidence that the subject matter of the
investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office
of the Ombudsman.

No court shall hear any appeal or application for

remedy against the decision or findings of the
Ombudsman, except the Supreme Court, on pure
question of law.” (Sec. 14, R.A. No. 6770)

- Caveat: The second paragraph of Section 14 of Republic

Act No. 6770 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL, while
the policy against the issuance of provisional injunctive
writs by courts other than the Supreme Court to enjoin an
investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
under the first paragraph of the said provision is declared
INEFFECTIVE until the Court adopts the same as part of
the rules of procedure through an administrative circular

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 duly issued therefor. (Conchita Carpio Morales v. Court
of Appeals [Sixth Division], GR Nos. 217126-27,
November 10, 2015, En Banc [Perlas-Bernabe]).

- Facura vs. CA, et al., GR No. 166495, February 16, 2011-

Appeals from the decisions of the Ombudsman in
administrative cases do not stay the execution of the penalty
imposed.

- Olais vs. Almirante, GR No. 181195, June 10, 2013- where

the respondent is absolved of the charge or in case of
conviction where the penalty imposed is public censure or
reprimand, or suspension for the period not more than one
month or a fie equivalent to one month’s salary, the
Ombudsman Decision shall be final, executor and
unappelable, subject to judicial review.

Doctrine of CONDONATION:

- Ombudsman vs. CA, G.R. Nos. 217126-27, November 10,

2015- In this case, the Court agrees x x x that since the time
Pascual was decided, the legal landscape has radically shifted.
Again, Pascual was a 1959 case decided under the 1935
Constitution, which dated provisions do not reflect the
experience of the Filipino people under the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. Therefore, the plain difference in setting,
including, of course, the sheer impact of the condonation
doctrine on public accountability, calls for Pascual’s judicious
re-examination.

- Pascual’s ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3)

parts: First, the penalty of removal may not be extended
beyond the term in which the public officer was elected for
each term is separate and distinct x x x.

- Second, an elective official’s re-election serves as a

condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right
to remove him therefor; and

- Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are ssumed
to have known the life and character of candidates, of their
right to elect officers x x x.

- The Court, citing Civil Service Commission v. Sojor (577

Phil. 52, 72 [2008]), also clarified that the condonation
doctrine would not apply to appointive officials since, as to
them, there is no sovereign will to disenfranchise x x x.

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- A thorough review of the cases post-1987 x x x would show
that the basis for condonation under the prevailing
constitutional and statutory framework was never accounted
for. What remains apparent from the text of these cases is
that the basis for condonation, as jurisprudential doctrine, was
– and still remains – the above-cited postulates of Pascual,
which was lifted from rulings of US courts where
condonation was amply supported by their own state laws.
With respect to its applicability to administrative cases, the
core premise of condonation - that is, an elective official’s re-
election cuts off the right to remove him for an administrative
offense committed during a prior term – was adopted hook,
line, and sinker in our jurisprudence largely because the
legality of that doctrine was never tested against existing legal
norms. As in the US, the propriety of condonation is – as it
should be – dependent on the legal foundation of the
adjudicating jurisdiction. Hence, the Court undertakes an
examination of our current laws in order to determine if there
is legal basis for the continued application of the doctrine of
condonation.

- As earlier intimated, Pascual was a decision promulgated in

1959. Therefore, it was decided within the context of the
1935 Constitution which was silent with respect to public
accountability, or of the nature of public office being a public
trust. The provision in the 1935 Constitution that comes
closest in dealing with public office is Section 2, Article II
which states that “[t]he defense of the State is a prime duty of
government, and in the fulfillment of this duty all citizens
may be required by law to render personal military or civil
service.” Perhaps owing to the 1935 Constitution’s silence on
public accountability, and considering the dearth of
jurisprudential rulings on the matter, as well as the variance in
the policy considerations, there was no glaring objection
confronting the Pascual Court in adopting the condonation
doctrine that originated from select US cases existing at that
time.

- With the advent of the 1973 Constitution, the approach in

dealing with public officers underwent a significant change.
The new charter introduced an entire article on accountability
of public officers, found in Article XIII. Section 1 thereof
positively recognized, acknowledged, and declared that
“[p]ublic office is a public trust.” Accordingly, “[p]ublic
officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, and shall
remain accountable to the people.”

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- After the turbulent decades of Martial Law rule, the Filipino
People have framed and adopted the 1987 Constitution, which
sets forth in the Declaration of Principles and State Policies in
Article II that “[t]he State shall maintain honesty and integrity
in the public service and take positive and effective measures
against graft and corruption.” Learning how unbridled power
could corrupt public servants under the regime of a dictator,
the Framers put primacy on the integrity of the public service
by declaring it as a constitutional principle and a State policy.
More significantly, the 1987 Constitution strengthened and
solidified what have been first proclaimed in the 1973
Constitution by commanding public officers to be
accountable to the people at all times.

- The same mandate is found in the Revised Administrative

Code under the section of the Civil Service Commission, and
also, in the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public
Officials and Employees.

- For local elective officials like Binay, Jr., the grounds to

discipline, suspend or remove an elective local official
from office are stated in Section 60 of Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the “Local Government Code of
1991” (LGC), which was approved on October 10, 1991,
and took effect on January 1, 1992.

- Related to this provision is Section 40 (b) of the LGC which

states that those removed from office as a result of an
administrative case shall be disqualified from running for any
elective local position.

- In the same sense, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS provides

that the penalty of dismissal from service carries the
accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office.

- In contrast, Section 66 (b) of the LGC states that the penalty

of suspension shall not exceed the unexpired term of the
elective local official nor constitute a bar to his candidacy for
as long as he meets the qualifications required for the office.
Note, however, that the provision only pertains to the duration
of the penalty and its effect on the official’s candidacy.
Nothing therein states that the administrative liability therefor
is extinguished by the fact of re-election x x x.

- Reading the 1987 Constitution together with the above-

cited legal provisions now leads this Court to the
conclusion that the doctrine of condonation is actually
bereft of legal bases.

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- To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the people
at all times, as mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is
plainly inconsistent with the idea that an elective local
official’s administrative liability for a misconduct committed
during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact that he was
elected to a second term of office, or even another elective
post. Election is not a mode of condoning an administrative
offense, and there is simply no constitutional or statutory
basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that an official
elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned by the President in
light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution
which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos (279 Phil. 920, 937
[1991]) to apply to administrative offenses x x x.

- Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that

the grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore
be invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact,
Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the
first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such
post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS
imposes penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding
public office as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from
service.

- To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were

decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of
condonation of administrative liability was supported by
either a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect,
that an officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed
during a previous term, or that the disqualification to hold the
office does not extend beyond the term in which the official’s
delinquency occurred. X x x. Hence, owing to either their
variance or inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as
basis for the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine
under our existing laws.

- At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC prohibits the enforcement

of the penalty of suspension beyond the unexpired portion of
the elective local official’s term, and likewise allows said
official to still run for re-election. X x x. However, as
previously stated, nothing in Section 66 (b) states that the

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 elective local official’s administrative liability is extinguished
by the fact of re-election. Thus, at all events, no legal
provision actually supports the theory that the liability is
condoned.

- Relatedly, it should be clarified that there is no truth in

Pascual’s postulation that the courts would be depriving the
electorate of their right to elect their officers if condonation
were not to be sanctioned. In political law, election pertains
to the process by which a particular constituency chooses an
individual to hold a public office. In this jurisdiction, there is,
again, no legal basis to conclude that election automatically
implies condonation. Neither is there any legal basis to say
that every democratic and republican state has an inherent
regime of condonation. If condonation of an elective
official’s administrative liability would perhaps be allowed in
this jurisdiction, then the same should have been provided by
law under our governing legal mechanisms. May it be at the
time of Pascual or at present, by no means has it been shown
that such a law, whether in a constitutional or statutory
provision, exists. Therefore, inferring from this manifest
absence, it cannot be said that the electorate’s will has been
abdicated.

- Equally infirm is Pascual’s proposition that the electorate,

when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so
with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had
been guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption
exists in any statute or procedural rule. Besides, it is contrary
to human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official’s misdeeds. The Ombudsman
correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the
public. Misconduct committed by an elective public official
is easily covered up, and is almost always unknown to the
electorate when they cast their votes. At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be
no condonation of an act that is unknown. X x x.

- That being said, this Court simply finds no legal authority to

sustain the condonation doctrine in this jurisdiction. As can
be seen from this discourse, it was a doctrine from one class
of US rulings way back in 1959 and thus out of touch from –
and now rendered obsolete by – the current legal regime. In
consequence, it is high time for this Court to abandon the
condonation doctrine that originated from Pascual, and
affirmed in the cases following the same, such as Aguinaldo,

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 Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and Governor Garcia, Jr. which were
all relied upon by the CA.

- It should, however, be clarified that this Court’s

abandonment of the condonation doctrine should be
prospective in application for the reason that judicial
decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution, until reversed, shall form part of the
Philippine legal system. Unto this Court devolves the sole
authority to interpret what the Constitution means, and all
persons are bound to follow its interpretation. X x x

- Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover a doctrine’s

error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized as “good law”
prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the people’s reliance
thereupon should be respected. X x x

- Indeed, the lessons of history teach us that institutions can

greatly benefit from hindsight and rectify its ensuing course.
Thus, while it is truly perplexing to think that a doctrine
which is barren of legal anchorage was able to endure in our
jurisprudence for a considerable length of time, this Court,
under a new membership, takes up the cudgels and now
abandons the condonation doctrine.

- Rule 65 petitions for certiorari against unappelable issuances

of the Ombudsman should be filed before the CA, and not
directly before the Supreme Court. In Office of the
Ombudsman v. Capulong (March 12, 2014), wherein a
preventive suspension order issued by the Office of the
Ombudsman was - similar to this case - assailed through a
Rule 65 petition for certiorari filed by the public officer
before the CA, the Court held that "[t]here being a finding of
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Ombudsman, it
was certainly imperative for the CA to grant incidental reliefs,
as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule 65."

- The concept of public office is a public trust and the corollary

requirement of accountability to the people at all times, as
mandated under the 1987 Constitution, is plainly inconsistent
with the idea that an elective local official's administrative
liability for a misconduct committed during a prior term can
be wiped off by the fact that he was elected to a second term
of office, or even another elective post. Election is not a
mode of condoning an administrative offense, and there is
simply no constitutional or statutory basis in our
jurisdiction to support the notion that an official elected
for a different term is fully absolved of any administrative

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 liability arising from an offense done during a prior term.
In this jurisdiction, liability arising from administrative
offenses may be condoned bv the President in light of Section
19, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution which was
interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos to apply to administrative
offenses.

- Ombudsman vs. CA, et al., GR No. 1772224, January 26,

2011- The decision of the Ombudsman in administrative
cases may be executed pending appeal. This is pursuant to the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman which
explicitly states that an appeal shall not stop the decision from
being executory. Also, the power of the Ombudsman to
implement the penalty is not merely recommendatory but
mandatory.

- Masing, et al. vs. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. No.

165584, January 22, 2008 – Supreme Court reiterated this
ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja, where we
emphasized that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or
employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is
actually mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing
the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper
officer.

- Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative

investigations conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman
shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and
consistent with due process. It is erroneous, therefore, for
respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an
exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public
school teachers and prescribes an exclusive procedure in
administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No. 4670
was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987
Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987
while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is
basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its
meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority
on the Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public
officials and employees, with the exception of officials who
may be removed only by impeachment or over members of
Congress and the Judiciary.

- QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN- It is not material that a

GOCC is originally created by charter or not. What is
decisive is that it has been acquired by the government to

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 perform functions related to government programs and
policies.

- JURISDICTION OVER GOCC- Macalino vs.

Sandiganbayan, 376 SCRA 452- Section 13, Article XI of
the Constitution and Section 15 of RA 6770 granted the
Ombudsman the power to direct any officer or employee of
government-owned or controlled corporations with
original charters to perform any act or duty required by law
or to stop any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.

- PRESCRIPTION- Presidential Ad-hoc Fact-finding

Committee on Behest Loans vs. Desierto , 317 SCRA 272-
Section 15 of Article XI applies only to civil actions for
recovery of ill-gotten wealth and not to criminal cases.

ARTICLE XII
(NATIONAL ECONOMY & PATRIMONY)

- ANCESTRAL DOMAIN- Alcantara vs. DENR, GR No.

161881, July 31, 2008- It must be emphasized that FLGLA No.
542 is a mere license or privilege granted by the State to petitioner
for the use or exploitation of natural resources and public lands over
which the State has sovereign ownership under the Regalian
Doctrine. Like timber or mining licenses, a forest land grazing
lease agreement is a mere permit which, by executive action, can be
revoked, rescinded, cancelled, amended or modified, whenever
public welfare or public interest so requires. The determination of
what is in the public interest is necessarily vested in the State as
owner of the country's natural resources. Thus, a privilege or
license is not in the nature of a contract that enjoys protection under
the due process and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In
cases in which the license or privilege is in conflict with the people's
welfare, the license or privilege must yield to the supremacy of the
latter, as well as to the police power of the State. Such a privilege
or license is not even a property or property right, nor does it
create a vested right; as such, no irrevocable rights are created
in its issuance. Xxx

- The Supreme Court recognized the inherent right of ICCs/IPs to

recover their ancestral land from outsiders and usurpers. Seen
by many as a victory attained by the private respondents only after a
long and costly effort, the Court, as a guardian and instrument of
social justice, abhors a further delay in the resolution of this
controversy and brings it to its fitting conclusion by denying the
petition.

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- CRUZ VS. SEC. OF DENR, 347 SCRA 128- RA 8371
categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by
native title as never to have been public land. Domains and
lands under native title are, therefore, indisputably
presumed to have never been public lands and are
private. The right of ownership granted to indigenous
peoples over their ancestral domains does not cover the
natural resources. The right granted to IP to negotiate the
terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only
their exploration to ensure ecological and environmental
protection.

- Carino vs. Insular Government, 212 US 449 – recognized

the existence of a native title to land by Filipinos by virtue of
possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial
as an exception to the theory of jus regalia.

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002-

Foreshore and submerged areas form part of the public
domain and are inalienable. Lands reclaimed from foreshore
and submerged areas are also form part of the public domain
and are also inalienable, unless converted into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.

- The prevailing rule is that reclaimed disposable lands of

the public domain may only be leased and not sold to
private parties. These lands remained sui generis, as the
only alienable or disposable lands of the public domain
which the government could not sell to private parties
except if the legislature passes a law authrizing such sale.
Reclaimed lands retain their inherent potential as areas for
public use or public service. xxx The ownership of lands
reclaimed from foreshore areas is rooted in the Regalian
Doctrine, which declares that all lands and waters of the
public domain belong to the State.

- But notwithstanding the conversion of reclaimed lands to

alienable lands of the public domain, they may not be sold to
private corporations which can only lease the same. The
State may only sell alienable public land to Filipino citizens.

- Chavez vs. PEA & Amari, May 6, 2003- Decision does not
bar private corporations from participating in reclamation
projects and being paid for their services in reclaiming lands.
What the Decision prohibits, following the explicit
constitutional mandate, is for private corporations to acquire
reclaimed lands of the public domain. There is no
prohibition on the directors, officers and stockholders of

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 private corporations, if they are Filipino citizens, from
acquiring at public auction reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain. They can acquire not more than 12
hectares per individual, and the land thus acquired becomes
private land.

- Freedom Islands are inalienable lands of the public domain.

Government owned lands, as long they are patrimonial
property, can be sold to private parties, whether Filipino
citizens or qualified private corporations. Thus, the so-called
Friar Lands acquired by the government under Act No. 1120
are patrimonial property which even private corporations can
acquire by purchase. Likewise, reclaimed alienable lands of
the public domain if sold or transferred to a public or
municipal corporation for a monetary consideration become
patrimonial property in the hands of the public or municipal
corporation. Once converted to patrimonial property, the
land may be sold by the public or municipal corporation
to private parties, whether Filipino citizens or qualified
private corporations.

- Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic of the Philipipnes,

GR No. 179987, April 29, 2009)- public domain lands
become patrimonial property or private property of the
government only upon a declaration that these are alienable or
disposable lands, together with an express government
manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no
longer retained for public service or the development of
national wealth. Only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of
property of the public domain begin to run.

- In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration

Decree, Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act recognizes that
“those who by themselves or through their predecessors in
interest have been in open, continuous and exclusive
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of ownership,
since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership of, and
registrable title, to such lands based on the length and quality
of their possession. The Court clarified that the Public Land
Act merely requires possession since June 12, 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and
disposable during the entire period of possession. The
possessor is thus entitled to secure judicial confirmation of
title as soon as the land it covers is declared alienable and
disposable. This is, however, subject to the December 31,
2020 deadline imposed by the Public Land Act, as amended
by R.A. 9176.

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- Fortun vs. Republic- applicants must prove that they have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bonafide claim of acquisition or ownership for at least
30 years or at least since May 8, 1947.

- DENR vs. Yap, GR No. 167707, Sacay vs. DENR, GR No.

17775, October 8, 2008- Boracay Island is owned by the
State except for the lot areas with existing titles. The
continued possession and considerable investment of private
claimants do not automatically give them a vested right in
Boracay. Nor do these give them a right to apply a title to the
land they are presently occupying. The present land law traces
its roots to the Regalian Doctrine.

- Except for lands already covered by existing titles, the

Supreme Court said that Boracay was unclassified land of the
public domain prior to Proc. 1064 (which classified Boracay
as 400 hecs of reserved forest land and 628.96 hecs. of
agricultural land). Such unclassified lands are considered
public forest under PD No. 705. Forest lands do not
necessarily refer to large tracts of wooded land or expanses
covered by dense growths of trees and underbrushes.

- Laureano V. Hermoso, et al. vs. Francia, et al., GR No.

16678, April 24, 2009 – The classification of lands of the
public domain is of two types, i.e., primary classification and
secondary classification. The primary classification comprises
agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national
parks. The agricultural lands of the public domain may further
be classified by law according to the uses to which they may
be devoted. This further classification of agricultural lands is
referred to as secondary classification. Congress, under
existing laws, granted authority to a number of government
agencies to effect the secondary classification of agricultural
lands to residential, commercial or industrial or other urban
uses.

- Sps. Fortuna vs. Republic, GR No. 173423, March 5, 2014-

The DENR Secretary is empowered by law to approve a land
classification and declare such land as alienable and
disposable.

- Borromeo v. Descallar, GR No. 159310, February 24,

2009- While the acquisition and the purchase of real
properties in the country by a foreigner is void ab initio for
being contrary to the Constitution, the subsequent acquisition
of the said properties from the foreigner by a Filipino citizen

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 has cured the flaw in the original transaction and the title of
the transferee is valid.

- Chavez vs. NHA, et al., August 15, 2007- To lands

reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private person
or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands of
public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino
citizens but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA
under PD 1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of
alienable lands of public domain and it is only when it is
transferred to Filipino citizens that it becomes patrimonial
property. On the other hand, the NHA is a government
agency not tasked to dispose of public lands under its
charter—The Revised Administrative Code of 1987. The
NHA is an “end-user agency” authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment
titles over reclaimed lands based on the special patents are
transferred to the NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are
automatically converted to patrimonial properties of the
State which can be sold to Filipino citizens and private
corporations, 60% of which are owned by Filipinos. The
reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be
useless to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally
transfer or alienate lands of public domain. More
importantly, it cannot attain its avowed purposes and goals
since it can only transfer patrimonial lands to qualified
beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise funds for the
SMDRP. From the foregoing considerations, we find that the
79-hectare reclaimed land has been declared alienable and
disposable land of the public domain; and in the hands of
NHA, it has been reclassified as patrimonial property.

- Republic vs. Tri-plus Corp., September 26, 2006- Section 6

of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, provides that
the classification and reclassification of public lands into
alienable or disposable, mineral or forest land is the
prerogative of the Executive Department. Under the
Regalian doctrine, which is embodied in our Constitution, all
lands of the public domain belong to the State, which is the
source of any asserted right to any ownership of land. All
lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Accordingly, public lands
not shown to have been reclassified or released as alienable
agricultural land or alienated to a private person by the State
remain part of the inalienable public domain.

- JG Summit Holdings Inc. vs. CA, January 31, 2005- the

prohibition in the Constitution applies only to ownership of

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 land. It does not extend to immovable or real property as
defined under Article 415 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, we
would have a strange situation where the ownership of
immovable property such as trees, plants and growing fruit
attached to the land would be limited to Filipinos and Filipino
corporations only.

- Ramos-Bulalio vs. Ramos, January 23, 2006- Under the

Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to
the State and those lands not appearing to be clearly within
private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. Lands
of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or
timber, mineral lands, and national parks. Alienable lands of
the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. A
homestead patent, such as the subject of the instant case, is
one of the modes to acquire title to public lands suitable for
agricultural purposes.

- La Bugal-B’laan Tribal Ass., Inc. vs. Ramos, December 1,

2004 – Foreign corporations are confined to technical and
financial assistance. The State itself may explore, develop or
utilize the country’s natural resources by entering into the
necessary agreements with individuals or entities in the
pursuit of visible operations. Service contracts with foreign
corporations as contractors who invest in and operate and
manage extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State. Control by the state must be on the
macro level, through the establishment of policies,
guidelines, regulations, industry standards and similar
measures that would enable the government to control the
conduct of the affairs in various enterprises and restrain
activities deemed not desirable or beneficial.

- Resident Marine Mammals vs. Secretary of Department

of Energy- As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the
words “service contracts” in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of
the members of the Constitutional Commission show that in
deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring
to service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution.
The framers, in short, used the term “service contracts” in
referring to agreements involving technical or financial
assistance.

- GR No. 157882, Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose

Association, Incorporated, et al. v. DENR Sec. Gozun, et
al., March 30, 2006- the Constitution expressly allows
service contracts in the large-scale exploration, development,
and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and mineral oils via

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 “agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving
either technical or financial assistance” as provided by law.
The Court said that these agreements with foreign
corporations are not limited to mere financial or technical
assistance. The 1987 Constitution allows the continued use
of service contracts with foreign corporations as
contractors who would invest in and operate and manage
extractive enterprises, subject to the full control and
supervision of the State.

- GR Nos. 152613 & 152628, Apex Mining Co., Inc. v.

Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; GR No.
152619-20, Balite Communal Portal Mining Cooperative
v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining Corp., et al.; and GR
No. 152870-71, The Mines Adjudication Board and its
Members, et al. v. Southeast Mindanao Gold Mining
Corp., et al., June 23, 2006- Mining operations in the
Diwalwal Mineral Reservation Area lies within the full
control of the executive branch of the state. xxx Mining
operations in the Diwalwal Mineral Reservation are now,
therefore, within the full control of the State through the
executive branch. Pursuant to sec. 5 of RA 7942, the State can
either directly undertake the exploration, development, and
utilization of the area or it can enter into agreement with
qualified entities.

- Republic vs. Rosemoor Mining & Development Corp., 426

SCRA 517 – Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 constitution
does not apply retroactively to a “license, concession or
lease” granted by the government under the 1973
constitution or before the effectivity of the 1987
constitution.

- Zarate vs. Director of Lands, 434 SCRA 322- It is the rule

of law that possession, however long, cannot ripen into
private ownership.

- PUBLIC UTILITIES- Republic vs. EXTELCOM, 373

SCRA 316 – The operation of public utility shall not be
exclusive.

- Gamboa vs. Teves, GR No. 176579, October 9, 2013- Both

voting control test and beneficial ownership test must be applied to
determine whether a corporation is a Filipino national.xxx The
term capital in Section 11, Article XII of the Constitution refers
only to shares of stock that can vote in the election of directors.
Thus, 60 percent of the capital assumes, or should result in,
controlling interest in the corporation. Full beneficial ownership of
60 percent of the outstanding capital stock, coupled with 60

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 percent of the voting rights, is required. The legal and beneficial
ownership of 60 percent of the outstanding capital stock must rest
in the hands of Filipino nationals in accordance with the
constitutional mandate.

- Roy vs. Herbosa, G.R. No. 207246, November 22, 2016- The
interpretation of the term "capital", as referring to interests or
shares entitled to vote, is the definition of a Philippine national in
the Foreign Investments Act of 1991. xxx A domestic corporation
is a "Philippine national" only if at least 60% of its voting stock is
owned by Filipino citizens." The Court also reiterated that, from
the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is evident
that the term "capital" refers to controlling interest of a
corporation, and the framers of the Constitution intended public
utilities to be majority Filipino-owned and controlled.

- Baraquel vs. Toll Regulatory Board, GR No. 181293, February

23, 2015- a franchise is not required before each and every public
utility may operate. There is no law that states that a legislative
franchise is necessary for the operation of toll facilities. What
constitutes a public utility is not their ownership but their use to the
public.

- Ridjo Doctrine- (MERALCO vs. Wilcon Builders Supply Inc.,

556 SCRA 742)- doctrine states that the public utility has the
imperative duty to make a reasonable and proper inspection of its
apparatus and equipment to ensure they do not malfunction.

- Long Island Water Supply Company vs Brooklyn: It matters

not to whom the water supply system belongs, individual or
corporation, or what franchises are connected with it; all may
be taken for public uses upon payment of just compensation.

- FRANCHISE - PLDT vs. Bacolod City, July 15, 2005 - In sum,

it does not appear that, in approving §23 of R.A. No. 7925,
Congress intended it to operate as a blanket tax exemption to all
telecommunications entities. Applying the rule of strict
construction of laws granting tax exemptions and the rule that
doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal corporations in
interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing powers, we
hold that §23 of R.A. No. 7925 cannot be considered as having
amended petitioner's franchise so as to entitle it to exemption
from the imposition of local franchise taxes.

- Divinagracia v. CBS, GR No. 162272, April &, 2009-The

National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) is not
authorized to cancel the certificates of public convenience (CPCs)
and other licenses it had issued to the holders of duly issued
legislative franchises on the ground that the latter had violated the

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 terms of their franchise. As legislative franchises are extended
through statutes, they should receive recognition as the ultimate
expression of State policy.

- City Government of San Pablo vs. Reyes, 305 SCRA 353-

Under the Constitution, no franchise shall be granted under the
condition that it shall be subject to amendment or repeal when the
public interest so requires. Franchises are also subject to
alteration by the power to tax, which cannot be contracted
away.

- Pilipino Telephone Corp. vs. NTC, 410 SCRA 82 – The

constitution is emphatic that the operation of public utility shall not
be exclusive.

- Eastern Assurance & Surety Corp. vs. LTFRB, October 7,

2003 - The constitution does not totally prohibit monopolies. It
mandates the State to regulate them when public interest so
requires.

ARTICLE XIII
(SOCIAL JUSTICE & HUMAN RIGHTS)

- SOCIAL JUSTICE- while the pursuit of social justice can have

revolutionary effect, it cannot justify breaking the law. (Astudillo
v. Board of Directors, PHHC, 73 SCRA 15).

- HUMAN RIGHTS- read EPZA VS, HR, 208 SCRA; Simon vs.
Com. on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 1170- limited to violations of
civil and political rights only either by government official or
private individual.

- Human Security Act- granting adjudicatory and prosecutorial

powers to the CHR re violations of human rights.- refer to Section
5- perform such other functions and duties as may be provided by
law.

- CHREA vs. CHR, November 25, 2004- The CHR, although

admittedly a constitutional creation is, nonetheless, not included
in the genus of offices accorded fiscal autonomy by
constitutional or legislative fiat.

- People vs. Leachon, 1998- The constitutional requirement that the

eviction and demolition be in accordance with law and conducted
in a just and humane manner does not mean validity or legality of
the demolition or eviction is hinged on the existence of
resettlement area designated or earmarked by the government.

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 ARTICLE XIV
(ESTACS)

- Review Center Association of the Philippines v. Ermita, GR

No. 180046, April 2, 2009- A “review center is not an institution
of higher learning as contemplated by RA 7722…[i]t does not
offer a degree-granting program that would put it under the
jurisdiction of the CHED.” Moreover, “[a] review course is only
intended to ‘refresh and enhance the knowledge or competencies
and skills of reviewees,’” and it does not require enrollment,
attendance, a grade or submission of a thesis in order to complete
the review center course requirements or take the licensure
examination.

- ACADEMIC FREEDOM- from standpoint of the educational

institution and the members of the academe. The Supreme Court
sustained the primacy of academic freedom over Civil service rules
on AWOL, stressing when UP opted to retain private petitioner
and even promoted him despite his absence, the University was
exercising its freedom to choose who may teach or who may
continue to teach its faculty (UP, et al. vs. CSC, April 3, 2001).

- Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, - The

right of the school to discipline its students is at once apparent in
the third freedom, i.e., "how it shall be taught." A school certainly
cannot function in an atmosphere of anarchy. The school not only
has the right but the duty to develop discipline in its students. The
Constitution no less imposes such duty.

- University of the Phils. Board of Regents v. Court of Appeals,

G.R. No. 110280, October 21, 1993, 227 SCRA 342, 360. - The
power of the school to impose disciplinary measures extends even
after graduation for any act done by the student prior thereto.

- Cudia vs. Superintendent of PMA, G.R. No. 211362, February

24, 2015- The PMA is not different. As the primary training and
educational institution of the AFP, it certainly has the right to
invoke academic freedom in the enforcement of its internal rules
and regulations, which are the Honor Code and the Honor System
in particular.

- The Honor Code is a set of basic and fundamental ethical and

moral principle. It is the minimum standard for cadet behavior and
serves as the guiding spirit behind each cadet’s action. It is the
cadet’s responsibility to maintain the highest standard of honor.
Throughout a cadet’s stay in the PMA, he or she is absolutely

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 bound thereto. It binds as well the members of the Cadet Corps
from its alumni or the member of the so-called “Long Gray Line.”

- Likewise, the Honor Code constitutes the foundation for the

cadets’ character development. It defines the desirable values they
must possess to remain part of the Corps; it develops the
atmosphere of trust so essential in a military organization; and it
makes them professional military soldiers.133 As it is for character
building, it should not only be kept within the society of cadets. It
is best adopted by the Cadet Corps with the end view of applying it
outside as an officer of the AFP and as a product of the PMA.

- The Honor Code and System could be justified as the primary

means of achieving the cadets’ character development and as ways
by which the Academy has chosen to identify those who are
deficient in conduct.135 Upon the Code rests the ethical standards
of the Cadet Corps and it is also an institutional goal, ensuring that
graduates have strong character, unimpeachable integrity, and
moral standards of the highest order.136 To emphasize, the
Academy's disciplinary system as a whole is characterized as
"correctional and educational in nature rather than being legalistic
and punitive." Its purpose is to teach the cadets "to be prepared to
accept full responsibility for all that they do or fail to do and to
place loyalty to the service above self-interest or loyalty to friends
or associates."

- Morales vs. UP Board of Regents, December 13, 2004- As

enunciated by this Court in the case of University of San Carlos v.
Court of Appeals, the discretion of schools of learning to formulate
rules and guidelines in the granting of honors for purposes of
graduation forms part of academic freedom. And such discretion
may not be disturbed much less controlled by the courts, unless
there is grave abuse of discretion in its exercise. Therefore, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, the courts may not
disturb the University’s decision not to confer honors to petitioner.

- Lacuesta vs. Ateneo, December 9, 2005- Consistent with

academic freedom and constitutional autonomy, an institution of
higher learning has the prerogative to provide standards for its
teachers and determine whether these standards have been met. At
the end of the probation period, the decision to re-hire an employee
on probation, belongs to the university as the employer alone.

- UP vs. CSC, April 3, 2001- the University has the academic

freedom to determine for itself on academic grounds who may
teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may be
admitted to study.” Clearly, this freedom encompasses the
autonomy to choose who should teach and, concomitant therewith,
who should be retained in its rolls of professors and other

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 academic personnel. This Court declared in Ateneo de Manila
University v. Capulong: “As corporate entities, educational
institutions of higher learning are inherently endowed with the
right to establish their policies, academic and otherwise,
unhampered by external controls or pressure.”

- De LaSalle University vs. CA, December 19, 2007- Section 5(2),

Article XIV of the Constitution guaranties all institutions of higher
learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its
aims and objectives, and how best to attain them free from outside
coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public
interest calls for some restraint. According to present
jurisprudence, academic freedom encompasses the
independence of an academic institution to determine for itself
(1) who may teach, (2) what may be taught, (3) how it shall
teach, and (4) who may be admitted to study.

- It cannot be gainsaid that “the school has an interest in teaching the

student discipline, a necessary, if not indispensable, value in any
field of learning. By instilling discipline, the school teaches
discipline. Accordingly, the right to discipline the student
likewise finds basis in the freedom “what to teach.” Indeed,
while it is categorically stated under the Education Act of 1982
that students have a right “to freely choose their field of study,
subject to existing curricula and to continue their course
therein up to graduation,” such right is subject to the
established academic and disciplinary standards laid down by
the academic institution. Petitioner DLSU, therefore, can very
well exercise its academic freedom, which includes its free choice
of students for admission to its school.

- Son, e t. al. vs. UST, G.R. No. 211273, APRIL 18, 2018 -
Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual,
Manaois still cannot legally acquire a permanent status of
employment. Private educational institutions must still
supplementarily refer to the prevailing standards, qualifications,
and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies
(presently the Department of Education, the Commission on
Higher Education, and the Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private
schools, colleges, and universities to select and determine the
employment status of their academic personnel has been imposed
by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational
institutions, so as to ensure the quality and competency of our
schools and educators.

- Pimentel vs. Legal Education Board, G.R. No. 230642/G.R. No.

242954. September 10, 2019:

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- Supreme Court has no primary and direct supervision over legal
education. It is an executive function.

- Supreme Court’s exclusive rule making power covers the practice

of law and not the study of law. xxx The definition of the practice
of law, no matter how broad, cannot be further enlarged as to cover
the study of law.

- Academic freedom has been traditionally been associated as a

narrow aspect of the broader area of freedom of thought, speech,
expression and the press. It has been identified with the individual
autonomy of educators to "investigate, pursue, [ and] discuss free
from internal and external interference or pressure." Thus,
academic freedom of faculty members, professors, researchers, or
administrators is defended based on the freedom of speech and
press.

- Garcia v. The Faculty Admission Committee, Loyola School of

Theology-elucidates how academic freedom is enjoyed by institutions
of higher learning: [I]t is to be noted that the reference is to the
"institutions of higher learning" as the recipients of this boon. It would
follow then that the school or college itself is possessed of such a right.
It decides for itself its aims and. objectives and how best to attain them.
It is free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the
overriding public welfare calls for some restraint. It has a wide sphere
of autonomy certainly extending to the choice of students.

- Garcia also enumerated the internal conditions for institutional

academic freedom, that is, the academic staff should have de facto
control over: (a) the admission and examination of students; (b) the
curricula for courses of study; (c) the appointment and tenure of office
of academic staff; and ( d) the allocation of income among the different
categories of expenditure.

- inasmuch as the power to promulgate rules concerning the

protection and enforcement of constitutional rights, pleading,
practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice
of law the Integrated Bar, and legal assistance to the
underprivileged is settled as belonging exclusively to the Court,
certain provisions and clauses of R.A. No. 7662 which, by its plain
language and meaning, go beyond legal education and intrude
upon the Court's exclusive jurisdiction suffer from patent
unconstitutionality and should therefore be struck down.
Moreover, the exercise of the power to supervise and regulate legal
education is circumscribed by the normative contents of the
Constitution itself, that is, it must be reasonably exercised.
Reasonable exercise means that itshould not amount to control and
that it respects the Constitutionally guaranteed institutional
academic freedom and the citizen's right to quality and accessible

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 education. Transgression of these limitations renders the power
and the exercise thereof unconstitutional.

- Accordingly, the Court recognizes the power of the LEB under its
charter to prescribe minimum standards for law admission. The
PhiLSAT, when administered as an aptitude test to guide law
schools in measuring the applicants' aptness for legal education
along with such other admissions policy that the law school may
consider, is such minimum standard.

- However, the PhiLSAT presently operates not only as a measure of

an applicant's aptitude for law school. The PhiLSAT, as a pass or
fail exam, dictates upon law schools who among the examinees are
to be admitted to any law program. When the PhiLSAT is used to
exclude, qualify, and restrict admissions to law schools, as its
present design mandates, the PhiLSAT goes beyond mere
supervision and regulation, violates institutional academic
freedom, becomes unreasonable and therefore, unconstitutional. In
striking down these objectionable clauses in the PhiLSAT, the
State's inherent power to protect public interest by improving legal
education is neither emasculated nor compromised. Rather, the
institutional academic freedom of law schools to determine for
itself who to admit pursuant to their respective admissions policies
is merely protected.

-
ARTICLE XVI
(GENERAL PROVISIONS)

- NATIONAL POLICE FORCE- Under the DILG (Carpio vs.

Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290). Alunan vs. Asuncion,
January 28, 2000, the new PNP absorbed the members of the
former NAPOLCOM, PC and INP, all three of which accordingly
abolished.

- Note: Professionalism of the AFP- cannot engage, directly or

indirectly, in any partisan political activity, except to vote. They
cannot be appointed to a civilian position in the government,
including GOCCs or their subsidiaries.

- IBP vs. Zamora- Since none of the marines were incorporated or

enlisted as members of the PNP, there can be no appointment to a
civilian position to speak of.

- OPERATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES- 60% Filipino

ownership.

- MASS MEDIA- 100% Filipino ownership

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- ADVERSTISING INDUSTRY – 70%

- EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION- 60 % EXCEPT: Schools

established by religious groups and mission boards.

ARTICLE XVII
(AMENDMENTS)

- The Province of North Cotabato v. Republic, GR Nos. 183591,

183572, 183893, and 183951, October 14, 2008- The Court noted
that inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an
associative relationship between the BJE and the Central
Government is itself a violation of the Memorandum of
Instructions from the President dated March 1, 2001, addressed to
the government peace panel. Moreover, it virtually guarantees
that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the
laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace
Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a
guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing
a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress,
a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through
the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can
ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an
undue influence or interference with that process.

- IMBONG VS. COMELEC, 35 SCRA 28- Congress when

acting as a Constituent Assembly has full and plenary powers
to propose amendments or to call a convention. The grant to
Congress as a Constituent Assembly of such plenary authority
includes, by virtue of the doctrine of necessary implication,
all powers necessary to the effective exercise of principal
power granted, such as the power to fix qualifications,
apportionment, etc..

- SANTIAGO VS. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106- RA 6735 is

insufficient in providing for mechanism to govern initiatives
for constitutional amendments. While the Constitution
recognizes the right of citizens to propose amendments, the
people cannot exercise such until Congress provides for its
implementation.

- LAMBINO VS., ET AL. VS. COMELEC, October 25, 2006 -

Clearly, the framers of the Constitution intended that the “draft
of the proposed constitutional amendment” should be “ready
and shown” to the people “before” they sign such proposal.
The framers plainly stated that “before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them.” The framers also

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 “envisioned” that the people should sign on the proposal itself
because the proponents must “prepare that proposal and pass
it around for signature.” The essence of amendments
“directly proposed by the people through initiative upon a
petition” is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by
the people. This means two essential elements must be present.
First, the people must author and thus sign the entire proposal.
No agent or representative can sign on their behalf. Second, as
an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be embodied in a
petition.

- DOCTRINE OF PROPER SUBMISSION- GONZALES VS.

COMELEC, 21 SCRA 774- The power to amend the Constitution
or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. It is part of the inherent powers of
the people as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state.
Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely
because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when
exercising the same, it is said that Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as
component elements of a Constituent Assembly.

- When Congress, acting as Constituent Assembly, makes proposals

for amendments, it does not have the final say on whether or not its
acts are within constitutional limits- an issue which is clearly
subject to judicial review.

- There is nothing to indicate that a special election is all times

necessary in the ratification of amendments. A plebiscite may be
validly held together with general elections.

- TOLENTINO VS. COMELEC, 41 SCRA 702- There can be no

piece meal ratification.

- Presidential proclamation is not required for effectivity of

amendment/revisions. UNLESS, the proposed
amendments/revisions so provide.

ARTICLE XVIII
(TRANSITORY PROVISIONS)

- LIM VS. EXEC SEC., April 11, 2002- Section 25 of the

Transitory Provisions show a marked antipathy towards foreign
military presence in the country, or of foreign influence in general.
Hence, foreign troops are allowed entry into the Philippines only
be way of direct exception.

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- Under the Constitution, the US forces are prohibited from
engaging in an offensive war on Philippine territory. The Supreme
Court, however, cannot accept the bare allegations that the Arroyo
administration is engaged in double speak in trying to pass off as a
mere training exercise an offensive effort by foreign troops on
native soil.

- Bayan vs. Zamora, G.R. No. 138570, October 10, 2000, 342
SCRA 449-the VFA was duly concurred in by the Philippine
Senate and has been recognized as a treaty by the United States as
attested and certified by the duly authorized representative of the
United States government. The fact that the VFA was not
submitted for advice and consent of the United States Senate does
not detract from its status as a binding international agreement or
treaty recognized by the said State. For this is a matter of internal
United States law. Notice can be taken of the internationally
known practice by the United States of submitting to its Senate for
advice and consent agreements that are policymaking in nature,
whereas those that carry out or further implement these
policymaking agreements are merely submitted to Congress, under
the provisions of the so-called Case–Zablocki Act, within sixty
days from ratification. The second reason has to do with the
relation between the VFA and the RP-US Mutual Defense Treaty
of August 30, 1951. This earlier agreement was signed and duly
ratified with the concurrence of both the Philippine Senate and the
United States Senate.

- Saguisag, et al. vs. Ochoa, GR No. 212426-212444, January 12,

2016- The President also carries the mandate of being the sole
organ in the conduct of foreign relations. The role of the President
in foreign affairs is qualified by the Constitution in that the Chief
Executive must give paramount importance to the sovereignty
of the nation, the integrity of its territory, its interest, and the
right of the sovereign Filipino people to self-determination. In
specific provisions, the President's power is also limited, or at least
shared, as in Section 2 of Article II on the conduct of war; Sections
20 and 21 of Article VII on foreign loans, treaties, and
international agreements; Sections 4(2) and 5(2)(a) of Article VIII
on the judicial review of executive acts; Sections 4 and 25 of
Article XVIII on treaties and international agreements entered into
prior to the Constitution and on the presence of foreign military
troops, bases, or facilities.

- EDCA authorizes the U.S. military forces to have access to and

conduct activities within certain "Agreed Locations" in the
country. It was not transmitted to the Senate on the executive's
understanding that to do so was no longer necessary. Accordingly,
in June 2014, the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the
U.S. Embassy exchanged diplomatic notes confirming the

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 completion of all necessary internal requirements for the
agreement to enter into force in the two countries.

- Despite the President's roles as defender of the State and sole

authority in foreign relations, the 1987 Constitution expressly
limits his ability in instances when it involves the entry of foreign
military bases, troops or facilities. The initial limitation is found in
Section 21 of the provisions on the Executive Department: "No
treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the Members of the
Senate." The specific limitation is given by Section 25 of the
Transitory Provisions.

- The constitutional restriction refers solely to the initial entry of

the foreign military bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is
authorized, the subsequent acts are thereafter subject only to the
limitations provided by the rest of the Constitution and Philippine
law, and not to the Section 25 requirement of validity through a
treaty.

- Executive agreements is that their validity and effectivity are

not affected by a lack of Senate concurrence. Xxx Under
international law, the distinction between a treaty and an
international agreement or even an executive agreement is
irrelevant for purposes of determining international rights and
obligations. xxx Executive agreements may cover the matter
of foreign military forces if it merely involves detail
adjustments.

- AKBAYAN CITIZENS ACTION PARTY (AKBAYAN),

et al., Petitioners - versus - THOMAS G. AQUINO, et al.,
No. 170516, July 16, 2008- While Article VII, Section 21
provides for Senate concurrence, such pertains only to the
validity of the treaty under consideration, not to the conduct
of negotiations attendant to its conclusion. Moreover, it is not
even Congress as a whole that has been given the authority to
concur as a means of checking the treaty-making power of the
President, but only the Senate .

- Nicolas vs. Romulo, et al., G.R. No. 175888; Salonga vs.

Smith, et al. G.R. No. 176051; and Makabayan vs. Arroyo,
et al., G.R. No. 176222- February 11, 2009 - The
Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) between the Republic of
the Philippines and the United States, entered into on
February 10, 1998, is UPHELD as constitutional, but the
Romulo-Kenney Agreements of December 19 and 22, 2006
are DECLARED not in accordance with the VFA, and
respondent Secretary of Foreign Affairs is hereby ordered to
forthwith negotiate with the United States representatives for

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 the appropriate agreement on detention facilities under
Philippine authorities as provided in Art. V, Sec. 10 of the
VFA, pending which the status quo shall be maintained until
further orders by this Court.

ARTICLE III
(BILL OF RIGHTS)

- True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights
of notice and hearing pervade not only in criminal and civil
proceedings, but in administrative proceedings as well. Non-
observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings.
Individuals are entitled to be notified of any pending case
affecting their interests, and upon notice, they may claim the
right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Philippine
Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64). (Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 186-188, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc
[Melo])

- Social Justice Society, et al. v. Atienza, Jr., GR No.

156052, February 13, 2008- Essentially, the oil companies
are fighting for their right to property. They allege that they
stand to lose billions of pesos if forced [to] relocate.
However, based on the hierarchy of constitutionally protected
rights, the right to life enjoys precedence over the right to
property. The reason is obvious: life is irreplaceable, property
is not. When the state or [local government unit] LGU’s
exercise of police power clashes with a few individuals’ right
to property, the former should prevail,”.

- Procedural Due Process- Banco Español-Filipino vs.

Palanca Serano vs NLRC, 323 SCRA 445- Due process
clause of the constitution is a limitation on government
powers. It does not apply to the exercise of private power,
such as the termination of employment under the Labor Code.

- Pichay, Jr. vs. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary

for Legal Affairs, et al., GR No. 196425, July 24, 2012-
Pichay’s right to due process was not violated when the IAD-
ODESLA took cognizance of the administrative complaint
against him. In administrative proceedings, the filing of the
charges and giving reasonable opportunity for the person so
charged to answer the accusations against him constitute the
minimum requirements of due process, which simply means
having the opportunity to explain one’s side.

- Chavez vs. Romulo, 431 SCRA 534- The license to carry

firearm is neither a property nor a property right. Neither does

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 it create a vested right. A permit to carry a firearm outside of
one’s residence maybe revoked at anytime.

- MMDA vs. Garin, GR No. 130230, April 15, 2005- A

license to operate a motor vehicle is not a property right, but a
privilege granted by the State, which may be suspended or
revoked by the State in the exercise of police power.

- Macias vs. Macias, September 3, 2003- Denial of due

process suffices to cast on the official act taken by whatever
branch of the government the impress of nullity.

- INSTANCES WHEN HEARINGS ARE NOT

NECESSARY:

1. When administrative agencies are exercising their quasi-legislative

functions;
2. Abatement of nuisance per se Art. (704, NCC);
3. Granting by courts of provisional remedies;
4. Preventive suspension; (Co. Vs. Barbers. Sec. 63 of LGC; BP
337);
5. Removal or replacement of temporary employees in the
government service;
6. Issuance of warrants of distraint and/or levy by the BIR
Commissioner;
7. Cancellation of passport of a person charged with a crime;
8. Issuance of sequestration orders;
9. Judicial order which prevents an accused from traveling abroad;
10. Suspension of bank’s operations by the Monetary Board upon a
prima facie finding of liquidity problems in such bank.
11. Extradition proceedings ([evaluation stage]- Sec of Justice vs.
Lantion; Cuevas vs. Munoz, 2000);
12. Reinvestigation (criminal cases);
13. TPO (Garcia vs. Drilon, June 25, 2013);

- SP of Baguio City vs. Jadewell Parking Systems Corp.,

April 23, 2014- Prior notice and hearing, as elements of due
pocess of law, are only required in judicial or quasi judicial
proceedings, not when the government agency is engaged in the
performance of quasi legislative or administrative functions.

- Shu vs. Dee, April 23, 2014- The repondents cannot claim
that they were denied due process during the NBI
Investigation. The functions of the NBI are merely
investigatory and informational in nature. The NBI has no
judicial or quasi-judicial power and is incapable of granting
any relief to any party, it cannot even determine probable
cause.

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- Estrada vs. Office of the Ombudsman, GR No. 212140-41,
January 21, 2015- there is no law or rule that requires the
Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the
counter-affidavits of his co-respondents.

The Void-for-vagueness Doctrine

- The law should be declared void as it is vague, i.e., it lacks

comprehensible standards so that men of ordinary intelligence
will probably have to guess as to its meaning and differ in its
application.

- Such vague law is repugnant to the Constitution in two (2)

respects: one, it violates due process as it fails to afford
persons fair notice of the conduct to avoid and; second, it
gives law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out
provisions and, therefore, in effect, it becomes an arbitrary
flexing of the government’s muscle.

- However, for this to be validly invoked, the act or law must

be utterly vague on its face that it cannot be clarified either by
a saving clause or by statutory construction.

Equal Protection of the Law

- The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all

persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly
situated individuals in a similar manner. The guarantee of
equal protection secures every person within the State’s
jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statute or by its
improper execution through the State’s duly constituted
authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law
demands that the State governs impartially and not to draw
distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to the legitimate governmental objective.

- The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among

equals determined according to a valid classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that
make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated
differently from another. In other words, a valid
classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions;
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- (2) germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) equally applicable to all
members of the class. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana
Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al., G.R. No.
189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

- The Three (3) Levels of Scrutiny to Determine the Propriety

of the Classification under the Equal Protection Clause

- To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort

to three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny,
intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.

- The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation

test or rational basis test) demands that the classification
reasonably relate to the legislative purpose. The rational basis
test often applies in cases involving economics or social
welfare, or to any other case not involving a suspect class.

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- When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a
disadvantage, it will be treated under intermediate or
heightened review. Classifications based on gender or
illegitimacy receives intermediate scrutiny. To survive
intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an
important governmental interest and be substantially related
to that interest, but the justification for the classification must
be genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.

- The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative

classification impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a
fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class
disadvantage of a suspect class. The Government carries the
burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve
a compelling state interest, and that it is the least restrictive
means to protect such interest. (Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino
Banana Growers & Exporters Association, Inc., et al.,
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin])

- In Mosqueda, et al. v. Pilipino Banana Growers &

Exporters Association, Inc., et al., (G.R. No. 189185,
August 16, 2016, En Banc [Bersamin]), the Court, applying
the rational basis test, ruled that the ordinance of Davao City
prohibiting aerial spraying in all agricultural entities therein
as the practice produces pesticide drift causing inconvenience
and harm to the residents and degrades the environment,
violates the equal protection clause, hence, should be declared
unconstitutional.

- Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large

farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the investment
of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It
effectively denies the affected individuals the technology
aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and
cultivation not only of banana but of other crops as well. The
prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial
technology to arrest the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease
and other menaces that threaten their production and harvest.
X x x the effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City
in view of the significant contribution of banana export
trading to the country’s economy.

- The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it

oppressive and unreasonable in light of the existence and
availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that
will not overburden the respondents and those dependent on

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 their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by
the ordinance. X x x

- Disini Jr. vs. Secretary of Justice- The Supreme Court found

the strict scrutiny standard, an American constituted
construct, useful in determining the constitutionality of laws
that tend to target a class of things or persons. According to
this standard, a legislative classification that impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of fundamental right or operates
to the peculiar class disadvantaged of a suspect class is
presumed unconstitutional. The burden is on the government
to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a
compelling state interest and it is the least restrictive means to
protect such interest. Later, the strict scrutiny standard was
used to assess the validity of laws dealing with the regulation
of speech, gender or race as well as other fundamental rights,
as expansion from its earlier application to equal protection.
In the cases, the Supreme Court finds nothing in Section
4(a)(1) that calls for the application of the strict scrutiny
standard since no fundamental freedom, like speech, is
involved in punishing what is essentially condemnable act-
accessing the computer system of another without right. It is
universally condemned act.

- Biraogo vs the Philippine Truth Commission, G.R. No.

192935, December 7, 2010- the Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past
administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such
discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the
commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective
retribution.

- Trillanes IV vs. Pimentel, GR No. 179817, June 27, 2008

Election to Congress is not a reasonable classification in
criminal law enforcement as the functions and duties of the
office are not substantial distinctions which lift one from the
class of prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted
in liberty of movement.

- People vs. Jalosjos, 324 SCRA 689, Election to the position

of a Congressman is not reasonable classification in criminal
law enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are
not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement.

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 - USA vs. Puruganan, September 3, 2002- The position of
Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not
substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty
of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are germane to
the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the
same class.

- Fariñas vs. Executive Secretary, 417 SCRA 503,

December 10, 2003, Substantive distinctions exist between
elective officials and appointive officials. The former occupy
their office by virtue of the mandate of the people while the
latter hold their office by virtue of their designation by an
appointing authority.

Section 2- Unreasonable searches & seizures

- The right to security of a person- (Secretary of National

Defense vs. Manalo, GR No. 180908, October 7, 2008)-is a
gurarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In
the context of the writ of amparo, this right is built into the
guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Art. III, Sec. 1
of the 1987 constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and
psychological integrity) under Art. III, Sec. 2.

- Vivares, et al. vs. STC, G.R. No. 202666, September 29,

2014- the concept of privacy has, through time, greatly
evolved, with technological advancements having an
influential part therein. This evolution was briefly recounted
in former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno’s speech, The
Common Right to Privacy, where he explained the three
strands of the right to privacy, viz: (1) locational or situational
privacy; (2) informational privacy; and (3) decisional
privacy. Of the three, what is relevant to the case at bar is the
right to informational privacy––usually defined as the right of
individuals to control information about themselves.

- It is through the availability of said privacy tools that many

Online Social Network (OSN) users are said to have a
subjective expectation that only those to whom they grant
access to their profile will view the information they post or
upload thereto. Utilization of these privacy tools is the
manifestation, in cyber world, of the user’s invocation of his
or her right to informational privacy.

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- Considering that the default setting for Facebook posts is
"Public," it can be surmised that the photographs in question
were viewable to everyone on Facebook, absent any proof
that petitioners’ children positively limited the disclosure of
the photograph. If such were the case, they cannot invoke the
protection attached to the right to informational privacy. The
ensuing pronouncement in US v. Gines-Perez is most
instructive:

- [A] person who places a photograph on the Internet precisely

intends to forsake and renounce all privacy rights to such
imagery, particularly under circumstances such as here, where
the Defendant did not employ protective measures or devices
that would have controlled access to the Web page or the
photograph itself.

- Also, United States v. Maxwell held that "[t]he more open

the method of transmission is, the less privacy one can
reasonably expect. Messages sent to the public at large in the
chat room or e-mail that is forwarded from correspondent to
correspondent loses any semblance of privacy."

Is there a constitutional right to privacy?

- The essence of privacy is the “right to be let alone.” In the

1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut (381 U.S. 479, 14 L.
ed. 2D 510 [1965]), the United States Supreme Court gave
more substance to the right of privacy when it ruled that the
right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a
right of privacy which can be found within the penumbras of
the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments x x x.
In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc (22 SCRA 424, 444-445),
we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional
right to privacy x x x.

- Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the

right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution. (Morfe v. Mutuc, 22 SCRA
424, 444 [1968]; Cortes, The Constitutional Foundations of
Privacy, p. 18 [1970]). It is expressly recognized in Section
3(1) of the Bill of Rights x x x. Other facets of the right to
privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of
Rights (viz: Secs. 1, 2, 6, 8, and 17. (Ople v. Torres, G.R.
No. 127685, July 23, 1998 [Puno])

What are the zones of privacy recognized and protected in our

laws?

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- The Civil Code provides that “[e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his
neighbors and other persons” and punishes as actionable torts
several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee
or any private individual liable for damages for any violation
of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes
the privacy of letters and other private communications. The
Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of secrets by
an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and
trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in
special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law (R.A. 4200), the
Secrecy of Bank Deposits (R.A. 1405) and the Intellectual
Property Code (R.A. 8293). The Rules of Court on privileged
communication likewise recognize the privacy of certain
information (Section 24, Rule 130[c], Revised Rules on
Evidence). (Ople v. Torres, G.R. No. 127685, July 23, 1998
[Puno])

- Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al. v. The Secretary of Justice,

et al., G.R. No,. 203335, Feb. 11, 2014, En Banc (Abad) The
right to privacy, or the right to be let alone, was
institutionalized in the 1987 Constitution as a facet of the
right protected by the guarantee against unreasonable
searches and seizures. But the Court acknowledged its
existence as early as 1968 in Morfe v. Mutuc, it ruled that the
right to privacy exists independently of its identification with
liberty; it is in itself fully deserving of constitutional
protection.

- Relevant to any discussion of the right to privacy is the

concept known as the “Zones of Privacy.” The Court
explained in “In the Matter of the Petition for Issuance of
Writ of Habeas Corpus of Sabio v. Senator Gordon” the
relevance of these zones to the right to privacy:

- Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws.

Within these zones, any form of intrusion is impermissible
unless excused by law and in accordance with customary
legal process. The meticulous regard we accord to these
zones arises not only from our conviction that the right to
privacy is a “constitutional right” and “the right most valued
by civilized men,” but also from our adherence to the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights which mandates that,
“no one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his
privacy” and “everyone has the right to the protection of the
law against such interference or attacks.”

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- Two constitutional guarantees create these zones of privacy:
(a) the right against unreasonable searches and seizures,
which is the basis of the right to be let alone, and (b) the right
to privacy of communication and correspondence.

- In assessing the challenge that the State has impermissibly

intruded into these zones of privacy, a court must determine
whether a person has exhibited a reasonable expectation of
privacy and, if so, whether that expectation has been violated
by unreasonable government intrusion.

- SJS vs. Dangerous Drugs Board and PDEA, GR No.

157870, November 3, 2008- Supreme Court declared as
unconstitutional the provisions of RA 9165 requiring
mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office and
persons accused of crimes. However, the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of the said RA insofar as random
drug testing for secondary and tertiary school students, as
well as for officials and employees of public and private
offices is concerned. The need for drug testing to at least
minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the
individual’s privacy interest under the premises.

- Ople vs. Torres, G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998- The right
to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living
in a mass society. The threats emanate from various sources
— governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.
In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch
of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the
people to surrender their privacy by giving information about
themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of
basic services. Given the record-keeping power of the
computer, only the indifferent fail to perceive the danger that
A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to compile a
devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely
to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the
disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by
an unerasable record of his past and his limitations. In a way,
the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society
will have lost its benign capacity to forget." Oblivious to this
counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in
labelling the right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close
with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved
in our Constitution for flattery.

- KMU v. NEDA, G.R. No. 167798, April 19, 2006- On its

face, EO 420 shows no constitutional infirmity because it
even narrowly limits the data that can be collected, recorded
and shown compared to the existing ID systems of

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 government entities. EO 420 further provides strict safeguards
to protect the confidentiality of the data collected, in contrast
to the prior ID systems which are bereft of strict
administrative safeguards. The right to privacy does not bar
the adoption of reasonable ID systems by government
entities. With the exception of the 8 specific data shown on
the ID card, the personal data collected and recorded under
EO 420 are treated as strictly confidential under Section 6(d)
of EO 420. These data are not only strictly confidential but
also personal matters. The disclosure requirements under EO
420 are far benign and cannot therefore constitute violation of
the right to privacy. EO 420 requires disclosure of 14
personal data that are routine for ID purposes, data that
cannot possibly embarrass or humiliate anyone.

- EO 420 applies only to government entities that already

maintain ID systems and issue ID cards pursuant to their
regular functions under existing laws. EO 420 does not grant
such government entities any power that they do not already
possess under existing laws. In contrast, the assailed
executive issuance in Ople v. Torres sought to establish a
National Computerized Identification Reference System, a
national ID system that did not exist prior to the assailed
executive issuance. Obviously, a national ID card system
requires legislation because it creates a new national data
collection and card issuance system where none existed
before.

- EO 420 does not establish a national ID system but makes the

existing sectoral card systems of government entities like
GSIS, SSS, Philhealth and LTO less costly, more efficient,
reliable and user-friendly to the public. Hence, EO 420 is a
proper subject of executive issuance under the Presidents
constitutional power of control over government entities in
the Executive department, as well as under the Presidents
constitutional duty to ensure that laws are faithfully executed.

- Del Castillo vs. People, GR No. 185128, January 30, 2012-

The confiscated items having been found in a place other than
the one described in the search warrant, can be considered as
fruits of an invalid warrantless search. xxx Evidence obtained
due to warrantless search conducted by a barangay tanod is
inadmissible in evidence since a barangay tanod is an agent of
a person in authority under the Revised Penal Code

VALID WARRANTLESS SEARCHES & SEIZURES:

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1. Search incidental to lawful arrest (PP vs. Tiu Won Chua, 405 SCRA
280; PP vs. Estella, 395 SCRA 553);
2. search of a moving vehicle (PP vs. Tampis, 407 SCRA 582);
3. seizure in plain view (PP vs. Go, 411 SCRA 81, The counterfeit
nature of the seals and stamps was not apparent and established until after
they have been turned over to the Chinese embassy and the Bureau of
Immigration for verification. Hence, not considered as evidence in plain
view);
4. customs search (Salvador vs. PP, July 15, 2005);
5. waiver by the accused( 1. right to be waived exists; 2. person waiving
has knowledge of such right, actually or constructively; and 3. he/she has
actual intention to relinquish the right.) Silahis Int’l Hotel vs. Soluta, Feb.
20, 2006; Valdez vs. People, 538 SCRA 611)- It is the State which has the
burden of proving, by clear and positive testimony, that the necessary
consent was obtained and that it was freely and voluntarily given;
6. stop & frisk (limited protective search); Terry Search – (Terry vs,
Ohio, 1968; Malacatvs CA, Dec. 1, 1997) it is a stop of a person by law
enforcement officer based upon “reasonable suspicion” that a person may
have been engaged in criminal activity, whereas an arrest requires “probable
cause” that a suspect committed a criminal offense;
7. Armed conflict (war time);
8. Check points (limited to visual search; PP vs. Escaño, GR No.
129756-58, January 28, 2000);
9. Exigent and emergency circumstances (PP vs. De Gracia, 233 SCRA
716), where a warrantless search was allowed where there was a prevailing
general chaos and disorder because of an ongoing coup;
10. Conduct of “Area Target Zone” and “Saturation Drives” in the
exercise of military powers of the President (Guanzon vs. Villa, 181 SCRA
623);
11. Routine Airport Security Procedure (PP vs. Suzuki, October 23, 2003;
PP vs. Johnson, GR No. 138881, December 18, 2000).

Valmonte v. De Villa: For searches at checkpoints to be valid, the

following must be observed:

1. The checkpoint must be pre-announced;

2. It must be stationary; and
3. The search at checkpoint must be limited to visual search only. An
intrusive search is not allowed

People v. Doria

The requisites for the “plain view” doctrine to be validly invoked are:

1. The law enforcement officer must have a valid justification for an

intrusion, or is in a position where he can view a particular area;
2. The discovery of the evidence in plain view must be inadvertent; and
3. It is immediately apparent to him that the thing he sees is object of a
crime, contraband, or subject to seizure.

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 - It is clear that if the object is inside a closed container, “plain
view” may not be invoked. However, even if it inside a closed
container but if due to the configuration of the container, or due
to its transparency, it can still be seen from the outside what is
inside, “plain view” may still be invoked.

- Del Rosario vs. People, May 31, 2001- Seizure of evidence in

plain view is justified only when:

1. there is prior valid intrusion based on a valid warrantless arrest

in which the police are legally present in the pursuit of their
official duties;
2. the evidence was inadvertently discovered by the police who
had the right to be there where they are;
3. the evidence must be immediately apparent; and
4. plain view justified the seizure without further search
conducted- Manalili vs. CA, 280 SCRA 400

WARRANTLESS ARREST

- Luz vs. People, GR No. 197788, February 29, 2012- Under

the Rules, a warrant of arrest need not be issued if the
information or charge was filed for an offense penalized by a
fine only. As a corollary, neither can a warrantless arrest be
made for such an offense. xxx In this case, the officer’s
issuance (or intent to issue) a traffic citation ticket negates the
possibility of an arrest for the same violation.

HOT PURSUIT- Requisites:

1. The pursuit of the offender by the arresting officer must be continuous

from the time of the commission of the offense to the time of the arrest.
2. There must be no supervening event which breaks the continuity of
the chase.

- Ladlad/Beltran, et al. vs. Gonzales/Velasco, June 1, 2007-

Inquest proceedings are proper only when the accused has
been lawfully arrested without warrant.

- PP vs. dela Cruz, 571 SCRA 469- arrest in flagrante delicto

to be availed, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that
he has just committed, is actually committing or is attempting
to commit a crime. (2) such commission of a crime must be
done in the presence and within the view of the arresting
officer.

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 - PP vs. Del Rosario, 305 SCRA 740, There must be a large
measure of immediacy between the time of the offense was
committed and the time of the warrantless arrest. If there was
an appreaciable lapse of time between the arrest and the
commission of the crime, a warrant of arrest must be secured.

- Padilla vs. CA, 269 SCRA 402, When the law speaks of a
crime committed in the presence of an arresting officer, it is
not limited to actually seeing the commission of the crime.
The requirement of the law is complied where the arresting
officer was within an earshot from the scene although he did
not personally witness the commission of the crime.

- PP vs. Martin, 193 SCRA 57, The Bill of Rights is protection

against the State. The protection against unreasonable
searches and seizures cannot be extended to acts committed
by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of
alleged unlawful intrusion by the government. Right applies
only against the government and agencies tasked with the
enforcement of the law.

- Only a judge may validly issue a warrant- EXCEPT: By

administrative authorities (CID; BOC) only for the purpose of
carrying out a final finding of violation of law.

- Jackson vs. Macalino, November 24, 2003- the Commissioner

of the Immigration can issue a warrant of arrest against a
foreigner who has been ordered to be deported.

- SCATTER SHOT WARRANT- is a warrant having been

issued to more than one offense.

- PRECISE AND MINUTE DETAIL AS TO THE PLACE TO

BE SEARCHED AND THINGS OR PERSONS TO BE
SEIZED NOT REQUIRED- the constitution does not require
that the things to be seized must be described in precise and
minute detail as to no room for doubt on the part of the
searching authorities; TECHNICAL DESCRIPTION IS NOT
REQUIRED- It is only necessary that there be reasonable
certainty or particularity as to the identity of the property to
be searched for and seized so that the warrant shall not be a
mere roving commission. THE TEST as would be as to what
is to be taken, nothing is left to the discretion of the officer
executing the warrant. VALLEJO VS. CA, 427 SCRA 658,
April 14, 2004.

Administrative Warrantless Arrest-Causes:

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a. If you breach peace or if you are planning to do so, you can be
arrested but only if it is absolutely necessary to do so. You will be freed as
soon as you no longer represent a threat to public security.
b. If you disrupt a court hearing;
c. If you are in a drunken state on the public highway;
d. In case of brawling;
e. If you block traffic without authorization;
f. If you refuse to give your ID documents or if these are questionable;
g. If you are in the country illegally.

Section 3- Privacy of communication & correspondence-

- In the matter of petition for habeas corpus of Capt. G.

Alejano, et al. vs. Cabuay, G.R. No. 160792, August 25,
2005- The letters alleged to have been read by the ISAFP
authorities were not confidential letters between the detainees
and their lawyers. The petitioner who received the letters
from detainees Trillanes and Maestrecampo was merely
acting as the detainees’ personal courier and not as their
counsel when he received the letters for mailing. In the
present case, since the letters were not confidential
communication between the detainees and their lawyers, the
officials of the ISAFP Detention Center could read the letters.
If the letters are marked confidential communication between
the detainees and their lawyers, the detention officials should
not read the letters but only open the envelopes for inspection
in the presence of the detainees. That a law is required before
an executive officer could intrude on a citizen’s privacy rights
is a guarantee that is available only to the public at large but
not to persons who are detained or imprisoned. The right to
privacy of those detained is subject to Section 4 of RA 7438,
as well as to the limitations inherent in lawful detention or
imprisonment. By the very fact of their detention, pre-trial
detainees and convicted prisoners have a diminished
expectation of privacy rights.

- Roxas vs. Zuzuarregei, June 12, 2007- To prevent liability

from attaching on account of his letter, he invokes his rights
to free speech and privacy of communication. The invocation
of these rights will not, however, free him from liability. As
already stated, his letter contained defamatory statements that
impaired public confidence in the integrity of the judiciary.
The making of contemptuous statements directed against the
Court is not an exercise of free speech; rather, it is an abuse of
such right. Unwarranted attacks on the dignity of the courts
cannot be disguised as free speech, for the exercise of said
right cannot be used to impair the independence and
efficiency of courts or public respect therefor and confidence

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 therein. Free expression must not be used as a vehicle to
satisfy one’s irrational obsession to demean, ridicule, degrade
and even destroy this Court and its magistrates.

- Read: Ayer Productions vs. Capulong- The right of privacy or

the right to be let alone is not an absolute right where the
person is a public figure and the information sought to be
elicited from him or to be published about him constitute
matters of a public character.

- Zulueta vs. CA, 253 SCRA 699- The only exception to the
prohibition in the constitution is if there is a “lawful order
from a court or when public safety or order requires
otherwise, as prescribed by law”.

- A violation of the Anti Wire Tapping Law (R.A. 4200) which

prohibits not only the unauthorized taping of private
conversations, but also: (a) the possession of such tapes with
the knowledge of their nature as illegal wiretaps; (b) the
replaying of the tapes to any person; and (c) to communicate
the contents thereof either verbally or in writing, such as the
provision of transcripts. The potential jail term, if convicted,
ranges from six months to six years.

- Arts. 290, 291, 292 and 299 of the Revised Penal Code

- RA No. 9372 (Human Security Act)- The provisions of RA

4200 to the contrary notwithstanding, a police or law
enforcement official and members of his team may, upon a
written order of the Court of Appeals, listen to intercept, and
record, with the use of any mode, form, kind or type of
electronic or other surveillance equipment or intercepting and
tracking devices, or with the use of any other suitable ways
and means for that purpose, any communication, message,
conversation, discussion or spoken or written words between
members of a judicially declared and outlawed terrorist
organization, association, or group of persons or any person
charged with or suspected of the crime of terrorism or
conspiracy to commit terrorism. Provided, that surveillance,
interception and recording of communications between
lawyers and clients, doctors and patients, journalists and their
sources and confidential business correspondence shall not be
authorized.

Section 4- Freedom of expression-

- Content-based restrictions on free speech, and content-neutral

regulations

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 - Content-based restrictions are imposed because of the content
of the speech and are, therefore, subject to the clear-and-
present danger test. For example, a rule such as that involved
in Sanidad v. Comelec, prohibiting columnists,
commentators, and announcers from campaigning either for
or against an issue in a plebiscite must have compelling
reason to support it, or it will not pass muster under strict
scrutiny. These restrictions are censorial and therefore they
bear a heavy presumption of constitutional invalidity. In
addition, they will be tested for possible overbreadth and
vagueness.

- Content-neutral restrictions, on the other hand, like Sec. 11(b)

of R.A. No. 6646, which prohibits the sale or donation of
print space and air time to political candidates during the
campaign period, are not concerned with the content of the
speech. These regulations need only a substantial
governmental interest to support them. A deferential standard
of review will suffice to test their validity. The clear-and-
present danger rule is inappropriate as a test for determining
the constitutional validity of laws, like Sec. 11(b) of R.A. No.
6646, which are not concerned with the content of political
ads but only with their incidents. To apply the clear-and-
present danger test to such regulatory measures would be like
using a sledgehammer to drive a nail when a regular hammer
is all that is needed.

- The test for this difference in the level of justification for the
restriction of speech is that content-based restrictions distort
public debate, have improper motivation, and are usually
imposed because of fear of how people will react to a
particular speech. No such reasons underlie content-neutral
regulations, like regulation of time, place and manner of
holding public assemblies under B.P. Blg. 880, the Public
Assembly Act of 1985. (Osmena v. COMELEC, 288 SCRA
447, March 31, 1998 [Mendoza])

What is the most influential test for distinguishing content-based from

content-neutral regulations?

- The United States Supreme Court held in United States v. O’

Brien:
- [A] a governmental regulation is sufficiently justified (1) if it
is within the constitutional power of the government; (2) if it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; (3)
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and (4) if the incidental restriction on alleged
First Amendment freedoms (of speech, expression and press)
is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest

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 (391 U.S. 367, 20 L. Ed. 2df 692, 680 [1968] [bracketed
numbers added])

- This is so far the most influential test for distinguishing

content-based from content-neutral regulations and is said to
have “become canonical in the review of such laws.” (G.
Gunther & K. Sullivan, Constitutional Law 1217 [13th ed.
1997]). It is noteworthy that the O’ Brien test has been
applied by this Court in at least two cases (Adiong v.
Comelec, 207 SCRA 712 [1992]; Osmena v. Comelec,
supra.).

- Under this test, even if a law furthers an important or

substantial governmental interest, it should be invalidated if
such governmental interest is “not unrelated to the
suppression of free expression.” Moreover, even if the
purpose is unrelated to the suppression of free speech, the law
should nevertheless be invalidated if the restriction on
freedom of expression is greater than is necessary to achieve
the governmental purpose in question. (Social Weather
Stations, Inc. v. Comelec, G.R. No. 147571, May 5, 2001, En
Banc [Mendoza]) Chavez v. Secretary Gonzales

- Content based and content neutral regulations- Regulations of

speech may either be content-based (the subject of the speech
or utterance is sought to be regulated) and content-neutral (it
regulates only the conduct associated with speech, such as the
time, place and manner). To pass constitutional muster, any
content-based regulation must show that the government has a
compelling or overriding interest in the subject regulation. A
content neutral restriction, on the other hand, need only show
an important government interest, as long as it leaves open
alternative channels of communication.

- Chavez vs. Secretary Gonzales, GR No. 168338, February

15, 2008- The acts of the Secretary of Justice and the NTC in
warning television stations against playing the “Garci tapes”
under pain of revocation of their licenses, were content-based
restrictions and should be subjected to the “clear and present
and danger test”.

- Newsounds Broadcasting Network, Inc., et al. vs. Dy, et al.,

GR No. 170270/GR No. 179411, April 2, 2009- The
immediate implication of the application of the “strict
scrutiny” test is that the burden falls upon respondents as
agents of the government to prove that their actions do not
infringe upon petitioners’ constitutional rights. As content
regulation cannot be done in the absence of compelling
reason to infringe the right to free expression.

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- The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev.
Bishop Vicente M. Navarra, et al. v. COMELEC, GR No.
205728, January 21, 2015, En Banc (Leonen) This case
defines the extent that our people may shape the debates
during elections. It is significant and of first impression. We
are asked to decide whether the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC) has the competence to limit expressions made
by the citizens – who are not candidates – during elections.

- All regulations will have a impact directly or indirectly on

expression. The prohibition against the abridgment of speech
should not mean an absolute prohibition against regulation.
The primary and incidental burden on speech must be
weighed against a compelling state interest clearly allowed in
the Constitution. The test depends on the relevant theory of
speech implicit in the kind of society framed by our
Constitution.

- Our Constitution has also explicitly included the freedom of

expression, separate and in addition to the freedom of speech
and of the press provided in the US Constitution. The word
“expression” was added in the 1987 Constitution x x x for
having a wider scope x x x.

- Speech may be said to be inextricably linked to freedom itself

as “[t]he right to think is the beginning of freedom, and
speech must be protected from the government because
speech is the beginning of thought.” (Freedom of Speech and
Expression, 116 Harv. L. Rev. 272, 277 [2002], quoting
Justice Kennedy in Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, 122 S.
Ct. 1389, 1403 [2002])

- Communication is an essential outcome of protected speech.

Communication exists when “(1) a speaker, seeking to signal
others, uses conventional actions because he or she
reasonably believes that such actions will be taken by the
audience in the manner intended; and (2) the audience so
takes the actions.” (Heidi M. Hurd, Sovereignty in Silence, 99
Yale L. J. 945, 954 [1990]) “[I]n communicative action[,] the
hearer may respond to the claims by x x x either accepting the
speech act’s claims or opposing them with criticism or
requests for justification.” (Hugh Baxter, System and
Lifeworld in Haberma’s Theory of Law, 23 Cardozo L. Rev.
473, 499 [2002])

- Speech is not limited to vocal communication. “[C]onduct is

treated as a form of speech sometimes referred to as
‘symbolic speech[,]’ (Joshua Waldman, Symbolic Speech and

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 Social Meaning, 97 Colum. L. Rev. 1844, 1847 [1997]) such
that “’when ‘speech’ and ‘nonspeech’ elements are combined
in the same course of conduct,’ the ‘communicative element’
of the conduct may be ‘sufficient to bring into play the [right
to freedom of expression].’” (Id., citing US v. O’Brien, 391
U.S. 367, 376 [1968])

- The right to freedom of expression, thus, applies to the entire

continuum of speech from utterances made to conduct
enacted, and even to inaction itself as a symbolic manner of
communication.

- Even before freedom “of expression” was included in Article

III, Section 4 of the present Constitution, this court has
applied its precedent version to expressions other than verbal
utterances.

- 1 Utak vs COMELEC, GR 206020 April 14 2015- The

COMELEC may only regulate the franchise or permit to
operate and not the ownership per se of PUVs and transport
terminals. The posting of election campaign material on
vehicles used for public transport or on transport terminals is
not only a form of political expression, but also an act of
ownership – it has nothing to do with the franchise or permit
to operate the PUV or transport terminal.

- A government regulation based on the captive-audience

doctrine may not be justified if the supposed “captive
audience” may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive
speech. Here, the commuters are not forced or compelled to
read the election campaign materials posted on PUVs and
transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to
receive the messages contained in the posted election
campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if
they find the same unbearably intrusive. Hence, the doctrine
is not applicable.

- It unduly infringes on the fundamental right of the people to

freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom
of individuals such as the owners of PUVs and private
transport terminals to express their preference, through the
posting of election campaign material in their property, and
convince others to agree with them.

- The prohibition under the certain provisions of RA 9615 are

content-neutral regulations since they merely control the
place where election campaign materials may be posted, but
the prohibition is repugnant to the free speech clause as it

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 fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.

- The restriction on free speech of owners of PUVs and

transport terminals is not necessary to a stated governmental
interest. First, while Resolution 9615 was promulgated by the
COMELEC to implement the provisions of Fair Elections
Act, the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials
on PUVs and transport terminals was not provided for therein.
Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our
present election laws that would ensure equal time, space, and
opportunity to candidates in elections. Hence, one of the
requisites of a valid content-neutral regulation was not
satisfied.

- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- to prohibit the transmission of

unsolicited commercial ads; and the State cannot rob him of
his right without violating his constitutionally guaranteed
freedom of expression.

- GMA Network vs. COMELEC, September 2, 2014- when

the COMELEC drastically reduced the airtime within which
national candidates and political parties may air political
advertisements on television and radio, it unduly restricted
and constrained the ability of candidates and political parties
to reach out and communicate with the people.

- Social Weather Stations vs. COMELEC, May 5, 2001-

Election surveys are covered by the protection to freedom of
expression as they refer to the measurement of opinions and
perception of voters as regards to a candidate’s popularity,
qualifications, platforms or a matter of public discussion in
relation to the election, including the voter’s preference for
candidates or publicly discussed issues during the campaign
period.The prohibition imposed by Section 5.4 of RA 9006
(Fair Election Act) is invalid because: 1) it imposes prior
restraint on the freedom of expression; 2) it is a direct and
total suppression of a category of expression even though
such suppression is only for a limited period; and 3) the
government interest sought to be promoted can be achieved
by means other than the suppression of freedom of
expression.

- The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special

application only to free-speech cases, and are not appropriate
for testing the validity of penal statutes. The doctrines of strict
scrutiny, overbreadth, and vagueness are analytical tools
developed for testing "on their faces" statutes in free speech
cases or, as they are called in American law.

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- A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it
lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ
as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.[57] The
overbreadth doctrine, meanwhile, decrees that a governmental
purpose to control or prevent activities constitutionally
subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means
which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the
area of protected freedoms.

- As distinguished from the vagueness doctrine, the

overbreadth doctrine assumes that individuals will understand
what a statute prohibits and will accordingly refrain from that
behavior, even though some of it is protected.

- A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as-

applied” challenge. Distinguished from an as-applied
challenge which considers only extant facts affecting real
litigants, a facial invalidation is an examination of the entire
law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only on the basis of
its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption
or prediction that its very existence may cause others not
before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.

- The vagueness and overbreadth doctrines, as grounds for a

facial challenge, are not applicable to penal laws. A litigant
cannot thus successfully mount a facial challenge against a
criminal statute on either vagueness or overbreadth grounds.

- The allowance of a facial challenge in free speech cases is

justified by the aim to avert the “chilling effect” on protected
speech, the exercise of which should not at all times be
abridged. As reflected earlier, this rationale is inapplicable to
plain penal statutes that generally bear an “in terrorem effect”
in deterring socially harmful conduct. In fact, the legislature
may even forbid and penalize acts formerly considered
innocent and lawful, so long as it refrains from diminishing or
dissuading the exercise of constitutionally protected rights.

- The rule established in our jurisdiction is, only statutes on

free speech, religious freedom, and other fundamental rights
may be facially challenged. Under no case may ordinary

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 penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. The rationale
is obvious. If a facial challenge to a penal statute is permitted,
the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No prosecution
would be possible. A strong criticism against employing a
facial challenge in the case of penal statutes, if the same is
allowed, would effectively go against the grain of the
doctrinal requirement of an existing and concrete controversy
before judicial power may be appropriately exercised. A
facial challenge against a penal statute is, at best, amorphous
and speculative. It would, essentially, force the court to
consider third parties who are not before it. As I have said in
my opposition to the allowance of a facial challenge to attack
penal statutes, such a test will impair the State’s ability to deal
with crime. If warranted, there would be nothing that can
hinder an accused from defeating the State’s power to
prosecute on a mere showing that, as applied to third parties,
the penal statute is vague or overbroad, notwithstanding that
the law is clear as applied to him.

- It is settled, on the other hand, that the application of the

overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial kind of challenge
and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge,
applicable only to free speech cases.

- By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily

apply a facial type of invalidation in order to plot areas of
protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations
not before the court, that are impermissibly swept by the
substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a statute
cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad
if the court confines itself only to facts as applied to the
litigant.

- In restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech claims,

the Court, in at least two cases, observed that the US Supreme
Court has not recognized an overbreadth doctrine outside the
limited context of the First Amendment, and that claims of
facial overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken
words. In Virginia v. Hicks, it was held that rarely, if ever,
will an overbreadth challenge succeed against a law or
regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or
speech-related conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are
justified by the “transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression.”

- American jurisprudence instructs that “vagueness challenges

that do not involve the First Amendment must be examined in

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 light of the specific facts of the case at hand and not with
regard to the statute's facial validity.”

- In this jurisdiction, the void-for-vagueness doctrine asserted

under the due process clause has been utilized in examining
the constitutionality of criminal statutes. In at least three
cases, the Court brought the doctrine into play in analyzing an
ordinance penalizing the non-payment of municipal tax on
fishponds, the crime of illegal recruitment punishable under
Article 132(b) of the Labor Code, and the vagrancy provision
under Article 202 (2) of the Revised Penal Code. Notably, the
petitioners in these three cases, similar to those in the two
Romualdez and Estrada cases, were actually charged with the
therein assailed penal statute, unlike in the present case.

- From the definition of the crime of terrorism in the earlier

cited Section 3 of RA 9372, the following elements may be
culled: (1) the offender commits an act punishable under any
of the cited provisions of the Revised Penal Code, or under
any of the enumerated special penal laws; (2) the commission
of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of
widespread and extraordinary fear and panic among the
populace; and (3) the offender is actuated by the desire to
coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand.

- Before a charge for terrorism may be filed under RA 9372,

there must first be a predicate crime actually committed to
trigger the operation of the key qualifying phrases in the other
elements of the crime, including the coercion of the
government to accede to an “unlawful demand.” Given the
presence of the first element, any attempt at singling out or
highlighting the communicative component of the prohibition
cannot recategorize the unprotected conduct into a protected
speech.

- Disini vs. Secretary of Justice- Commercial Speech vis-a-

vis Section 4©(3) of RA No. 10175- To prohibit the
transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right
to read his emails, even if unsolicited commercial ads
addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category
of speech which is not accorded the same level of protection
as that given to other constitutionally guaranteed forms of
expression, but is nonetheless is entitled to protection. The
State cannot rob him of his right without violating the
constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
Unsolicited advertisements are legitimate forms of
expression.

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- ABS-CBN vs. COMELEC, 323 SCRA 811 (2000)- The
prohibition of publication of exit poll or electoral survey
would be unreasonably restrictive because it effectively
prevents the use of exit poll data not only for election day
projections, but also for long term research.

- MTRCB vs. ABS-CBN, et al., January 17, 2005- P.D. No.

1986 gives petitioner “the power to screen, review and
examine “all television programs,” emphasizing the phrase
“all television programs”. Thus, when the law says “all
television programs,” the word “all” covers all television
programs, whether religious, public affairs, news
documentary, etc. The principle assumes that the legislative
body made no qualification in the use of general word or
expression. It then follows that since “The Inside Story” is a
television program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB
over which it has power of review.

- Soriano v. Laguardia, GR No. 164785; Soriano v. MTRCB

GR No. 165636, April 29, 2009-The Supreme Court said
that Soriano’s “statement can be treated as obscene, at least
with respect to the average child,” and thus his utterances
cannot be considered as protected speech. Ang Dating Daan
has earlier been given a “G” rating for general viewership.
The Supreme Court said the MTRCB suspension was limited
only to the show Ang Dating Daan, not Soriano, as the
MTRCB “may not suspend television personalities, for such
would be beyond its jurisdiction.”

- Borjal vs. CA, 301 SCRA 1, In order to maintain a libel suit,

it is essential that the victim is identifiable although it is not
necessary that he be named. It must also be shown that a third
party could identify him as the object of the libelous article.
Every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious,
even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive
for making it is shown, except in the following:

- 1. private communication made by any person to another in

the performance of any legal, moral or social duty;

- 2. a fair and true report, made in good faith, without remarks,

of any judicial, legislative or other official proceeding which
are not confidential in nature including any statement made
therein or act performed by public officer.

- A privileged communication may either be absolutely

privileged (those which are not actionable or even if author
acted in bad faith, e.g. speech by member of Congress therein
or any committee thereof) or qualified privileged (those

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 containing defamatory imputations which are not actionable
unless found to have been made without good intention or
justifiable motive, e.g., private communications and fair and
true reports without any comments/remarks).

- Fair commentaries on matters of public interest are privileged

and constitute a valid defense in an action for libel or slander.
The doctrine of fair comment means that while in general
every discreditable imputation publicly made is deemed false,
because every man is presumed innocent until his guilt is
judicially proved.

Freedom of the Press

- Four (4) Aspects of Press Freedom

- Philippine jurisprudence, even as early as the period under the

1935 Constitution, has recognized four aspects of freedom of
the press. These are (1) freedom from prior restraint; (2)
freedom from punishment subsequent to publication; (3)
freedom of access to information; and (4) freedom of
circulation. (Francisco Chavez v. Raul M. Gonzales, et. al.,
G.R. No. 168338, 15 February 2008, En Banc [Puno, CJ])

Freedom of Assembly

- The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably assemble

and petition for redress of grievances is, together with
freedom of speech, of expression, and of the press, a right that
enjoys primacy in the realm of constitutional protection. For
these rights constitute the very basis of a functional
democratic polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et
al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

- Batas Pambansa Blg. 880 – The Public Assembly Act of 1985

- Meaning of Public Assembly- “Public assembly” means any

rally, demonstration, march, parade, procession or any other
form of mass or concerted action held in a public place for the
purpose of presenting a lawful cause, or expressing an
opinion to the general public on any particular issue; or
protesting or influencing any state of affairs whether political,
economic or social; or petitioning the government for redress
of grievances.

- The processions, rallies, parades, demonstrations, public

meetings and assemblages for religious purposes shall be
governed by local ordinances; Provided, however, That the

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 declaration of policy as provided in Section 2 of this Act shall
be faithfully observed.

- The definition herein contained shall not include picketing

and other concerted action in strike areas by workers and
employees resulting from a labor dispute as defined by the
Labor Code, its implementing rules and regulations, and by
the Batas Pambansa Bilang 227. (Section 3[a], B.P. Blg. 880)

- Permit when required and when not required- A written

permit shall be required for any person or persons to organize
and hold a public assembly in a public place. However, no
permit shall be required if the public assembly shall be done
or made in a freedom park duly established by law or
ordinance or in a private property, in which case only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its legal possession
is required, or in the campus of a government–owned and
operated educational institution which shall be subject to the
rules and regulations of said educational institution. Political
meetings or rallies held during any election campaign period
as provided for by law are not covered by this Act. (Section
4, B.P. Blg. 880)

- Freedom Parks- Every city and municipality in the country

shall within six months after the effectivity of this Act
establish or designate at least one suitable “freedom park” or
mall in their respective jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally located within the poblacion
where demonstrations and meetings may be held at any time
without the need of any prior permit. (Section 5, B.P. Blg.
880)

- Action to be taken on the application (Section 6, B.P. Blg.

880)

- i. It shall be the duty of the mayor or any official acting in

his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear and
convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a
clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.

- ii. The mayor or any official acting in his behalf shall act on
the application within two (2) working days from the date the
application was filed, failing which, the permit shall be
deemed granted. Should for any reason the mayor or any
official acting in his behalf refuse to accept the application for
a permit, said application shall be posted by the applicant on
the premises of the office of the mayor and shall be deemed to
have been filed.

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- iii. If the mayor is of the view that there is imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil warranting the denial or
modification of the permit, he shall immediately inform the
applicant who must be heard on the matter.

- iv. The action on the permit shall be in writing and served on

the applicant within twenty-four hours.

- v. If the mayor or any official acting in his behalf denies the

application or modifies the terms thereof in his permit, the
applicant may contest the decision in an appropriate court of
law.

- Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Hon. Mayor Jose

“Lito” Atienza, G.R. No. 175241, 24 February 2010, 1st
Div. (Carpio Morales) Section 6(c) of the Public Assembly
Act (BP 880) provides that “If the mayor is of the view that
there is imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil
warranting the denial or modification of the permit, he shall
immediately inform the applicant who must be heard on the
matter.”

- In modifying the permit outright, Atienza gravely abused his

discretion when he did not immediately inform the IBP who
should have been heard first on the matter of his perceived
imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil that may
warrant the changing of the venue. Atienza failed to indicate
how he had arrived at modifying the terms of the permit
against the standard of a clear and present danger test which x
x x is an indispensable condition to such modification.
Nothing in the issued permit adverts to an imminent and
grave danger of a substantive evil, which “blank” denial or
modification would, when granted imprimatur as the appellate
court would have it, render illusory any judicial scrutiny
thereof.

- It is true that the licensing official is not devoid of discretion

in determining whether or not a permit would be granted. It
is not, however, unfettered discretion. While prudence
requires that there be a realistic appraisal not of what may
possibly occur but of what may probably occur, given all the
relevant circumstances, still the assumption – especially so
where the assembly is scheduled for a specific public place –
is that the permit must be for the assembly being held there.
It smacks of whim and caprice for Atienza to impose a
change of venue for an assembly that was slated for a specific
public place. It is thus reversible error for the appellate court
not to have found such grave abuse of discretion and, under

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 specific statutory provision, not to have modified the permit
“in terms satisfactory to the applicant.”

- Meaning of Maximum Tolerance- “Maximum tolerance”

means the highest degree of restraint that the military, police
and other peace keeping authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal of the same. (Section 3[c],
B.P. Blg. 880)

- B.P. No. 880 is merely a “content-neutral” regulation

- It is very clear that B.P. No. 880 is not an absolute ban of

public assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates the
time, place and manner of the assemblies. This was adverted
to in Osmena v. Comelec (G.R. No. 132231, March 31, 1998,
288 SCRA 447), where the Court referred to it as a “content-
neutral” regulation of the time, place, and manner of holding
public assemblies (Ibid, p. 478).

- A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880 thus readily

shows that it refers to all kinds of public assemblies (except
picketing and other concerted action in strike areas by
workers and employees resulting from a labor dispute, which
are governed by the Labor Code and other labor laws,
political meeting or rallies held during election campaign
period, which are governed by the Election Code and other
election related laws, and public assemblies in the campus of
a government-owned and operated educational institution,
which shall be subject to the rules and regulations of said
educational institution [Sec. 3(a) and Sec. 4 of B.P. No. 880])
that would use public places. The reference to “lawful cause”
does not make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would not be
“peaceable” and entitled to protection. Neither are the words
“opinion,” “protesting” and “influencing” in the definition of
public assembly content-based, since they can refer to any
subject. The words “petitioning the government for redress of
grievances” come from the wording of the Constitution, so its
use cannot be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefits of all rallyists and is independent of
the content of the expressions in the rally.

- Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on the ground of

clear and present danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health. This is a
recognized exception to the exercise of the right even under
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights x x x.

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 (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838, April 25,
2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

- The Calibrated Pre-emptive Response (CPR) Policy adopted

by the Arroyo Administration in dealing with public
assemblies: The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR.
As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has conceded that the
use of the term should now be discontinued, since it does not
mean anything other than the maximum tolerance policy set
forth in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita, submitted
by the Solicitor General.

- At any rate, the Court rules that in view of the maximum

tolerance mandated by B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid
purpose if it means the same thing as maximum tolerance and
is illegal if it means something else. Accordingly, what is to
be followed is and should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance.

- In sum, this Court reiterates its basic policy of upholding the

fundamental rights of our people, especially freedom of
expression and freedom of assembly.

- For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response

policy has no place in our legal firmament and must be struck
down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify
abuses. On the other hand, B.P. No. 880 cannot be
condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly
restrict freedoms; it merely regulates the use of public places
as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Far from
being insidious, “maximum tolerance” is for the benefit of
rallyists, not the government., The delegation to the mayors
of the power to issue rally “permits” is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound “clear and present
danger” standard. (BAYAN, et al. v. Ermita, et al., G.R. No.
169838, April 25, 2006, En Banc [Azcuna])

Section 5- Freedom of Religion-

- Ang Ladlad-LGBT Party v. Commission on Elections, G.R.

No. 190582, 618 SCRA 32, April 8, 2010, En Banc (Del
Castillo) The decision of the COMELEC not to allow the Ang
Ladlad-LGBT Party to participate in party-list elections
because its members are “immoral,” citing verses from the
Bible and the Koran, was ruled by the SC to be tainted with
grave abuse of discretion and, therefore, nullified, as it
violated the non-establishment clause of freedom of religion.

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 In effect, the COMELEC used religious standard in its
decision by using verses from the Bible and the Koran. The
COMELEC, as a government agency, is not supposed to be
guided by religious standards in its decisions and actions.

- What is a purely ecclesiastical affair to which the State can not

meddle following the Separation of Church and State Doctrine?

- An ecclesiastical affair is “one that concerns doctrine, creed,

or form of worship of the church, or the adoption and
enforcement within a religious association of needful laws
and regulations for the government of the membership, and
the power of excluding from such associations those deemed
not worthy of membership.” Based on this definition, an
ecclesiastical affair involves the relationship between the
church and its members and relate to matters of faith,
religious doctrines, worship and governance of the
congregation. To be concrete, examples of this so-called
ecclesiastical affairs to which the State cannot meddle are
proceedings for excommunication, ordinations of religious
ministers, administration of sacraments and other activities
with attached religious significance. (Pastor Dionisio V.
Austria v. NLRC, G.R. No. 124382, Aug. 16, 1999, 1st Div.
[Kapunan])

- Iglesia Ni Cristo v. Court of Appeals- Under the non-

establishment clause of freedom of religion, when it comes to
religious differences, the State enjoys no banquet of options –
neutrality alone is its fixed and immovable stance. It is not its
task to defend one religion against an attack by another
religion. After all, the remedy against bad theology is better
theology. Let them duel in the market place of ideas. The
marketplace of ideas demands that speech should be met by
more speech, for it is the spark of opposite speech, the heat of
colliding ideas, that can fan the embers of truth.

- James M. Imbong, et al. v. Hon. Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et

al., GR No. 204819, April 8, 2014, En Banc (Mendoza) -
Wherefore, THE PETITIONS ARE partially granted.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL, except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:

- 1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in RH-IRR

insofar as they: a) require private health facilities And non-
maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and
operated by a religious group to refer patients, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic

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 Act no. 8344, to another health facility which is conveniently
accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modern methods of family
planning without written consent from their parents or
guardian/s;

- 2) Section 23(a)(1) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails or refuses to
disseminate information regarding programs and services on
reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs;

- 3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married individual, not in an
emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic
Act No. 8344, to undergo reproductive health procedures
without the consent of the spouse;

- 4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of parental
consent only to elective surgical procedures;

- 5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the

RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they
punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or
refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency or life-
threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health care service provider within the same facility
or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or
her religious beliefs;

- 6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-

IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar as they punish
any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health
programs or shall do any act that hinders the full
implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless
of his or her religious beliefs;

- 7) Section 17 and the corresponding provision in the RH-

IRR regarding the rendering of pro bono reproductive health
service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in
securing Philhealth accreditation; and

- 8) Section 3.01(a) and Section 3.01(j) of the RH-IRR, which

added the qualifier “primarily” in defining abortifacients and
contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and
void for contravening Section 4(a) of the RH Law and
violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.

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- Ebralinag vs. Div. Superintendent of Schools of Cebu, 219
SCRA 256 - members of Jehovah’s witnesses may validly
refuse participating in flag ceremonies (singing the national
anthem, saluting the flag, etc.) on account of their religious
beliefs.

- Iglesia ni Cristo vs. CA, 259 SCRA 529- The exercise of

religious freedom can be regulated when it will bring about
clear and present danger of a substantive evil which the State
has a duty to prevent. However, criticism on certain catholic
tenets and dogmas does not constitute clear and present
danger.

- Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance, 235 SCRA 630 – Freedom of

religion does not prohibit imposition of a generally applicable
sales and use tax on the sale of religious materials by a
religious organization. For the purpose of defraying cost of
registration.

- Islamic Da’wah Council of the Philippines vs. Executive

Secretary, 405 SCRA 497- Classifying a food product as
halal is a religious function because the standards are drawn
from the Qur’an and Islamic beliefs. By giving the Office of
the Muslim Affairs exclusive power to classify food products
as halal, E. O. No. 46 encroached on the religious freedom of
Muslim organization to interpret what food products are fit
for Muslim consumption. The State has in effect forced
Muslim to accept its own interpretation of the Qur’an and
Sunnah on halal food.

- Citing Art. III, sec. 5 of the Constitution, the Court stressed

that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” Thus, it
found a grave violation of the non-establishment clause for
the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and Koran to justify the
exclusion of AngLadlad. The Court held that moral
disapproval “is not a sufficient governmental interest to
justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the
party list system.” Upholding equal protection, the Court
ruled that from the standpoint of the political process, LGBTs
have the same interest in participating in the party-list system
on the same basis as other political parties similarly situated.
As such, laws of general application should apply with equal
force to LGBTs and they deserve to participate in the party
list system on the same basis as other marginalized and
underrepresented sectors. The Court also found that there
was a transgression of AngLadlad’s fundamental right of
freedom of expression since, by reason of the COMELEC
action, the former was precluded from publicly expressing its

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 views as a political party and participating on an equal basis
in the political process with other party-list candidates. (GR
No. 190582, Ang Ladlad LGBT Party v. COMELEC,
April 8, 2010)

- Diocese of Bacolod vs. COMELEC- The Supreme Court

declared that the COMELEC order to remove the tarpaulin
did not violate freedom of religion, It does not convey any
religious doctrine of the catholic church.

- Imbong vs Ochoa- The Supreme Court is of the view that

the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the
religious belief and conviction of a conscientious objector.
Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products,
services, procedures and methods, his conscience is
immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform
an act against his beliefs. As Commissioner Joaquin A.
Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of
the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of
the human conscience.

- Taruc vs. Bishop dela Cruz, et al., GR No. 144801, March

10, 2005- The expulsion/excommunication of members of a
religious institution/organization is a matter best left to the
discretion of the officials, and the laws and canons, of said
institution/organization.

Section 6- Liberty of abode & Right to travel

- Read: Villavicencio vs. Lukban; Manotoc vs. CA;

Silveriovs CA- Relate to suspension of deployment of OFWs
to SARs infected countries. In relation to bail (Manotoc vs.
CA; Santiago vs. Vasquez)- valid restriction on his right to
travel.

- Marcos vs. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 115132, August 9, 1995-

The person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints
imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of
justice. Whether the accused should be permitted to leave the
country for humanitarian reasons is a matter addressed to the
court’s discretion. (Yap vs. CA, GR No. 141529, June 6,
2001).

- Art. 13 (2), Universal Declaration of Human Rights- provides

that everyone has the right to leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his country.

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 - Art. 12 (4), Covenant on Civil and Political Rights- provides
that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter
his own country.

- Office of the Administrative Service-OCA vs. Macarine, AM

NO. MTJ-10-1770-July 18, 2012- OCA Circular No. 49-
2003- does not restrict but merely regulates, by providing
guidelines to be complied by judges and court [personnel,
before they can go on leave to travel abroad. To “restrict” is
to restrain or prohibit a person from doing something; to
“regulate” is to govern or direct according to rule.

Section 7- Right to Information

- Chavez vs. Public Estates Authority, July 9, 2002- The

constitutional right to information includes official
information on on-going negotiations before a final contract is
consummated. The information, however, must constitute
definite propositions by the government and should not cover
recognized exceptions liked privileged information, military
and diplomatic secrets and similar matters affecting national
security and public order.

- Re: Request for Copy of 2008 SALN, June 13, 2012-

Under Section 17, Art. XI has classified the information
disclosed in the SALN as a matter of public concern and
interest. In other words, a “duty to disclose” sprang from the
“right to know”. Both of constitutional origin, the former is a
command while the latter is a permission. Hence, there is a
duty on the part of members of the government to disclose
their SALNs to the public in the manner provided by law. xxx
While public officers in the custody or control of public
records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which
records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested
parties, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to
prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the
records. After all, public office is a public trust.

- Legazpi vs. CSC; Valmonte vs. Belmonte; BARA vs.

COMELEC

- Berdin vs. Mascarinas, 526 SCTA 592- While access to

official records may not be prohibited, it certainly may be
regulated.

Section 8- Right to form Unions of public sector

- United Pepsi Cola Supervisory Union vs. Laguesma, 288

SCRA 15- Congress, via Art. 125 of the Labor Code, validly

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 prohibited supervisors from forming labor unions. the right to
strike does form an integral part of the Right to Association.

Section 9- Expropriation

- Republic vs. Gingoyon, December 19, 2005- Rule 67

outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve
at present as the solitary guideline through which the State
may expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of
the Local Government Code governs as to the exercise by
local government units of the power of eminent domain
through an enabling ordinance. And then there is Rep. Act
No. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings intended
for national government infrastructure projects.

- Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently

more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67,
inescapably applies in instances when the national
government expropriates property “for national government
infrastructure projects”.

- Republic vs. Holy Trinity Realty Development Corp., 551

SCRA 303- There are at least two crucial differences between
the respective procedure under RA No. 8974 and Rule 67.
Under the statute, the government is required to make
immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing of
the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas
Rule 67, the government is required only to make an initial
deposit with an authorized government depositary, and Rule
67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the
assessed value of the property for purpose of taxation, unlike
RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial
compensation, the market value of the property as stated in
the tax declaration or the current relevant zonal value of the
BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements
and/or structures using the replacement cost method.

- LBP vs. Honeycomb Farms Corp., GR No. 169903,

February 29, 2012- When the State exercises the power of
eminent domain in the implementation of its agrarian
program, the constitutional provision which governs is
Section 4 Article XIII of the constitution which provides that
the State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program
founded on the right of the farmers and regular farm workers
who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands
they till or, in the case of other farm workers, to receive a just
share of the fruits thereof. Notably, the provision also
imposes upon the State the obligation of paying landowner

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 compensation for the land taken, even if it is for the
government’s agrarian reform purposes. It pertains to the fair
and full price if the taken property.

- LBP vs. Eusebio, July 2, 2014- LBP, in this case, opened a

trust account to provisionally pay Eusebio for the property
taken. In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Honeycomb Farms
Corporation, we struck down as void the DAR administrative
circular that provided for the opening of the trust accounts in
lieu of the deposit in cash or in bonds contemplated in Section
16(e) of R.A. No. 6657. We pointedly declared that the
explicit words of Section 16(e) did not include "trust
accounts," but only cash or bonds, as valid modes of
satisfying the government’s payment of just compensation.

- Apo Fruits Corp vs. LBP, October 12, 2010- In the

process, the Court determined that the legal interest should be
12% after recognizing that the just compensation due was
effectively a forbearance on the part of the government. Had
the finality of the judgment been the critical factor, then the
12% interest should have been imposed from the time the
RTC decision fixing just compensation became final. Instead,
the 12% interest was imposed from the time that the Republic
commenced condemnation proceedings and took the property.

- LBP vs. Heirs of Alsua, GR No. 211351, February 4, 2015-

the Court has allowed the grant of legal interest in
expropriation cases where there is delay in the payment since
the just compensation due to the landowners was deemed to
be an effective forbearance on the part of the State. Legal
interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% interest p.a. from
the time of taking until June 30, 2013 only. Thereafter, or
beginning July 1, 2013 until fully paid, interest shall be at 6%
p.a..

- Republic vs. Soriano, GR No. 211666, February 25, 2015-

As often ruled by this Court, the award of interest is imposed
in the nature of damages for delay in payment which, in
effect, makes the obligation on the part of the government one
of forbearance to ensure prompt payment of the value of the
land and limit the opportunity loss of the owner. However,
when there is no delay in the payment of just compensation,
the Supreme Court has not hesitated in deleting the
imposition of interest thereon for the same is justified only in
cases where delay has been sufficiently established.

- Secretary of DPWH vs. Heracleo, GR 179334 Apr 21

2015- The government’s failure to initiate the necessary
expropriation proceedings prior to actual taking cannot

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 simply invalidate the State’s exercise of its eminent domain
power, given that the property subject of expropriation is
indubitably devoted for public use, and public policy imposes
upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services
to the public. To hastily nullify said expropriation in the guise
of lack of due process would certainly diminish or weaken
one of the State’s inherent powers, the ultimate objective of
which is to serve the greater good. Thus, the non-filing of the
case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of
the property to the landowner. What is left to the landowner is
the right of compensation.

- While it may appear inequitable to the private owners to

receive an outdated valuation, the long-established rule is that
the fair equivalent of a property should be computed not at
the time of payment, but at the time of taking. This is because
the purpose of ‘just compensation’ is not to reward the owner
for the property taken but to compensate him for the loss
thereof. The owner should be compensated only for what he
actually loses, and what he loses is the actual value of the
property at the time it is taken.

- The Court must adhere to the doctrine that its first and
fundamental duty is the application of the law according to its
express terms, interpretation being called for only when such
literal application is impossible. To entertain other formula
for computing just compensation, contrary to those
established by law and jurisprudence, would open varying
interpretation of economic policies – a matter which this
Court has no competence to take cognizance of. Equity and
equitable principles only come into full play when a gap
exists in the law and jurisprudence.

- For purposes of “just” compensation, the value of the land

should be determined from the time the property owners filed
the initiatory complaint, earning interest therefrom. To hold
otherwise would validate the State’s act as one of
expropriation in spite of procedural infirmities which, in turn,
would amount to unjust enrichment on its part. To continue
condoning such acts would be licensing the government to
continue dispensing with constitutional requirements in taking
private property.

- Discretionary execution of judgments pending appeal under

Sec. 2(a) of Rule 39 simply does not apply to eminent domain
proceedings. Since PPAs monies, facilities and assets are
government properties, they are exempt from execution
whether by virtue of a final judgment or pending appeal.

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- It is a universal rule that where the State gives its consent to
be sued by private parties either by general or special law, it
may limit the claimant’s action only up to the completion of
proceedings anterior to the stage of execution and that the
power of the Courts ends when the judgment is rendered,
since government funds and properties may not be seized
under writs of execution or garnishment to satisfy such
judgments. This is based on obvious considerations of public
policy. Disbursements of public funds must be covered by the
corresponding appropriation as required by law. The
functions and public services rendered by the State cannot be
allowed to be paralyzed or disrupted by the diversion of
public funds from their legitimate and specific objects, as
appropriated by law. (Commissioner of Public Highways vs
San Diego, 1970).

- The appropriate standard of just compensation inclusive of

the manner of payment thereof and the initial compensation to
the lot owners is a substantive, not merely a procedural,
matter. This is because the right of the owner to receive just
compensation prior to acquisition of possession by the State
of the property is a proprietary right. RA 8974, which
specifically prescribes the new standards in determining the
amount of just compensation in expropriation cases relating to
national government infrastructure projects, as well as the
payment of the provisional value as a prerequisite to the
issuance of a writ of possession, is a substantive law. Further,
there is nothing in RA No. 8974 which expressly provides
that it should have retroactive effect. Neither is retroactivity
necessarily implied from RA No. 8974 or in any of its
provisions. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively in
relation to this case.

- RA 8974 amended Rule 67 effective November 26, 2000, but

only with regard to the expropriation of right-of-way sites and
locations for national government infrastructure projects. On
the other hand, in all other expropriation cases outside of
right-of-way sites or locations for national government
infrastructure projects, the provisions of Rule 67 of the Rules
of Court shall still govern.

- Vda de Ouano vs. Republic, 168770, February 9, 2011-

The twin elements of just compensation and public purpose
are, by themselves, direct limitations to the exercise of
eminent domain, arguing, in a way, against the notion of fee
simple title. The simple fee does not vest until payment of just
compensation. In esse, expropriation is forced private
property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of
a chance to defeat the case of the expropriating agency. In

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 other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of
property against his will. Withal, the mandatory requirement
of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the
state must show, at the minimum, a genuine need, an exacting
public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be
specifically alleged or least reasonably deducible from the
complaint. Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has
now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is
of usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is productive of
general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessity
the very reason or condition as it were allowing, at the first
instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or
disappears, then there is no more cogent point for the
governments retention of the expropriated land. The same
legal situation should hold if the government devotes the
property to another public use very much different from the
original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by
the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it
predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive
to our laws. A condemnor should commit to use the property
pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for
expropriation, failing which it should file another petition for
the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to
return the said property to its private owner, if the latter so
desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it
expropriated in any manner it pleases and, in the process,
dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping
with the idea of fair play

- ATO vs. Tongoy, 551 SCRA 320- the right of the previous
owners who were able to prove the commitment of the
government to allow them to repurchase their land.

- Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corp. vs. DOTC, 552 SCRA 59-

The State, through expropriation proceedings may take
private property even if, admittedly, it will transfer this
property again to another private party as long as there is
public purpose to the taking.

- Tiongson vs. NHA, 558 SCRA 56- Where the initial taking
of a property subject to expropriation was by virtue of a law
which was subsequently declared unconstitutional, just
compensation is to be determined as of the date of the filing
of the complaint, and not the earlier taking.

- MCWD vs. J. King and Sons Co., Inc., GR No. 175983,

April 16, 2009 - For MCWD to exercise its power of

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 eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely:
first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the
expropriation, and second, the exercise of the power of
eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA.

- Republic vs. Lim, June 29, 2005- Section 9, Article III of

the Constitution is not a grant but a limitation of power. This
limiting function is in keeping with the philosophy of the Bill
of Rights against the arbitrary exercise of governmental
powers to the detriment of the individual’s rights. Given this
function, the provision should therefore be strictly interpreted
against the expropriator, the government, and liberally in
favor of the property owner.

- While the prevailing doctrine is that “the non-payment of just

compensation does not entitle the private landowner to
recover possession of the expropriated lots, however, in cases
where the government failed to pay just compensation within
five (5) years from the finality of the judgment in the
expropriation proceedings, the owners concerned shall have
the right to recover possession of their property. This is in
consonance with the principle that “the government cannot
keep the property and dishonor the judgment.” To be sure, the
five-year period limitation will encourage the government to
pay just compensation punctually. This is in keeping with
justice and equity. After all, it is the duty of the government,
whenever it takes property from private persons against their
will, to facilitate the payment of just compensation.

- Local government units possessed the delegated power of

eminent domain, subject to judicial review (City of Manila
vs. Chinese Community).

- Any property owned by a municipal corporation in its private

capacity (patrimonial), in any expropriation proceeding, must
be paid just compensation. If the property owned is public or
otherwise held in trust then no compensation need be paid
(City of Baguio vs. NAWASA).

- To set just compensation is a judicial prerogative (EPZA vs.

Dulay).

- GR No. 177056, Office of the Solicitor General v. Ayala

Land Incorporated, September 18, 2009- The Court said
that the total prohibition against the collection by respondents
of parking fees from persons who use the mall parking
facilities has no basis in the National Building Code or its
implementing rules and regulations. It added that the State
also cannot impose the same prohibition by generally

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 invoking police power, since said prohibition amounts to a
taking of respondents’ property without payment of just
compensation.

- Cmsr. of IR vs. Central Luzon Drug Corp., GR No.

148512, June 26, 2006, Cmsr. of IR vs. Bicolandia Drug
Corp., GR No. 148083, July 21, 2006 – The tax credit given
to commercial establishments for the discount enjoyed by
senior citizens pursuant to RA 7432 is a form of just
compensation for private property taken by the State for
public use, since the privilege enjoyed by senior citizens does
not come directly from the State, but from private
establishments concerned.

- Public use does not mean use by the public. As long as the
purpose of the taking is public, then power of eminent domain
comes into play. It is inconsequential that private entities may
benefit as long as in the end, public interest is served (Ardona
vs. Reyes).

- Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Taking

of property for socialized housing is for public use.

- Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired n the

following order: 1) government lands; 2) alienable lands of
the public domain; 3) unregistered or abandoned or idle lands;
4) lands within the declared areas for priority development,
zonal improvement program sites, slum improvement and
resettlement sites which have not yet been acquired; 5) BLISS
sites which have not yet been acquired; and 6) privately-
owned lands (City of Mandaluyong vs. Aguilar, 350SCRA
487 2001).

Section 10- Non-impairment clause

- There is no impairment in the imposition of the VAT against

real estate transactions entered or perfected even prior to its
imposition. The contract clause is not a limitation on the
exercise of the State’s power of taxation save only where a
tax exemption has been granted for a valid consideration.
(Tolentino vs. Sec. of Finance)

- The non-impairment clause includes prohibition on judicial

acts that impair contract. (Ganzon vs. Inserto, 123 SCRA 135)

- Goldenway Merchandising Corp. vs. Equitable PCI Bank,

GR No. 195540, March 13, 2013- Section 47 of RA 8791
did not divest juridical persons of the right to redeem their

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 foreclosed properties but only modified the time for the
exercise of such right by reducing the one-year period
originally provided in Act No. 3135. The new redemption
period commences from the date of foreclosure sale, and
expires upon registration of the certificate of sale or three
months after foreclosure, whichever is earlier. There is
likewise no retroactive application of the new redemption
period because Section 47 exempts from its operation those
properties foreclosed prior to its effectivity and whose owners
shall retain their redemption rights under Act No. 3135.

Sections 11 & 12 – Custodial Investigation Rights

- Read: Miranda vs. Arizona, Gamboa vs. Cruz, Escobedo vs.

Illinois.

- People vs. Lauga, GR No. 186228, March 15, 2010-

Barangay based organizatios in the nature of watch groups, as
in the case of bantay bayan, are recognized by local
government unit to perform functions relating to the
preservation of peace and order at the barangay level. Thus,
without ruling on the legality of the actions taken by Banting
and the specific scope of duties and responsibilities delegated
to a bantay bayan, particularly on the authority to conduct a
custodial investigation, any inquiry he makes has the color of
a state-related function and objective insofar as the
entitlement of a suspect to his constitutional rights provided
for under Article III, section 12 of the constitution. The
Supreme Court, therefore, finds the extra-judicial confession
of Lauga which was taken without a counsel, inadmissible in
evidence.

- Luz vs. People- roadside questioning does not fall under

custodial investigation, nor it can be considered a formal
arrest, by the very nature of the questioning, the
expectations of the motorist and the officer, and the length
of time the procedure is conducted.

- Applies to preliminary investigation, PP vs. Sunga, 399

SCRA 624

- PP vs. Vallejo, May 9, 2002- To be an effective counsel, a

lawyer need not challenge all the questions being propounded
to his client. The presence of counsel to preclude the slightest
coercion as would lead the accused to admit something false.
Indeed counsel should not prevent an accused from freely and
voluntarily telling the truth.

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 - PP vs. Domantay, 307 SCRA 1- RA 7438 has extended the
constitutional guarantee to situations in which an individual
has not been formally arrested but has merely been “invited”
for questioning.

- PP vs. Garcia, 400 SCRA 229, A confession made to a

private person is admission in evidence.

- PP vs. Lozada, 406 SCRA 494, An unwritten confession is

inadmissible.

- A party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be

assisted by counsel (Ampong vs. CSC, 563 SCRA 293).

- Van Luspo vs. People, GR No. 188487, February 14, 2011-

The court sustained the admissibility of the sworn statements
of the other accused, explaining that the investigations
performed by the PNP were administrative and not custodial
in nature.

- Perez vs. People, 544 SCRA 532- While investigations by

an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal
proceeding, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may
not be assisted by counsel, irrespective of the nature of the
charges and of respondent’s capacity to represent himself, and
no duty rests on such body to furnish the person being
investigated with counsel.

Section 13- Bail

In bail application where the accused is charged with a capital offense,

will it be proper for the judge to grant bail without conducting hearing if the
prosecutor interposes no objection to such application?

- Jurisprudence is replete with decisions compelling judges to

conduct the required hearings in bail applications, in which
the accused stands charged with a capital offense. The
absence of objection from the prosecution is never a basis for
the grant of bail in such cases, for the judge has no right to
presume that the prosecutor knows what he is doing on
account of familiarity with the case. “Said reasoning is
tantamount to ceding to the prosecutor the duty of exercising
judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the
judge before whom the petition for provisional liberty will be
decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never
been reposed upon the prosecutor.”

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 - Imposed in Baylon v. Sison was this mandatory duty to
conduct a hearing despite the prosecution's refusal to adduce
evidence in opposition to the application to grant and fix bail.
(Joselito V. Narciso v. Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, G.R.
No. 134504, March 17, 2000, 3rd Div. [Panganiban])

Is a condition in an application for bail that accused be first arraigned

before he could be granted bail valid?

- In the first place x x x in cases where it is authorized, bail

should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused
may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the
information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would
then be no need for the arraignment of the accused. In the
second place, the trial court could ensure the presence of
petitioner at the arraignment precisely by granting bail and
ordering his presence at any stage of the proceedings, such as
arraignment. Under Rule 114, Sec. 2(b) of the Rules on
Criminal Procedure, one of the conditions of bail is that “the
accused shall appear before the proper court whenever so
required by the court or these Rules,” while under Rule 116,
Sec. 1(b) the presence of the accused at the arraignment is
required.

- On the other hand, to condition the grant of bail to an accused

on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where
he has to choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and
thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to
quash can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and
(2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can be
arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail. These
scenarios certainly undermine the accused’s constitutional
right not to be put on trial except upon valid complaint or
information sufficient to charge him with a crime and his
right to bail. (Lavides v. CA, 324 SCRA 321, Feb. 1, 2000,
2nd Div. [Mendoza])

- Government of Hongkong Special Administrative Region

v. Judge Olalia- The decision of the SC in Government of
the USA v. Judge Purganan which says that “no bail rule
applies in extradition since bail is available only to one who
had arrested and detained for violation of Philippine criminal
laws” was re-examined and, after re-examination, the rule
now is that an extraditee may be allowed to post bail during
the pendency of an extradition proceeding. However, for him
to be allowed to post bail, still he must prove that (1) once
granted bail he will not be a flight risk or a danger to the
community; and (2) that there exists special, humanitarian

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 and compelling circumstances that will justify the grant of
bail to him, by a clear and convincing evidence.

- The reason why the Purganan ruling was re-examined is

because of the modern trend in public international law where
an individual person is no longer considered a mere object of
international law but rather as a subject thereof, and the
primacy given to human rights, among which is the right to
liberty.

- Juan Ponce Enrile v. Sandiganbayan (3rd Div.), G.R. No.

213847, August 18, 2015, En Banc (Bersamin) A close
reading of the ruling of the SC in this case allowing former
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile to post bail although he was
charged of plunder, a non-bailable offense, was because of
the Olalia ruling.

- In this case, former Senator Enrile was shown not to be a

flight risk or a danger to the community (his voluntary
surrender to the authorities and his record of respect for court
processes in earlier cases), and that there exist special,
humanitarian and compelling circumstances (his advanced
age, fragile state of health and medical predicament that will
require the services of doctors of his choice) that will justify
the grant of bail to him. After all, the main purpose of bail is
to assure the presence of an accused during the trial of the
case as required by the court.

- “Bail for the provisional liberty to the accused, regardless of

the crime charged, should be allowed independently of the
merits of the charge, provided his continued incarceration is
clearly shown to be injurious to his health or to endanger his
life. Indeed, denying him bail despite imperiling hid health
and life would not serve the true objective of preventive
incarceration during the trial.

- “It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to

Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be
properly addressed and better attended to by competent
physicians in the hospitals of his choice. This will not only
aid in his adequate preparation of his defense but, more
importantly, will guarantee his appearance in court for the
trial.

- “On the other hand, to mark time in order to wait for the trial
to finish before a meaningful consideration of the application
for bail can be had is to defeat the objective of bail, which is
to entitle the accused to provisional liberty pending the trial.
There may be circumstances decisive of the issue of bail x x x

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 that the courts can already consider in resolving the
application for bail without awaiting the trial to finish. The
Court thus balances the scales of justice by protecting the
interest of the People through ensuring his personal
appearance at the trial, and at the same time realizing for him
the guarantees of due process as well as to be presumed
innocent until proven guilty.”

- Where the accused was originally charged with a capital

offense but later convicted of non-capital and which he
appeals, bail cannot be granted as a matter right (Obosa vs.
CA, 266 SCRA 281).

- The constitutional right to bail is available only in criminal

proceedings. The right is not available in extradition
proceedings that are not criminal in nature. In the absence of
any provision in the constitution, the law or the treaty,
adopting the practice of not granting bail, as a general rule,
would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to
the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors.

Section 14- Rights of accused

1. Presumption of innocence- as against presumption of law.

2. The right to be heard

- The vagueness doctrine merely requires reasonable degree of

certainty for the law to be upheld- not absolute precision or
mathematical exactitude ( Estrada vs. Desierto, November 19,
2001).
- Despite the allegation of minority of the victim, an accused
appellant may not be sentenced to death under RA 7659 due
to the failure of the information to allege relationship to the
victim. It would be a denial of the right of the accused to be
informed of the charges against him and, consequently, a
denial of due process (PP vs. Sandoval, 348 SCRA 476).

- A person subject of an extradition request from another

sovereign State is bereft of the right to notice and hearing
during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. An
extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not criminal
proceeding which will call into operations all the rights of an
accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. The extraditee’s
right to notice and hearing is present only when the petition
for extradition is filed in court- it is only then when he has the
opportunity to meet the evidence against him (Secretary of
Justice vs. Lantion, 343 SCRA 377, 2000).

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 - Political offense doctrine: Ocampo vs. Abando, February
11, 2014- the burden of demonstrating political motivation is
adduced during trial where the accused is assured an
opportunity to present evidence.

3. Right to public trial

- A public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial; it only

implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish
to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with
decorum and observe trial (Sec of Justice vs. Estrada, June
29, 2001).

- RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION

COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES
AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY
AMPATUAN, ET AL., [A.M. No. 10-11-6-SC ]- The
impossibility of holding such judicial proceedings in a
courtroom that will accommodate all the interested parties,
whether private complainants or accused, is unfortunate
enough. What more if the right itself commands that a
reasonable number of the general public be allowed to
witness the proceeding as it takes place inside the courtroom.
Technology tends to provide the only solution to break the
inherent limitations of the courtroom, to satisfy the imperative
of a transparent, open and public trial. Thus, the Supreme
Court PARTIALLY GRANTS PRO HAC VICE the request
for live broadcast by television and radio of the trial court
proceedings of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, subject to
the guidelines outlined therein.

- Barcelona vs. Lim, GR No. 189171, June 3, 2014- the right

to speedy trial maybe waived except when otherwise
expressly provided by law. One's right to speedy disposition
of his case must, therefore, be asserted. Due to the failure of
the petitioner to assert his right, he is considered to have
waived it.

4. Right to face to face confrontation

- The absence of cross-examination by the defense due to the

supervening death of plaintiff/witness does not necessarily
render the deceased’s testimony inadmissible. Where no fault
can be attributed to plaintiff/witness, it would be a harsh
measure to strike out all that has been obtained in the direct
examination (PP vs. Narca, 275 SCRA 696).

Section 16- Speedy disposition

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 - Where the case for violation of the Anti-Graft Law was
pending for preliminary investigation with the Office of the
Tanodbayan for 3 years and it is indicated that the case is of
simple nature and was prosecuted for political reasons, it is
held that there was violation of the accused’s right to speedy
disposition of case. Right to speedy disposition extends to
preliminary investigations. (Tatad vs. Sandiganbayan, 159
SCRA 70).

- N. B. Recent decision of the Supreme Court on the

Inordinate delay Doctrine (Cagang case)- The Supreme
Court interpreted the reckoning period for the right to ‘speedy
disposition of…cases’ under Article III, Section 16, to start
from the preliminary investigation of cases, and not before the
preliminary investigation and not from the fact-finding stage,”

Section 17- Against Self-incrimination

- It bears emphasis, however, that under the above-quoted

provisions, what is actually proscribed is the use of physical
or moral compulsion to extort communication from the
accused-appellant and not the inclusion of his body in
evidence when it may be material. For instance, substance
emitted from the body of the accused may be received as
evidence in prosecution for acts of lasciviousness (US v. Tan
Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) and morphine forced out of the
mouth of the accused may also be used as evidence against
him (US v. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]).
Consequently, although accused-appellant insists that hair
samples were forcibly taken from him and submitted to the
NBI for forensic examination, the hair samples may be
admitted in evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the
use of testimonial compulsion or any evidence
communicative in nature acquired from the accused under
duress. (People v. Rondero, 320 SCRA 383, 399-401, Dec. 9,
1999, En Banc [Per Curiam])

Does the right against self-incrimination extend to administrative

proceedings?

- In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344

[1969]), we held that the right against self-incrimination
under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution which is
ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to
administrative proceedings which possess a criminal or penal
aspect, such as an administrative investigation of a licensed
physician who is charged with immorality, which could result

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 in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found
guilty. The Court, citing the earlier case of Cabal v. Kapunan
(6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the revocation of
one’s license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater
deprivation than forfeiture of property. (Secretary of Justice
v. Lantion, 322 SCRA 160, 184, Jan. 18, 2000, En Banc
[Melo])

May the Right against Self-incrimination be validly invoked during

Inquiries in Aid of Legislation?

- [I]t has been held that “a congressional committee’s right to

inquire is ‘subject to all relevant limitations placed by the
Constitution on governmental action,’ including ‘the relevant
limitations of the Bill of Rights’.”

- One of the basic rights guaranteed by the Constitution to an

individual is the right against self-incrimination. (Bengzon,
Jr. v. Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, 203 SCRA 767,
Nov. 20, 1991, En Banc [Padilla])

What are the two types of immunity statutes? Which has broader
scope of protection?

- Our immunity statutes are of American origin. In the United

States, there are two types of statutory immunity granted to a
witness. They are the transactional immunity and the use-
and-derivative-use immunity. Transactional immunity is
broader in the scope of its protection. By its grant, a witness
can no longer be prosecuted for any offense whatsoever
arising out of the act or transaction. In contrast, by the grant
of use-and-derivative-use immunity, a witness is only assured
that his or her particular testimony and evidence derived from
it will not be used against him or her in a subsequent
prosecution. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783,
797-798, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])

Is the grant of immunity to an accused willing to testify for the

government a special privilege and, therefore, must be strictly construed
against the accused?

- [W]e reject respondent court’s ruling that the grant of section

5 immunity must be strictly construed against the petitioners.
It simplistically characterized the grant as a special privilege,
as if it was gifted by the government, ex gratia. In taking this
posture, it misread the raison d’ etre and the long pedigree of
the right against self-incrimination vis-à-vis immunity
statutes.

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- The days of inquisition brought about the most despicable
abuses against human rights. Not the least of these abuses is
the expert use of coerced confessions to send to the guillotine
even the guiltless. To guard against the recurrence of this
totalitarian method, the right against self-incrimination was
ensconced in the fundamental laws of all civilized countries.
Over the years, however, came the need to assist government
in its task of containing crime for peace and order is a
necessary matrix of public welfare. To accommodate the
need, the right against self-incrimination was stripped of its
absoluteness. Immunity statutes in varying shapes were
enacted which would allow government to compel a witness
to testify despite his plea of the right against self-
incrimination. To insulate these statutes from the virus of
unconstitutionality, a witness is given what has come to be
known as transactional or a use-derivative-use immunity x x
x. Quite clearly, these immunity statutes are not a bonanza
from government. Those given the privilege of immunity
paid a high price for it – the surrender of their precious right
to be silent. Our hierarchy of values demands that the right
against self-incrimination and the right to be silent should be
accorded greater respect and protection. Laws that tend to
erode the force of these preeminent rights must necessarily be
given a liberal interpretation in favor of the individual. The
government has a right to solve crimes but it must do it,
rightly. (Mapa, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, 231 SCRA 783, 805-
806, April 26, 1994, En Banc [Puno])

- Standard Chartered Bank vs. Senate Committee on

Banks, 541 SCRA 456- The right against self incrimination
is extended in an administrative investigations that partake of
the nature of or are analogous to criminal proceedings. The
privilege has consistently been held to extend to all
proceedings sanctioned by law; and all cases in which
punishment is sought to be visited upon a witness, whether a
party of not.

- The right against self-incrimination is defeated by the public

nature of documents sought to be accessed (Almonte vs.
Vasquez).

- In the recent case of PEOPLE vs. YATAR, G.R. No.

150224, May 19, 2004, the Supreme Court affirmed the
admissibility and probative value of DNA (deoxyribonucleic
acid). Citing the first ever Supreme Court decision on the
admissibility of DNA evidence, i.e., People v. Vallejo, G.R.
No. 144656, 9 May 2002, 382 SCRA 192, 209, the Court, in
Yatar, held that in assessing the probative value of DNA
evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the following

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 factors: “how the samples were collected, how they were
handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the
procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting
the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted
the tests”

- In Yatar, in an attempt to exclude the DNA evidence, the

appellant contended “that the blood sample taken from him as
well as the DNA tests were conducted in violation of his right
to remain silent as well as his right against self-incrimination
under Secs. 12 and 17 of Art. III of the Constitution”.

- The Court rejected the argument. It held that “the kernel of

the right is not against all compulsion, but against testimonial
compulsion”, citing Alih v. Castro, G.R. No. 69401, 23 June
1987, 151 SCRA 279. It held that “the right against self-
incrimination is simply against the legal process of extracting
from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt” and that “it
does not apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is
not an incrimination but as part of object evidence”.

- Citing People v. Rondero, G.R. No. 125687, 9 December

1999, 320 SCRA 383, the Court held that “although accused-
appellant insisted that hair samples were forcibly taken from
him and submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for
forensic examination, the hair samples may be admitted in
evidence against him, for what is proscribed is the use of
testimonial compulsion or any evidence communicative in
nature acquired from the accused under duress.”

- Hence, according to the Court, “a person may be compelled to

submit to fingerprinting, photographing, paraffin, blood and
DNA, as there is no testimonial compulsion involved”. It
cited People v. Gallarde, G.R. No. 133025, 27 February 2000,
325 SCRA 835, where immediately after the incident, “the
police authorities took pictures of the accused without the
presence of counsel”. In that case, the Court ruled that “there
was no violation of the right against self-incrimination”. It
further stated that “the accused may be compelled to submit
to a physical examination to determine his involvement in an
offense of which he is accused”.

Section 18 – Involuntary servitude: (Article 272 of the Revised

Penal Code)

Exceptions:
1. Punishment for a crime;
2. service in defense of the state

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3. naval enlistment;
4. posse commitatus;
5. return to work order;
6. patria potestas

Section 19- Death penalty

- The death penalty is not a cruel punishment. There was no

total abolition of the death penalty. The ConCom had deemed
it proper for Congress to determine its reimposition because
of compelling reasons involving heinous crimes. (PP v.
Echegaray, 267 SCRA 682).

Section 20- Non-imprisonment for Debt

- The civil liability from a crime is not “debt” within the

purview of the constitutional provision against imprisonment
for non payment of “debt”.

- Vergara vs. Gedorio, 402 SCRA 520- Debt, as used in the

Constitution, refers to a civil debt or one not arising from a
criminal offense. Clearly, the non payment of rentals is
covered by the constitutional guarantee against imprisonment.

Section 21- Double Jeopardy

The Two (2) Kinds of Double Jeopardy:

- Our Bill of Rights deals with two (2) kinds of double

jeopardy. The first sentence of Clause 20, Section 1(now Sec.
21), Article III of the Constitution ordains that “no person
shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.” The second sentence of said clause provides that “if
an act is punishable by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another
prosecution for the same act.” Thus, the first sentence
prohibits double jeopardy of punishment for the same offense
whereas, the second contemplates double jeopardy of
punishment for the same act. Under the first sentence, one
may be twice put in jeopardy of punishment of the same act,
provided that he is charged with different offenses, or the
offense charged in one case is not included in, or does not
include, the crime charged in the other case. The second
sentence applies, even if the offense charged are not the same,
owing to the fact that one constitutes a violation of an
ordinance and the other a violation of statute. If the two
charges are based on one and the same act, conviction or
acquittal under either the law or the ordinance shall bar a
prosecution under the other. Incidentally, such conviction or

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 acquittal is not indispensable to sustain the plea of double
jeopardy of punishment or the same offense. So long as
jeopardy has been attached under one of the informations
charging said offense, the defense may be availed of in the
other case involving the same offense, even if there has been
neither conviction nor acquittal in either case.

- Elsewhere stated, where the offense charged are penalized

either by different sections of the same statute or by different
statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of
offenses charged. The constitutional protection against
double jeopardy is available only where an identity is shown
to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses
charged. The question of identity or lack of identity of
offenses is addressed by examining the essential elements of
each of the two offenses charged, as such elements are set out
in the respective legislative definitions of the offenses
involved. (People v. Quijada, 259 SCRA 191, July 24,
1996)

- To substantiate a claim of double jeopardy, the following

must be proven: (1) A first jeopardy must have attached prior
to the second; (2) the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated; (3) the second jeopardy must be for the same
offense, or the second offense includes or is necessarily
included in the offense charged in the first information, or is
an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof.

- Legal jeopardy attaches only: (1) upon a valid indictment; (b)

before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a
valid plea has been entered; and (e) the case was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without the express consent of the
accused. (Cuison v. CA, 289 SCRA 159, April 15, 1998
[Panganiban])

- As a rule, a judgment of acquittal cannot be reconsidered

because it places the accused under double jeopardy (Re MR
in Lejano vs. People, GR No. 176389, January 18, 2011).

- The impeachment proceedings against petitioner Estrada was

not concluded as a series of events prompted the Senate to
declare the impeachment functus officio- thus, he was neither
acquitted nor was the impeachment proceeding dismissed
without his express consent. Neither was there conviction/ It
follows then that the claim of double jeopardy must fail.
(Estrada vs. Desierto, April 3, 2001).

- Under Sec. 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, a provisional

dismissal of a case becomes permanent after the lapse of one

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 year for offenses punishable by imprisonment of not
exceeding six years or a lapse of two years for offenses
punishable by imprisonment of more than six years.

- For this rule to bar the subsequent filing of a similar case

against the accused, the following must be established: 1) the
provisional dismissal had express consent of the accused; 2)
the provisional dismissal was ordered by the court after notice
to the offended party; 3) the 1 yr. or 2-yr. period to revive had
lapsed; 4) there is no justification to file a subsequent case
beyond the period of one or two years. (PP vs. Lacson, May
28, 2002).

- The order approving the plea of guilty to homicide was not a

judgment of conviction. It merely approved the agreement
between the parties on the plea to a lesser offense by the
accused and the condition attached to it. (PP vs. Romero, 399
SCRA 386)

- Disini vs. DOJ Secretary- online libel as to which charging

the offender under both section 4(c) of RA 10175 and Article
353 of RPC is unconstitutional because it constitutes a
violation of the proscription against double jeopardy. Same
with charging the offender under section 4(c)(2) of RA 10175
and RA 9775 (Anti Child Pornography constitute double
jeopardy.

- Braza vs. Sandiganbayan, February 20, 2013- there is

double jeopardy if the subsequent information charges the
accused with different offense, even if it arises from the same
act or set of acts. Prosecution for the same act is not
proscribed; what is forbidden is prosecution for the same
offense.

Section 22- Ex post facto law/bill of attainder

What is a bill of attainder? Is P.D. 1866 a bill of attainder?

- [T]he Court, in People v. Ferrer, defined a bill of attainder as

a legislative act which inflicts punishment on individuals or
members of a particular group without a judicial trial.
Essential to a bill of attainder are a specification of certain
individuals or a group of individuals, the imposition of a
punishment, penal or otherwise, and the lack of judicial trial.
This last element, the total lack of court intervention in the
finding of guilt and the determination of the actual penalty to
be imposed, is the most essential. P.D. No. 1866 does not
possess the elements of a bill of attainder. It does not seek to

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 inflict punishment without a judicial trial. Nowhere in the
measure is there a finding of guilt and an imposition of a
corresponding punishment. What the decree does is to define
the offense and provide for the penalty that may be imposed,
specifying the qualifying circumstances that would aggravate
the offense. There is no encroachment on the power of the
court to determine after due hearing whether the prosecution
has proved beyond reasonable doubt that the offense of illegal
possession of firearms has been committed and that the
qualifying circumstances attached to it has been established
also beyond reasonable doubt as the Constitution and judicial
precedents require. (Misolas v. Panga, 181 SCRA 648, 659-
660, Jan. 30, 1990, En Banc [Cortes])

What is an ex post facto law? Is R.A. No. 8249 an ex post facto law?

- Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal

laws. R.A. 8249 is not a penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are
those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations; or those that define
crimes, treat of their nature, and provide for their punishment.
R.A. 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a
penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e., one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws
of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be
challenged as unconstitutional.

- Petitioner’s and intervenors’ contention that their right to a

two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The
same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times considering that the right to appeal is not a
natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory
right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex
post facto laws. R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of
procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not
partake the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete
out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition. Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of
evidence or the mode of trial. It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and
unresolved at the time of their passage.

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- At any rate, R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused’s right to
appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. On
the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme
Court still has the power of review to determine if the
presumption of innocence has been convincingly overcome.
(Panfilo M. Lacson v. The Executive Secretary, et. al.,
G.R. No. 128096, Jan. 20, 1999 [Martinez])

- RA 8249, an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the

Sandiganbayan, is not penal law but a substantive law on
jurisdiction whose retroactive application is constitutional
(Lacson vs. Exec. Secretary, 301 SCRA 298).

- Nasi-Villar vs. People, 571 SCRA 202- A law can never be

considered ex-post facto law as long as it operates
prospectively since its stricture would cover only offenses
committed after and not before its enactment.

- The prohibition of ex post facto laws and bill of attainder

applies to court doctrines pursuant to the maxim
“legisinterpretatiolegis vim obtinet”- the interpretation placed
upon the written law by a competent court has the force of
law ( PP vs. Jabinal, 55 SCRA 602).

- The law making the use of an unlicensed firearm a qualifying

circumstance in murder cannot apply retroactively. (PP vs.
Patoc, 398 SCRA 62).

- Re DNA tests conducted by the prosecution against accused

being unconstitutional on the ground that resort thereto was
tantamount to the application of an ex-post facto law-
Describing the argument as specious, the Supreme Court held
“no ex-post facto law was involved in the case at bar”. It
added that “the science of DNA typing involved the
admissibility, relevance and reliability of the evidence
obtained under the Rules of Court”. Whereas, “an ex-post
facto law referred primarily to a question of law, DNA
profiling requires a factual determination of the probative
weight of the evidence presented”. (PP vs. Yatar, May 19,
2004)

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