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G.R. No. 152662. June 13, 2012.

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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MA. THERESA PANGILINAN, Same; Same; Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights
and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily
Criminal Law; Prescription of Offenses; Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies.—In the
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefore prescribes in four (4) years case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), which is
in accordance with the aforecited law.—Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that in all fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that
imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the
in accordance with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, offenses they had been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially
however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should
person. not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances
beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and
Same; Same; The filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office suspends the inefficiency of the investigating agencies.
running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense.—In the old but oft-cited
case of People v. Olarte, 19 SCRA 494 (1967), this Court ruled that the filing of The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed this petition for certiorari1 under
the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines,
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period praying for the nullification and setting aside of the Decision2 of the Court of
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 66936, entitled "Ma. Theresa Pangilinan vs.
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling People of the Philippines and Private Complainant Virginia C. Malolos."
was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et al. v. Court of Appeals, et
al., 122 SCRA 538 (1983), when it held that the filing of the complaint with the The fallo of the assailed Decision reads:
Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal
offense. WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 218, is REVERSED
Same; Same; There is no more distinction between cases under the Revised Penal and SET ASIDE and Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153 against petitioner
Code (RPC) and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of Ma. Theresa Pangilinan are hereby ordered DISMISSED.3
the period of prescription.—There is no more distinction between cases under the
RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the Culled from the record are the following undisputed facts:
period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277 (1992),
is not controlling in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, 260 SCRA 207 (1996), On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an
Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997), Brillante v. CA, 440 SCRA affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22
541 (2004), and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303 (2008), cases against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
involving special laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued nine (9)
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred Fifty-Eight
prescription. In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (₱9,658,592.00) in favor of private
Corporation, et al., 567 SCRA 354 (2008), the Court even ruled that complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.
investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of
effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific
preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
1
performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of In a Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Valenzuela City. This was docketed as Civil Case No. 1429-V-97. Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC. The pertinent
portion of the decision reads:
Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a "Petition to
Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before the Office of xxx Inasmuch as the informations in this case were filed on 03 February 2000
the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of the civil action with the Clerk of Court although received by the Court itself only on 07 June
she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City. 2000, they are covered by the Rule as it was worded before the latest
amendment. The criminal action on two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, had,
On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended the therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo
suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil action considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been
respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of Valenzuela City. filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on 16 September 1997 yet.
The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Order dated 05 October 2000 is hereby REVERSED
Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of AND SET ASIDE. The Court a quo is hereby directed to proceed with the hearing
Justice (DOJ). of Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89153.4

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court a
resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of petition for review5 on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This was
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with her docketed as G.R. Nos. 149486-87.
issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219 in the amount of ₱4,129,400.00 and
RCBC Check No. 423773 in the amount of ₱4,475,000.00, both checks totaling In a resolution6 dated 24 September 2000, this Court referred the petition to the
the amount of ₱8,604,000.00. The estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 charges CA for appropriate action.
involving the seven other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on 16
September 1997 were, however, dismissed. On 26 October 2001, the CA gave due course to the petition by requiring
respondent and private complainant to comment on the petition.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18 November
1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3 February 2000 In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001 Decision of
before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Quezon RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 89152
City. These cases were raffled to MeTC, Branch 31on 7 June 2000. and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 had already
prescribed.
On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the
Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" before MeTC, Branch In reversing the RTC Decision, the appellate court ratiocinated that:
31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been extinguished by
reason of prescription. xxx this Court reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for
violations of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 imputed to [respondent] sometime in the
The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in an latter part of 1995, as it was within this period that the [respondent] was notified
Order dated 5 October 2000. by the private [complainant] of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the
five (5) days grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. The criminal then had, pursuant to Section 1 of Act 3326, as amended, four years therefrom
cases were raffled to RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City. or until the latter part of 1999 to file her complaint or information against the
petitioner before the proper court.
2
suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the
The informations docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 89152 and 89152(sic) against filing of the informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on 3 February 2000 was
the petitioner having been filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal
only on 03 February 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed. xxx cases for violation of BP Blg. 22 in accordance with Act No. 3326, as amended.

Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, prescription shall be interrupted In her comment-opposition dated 26 July 2002, respondent avers that the
when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person. petition of the OSG should be dismissed outright for its failure to comply with the
mandatory requirements on the submission of a certified true copy of the
In the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes7 the Supreme Court held that the proceedings decision of the CA and the required proof of service. Such procedural lapses are
referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended, are ‘judicial proceedings’, allegedly fatal to the cause of the petitioner.
which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court.
Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before
date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that, which is the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive
in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended. period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law.

While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, this Court, Respondent contends that the arguments advanced by petitioner are anchored on
considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended, governs the computation of erroneous premises. She claims that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved
the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling felonies punishable under the Revised Penal Code and are therefore covered by
of the Supreme Court in Zaldivia v. Reyes8 likewise applies to special laws, such Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)14 and Section 1, Rule 110 of the
as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.9 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.15 Respondent pointed out that the crime
imputed against her is for violation of BP Blg. 22, which is indisputably a special
The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for review.1âwphi1 law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended. She submits that a
According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal
3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November 1930, governs ordinances or special laws, as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC.
the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the institution of
criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City The key issue raised in this petition is whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint
Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged.10 It for estafa and violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the
submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant Virginia City Prosecutor of Quezon City on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of
C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of prescription of such offense.
Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the
subject BP Blg. 22 cases. We find merit in this petition. Initially, we see that the respondent’s claim that
the OSG failed to attach to the petition a duplicate original or certified true copy
Petitioner further submits that the CA erred in its decision when it relied on the of the 12 March 2002 decision of the CA and the required proof of service is
doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.11 that the refuted by the record. A perusal of the record reveals that attached to the original
filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial copy of the petition is a certified true copy of the CA decision. It was also
proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription. In relying on observed that annexed to the petition was the proof of service undertaken by the
Zaldivia,12 the CA allegedly failed to consider the subsequent jurisprudence Docket Division of the OSG.
superseding the aforesaid ruling.
With regard to the main issue of the petition, we find that the CA reversively
Petitioner contends that in a catena of cases,13 the Supreme Court ruled that the erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed.
filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of
3
Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et. al.,23 the Court
Begin," as amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange
reads: Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities
Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal
in such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after cases.
four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but
less than two years; (c) xxx. In fact, in the case of Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice,24 which is in all
fours with the instant case, this Court categorically ruled that commencement of
SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and been charged under BP Blg. 22. Aggrieved parties, especially those who do not
punishment. sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to
suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their
The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for investigating agencies.
reasons not constituting jeopardy.
We follow the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995"
Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of BP
less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation, Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by
it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the aforecited law. The private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace
running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution period granted by law elapsed.
of proceedings against the guilty person.
The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against respondent on 16
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte,16 this Court ruled that the filing September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on 13
of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for
preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of
of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question". The matter was raised before
complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. This ruling the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to
was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco, et.al. v. Court of Appeals, suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that
et. al.17 when it held that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of
suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. Quezon City.

Respondent’s contention that a different rule should be applied to cases involving Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal
special laws is bereft of merit. There is no more distinction between cases under proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for accounting, that
the RPC and those covered by special laws with respect to the interruption of the caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000.
period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr.18 is not controlling in
special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican,19 Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan,20 Brillante As laid down in Olarte,25 it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to
v. CA,21 and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim,22 cases involving special laws, this obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control. The only
Court held that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the
against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. In Securities and requisite complaint.
4
Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officials; Penalties; The crime of corruption of
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is GRANTED. The 12 public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of
March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET the Revised Penal Code with the “same penalties imposed upon the officer
ASIDE. The Department of Justice is ORDERED to re-file the informations for corrupted.”―The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case
violation of BP Blg. 22 against the respondent. No. 28001 is punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the “same
penalties imposed upon the officer corrupted.” Under the second paragraph of
SO ORDERED. Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery), if the gift was accepted by
the officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a
G.R. Nos. 169823-24. September 11, 2013.* crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision
HERMINIO T. DISINI vs. THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal Code,
the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials charged
G.R. Nos. 174764-65. September 11, 2013.* against Disini is 15 years.
HERMINIO T. DISINI vs. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION, AND THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); By express provision
of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the
Ill-Gotten Wealth; Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG); Section offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years.―As for
2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the Presidential Commission on Good Government Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section 4(a) of
(PCGG) with assisting the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as amended
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No. 3019 shall
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period was only
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador, 354 SCRA 310 (2001),
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or however, that the longer prescriptive period of 15 years would not apply to crimes
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using committed prior to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted approved on March 16, 1982, because the longer period could not be given
the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ retroactive effect for not being favorable to the accused. With the information
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without alleging the period from 1974 to February 1986 as the time of the commission of
distinction as to their private or public status.―That Disini was a private the crime charged, the applicable prescriptive period is 10 years in order to
individual did not remove the offenses charged from the jurisdiction of the accord with People v. Pacificador.
Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No. 1, which tasked the PCGG with assisting
the President in “[t]he recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former Ill-Gotten Wealth; During the Marcos regime, no person would have dared to
President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that the
close associates, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, including the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.―Accordingly,
takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began to run from
controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through nominees, by 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded to Burns &
taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot of the
authority, influence, connections or relationship,” expressly granted the authority sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like in
of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’ immediate Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, 397
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without distinction as to SCRA 171 (2003), the connivance and conspiracy among the public officials
their private or public status. involved and the beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly
well-nigh impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the
5
commission of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. fundamental test in determining whether a motion to quash may be sustained
Notwithstanding the highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, will
the unlawful acts or transactions in relation to it were discovered only through establish the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Extrinsic
the PCGG’s exhaustive investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima matters or evidence aliunde are not considered. The test does not require
facie case sufficient for the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of the offense; otherwise,
Before the discovery, the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to proceed to trial.
enjoyed the presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the
course of official functions. Considering further that during the Marcos regime, Criminal Law; Corruption of Public Officials; Elements of.―The elements of
no person would have dared to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code are: 1.
unreasonable to expect that the discovery of the unlawful transactions was That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a public
possible prior to 1986. officer; and 2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are
given to a public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer
Remedial Law; Criminal Procedure; Prosecution of Offenses; Prescription of liable for direct bribery or indirect bribery. The allegations in the information for
Offenses; Actions; The filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the corruption of public officials, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the
Ombudsman effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription.―We essential elements of the crime. The information stated that: (1) Disini made an
note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records transmitted by offer and promise, and gave gifts to President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in
the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991 for the conduct the consideration of the offers, promises and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the
preliminary investigation. In accordance with Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code award of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by taking advantage of
and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of Justice, 571 SCRA 549 (2008), his position and in committing said act in relation to his office, was placed under
the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman effectively circumstances that would make him liable for direct bribery. The second element
interrupted the running of the period of prescription. of corruption of public officers simply required the public officer to be placed
under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make him liable for
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Irrespective of whether the offense charged is direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President Marcos
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts — an essential element in
complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the direct bribery — the allegation that President Marcos caused the award of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription.―The contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged is circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the
complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the Same; Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (R.A. No. 3019); Elements of the
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019.―The sufficiency of the allegations in
prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly
of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of upheld. The elements of the offense under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are: 1.
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official; 2.
That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close personal
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; A complaint or information must state every relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift, material
single fact necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, transaction,
dismiss or to quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no application, request, or contract with the government; 3. That the public official
offense may be properly sustained.―It is axiomatic that a complaint or with whom the offender has family or close personal relation has to intervene in
information must state every single fact necessary to constitute the offense the business transaction, application, request, or contract with the government.
charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground that the
complaint or information charges no offense may be properly sustained. The
6
The Sandiganbayan has exclusive original jurisdiction over the criminal action Corporation at Morong, Bataan, all for and in consideration of accused Disini
involving petitioner notwithstanding that he is a private individual considering seeking and obtaining for Burns and Roe and Westinghouse Electrical
that his criminal prosecution is intimately related to the recovery of ill-gotten Corporation (Westinghouse), the contracts to do the engineering and architectural
wealth of the Marcoses, their immediate family, subordinates and close design and to construct, respectively, the Project, as in fact said Ferdinand E.
associates. Marcos, taking undue advantage of his position and committing the offense in
relation to his office and in consideration of the aforesaid gifts and presents, did
The Case award or cause to be awarded to said Burns and Roe and Westinghouse, the
contracts to do the engineering and architectural design and to construct the
Petitioner Herminio T. Disini assails via petition for certiorari there solutions Project, respectively, which acts constitute the crime of corruption of public
promulgated by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 28001and Criminal officials.
Case No. 28002, both entitled People v. Herminio T. Disini, on January 17, 2005
(denying his motion to quash the informations)1 and August 10, 2005 (denying CONTRARY TO LAW.3
his motion for reconsideration of the denial of his motion to quash),2 alleging that
the Sandiganbayan (First Division) thereby committed grave abuse of discretion Criminal Case No. 28002
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
That during the period 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and within
Antecedents the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, conspiring
together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines, Ferdinand
The Office of the Ombudsman filed two informations dated June 30,2004 E. Marcos, being then the close personal friend and golfing partner of said
charging Disini in the Sandiganbayan with corruption of public officials, Ferdinand E. Marcos, and being further the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini
penalized under Article 212 in relation to Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code who was the first cousin of then First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos and family
(Criminal Case No. 28001), and with a violation of Section 4(a) of Republic Act physicianof the Marcos family, taking advantage of such close personal relation,
3019 (R.A. No. 3019), also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act intimacy and free access, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
(Criminal Case No. 28002). in connection with the Philippine Nuclear Power Plant (PNPP)Project ("PROJECT")
of the National Power Corporation (NPC) at Morong, Bataan, request and receive
The accusatory portions of the informations read as follows: from Burns and Roe, a foreign consultant, the total amount of One Million U.S.
Dollars ($1,000,000.00),more or less, and also from Westinghouse Electric
Criminal Case No. 28001 Corporation(WESTINGHOUSE), the total amount of Seventeen Million U.S.
Dollars($17,000,000.00), more or less, both of which entities were then having
That during the period from 1974 to February 1986, in Manila, Philippines, and business, transaction, and application with the Government of the Republic of
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused HERMINIO T. DISINI, the Philippines, all for and in consideration of accused DISINI securing and
conspiring together and confederating with the then President of the Philippines obtaining, as accused Disini did secure and obtain, the contract for the said
Ferdinand E. Marcos, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously Burns and Roe and Westinghouse to do the engineering and architectural design,
offer, promise and give gifts and presents to said Ferdinand E. Marcos, consisting and construct, respectively, the said PROJECT, and subsequently, request and
of accused DISINI’s ownership of two billion and five hundred (2.5 billion) shares receive subcontracts for Power Contractors, Inc. owned by accused DISINI, and
of stock in Vulcan Industrial and Mining Corporation and four billion (4 Engineering and Construction Company of Asia (ECCO-Asia), owned and
billion)shares of stock in The Energy Corporation, with both shares of stock controlled by said Ferdinand E. Marcos, which stated amounts and subcontracts
having then a book value of ₱100.00 per share of stock, and subcontracts, to constituted kickbacks, commissions and gifts as material or pecuniary
Engineering and Construction Company of Asia, owned and controlled by said advantages, for securing and obtaining, as accused DISINI did secure and obtain,
Ferdinand E. Marcos, on the mechanical and electrical construction work on the through the direct intervention of said Ferdinand E. Marcos, for Burns and Roe
Philippine Nuclear Power Plant Project("Project") of the National Power
7
the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE
construction contract, for the PROJECT. APPLICABLE PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4 2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE


COMMENCEMENT OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.
On August 2, 2004, Disini filed a motion to quash,5 alleging that the criminal
actions had been extinguished by prescription, and that the informations did not 3. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED INDETERMINING THE POINT
conform to the prescribed form. The Prosecution opposed the motion to quash.6 OF INTERRUPTION OF THEPRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD.

On September 16, 2004, Disini voluntarily submitted himself for arraignment to C. BY MERELY ASSUMING THE PRESENCE OF GLARINGLYABSENT ELEMENTS
obtain the Sandiganbayan’s favorable action on his motion for permission to IN THE OFFENSES CHARGED TOUPHOLD THE ‘SUFFICIENCY’ OF THE
travel abroad.7 He then entered a plea of not guilty to both informations. INFORMATIONS INCRIMINAL CASE NOS. 28001 AND 28002, THE
RESPONDENTCOURT DEMONSTRATED ITS PREJUDGMENT OVER THE
As stated, on January 17, 2005, the Sandiganbayan (First Division) promulgated SUBJECT CASES AND ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF ITSDISCRETION.
its first assailed resolution denying the motion to quash.8
D. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OFDISCRETION IN
Disini moved for the reconsideration of the resolution dated January 17, 2005,9 REFUSING TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONSDESPITE THEIR UTTER FAILURE
but the Sandiganbayan (First Division) denied his motion on August 10, 2005 TO COMPLY WITH THEPRESCRIBED FORM, THUS EFFECTIVELY DENYING
through the second assailed resolution.10 THEACCUSED HIS CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHTTO BE
INFORMED OF THE NATURE AND CAUSE OF THEACCUSATION AGAINST
Issues HIM.11

Undaunted, Disini commenced this special civil action for certiorari, alleging that: Ruling

A. THE RESPONDENT COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THEOFFENSES The petition for certiorari has no merit.
CHARGED.
1.Preliminary Considerations
1. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITRULED THAT
SECTION 4, PARAGRAPHS (A) AND (B) OFREPUBLIC ACT NO. 8249 DO NOT To properly resolve this case, reference is made to the ruling of the Court in G.R.
APPLY SINCE THEINFORMATIONS WERE "FILED PURSUANT TO E.O. NOS. 1,2, No. 175730 entitled Herminio Disini v. Sandiganbayan,12 which involved the civil
14 AND 14-A". action for reconveyance, reversion, accounting, restitution, and damages (Civil
Case No. 0013 entitled Republic v. HerminioT. Disini, et al.) filed by the
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED WHEN ITASSUMED Presidential Commission on Good Government(PCGG) against Disini and
JURISDICTION WITHOUT HAVING MET THEREQUISITE UNDER SECTION 4 OF others.13 The amended complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 alleged that Disini had
R.A. 8249 THAT THEACCUSED MUST BE A PUBLIC OFFICER. acted in unlawful concert with his co-defendants in acquiring and accumulating
ill-gotten wealth through them is appropriation of public funds, plunder of the
B. THE RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH SUCH GRAVEABUSE OF nation’s wealth, extortion, embezzlement, and other acts of corruption,14 as
DISCRETION WHEN IT EFFECTIVELY IGNORED, DISREGARDED, AND DENIED follows:
PETITIONER’SCONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY RIGHT TOPRESCRIPTION.
4. Defendant HERMINIO T. DISINI is a close associate of defendant Ferdinand E.
Marcos and the husband of the first cousin of Defendant Imelda R. Marcos. By
8
reason of this relationship xxx defendant Herminio Disini obtained staggering of the suspicion that the PCGG cannot conduct an impartial investigation in
commissions from the Westinghouse in exchange for securing the nuclear power cases similar to that of the Cojuangco case. x x x
plant contract from the Philippine government.
Ostensibly, the PCGG’s letter of transmittal was adverting to the ruling in
xxxx Cojuangco, Jr. v. Presidential Commission on Good Government (Cojuangco,
Jr.),17 viz:
13. Defendants Herminio T. Disini and Rodolfo Jacob, by themselves and/or in
unlawful concert, active collaboration and willing participation of defendants x x x The PCGG and the Solicitor General finding a prima facie basis filed a civil
Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, and taking undue advantage of their complaint against petitioner and intervenors alleging substantially the same
association and influence with the latter defendant spouses in order to prevent illegal or criminal acts subject of the subsequent criminal complaints the Solicitor
disclosure and recovery of ill-gotten assets, engaged in devices, schemes, and General filed with the PCGG for preliminary investigation. x x x.
stratagems such as:
Moreover, when the PCGG issued the sequestration and freeze orders against
xxxx petitioner’s properties, it was on the basis of a prima facie finding that the same
were ill-gotten and/or were acquired in relation to the illegal disposition of
(c) unlawfully utilizing the Herdis Group of Companies and Asia Industries, Inc. coconut levy funds. Thus, the Court finds that the PCGG cannot possibly
as conduits through which defendants received, kept, and/or invested improper conduct the preliminary investigation of said criminal complaints with the "cold
payments such as unconscionably large commissions from foreign corporations neutrality of an impartial judge," as it has prejudged the matter. x x x18
like the Westinghouse Corporation; (d) secured special concessions, privileges
and/or benefits from defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, xxxx
such as a contract awarded to Westinghouse Corporation which built an
inoperable nuclear facility in the country for a scandalously exorbitant amount The Court finds that under the circumstances of the case, the PCGG cannot
that included defendant’s staggering commissions – defendant Rodolfo Jacob inspire belief that it could be impartial in the conduct of the preliminary
executed for HGI the contract for the aforesaid nuclear plant;15 investigation of the aforesaid complaints against petitioner and intervenors. It
cannot possibly preside in the said preliminary investigation with an even hand.
Through its letter dated April 8, 1991,16 the PCGG transmitted the records of
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 to then Ombudsman The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted if
Conrado M. Vasquez for appropriate action, to wit: the PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of
the complaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that
In line with the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of EduardoM. the records of the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an
Cojuangco, Jr. versus the PCGG (G.R. Nos. 92319–92320) dated October 2, 1990, independent constitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this
we are hereby transmitting to your Office for appropriate action the records of the nature, to conduct such preliminary investigation and take appropriate action.19
attached criminal case which we believe is similar to the said Cojuangco case in (Bold emphasis supplied)
certain aspects, such as: (i) some parts or elements are also parts of the causes of
action in the civil complaints[-]filed with the Sandiganbayan; (ii) some properties It appears that the resolutions of the Office of the Ombudsman, following its
or assets of the respondents have been sequestered; (iii) some of the respondents conduct of the preliminary investigation on the criminal complaints thus
are also party defendants in the civil cases. transmitted by the PCGG, were reversed and set aside by the Court in
Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Desierto,20
Although the authority of the PCGG has been upheld by the Supreme Court, we
are constrained to refer to you for proper action the herein-attached case in view

9
with the Court requiring the Office of the Ombudsman to file the informations Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are
that became the subject of Disini’s motion to quash in Criminal Case No.28001 officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a
and Criminal Case No. 28002. permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:
2.
xxxx
Sandiganbayan has exclusive and
b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
original jurisdiction over the offenses charged committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of
this section in relation to their office.
Disini challenges the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the offenses charged
in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002.He contends that: (1) c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive
the informations did not allege that the charges were being filed pursuant to and Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. (Bold emphasis supplied)
in connection with Executive Order (E.O.) Nos.1, 2, 14 and 14-A; (2) the offenses
charged were not of the nature contemplated by E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to
because the allegations in the informations neither pertained to the recovery of salary grade ‘27’ or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or
ill-gotten wealth, nor involved sequestration cases; (3) the cases were filed by the military or PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof
Office of the Ombudsman instead of by the PCGG; and (4) being a private shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court,
individual not charged as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory of a public municipal trial court and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be,
officer, he should be prosecuted in the regular courts instead of in the pursuant to their respective jurisdiction as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129,
Sandiganbayan. as amended.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) counters that the Sandiganbayan has xxxx
jurisdiction over the offenses charged because Criminal Case No. 28001 and
Criminal Case No. 28002 were filed within the purview of Section 4 (c) of R.A. No. In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
8249; and that both cases stemmed from the criminal complaints initially filed by accessories with the public officers or employees, including those employed in
the PCGG pursuant to its mandate under E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A to government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly with said
investigate and file the appropriate civil or criminal cases to recover ill-gotten public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive
wealth not only of the Marcoses and their immediately family but also of their jurisdiction over them. x x x x
relatives, subordinates and close associates.
It is underscored that it was the PCGG that had initially filed the criminal
We hold that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 28001 complaints in the Sandiganbayan, with the Office of the Ombudsman taking over
and Criminal Case No. 28002. the investigation of Disini only after the Court issued in Cojuangco, Jr. the
directive to the PCGG to refer the criminal cases to the Office of the Ombudsman
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 was the law that established the on the ground that the PCGG would not be an impartial office following its
Sandiganbayan and defined its jurisdiction. The law was amended by R.A. No. finding of a prima facie case being established against Disini to sustain the
7975 and R.A. No. 8249. Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan institution of Civil Case No. 0013.
was vested with original and exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving:
Also underscored is that the complaint in Civil Case No. 0013 and the
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002involved
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, the same transaction, specifically the contracts awarded through the intervention
10
of Disini and President Marcos in favor of Burns & Roe to do the engineering and
architectural design, and Westinghouse to do the construction of the Philippine (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang
Nuclear Power Plant Project (PNPPP). Given their sameness in subject matter, to panlalawigan and provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial
still expressly aver in Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 that department heads;
the charges involved the recovery of ill-gotten wealth was no longer necessary.21
With Criminal Case No.28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 being intertwined (b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city
with Civil Case No.0013, the PCGG had the authority to institute the criminal treasurers, assessors engineers and other city department heads;
prosecutions against Disini pursuant to E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A.
(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
That Disini was a private individual did not remove the offenses charged from the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Section 2 of E.O. No.1, which tasked the (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of
PCGG with assisting the President in "the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth higher rank;
accumulated by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, whether located in the Philippines or (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of
abroad, including the takeover or sequestration of all business enterprises and provincial director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or
through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and
their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship," expressly granted prosecutors in the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
the authority of the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth covered President Marcos’
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, without (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or
distinction as to their private or public status. -controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations;
Contrary to Disini’s argument, too, the qualifying clause found in Section 4 of
R.A. No. 824922 (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade‘27’ and up
under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
applied only to the cases listed in Subsection 4aand Subsection 4b of R.A. No.
8249, the full text of which follows: (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;
xxxx
(4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to
a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti- the provisions of the Constitution; and
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No.1379, and Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accused are (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade ‘27’and higher under
officials occupying the following positions in the government whether in a the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989. b. Other offenses or
permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
offense: officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to
their office. (bold emphasis supplied)
(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director
and higher, otherwise classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher, of the Compensation xxxx
and Position Classification Act of 1989(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically
including:
11
Unquestionably, public officials occupying positions classified as Grade 27 or
higher are mentioned only in Subsection 4a and Subsection 4b,signifying the As for Criminal Case No. 28002, Disini was charged with a violation of Section
plain legislative intent of limiting the qualifying clause to such public officials. To 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019. By express provision of Section 11 of R.A. No. 3019, as
include within the ambit of the qualifying clause the persons covered by amended by Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, the offenses committed under R.A. No.
Subsection 4c would contravene the exclusive mandate of the PCGG to bring the 3019 shall prescribe in 15 years. Prior to the amendment, the prescriptive period
civil and criminal cases pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 was only 10 years. It became settled in People v. Pacificador,28 however, that the
and 14-A. In view of this, the Sandiganbayan properly took cognizance of longer prescriptive period of 15years would not apply to crimes committed prior
Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case No. 28002 despite Disini’s being a to the effectivity of Batas Pambansa Blg. 195, which was approved on March 16,
private individual, and despite the lack of any allegation of his being the co- 1982, because the longer period could not be given retroactive effect for not being
principal, accomplice or accessory of a public official in the commission of the favorable to the accused. With the information alleging the period from 1974 to
offenses charged. February1986 as the time of the commission of the crime charged, the applicable
prescriptive period is 10 years in order to accord with People v. Pacificador .
3.
For crimes punishable by the Revised Penal Code, Article 91 thereof provides that
The offenses charged in the prescription starts to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
informations have not yet prescribed offended party, the authorities, or their agents. As to offenses punishable by R.A.
No. 3019, Section 2 of R.A. No. 332629 states:
In resolving the issue of prescription, the following must be considered, namely:
(1) the period of prescription for the offense charged;(2) the time when the period Section 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
of prescription starts to run; and (3) the time when the prescriptive period is violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
interrupted.23 thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleged that Disini had offered,
promised and given gifts and presents to Ferdinand E. Marcos; that said gifts The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
were in consideration of Disini obtaining for Burns & Roe and Westinghouse guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
Electrical Corporation (Westinghouse) the contracts, respectively, to do the reasons not constituting double jeopardy.
engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP; and that
President Marcos did award or cause to be awarded the respective contracts to The ruling on the issue of prescription in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding
Burns & Roe and Westinghouse, which acts constituted the crime of corruption Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto30 is also enlightening, viz:
of public officials.24
Generally, the prescriptive period shall commence to run on the day the crime is
The crime of corruption of public officials charged in Criminal Case No. 28001 is committed. That an aggrieved person "entitled to an action has no knowledge of
punished by Article 212 of the Revised Penal Code with the" same penalties his right to sue or of the facts out of which his right arises," does not prevent the
imposed upon the officer corrupted."25 Under the second paragraph of Article running of the prescriptive period. An exception to this rule is the "blameless
210 of the Revised Penal Code (direct bribery),26 if the gift was accepted by the ignorance" doctrine, incorporated in Section 2 of Act No. 3326. Under this
officer in consideration of the execution of an act that does not constitute a doctrine, "the statute of limitations runs only upon discovery of the fact of the
crime, and the officer executes the act, he shall suffer the penalty of prision invasion of a right which will support a cause of action. In other words, the
mayor in its medium and minimum periods and a fine of not less than three courts would decline to apply the statute of limitations where the plaintiff does
times the value of the gift. Conformably with Article 90 of the Revised Penal not know or has no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of
Code,27 the period of prescription for this specie of corruption of public officials action." It was in this accord that the Court confronted the question on the
charged against Disini is 15 years. running of the prescriptive period in People v. Duque which became the
12
cornerstone of our 1999 Decision in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee Considering further that during the Marcos regime, no person would have dared
on Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130149), and the subsequent cases which to assail the legality of the transactions, it would be unreasonable to expect that
Ombudsman Desierto dismissed, emphatically, on the ground of prescription too. the discovery of the unlawful transactions was possible prior to 1986.
Thus, we held in a catena of cases, that if the violation of the special law was not
known at the time of its commission, the prescription begins to run only from the We note, too, that the criminal complaints were filed and their records
discovery thereof, i.e., discovery of the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or transmitted by the PCGG to the Office of the Ombudsman on April 8, 1991for the
acts. conduct the preliminary investigation.33 In accordance with Article 91 of the

Corollary, it is safe to conclude that the prescriptive period for the crime which is Revised Penal Code34 and the ruling in Panaguiton, Jr. v. Department of
the subject herein, commenced from the date of its discovery in 1992 after the Justice,35 the filing of the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman
Committee made an exhaustive investigation. When the complaint was filed in effectively interrupted the running of the period of prescription. According to
1997, only five years have elapsed, and, hence, prescription has not yet set in. Panaguiton:36
The rationale for this was succinctly discussed in the 1999 Presidential Ad Hoc
Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, that "it was well-high impossible for In Ingco v. Sandiganbayan and Sanrio Company Limited v. Lim, which involved
the State, the aggrieved party, to have known these crimes committed prior to the violations of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act(R.A. No. 3019) and the
1986EDSA Revolution, because of the alleged connivance and conspiracy among Intellectual Property Code (R.A. No. 8293),which are both special laws, the Court
involved public officials and the beneficiaries of the loans." In yet another ruled that the prescriptive period is interrupted by the institution of proceedings
pronouncement, in the 2001 Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on for preliminary investigation against the accused. In the more recent case of
Behest Loans v. Desierto (G.R. No. 130817), the Court held that during the Securities and Exchange Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, the
Marcos regime, no person would have dared to question the legality of these Court ruled that the nature and purpose of the investigation conducted by the
transactions. (Citations omitted)31 Securities and Exchange Commission on violations of the Revised Securities Act,
another special law, is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by
Accordingly, we are not persuaded to hold here that the prescriptive period began the DOJ in criminal cases, and thus effectively interrupts the prescriptive period.
to run from 1974, the time when the contracts for the PNPP Project were awarded
to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse. Although the criminal cases were the offshoot The following disquisition in the Interport Resources case is instructive, thus:
of the sequestration case to recover ill-gotten wealth instead of behest loans like
in Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Desierto, the While it may be observed that the term "judicial proceedings" in Sec. 2 of Act No.
connivance and conspiracy among the public officials involved and the 3326 appears before" investigation and punishment" in the old law, with the
beneficiaries of the favors illegally extended rendered it similarly well-nigh subsequent change in set-up whereby the investigation of the charge for
impossible for the State, as the aggrieved party, to have known of the commission purposes of prosecution has become the exclusive function of the executive
of the crimes charged prior to the EDSA Revolution in 1986. Notwithstanding the branch, the term "proceedings" should now be understood either executive or
highly publicized and widely-known nature of the PNPPP, the unlawful acts or judicial in character: executive when it involves the investigation phase and
transactions in relation to it were discovered only through the PCGG’s exhaustive judicial when it refers to the trial and judgment stage. With this clarification, any
investigation, resulting in the establishment of a prima facie case sufficient for kind of investigative proceeding instituted against the guilty person which may
the PCGG to institute Civil Case No. 0013 against Disini. Before the discovery, ultimately lead to his prosecution should be sufficient to toll prescription.
the PNPPP contracts, which partook of a public character, enjoyed the
presumption of their execution having been regularly done in the course of official Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain
functions.32 vindication on account of delays that are not under his control.

The prevailing rule is, therefore, that irrespective of whether the offense charged
is punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by a special law, it is the filing of the
13
complaint or information in the office of the public prosecutor for purposes of the caused to be awarded to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse the respective contracts
preliminary investigation that interrupts the period of prescription. Consequently, to do the engineering and architectural design of and to construct the PNPPP. The
prescription did not yet set in because only five years elapsed from 1986, the time felonious act consisted of causing the contracts for the PNPPP to be awarded to
of the discovery of the offenses charged, up to April 1991, the time of the filing of Burns & Roe and Westinghouse by reason of the gifts and promises offered by
the criminal complaints in the Office of the Ombudsman. Disini to President Marcos.

The informations were sufficient in form and substance The elements of corruption of public officials under Article 212 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
It is axiomatic that a complaint or information must state every single fact
necessary to constitute the offense charged; otherwise, a motion to dismiss or to 1. That the offender makes offers or promises, or gives gifts or presents to a
quash on the ground that the complaint or information charges no offense may public officer; and
be properly sustained. The fundamental test in determining whether a motion to
quash may be sustained based on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if 2. That the offers or promises are made or the gifts or presents are given to a
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as public officer under circumstances that will make the public officer liable for
defined in the law.37 Extrinsic matters or evidence aliunde are not considered.38 direct bribery or indirect bribery.

The test does not require absolute certainty as to the presence of the elements of The allegations in the information for corruption of public officials, if
the offense; otherwise, there would no longer be any need for the Prosecution to hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the crime. The
proceed to trial. information stated that: (1) Disini made an offer and promise, and gave gifts to
President Marcos, a public officer; and (2) in consideration of the offers, promises
The informations in Criminal Case No. 28001 (corruption of public officials) and and gifts, President Marcos, in causing the award of the contracts to Burns & Roe
Criminal Case No. 28002 (violation of Section 4(a) of RA No.3019) have and Westinghouse by taking advantage of his position and in committing said act
sufficiently complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule110 of the Rules of in relation to his office, was placed under circumstances that would make him
Court, viz: liable for direct bribery.39

Section 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. — A complaint or information The second element of corruption of public officers simply required the public
is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense officer to be placed under circumstances, not absolute certainty, that would make
given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the him liable for direct or indirect bribery. Thus, even without alleging that President
offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission Marcos received or accepted Disini’s offers, promises and gifts – an essential
of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. element in direct bribery – the allegation that President Marcos caused the award
of the contracts to Burns & Roe and Westinghouse sufficed to place him under
When the offense is committed by more than one person, all of them shall be circumstances of being liable for direct bribery.
included in the complaint or information.
The sufficiency of the allegations in the information charging the violation of
The information in Criminal Case No. 28001 alleging corruption of public officers Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 is similarly upheld. The elements of the offense
specifically put forth that Disini, in the period from 1974 to February 1986 in under Section 4(a) of R.A. No. 3019 are:
Manila, Philippines, conspiring and confederating with then President Marcos,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously offered, promised and gave gifts and presents 1. That the offender has family or close personal relation with a public official;
to President Marcos, who, by taking undue advantage of his position as
President, committed the offense in relation to his office, and in consideration of 2. That he capitalizes or exploits or takes advantage of such family or close
the gifts and presents offered, promised and given by Disini, President Marcos personal relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift,
14
material or pecuniary advantage from any person having some business, canon that words in a statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from
transaction, application, request or contract with the government; the rest of the measure, to discover the true legislative intent.

3. That the public official with whom the offender has family or close personal Same; Same; Same; Same; The charge against the petitioner, which is for
relation has to intervene in the business transaction, application, request, or violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez is governed by the Rule on
contract with the government. Summary Procedure and not Section 1 of Rule 110.—As it is clearly provided in
the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the offenses it covers are violations
The allegations in the information charging the violation of Section 4(a) of R.A. of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow that the charge against the
No. 3019, if hypothetically admitted, would establish the elements of the offense, petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is
considering that: (1) Disini, being the husband of Paciencia Escolin-Disini, the governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
first cousin of First Lady Imelda Romualdez-Marcos, and at the same time the
family physician of the Marcoses, had close personal relations and intimacy with Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure,
and free access to President Marcos, a public official; (2) Disini, taking advantage the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
of such family and close personal relations, requested and received actually filed in court and not on any date before that.—Under Section 9 of the
$1,000,000.00 from Burns & Roe and $17,000,000.00 from Westinghouse, the Rule on Summary Procedure, “the complaint or information shall be filed directly
entities then having business, transaction, and application with the Government in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
in connection with the PNPPP; (3) President Marcos, the public officer with whom investigation.” Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the
Disini had family or close personal relations, intervened to secure and obtain for prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However,
Burns & Roe the engineering and architectural contract, and for Westinghouse the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or
the construction of the PNPPP. not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means
that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is
WHEREFORE, the Court DISMISSES the petition for certiorari; AFFIRMS the actually filed in court and not on any date before that.
resolutions promulgated on January 17, 2005 and August 10, 2005 by the
Sandiganbayan (First Division) in Criminal Case No. 28001 and Criminal Case Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act
No. 28002; and DIRECTS petitioner to pay the costs of suit. No. 3326 are judicial proceedings, contrary to the submission of the Solicitor
General that they include administrative proceedings.—This interpretation is in
SO ORDERED. consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of
prescription shall be suspended “when proceedings are instituted against the
Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. G.R. No. 102342. July 3, 1992.* guilty party.” The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are “judicial
proceedings,” contrary to the submission of the Solicitor General that they
LUZ M. ZALDIVIA, petitioner, vs. HON. ANDRES B. REYES, JR., in his capacity include administrative proceedings.
as Acting Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. Same; Same; Same; Same; In case of conflict, the Rule on Summary Procedure as
Criminal Procedure; Actions; Prescription; Section 1, Rule 110 of the Rules on the special law prevails over Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Criminal Procedure does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary Procedure and also Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure must yield to
procedure.—That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, “for offenses not Act No. 3326.—At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases,” which plainly Rule on Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
summary procedure. The phrase “in all cases” appearing in the last paragraph between Act No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the power, is not allowed to “diminish, increase or modify substantive rights” under
15
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. B. Criminal Cases:

Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to 1. Violations of traffic laws, rules and regulations; 2. Violations of rental law; 3.
the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990 and Violations of municipal or city ordinances; 4. All other criminal cases where the
ended two months thereafter on July 11, 1990 in accordance with Section 1 of penalty prescribed by law for the offenses charged does not exceed six months
Act No. 3326.—Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imprisonment, or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00), or both, irrespective
imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, of other imposable penalties, accessory or otherwise, or of the civil liability arising
1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with therefrom. . . . (Emphasis supplied.)
Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint
with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a xxx xxx xxx
judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the
period was the filing of the information with the Municipal Trial Court of Sec. 9. How commenced. — The prosecution of criminal cases falling within the
Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had scope of this Rule shall be either by complaint or by information filed directly in
already prescribed. court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary
investigation: Provided, however, That in Metropolitan Manila and chartered
The Court is asked to determine the applicable law specifying the prescriptive cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information; Provided, further,
period for violations of municipal ordinances. That when the offense cannot be prosecuted de oficio, the corresponding
complaint shall be signed and sworn to before the fiscal by the offended party.
The petitioner is charged with quarrying for commercial purposes without a
mayor's permit in violation of Ordinance No. 2, Series of 1988, of the Municipality She then invokes Act. No. 3326, as amended, entitled "An Act to Establish
of Rodriguez, in the Province of Rizal. Periods of Prescription for Violations Penalized by Special Acts and Municipal
Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin to Run," reading as
The offense was allegedly committed on May 11, 1990.1 The referral-complaint of follows:
the police was received by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal on May
30, 1990. 2 The corresponding information was filed with the Municipal Trial Sec. 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless provided in such acts,
Court of Rodriguez on October 2, 1990. 3 prescribe in accordance with the following rules: . . . Violations penalized by
municipal ordinances shall prescribe after two months.
The petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that the crime had
prescribed, but the motion was denied. On appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
Rizal, the denial was sustained by the respondent judge. 4 violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
In the present petition for review on certiorari, the petitioner first argues that the punishment.
charge against her is governed by the following provisions of the Rule on
Summary Procedure: The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
Sec. 1. Scope — This rule shall govern the procedure in the Metropolitan Trial reasons not constituting jeopardy.
Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in the
following cases: Sec. 3. For the purposes of this Act, special acts shall be acts defining and
penalizing violations of law not included in the Penal Code. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
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Her conclusion is that as the information was filed way beyond the or investigation, should, and does, interrupt the period of prescription of the
two-month statutory period from the date of the alleged commission of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is
offense, the charge against her should have been dismissed on the ground of filed can not try the case on its merits. Several reasons buttress this conclusion:
prescription. first, the text of Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, in declaring that the period
of prescription "shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information"
For its part, the prosecution contends that the prescriptive period was suspended without distinguishing whether the complaint is filed in the court for preliminary
upon the filing of the complaint against her with the Office of the Provincial examination or investigation merely, or for action on the merits. Second, even if
Prosecutor. Agreeing with the respondent judge, the Solicitor General also the court where the complaint or information is filed may only proceed to
invokes Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, providing investigate the case, its actuations already represent the initial step of the
as follows: proceedings against the offender. Third, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of
the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
Sec. 1. How Instituted — For offenses not subject to the rule on summary control. All that the victim of the offense may do on his part to initiate the
procedure in special cases, the institution of criminal action shall be as follows: prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

a) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, by filing It is important to note that this decision was promulgated on May 30, 1983, two
the complaint with the appropriate officer for the purpose of conducting the months before the promulgation of the Rule on Summary Procedure on August 1,
requisite preliminary investigation therein; 1983. On the other hand, Section 1 of Rule 110 is new, having been incorporated
therein with the revision of the Rules on Criminal Procedure on January 1, 1985,
b) For offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and except for the last paragraph, which was added on October 1, 1988.
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts, by filing the complaint directly with the said
courts, or a complaint with the fiscal's office. However, in Metropolitan Manila That section meaningfully begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the
and other chartered cities, the complaint may be filed only with the office of the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the
fiscal. section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The
phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases
In all cases such institution interrupts the period of prescription of the offense covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the Rule on
charged. (Emphasis supplied.) Summary Procedure. This interpretation conforms to the canon that words in a
statute should be read in relation to and not isolation from the rest of the
Emphasis is laid on the last paragraph. The respondent maintains that the filing measure, to discover the true legislative intent.
of the complaint with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor comes under the
phrase "such institution" and that the phrase "in all cases" applies to all cases, As it is clearly provided in the Rule on Summary Procedure that among the
without distinction, including those falling under the Rule on Summary offenses it covers are violations of municipal or city ordinances, it should follow
Procedure. that the charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal
ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by that rule and not Section 1 of Rule 110.
The said paragraph, according to the respondent, was an adoption of the
following dictum in Francisco v. Court of Appeals: 5 Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the
jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts," the
In view of this diversity of precedents, and in order to provide guidance for Bench obvious reference is to Section 32(2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts:
and Bar, this Court has re-examined the question and, after mature
consideration, has arrived at the conclusion that the true doctrine is, and should (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment
be, the one established by the decisions holding that the filing of the complaint in of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four
the Municipal Court, even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other
17
imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from
such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or The Court realizes that under the above interpretation, a crime may prescribe
amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property even if the complaint is filed seasonably with the prosecutor's office if,
through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where intentionally or not, he delays the institution of the necessary judicial
the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. proceedings until it is too late. However, that possibility should not justify a
misreading of the applicable rules beyond their obvious intent as reasonably
These offenses are not covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure. deduced from their plain language. The remedy is not a distortion of the meaning
of the rules but a rewording thereof to prevent the problem here sought to be
Under Section 9 of the Rule on Summary Procedure, "the complaint or corrected.
information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary
examination or preliminary investigation." 6 Both parties agree that this provision Our conclusion is that the prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the
does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended
wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No.
court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the Office of the
investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be Provincial Prosecutor on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The
halted on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the
that. information with the Municipal Trial Court of Rodriguez, but this was done only
on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed.
This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which
says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the challenged Order dated October
instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 2, 1991 is SET ASIDE. Criminal Case No. 90-089 in the Municipal Trial Court of
thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the Solicitor Rodriguez, Rizal, is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of prescription. It is so
General that they include administrative proceedings. His contention is that we ordered.
must not distinguish as the law does not distinguish. As a matter of fact, it does.

At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Section 1 of Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict
between Act. No. 3326 and Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, the
latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making
power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under
Article VIII, Section 5(5) of the Constitution. Prescription in criminal cases is a
substantive right. 7

Going back to the Francisco case, we find it not irrelevant to observe that the
decision would have been conformable to Section 1, Rule 110, as the offense
involved was grave oral defamation punishable under the Revised Penal Code
with arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum
period. By contrast, the prosecution in the instant case is for violation of a
municipal ordinance, for which the penalty cannot exceed six months, 8 and is
thus covered by the Rule on Summary Procedure.
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