Policy Communities and Issue Networks PDF

Policy Communities, Issue Networks and the Formulation of Australian Higher Education
Policy
Author(s): Neil Marshall
Source: Higher Education, Vol. 30, No. 3 (Oct., 1995), pp. 273-293
Published by: Springer
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Higher Education 30: 273-293, 1995.
? 1995 Kluwer Academic Publishers. Printed in the Netherlands.
Policy communities, issue networks and the formulation of

Australian higher education policy
NEIL MARSHALL
Department of Politics, University of New England, Australia
Abstract Governments in most western countries consult extensively with clientele groups in
process of formulating higher education policy. The nature of these consultative mechanisms, in t
influences the manner in which decisions are made, and the substance of policy outcomes. This
explores the changing style of government-interest group interaction in Australia over the decade
94 and how these changes have effected the way policy is determined. It is argued that Austra
gone through three phases over that time. Until 1987 policy was formulated by a stable '
community'. From 1988-90, when a number of major reforms were introduced, this framewor
replaced by a brief period of 'state direction'. During the early 1990s a new environment character
by unstable 'issue networks' emerged.
In Australia, as in most western countries, governments have relied heavily on

assistance of clientele groups in the process of developing higher education po
While this is also true of most other policy sectors, it has been especially the c
relation to higher education. Governments alone have rarely possessed the exper
necessary to manage the specialised and somewhat abstruse activities of
universities. Indeed, the more complex and technical the policy arena, the mo
necessary are extensive consultative arrangements with interest groups (Jordan
Richardson 1987:185; Moon et al. 1986). As far as the universities are concerne
governments need informed and knowledgeable policy advice and have us
developed appropriate mechanisms to ensure that it is available. The nature of t
mechanisms, furthermore, can have a significant influence both on the way po
is formulated and on the substance of policy outcomes.
Over the last decade in Australia the structure of the policy environmen
which government and higher education organisations interact has chang
substantially. Until the mid-1980s elaborate consultative procedures ensured t
the universities and interest groups - which at that time constituted a small
closed policy sector - were closely integrated into decision-making proce
During 1987-88, however, the federal government introduced a series of
reaching reforms which gave ministers much greater direct control over
activities of the universities. The reforms also recast the role of the campuse
terms of the country's economic and industrial requirements. The result of t
reforms has been that the scope and significance of higher education in natio
affairs has increased greatly, and a much more complex and demanding p
milieu has emerged. These developments have had a two-fold effect; on the on
hand they have heightened the government's need for expert policy advice, and
the other they have created an enlarged and vigorous interest group constitu
274
As a consequence, new modes of interaction between government and clientele

bodies have had to evolve.
This article explores the way government-interest group relations in the higher
education policy arena have changed over the period 1985-94 and how these
changes have effected the way policy is made. It examines the various institutional
structures and modes of interaction that have been adopted over that period. In
particular the study identifies the different styles of policy-making that have
emerged, and how those styles have influenced the substance of policy outputs. The
discussion draws on several theoretical perspectives put forward in the policy
communities/issue networks literature to provide a conceptual framework against
which to view the empirical analysis. It is argued that Australian higher education
policy has passed through three phases over the last ten years. First, up to the mid-
1980s, the determination of policy took place largely within what is described as a
'policy community'; a policy environment in which responsibility for decision-
making was shared between government and groups and where policy outputs were
reasonably stable and predictable over time. The second phase began in 1987-88
with the introduction of the government's reform program. The policy community
was replaced by a short period of 'state direction' where the government functioned
largely without the assistance of clientele bodies. This strategy proved to be
untenable in the longer term and gave way - in the early 1990s - to a new style of
interaction which has been termed 'issue networks'. The higher education arena
became filled with a large number of new groups competing for the government's
attention. This has contributed to the development of a relatively unstable
environment and less predictable policy outcomes. A significant feature of the new
landscape has been the growth in the number of transectoral interests becoming
involved in the higher education policy arena. The article concludes with some
observations on the consequences of higher education evolving into a transectoral
policy milieu.
The pre-1987 policy community
Since the late 1970s the concept of the policy community has been used
increasingly by scholars as a useful tool to explore and explain how policy is
actually made in many modem sectoral arenas (Richardson and Jordan 1979; Pross
1986; Jordan 1990a, 1990b; Rhodes and Marsh 1990). Policy communities
correspond roughly to the functional areas of government (such as education, health
and industry) and usually comprise the minister, government agencies, and major
interest groups. They are delineated by clear subject boundaries and membership is
limited to a relatively small number of privileged bodies. A dependency
relationship emerges between participants. Ministers and departments need the
specialist advice, information, support, and legitimation that clientele organisations
can provide. Groups, for their part, require ready access to the machinery of
government The process of policy-making therefore becomes a shared exercise.
'Institutionalised relations' arise between groups and government, 'to facilitate
275
policy-making and implementation' (Jordan 1990b:472). Decisions are arrived at

after a process of accommodation, negotiation and bargaining. Over time the
community evolves its own 'belief systems, codes of conduct and established
patterns of behaviour' (Pross 1986:98). Such an environment tends to be stable and
predictable in operation over time, and policy outputs usually incremental in scope.
This notion of the policy community is a reasonably accurate portrayal of the
manner in which the Australian higher education arena functioned until the mid-
1980s. During this period the focus for policy formulation and implementation
rested with the Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission (CTEC), a
statutory body based on similar principles to Britain's University Grants
Committee. The commission possessed substantial regulatory and administrative
powers; it was expected to coordinate the development of the universities and
colleges, make recommendations to the government on the level of funding
required by institutions, and to distribute the moneys subsequently allocated by
cabinet. To carry out these duties the commission aggregated the demands and
requirements of higher education and shaped them into coherent proposals for the
minister.
Despite the considerable authority that CTEC wielded in the higher education
sector, it was not in a position to act of its own accord. Though the universities and
colleges were almost entirely dependent upon the Commonwealth for funds,
constitutional responsibility for these institutions rested with the states. The
universities also enjoyed a high degree of individual autonomy. In addition, it was
desirable for CTEC to have the public support of such peak associations as the
Australian Vice-Chancellors' Committee (AVCC) and the Australian Committee of
Directors and Principals (ACDP) (the organisation representing the chief executive
of the colleges of advanced education), and the academic staff associations.
Consequently, the development of higher education policy was a joint
responsibility, requiring the effective cooperation of the Commonwealth (through
CTEC), state authorities, the campuses themselves, and other established groups.
The means to achieve this cooperation were set out in the commission's enacting
legislation which required it to undertake regularised consultation with affected
parties. The procedure that emerged embraced a triennial planning cycle which
ensured that all relevant interest were included in the policy making process (TEC
1979:29)
The triennial consultative mechanism was a complex and cumbersome exercise.
It did, however, manage to accommodate the conflicting interests of groups and to
reconcile tensions inherent within the system. That it succeeded in doing so was
due in part to three important factors. First, there was a close rapport between
members of the higher education community. Bodies such as the AVCC, ACDP,
and the academic staff unions communicated regularly with each other. Interaction
was facilitated by a commonality of background and an underlying commitment to
academic values. These attributes fostered the 'operating understandings' that
Richardson and Jordan refer to (1979:100). A second factor was the way in which
policy was processed. Decision-making mechanisms were broadly collegiate in
style; issues were canvassed exhaustively with all arguments being openly and
276
carefully considered before a final position was adopted. While changes in the
direction of policy were usually marginal - with the outcome often being the lowest
common denominator - they enjoyed a high degree of consensual support. Finally,
the community functioned as a relatively autonomous and self-contained arena.
Outside interference was minimal. This situation provided for a stable environment
within which participants were able develop appiopriate policy-making procedures
(Marshall 1990).
Overall, the higher education policy milieu incorporated many of the
characteristics of the classic conception of a policy community. Though CTEC
constituted the dominant force within the system and exerted the greatest influence
over the course of events, critical decisions were essentially the result of
cooperative effort. Policy-making tended to be a slow and time-consuming
business. Mutual adjustment and compromise between the major participants were
pervasive activities. Yet this framework also ensured a high degree of continuity
and coherence of operation, and reasonable certainty over future directions. The
system as a whole, Harman observed, generally worked 'remarkably well' (Harman
1984: 514)).
The policy community, however, came to an abrupt end during 1987-88. The
newly appointed Minister for Employment Education and Training, John Dawkins,
extensively reformed the higher education arena and brought the univerisities under
direct government control. These reforms were part of the Labor government's
broader economic rationalist agenda after it came to office in 1983. During
1984-86 the government implemented a number of policies aimed at deregulating
the economy, fostering a more competitive industrial base, and encouraging
Australian business to seek export markets. In the public sector, the
Commonwealth restructured its bureaucracy to develop a leaner, more efficient
organisational format which incorporated performance management strategies
(Pusey 1992). The higher education reforms were intended to complement these
measures by gearing the activities of the universities more closely to commercial
requirements. In particular institutions were perceived as being able to contribute to
national goals in three respects. First, they could inject larger numbers of
appropriately skilled graduates into the workforce to improve productivity and
international competitiveness. Second, the research capacities of campuses could be
harnessed more closely to industry needs, and third, campuses should be subjected
to greater finmancial accountability.
These goals were to be achieved through a number of interrelated strategies
which were set out in two documents: the Green paper (Dawkins 1987) and a later
White Paper (Dawkins 1988). To enhance ministerial authority over the functions
of campuses, CTEC was dismantled and most of its regulatory and administrative
powers transferred to the recently created Department of Employment, Education
and Training (DEET). A new statutory body with an advisory role only - the
Higher Education Council - was set up in the commission's place. The binary
divide that separated the colleges from the universities was removed and all
campuses treated on an equal footing. Campuses were to negotiate an 'educational
profile' with DEET which would set out the mission and objectives of each
277
institution. These profile negotiations provided the medium through which the
Commonwealth could pursue national goals in terms of student enrolments in
particular fields of study. Funding for research was separated from operating grants
and provided to individual institutions on a competitive basis through a central
body (the Australian Research Council). Amalgamations between institutions were
required to ensure economies of scale. Further efficiencies in operation were to be
sought through the introduction of more flexible staffing policies. In addition, all
campuses were encouraged to foster closer linkages with industry and the broader
community, develop an entrepreneurial outlook which would help reduce their
dependence on Commonwealth funding, and orientate themselves towards market
requirements.
State direction
The Implementation of Dawkins' reforms changed completely the nature of the

higher education policy landscape. Responsibility for the determination and
direction of policy became almost entirely a ministerial affair. Interest groups
which had previously been closely involved in policy formulation found
themselves with little influence over the course of events. There were several
reasons underlying this outcome.
First, the cooperative approach to decision-making that had existed under the old
policy community structure was dissolved. The demise of CTEC and the transfer of
its regulatory and administrative functions to DEET gave the government direct
control over the manner in which funding was distributed to campuses. With the
commission's removal the focus of the community's interaction, as well as the
regularised consultative framework, was lost.
In the absence of CTEC as an intermediary, interest groups were forced to
develop their own means of interfacing with the government if they were to
adequately represent their constituencies. This was a task that fell most heavily
upon the AVCC which was expected to adopt a position of leadership in the new
order. For all groups the transition posed real difficulties. DEET was one of a
number of 'mega-departments' created in 1987 and structured on managerialist
principles (Pusey 1992). The new corporate ethos brought with it different
bureaucratic expectations; groups were required to talk the language of economic
rationalism and understand how to use quantitative indicators in the presentation of
their arguments. To add to these difficulties, most groups had only limited
resources and skills at their disposal. During the CTEC years elaborate support
bases had been unnecessary. Under Dawkins, however, it was clear that interests
would have to be backed by much more sophisticated and professional
organisational structures if they were to have an effective input into the policy
process.
In addition to changing the format of the higher education sector, the substance
of Dawkins' reforms also succeeded in undermining the cohesion of the groups that
had participated in the old policy community. In the wake of the Green and White
278
papers, divisions rapidly sprouted, both between the two employers' associations,
and between the employers' associations and the unions. In the case of the
employers' associations, the ACDP and the AVCC adopted quite different
responses to the government's policy intentions. With the removal of the binary
system the college principals stood to gain greatly in terms of new research
opportunities, increased funding, and higher status. The ACDP therefore threw its
unconditional support behind Dawkins. The AVCC, on the other hand, was much
more qualified in its approach to the reforms (AVCC 1988). It expressed concern
that the thrust of the Green and White papers had the potential to erode institutional
autonomy and undermine the quality of teaching. During 1988-89 disagreements
between the two bodies often erupted into unedifying public disputes. The chief
executives of the nation's tertiary institutions were thus unable to present a united
front to the government on many critical issues. It was a situation that Dawkins was
happy to exploit at time by playing the two groups off against each other (Hambly
1992:7)
The reform process also unravelled the previously close relationship between the
AVCC and the academic unions. In the period before 1986 questions relating to
remuneration and conditions of pay were determined through an academic salaries
tribunal that adopted a broadly collegial approach to the resolution of such matters
(O'Brien 1993:214). By 1986, however, higher education had been designated as
an 'industry' and both the AVCC and the unions became subject to the jurisdiction
of the Federal Industrial Relations Act. Under the new arrangements the vice-
chancellors were required to enter into advocacy and negotiation with the unions
and to implement agreed awards. This development replaced the previous collegial
approach to the resolution of staffing issues with an adversarial one (Smith 1992).
Though industrial registration predated the higher education reforms, it was not
until the tabling of the Green paper that serious contention between the AVCC and
the unions arose. The Green paper (Dawkins 1987: Chp 7) and the White paper
(Dawkins 1988: Chp 10) proposed substantial changes to the nature of academic
appointments, staff assessment, salary flexibility, and dismissal procedures.
Acceptance of these changes, which were intended to produce an improvement in
productivity, was sought by the government in return for salary increases. The
unions strongly opposed the Green paper proposals while the AVCC supported
them (though probably under some pressure from Dawkins). The dispute drove
such a wedge between the two groups that by mid-1988 the union executive
commented that:
Relations with the employers on the industrial front have become increasingly acrimonious, and the
previous general alliance with the Vice-Chancellors on broad education policy issues has been
substantially weakened (FAUSA 1988).
The alliance never recovered. There has been little formal contact between the
groups since, with industrial relations continuing to be the major issue of
contention.
A third factor that contributed to the weakness of groups in the higher education
arena was that the minister and his department provided only limited opportunities
279
for interests to consult with the government. For the academic staff unions, not only
was access to the minister very difficult to obtain, but the actual outcomes of
discussions also proved disappointing (see for example Hall 1989). The AVCC met
more frequently with Dawkins and from time to time succeeded in gaining
concessions. But the committee's impact on government thinking was relatively
minor and had little effect on the broader thrust of the reform program. At one point
the president of the committee, in some frustration, 'challenged the federal
government to consult universities on where they should be heading instead of
dictating their future through funding' (West 1989). The Vice-Chancellor of the
University of Sydney, for his part, observed that:
By and large, communication between the minister and the universities is being carried out through the
pages of the Higher Education Supplement which has become something of an academic graffiti wall
(McNicol 1989).
Certainly the minister did not really need serious clientele involvement at this
stage and could afford to largely ignore them. His major objective was to set in
place the structural framework of the reform program and DEET's resources were
more than adequate for this purpose.
By 1988-89, therefore, the nature of the higher education policy environment
had changed dramatically from that of the closely integrated policy community.
The government had moved into a dominant position in relation to other
participants in the domain. Group representation in the arena had become
fragmented and largely ineffectual. In Dawkins, by contrast, the government
possessed a determined minister who was supported by a bureaucracy that was in
control of substantial financial and regulatory powers. A policy sector bearing such
characteristics closely resembles Atkinson's and Coleman's model of 'state
direction'; a period in which the government is largely free of interest group
constraints and enjoys a high degree of autonomy over the direction of policy
development (Atkinson and Coleman 1989:80-87). 'The policy-administrative
style' they suggest, 'is one of managerial directive followed by a polite briefing'
(1989:87). This period of state direction lasted for some two years from 1988-90.
The government's dominance of the higher education arena, however, could not
be sustained in the longer term. The reason for this was that after about 1990 the
substance of the reform program itself began to create a new policy environment
which required the government to seek the assistance of clientele groups. While
DEET's resources were adequate to set in place the mechanisms required to
implement the reform program, they proved insufficient to cope with the longer-
term policy issues created by the Green and White papers. The reforms opened up
the universities and exposed them to new demands, such as meeting industry needs
in teaching and research, and new activities, such as competing with each other to
market courses to fee-paying postgraduate and overseas students. The higher
education landscape that emerged as a result of these developments subsequently
altered the balance of power between the government and clientele interests. Two
major factors contributed to this outcome. First, DEET discovered that it lacked the
expertise and resources to manage such a diverse and complex policy environment
280
and was forced to turn to specialist groups for advice. Second, the extent and nature
of the changes mobilised a new range of group interests which sought to influence
the direction of policy. These two issues are taken up in the following sections.
Lack of bureaucratic expertise
During 1988-90 DEET was preoccupied with setting in place the financial and
administrative structures which underpinned the reforms. These were Dawkins'
dominant concerns in the higher education sector at this time and his department
possessed the necessary in-house managerial skills to handle their implementation.
By 1990, however, the structural framework had been largely settled and broader
policy issues - arising from the reforms - began to assume greater prominence. It
was in this arena that the department's weaknesses became apparent.
Indeed, from the time it was established, DEET was widely perceived as lacking
the expertise necessary to tackle the substantive dimension of higher education
policy. Many of the staff employed by CTEC up to 1987 had been dispersed
following that body's abolition and much of the accumulated knowledge built up
over the years was therefore lost. The Green and White papers, which were
prepared by DEET, were strongly criticised by academics for relying on assertion
rather than evidence, and for demonstrating an unsophisticated appreciation of the
nature of the higher education environment (see Bourke 1988; Williams 1988;
Stretton 1989). The inexperience of DEET personnel, their limited understanding of
the organisational culture of the universities, and the unwillingness of the
department to consult, resulted in inadequate policy development and
implementation in a number of areas. One such example was the White paper's
proposal to 'clawback' a significant proportion of institutions' operating grants and
place them in a competitive pool within the Australian Research Council (Dawkins
1988:83). Condemnation of this proposal was so widespread that Dawkins was
forced to set up an inquiry into the issue. The inquiry subsequently confirmed
academic concerns by indicating that the clawback was 'potentially damaging' to
the universities' research infrastructure (Smith 1989:96) and recommended a
substantial injection of funds to rectify the problem. The report also suggested
strongly to the government that in future it consult more widely with informed
interests before taking major decisions; 'it is imperative that effective two-way
communications systems between the higher education research community and
government exist, are used, and are seen to be used' (Smith 1989:112).
Another example of DEET's apparent inability to administer effectively the
university sector occurred during 1990-91 when many campuses experienced
serious student ovetemiolment problems. This situation resulted in overcrowding
and deteriorating standards. The minister's initial response was to blame
institutional management and refused to take any immediate action. A report by an
independent state statutory authority, however, dispelled the 'myth' that
overenrolments were the fault of the universities. Rather, the problem was due to
Commonwealth underfunding for infratructure and the implementation of
281
contradictory regulatory policies. The report pointed forcefully to 'a need for a
more structured approach to consultation' and implied that had this taken place
earlier, the extent of overenrolments could have been minimised (VPSEC 1991:51).
The consequence of DEET's inability to adequately address complex, critical
issues in the higher education policy arena was that during the 1990s it was forced
increasingly to seek the assistance of clientele interests (DEET 1992:Chp 4). These
groups, as is discussed below, had grown in sophistication and became increasingly
vital sources of information to the department. In some cases, where no suitable
group existed, DEET created one. For example, when the department was
embarrassed by the collapse of a number of privately run English language colleges
for overseas students (the result of government policy), it provided $100,000 to
establish the Australian Council for Private Education and Training. The new body
assists the department with the administration and regulation of the colleges and
acts as a source of information (Juddery 1993). The Higher Education Council and
the Australian Research Council were originally created to provide specialist advice
to DEET and have proved to be vital sources of support for the department. Yet it is
clear that to fulfill their functions, the two councils themselves must consult widely
with interest groups before making recommendations (for example see NBEET
1993: 61,72-73).
Though DEET's understanding of, and familiarity with, the higher education
arena has improved since 1988/90, the department has nevertheless been unable to
develop the depth of organisational expertise needed to administer effectively the
university sector during the 1990s. A major reason for this has been that the
managerialist ethos underpinning the Australian Public Service encourages a high
degree of mobility on the part of its senior officers (Pusey 1992). Promotion
requirements, and the need to foster broadly generic management skills, has meant
that officers have not stayed long enough in higher education to become policy
specialists. This deficiency has become an issue in a number of quarters (for
example, Hambly 1993:8). By 1994 the Higher Education Council had become so
concerned at the extent of this problem that it pointed out to the government that:
efficient and effective management of the [higher education] program is dependent on a pool of
knowledge and experience that can only come through longstanding association with the program and
through regular interactions with the sector (HEC 1994:3).
Instability within the department has also been accentuated by the high turnover of
ministers. Over the five years 1990-94 there have been four different ministers
(Dawkins handed the portfolio to a junior minister in 1990). This situation has
eroded continuity of policy development.
The government, therefore has not been able to sustain the highly directive
stance taken by Dawkins in the immediate wake of the reforms, and since 1990 has
moved to adopt a far more conciliatory role towards higher education interests.
This process began with Peter Baldwin, Dawkins' successor, who recognised the
need to build a more constructive relationship with the sector (Baldwin 1991). A
further factor underlying the government's willingness to consult more widely was
the emergence of a new and sophisticated group environment.
282
The new group environment
By the early 1990s a considerable change had taken place in the nature of the group
environment. First, the established interests - those existing before 1987 - had
rebuilt their organisational structures and adapted to the changed expectations for
negotiating with government and bureaucracy. In the case of the AVCC, the
committee reconstructed its operational base after merging with the ACDP in late
1991. By that time most of the colleges of advanced education had either
transformed into universities themselves or been absorbed into existing institutions.
The expanded committee quickly set about acquiring new personnel and
developing its policy advising capacity. Staff and student unions subjected
themselves to much the same process. Most importantly, these groups experienced
a period of organisational adjustment during which they learned to incorporate the
logic and rhetoric of economic rationalism into their lobbying strategies. The
AVCC's first major policy statement after its merger, for example, defended
traditional academic values but at the same time carefully emphasised the
interdependence of the universities with industrial and economic development
(AVCC 1992a). The ability to present policy proposals in such a framework
certainly enhanced communication with public sector decision-makers. (In this
regard Dawkins' efforts to reorient the higher education sector towards an
economic perspective have been quite successful. In order to gain access to
government, interest groups were forced to modify their positions and accept the
legitimacy of economic goals and market principles).
Second, the opening-up of the higher education policy arena resulted in greater
diversification of activity and complexity of function for the univeristies. This, in
turn, led to the emergence - and influx - of a number of new group interests which
had either previously not existed, or not been involved in the university sphere. The
range of interest groups that had arisen by the 1990s, and which sought
involvement in the development of policy relating to the universities, can be
divided broadly into three categories; the sectoral associations, specialist higher
education interests, and the transectoral groups1.
Sectoral associations
The major distinguishing charactersitic of these groups is that they focus on the
broad spectrum of higher education policy and will seek to put forward a view on
most issues that affect the universities. The campuses themselves may be placed in
this category for they bear the brunt of government decision-making and will often
lobby the minister or bureaucracy in an individual capacity. The bulk of lobbying
on institutional matters, however, is conducted by the AVCC, the academic staff
unions, and the student unions.
The AVCC is the peak body representing the vice-chancellors and enjoys a high
profile in the political arena. The committee is a major source of advice to the
government through its provision of well-researched and comprehensive policy
283
proposals (see for example AVCC 1992a, 1993, 1994). In addition, the vice-
chancellors also perform a number of quasi-regulatory functions and carry out
several administrative and infrastructure services. The committee's great political
strength lies in the fact that its members are the gatekeepers of the university
system; it is best positioned to both aggregate the views of institutions and to
legitimise the implementation of government policy. There is little question that the
AVCC is the most influential of the higher education interest groups and enjoys a
close relationship with the minister and bureaucracy. The extent of its influence is
weakened, however, by internal divisions within the committee that prevent it
achieving a united stance on some critical issues (Marshall 1995:53-55).
The academic and student unions, similarly, have re-emerged as significant
sectoral players. Until 1993 there were two organisations representing the interests
of university staff (in that year they amalgamated to form the National Tertiary
Education Union). The opinions of these two bodies were sought by DEET, the
Higher Education Council and the Australian Research Council on a range of
issues, and they have been invited to sit on several short-term policy committees
dealing with specific matters. It is in the industrial sphere that the unions have
concentrated their attention, and on this front they have clearly won a number of
important gains (Chapman 1993). Attempts by both organisation to come to grips
with broader issues arising in the sector (for example FAUSA/UACA 1993),
however, have met with less success. Their lack of effectiveness in this regard may
be attributable to low membership levels (they represent only about 40% of total
academic staff) and, as a result, their relatively limited financial support. By
contrast, membership of the student unions is compulsory for all undergraduates
and postgraduates. Consequently the National Union of Students and the Council of
Australian Postgraduate Associations have captive constituencies and are highly
representative organisations. The two groups are reasonably well resourced, have
produced quite sophisticated and wide-ranging policy documents in recent years
(CAPA 1994), and are taken seriously by DEET and the minister. Nevertheless, the
focus and impact of both groups has been dissipated by conflicting demands from
within their diverse student constituencies, and by the constant in-fighting that
seems to be a characteristic of student politics.
Specialist higher education interests
In addition to the established sectoral associations, a host of other entities populate

the higher education arena. Many of these groups formed in the wake of the
government's reforms to defend and support the more specialised interests within
the sector. They include such bodies as; the Committee of Pro-Vice-Chancellors of
Research, the Deans of Humanities, professional and disciplinary associations, the
Graduate Careers Council of Australia, the Australian Technology Network (which
comprises the universities of technology), and an informal group consisting of the
traditional research universities. Many of these bodies have only a small secretariat
and lack the resources and experience of the established groups. They do, however,
284
possess expertise and status and can be very influential in relation to particular
issues, especially where highly specialised or technical knowledge is required.
Most of these groups choose to adopt a low public profile and often prefer to
express their views through submissions to inquiries. When necessary they can
usually gain access to relevant officials and will, on occasions, resort to the media
to get their point across.
Transectoral groups
These groups are located in other policy sectors but have crossed boundaries to
become involved with higher education. One of the consequences of the
government's reform program - oriented as it was towards gearing the universities
to national economic considerations - was that it broke down the barriers between
higher education and almost every other policy sector. Growth in the number of full
fee-paying overseas students, for example, pushed campuses into the area of
international trade. Entrepreneurial initiatives have created new forms of linkages
with industry. Expanded and more diverse research programs have embraced other
science organisations as well as business. Increased enrolments of undergraduates
has had implications for schooling and technical education.
Such developments have attracted a multitude of related interest groups with a
new found stake in the universities, as well as a large number of Commonwealth
departments and statutory bodies. As Kim Beazley, Baldwin's successor as
Minister for Employment, Education and Training, commented:
The fact of the matter is, the [higher] education system is absolutely critical to every conceivable area of
human endeavour in this country. There are always going to be, as a result of that, views in other
departments about what is going to be done with it (Juddery 1993b).
Determination of policy in relation to overseas students may involve the

Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, the Department of Finance, and the
Department of Immigration as well as the Industries Commission and AUSTRADE
(both these latter are Commonwealth statutory bodies). Industry matters will be of
concern to the Department of Industry, Technology and Science, the Australian
Council of Trade Unions, and the peak business groups: the Metal Trades
Industries Association, the Business Council of Australia, and the Confederation of
Australian Industry. In addition, more specialised bodies and state authorities may
become involved. Indeed, all these organisations - to specify a few - have been
drawn into the higher education arena in one form or another since 1988. As with
the specialist university lobbies, transectoral groups are usually only interested in
aspects of higher education policy. Rarely are broader issues of concern.
The most salient of the transectoral participants are the peak business
associations and other industry bodies. Their support has clearly been critical to
defining and implementing many of the objectives underpinning the reform
program. Consequently, the views expressed by such groups - though usually
limited to particular concerns - receive careful consideration from the government.
285
The vice-chancellors, for their part, have sought to benefit from the privileged role
enjoyed by the business lobbies (and perhaps also to contain it) by forming a cross-
sectoral alliance in relation to some matters. This was achieved in 1990 with the
establishment of the Australian Business/Higher Education Round Table (Hutton
1993).
New and widespread group activity has therefore sprouted in the higher
education arena during the early 1990s. The environment that has evolved,
however, bears almost no similarity to the pre-1987 policy community. Its
characteristics and modus operandi are quite different. Rather, the nature of
interaction between participants in this environment bears some resemblance to the
concept of 'issue networks'.
The nature of group interaction: Issue network
Issue networks was a term used by Heclo (1978) to describe the nature of the
American policy environment as it was emerging in the late 1970s. The concept has
since been taken up and elaborated upon by other scholars in the context of
different polities (Jordan 1981, 1990; Rhodes and Marsh 1992; Jordan and
Schubert 1992). Heclo argued that the growth in the scope and complexity of
government, the disintegration of policy boundaries, and the mobilisation of new
group interests had undermined the traditional channels of negotiation between
political actors, bureaucracy and established interest groups. Policy sectors lose
their overall sense of cohesion and dissolve into a series of issues around which
specialised interests cluster. Issue networks then develop. Heclo defined an issue
network as 'a shared knowledge group having to do with some aspect (or, as
defined by the network, some problem) of public policy' (1978:103).
There are many issue networks, often overlapping, with indistinct and fluid
boundaries. Networks differ substantively from policy communities in so far as
there are usually large numbers of participants involved rather than a clearly
defined and limited collection of established groups and political/bureaucratic
actors. Power and influence are unequally distributed among network participants
for some are better resourced, and enjoy easier access to decision-making, than
others. The relative influence of participants, along with the composition of the
network, may change as circumstances alter and/or the issue is redefined.
Moreover, there is little in the way of consensus or common values on the part of
participants 'because there is no shared understanding either among interests or
between the interests and the bureaucracy' (Rhodes and Marsh 1992:187). Instead,
there is conflict and competition between opposing interests.
Fragmentation, Jordan has pointed out (1981:96), is the key feature which
differentiates such an enviroment from that of the segmented format of the policy
community. Fragmentation, in turn, is conducive to uncertainty of process and,
consequently, unpredictablity of policy outcomes. This situation contrasts to the
longer-term stability of the policy community and relative predictability of its
decision-making procedures.
286
The concept of issue networks provides a useful tool for desribing the nature of
the Australian higher education milieu in the 1990s. The higher education arena
could be said to consist of a number of closely related and overlapping issue
networks. When a relevant policy issue arises, affected groups and authorities, with
varying degrees of commitment, quickly become involved (individual groups, of
course, may contribute to several issue networks). Not necessarily the same range
of organisations line up consistently. Questions relating to research policy, for
example, may become confined largely to public sector bodies, or private sector
interests, or both.
There is little sense of integration or coherence among the various participating
interests. The commitment to shared values and goals that was a feature of the
CTEC era is no longer present. This is particularly the case with transectoral groups
which have no academic background. There is agreement among some groups in
relation to some issues. The academic and student unions, for example, form
alliances from time to time, as do the vice-chancellors and some business lobbies.
Occasionally there is consensus among all the higher education bodies. One such
instance was the united opposition presented to a state government's intention to
abolish compulsory student unionism. But more usually there are divergent views
between groups and conflict over means and objectives. This is most apparent in
the opposite stances adopted by the academic staff unions and the AVCC over
industrial matters. In other areas there is dispute over such diverse issues as the
extent of payment of fees for courses, the introduction of competency-based
training, the use of credit transfers, the content of the undergraduate curriculum,
and the nature of university research. In addition, a strong competitive element has
grown up between the campuses themselves in terms of attracting students and
winning research grants. Such an environment inevitably contributes to a
fragmented policy milieu.
This fragmentation has been exacerbated by the lack of opportunity for
institutionalised interaction between government and groups. The government does
set up ad hoc policy committees from time to time on which groups are invited to
participate. But there is no permanent committee structure to accommodate the
representatives of the major established interests and which might foster a more
consensual approach to decison-making. The part-time members of the Higher
Education Council and the Australian Research Council are selected for their
specialist advice and are short-term appointments. On the Higher Education
Council there is no legislative provison for the involvement of established interests
(EET Act 1988). Nor, with the exception of the National Union of Students, have
established interests been appointed to sit on the council on a continuing basis.
Furthermore, apart from the annual profile process (whereby DEET negotiates the
nature of each university's future development on an individual basis), there are no
regularised consultative mechanisms through which groups can meet with
government in an orderly fashion. Rather, groups must jostle for access to
ministerial and bureaucratic circles. This is an uneven contest for some groups are
clearly better positioned to gain the ear of government than others. Though the
vice-chancellors' committee is the most successful body in this regard, resources
287
and expertise are nonetheless distributed among a range of organisations. The

extent to which different groups wield influence will vary according to the issue in
question, its timing, and its context.
The struggle for access and influence is accentuated by the large numbers of
groups involved. Higher education is now a very crowded arena with new groups
continually joining the fray. The disciplined structure of the old policy community,
and the measured activity that prevailed, has given way to the push and shove of a
multitude of competing interests. A recent report by the Australian Science and
Technology Council acknowledged the intensity of this environment. The report,
which examined the role played by the social sciences and humanities in the
promotion of economic development, noted the lack of impact that these particular
disciplinary groups had had on the direction of government policy. The document
emphasised the need for them to develop 'a strong and confident articulation of the
social sciences and humanities viewpoint', and pointed out forcefiully that:
Farmers, health consumers and practitioners, small business people and many other groups inform
government about their contribution to Australia's economic and social well-being, about their needs
and about their proposals for Australia's future. This is all part of the legitimate political process. If the
social sciences and humanities researchers do not do this on their own behalf, amid many competing
voices, no one else will (ASTEC 1993:55).
Within this interactive milieu the government does not function simply as a
passive actor which responds to the demands of particular groups. The minister and
DEET retain a high degree of autonomy and undoubtedly constitute the decisive
voice in determining policy direction. Nevertheless, because DEET lacks
bureaucratic expertise and knowledge in critical areas, both the minister and his
department have become more dependent upon group advice, and therefore more
vulnerable to group pressure. Consequently, as the relative influence of interests
changes over time in terms of circumstance and particular policy issues, policy
outcomes become less stable and predictable. Indeed, as Jordan and Schubert
indicate (1992:22), a major feature of policy environments characterised by issue
networks is the uncertainty over the nature of policy outcomes.
The following brief case study, which deals with quality assurance, provides an
example of the way an issue network may form and evolve. It illustrates how
circumstances change, how different interests become involved, how their
influence may vary over an extended period, and how eventual outcomes can be
unpredictable.
Case study - the politics of quality assurance 1991-94
In October 1991, following widespread concerns that the expansion of Australian

higher education had resulted in a fall in standards, Minister Baldwin announced
that the government would make available $76 million to promote quality
assurance in the universities (Baldwin 1992). Baldwin directed the Higher
Education Council to determine how this program could be most effectively carried
288
out. The council, in turn, consulted extensively with the tertiary education sector
during 1992. Particular emphasis was placed on the views of the established
sectoral groups; the AVCC, and the academic and student unions (HEC 1992a). In
July a draft report was released which suggested that a national body be set up to
evaluate the quality assurance mechanisms of individual universities (HEC 1992b).
The draft document received the support of the government and many groups, and
its proposals were formally incorporated into a final report submitted to the
government in October 1992. Baldwin acted almost immediately to appoint a
quality audit committee which would recommend to the minister how the $76
million should be distributed. It was Baldwin's intention that the exercise would be
largely uncompetitive and that all institutions would be eligible to receive a
proportion of the funds available (Harman 1994:37).
Following the federal election in March 1993, however, a new minister - Kim
Beazley - took over the higher education portfolio. Over the next four months
Beazley overturned the approach to quality assurance developed by Baldwin. He
decided that only 50% of institutions would receive funds for quality improvement,
that all monies would be allocated competitively on the basis of demonstrated
outcomes (especially research), and that each university would be ranked in order
of merit. While these new measures stemmed partly from Beazley's own
convictions, he appears to have been influenced by a different range of groups from
the established sectoral bodies. Among these were business interests who were
pushing for the introduction of tougher performance indicators into the universities,
and a number of Beazley's ministerial colleagues who shared similar views. In
addition, a group consisting of the older, more prestigious campuses had argued
that longer-term national development goals would best be served by improving
research infrastructure through quality grants. These institutions, which possessed
the most extensive research facilities, stood to gain the most from such a
competitive scheme (Campus Review 1993). Beazley's approach was very much in
accord with the views of this specialised collection of interests.
The higher education sector as a whole was dismayed by Beazley's about-face
midway through the process and in the absence of consultation with a wider range
of opinion. The situation deteriorated further when the committee appointed by
Beazley to assess quality outcomes issued guidelines which were vague and
ambigious (CFQAHE 1994: Appendix 4). This was due in part to the imposition of
a very tight time-frame that did not allow the committee members to consider the
issue adequately. In October 1993, at which point the committee's work was well
advanced, many senior institutional administrators were 'still not sure what was
meant by quality' and felt that the whole issue 'was being driven by politics, rather
than educational needs' (Donaghy 1993).
During Christmas 1993 there was a further cabinet reshuffle and higher
education ended up with its third minister in two years - Simon Crean. Though
Crean conceded that the whole issue had become 'very confusing' (Juddery 1994a),
this did not stop him changing the rules yet again to ensure that all institutions
would get some money from the quality exercise (instead of only half). It seems
that Crean had been vigorously lobbied by those campuses who were the potential
289
losers in the quality stakes (the newer, less prestigious universities). They argued
that a poor rating would result in a loss of applications by full fee-paying overseas
students. The dilemma facing Crean was that:
overtuning [the 50%]rule would result in the political benefit of being hated by far fewer univeristies
overall yet risked the ire of larger univerisities that could have expected a greater sweep of the funds
(Healy 1994b).
In the end, though the minister decided that each of the nation's 36 institutions
would receive some funding, campuses were ranked into six quality 'bands' with
those in the bottom band receiving the smallest proportion of the $76 million
(CFQAHE 1994). The inclusion of this particular ranking mechanism in the
committee's final report was unexpected and took much of the higher education
sector by surprise.
Apart from the six universities in the top band (all traditional, capital city
campuses), both the process of the quality exercise, and its outcome, proved
unsatisfactory to most institutions. The rules of the game had changed on three
occasions between 1991 and 1994 as ministers came and went, and the influence of
different interests waxed and waned. For the majority of institutions it was a
demoralising experience with administrators being unsure as to what the expected
criteria for success was, and how they should prepare their submissions. The
eventual distribution of campuses into categories - with winners and losers -
differed substantially from Baldwin's initial proposal in 1991, and was widely
perceived as unfair and inequitable. Some universities made it clear that they would
not have participated in the process had they known what the final format would
be.
Inter-sectoral implications
The uncertainty that can accompany higher eduaction policy-making, illustrated in

the quality issue, is accentuated by the inter-sectoral nature of the arena. With a
growing number of government departments, semi-government bodies and diverse
groups taking an interest in the universities, policy issues which affect institutions
can originate in other sectors. Issue networks may emerge which consist of a
majority of participants who are not directly involved in the university sphere, but
whose activities impinge on the affairs of the campuses. Important decisions
relating to the universities may be taken in other sectors, and higher education
groups may find themselves unable to influence the course of events. A useful
example of this situation was the debate over competency based training during
1991-92.
The genesis of the competency issue lay in the Australian industrial relations
agenda of the late 1980s and was essentially industry-driven. The process of award
restructuring at the workface necessitated the redefing of awards in terms of
career paths, promotion on the basis of competence, and the provision of incentives
for workers to upgrade their skills. These requirements found a solution in the
290
introduction of competency based training; the attainment of specific competencies

at particular levels as opposed to the simple completion of a course. The concept
was taken up by two intergovernmental ministerial councils which, in turn,
appointed a joint advisory body consisting of union, employer and government
representatives to make recommendations on the nature of training structures. The
Commonwealth's Employment and Skills Formation Council was also requested to
consider the matter. By 1992 three major reports had been commissioned on the
subject (AECRC 1991; Mayer 1992; ESFC 1992) and three additional national
bodies set up to regulate and administer competency based training.
In a very short period of time, then, a proliferation of interests had become
involved in the issue. As early as 1991 one report noted the 'extraordinary
avalanche of policy development' that has taken place (AECRC 1991:11). By 1993
even the chief executive of the Australian National Training Authority conceded
that the system had become 'too complex and bureaucratic', and that there were
'too many committees and working parties at the national level' involved in the
competency issue (Moran 1993).
Though the question of competency standards was originally directed at the
technical and further education structure and its relationship with the workplace,
following the tabling of the Australian Educational Council Review Committee
report (1991) it was extended to general education. It was then a short step from
there to the inclusion of higher education which, by the beginning of 1992, had
become an integral part of the debate. The AVCC strongly opposed the use of
competency principles in university teaching on the grounds that it was
inappropiiate. Yet the committee found itself 'systematically excluded from most
consultation processes' (AVCC 1992b). Effectively, the secretary of the AVCC
commented, an issue that had far-reaching ramifications for campus teaching was
being controlled by 'people ... who have absolutely nothing to do with the
universities' (Hambly 1992:18).
At the end of 1992, after sustained pressure from the AVCC, Minister Baldwin
gave an assurance that the universities would be exempted from the introduction of
competency based training. In this instance Baldwin was able to assert his authority
over the situation. As intersectoral involvement in higher education expands,
however, it may become increasingly difficult for the minister to assume control
over such matters. The making of critical decisions could become dispersed across
diverse policy sectors, contributing to growing uncertainty and unpredictability
over policy direction.
Concluding comments
It has been argued that government-interest group relations have gone through three
stages since 1985. From a stable policy community, through a period of substantial
change under firm government control, to a densely populated and competitive
environment comprised of issue networks. The need for the government to return to
a more interactive strategy in the wake of the reform process would seem to
291
highlight the critical role that clientele groups play in the formation of higher
education policy. There is little doubt that this becomes increasingly the case given
the growing complexity and sophistication of the universities, and the importance
of their contribution to the broader community. However, while group input will
remain a vital component of the policy-making process, it is important that
specialist bureaucratic expertise is built-up and maintained. The existence of
knowledgeable government agencies is necessary to balance the demands of
competing groups and thereby ensure greater stability of policy outcomes. One of
the benefits of past bodies such as the Commonwealth Tertiary Education
Commission and the British University Grants Committee was that they possessed
this attribute.
The breaking down of sectoral boundaries and the involvement in higher
education of a variety of disparate interests was perhaps the inevitable consequence
of the need to build a more open and productive economy. In this regard, higher
education may well be unusual. Few other policy sectors (science and technology is
a notable exception) have become so inter-linked with different arenas of activity.
However, it is a situation that holds potential problems for the direction and
development of the universities. There is a danger that the autonomy of higher
education as a distinctive policy sector may be eroded. Decision-making could
fragment across policy sectors with the consequence that coordinated and coherent
policy formulation becomes increasingly difficult.
Notes
1. State government authorities have largely faded from the higher education policy process. In the
course of its reform program the federal government has almost entirely taken over the contribution the
states used to make. They now play only a very peripheral role in the higher education policy arena and
therefore have not been included in the new group environment
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Policy Communities, Issue Networks and the Formulation of Australian Higher Education

Policy communities, issue networks and the formulation of

In Australia, as in most western countries, governments have relied heavily on

As a consequence, new modes of interaction between government and clientele

The pre-1987 policy community

policy-making and implementation' (Jordan 1990b:472). Decisions are arrived at

The Implementation of Dawkins' reforms changed completely the nature of the

Lack of bureaucratic expertise

The new group environment

Specialist higher education interests

In addition to the established sectoral associations, a host of other entities populate

Determination of policy in relation to overseas students may involve the

The nature of group interaction: Issue network

and expertise are nonetheless distributed among a range of organisations. The

Case study - the politics of quality assurance 1991-94

In October 1991, following widespread concerns that the expansion of Australian

The uncertainty that can accompany higher eduaction policy-making, illustrated in

introduction of competency based training; the attainment of specific competencies

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