SECOND DIVISION

G. R. No. 125297 - June 6, 2003

ELVIRA YU OH, Petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. CR No. 16390, promulgated on January 30, 1996, affirming
the conviction of petitioner Elvira Yu Oh by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch
99, Quezon City and the resolution dated May 30, 1996 which denied her motion for
reconsideration.

The facts as borne by the records are as follows:

Petitioner purchased pieces of jewelry from Solid Gold International Traders, Inc., a
company engaged in jewelry trading. Due to her failure to pay the purchase price,
Solid Gold filed civil cases2 against her for specific performance before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig. On September 17, 1990, petitioner and Solid Gold, through its
general manager Joaquin Novales III, entered into a compromise agreement to settle
said civil cases.3 The compromise agreement, as approved by the trial court, provided
that petitioner shall issue a total of ninety-nine post-dated checks in the amount of
P50,000.00 each, dated every 15th and 30th of the month starting October 1, 1990 and
the balance of over P1 million to be paid in lump sum on November 16, 1994 which is
also the due date of the 99th and last postdated check. Petitioner issued ten checks at
P50,000.00 each, for a total of P500,000.00, drawn against her account at the
Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC), Grace Park, Caloocan City Branch. Novales
then deposited each of the ten checks on their respective due dates with the Far East
Bank and Trust Company (FEBTC). However, said checks were dishonored by EBC
for the reason "Account Closed." Dishonor slips were issued for each check that was
returned to Novales.4

On October 5, 1992, Novales filed ten separate Informations, docketed as Criminal

Cases Nos. 92-26243 to 92-36252 before the RTC of Quezon City charging petitioner
with violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing
Checks Law.5 Except for the dates and the check numbers, the Informations uniformly
allege:

That on or about the in Quezon City, Philippines, the said

accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously make or draw and issue to JOAQUIN P. LOVALES III
to apply on account or for value Equitable Banking Corp. Grace
 Park Caloocan Branch Check No. dated payable to SOLID GOLD
INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC. in the amount of P50,000.00,
Philippine Currency, said accused well knowing that at the
time of issue she/he/they did not have sufficient funds in
or credit with the drawee bank for payment of such check in
full upon its presentment, which check when presented for
payment was subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for
insufficiency of funds/Account Closed and despite receipt of
notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said SOLID
GOLD INTERNATIONAL TRADERS, INC. the amount of said check or
to make arrangement for full payment of the same within five
(5) banking days after receiving said notice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

The cases were consolidated and subsequently raffled to Branch 99 of the said RTC.
Upon arraignment, accused pleaded not guilty.7 Trial then ensued. On December 22,
1993, the RTC rendered its decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused GUILTY of ten counts

of violation of BP 22 and hereby sentences her to a penalty
of one year imprisonment for each count, or a total of ten
years, to be served in accordance with the limitation
prescribed in par. 4, Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code
and to indemnify complainant the amount of the checks in their
totality, or in the amount of P500,000.00.

SO ORDERED.8

Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals alleging that: the RTC has no jurisdiction
over the offense charged in the ten informations; it overlooked the fact that no notice
of dishonor had been given to the appellant as drawer of the dishonored checks; it
failed to consider that the reason of "closed account" for the dishonor of the ten
checks in these cases is not the statutory cause to warrant prosecution, much more a
conviction, under B.P. Blg. 22; it failed to consider that there is only one act which
caused the offense, if any, and not ten separate cases; and it disregarded the definition
of what a 'check' is under Sec. 185 of the Negotiable Instruments Law.9

Finding the appeal to be without merit, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of
the trial court with costs against appellant.

Hence, herein petition raising the following errors:

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING THE

JURISDICTIONAL ISSUE IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT BY
 UNJUSTLY DEPRIVING HER OF THE LEGAL BENEFITS OF GIVING
RETROACTIVE EFFECT TO THE PROVISIONS OF R.A. NO. 7691
EXPANDING THE JURISDICTION OF THE INFERIOR COURTS TO COVER
THE OFFENSES INVOLVED IN THESE CASES PURSUANT TO ART. 22 OF
THE REVISED PENAL CODE, THUS IN EFFECT RENDERING THE JUDGMENT
OF CONVICTION PROMULGATED BY THE TRIAL COURT BELOW AND
AFFIRMED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY NULL AND VOID FOR
HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.

II

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RESOLVING IN FAVOR OF

ACCUSED-APPELLANT THE FACT THAT NO NOTICE OF DISHONOR HAD
BEEN GIVEN HER AS DRAWER OF THE DISHONORED "CHECKS" PURSUANT
TO THE REQUIREMENT EXPRESSLY PROVIDED UNDER BATAS PAMBANSA
BILANG 22.

III

THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN CONSTRUING THE PROVISIONS

OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG 22 CONTRARY TO THE WELL-ESTABLISHED
RULE OF STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION THAT "PENAL STATUTES,
SUBSTANTIVE AND REMEDIAL OR PROCEDURAL, ARE, BY THE
CONSECRATED RULE, CONSTRUED STRICTLY AGAINST THE STATE, OR
LIBERALLY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED" AND THAT "IT IS ALWAYS THE
DUTY OF THE COURT TO RESOLVE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF EVIDENCE
UPON A THEORY OF INNOCENCE RATHER THAN UPON A THEORY OF GUILT
WHERE IT IS POSSIBLE TO DO SO", AND IN SO DOING THE DECISION
APPEALED FROM INDULGED ITSELF IN "JUDICIAL LEGISLATION" TO
FAVOR THE PROSECUTION AND TO WORK GRAVE INJUSTICE TO THE
ACCUSED.

Simply worded, the issues of this case may be stated as follows: (1) whether or not the
appellate court erred in not granting retroactive effect to Republic Act No. 769110 in
view of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); (2) whether or not notice of
dishonor is dispensable in this case; and (3) whether or not the appellate court erred in
construing B.P. Blg. 22.

We will resolve the first and third issues before considering the second issue.

First issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in not giving retroactive effect
to R.A. 7690 in view of Article 22 of the RPC.

Petitioner argues that: the failure of the appellate court to give retroactive application
to R.A. 7691 is a violation of Art. 22 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that
penal laws shall have retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of the
felony; R.A. 7691 is a penal law in the sense that it affects the jurisdiction of the court
to take cognizance of criminal cases; taken separately, the offense covered by each of
the ten Informations in this case falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Municipal Trial Court under Sec. 2 of R.A. 7691; and the Court of Appeals is guilty
of judicial legislation in stating that after the arraignment of petitioner, said cases
could no longer be transferred to the MTC without violating the rules on double
jeopardy, because that is not so provided in R.A. 7691.11

The Solicitor General, in its Comment, counters that the arguments of petitioner are
baseless contending that: penal laws are those which define crimes and provides for
their punishment; laws defining the jurisdiction of courts are substantive in nature and
not procedural for they do not refer to the manner of trying cases but to the authority
of the courts to hear and decide certain and definite cases in the various instances of
which they are susceptible; R.A. No. 7691 is a substantive law and not a penal law as
nowhere in its provisions does it define a crime neither does it provide a penalty of
any kind; the purpose of enacting R.A. No. 7691 is laid down in the opening sentence
thereof as "An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Courts,
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and the Metropolitan Trial Court" whereby it
reapportions the jurisdiction of said courts to cover certain civil and criminal case,
erstwhile tried exclusively by the Regional Trial Courts; consequently, Art. 22 of the
RPC finds no application to the case at bar; jurisdiction is determined by the law in
force at the time of the filing of the complaint, and once acquired, jurisdiction is not
affected by subsequent legislative enactments placing jurisdiction in another tribunal;
in this case, the RTC was vested with jurisdiction to try petitioner's cases when the
same were filed in October 1992; at that time, R.A. No. 7691 was not yet effective;12
in so far as the retroactive effect of R.A. No. 7691 is concerned, that same is limited
only to pending civil cases that have not reached pre-trial stage as provided for in
Section 7 thereof and as clarified by this Court in People vs. Yolanda Velasco13,
where it was held: "[a] perusal of R.A. No. 7691 will show that its retroactive
provisions apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the pre-trial stage.
Neither from an express proviso nor by implication can it be understood as having
retroactive application to criminal cases pending or decided by the RTC prior to its
effectivity."14

On this point, the Court fully agrees with the Solicitor General and holds that Article
22 of the Revised Penal Code finds no application to the case at bar.

Said provision reads:

ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. Penal laws shall

have a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person
guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this
term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although
at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence
has been pronounced and the convict is serving sentence.

A penal law, as defined by this Court, is an act of the legislature that prohibits certain
acts and establishes penalties for its violations. It also defines crime, treats of its
nature and provides for its punishment.15 R.A. No. 7691 does not prohibit certain acts
or provides penalties for its violation; neither does it treat of the nature of crimes and
its punishment. Consequently, R.A. No. 7691 is not a penal law, and therefore, Art. 22
of the RPC does not apply in the present case.

B. P. Blg. 22, which took effect on April 24, 1979, provides the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty days but not more than one year or by a fine of
not less than but not more then double the amount of the check which fine shall in no
case exceed P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the
court.

R.A. No. 7691 which took effect on June 15, 1994, amended B.P. Blg. 129, and
vested on the Metropolitan, Municipal and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts jurisdiction
to try cases punishable by imprisonment of not more than six (6) years.16 Since R.A.
No. 7691 vests jurisdiction on courts, it is apparent that said law is substantive.17

In the case of Cang vs. Court of Appeals,18 this Court held that "jurisdiction being a
matter of substantive law, the established rule is that the statute in force at the time of
the commencement of the action determines the jurisdiction of the court."19 R.A. No.
7691 was not yet in force at the time of the commencement of the cases in the trial
court. It took effect only during the pendency of the appeal before the Court of
Appeals.20 There is therefore no merit in the claim of petitioner that R.A. No. 7691
should be retroactively applied to this case and the same be remanded to the MTC.
The Court has held that a "law vesting additional jurisdiction in the court cannot be
given retroactive effect."21

Third issue Whether or not the Court of Appeals erroneously construed B.P. Blg. 22.

Petitioner insists that: penal statutes must be strictly construed and where there is any
reasonable doubt, it must always be resolved in favor of the accused;22 the Court of
Appeals, in construing that B.P. Blg. 22 embraces cases of "no funds" or "closed
accounts" when the express language of B.P. Blg. 22 penalizes only the issuance of
checks that are subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for "insufficiency" of
funds or credit, has enlarged by implication the meaning of the statute which amounts
to judicial legislation;23 a postdated check, not being drawn payable on demand, is
technically not a special kind of a bill of exchange, called check, but an ordinary bill
of exchange payable at a fixed date, which is the date indicated on the face of the
postdated check, hence, the instrument is still valid and the obligation covered thereby,
but only civilly and not criminally;24 the trial court also erroneously cited a portion in
the case of Lozano vs. Martinez25 that the "language of B.P. Blg. 22 is broad enough
to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for
something of value," since the same is mere obiter dictum;26 in the interpretation of
the meaning of a "check", where the law is clear and unambiguous, the law must be
taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.27

The Solicitor General counters that a postdated check is still a check and its being a
postdated instrument does not necessarily make it a bill of exchange "payable at a
fixed or determinable future time" since it is still paid on demand on the date
indicated therein or thereafter just like an ordinary check.28 It also points out that the
doctrine laid down in Lozano vs. Martinez was reiterated in People vs. Nitafan,29
hence, it can no longer be argued that the statement in the case of Lozano regarding
the scope of "checks" is mere obiter dictum.

Again, we agree with the Solicitor General and find petitioner's claim to be without
merit.

The rationale behind B.P. Blg. 22 was initially explained by the Court in the landmark
case of Lozano vs. Martinez30 where we held that:

The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the

act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that
is dishonored upon its presentation for payment The thrust
of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the
making or worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest,
the practice is proscribed by law. The law punished the act
not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.31

. . .

The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcend

the private interests of the parties directly involved in the
transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee
or holder but also an injury to the public. The harmful
practice of putting valueless commercial papers in
circulation, multiplied a thousandfold, can very well
pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and
the public interest.32

The same is reiterated in Cueme vs. People33 where we pronounced that:

. . . B.P. Blg. 22 was purposely enacted to prevent the

proliferation of worthless checks in the mainstream of daily
business and to avert not only the undermining of the banking
system of the country but also the infliction of damage and
injury upon trade and commerce occasioned by the
indiscriminate issuances of such checks. By its very nature,
the offenses defined under B.P. Blg. 22 are against public
interest.34

In Recuerdo vs. People, this Court also held that the terms and conditions surrounding
the issuance of the checks are irrelevant since its primordial intention is to ensure the
stability and commercial value of checks as being virtual substitutes for currency.35
Petitioner's claim that cases of "closed accounts" are not included in the coverage of
B.P. Blg. 22 has no merit considering the clear intent of the law, which is to
discourage the issuance of worthless checks due to its harmful effect to the public.
This Court, in Lozano vs. Martinez, was explicit in ruling that the language of B.P.
Blg. 22 is broad enough to cover all kinds of checks, whether present dated or
postdated, or whether issued in payment of pre-existing obligations or given in mutual
or simultaneous exchange for something of value.36

In People vs. Nitafan,37 the Supreme Court reiterated this point and held that:

B.P. Blg. 22 does not distinguish but merely provides that

"[any person who makes or draws and issues any check knowing
at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds
in or credit with the drawee bank which check is subsequently
dishonored shall be punished by imprisonment Ubi lex non
distinguit nec nos distinguere debemus.

But even if We retrace the enactment of the "Bouncing Check

Law" to determine the parameters of the concept of "check",
we can easily glean that the members of the then Batasang
Pambansa intended it to be comprehensive as to include all
checks drawn against banks.38

In this light, it is easy to see that the claim of petitioner that B.P. Blg. 22 does not
include 'postdated checks' and cases of 'closed accounts' has no leg to stand on. The
term "closed accounts" is within the meaning of the phrase "does not have sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank".

Anent the second issue: whether or not notice of dishonor is dispensable in the case at
bar. Petitioner failed to show any cogent reason for us to disturb the findings of the
RTC and the Court of Appeals.

B.P. Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Check's Law seeks to prevent the act of making and
issuing checks with the knowledge that at the time of issue, the drawer does not have
sufficient funds in or credit with the bank for payment and the checks were
subsequently dishonored upon presentment.39 To be convicted thereunder, the
following elements must be proved:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to

account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or

she does not have sufficient funds in, or credit with, the
drawee bank for the payment of the check in full upon its
presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank

for insufficiency of funds or credit or it would have been
 dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without
any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.40

For liability to attach under B.P. Blg. 22, it is not enough that the prosecution
establishes that checks were issued and that the same were subsequently dishonored.
The prosecution must also prove that the issuer, at the time of the check's issuance,
had knowledge that he did not have enough funds or credit in the bank of payment
thereof upon its presentment.41

Since the second element involves a state of mind which is difficult to establish,
Section 2 of B.P. Blg. 22 created a prima facie presumption of such knowledge, as
follows:

SEC. 2. Evidence of knowledge of insufficient funds. The

making, drawing and issuance of a check payment of which is
refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or
credit with such bank, when presented within ninety (90) days
from the date of the check, shall be prima facie evidence of
knowledge of such insufficiency of funds or credit unless
such maker or drawer pays the holder thereof the amount due
thereon, or makes arrangements for payment in full by the
drawee of such check within five (5) banking days after
receiving notice that such check has not been paid by the
drawee.

Based on this section, the presumption that the issuer had knowledge of the
insufficiency of funds is brought into existence only after it is proved that the issuer
had received a notice of dishonor and that within five days from receipt thereof, he
failed to pay the amount of the check or to make arrangement for its payment.42 The
presumption or prima facie evidence as provided in this section cannot arise, if such
notice of non-payment by the drawee bank is not sent to the maker or drawer, or if
there is no proof as to when such notice was received by the drawer, since there
would simply be no way of reckoning the crucial 5-day period.43

In this case, it is not disputed that checks were issued by petitioner and said checks
were subsequently dishonored. The question however is, was petitioner furnished a
notice of dishonor? If not, is it sufficient justification to exonerate petitioner from her
criminal and civil liabilities for issuing the bouncing checks?

The trial court ruled that the second element is present because:

the accused knew at the time of issuance of the checks that

she did not have sufficient funds in or credit with her drawee
bank for the payment of the checks in full upon their
presentment [as admitted by her in the Counter-Affidavit she
executed during the preliminary investigation of these
criminal cases (itals. ours), to wit:
 4. That the time of the issuance of the said
checks, due notice and information had been so
given to Solid Gold anent the actual status of
the checks that the same might not be able to
cover the amount of the said checks so stated
therein (Exhibit "N", "1", underscoring
supplied).

This fact became evident again during the cross-examination

by the accused's counsel of the prosecution's witness,
Joaquin Novales III:

ATTY. TAGANAS:

Q: And the reason you agreed to the terms and conditions for
the issuance of post-dated checks because you are also aware
the particular time the accused Mrs. Elvira Yu Oh did not also
have enough funds or money in the bank within which to cover
the amount of the checks?

A: I am not aware, sir.

. . .

Q: To your knowledge when the accused had already admitted

to you that she had not enough money to pay you?

A: That is the terms and promise and agreed upon, sir.

Q: But inspite of the fact that she already told you about
that, that you never suspected that she did not have enough
money to cover the checks agreed upon and issued to you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: And inspite of the fact she told you you never suspected
that she did not have enough money to cover you . . .

Q: You still believe that although she does not have enough
money she still issued checks to you?

A: Yes, sir. (TSN, April 6, 1993, pp. 24-26)

At any rate, there is already prima facie evidence of

knowledge of insufficiency of funds on the part of the accused
from her failure to pay the amount due on the checks or to
 make arrangements for payment in full by the drawee bank
within five banking days after she received notice of their
dishonor, each of the checks having been presented within
ninety days from their respective dated (B.P. Blg. 22, Sec.
2). The defense did not controvert this evidence. (itals.
44
ours)

Although the trial court in its decision, mentioned that herein petitioner received
notices of dishonor, nowhere in the records is there proof that the prosecution ever
presented evidence that petitioner received or was furnished a notice of dishonor. The
notices of dishonor that were presented in court and marked as Exhibits "D-2", "E-2",
"F-2", "G-2", "H-2", "I-2", "J-2", "K-2", "L-2", "C-2"45 were all sent to the private
complainant, Solid Gold, and not to petitioner. In convicting petitioner, the trial court,
gave probative weight on the admission of petitioner in her Counter-Affidavit which
she submitted during the preliminary investigation that at the time of issuance of the
subject checks, she was aware and even told private complainant that the checks
might not be able to cover the amount stated therein.

The Court of Appeals sustained the RTC, to wit:

. . . Neither can We agree that accused-appellant was still

entitled to notice of dishonor of the bouncing checks as she
had no more checking account with the drawee bank at the time
of the dishonor of the ten checks in question.
Accused-appellant must have realized that by closing her
checking account after issuing the ten postdated checks, all
of said checks would bounce. Knowing that she had already
closed her checking account with the drawee bank, certainly
accused-appellant would not have expected, even in her
wildest imagination, that her postdated checks would be
honored by the drawee bank. Thus, accused-appellant need not
be notified anymore of the obvious dishonor of her rubber
46
checks. (itals. ours)

Based on the law and existing jurisprudence, we find that the appellate court erred in
convicting petitioner.

In cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, it is necessary that the prosecution prove that
the issuer had received a notice of dishonor. Since service of notice is an issue, the
person alleging that the notice was served must prove the fact of service. Basic also is
the doctrine that in criminal cases, the quantum of proof required is proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, for cases of B.P. Blg. 22 there should be clear proof of
notice.47

Indeed, this requirement cannot be taken lightly because Section 2 provides for an
opportunity for the drawer to effect full payment of the amount appearing on the
check, within five banking days from notice of dishonor. The absence of said notice
therefore deprives an accused of an opportunity to preclude criminal prosecution. In
other words, procedural due process demands that a notice of dishonor be actually
served on petitioner. In the case at bar, appellant has a right to demand and the basic
postulate of fairness requires that the notice of dishonor be actually sent to and
received by her to afford her to opportunity to aver prosecution under B.P. Blg. 22.48

The Solicitor General contends that notice of dishonor is dispensable in this case
considering that the cause of the dishonor of the checks was "Account Closed" and
therefore, petitioner already knew that the checks will bounce anyway. This argument
has no merit. The Court has decided numerous cases where checks were dishonored
for the reason, "Account Closed"49 and we have explicitly held in said cases that "it is
essential for the maker or drawer to be notified of the dishonor of her check, so she
could pay the value thereof or make arrangements for its payment within the period
prescribed by law"50 and omission or neglect on the part of the prosecution to prove
that the accused received such notice of dishonor is fatal to its cause.51

A perusal of the testimony of the prosecution witness Joaquin Novales III, General
Manager of complainant Solid Gold, discloses that no personal demands were made
on appellant before the filing of the complaints against her.52 Thus, absent a clear
showing that petitioner actually knew of the dishonor of her checks and was given the
opportunity to make arrangements for payment as provided for under the law, we
cannot with moral certainty convict her of violation of B.P. Blg. 22. The failure of the
prosecution to prove that petitioner was given the requisite notice of dishonor is a
clear ground for her acquittal.53

Moreover, as understood by the trial court itself in the herein aforequoted portion of
its decision, General Manager Novales knew of the non-availability of sufficient
funds when appellant issued the subject checks to him. This Court has held that there
is no violation of B.P. 22 if complainant was told by the drawer that he has no
sufficient funds in the bank.54

For these reasons, we reverse the ruling of the Court of Appeals affirming the trial
court's conviction of petitioner for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. This is without prejudice,
however, to her civil liability towards private complainant Solid Gold in the amount
of P500,000.00 plus interest thereon at the rate of 12% per annum from date of
finality of herein judgment.55

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Elvira Yu Oh is ACQUITTED of
the offense of violation of B.P. Blg. 22 on ten counts for insufficiency of evidence.
However, she is ordered to pay complainant Solid Gold International Traders, Inc. the
total amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) with 12% interest per
annum from date of finality of herein judgment.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.