G.R. No.

140746             March 16, 2005

PANTRANCO NORTH EXPRESS, INC., and ALEXANDER BUNCAN, Petitioner, 

vs.
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., and MARTINA GICALE, Respondents.

DECISION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Decision1 dated July 23 1999 and
Resolution2 dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453, entitled
"Standard Insurance Company, Inc., and Martina Gicale vs. PANTRANCO North Express, Inc., and
Alexander Buncan."

In the afternoon of October 28, 1984, Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by
his mother Martina Gicale, respondent herein. It was then raining. While driving north bound along
the National Highway in Talavera, Nueva Ecija, a passenger bus, owned by Pantranco North
Express, Inc., petitioner, driven by Alexander Buncan, also a petitioner, was trailing behind. When
the two vehicles were negotiating a curve along the highway, the passenger bus overtook the
jeepney. In so doing, the passenger bus hit the left rear side of the jeepney and sped away.

Crispin reported the incident to the Talavera Police Station and respondent Standard Insurance Co.,
Inc. (Standard), insurer of the jeepney. The total cost of the repair was P21,415.00, but respondent
Standard paid only P8,000.00. Martina Gicale shouldered the balance of P13,415.00.

Thereafter, Standard and Martina, respondents, demanded reimbursement from petitioners

Pantranco and its driver Alexander Buncan, but they refused. This prompted respondents to file with
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Manila, a complaint for sum of money.

In their answer, both petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that
it is the Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

On June 5, 1992, the trial court rendered a Decision3 in favor of respondents Standard and Martina,
thus:

"WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered in

favor of the plaintiffs, Standard Insurance Company and Martina Gicale, and against
defendants Pantranco Bus Company and Alexander Buncan, ordering the latter to pay as
follows:

(1) to pay plaintiff Standard Insurance the amount of P8,000.00 with interest due thereon
from November 27, 1984 until fully paid;

(2) to pay plaintiff Martina Gicale the amount of P13,415.00 with interest due thereon from
October 22, 1984 until fully paid;

(3) to pay the sum of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees;

(4) to pay the expenses of litigation and the cost of suit.

 SO ORDERED."

On appeal, the Court of Appeals, in a Decision4 dated July 23, 1999, affirmed the trial court’s ruling,
holding that:

"The appellants argue that appellee Gicale’s claim of P13,415.00 and appellee insurance
company’s claim of P8,000.00 individually fell under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court. This is not correct because under the Totality Rule provided for under
Sec. 19, Batas Pambansa Bilang 129, it is the sum of the two claims that determines the
jurisdictional amount.

xxx

In the case at bench, the total of the two claims is definitely more than P20,000.00 which at
the time of the incident in question was the jurisdictional amount of the Regional Trial Court.

Appellants contend that there was a misjoinder of parties. Assuming that there was, under
the Rules of Court (Sec. 11, Rule 7) as well as under the Rules of Civil Procedure (ditto), the
same does not affect the jurisdiction of the court nor is it a ground to dismiss the complaint.

xxx

It does not need perspicacity in logic to see that appellees Gicale’s and insurance company’s
individual claims against appellees (sic) arose from the same vehicular accident on October
28, 1984 involving appellant Pantranco’s bus and appellee Gicale’s jeepney. That being the
case, there was a question of fact common to all the parties: Whose fault or negligence
caused the damage to the jeepney?

Appellants submit that they were denied their day in court because the case was deemed
submitted for decision "without even declaring defendants in default or to have waived the
presentation of evidence." This is incorrect. Of course, the court did not declare defendants
in default because that is done only when the defendant fails to tender an answer within the
reglementary period. When the lower court ordered that the case is deemed submitted for
decision that meant that the defendants were deemed to have waived their right to present
evidence. If they failed to adduce their evidence, they should blame nobody but themselves.
They failed to be present during the scheduled hearing for the reception of their evidence
despite notice and without any motion or explanation. They did not even file any motion for
reconsideration of the order considering the case submitted for decision.

Finally, contrary to the assertion of the defendant-appellants, the evidence preponderantly

established their liability for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code."

Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by the Appellate Court in a Resolution
dated November 4, 1999.

Hence, this petition for review on certiorari raising the following assignments of error:

"I

WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF
THE ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS’ RESPECTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION
 AGAINST PETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE
THERE QUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND
RESPONDENTS.

II

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS ARE LIABLE TO RESPONDENTS CONSIDERING

THAT BASED ON THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AND LAW APPLICABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR, RESPONDENTS HAVE NOT SHOWN ANY RIGHT TO THE RELIEF PRAYED FOR.

III

WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONERS WERE DEPRIVED OF THEIR RIGHT TO DUE

PROCESS."

For their part, respondents contend that their individual claims arose out of the same vehicular
accident and involve a common question of fact and law. Hence, the RTC has jurisdiction over the
case.

Petitioners insist that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the case since the cause of action of
each respondent did not arise from the same transaction and that there are no common questions of
law and fact common to both parties. Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5 provides:

"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. – All persons in whom or against whom any right to
relief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alleged to
exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise provided in
these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where any
question of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may arise in the
action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintiff or
defendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceedings in
which he may have no interest."

Permissive joinder of parties requires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same transaction or
series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plaintiffs or defendants;
and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules on jurisdiction and
venue.6

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantranco’s bus hitting the rear side
of the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligent.
There being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the same
cause of action against petitioners.

To determine identity of cause of action, it must be ascertained whether the same evidence which is
necessary to sustain the second cause of action would have been sufficient to authorize a recovery
in the first.7 Here, had respondents filed separate suits against petitioners, the same evidence would
have been presented to sustain the same cause of action. Thus, the filing by both respondents of the
complaint with the court below is in order. Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and
ensures the convenient, speedy and orderly administration of justice.
Corollarily, Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:

"Sec. 5. Joinder of causes of action. – A party may in one pleading assert, in the alternative
or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, subject
to the following conditions:

xxx

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the
aggregate amount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in favor
of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is
involved.8 The issue of whether respondents’ claims shall be lumped together is determined by
paragraph (d) of the above provision. This paragraph embodies the "totality rule" as exemplified by
Section 33 (1) of B.P. Blg. 1299 which states, among others, that "where there are several claims or
causes of action between the same or different parties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount
of the demand shall be the totality of the claims in all the causes of action, irrespective of whether
the causes of action arose out of the same or different transactions."

As previously stated, respondents’ cause of action against petitioners arose out of the same
transaction. Thus, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of the claims.

Respondent Standard’s claim is P8,000.00, while that of respondent Martina Gicale is P13,415.00,
or a total ofP21,415.00. Section 19 of B.P. Blg. 129 provides that the RTC has "exclusive original
jurisdiction over all other cases, in which the demand, exclusive of interest and cost or the value of
the property in controversy, amounts to more than twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)." Clearly, it
is the RTC that has jurisdiction over the instant case. It bears emphasis that when the complaint was
filed, R.A. 7691 expanding the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts had not yet taken effect. It became effective on April 15, 1994.

II

The finding of the trial court, affirmed by the Appellate Court, that petitioners are negligent and thus
liable to respondents, is a factual finding which is binding upon us, a rule well-established in our
jurisprudence. It has been repeatedly held that the trial court's factual findings, when affirmed by the
Appellate Court, are conclusive and binding upon this Court, if they are not tainted with arbitrariness
or oversight of some fact or circumstance of significance and influence. Petitioners have not
presented sufficient ground to warrant a deviation from this rule.10

III

There is no merit in petitioners’ contention that they were denied due process. Records show that
during the hearing, petitioner Pantranco’s counsel filed two motions for resetting of trial which were
granted by the trial court. Subsequently, said counsel filed a notice to withdraw. After respondents
had presented their evidence, the trial court, upon petitioners’ motion, reset the hearing to another
date. On this date, Pantranco failed to appear. Thus, the trial court warned Pantranco that should it
fail to appear during the next hearing, the case will be submitted for resolution on the basis of the
evidence presented. Subsequently, Pantranco’s new counsel manifested that his client is willing to
settle the case amicably and moved for another postponement. The trial court granted the motion.
On the date of the hearing, the new counsel manifested that Pantranco’s employees are on strike
and moved for another postponement. On the next hearing, said counsel still failed to appear.
Hence, the trial court considered the case submitted for decision.

We have consistently held that the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or
an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek for a reconsideration of the action or
ruling complained of.11

Petitioner Pantranco filed an answer and participated during the trial and presentation of
respondents’ evidence. It was apprised of the notices of hearing issued by the trial court. Indeed, it
was afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain its side of the controversy. Clearly, it was not
denied of its right to due process. What is frowned upon is the absolute lack of notice and hearing
which is not present here.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated July 23 1999 and Resolution
dated November 4, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 38453 are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.