Digital Marketing: Avi Goldfarb, Catherine Tucker

CHAPTER
Digital marketing✩
a Rotman
Avi Goldfarba,b,∗ , Catherine Tuckerc,b
5
School of Management, University of Toronto, Toronto, ON, Canada
b NBER, Cambridge, MA, United States
c MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge, MA, United States
∗ Corresponding author: e-mail address: [email protected]
Contents
1 Reduction in consumer search costs and marketing ...................................... 261
1.1 Pricing: Are prices and price dispersion lower online? ....................... 261
1.2 Placement: How do low search costs affect channel relationships? ....... 263
1.3 Product: How do low search costs affect product assortment? ............. 264
1.4 Promotion: How do low search costs affect advertising?..................... 265
2 The replication costs of digital goods is zero .............................................. 267
2.1 Pricing: How can non-rival digital goods be priced profitably?.............. 267
2.2 Placement: How do digital channels – some of which are illegal – affect
the ability of information good producers to distribute profitably? ......... 268
2.3 Product: What are the motivations for providing digital products given
their non-excludability? ........................................................... 268
2.4 Promotion: What is the role of aggregators in promoting digital goods? ... 269
3 Lower transportation costs..................................................................... 269
3.1 Placement: Does channel structure still matter if transportation costs
are near zero? ...................................................................... 270
3.2 Product: How do low transportation costs affect product variety?.......... 271
3.3 Pricing: Does pricing flexibility increase because transportation costs
are near zero? ...................................................................... 272
3.4 Promotion: What is the role of location in online promotion? ............... 272
4 Lower tracking costs............................................................................ 273
4.1 Promotion: How do low tracking costs affect advertising? ................... 273
4.2 Pricing: Do lower tracking costs enable novel forms of price
discrimination?..................................................................... 276
4.3 Product: How do markets where the customer’s data is the ‘product’
lead to privacy concerns?......................................................... 277
4.4 Placement: How do lower tracking costs affect channel management? ... 278
5 Reduction in verification costs ................................................................ 278
5.1 Pricing: How willingness to pay is bolstered by reputation mechanisms .. 278
5.2 Product: Is a product’s ‘rating’ now an integral product feature? .......... 279
✩ This builds heavily on our Journal of Economic Literature paper, ‘Digital Economics.’
Handbook of the Economics of Marketing, Volume 1, ISSN 2452-2619, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hem.2019.04.004

Copyright © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
259
260 CHAPTER 5 Digital marketing
5.3 Placement: How can channels reduce reputation system failures? ........ 280
5.4 Promotion: Can verification lead to discrimination in how goods are
promoted? .......................................................................... 280
6 Conclusions ...................................................................................... 281
References............................................................................................ 282
Digital technology is the representation of information in bits, reducing the costs

of collecting, storing, and parsing customer data. Such technologies span TCP/IP
and other communications standards, improvements in database organization, im-
provements in computer memory, faster processing speeds, fiber optic cable, wireless
transmission, and advances in statistical reasoning.
These new digital technologies can be seen as reducing the costs of certain mar-
keting activities. Digital marketing explores how traditional areas of marketing such
as pricing, promotion, product, and placement change as certain costs fall substan-
tially, perhaps approaching zero. Using the framework in our recent summary of the
digital economics literature (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2019), we emphasize a shift in five
different costs in addressing the needs of customers.
1. Lower search costs for customers.
2. Lower replication costs for certain digital goods.
3. Lower transportation costs in transporting digital goods.
4. Lower tracking costs enabling personalization and targeting.
5. Lower verification costs of customers’ wishes and firms’ reputations.
We argue that each of these costs had the distinction of affecting marketing earlier
and more dramatically than many other firm functions or sectors. As a consequence,
marketing has become a testing lab for understanding how these shift in costs may
affect the broader economy. This link between marketing and economics is impor-
tant because each of these shifts in costs draws on familiar modeling frameworks
from economics. For example, the search cost literature goes back to Stigler (1961).
Search costs are lower in digital environments, enabling customers to find products
and firms to find customers. Non-rivalry is another key concept, as digital goods can
be replicated at zero cost. Transportation cost models, such as the Hotelling Model,
provide a useful framework for the literature on the low cost of transportation of dig-
ital goods. Digital technologies make it easy to track any one consumer’s behavior,
a theme of advertising models at least since Grossman and Shapiro (1984). Last, in-
formation models that emphasize reputation and trust help frame research that shows
that digitization can make verification easier.
Early work in digital economics and industrial organization emphasized the role
of lower costs (Shapiro and Varian, 1998; Borenstein and Saloner, 2001; Smith et al.,
2001; Ellison and Ellison, 2005). Goldfarb and Tucker (2019) analyzed how these
shifts have been studied in the economics literature. We aim to focus on the extent to
which quantitative marketing has led, and has been the first empirical testing ground
for, many of these changes. As such, we will focus on work in quantitative marketing
aiming to understand the effect of technology. In doing so, we will not emphasize
1 Reduction in consumer search costs and marketing 261
work from the consumer behavior literature or methodology-focused work from the
marketing statistics literature. We will also not emphasize studies in the marketing
strategy literature that document correlations which are of managerial importance,
rather than measuring the causal effects of digital technologies.
1 Reduction in consumer search costs and marketing

Search costs matter in marketing because they represent the costs consumers incur
looking for information regarding products and services. The most important effect
of lower search costs with respect to digital marketing is that it is easier to find and
compare information about potential products and services online than offline. Many
of the earliest reviews about the impact of the internet on the economy emphasized
low search costs in the retail context (Borenstein and Saloner, 2001; Bakos, 2001) and
the resulting impact on prices, price dispersion, and inventories. These papers built on
a long-established economic literature on search costs (Stigler, 1961; Diamond, 1971;
Varian, 1980). Recent work in marketing has examined the search process in depth,
documenting the clickstream path and underlying search strategies (Bronnenberg et
al., 2016; Honka and Chintagunta, 2017).
1.1 Pricing: Are prices and price dispersion lower online?

Perhaps the dominant theme in the early literature was the impact of low search costs
on prices and price dispersion. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000) hypothesized that low
internet search costs should lower both prices and price dispersion. They empirically
tested these ideas, comparing the prices of books and CDs online and offline. They
found that online prices were lower. Similarly, Brown and Goolsbee (2002) showed
that insurance prices are lower online and Orlov (2011) found that airline prices are
lower online. A series of related studies (Zettelmeyer et al., 2001; Scott Morton et al.,
2003; Zettelmeyer et al., 2006) showed how digitization reduced automobile prices,
though not equally for all types of consumers. While prices fell, the results of the
literature on price dispersion have been more mixed. Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000)
show substantial price dispersion online. Nevertheless, they find that online price
dispersion is somewhat lower than offline price dispersion. Baye and Morgan (2004)
emphasize persistently high levels of price dispersion online. Orlov (2011) suggests
that online price dispersion is higher.
The persistence of price dispersion is a puzzle. Broadly, the literature gives two
main answers. First, the earlier economics literature has emphasized that retailers
differ, so the service provided for the same item differs across retailers. Firms with
stronger brands command higher prices, though this has been decreasing somewhat
over time (Waldfogel and Chen, 2006). This decline in importance of brands in the
digital environment, as shown in Hollenbeck (2018), is related as we discuss to the
reduction in verification costs.
Second, as a counterpoint to the notion that there are exogenously given differ-
ences in seller quality that formed the basis of the early economics literature – the
marketing literature has emphasized the extent to which search can be influenced
by the seller. In other words, in marketing we recognize that search costs are en-
dogenous and a reflection of a firm’s marketing strategy. Honka (2014) and De los
Santos et al. (2012) provide surprisingly large estimates of the cost of each click in
the online context. By forcing customers to conduct an extra click or two, sellers can
increase the relative cost of search in areas where they are weak. For example, a high-
quality, high-price firm might make it easy to compare product quality but difficult
to find prices. Chu et al. (2008) show that price sensitivity is lower in online gro-
cery compared to offline grocery. Fradkin (2017) has shown a similar phenomenon
in the context of Airbnb. A number of scholars have shown that such endogenous
increases in search costs can be sustained in equilibrium (Ellison and Ellison, 2009)
and profitable (Hossain and Morgan, 2006; Dinerstein et al., 2018; Moshary et al.,
2017).
Ellison and Ellison (2009) showed how firms can obfuscate prices. They empha-
size a setting where search costs should be very low: An online price comparison
website. They show that retailers that display prices on that website emphasize their
relatively low priced products. Then, when consumers click the link and arrive at
the retailer’s own website, they are shown offers for higher prices and higher mar-
gin goods. Thus, price dispersion is low at the price comparison website where
search costs are low, but dispersion is high where comparison is more difficult. More
recently, Moshary et al. (2017) demonstrate the effectiveness of similar price ob-
fuscation in the context of a massive field experiment at StubHub. The experiment
compared purchase prices and demand estimates when the service fees for using
StubHub were shown early in the search process versus immediately before pur-
chase. The experiment showed that customers were less sensitive to the same fee
when it was shown late in the process. The company deliberately made some price
information more difficult to find, and this increased quantity demanded at the same
price.
Another area where search costs are endogenous to firm marketing strategy re-
flects the use of devices. Firms recognize that tablets and mobile devices, with smaller
screens, may facilitate this process of restricting the information that consumers see
initially (Xu et al., 2017; Ghose et al., 2013). A developing area of marketing is
trying to understand, given this different environment, how best to present price in-
formation to consumers to maximize profits in a mobile environment (Andrews et al.,
2015; Fong et al., 2015).
The early online price dispersion literature and the more recent literature demon-
strating endogenous online search costs show where a close study of marketing
contexts has been able to add nuance to a puzzle noted in the economics literature,
by exploring how firms can increase search costs for consumers in a digital environ-
ment.
1.2 Placement: How do low search costs affect channel

relationships?
Reduced search costs facilitate exchange more generally, often enabled by large digi-
tal platforms. Many major technology firms can be seen as platform-based businesses.
For example, Google and Facebook are platforms for advertisers and buyers. Jullien
(2012) highlighted that digital markets give rise to platforms because of low search
costs that facilitate matching and enable trade. Horton and Zeckhauser (2016) em-
phasize that many large digital platforms are driven by low search costs that enable
efficient use of unused capacity for durable goods. This emphasis on unused capac-
ity, and the need to match supply and demand, means that much research takes a
market design perspective (Einav et al., 2018). Cullen and Farronato (2016) empha-
size the challenges of matching supply and demand over time and the importance of
economies of scale in matching. Zervas et al. (2017) emphasize how supply changes
in response to changes in demand. Bapna et al. (2016) emphasize that platform design
can also be informed by consumer theory.
These platforms often provide an alternative type of distribution channel, through
which sellers can reach buyers. This can enable new markets and affect incumbents.
For example, several papers have examined the accommodation industry (Fradkin,
2017; Farronato and Fradkin, 2018; Zervas et al., 2017). Zervas et al. (2017) examine
how the introduction of Airbnb as a channel for selling accommodations reduced de-
mand in the incumbent hotel industry in a particular way. Airbnb provided a channel
for selling temporary accommodation. This enabled accommodations to go on and
off the market as demand fluctuated. Consequently, the impact of Airbnb is largest in
periods of peak demand (such as the SXSW festival in Austin, Texas). In these peri-
ods, hotel capacity is constrained. Airbnb ‘hosts’ play a role in providing additional
capacity. This means that hotel prices do not rise as much.
Digital platforms serve as distribution channels in a wide variety of industries,
including airlines (Dana and Orlov, 2014), books (Ellison and Ellison, 2017), food
trucks (Anenberg and Kung, 2015), entertainment (Waldfogel, 2018), and cars (Hall
et al., 2016). In many of these cases, a key role of online platforms is to provide an
additional channel to overcome capacity constraints (Farronato and Fradkin, 2018).
These constraints may be regulatory, as in the case of limited taxi licensing, related
to fixed costs and technological limits as in the case of YouTube as a substitute for
television, or both, as in the case of accommodation, where hotel rooms have high
fixed costs and short term rentals are constrained by regulation.
Given that a key role of these online platforms is to overcome capacity constraints
in offline distribution channels, this provides a structure for understanding where new
online platforms may arise. They will likely appear in places where existing distri-
bution channels generate capacity constraints, particularly in the presence of large
demand fluctuations. Furthermore, it provides a structure for identifying which exist-
ing channels and incumbent sellers will be most affected by online platforms: Those
in which capacity constraints generate a key source of their profits. As Farronato and
Fradkin (2018) show, hotels lost their ability to charge unusually high prices during
periods of peak demand.
In summary, digital platforms facilitate a reduction in search costs. This creates an

opportunity for sellers working at a small scale to find buyers. By enabling an influx
of sellers, online platforms overcome capacity constraints, creating new opportuni-
ties for sellers, new benefits to buyers, and new threats to the existing distribution
channels and the larger incumbent sellers. Much of the initial literature on platform
or two-sided networks was led by economists inspired by antitrust litigation in credit
cards (Rochet and Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006). However, recently the literature
has exploded in marketing because so many large platforms are primarily marketing
channels – such as Amazon, Facebook, and Google. This means that the digital mar-
keting literature is at the core of much of the debate about the extent to which such
platforms represent a challenge for antitrust regulators (Chiou and Tucker, 2017b).
1.3 Product: How do low search costs affect product assortment?

Anderson (2006) emphasized that the internet increases the purchase of niche or ‘long
tail’ products relative to mainstream or superstar products. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, Brynjolfsson et al. (2011) find that the variety of products available and
purchased online is higher than offline. Zentner et al. (2013) use a quasi-experimental
estimation strategy to show that consumers are more likely to rent niche movies
online and blockbusters offline. Datta et al. (2018) demonstrate that the move to
streaming, rather than purchasing, music has led to a wider variety of music con-
sumption and increased product discovery, which in turn increases the variety of
music available (Aguiar and Waldfogel, 2018). Zhang (2018) links this discovery
of relatively unknown products to low search costs. Empirical evidence suggests that
this increase in variety increased consumer surplus (Brynjolfsson et al., 2003).
Furthermore, Quan and Williams (2018) suggest that the increase in the variety of
products purchased by consumers has been overestimated by the literature. In partic-
ular, they note that tastes are spatially correlated, and examine the consequences of
spatially correlated tastes on the distribution of product assortment both online and
offline. The key finding is that offline product assortment has been mis-measured,
because products that might appear to be rarely purchased in a national sample could
still have sufficient local demand in certain markets that they would be available.
Drawing on this insight, they build a structural model of demand and show that the
welfare effects of the internet through the long tail are much more modest than many
previous estimates. These relatively low welfare benefits of the long tail or the bene-
fits of increased variety are consistent with Ershov’s (2019) research in the context of
online software downloads from the Google Play store, which emphasizes the general
benefits of a reduction in search costs for consumers.
While much of the popular discussion has emphasized the long tail, the effect of
search costs on product assortment is ambiguous. If there are vertically differentiated
products, low search costs mean that consumers will all be able to identify the best
product. Bar-Isaac et al. (2012) provide a theoretical framework that combines super-
star and long tail effects as search costs fall, demonstrating that lower search costs
hurt middle-tier products while helping extremes. Elberse and Eliashberg (2003) doc-
ument both effects in the entertainment industry.
As noted above, search costs can be endogenously chosen by firms. Recommen-

dation engines are one tool through which firms choose which attributes to empha-
size, lowering search costs in some dimensions and not others. Fleder and Hosanagar
(2009) show that simple changes to recommendation engine algorithms can bias
purchases toward superstar or long tail effects. Superstar effects occur when the rec-
ommendation engine primarily suggests ‘people who bought this also bought’. In
contrast, long tail effects occur when the engine instead suggests ‘people who bought
this disproportionately bought’. Consistent with this framing, Zhang and Liu (2012)
and Agrawal et al. (2015) show how recommendation engines can lead to a small
number of products receiving the most attention when they focus on showing which
products are most popular. In contrast, Tucker and Zhang (2011) provide an example
in which a recommendation engine which highlights the popularity of a digital choice
has asymmetrically large effects for niche products. This occurs for a different reason
than the one highlighted in Fleder and Hosanagar (2009). In this case, the release of
popularity information allowed niche sellers to appear to be relatively popular and
consequently signal their quality or general attractiveness.
Overall, reduced search costs appear to increase product assortment while also
increasing sales at the top of the distribution. We have empirical evidence of both
long tail and superstar effects, probably at the expense of products in the middle
of the distribution. While the variety of products offered has increased, Quan and
Williams (2018) highlight that the welfare consequences of this appear to be small
in the context of a particular set of online products. This contrasts with the evidence
summarized in Waldfogel (2018) who argues that digitization has led to a substantial
increase in consumer welfare in the entertainment industry. Currently, the literature
does not have a systematic structure for identifying when increased product assort-
ment will have a large welfare impact. The evidence presented by both Quan and
Williams (2018) and Waldfogel (2018) is compelling. It suggests that the particular
characteristics of the product category will determine welfare effects. It remains an
open research question what those characteristics might be, and this is something we
feel that marketing contexts are well able to exploit.
1.4 Promotion: How do low search costs affect advertising?

Advertising is often modeled as a process for facilitating search (Bagwell, 2007).
Online search costs affect advertising in a variety of ways. For example, low search
costs online can also change the nature and effectiveness of offline advertising. Joo et
al. (2014) show that television advertising leads to online search. Such searches can
in turn lead to better information about products and higher sales. In other words, the
ability to search online can make other advertising more effective, and it can enable
advertisers to include an invitation to search in their messaging.
Modeling advertising as a search process is particularly useful in the context
of search engine advertising. This is advertising that responds directly to consumer
search behavior. Consumers enter what they are looking for into the search engine.
Advertisers respond to that statement of intent. Search engine advertising allows both
online and offline advertisers to find customers. Kalyanam et al. (2017) show how
search engine ads affect offline stores. Even within search engine advertising, search
costs vary. Ghose et al. (2012) demonstrate the importance of rank in search out-
comes. Higher ranked products get purchased more. Narayanan and Kalyanam (2015)
and Jeziorski and Moorthy (2017) both document that rank matters in search engine
advertising in particular, but that this effect varies across advertisers and contexts.
Despite the widespread use of search advertising, there is some question about
whether search advertising is effective at all. Li et al. (2016) discuss how industry
attributes consumer purchases to particular advertising. Search engine advertising
appears most effective because people who click on search ads are very likely to end
up purchasing and because the click on the search ad is often the ‘last click’ before
purchase. Many industry models treat this last click as the most valuable and hence
search engine advertising is seen as particularly effective. Li et al. (2016) argue that
the industry models overestimate the effectiveness of search ads.
Blake et al. (2015) describe why the effectiveness of search advertising may be
overestimated. They emphasize the importance of the counterfactual situation where
the ad did not appear. If the search engine user would click the algorithmic link in-
stead of the advertisement, then the advertiser would receive the same result for free.
The paper shows the result of a field experiment conducted by eBay, in which eBay
stopped search engine advertising in a randomly selected set of local markets in the
United States. Generally, eBay sales did not fall in markets without search engine
advertising compared to markets with search engine advertising. In the absence of
search ads, it appears that users clicked the algorithmic links and purchased at roughly
the same rate. This was particularly true of the branded keyword search term ‘eBay’.
In other words, careful analysis of the counterfactual suggested that search engine ad-
vertising generally did not work (except in a small number of specialized situations).
This research led eBay to substantially reduce its search engine advertising.
Simonov et al. (2018a) revisit the effectiveness of search engine advertising and
focus on advertisements for the branded keyword, but for less prominent advertis-
ers than eBay. Using data from search results at Bing’s search engine, they replicate
the result that search engine advertising is relatively ineffective for very well known
brands. They then demonstrate that search engine advertising is effective for less well
known brands, particularly for those that do not show up high in the algorithmic list-
ings. Overall, these papers have shown that understanding the search process – for
example through examining heterogeneity in the counterfactual options when search
advertising is unavailable – is key to understanding when advertising serves to lower
search costs. Coviello et al. (2017) also find that search advertising is effective for
a less well-known brand. Simonov et al. (2018b) show that competitive advertising
provides a further benefit of search engine advertising: If competitors are bidding
on a keyword (even if that keyword is a brand name), then there can be a benefit
to paying to search engine advertising even for advertisers who appear as the top
algorithmic link.
In other words, Blake et al. (2015), Simonov et al. (2018a), and Simonov et al.
(2018b) together demonstrate what might seem obvious ex post: Search advertis-
2 The replication costs of digital goods is zero 267
ing meaningfully lowers search costs for products that are relatively difficult to find
through other means. This finding is nevertheless important. Search advertising is a
multi-billion dollar industry and many marketers appear to have been mis-attributing
sales to the search advertising channel.
These three papers provide a coherent picture of how search engine advertising
works. The open questions relate to how changes in the nature of search advertising
– and the addition of new search channels such as mobile devices and personal assis-
tants – might affect this picture. As we move off the larger screens into more limited
bandwidth devices, then search costs may rise and even strong brands may benefit
from search advertising.
Tools and questions from economics – such as thinking about the right counter-
factual – have led to an extensive and important literature on search engines that spans
marketing and economics. Even though search engines are so recent, the speed with
which this literature has sprung up reflects the growing importance of search engines
and other search mechanisms in the digital economy.
2 The replication costs of digital goods is zero

Digital goods are non-rival. They can be consumed by one person without reducing
the amount or quality available to others. Fire is a non-rival good. If one person starts
a fire, they can use it to light someone else’s fire without diminishing their own.
The non-rival nature of digital goods leads to important implications for marketing,
particularly with respect to copyright and privacy. The internet is, in many ways,
a “giant, out of control copying machine” (Shapiro and Varian, 1998). This means
that a key challenge for marketers in the era of digitization is controlling product
reproduction – free online copying – by consumers.
2.1 Pricing: How can non-rival digital goods be priced profitably?

Non-rival goods create pricing challenges. If customers can give their purchases away
without decreasing the quality of what they bought, this creates challenges to the
ability to price positively. The initial response by many producers of digital products
was both legal (through copyright enforcement) and technological (through digital
rights management). The effectiveness of such policies on consumer purchases is
theoretically ambiguous, and the empirical evidence is mixed (Varian, 2005; Vernik
et al., 2011; Danaher et al., 2013; Li et al., 2015; Zhang, 2018).
Non-rivalry can lead to opportunities for price discrimination. Lambrecht and
Misra (2016) examine price discrimination in sports news. In this context, the highest
willingness to pay customers appear all year, while casual fans primarily read news
in-season. Therefore, it is profitable for a sports website to provide more free articles
during periods of peak demand. During the off-season, more content should require a
subscription because that is when the highest value customers appear. Rao and Hart-
mann (2015) examine price discrimination in digital video, comparing options to rent
or buy a digital movie. The paper shows that in the zero marginal cost digital context,
dynamic considerations play an important role.
The marketing literature has long being focused on tactical and practical questions
about how to price (Rao, 1984). Therefore, it is not surprising that scholars at the
boundary between marketing and economics have been exploring the new frontier
question about how to price non-rival digital goods.
2.2 Placement: How do digital channels – some of which are

illegal – affect the ability of information good producers to
distribute profitably?
Digital channels affect the ability of the producers of information goods to distribute
profitably. For example, music industry revenue began to fall in 1999 and this has
been widely blamed on the impact of digitization generally and free online copying
in particular (Waldfogel, 2012). This leads to a question of optimal restrictions on free
online copying by governments through copyright and by firms through digital rights
management. While the direct effect of free online copying is to reduce revenues,
such free copying may induce consumers to sample new music and buy later (Peitz
and Waelbroeck, 2006). Furthermore, Mortimer et al. (2012) show that revenues for
complementary goods (like live performances) could rise. Despite this ambiguity,
the vast majority of the empirical literature has shown that free online copying does
reduce revenue across a wide variety of industries (Zentner, 2006; Waldfogel, 2010;
Danaher and Smith, 2014; Godinho de Matos et al., 2018; Reimers, 2016).
The core open marketing questions therefore relate to the development and dis-
tribution of complementary goods. To the extent that free and even illegal channels
for distribution are inevitable for many digital goods, what are the opportunities for
intermediaries to facilitate profitable exchange? In other words, besides selling tick-
ets to live music, it is important to understand the ways in which industry has reacted
to these changes. As free video distribution becomes widespread through platforms
like YouTube and through illegal channels, it may generate incentives to offer sub-
scription bundles (as in Netflix) rather than charging per view (as in the cinema). It
may also generate incentives to produce merchandizable content, and then earn prof-
its through toy and clothing licensing, theme parks, and other channels. This in turn
may affect the role of entertainment conglomerates in the industry. If merchandizing
is necessary, then companies like Disney may have an advantage because they own
theme parks, retail stores, and other channels. Aside from Mortimer et al. (2012),
our empirical understanding is limited as to how complements to digital information
goods arise, how they work, and how they change the nature of the firm.
2.3 Product: What are the motivations for providing digital products
given their non-excludability?
Intellectual property laws exist because they can generate incentives to innovate and
create new products. The non-rival nature of digital goods leads to widespread viola-
3 Lower transportation costs 269
tion of copyright and questions about what constitutes fair use. Many people consume
digital products without paying for them. While the owners of copyrighted works are
harmed, the provision of a product at zero price increases consumer surplus and elim-
inates deadweight loss. It also allows for valuable derivative works. In a static model,
this is welfare-enhancing. Consumers benefit more than producers are hurt.
Therefore, the key question with respect to digitization and copyright is with
respect to the creation of new products. Waldfogel (2012) provides evidence that
suggests that the quality of music has not fallen since Napster began facilitating free
online copying in 1999. While digitization did reduce incentives to produce because
of online copying, the costs of production and distribution fell as well. For distribu-
tion, low marginal costs of reproduction meant that early-stage artists could distribute
their music widely and get known, even without support from a music label or pub-
lisher (Waldfogel, 2016; Waldfogel and Reimers, 2015). The title of the new book
‘Digital Renaissance’ (Waldfogel, 2018) summarizes a decade of his research em-
phasizing that digitization has led to more and better quality entertainment despite
increased copying, largely because of reduced production and distribution costs. In
our view, the argument Waldfogel presents is convincing. The challenge for market-
ing scholars is to extend this literature by understanding better the profitable provision
of goods which serve as complements to digital goods.
2.4 Promotion: What is the role of aggregators in promoting digital

goods?
Non-rivalry means that it is easier for companies to replicate and aggregate the dig-
ital content of other firms. Such aggregators both compete with the producing firms
content and promote the producing firm’s content (Dellarocas et al., 2013). Thus, the
distinction between advertisement and product can become ambiguous. This tension
has been empirically examined in the context of the new aggregators. Examining
policy changes in Europe, three different studies have shown that news aggregators
served more as promotion tools than to cannibalize the revenues of producing firms
(Calzada and Gil, 2017; Chiou and Tucker, 2017a; Athey et al., 2017b). For example,
Calzada and Gil (2017) show that shutting down Google News in Spain substan-
tially reduced visits to Spanish news sites. Chiou and Tucker (2017a) found similar
evidence of market expansion looking at a contract dispute between the Associated
Press and Google News. Therefore, in general empirical evidence suggests that news
aggregators appear to have a market expansion effect rather than being cannibalizing.
3 Lower transportation costs

Information stored in bits can be transported at the speed of light. Therefore digital
goods and digital information can be transported anywhere at near-zero cost. Further-
more, the transportation cost to the consumer of buying physical goods online can be
relatively low. As emphasized by Balasubramanian (1998), the transportation costs
of traveling to an offline retailer are reduced, even if an online retailer still needs to
ship a physical product.
3.1 Placement: Does channel structure still matter if transportation

costs are near zero?
Digitization added a new marketing channel (Peterson et al., 1997). For digital goods,
this channel is available to anyone with an internet connection. For physical goods
bought online and shipped, this channel is available to anyone within the shipping
range. In the United States, this means just about anybody with a mailing address.
A variety of theory papers examined the impact of the online channel on marketing
strategy (Balasubramanian, 1998; Liu and Zhang, 2006). These papers build on ex-
isting models of transportation costs that build themselves on Hotelling (1929). They
model online retailers as being equidistant from all consumers, while consumers have
different costs of visiting offline retailers, depending on their location.
Empirical work has generally supported the use of these models. The new chan-
nel competed with the existing offline channels for goods that needed to be shipped
(Goolsbee, 2001; Prince, 2007; Brynjolfsson et al., 2009; Forman et al., 2009; Choi
and Bell, 2011) and for goods that could be consumed digitally (Sinai and Waldfo-
gel, 2004; Gentzkow, 2007; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011a,d; Seamans and Zhu, 2014;
Sridhar and Sriram, 2015). Forman et al. (2009) aim to explicitly test the applicabil-
ity of Balasubramanian (1998) to the context of online purchasing on Amazon. Using
weekly data on top-selling Amazon books by US city, the paper examines changes
in locally top-selling books when offline stores open (specifically Walmart, Target,
Barnes & Noble, and Borders). The paper shows that when offline stores open, books
that are relatively likely to appear in those stores disproportionately fall out of the top
sellers list. The paper interprets this as evidence of offline transportation costs by con-
sumers of visiting retailers: When a retailer opens nearby, consumers become more
likely to buy books offline. If the retailer is relatively far away, then consumers are
more likely to buy online. A key limitation of this paper is that the data are ranked
sales, rather than actual purchase data. Work with purchase data is more limited,
though Choi and Bell (2011) show similar evidence of online-offline substitution in
the context of online diaper purchasing.
This result of online-offline substitution is not always evident. For multi-channel
retailers, while substitution does occur in many situations, there are particular situa-
tions in which the offline channel enhances the online channel, such as when a brand
is relatively unfamiliar in a location where a new store opens (Wang and Goldfarb,
2017; Bell et al., 2018). In particular, Wang and Goldfarb (2017) examined US sales
at a large clothing retailer with a substantial presence both online and offline. During
the period of study, the retailer substantially expanded the number of offline stores.
Using internal sales data, as well as information on website visits, the analysis com-
pares locations in which sales were high at the beginning of the sample period with
locations in which sales were low. For places that already had high sales, opening an
offline store reduced online purchasing. In these places, online and offline served as
3 Lower transportation costs 271
competing channels, consistent with the prior literature. In contrast, in locations in

which sales were low, the opening of offline stores led to an increase in online sales.
This increase occurred in a variety of product categories, not only those that required
the customer to know whether the clothes fit. The evidence suggests a marketing
communications role for the offline channel.
These results suggest more nuance than simply ‘online is a substitute for offline.’
They suggest some validity to the widespread use among practitioners of the jargon
term ‘omnichannel’ (Verhoef et al., 2015). In particular, while the previous paragraph
summarized a long and careful literature that suggests the arrival of online compe-
tition reduced offline sales – and that new offline competitors reduce online sales –
within a firm the results are more nuanced. The offline store can drive traffic to the
online channel and in doing this it serves two roles: Sales channel and communica-
tions channel. This suggests the possibility that an online store can also drive traffic
to an offline channel – there is a nascent literature that explores this but, as might be
expected, establishing causality is hard.
3.2 Product: How do low transportation costs affect product variety?

In the absence of the online channel, all purchases would be made offline. Each
person would be constrained to purchase the products available locally. As high-
lighted above in the context of the long tail, the online channel provides access to
a much wider variety of products and services. Sinai and Waldfogel (2004) show
that online media enables non-local news consumption. In particular, they show that
digitization makes it relatively easy for African Americans living in primarily white
neighborhoods to read similar news to African Americans living in African Ameri-
can neighborhoods. In addition, digitization makes it relatively easy for whites living
in African American neighborhoods to read similar news to whites living in white
neighborhoods. Similarly, Gandal (2006) shows that online media enables local lan-
guage minorities to read news in their language of choice. Choi and Bell (2011)
document that sales of niche diaper brands are higher online in zipcodes where such
brands are generally not available offline. Low transportation costs enable product
variety, by reducing geographic barriers to distribution. While tastes are spatially
correlated (Blum and Goldfarb, 2006; Quan and Williams, 2018), distribution is not
limited by local tastes. As discussed earlier, Quan and Williams (2018) show that spa-
tially correlated tastes are reflected in offline offerings. This means that the welfare
impact of online product variety is smaller than it might seem if measured by num-
ber of varieties available. Combined, these results suggest that the welfare impact of
increased product variety will disproportionately accrue to people with distinct pref-
erences from their neighbors, what Choi and Bell (2011) call ‘preference minorities’.
This provides an additional layer for interpreting the results of Quan and Williams
(2018). If the welfare impact of increased online variety accrues to local minorities,
then it might indicate a larger benefit than straight utilitarian analysis might sug-
gest.
3.3 Pricing: Does pricing flexibility increase because transportation

costs are near zero?
Low transportation costs constrain online pricing in several ways. First, there is the
competition highlighted above, both between the various online retailers and between
online and offline retailers. Second, one aspect of low online transportation costs
involves the reduced physical effort when consumers are not required to carry items
home from the store. Pozzi (2013) shows that online grocery buyers stockpile more
than offline grocery buyers, purchasing in bulk when a discount appears. This ability
to stockpile further restricts online pricing strategies. Third, it is difficult, though not
impossible, to charge different prices for the same item at different locations; the
media has not treated retailers well who have been caught charging different online
prices to buyers in different locations (even if to match local offline store prices)
(Valentino-Devries et al., 2012; Cavallo, 2017).
3.4 Promotion: What is the role of location in online promotion?

Location matters in online promotion. This is partly because – as mentioned above
– tastes are spatially correlated. In addition, a long sociology literature, at least since
Hampton and Wellman (2003), shows that social networks are highly local. Mar-
keters have long known that word of mouth is perhaps the most effective form of
promotion (Dellarocas, 2003). Online word of mouth has become increasingly im-
portant, as we discuss in the context of verification costs, but offline word of mouth
remains a key tool for promotion even for products sold entirely online. Even though
individuals can communicate with anyone anywhere, much online communication
is between people who live in the same household or work in the same building.
Promotion through local social networks can be effective (Bell and Song, 2007;
Choi et al., 2010). For example, in the context of online crowdfunding of music,
Agrawal et al. (2015) show that local social networks provided early support that
helped promote musicians to distant strangers. There is also suggestive evidence that
online recommendations are more effective if provided by people who live nearby
(Forman et al., 2008). In other words, although the transportation costs for digital
costs are near zero, and the transportation costs for consumers of visiting stores are
reduced, a different type of transportation cost persists. This leads to spatially cor-
related social networks, which in turn leads to spatially correlated word-of-mouth
promotion. While the online word-of-mouth literature has grown rapidly, there is still
little understanding of how online and offline social networks interact. We expect
the quantitative marketing literature to be well placed to address this. As Facebook
and online social network platforms become increasingly important promotion chan-
nels, this gap in understanding limits our ability to design online promotion strate-
gies.
4 Lower tracking costs 273
4 Lower tracking costs

Literatures on search, replication, and transportation all began in the 1990s and were
well established in the early digital marketing literature. More recently, it has become
clear that two additional cost shifts have occurred: Tracking costs and verification
costs have fallen.
It is easy to track digital activity. Tracking is the ability to link an individual’s
behavior digitally across multiple different media, content venues, and purchase con-
texts. Often, information is collected and stored automatically. Tracking enables ex-
tremely fine segmentation, and even personalization (Ansari and Mela, 2003; Murthi
and Sarkar, 2003; Hauser et al., 2014). This has created new opportunities for mar-
keters in promotion, pricing, and product offerings. The effect in placement has been
weaker simply because often there are coordination difficulties between different ver-
tical partners that make tracking harder.
4.1 Promotion: How do low tracking costs affect advertising?

Marketing scholars have been particularly prolific in studying the impact of low
tracking costs on advertising. The improved targeting of advertising through digi-
tal media is perhaps the dominant theme in the online advertising literature (Goldfarb
and Tucker, 2011b; Goldfarb, 2014). Many theoretical models on how digitization
would affect advertising emphasize targeting (Chen et al., 2001; Iyer et al., 2005; Gal-
Or and Gal-Or, 2005; Anand and Shachar, 2009). Much of this work has emphasized
online-offline competition when online advertising is targeted, and the scarcity of ad-
vertising space online and offline (Bergemann and Bonatti, 2011; Athey et al., 2016).
A large empirical literature has explored various strategies for successful target-
ing. Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c) show that targeted banner advertising is effective,
but only as long as it does not take over the screen too much. Targeting works when
it is subtle, in the sense that it has the biggest impact on plain banner ads, relative
to how it increases the effectiveness of other types of ads. Tucker (2014) shows a
related result in the context of social media targeting. Targeting works when it is not
too obvious to the end consumer that an ad is closely targeted.
Other successful targeting strategies include retargeting (to a partial extent) (Lam-
brecht and Tucker, 2013; Bleier and Eisenbeiss, 2015; Johnson et al., 2017a), target-
ing by stage in the purchase funnel (Hoban and Bucklin, 2015), time between ad
exposures (Sahni, 2015), search engine targeting (Yao and Mela, 2011), and target-
ing using information on mobile devices (Bart et al., 2014; Xu et al., 2017). In each
case, digitization facilitates targeting and new opportunities for advertising.
In addition to better targeting, better tracking enables the measurement of adver-
tising effectiveness (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011b). Early attempts to measure banner
advertising effectiveness included Manchanda et al. (2006) and Rutz and Bucklin
(2012). Tracking makes it relatively straightforward to identify which customers see
ads, to track purchases, and to randomize advertising between treatment and control
groups. More generally, prior to the diffusion of the internet, advertising measure-
ment has relied on aggregate correlations (with the exception of a small number of
expensive experiments such as Lodish et al., 1995).
Perhaps the clearest result of the increased ability to run advertising experiments
because of better tracking is the finding that correlational studies of advertising ef-
fectiveness are deeply flawed. For example, Lewis et al. (2011) use data from banner
ads on Yahoo to show the existence of a type of selection bias that they label ‘activity
bias’. This occurs because users who are online at the time an advertisement is shown
are disproportionately likely to undertake other online activities, including those used
as outcome measures in advertising effectiveness studies. They show activity bias by
comparing a randomized field experiment to correlational individual-level analysis.
Measured advertising effectiveness is much lower in the experimental setting. One
interpretation of this result would be to treat correlational analysis as an upper bound
on the effectiveness of advertising. Gordon et al. (2019) demonstrate that this is not
correct, and instead it is best to treat correlational analysis as having no useful infor-
mation for measuring advertising effectiveness in the context they study. They exam-
ine a series of advertising field experiments on Facebook. Consistent with Lewis et
al. (2011), they show that correlational analysis fails to measure advertising effective-
ness properly. Importantly, they show that sometimes correlational analysis underes-
timates the effectiveness of an advertisement. Schwartz et al. (2017) demonstrate the
usefulness of reframing experimental design as a multi-armed bandit problem.
Measurement challenges extend beyond the need to run experiments. Ideally, ad-
vertising effectiveness would be measured based on the increase in long term profits
caused by advertising. Given the challenge in measuring long term profits, research
has focused on various proxies for advertising success. For example, in measuring
the effectiveness of banner advertising, Goldfarb and Tucker (2011c) used data from
thousands of online advertising campaigns and randomized advertising into treatment
and control groups. The analysis delivered on the promise of better measurement, but
the outcome measure was far from a measure of long term profits. In order to get
a systematically comparable outcome measure across many campaigns, the paper
used the stated purchase intent of people who took a survey after having randomly
allocated into seeing the advertisement or seeing a public service announcement.
Advertising effectiveness was measured as the difference in stated purchase intent
between the treatment and control groups. This is a limited measure of effectiveness
in at least two ways. First, only a small fraction of those who saw the ads (whether
treatment or control) are likely to take the survey and so the measure is biased to
the type of people who take online surveys. Second, purchase intent is different from
sales (which in turn is different from long term profits).
In our view, for the purpose of comparing the effectiveness of different types of
campaigns, this measure worked well. We were able to show that contextually tar-
geted advertising increases purchase intent compared to other kinds of advertising,
and that obtrusive advertising works better than plain advertising. Furthermore, we
found that ads that were both targeted and obtrusive lifted purchase intent less than
ads that were either targeted or obtrusive but not both. At the same time, this mea-
sure would not be useful for measuring the return on advertising investment or for
determining the efficient allocation of advertising spending.
To address questions like these, subsequent research has built new tools for mea-
suring actual sales. Lewis and Reiley (2014) link online ads to offline sales using
internal data from Yahoo! and a department store. The paper linked online user pro-
files to the loyalty program of the department store using email addresses. With this
measure, they ran a field experiment on 1.6 million users that showed that online ad-
vertising increases offline sales in the department store. While still not a measure of
long term profits, this outcome measure is more directly related to the true outcome of
interest. This came at the cost of challenges in comparing across types of campaigns
and across categories.
This study was possible because the research was conducted by scholars working
in industry. Such industry research has been important in developing better mea-
sures of outcomes, as well as more effective experimentation. Other examples include
Lewis and Nguyen (2015), who show spillovers from display advertising to con-
sumer search; Johnson et al. (2017a), who provide a substantially improved method
for identifying the control group in the relevant counterfactual to firms that choose
not to advertise; and Johnson et al. (2017a), who examine hundreds of online display
ad campaigns to show that they have a positive effect on average.
Even in the presence of experiments and reliable outcome measures, Lewis and
Rao (2015) show that advertising effects are relatively low powered. In other words,
the effect of seeing one banner ad once on an eventual purchase is small. It is mean-
ingful and can deliver a positive return on investment, but demonstrating that requires
a large number of observations. Johnson et al. (2017b) show that better controls can
increase the power of the estimated effects, though this effect is modest. In addi-
tion, they found that careful experimental design and sample selection can lead to a
substantial boost in power.
In general, given these findings, advancing the literature poses some challenges
for marketing scholars. This is because it appears increasingly necessary, given the
high variance of advertising effectiveness and small effect sizes, to work with mar-
keting platforms to calibrate effects. This need is magnified because of the use of
advertising algorithms in these platforms which make understanding a counterfactual
problematic (Eckles et al., 2018). It is unlikely that advertising platforms would en-
courage researchers to study newer issues facing their platforms such as algorithmic
bias (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2018) or the spread of misinformation through advertis-
ing (Chiou and Tucker, 2018).
This is important because some of the biggest research questions that are open in
digital marketing communications are no longer simply about advertising effective-
ness. Instead, there are now large policy issues about the consequences of the ability
to track and target consumers in this way. An example of the challenges facing the
online targeting policy debate, is the extent to which regulators should be worried
about advertising that is deceptive or distortionary. Though there has been much dis-
cussion about the actions of firms such as Cambridge Analytica that use Facebook
data to target political ads, as of yet there has been limited discussion in marketing
about the issues of deceptive uses of targeting. Again, we expect this will be a fruitful
avenue of research.
4.2 Pricing: Do lower tracking costs enable novel forms of price

discrimination?
Low tracking costs can enable new ways to price discriminate. Early commentators
on the impact of digitization emphasized this potential (Shapiro and Varian, 1998;
Smith et al., 2001; Bakos, 2001). Tracking means that firms can observe customer be-
havior and keep tabs on customers over time. This enables behavioral price discrimi-
nation (see Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2012) and Fudenberg and Villas-Boas (2007)
for reviews). This literature emphasizes how identifying previous customers affects
pricing strategy and profitability (Villas-Boas, 2004; Shin and Sudhir, 2010; Chen
and Zhang, 2011). While digital price discrimination has received a great deal of at-
tention in the theory literature, empirical support is limited. Other examples of online
price discrimination include Celis et al. (2014) and Seim and Sinkinson (2016).
Perhaps the best example is Dube and Misra (2017), who document that target-
ing many prices to different customers can be profitable in the context of an online
service. This paper relies on a large scale field experiment to learn the optimal price
discrimination policy. It then demonstrates that the learned policy outperforms other
pricing strategies, using an experiment. In other words, the paper demonstrates the
opportunity in price targeting and convincingly shows it works in a particular context
using experimental design.
One area where we have seen high levels of price discrimination is online ad-
vertising. Individual-level tracking means that there are thousands of advertisements
to price to millions of consumers. Price discrimination is feasible but price discov-
ery is difficult. As a consequence, digital markets typically use auctions to determine
prices for advertising. Auctions facilitate price discovery when advertisements can
be targeted to individuals based on their current and past behavior.
In the 1990s, online advertising was priced according to a standard rate in dollars
(or cents) per thousand impressions. Early search engine Goto.com was the first to
recognize that an auction could be used to price discriminate in search advertising.
Rather than a fixed price per thousand on the search page, prices could vary by search
term. Today, both search and display advertising run on this insight, and a large lit-
erature has explored various auction formats for online advertising (Varian, 2007;
Edelman et al., 2007; Levin and Milgrom, 2010; Athey and Ellison, 2011; Zhu and
Wilbur, 2011; Arnosti et al., 2016). As long as an auction is competitive, the platform
is able to price discriminate with much more detail than before. While this might
generate more efficient advertising in the sense that the highest bidder values the ad-
vertisement the most, it also may enable the platform to capture more of the surplus
from advertising. In other words, by enabling better price discrimination, advertising
auctions likely lead to the familiar welfare effects of price discrimination between
buyers and sellers, in this case the buyers and sellers of advertising. The impact on
consumer welfare is ambiguous and likely depends on the particular way in which
advertising enters the utility function.
4.3 Product: How do markets where the customer’s data is the

‘product’ lead to privacy concerns?
Tracking is an opportunity for marketers to segment. It also creates privacy concerns.
Therefore, low tracking costs have led to a resurgence of policy interest in privacy.
A core question in the privacy literature is whether privacy is an intermediate good
that is only valuable because it affects consumers indirectly (such as through higher
prices) or whether privacy a final good that is valued in and of itself (Farrell, 2012).
The theoretical literature has focused on privacy as an intermediate good (Taylor,
2004; Acquisti and Varian, 2005; Hermalin and Katz, 2006), while policy discus-
sions often emphasize privacy as a final good. Research outside of marketing such
as Acquisti et al. (2013, 2015) have argued that this discussion has been complicated
by inconsistent behavior of consumers towards their desires for privacy – leading to
a privacy paradox – where consumers behave in a way which contradicts their stated
preferences (Athey et al., 2017a).
Many examples of privacy regulation have been aimed at marketers. Such regu-
lation limits what marketers can do with data. It affects the nature and distribution
of outcomes (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2012). For example, European privacy regula-
tion in the early 2000s substantially reduced the effectiveness of online advertising
in Europe (Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011e). Assuming that opt-in policies mean that
fewer users can be tracked, Johnson (2014) builds a structural model to estimate the
financial costs of opt-in privacy policies relative to opt-out. The estimates suggest
that opt-in policies can have substantial financial costs to platforms. While negative
effects of privacy regulation have been shown in a variety of contexts (Miller and
Tucker, 2009, 2011; Goldfarb and Tucker, 2011e; Miller and Tucker, 2018; Johnson
et al., 2017c), firm-implemented policies that protect the privacy of their consumers
can have strongly positive effects (Tucker, 2012, 2014).
Privacy regulation also affects the nature of product market competition (Camp-
bell et al., 2015). It can either constrain the ability of smaller firms to compete
cost-effectively (Campbell et al., 2015), or lead firms to intentionally silo data about
consumers (Miller and Tucker, 2014).
In our view, the empirical privacy literature in marketing is surprisingly sparse.
Marketers have an important role to play in the debate about data flows because we
are among the primary users of data. While there has been some progress on research
with respect to marketing policy, we have little empirical understanding of the strate-
gic challenges that relate to privacy. How should firms balance customer demands for
privacy and the usefulness of data to provide better products? What is the best way
to measure the benefits of privacy to consumers, given that short term measures sug-
gest consumers are often not willing to pay much to protect their privacy, while the
policy debate suggests consumers may care in the longer term? Overall, there are a
number of opportunities for marketing scholars to provide a deeper understanding of
when increased privacy protection will generate strategic advantage. We expect that
one such opportunity will be regulations, such as the EU General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR) which came into effect in May 2018. It was significant as the
first privacy regulation which has had a truly global impact and therefore affects not
just firms within the EU but across the world.
4.4 Placement: How do lower tracking costs affect channel

management?
Lower tracking costs can make it easier for a manufacturer to monitor behavior in
retail channels by tracking prices available online. Israeli (2018) discusses the use-
fulness of minimum advertised pricing restrictions that manufacturers sometimes im-
pose on retailers to reduce downstream price competition. Using a quasi-experimental
setting, the paper demonstrates that easier tracking of online prices makes minimum
advertised pricing policies more effective. Easier tracking enables different levels of
control in channel relationships. We believe there are opportunities for further re-
search in this area, especially in understanding how conflicts over control of digital
technologies affects channel conflict. A recent example of such work is Cao and Ke
(2019), who investigate how channel conflict emerges when it is possible to pinpoint
precisely a pair of eyeballs that may be interested in a particular search query and try
and advertise to them.
5 Reduction in verification costs

Reduced tracking costs have had an additional effect of improving verification. This
was not anticipated in the early literature which emphasized online anonymity. Per-
haps the most familiar verification technology in marketing is the brand (Shapiro,
1983; Erdem and Swait, 1998; Tadelis, 1999; Keller, 2003). The ability to verify on-
line identity and reputation without the need to invest in mass market branding has
affected marketing in a variety of ways. Verification is likely to continue to improve,
with the advent of new digital verification technologies such as blockchain (Catalini
and Gans, 2016).
5.1 Pricing: How willingness to pay is bolstered by reputation

mechanisms
Digital markets involve small players who may be unfamiliar to potential customers.
An estimated 88% of online Visa transactions are with a merchant that the customer
does not visit offline (Einav et al., 2017). While brands do play a role online (Bryn-
jolfsson and Smith, 2000; Waldfogel and Chen, 2006), for small players to thrive,
other verification mechanisms are needed. Online reputation mechanisms reduce the
importance of established brands and enable consumers to trust small online sellers.
Furthermore, Hollenbeck (2018) provides evidence that online reputation mecha-
5 Reduction in verification costs 279
nisms can reduce the importance of offline brands. In particular, the paper demon-
strates that high online ratings lead to higher sales in offline independent hotels. Luca
(2016) finds a similar result for restaurants.
There are many ways that a platform might regulate the behavior of its users. This
includes systems that ban users who behave undesirably. However, the majority of
platforms lean on online ratings systems. In such systems, past buyers and sellers
post ratings for future market participants to see. There is a large literature on the im-
portance of eBay’s online rating system to its success, as well as a variety of papers
that explore potential changes and improvements to that system and their impact on
prices, market outcomes, and willingness to pay (Resnick and Zeckhauser, 2002; Ba
and Pavlou, 2002; Lucking-Reiley et al., 2007; Cabral and Hortacsu, 2010; Hui et al.,
2016). For example, Hui et al. (2016) demonstrate that eBay’s reputation system is
effective in reducing bad behavior on the part of sellers, but it needs to be combined
with eBay’s ability to punish the worst behavior in order to create a successful mar-
ketplace on which small sellers can thrive. Perhaps the key theme of this literature is
that online reputation mechanisms increase willingness to pay and sometimes enable
markets that otherwise would not exist.
5.2 Product: Is a product’s ‘rating’ now an integral product feature?

In addition to enhancing trust and willingness-to-pay, ratings systems provide infor-
mation on product quality. The rating becomes a key feature of a platform. Ratings in-
form consumers about the best products available within the platform, and are there-
fore a key element of the overall product offering. Platforms benefit because rating
information guides consumers to the highest quality products. For example, Cheva-
lier and Mayzlin (2006) demonstrate that positive reviews lead to higher sales in the
context of online retail. Even online identities that are consistent over time but not
connected to a name or home address can influence consumption (Yoganarasimhan,
2012). For some online platforms, such as Yelp, their product is to provide ratings
about offline settings. As noted above, Luca (2016) and Hollenbeck (2018) show that
high online ratings improve sales in offline restaurants and hotels, particularly for in-
dependents. In both cases, the online rating system is a substitute for a widely known
chain brand. Godes and Silva (2012) also show that such ratings have the potential to
exhibit dynamics that reflect real economic effects. This insight is built on by Much-
nik et al. (2013), who document herding in ratings behavior on a news website.
In addition to the idea of a rating system controlled by the platform as being an
integral product feature, organic and digital forms of word-of-mouth are also essen-
tial heuristics that consumers use when making purchase decisions about a product
(Godes and Mayzlin, 2009). Work such as Toubia and Stephen (2013) has also stud-
ied why it is that consumers post word of mouth on platforms such as Twitter, and
has drawn a distinction between the intrinsic and extrinsic utility that consumers de-
rive from posting. Lambrecht et al. (2018), however, suggest that some of the most
attractive potential spreaders of word-of-mouth, people who start memes on social
platforms, are also the most resistant to advertising.
5.3 Placement: How can channels reduce reputation system

failures?
In addition to understanding the successes of reputation systems, a wide literature
has explored when reputation systems fail. A key source of failure is the inability to
verify whether the person doing the online rating actually experienced the product.
Mayzlin et al. (2014) and Luca and Zervas (2016) show evidence that firms seem to
give themselves high ratings while giving low ratings to their competitors. A related
issue is selection bias in who chooses to provide ratings (Nosko and Tadelis, 2015).
Anderson and Simester (2014) show evidence of a related problem: Many review-
ers never purchase the product. They review anyway and these reviews distort the
information available. In response to these and other concerns, platforms regularly
update their reputation systems. For example, Fradkin et al. (2017) document two
experiments made at Airbnb to improve their reputation system. What was striking
about these experiments is that rather than too many ‘fake’ reviews being a problem,
instead here the challenge the platform faced was incentivizing users to give accurate
accounts of negative experiences. This paper established that too much ‘favorable’
opinion can be a problem in such settings.
The existing literature has provided a broad sense of when and how online rep-
utation systems might fail. This suggests new opportunities for scholars focused on
market design. Given the challenges in building online reputation systems, it is im-
portant to carefully model and build systems that are robust to these failures.
5.4 Promotion: Can verification lead to discrimination in how goods

are promoted?
Improved verification technology meant that the early expectations of online
anonymity have not been met. For example, early literature showed that online car
purchases could avoid the transmission of race and gender information, thereby lead-
ing to a reduction of discrimination based on these characteristics (Scott Morton et
al., 2003).
As verification technology has improved, this anonymity has largely disappeared
from many online transactions. This has led to concerns that online identities can be
used to discriminate. For example, when information about race or gender is revealed
online, consumers receive advertisements for different products and may even receive
offers of different prices (Pope and Sydnor, 2011; Doleac and Stein, 2013; Edelman
and Luca, 2014).
One recent example of this has been the question of algorithmic bias in the way
that advertising is distributed – something that has been highlighted by computer sci-
entists (Sweeney, 2013; Datta et al., 2015). In Marketing and Economics, Lambrecht
and Tucker (2018) show that a career ad that was intended to highlight careers in
the STEM fields that was shown to more men than women, did so due to the price
mechanism underlying the distribution of ads. Male eyeballs are cheaper than female
eyeballs, so an ad algorithm that is trying to be cost-effective will show any ad to
fewer women than men.
6 Conclusions 281
This type of apparent algorithmic bias is a surprising consequence of improve-

ments in verification technology. In the past, it was not possible to verify gender
easily. Instead, firms used content to separate out likely gender affiliation – such as
assuming men were more likely to read fishing magazines and women more likely to
read beauty magazines. However, in a digital ecosystem where characteristics such
as gender can be verified, it means that there is now the possibility that inadvertently
our ability to classify gender could lead to perceptions of bias in areas where the
distribution of content in a non-gender-neutral way is problematic.
6 Conclusions
Digital marketing is inherently different to offline marketing due to a reduction of five
categories of costs: Search, reproduction, transportation, tracking, and verification.
In defining the scope of this article, we drew boundaries. We focus on under-
standing the impact of the technology on marketing using an economic perspec-
tive. Therefore, we did not discuss much work written in marketing that focuses
on methodology, such as the statistical modeling in digital environments literature
(Johnson et al., 2004; Moe and Schweidel, 2012; Netzer et al., 2012). We also did not
detail the consumer behavior literature on the effect of digital environments (Berger
and Milkman, 2012; Castelo et al., 2015).
This overview highlights that changes to marketing that result from the change
of costs inherent in the digital context are not as obvious as initial economic models
may imply. Instead, as may be expected, the complexities of both firm and consumer
behavior have led to less than predictable outcomes. It is these less predictable out-
comes which have allowed marketing contexts to inform the economics literature on
the likely effects of digitization outside of marketing.
Going forward, we anticipate the most influential work to fall into one of three
categories. First, there are still many opportunities to unpack the existing models
and identify new complexities in how the drop in search, reproduction, transporta-
tion, tracking, and verification costs affect various aspects of marketing. Many recent
papers fall in this category, including Blake et al. (2015), Simonov et al. (2018a),
Hollenbeck (2018), and Farronato and Fradkin (2018). In the above discussion, we
have highlighted some areas that we see as particularly important topics for future
research.
Second, as policies change, new business models arise, and new technologies
diffuse, there will be opportunities to understand these changes in light of existing
models. Recent papers of this type include Bart et al. (2014), Miller and Tucker
(2018), Lambrecht and Tucker (2018), and Johnson et al. (2017c).
Third, some of the changes brought by digitization and other advances in informa-
tion technology will require recognition of different types of cost changes. Just as the
early internet literature emphasized search, replication, and transportation costs, and
only later were tracking and verification costs recognized as important consequences,
we anticipate technological change to lead to the application of other well-established
models into new contexts. For example, one recent hypothesis is that recent advances
in machine learning can be framed as a drop in the cost of prediction which can be
modeled as a reduction in uncertainty (Agrawal et al., 2018).
For each of these categories, economic theory plays a fundamental role. Search
theory provided much of the initial impetus for the digital marketing literature. It
provided hypotheses on prices, price dispersion, and product variety. Some of these
hypotheses were supported, but others were not. In turn, this generated new models
that could explain the data, and the cycle continued. Models of reproduction costs,
transportation, tracking, and verification played similar roles. This led to a much
deeper understanding of the consequences of digitization on marketing.
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CHAPTER

Handbook of the Economics of Marketing, Volume 1, ISSN 2452-2619, https://doi.org/10.1016/bs.hem.2019.04.004

Digital technology is the representation of information in bits, reducing the costs

1 Reduction in consumer search costs and marketing

1.1 Pricing: Are prices and price dispersion lower online?

1.2 Placement: How do low search costs affect channel

In summary, digital platforms facilitate a reduction in search costs. This creates an

1.3 Product: How do low search costs affect product assortment?

As noted above, search costs can be endogenously chosen by firms. Recommen-

1.4 Promotion: How do low search costs affect advertising?

2 The replication costs of digital goods is zero

2.1 Pricing: How can non-rival digital goods be priced profitably?

2.2 Placement: How do digital channels – some of which are

2.4 Promotion: What is the role of aggregators in promoting digital

3 Lower transportation costs

3.1 Placement: Does channel structure still matter if transportation

competing channels, consistent with the prior literature. In contrast, in locations in

3.2 Product: How do low transportation costs affect product variety?

3.3 Pricing: Does pricing flexibility increase because transportation

3.4 Promotion: What is the role of location in online promotion?

4 Lower tracking costs

4.1 Promotion: How do low tracking costs affect advertising?

4.2 Pricing: Do lower tracking costs enable novel forms of price

4.3 Product: How do markets where the customer’s data is the

4.4 Placement: How do lower tracking costs affect channel

5 Reduction in verification costs

5.1 Pricing: How willingness to pay is bolstered by reputation

5.2 Product: Is a product’s ‘rating’ now an integral product feature?

5.3 Placement: How can channels reduce reputation system

5.4 Promotion: Can verification lead to discrimination in how goods

This type of apparent algorithmic bias is a surprising consequence of improve-

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