Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

particular disability was likewise removed. Henceforth, petitioner may

apply for reappointment to the office which was forfeited by reason of her
conviction. And in considering her qualifications and suitability for the
public post, the facts constituting her offense must be and should be
190 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED evaluated and taken into account to determine ultimately whether she can
once again be entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from
* holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her
G.R. No. 78239. February 9, 1989. former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo the
usual procedure required for a new appointment.
SALVACION A. MONSANTO, petitioner, vs. FULGENCIO S.
Same; Same; Same; Civil Liability, Extinction Of; The pardon granted
FACTORAN, JR., respondent.
to herein petitioner did not extinguish the civil liability arising from the
crime she has been convicted of.—Finally, petitioner has sought exemption
Criminal Law; Pardon, Effects of; Administrative Law; Public from the payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence.
Officers; Pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to public The Court cannot oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed
office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of such conviction.— by the Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence,
Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the penalties or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or
and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights. But unless commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be
expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is rare), it cannot extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, namely:
bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and fair dealing. This must payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, merger of the rights of
be constantly kept in mind lest we lose track of the true character and creditor and debtor, compensation and novation.
purpose of the privilege. Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive Same; Same; Same; Acceptance of Pardon; Petitioner is deemed to
language of the Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly- have abandoned her appeal when she accepted the pardon granted to her.—
held opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency could be
public office necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the extended only upon final conviction, implying that clemency could be given
conviction although such pardon undoubtedly restores his eligibility for even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s unconditional pardon was granted
appointment to that office. even as her appeal was pending in the High Court. It is worth mentioning
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The pardon granted to petitioner that under the 1987 Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction
resulted in removing her disqualification from holding public employment, was restored. But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it
but to regain her former post, she must reapply and undergo the usual is not material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
procedure required for a new appointment.—For petitioner Monsanto, this is conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted the
the bottom line: the absolute disqualification or ineligibility from public pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and her
office forms part of the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the character of
for estafa thru falsification of public documents. It is clear from the finality.
authorities referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by
her pardon, this PADILLA, J., Separate opinion:

Criminal Law; Pardon, Effects of; Administrative Law; Public

_______________
Officers; A public officer, like herein petitioner, who has been convicted of
Estafa Through Falsification of Public Documents, though
* EN BANC.

192

191

192 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 191 Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
subsequently pardoned, is deemed to have lost her right to public office, In a decision rendered on March 25, 1983, the Sandiganbayan
unless such right is expressly restored by the pardon.—An examination of convicted petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto (then assistant treasurer
the presidential pardon in question shows that, while petitioner was granted of Calbayog City) and three other accused, of the complex crime of
“an absolute and unconditional pardon and restored to full civil and political estafa thru falsification of public documents and sentenced them to
rights”, yet, nothing therein expressly provides that the right to hold public imprisonment of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
office was thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express prision correccional as minimum, to ten (10) years and one (1) day
exclusion by Art. 36, R.P.C., of the right to hold public office, of prision mayor as maximum, and to pay a fine of P3,500. They
notwithstanding a pardon unless the right is expressly restored by the were further ordered to jointly and severally indemnify the
pardon, it is my considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon government in the sum of P4,892.50 representing the balance of the
granted to the petitioner did not expressly restore the right to hold public amount defrauded and to pay the costs proportionately.
office as an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept away from the Petitioner Monsanto appealed her conviction to this Court which
petitioner. It is a recognized principle in public law—hopefully to be subsequently affirmed the same. She then filed a motion for
honored more in its compliance rather than in its breach—that a “public reconsideration but while said motion was pending, she was
office is a public trust.” The restoration of the right to hold public office to extended on December 17, 1984 by then President Marcos absolute
one who has lost such right by reason of conviction in a criminal case, but pardon which she accepted on December 21, 1984.
subsequently pardoned, cannot be left to inference, no matter how intensely By reason of said pardon, petitioner wrote the Calbayog City
arguable, but must be stated in express, explicit, positive and specific treasurer requesting that she be restored to her former post as
language. To require this would not be asking too much. assistant city treasurer since the same was still vacant.
Petitioner’s letter-request was referred to the Ministry of Finance
FELICIANO, J., concurring: for resolution in view of the provision of the Local Government
Code transferring the power of appointment of treasurers from the
Criminal Law; Pardon, Effects Of; Administrative Law; Public city governments to the said Ministry. In its 4th Indorsement dated
Officers; The pardon granted to herein petitioner is ineffective to restore her March 1, 1985, the Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
right to hold public office.—In other words, the mere grant of a pardon to a reinstated to her position without the necessity of a new appointment
public officer or employee who has been unfaithful to the public trust and not earlier than the date she was extended the absolute pardon. It
sentenced to disqualification from voting and from holding such office, does also directed the city treasurer to see to it that the amount of
not create the presumption that the recipient of the pardon has thereby P4,892.50 which the Sandiganbayan had required to be indemnified
suddenly become morally eligible once more to exercise the right to vote in favor 1of the government as well as the costs of the litigation, be
and to hold public office. In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was satisfied.
ineffective to restore to her the right to hold public office and on this Seeking reconsideration of the foregoing ruling, petitioner wrote
ground, I vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the the Ministry on April 17, 1985 stressing that the full pardon
assailed Resolution of the then Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, bestowed on her has wiped out the crime which implies
Jr.
_______________
PETITION to review the resolution of the Deputy Executive
Secretary. 1 Rollo at 14-15.

194
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

FERNAN, C.J.: 194 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

The principal question raised in this petition for review is Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

193
that her service in the government has never been interrupted and
therefore the date of her reinstatement should correspond to the date
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 193 of her preventive suspension which is August 1, 1982; that she is
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. entitled to backpay for the entire period of her suspension; and that
she should not be required
2
to pay the proportionate share of the
amount of P4,892.50.
whether or not a public officer, who has been granted an absolute
The Ministry of Finance, however, referred petitioner’s letter to
pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to reinstatement to her
the Office of the President for further review and action. On April
former position without need of a new appointment.
15, 1986, said Office, through Deputy Executive Secretary Fulgenio It is well to remember that petitioner had been convicted of the
S. Factoran, Jr. held: complex crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents and
sentenced to imprisonment of four years, two months and one day of
“We disagree with both the Ministry of Finance and the petitioner because, prision correccional as minimum, to ten years and one day of
as borne out by the records, petitioner was convicted of the crime for which prision mayor as maximum. The penalty of prision mayor carries
she was accused. In line with the government’s crusade to restore absolute the accessory penalties of temporary absolute disqualification and
honesty in public service, this Office adopts, as a juridical guide (Miranda v. perpetual special disqualification from the right 5of suffrage,
Imperial, 77 Phil. 1966), the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan, 2nd enforceable during the term of the principal penalty. Temporary
Division, in People v. Lising, Crim. Case No. 6675, October 4, 1985, that absolute disqualification bars the convict from public office or
acquittal, not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the only ground employment, such disqualification to last during the term of the
6
for reinstatement to his former position and entitlement to payment of his sentence. Even if the offender be pardoned, as to the principal
salaries, benefits and emoluments due to him during the period of his penalty, the accessory penalties remain unless the same have been
7
suspension pendente lite. expressly remitted by the pardon. The penalty of prision
“In fact, in such a situation, the former public official must secure a correccional carries, as one of its accessory penalties, suspension
8
reappointment before he can reassume his former position. xxx. from public office.
“Anent the civil liability of Monsanto, the Revised Penal Code The propositions earlier advanced by petitioner reveal her
expressly provides that ‘a pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from inadequate understanding of the nature of pardon and its legal
payment of the civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.’ (Sec. consequences. This is not totally unexpected considering that the
36, par. 2). authorities on the subject have not been wholly consistent
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Office holds that Salvacion A. particularly in describing the effects of pardon.
Monsanto is not entitled to an automatic reinstatement on the basis of the
absolute pardon granted her but must secure an appointment to her former
_______________
position and that, notwithstanding said absolute pardon, she is liable for the
3
civil liability concomitant to her previous conviction.” 4 Rollo at 73.
5 Article 42, Revised Penal Code.
Her subsequent motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 Article 30, supra.
petitioner filed the present petition in her behalf. We gave due course 7 Article 36, supra.
on October 13, 1987. 8 Article 43, supra.

_______________ 196

2 Rollo at 18-19.
3 Rollo at 21-22. 196 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
195

The benign mercy of pardon is of British origin, conceived to temper

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 195 the gravity of the King’s wrath. But Philippine jurisprudence on the
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. subject has been largely influenced by American case law.
Pardon is defined as “an act of grace, proceeding from the power
entrusted with the execution of the laws, which exempts the
Petitioner’s basic theory is that the general rules on pardon cannot
individual, on whom it is bestowed, from the punishment the law
apply to her case by reason of the fact that she was extended
inflicts for a crime he has committed. It is the private, though official
executive clemency while her conviction was still pending appeal in
act of the executive magistrate, delivered to the individual for whose
this Court. There having been no final judgment of conviction, her
benefit it is intended, and not communicated officially to the Court.
employment therefore as assistant city treasurer could not be said to
x x x. A pardon is a deed, to the validity of which delivery is
have been terminated or forfeited. In other words, without that final 8-a
essential, and delivery is not complete without acceptance.”
judgment of conviction, the accessory penalty of forfeiture of office
At the time the antecedents of the present case took place, the
did not attach and the status of her employment remained
pardoning power was governed by the 1973 Constitution as
“suspended.” More importantly, when pardon was issued before the
amended in the April 7, 1981 plebiscite. The pertinent provision
final verdict of guilt, it was an acquittal because there was no offense
reads:
to speak of. In effect, the President has declared her not4 guilty of the
crime charged and has accordingly dismissed the same.
“The President may, except in cases of impeachment, grant reprieves, day continue to hold sway in our jurisprudence despite the fact that
commutations and pardons, remit fines and forfeitures, and with the much of its relevance has been downplayed by later American
9
concurrence of the Batasang Pambansa, grant amnesty.” decisions.
Consider the following broad statements:
The 1981 amendments had deleted the earlier rule that clemency
could be extended only upon final conviction, implying that “A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the
clemency could be given even before conviction. Thus, petitioner’s guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment
unconditional pardon was granted even as her appeal was pending in and blots out of existence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender
the High Court. It is worth mentioning that under the 1987 is as innocent as if he had never committed the offense. If granted before
Constitution, the former limitation of final conviction was restored. conviction, it prevents any
But be that as it may, it is our view that in the present case, it is not
material when the pardon was bestowed, whether before or after _______________
conviction, for the result would still be the same. Having accepted
10 72 Phil. 441.
the pardon, petitioner is deemed to have abandoned her appeal and
11 Supra.
her unreversed conviction by the Sandiganbayan assumed the char-
12 In re Lontok, 43 Phil. 293; Pendon v. Diasnes, 91 Phil. 848 and Mijares v. Custorio, 73
Phil. 507.
_______________
13 4 Wall. 333, 18 L. Ed. 366.
8-a United States v. Wilson, 7 Pet. 150, 160-1, cited in Bernas, The 1973 Philippine
198
Constitution, Notes and Cases, Part I, 1974 Ed., p. 355.
9 Article VII, Section 11.
198 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
197
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 197 of the penalties and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and
disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a
14
new man, and gives him a new credit and capacity.”
acter of finality.
Having disposed of that preliminary point, we proceed to discuss Such generalities have not been universally accepted, recognized or
15
the effects of a full and absolute pardon in relation to the decisive approved. The modern trend of authorities now rejects the unduly
question of whether or not the plenary pardon had the effect of broad language of the Garland case (reputed to be perhaps the most
removing the disqualifications prescribed by the Revised Penal extreme statement which has been made on the effects of a pardon).
Code. To our mind, this is the more realistic approach. While a pardon has
10
In Pelobello v. Palatino, we find a reiteration of the stand generally been regarded as blotting out the existence of guilt so that
consistently adopted by the courts on the various consequences of in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent as though he never
pardon: “x x x we adopt the broad view expressed in Cristobal v. committed the offense, it does not operate for all purposes. The very
Labrador, G.R. No. 47941, December 7, 1940, that subject to the essence of a pardon is forgiveness or remission of guilt. Pardon
limitations imposed by the Constitution, the pardoning power cannot implies guilt. It does not erase the fact of the commission of the
be restricted or controlled by legislative action; that an absolute crime and the conviction thereof. It does not wash out the moral
16
pardon not only blots out the crime committed but removes all stain. It involves forgiveness and not forgetfulness.
disabilities resulting from the conviction. x x x. (W)e are of the The better considered cases regard full pardon (at least one not
opinion that the better view in the light of the constitutional grant in based on the offender’s innocence) as relieving the party from all the
this jurisdiction is not to unnecessarily restrict or impair the power punitive consequences of his criminal act, including the
17
of the Chief Executive who, after an inquiry into the environmental disqualifications or disabilities based on the finding of guilt. But it
facts, should be at liberty to atone the rigidity of the law to the relieves him from nothing more. “To say, however, that the offender
extent of relieving completely the party x x x concerned from the is a ‘new man’, and ‘as innocent as if he had never committed the
accessory and resultant disabilities of criminal conviction.” offense;’ is to ignore the difference between the crime and the
11
The Pelobello
12
v. Palatino and Cristobal v. Labrador cases, and criminal. A person adjudged guilty of an offense is a convicted
several others show the unmistakable
13
application of the doctrinal criminal, though pardoned; he may be deserving of punishment,
case of Ex Parte Garland, whose sweeping generalizations to this though left unpunished; and the law may regard him as more
dangerous to society than one never found guilty of crime,
18
though it _______________
places no restraints upon him following his conviction.”
19 Morris v. Hartsfield, 197 S.E. 251.
20 Illinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 33 L. Ed. 550, 554-555, citing Knote
_______________
v. United States, 95 U.S. 149.
14 Ex Parte Garland, supra at 367. 21 247 p. 957.
15 67 C. J. S. 576-577. 22 See also State v. Serfling, 230 P. 847.
16 67 C. J. S. 576-577; Page vs. Watson, 192 So. 205, 126 A.L.R. 249, 253.
200
17 Comm. of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E. 2d 95.
18 State v. Cullen, 127 P. 2d 257, cited in 67 C.J.S. 577, note 18.
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
199
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 199 maintained the mark of a good, law-abiding citizen.
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. Pardon cannot mask the acts constituting the crime. These are
“historical” facts which, despite the public manifestation of mercy
19
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It makes no and forgiveness implicit in pardon, “ordinary, prudent men 23
will take
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered into account in their subsequent dealings with the actor.”
by the offender. It does not impose upon the government any Pardon granted after conviction frees the individual from all the
obligation to make reparation for what has been suffered. “Since the penalties and legal disabilities and restores him to all his civil rights.
offense has been established by judicial proceedings, that which has But unless expressly grounded on the person’s innocence (which is
been done or suffered while they were in force is presumed to have rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation for honesty, integrity and
24
been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no satisfaction for it fair dealing. This must be constantly kept in mind lest we lose
20
can be required.” This would explain why petitioner, though track of the true character and purpose of the privilege.
pardoned, cannot be entitled to receive backpay for lost earnings and Thus, notwithstanding the expansive and effusive language of the
benefits. Garland case, we are in full agreement with the commonly-held
Petitioner maintains that when she was issued absolute pardon, opinion that pardon does not ipso facto restore a convicted felon to
the Chief Executive declared her not guilty of the crime for which public office25
necessarily relinquished or forfeited by reason of the
21
she was convicted. In the case of State v. Hazzard, we find this conviction although such pardon 26undoubtedly restores his
strong observation: “To assume that all or even a major number of eligibility for appointment to that office.
pardons are issued because of innocence of the recipients is not only The rationale is plainly evident. Public offices are intended
to indict our judicial system, but requires us to assume that which primarily for the collective protection, safety and benefit of the
we all know to be untrue. The very act of forgiveness implies the common good. They cannot be compromised to favor private
commission of wrong, and that wrong has been established by the interests. To insist on automatic reinstatement because of a mistaken
most complete method known to modern civilization. Pardons may notion that the pardon virtually acquitted one from the offense of
relieve from the disability of fines and forfeitures attendant upon a estafa would be grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
conviction, but they cannot erase the stain of bad character, which cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing appointment to
22
has been definitely fixed.” anyone deemed to be of bad character, a poor moral risk, or who is
In this ponencia, the Court wishes to stress one vital point: While unsuitable by reason of the pardoned conviction.
we are prepared to concede that pardon may remit all the penal For petitioner Monsanto, this is the bottom line: the absolute
consequences of a criminal indictment if only to give meaning to the disqualification or ineligibility from public office forms part of
fiat that a pardon, being a presidential prerogative, should not be
circumscribed by legislative action, we do not subscribe to the _______________
fictitious belief that pardon blots out the guilt of an individual and
23 Comm. of Met. Dist. Com. v. Director of Civil Service, 203 N.E. 2d 95.
that once he is absolved, he should be treated as if he were innocent.
24 Ibid.
For whatever may have been the judicial dicta in the past, we cannot
25 Illinois C.R. Co. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 33 L.E. 550; Page v. Watson, 192
perceive how pardon can produce such “moral changes” as to equate
So. 205, 126 ALR, 249; State v. Hazzard, 247 P. 957 and In re Stephenson, 10 So. 2d
a pardoned convict in character and conduct with one who has
1.
constantly
26 59 Am. Jur. 2d 40.
 201           Cruz, J., I concur subject to Mr. Justice Feliciano’s
reservation in his separate opinion.
     Feliciano, J., Please see separate concurring opinion.
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 201
     Padilla, J., Please see separate opinion.
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.      Sarmiento, J., I join the separate opinion of Justices Padilla
and Feliciano.
the punishment prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents. It is clear from the authorities
referred to that when her guilt and punishment were expunged by SEPARATE OPINION
her pardon, this particular disability was likewise removed.
Henceforth, petitioner may apply for reappointment to the office
which was forfeited by reason of her conviction. And in considering PADILLA, J.:
her qualifications and suitability for the public post, the facts
constituting her offense must be and should be evaluated and taken I concur in the result but on grounds different from those relied upon
into account to determine ultimately whether she can once again be by the majority opinion.
entrusted with public funds. Stated differently, the pardon granted to Petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was Assistant Treasurer of
petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification from holding Calbayog City. Together with three (3) other accused, she was
public employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain her charged before the Sandiganbayan with the complex crime of Estafa
former post as assistant city treasurer, she must reapply and undergo through falsification of public documents. After trial, the accused
the usual procedure required for a new appointment. were convicted and sentenced to imprisonment of four (4) years, two
Finally, petitioner has sought exemption from the payment of the (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to
civil indemnity imposed upon her by the sentence. The Court cannot ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision correccional, as maximum,
oblige her. Civil liability arising from crime is governed by the and to pay a fine of P3,500.00. They were also ordered to jointly and
Revised Penal Code. It subsists notwithstanding service of sentence, severally indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
or for any reason the sentence is not served by pardon, amnesty or representing the balance of the amount defrauded and to pay the
commutation of sentence. Petitioner’s civil liability may only be costs proportionately.
extinguished by the same causes recognized in the Civil Code, Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to this Court
namely: payment, loss of the thing due, remission of the debt, which affirmed the same. Petitioner then filed a motion for
merger of27 the rights of creditor and debtor, compensation and reconsideration but while said motion was pending, President
novation. Ferdinand E. Marcos extended to her on 17 December 1984 an
WHEREFORE, the assailed resolution of former Deputy absolute pardon which she accepted on 21 December 1984.
Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., dated April 15, By reason of said absolute pardon, petitioner in representations
1986, is AFFIRMED. No costs. before the City Treasurer of Calbayog, the Ministry of Finance and
So ordered. the Office of the President, asked that she be allowed to re-assume
her former office, as of 1 August 1982 (the date of her preventive
          Narvasa, Paras, Gancayco, Bidin, Cortés, Griño-Aquino, suspension), that she be paid her back salaries for the entire period
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur. of her suspension, and that she be not required to pay her
          Melencio-Herrera, J., In the result and in the Separate proportionate share of the amount of P4,892.50.
Opinions of Justices Padilla and Feliciano. Respondent Assistant Executive Secretary denied petitioner’s
     Gutierrez, Jr., J., I join Justice Feliciano in his concurring request for automatic reinstatement as well as her other claims,
opinion. because of which denial, this petition for review on certiorari

203
_______________

27 Articles 36, 112-113, Revised Penal Code. VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 203

202 Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.

202 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

was filed before the Court seeking the setting aside and reversal of
the decision of the respondent Assistant Executive Secretary, on the
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. main contention that, as a public officer who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the President, she is entitled to reinstatement to If such be the message of said cases, then I submit that a
her former position without need of a new appointment, and to the modification is in order, so that an absolute pardon to work a
other reliefs prayed for. restoration of the right to hold public office must expressly so state,
There can be no dispute that the pardon extinguished petitioner’s in order to give substance and meaning to the sound provisions of
criminal liability. At the same time, Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code, particularly in the light of our
Code categorically covers the effects of a pardon on the pardoned’s times and experience.
right to hold office, suffrage and on his civil liability. It states: ACCORDINGLY, I vote to DENY the petition.

“ART. 36. Pardon; its effects.—A pardon shall not work the restoration of FELICIANO, J.: Concurring:
the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
expressly restored by the terms of the pardon. I concur in the result reached in the important and eloquent opinion
“A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the of the Chief Justice. I also join in the separate concurring opinion of
civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.” (Italics supplied) Mr. Justice Padilla. At the same time, I would add a few brief
statements, basically for my own clarification. Article 36 of the
Applying Art. 36 of the Revised Penal Code to the case at bar, it is, Revised Penal Code states:
to my mind, clear that the pardon extended by the President to the
petitioner did not per se entitle her to again hold public office “Article 36. Pardon; its effects.—A pardon shall not work the restoration of
(including therefore the office of Assistant Treasurer, Calbayog City) the right to hold public office, or the right of suffrage, unless such rights be
or to suffrage; nor did such pardon extinguish her civil liability for expressly restored by the terms of the pardon.
the criminal conviction, subject matter of the pardon. A pardon shall in no case exempt the culprit from the payment of the
An examination of the presidential pardon in question shows civil indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.” (Italic supplied)
that, while petitioner was granted “an absolute and unconditional
It is worthy of note that the rule embodied in Article 36 is reiterated
pardon and restored to full civil and political rights”, yet, nothing
four (4) times by the Revised Penal Code in its following provisions:
therein expressly provides that the right to hold public office was
thereby restored to the petitioner. In view of the express exclusion by “Article 40. Death—Its accessory penalties.—The death penalty, when it is
Art. 36, R.P.C., of the right to hold public office, notwithstanding a not executed by reason of commutation or pardon shall carry with it that of
pardon unless the right is expressly restored by the pardon, it is my perpetual absolute disqualification and
considered opinion that, to the extent that the pardon granted to the
petitioner did not expressly restore the right to hold public office as 205
an effect of such pardon, that right must be kept away from the
petitioner. VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 205
It is a recognized principle in public law—hopefully to be
honored more in its compliance rather than in its breach—that a Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr.
“public office is a public trust.” The restoration of the right to
that of civil interdiction during thirty years following the date of sentence,
204 unless such accessory penalties have been expressly remitted in the
pardon.”
204 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED “Article 41. Reclusion perpetua and reclusion temporal.—Their
accessory penalties.—The penalties of reclusion perpetua and reclusion
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. temporal shall carry with them that of civil interdiction for life or during the
period of the sentence as the case may be, and that of perpetual absolute
hold public office to one who has lost such right by reason of disqualification which the offender shall suffer even though pardoned as to
conviction in a criminal case, but subsequently pardoned, cannot be the principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in
left to inference, no matter how intensely arguable, but must be the pardon.”
stated in express, explicit, positive and specific language. To require “Article 42. Prision mayor—Its accessory penalties.—The penalty of
this would not be asking too much. prision mayor shall carry with it that of temporary absolute disqualification
I am aware that there are broad statement in Cristobal vs. and that of perpetual special disqualification from the right of suffrage
Labrador, 71 Phil. 341 and Pelobello vs. Palatino, 72 Phil. 441 which the offender shall suffer although pardoned as to the principal
which may be understood to mean that an absolute pardon, without penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the pardon.”
qualification, restores full civil rights which have been construed, in “Article 43. Prision correccional—Its accessory penalties.—The penalty
turn, to include the right to hold public office (Versoza vs. of prision correccional shall carry with it that of suspension from public
Fernandez, 55 Phil. 323). office, from the right to follow a profession or calling, and that of perpetual
special disqualification from the right of suffrage, if the duration of said It is submitted, with respect, that Articles 36, et al. of the Revised
imprisonment shall exceed eighteen months. The offender shall suffer the Penal Code have not been shown to be an unconstitutional
disqualification provided in this article although pardoned as to the restriction on the pardoning power of the President. The limitation
principal penalty, unless the same shall have been expressly remitted in the on the President’s pardoning power, if limitation it be, does not
pardon.” (Italics supplied) appear to be an unreasonably onerous one. Articles 36, et al. merely
require the President to become completely explicit if the pardon he
The Chief Justice points out that the penalty imposed upon petitioner extends is intended to wipe out not merely the principal but also the
for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of public accessory penalty of disqualification from holding public office and
documents, included the accessory penalties of temporary absolute from voting and to restore the recipient of the pardon to the exercise
disqualification from public office or employment and perpetual of such fundamental political rights. Such requirement of
special disqualification from the right of suffrage. The 17 December explicitness seems entirely in line with the fundamental point made
1984 pardon extended to petitioner in the instant case was written on by the Chief Justice that a pardon does not blot out the factual guilt
a standard printed form which states in printed words that it was “an of the recipient of the pardon. In other words, the mere grant of a
absolute and unconditional pardon1
[which] restored [petitioner] to pardon to a public officer or employee who has been unfaithful to
full civil and political rights.” While the right of suffrage and the the public trust and sentenced to disqualification from voting and
right to hold public2
office or employment are commonly regarded as from holding such office, does not create the presumption that the
“political
3
rights,” it must be noted that there are other “political recipient of the pardon has thereby suddenly become morally
rights” and that the pardon given to petitioner did not eligible once more to exercise the right to vote

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1 Rollo, p. 90.
VOL. 170, FEBRUARY 9, 1989 207
2 Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192 (1946).
3 Malcolm and Laurel, The Constitutional Law of the Philippines, p. 378 (1936). Phil. National Construction Corp. vs. NLRC

206
and to hold public office.
In my view, the pardon extended to petitioner was ineffective to
206 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED restore to her the right to hold public office and on this ground, I
Monsanto vs. Factoran, Jr. vote to DENY the Petition for Review and to AFFIRM the assailed
Resolution of the then Executive Secretary Fulgencio S. Factoran,
Jr.
expressly and in printer’s ink restore to petitioner the particular right
Resolution affirmed.
to hold public office and the specific right to vote at elections and
plebiscites. Note.—Acquittal in a criminal case does not operate to dismiss a
I join in the basic point of Mr. Justice Padilla that because of the separate civil action filed on the basis of the same facts alleged in
nature of a public office as a public trust, Articles 36 and 40-43 the criminal case. (Salta vs. De Veyra, 117 SCRA 212).
appropriately require a very high degree of explicitness if a pardon
is to work the restoration of such right to petitioner. Exactly the ——o0o——
same point may, of course, be made in respect of the restoration of
the right to vote.
Articles 36 and 40-43 of the Revised Penal Code, quoted above,
have been in our statute books since 1930. I believe that they have
been left intact by the constitutional provisions on pardon, whether
one refers to the 1935 Constitution or to the 1973 and 1987
Constitutions. I do not believe that Articles 36, et al. collided with © Copyright 2020 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
any provision or principle embodied in either of our prior
constitutions. The Chief Justice appears to agree with this position
when he referred to Article 36 of the Revised Penal Code (Opinion,
p. 5). He goes on, however, to say (in page 13) that: “the pardon
granted to petitioner has resulted in removing her disqualification
from holding public employment but it cannot go beyond that.”