G.R. No.

199875               November 21, 2012

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is an appeal from the December 17, 2010 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR
1 

No. 28761, which affirmed the April 26, 2004 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 98,
2 

Quezon City (RTC), finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of
Rape and Frustrated Murder.

On July 25, 1997, two separate Informations for Frustrated Murder and Rape were filed before
the RTC, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-97-72078 and Q-97-72079, respectively. These
informations read:

Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078

The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL of the crime of Frustrated Murder, committed
as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with
intent to kill, with treachery and with evident premeditation, with abuse of superior strength, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and employ personal violence upon the
person of AAA by then and there stabbing her with a kitchen knife, hitting her twice below the chest,
3 

thereby inflicting upon said AAA serious and mortal wounds, the offender thus performing all the acts
of execution which would produce death, which, however, was not produced by reason of cause
independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical intervention, to the damage and
prejudice of the said offended party.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 4

Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079

The undersigned accuses EDWIN ISLA Y ROSSELL, of the crime of Rape, committed as follows:

That on or about the 21st day of July, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused by means
of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress her and
put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant
against her will and without her consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW. 5

Evidence for the Prosecution

During the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses; namely: complainant AAA; Dr. Ma.
Cristina Freyra (Dr. Freyra), the chief of the medico-legal division of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) Crime Laboratory; and Dr. Reynaldo Perez (Dr. Perez) of the East Avenue Medical Center,
AAA’s attending physician.

According to AAA’s account, on July 21, 1997, at around 3:00 o’clock in the afternoon, she was
inside her rented house together with her two (2) children, aged 1 ½ years old and 9 months
old, respectively. She then noticed that accused Edwin Isla (Isla) was standing by the door of
her kitchen. He asked her what time her landlady would be arriving and she answered that
she had no idea. Thereafter, she opened the door of the kitchen, hoping that
passersby would see him inside the house. After fifteen (15) minutes, she was
startled when he suddenly poked a knife on her neck and pulled her inside the
bedroom. By this time, she noticed that she had already closed the window and the door of the
living room. She pleaded and begged for mercy but to no avail. She was warned not to
shout or resist otherwise she would be stabbed.

Inside the bedroom, she was made to lie down on the floor because there was no
bed. Isla placed himself on top of her and then he removed her upper clothing. He raised
her bra, exposing her breasts and then kissed them. Eventually, he made her
spread her legs and had carnal knowledge with her. While he was committing the
dastardly act, she noticed a knife pointed at her. She also informed the trial court that
during the whole ordeal, her children were present and witnessed everything.

When Isla stood up after raping her, she noticed that the knife he was holding was already
bloodstained. At this point, she found out that she was stabbed with the knife. She tried to take
hold of the knife while shouting for help. In response, Isla struck her the second time, this
time, under her lower left breast. She also sustained a wound on her palm while trying to disarm
him. Then the knife fell to the floor. It was at this moment that she was able to get hold of it
and she threw it outside through a broken window in the room. Thereafter, Isla
scampered out of the house through the backdoor.

In a little while, a neighbor came knocking at the door and was able to see AAA’s condition. She was
taken to the East Avenue Medical Center (EAMC) for medical attention and was confined there for
five (5) days.

At the hospital, Dr. Freyra conducted an examination on AAA upon the request of the station
commander of the PNP Lagro Police Station. Based on her findings, AAA sustained eleven (11)
body injuries, two (2) of which were stab wounds, six (6) incised wounds and two
(2) contusions. The stab wounds required medical attendance of not less than 30 days.
An examination of AAA’s sexual organ showed congestions and abrasion in the labia
minora and yielded negative result on the presence of spermatozoa.

AAA’s attending physician, Dr. Perez, on the other hand, testified that she had multiple stab wounds
on the left side of the chest. Her chest x-ray result disclosed an accumulation of blood in the thorax
which required him to conduct a procedure to drain the blood. He concluded that the stab
wounds were severe and fatal which could have led to AAA’s death had it not
been for the timely medical attendance.
Evidence for the Defense

For the defense, accused Edwin Isla was presented together with two (2) psychiatric doctors who
examined him.

Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997. Invoking the defense of insanity,
he testified that before the incident, he and AAA had an illicit relationship for
about two months until they broke up. He had to use a knife to be able to
have sexual intercourse with her. It was the first time that he and AAA
had sex. After raping her, he admitted stabbing AAA twice, first on
her left breast and then on her lower right breast "for reason he
cannot understand." He also punched her several times when she attempted to
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grab the knife from him.

As to Isla’s claim of insanity, Dr. Juan Villacorta (Dr. Villacorta) and Dr. Mary Gomez (Dr. Gomez) of
the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) were presented as qualified expert witnesses.

Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder with
psychotic features; that he manifested psychosis on account of his hallucinations, poor impulse
control, poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that he exhibited such behavioral
pattern immediately prior to being jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however, could not say with definite
certainty or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder on July 21, 1997 as there was no
examination conducted on Isla on the said date. 7

To corroborate Dr. Villacorta’s findings, Dr. Gomez was presented. After a thorough interview and
psychiatric testing on Isla, she likewise observed that Isla was suffering from a major
depressive disorder which impaired his mental faculties. She said that his psychosis
could have been existing prior to or about July 21, 1997 but again, like Dr. Villacorta, she
opined that such finding could not be conclusive because of lack of information from
other informants during that time. 8

Ruling of the RTC

On April 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder.
It did not give credence to his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla
committed the crimes charged during a lucid interval. He knew that what he was
doing was unlawful. There was no indication that he was deprived of reason or
discernment and freedom of will when he committed all the acts attending the
commission of the crime. The RTC gave no weight to the assertion of the defense that,
based on the evaluations made by the doctors from NCMH, Isla was suffering from psychosis
since 1992. It was of the impression that there was nothing in the testimony of these expert
witnesses that Isla was suffering from psychosis long before the incident. On this note, his
9 

condition could not be equated with imbecility; hence, he could not be exempt from criminal liability.
Thus, the RTC ruled in this wise:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment in these cases is hereby rendered as follows:

 1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as defined and penalized under Art. 335 of
the Revised Penal Code, and hereby SENTENCES him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify complainant AAA the amount of Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity
ex delicto, the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the cause of suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, the Court finds accused Edwin Isla y Rosell GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Murder and hereby SENTENCES him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum,
and to indemnify complainant the sum of P10,000.00 for actual damages, and to pay the
cause of suit.

SO ORDERED. 10

Ruling of the CA

Aggrieved, Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. On December 17, 2010, the CA denied the
appeal and affirmed the RTC decision which found Isla to have acted with
discernment when he committed the crimes. According to the CA, Isla exactly knew
that what he was doing was evil so much so that he had to employ cunning
means, by discreetly closing the windows and the door of the house and by
resorting to threats and violence, to ensure the consummation of his dastardly
deed. The fact that he scampered away after AAA was able to take the knife from him, would only
show that he fully understood that he committed a crime for which he could be held liable.

The CA did not give weight to the expert testimonies given by the two psychiatric doctors
either. Since the mental examination on Isla was taken four to six years after the
commission of the crimes, the doctors could not say with definite certainty that he was
suffering from psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the
crimes which was very vital for said defense to prosper. Thus, the CA affirmed the RTC
decision.11

Hence, the present appeal.

Both the prosecution and the defense opted not to file any supplemental briefs and manifested that
they were adopting their arguments in their respective briefs filed before the CA. In his Appellant’s
Brief, the defense presented the following:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED–APPELLANT

NOTWITHSTANDING THAT HIS GUILT HAS NOT BEEN PROVEN BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT WAS INSANE AT THE TIME OF THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE.
At the outset, this Court notes that there is no more question as to whether or not AAA was raped by
Isla. The latter never denied this fact which can be gleaned from his direct testimony, to wit:

Atty. Erasmo (defense counsel)

Q: So when you left at 4:00, where did you proceed?

A: To my aunt at Balintawak.

Q: How about AAA, what happened to her if you know?

A: she was raped and stabbed, sir.

Q: Who raped and stabbed AAA, if you know?

A: Me, sir.

Q: What time did this happen?

A: 3:00 o’clock, sir.

Q: Now, how did you rape AAA?

A: I went inside their house. 12

(Emphases supplied)

That being so, what is left for this jurisdiction to resolve is whether or not Isla’s claim of insanity is
creditable so as to exculpate him of the crimes he admittedly committed.

This Court is not convinced with Isla’s defense.

Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) provides for one of the circumstances which will exempt
one from criminal liability which is when the perpetrator of the act was an imbecile or insane, unless
the latter has acted during a lucid interval. This circumstance, however, is not easily
available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the exception rather
than the rule in the human condition. Under Article 800 of the Civil Code, the presumption is
that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity bears the
burden of proving it with clear and convincing evidence. It is in the nature of confession and
avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or
she is not guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must,
however, relate to the time immediately preceding or simultaneous with the commission
of the offense with which he is charged.13

In the case at bench, the defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The
respective testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified
expert witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the
mental examination on Isla taken four to six years after the incident happened in July
1997, in effect, showed that it could not be concluded with certainty that he was
suffering from such psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the
commission of the crimes. The expert witnesses themselves opined that their findings were
not conclusive as to whether Isla was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination
was made on said day or for lack of information from other informants during that time. 14

This Court also agrees with the observation of the RTC as affirmed by the CA that Isla acted with
discernment as can be deduced from his acts before, during and after the commission of the crimes
with which he was charged. The RTC wrote:

The overt acts committed by the accused are attributed to a criminal mind, not a lunatic.
There is no indication whatsoever that he was completely deprived of reason or discernment
and freedom of will when he stood for a while by the door of complainant’s house, then
entered it, toyed with a disconnected telephone set, and cunningly poked a knife at
complainant’s neck and dragged her inside the room where he raped her. The fact that he first
discreetly closed the door and the window before he approached and poked a knife at complainant,
then, as he laid on top of her, ordered her to undress, kissed her breast, separated apart her legs
with his own legs, and satisfied his lust, all the while holding a knife with his right hand poked at
complainant’s body, are calculated means to ensure consummation of his lewd design. These are
by no means the workings of an imbecile, but by one engulfed by lust. 15

In the case of People vs. Rafanan, Jr., this Court has held that the defense of insanity may be
accepted as an exempting circumstance on the test of cognition, which requires
a complete deprivation of intelligence, not only of the will, in committing the
criminal act. Thus, when the accused in said case, threatened the victim with death in case she
reported her ravishment indicated that he was aware of the reprehensible moral depravity of that
assault and that he was not deprived of intelligence.16

If Isla had become insane after the commission of the crime, such fact does not alter the
situation and the Court’s ruling is the same. His defense still fails considering that he
was not insane during the commission of the acts charged. Any problem regarding his
present mental condition should be dealt with administratively.

With respect to the stabbings, it appears that Isla committed two acts. The first was while he was
ravishing AAA. The Court considers this and the rape as one continuous act, the stabbing being
necessary, as far as he was concerned, for the successful perpetration of the crime. When he
testified, Isla claimed that he had to use the knife so he could have sexual intercourse with her.

The second stabbing took place after consummation of the rape act. According to AAA, after her
defilement, she noticed the knife bloodied and she tried to wrest it from him. In their struggle, she
was stabbed under her lower left breast but she was able to force Isla to drop the knife. At this point,
Isla was able to escape through the backdoor. This second stabbing is a separate and
distinct offense as it was not a necessary means to commit the rape. It was
intended to do away with her life. Thus, it has been written, "Where a girl was raped and then
strangled to death, the crimes are the separate crimes of rape and homicide, not complex." This
17 

was also the ruling in People v. Dawandawan, where it was written:

18 

The physical injuries which could have caused the victim's death were not the result of the rape
committed; neither was the slashing a necessary means for committing the rape. Independently of
the slashing of the victim's neck and the stabbing, the accused was able to consummate the rape.
The physical injuries were inflicted after the rape and were not a necessary means to commit the
same. Hence, the crimes committed are the two separate crimes of Rape and Frustrated Homicide.

The Court, however, finds itself unable to agree that the second crime committed was
frustrated murder. In the information, it was alleged that the stabbing was committed
with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength. There is, however,
nothing in the records of the case that would show the presence of the said qualifying
circumstances.

Evidently, there was no treachery. For treachery to exist "the offender commits any of the crimes
against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the
offended party might make." It is important in ascertaining the existence of treachery that it be
proven that the attack was made swiftly, deliberately, unexpectedly, and without a warning,
thus affording the unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape the attack. In the 19 

case at bench, Isla’s attack was not sudden, swift, deliberate and without warning.
He stabbed AAA during the course of the struggle. T hus, the prosecution failed to show
that the stabbing was so calculated as not to afford AAA the chance to evade the attack.

Moreover, the attack was not with evident premeditation. The elements of evident premeditation
are: (1) a previous decision by the accused to commit the crime; (2) overt act/acts manifestly
indicating that the accused clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time between the decision
to commit the crime and its actual execution sufficient to allow accused to reflect upon the
consequences of his acts. These circumstances were not obtaining in the case at bench. An
examination of the facts would reveal that there was no sufficient time that elapsed for
Isla to decide to commit the crime and reflect on its consequences. Moreover,
there was no showing that he performed other overt acts to show that he was
determined to commit murder. The essence of evident premeditation is that the execution of
the criminal act must be preceded by cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the
criminal intent, during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm judgment. When Isla stabbed
20 

AAA the second time, it was more of a reaction to the possibility of his being disarmed by his victim
rather than a well-planned attack to kill her.

Neither was there an abuse of superior strength. There was no showing that Isla took
advantage of his superior strength to consummate the crime.

For said reasons, the crime charged should have been frustrated homicide only. Consequently the
penalty should be changed.

Under Article 249 of the RPC, the imposable penalty for one found guilty of Homicide is reclusion
temporal, whose duration is from twelve (12) years and one (1) day to twenty (20) years.
Considering that the crime is frustrated, Article 250 in relation to Article 50 of the RPC provides that
the penalty next lower in degree of the penalty prescribed by law for the consummated felony should
be imposed. Thus, the penalty should only be prision mayor, the duration of which is from six (6)
years to twelve (12) years.

Considering that there are neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, Article 64 of the RPC
provides that the penalty should be in its medium period which is eight (8) years and one (1) day to
ten (10) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum term should be within the range of prision
correccional, the penalty next lower in degree. Hence, for the crime of frustrated homicide, Isla
should suffer the indeterminate penalty ranging from four (4) years of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.

With respect to the civil aspect, he should also be made to pay AAA the amount of P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages in addition to the civil indemnity ex delicto and moral damages awarded. Said
award is in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence on simple rape wherein exemplary damages
are awarded in order to set a public example and to protect hapless individuals from sexual
molestation. 21

In lieu of the award of P10,000.00 as actual damages, an award of temperate damages should be
given instead. The Court has consistently held that in order for one to be entitled to actual damages,
the claim must not only be capable of proof, but must actually be proved with a reasonable degree of
certainty. Courts cannot simply rely on speculation, conjecture or guesswork in determining the fact
and amount of damages but there must be competent proof of the actual amount of loss. Credence
can be given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts. 22

In this case, AAA failed to provide receipts to substantiate her claim. This Court, however, is not
unmindful of the fact that AAA was hospitalized for about five (5) days. Considering that the
expenses she incurred cannot be proved with certainty, an award of temperate damages is but
proper. Temperate damages may be allowed in cases where from the nature of the case, definite
proof of pecuniary loss cannot be adduced, although the court is convinced that the aggrieved party
suffered some pecuniary loss. An award of P8,000.00 as temperate damages is, to the Court's
23 

mind, just.
1âwphi1

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS with ,MODIFICATION the December 17, 2010 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 28761 as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72079, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Rape, the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA P50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and P50,000.00
as moral damages, P30,000.00 as exemplary damages; and to pay the cost of suit.

2. In Criminal Case No. Q-97-72078, finding the accused Edwin Isla y Rossell guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Frustrated Homicide, the Court hereby sentences him to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from four (4) years prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum;
to pay AAA the sum of P8,000.00 as temperate damages; and to pay the cost of suit.

SO ORDERED.