Infantry Rifle Squad PDF
Infantry Rifle Squad PDF
Infantry Rifle Squad PDF
N
tI BI1B1 -lLE COPY,
The Infantry Rifle Squad: Size
"Li Not the Only Problem
A Monograph
by
Major Paul E. Melody
Infantry
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Table of Contents Page
I. Introduction .......................................... 1
Bibliography ......................................... 55
I. INTRODUCTION
squad's dismount element is too small. Its six man size can
pressed it, the loss of even one soldier in the squad puts
Starting out with two fewer soldiers than before only makes
1
concern over the infantry squad's reduced size has focused
2
nearly three years of trial and error in attempting to
3
attack.'
American Army did not field a genuine squad LMG, •t did ac-
4
peacetime testing.
on squad size. the need for a squad light machine gun, and.
could not control the WWII twelve man squad - even with an
should be nine." 1
5
members in regards to the infantry squad concerned attri-
Any future infantry squad that was small enough for the
priate. The nine man squad - a squad leader and eight men -
squad LUG could provide the squad with the requisite fire
Likewise, the BAR was also too heavy and too limited in
firepower."
Army's squad LMG. the MG42, and the SG44 *assault* rifle.
8
The MQ42 had a quick barrel change capability which allowed
LMG, the M1919A6, which weighed thirty three pounds and had
firepower during the assault. The German SG44 had the capa-
squad: one part had to act as the base of fire and the
7
precluded effective command and control. Moreover, due to
man infantry squad with two NCOs (a squad leader and an as-
was small enough for the squad leader to command and con-
trol effectively.10
quintesrential LMG.10
8
Benning significantly changed the. American Army's infantry
ferees felt a nine man squad was the optimum size to me4
equate. "
rean and Chinese Communist armies, the US Army did not feel
9
infantrymen failed to apply existing doctrine.
cause the BAR lacked the firepower of a I.MG, the Army au-
NMarshall observed:
... the BAR, even more than the machine gun C
.
the M1919WA6, provides the base around which the action
of other infantry weapons builds up and the force [tho
squad and platoon] expresses itself unitedly....'The BAR
[on account of its light weight in comparison to the
M19l1AG.) is the pivotal weapon in this eddying of the
tactical situation'.2
size. It. was neither too large to control nor too small to
IV
absorb casualties. In short, the Korean combat experience
ployment.22
spite the lack of proof that the Army needed to change the
nine man squad, the Army adopted an eleven man squad orga-
ited the squad's optimutu size to less then teo men. Addi-
11
test recounted the need for the squad to have sufficient
"a suitable LMG, this would mean at least one BAR). Finally,
squad.
nized so it too could fire and maneuver. One can only sus-
12
suggest the Army change its squad organization and infantry
doctrine.20
two small fire teams with each team having one junior NCO.
one BAR, and three riflemen. The squad leader would only
namely, the two fire team leaders. The fire team leaders,
do as I do method.26
he thought it necessary.
ceptable."
13
recommendation to change the infantry squad's organization.
the terrain helped to bring this about, other than the fact
than they had appeared during WWII might have been due to
14
hard pressed to see why the Army needed to change its squad
tics. 2
15
The other fact that helped influence the Army to
drill made the squad and the platoon more effective. This
1
titled. Assault Battle brill.' As one can see. the battle
16
squad fire and maneuver to the Army's doctrine. Together,
neuver.14
enough men the squad could not provide both a base of fire
17
suffered casualties, the squad could not execute both fire
tives stated that the test did not prove that an NCO could
control a ten man squad, nor conduct squad fire and maneu-
Army retain the nine man squad rather than adopting the
riflemen."1
the seven man squad, with only one BAR, lacked the fire-
18
control the squad due to the fact that he had to fire his
power. Second, having only seven men, the squad lacked the
ten man squad organized with two BARs. It did not recommend
fantry 40
squad's organization.
evaluate the Army's nine man squad, the Third Infantry Di-
nine man squad was too small to execute squad fire and ma-
19
pared, A Study of the Infantry Rifle Squad TOE (ASIRS).43
mand and controlO: and structure (all except the eleven man
the squad had a BAR assigned - and only one leader). The
and defenses.46
20
capability, control, attrition effects, and
exceed this ratio and effectively have one man lead seven
21
In terms of attrit-on, ASI".S qljantified the rather
sign - to each squad. Squad size did not seem to affect the
eight man squad with only one or two BARs. Although, if the
eight man squad had three BARs, it was appreciably less ma-
ter. `
22
nate leaders and organizations - such as the eleven man
that the proposed eleven man "squad" with two fire teams
between the fire team based eleven man 'squad* and the nine
the nine man squad could not execute fire and maneuver, but
the eleven man fire team based squad could. This made sense
23
squad contained subordinate fire teams. Without maintaining
the fire team structure, and the need for squad fire and
maneuver, the eleven man squad was not superior to the nine
man squad.5 0
Rifle Squad and Platoon (OCRSP) test. The Army's Combat De-
ons: the M14 rifle, the M60 light machine gun, and the M79
24
and tactics. Moreover, OCRSP results corroborated many of
eleven man fire team based squad. But they did so with some
5
carefully stated caveats. 2
They were either fire team based, or based around one squad
leader with an assistant squad leader (the Korean War type
25
tic. Although different squad organizations were based on
form the same missions in the OCRSP. When the eleven man
fire team squad was adopted in 1956, it was expected to em-
ties.0
To evaluate the differences in tacical effectiveness,
2d
of automatic rifles (the M14 rifle on fully automatic) and
LMGs) .
also noted that when the eleven man squad suffered casual-
ties, the fire team structure fell apart. Specifically, the
ture, the squad had to have a Minimtm of ten men and three
NCOs. Moreover, having fewer than ten men prevented the
squad from conducting fire and maneuver. (This observation
would prove prophetic of the fire teom based squad's per-
rily due to the need to replace the two LMGs' gunners and
assistant gunners with riflemen. Eventually, as the squad
27
"quently lost its close combat capability.,. This was
firepower capability.50
size, the squad lost its close combat capability. Such was
not the case, however, when the squad had only one LMG. as
with those squads organized around a squad leader and an
assistant.40
28
(mentioned earlier), this loss of firepower might be a rea-
to fire and maneuver (as was the case following WWII) , the
luxury.63
the Army adopt an eleven man fire team based squad with two
LMGs, even though it recognized the fact that the fire team
the fire team concept.* Given this comment, the fact that
ence.04
29
ficulties of squad command and control. As a result, both
War, the Army had not officially used the fire team based
squad in combat. When the Army did use the fire team orga-
Army retained the fire team based squad and squad fire and
30
maneuver tactics. The US Army's leadership continued to
and direct fire infantry combat to date. The IRUS also per-
31
pose grenade launchers in a variety of tactical
nized that the terms 'fire team* and *squad' already had
tain. IRUS's framers thought the term BIE would insure the
cerns the BIE's size, and its command and control. The IRUS
tests and combat that most men could easily control five
32
- the terrain, mission, leader's experience etc.. The
noted that once the BIE'S strength fell below five men it
nine man BIE actually performed better than the slx man
33
point: the serious effects combat attrition had on the
nine men was too small to employ fire teams in squad fire
and maneuver. This point was also noted in the 1961 OCRSP
test.13
34
pression weapon in the attack, but of comparatively little
bers and mix, the one that seems most unusual - some would
two U•Gs per BIE are much harder for the BIE leader to con-
ing more L14Gs per BIE does not axiomatically mean more ef-
35
a BIE should have one LMG and a grenade launcher (to
First, the testers observed that a BIE was the smallest el-
nade launcher."'
the BIE should not both fire and maneuver. Rather, the
36
trolled by an element above the BIF, namely The Next
squad.
HISTORICAL CONCLUSIONS
LMG. The LMG gives the squad its most effective firepower.
37
large enough to remain effective even with the historically
bias for the fire team based squad in the years following
38
minimum, to sustain the fire team structure, even if the
fire team leaders did not become casualties, the authorized
nine men and the M-2 Infantry Fighting Vehicle (IFV). Three
men comprise the vehicle crew with six men in the dismount
Srifle* team.04 The squad's nine man size resulted the dif-
S39
did not simply choose to readopt the Korea War nine man
carry a six man dismount element rather than the hoped for
eleven man squad. The reduced six man dismount element ab-
sorbed certain key weapons of the previous eleven man, fire
and two men armed with the M16 assault rifle. In short, the
tion. More importantly, they have made the squad less ef-
40
fective.
This process of reduced dismount strength and retention
41
could increase the infantry company's close combat strength
try squad contains nine men. This resulted from the changes
nine man light infantry squad was not by design, but by the
the squad's two fire teams. Each fire team has one team
42
even more pronounced when one considers the lingering
teams. *
43
combat strength and make the squad more quickly combat
eleven man, two fire team squad. The squad's small size
mitigates against its effectively using two SAWs and two
44
in equipment by one SAW and one grenade launcher. The net
45
These recommendations are not radical nor are they a
one keeps in mind that the loss of the now traditional fire
46
END NOTES
2. This
of remark
III, Chief Tactics,wasUSAIS,
made by LTC(P)
during Lawson Magruder
a tactics instructors
meeting in October 1987.
6. Ibid.
47
Tactics and Techniques of Committee 'B ', (Ft. Benning Ga.:
The United States Army Infantry School, 1946), T-17, T-18,
T-19, T-20, T-30.
12. Ibid.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
48
20. J. Lawton Collins, Stress the Fundamental,*
Combat Forces Journal, 1952, 11-18; Frank T. Mildren, *What
Has Korea Taught Us?,* Infantry School Quarterly, October
1953, 7-13; Lessons From Korea, The Infantry School, 1954;
Dillon Snell,* The New Squad Formations,' Infantry Journal,
1953, 72-74; Dean Havron, et. al., A Research Study of the
Infantry Rifle Squad T E, (Ft. Mornroe, Va : Headquarters
Continental Army Command, 1956). 1-10.
25. The authorization for two BARs did not appear un-
til 1953, after Marshall submitted his report, Marshall
Commenktary on, In-fan try- Ope~rat-ions adWeapon UsaieI
jKorea: Winter _1`950-1951, 53-54, 72-76; Robert Dupree and
Horace E. Homesley, Jr.... Hisory of United States ArnM
Squads and .Platoons. Ig35-1967,(Ft. Bonning, Ga.: Combat
Developments Command, 19T7), 20-22.
29. Ibid.
49
30. Robert Dupreeoand Horace E. Homesley, Jr. His-
tory of United States Army Squads and ?ltoons,
1935-1967,(Ft. Benning, Ga. : Combat Developments Command.
1967), 25.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
43. ASIRS, 1.
=--i 50
46. ASIRS, 64-67.
47. Ibid.
50. Ibid.
53. OCRSP,l-13.
59. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
51
tactically inferior.
52
79. Ibid.
53
eighty percent strength. Perhaps attrition rates will im-
prove in the next war, but there is no proof of this event
at the current time.
54
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Optimum Compo-
sition of the Rif~le Squsad•nd Platoon. Combat Developments
Command, Ft. Ord Ca., 1961.
55
Whittenberg, John A. et. al.. A Study of the Infantry
Rifle Squad TOE. U.S. Army Continental Command, Ft. Monroe,
Va., 1956.
2. Field Manuals
3. Published Articles
56
Fry, J.C. "Battle Drill." Combat Forces Journal, April
1953, 18-22.
"57
Mi.ldren, Frank T. *What Has Korea Taught Us?* Infantry
School 'Quarterly, October 1953, 7-13.
4. Books
58