LESSONS FROM HISTORY

‘We have moved from the age of the horse and sail through the age of the battleship and the tank to the age of the
aeroplane. Like its illustrious ancestors, the aeroplane will have its day in the sun ,and then it too shall be
replaced’.

-John Warden, 1992

The Spanish Civil War (1936-39) was the first conflict since 1918 in which the opposing parties fielded
air forces of nearly comparable size and technical proficiency. Franco’s Nationalists were supported by
air units from Germany and Italy, and the Republicans by the Soviet Union. The chief of the Nationalist
air forces, General Alfredo Kindelan, at the beginning of war issued a directive to select targets within
range which were of strategic importance, such as bridges, airfields, railways, factories, gasoline depots at
Valencia and Barcelona and munitions works. Kindelan appreciated from the outset that his objective
would be placed at risk without control of the air. Since he lacked resources to attain and maintain total air
superiority he fought for and sought local air superiority for specific operations. Right from the
beginning , Nationalist strike aircraft were targeting the airfields, fighter aircraft, fuel supplies and
Republican’s air defences.
. Carl A. Spaatz, ‘Ethiopia, China, and the Spanish Civil War’, in Emme, The Impact of Air Power, pp.
363–7; and Richardson, Air Power History, p. 15.
Whenever he suspected that his bombers will not go through un-contested, he would provide fighter
escort. The primacy given to resource allocation towards winning control of air paid dividends.

Air superiority is not ‘given’ it has to be fought for even when the adversary is not as well equipped or
trained. The closer the opposing forces are to parity the more will be the losses in this battle for air
superiority but it still has to be won. During the “blitzkrieg” of 1939-1940, the German Luftwaffe was
better trained and equipped and thus rapidly overwhelmed its adversaries. Even then the battle for control
of the skies was not without perils. The invasion of Poland cost the Luftwaffe 285 aircraft, 18% of the
operational strength committed to the campaign. Norway and Denmark cost a further 242 airplanes,
mostly transports. 21% of the Luftwaffe’s combat aircraft committed to the Battle of France were
destroyed on operations from enemy action: 1,129 out of 5,349 aircraft. The cost is paid both in blood and
treasure. ++++ Control of the air: the enduring requirement, Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES, Air Force
History and Museums Program Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111 September 8, 1999

Battle of Guadalcanal ( August 1942- February 1943). In this period the battle for the control of the
air was bitterly fought. Military historian Richard Frank has concluded that “Without a doubt, the air
struggle produced the most important long-term military effect of the Guadalcanal campaign.” Richard B.
Frank, Guadalcanal (New York: Penguin Books, 1992), p. 609. This was a close run thing if we are to go
by aerial losses alone wherein the Americans lost 290 ac for 261 Japanese fighters. This in spite of many
advantages enjoyed by Americans. Firstly they were flying in close proximity to their own bases. Second,
American had better protection (armour) for crew, engine and other vital systems. Another major
advantage was their better guns.

This bitter battle offers a significant lesson on the dangers of operating under essentially “air parity”
conditions. Lack of air superiority caused the campaign to run for as long as it did. This and subsequent
experience in 1943 at battle of Kasserine in which Luftwaffe hit American ground forces in a series of
strikes prompted the War Department Field Manual to state that the first and most important mission for
air power forces was securing control of the air. “Without this air supremacy,” the manual stated, “the
initiative passes to the enemy.” U.S. War Department, Field Manual FM 100-20, Command and
Employment of Air Power, 21 July 1943.

Op Overlord, Normandy (1944). There are many examples that make the case for control of air or air
superiority, but none as convincing and as emotive as Normandy landings of 1944. From the outset of the
Normandy landing, control of the air meant everything. As a result, less than a month before the invasion,
Army Chief of Staff George Marshall could state with confidence “We are about to invade the continent
and have staked our success on our air superiority, on Soviet numerical preponderance, and on the high
quality of our ground combat units.” The invasion turned out to be defining moment in military history.
Due credit was given to the contribution made by air superiority when Gen Eisenhower told his John two
weeks after the landings that if had not had air superiority he would not have been there.

9. Marshall, Memo to the Secretary of War, May 16, 1944, reprinted in Larry I. Bland, ed., The Papers of
George Catlett. Marshall, v. IV, p. 449.

World War-II. In this war the advantages of air superiority were enjoyed by both sides on different
occasion. Much can be written about them however the conclusion initially pronounced by the United
States Strategic Bombing Survey after World War II that “no nation can long survive the free exploitation
of air weapons over its homeland [and that] enemy planes enjoying control of the sky over one’s head can
be as disastrous to one’s country as its occupation by physical invasion.” sums it all up. 46USSBS,
Summary Reports (European and Pacific Theaters) (report, Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press,
1987 ed.), p. 110.

Korean War in 1950. The situation on ground in early days was grave to say the least. The surprise
North Korean attack had pushed South Korean and American forces to the far south of the Korean
peninsula. With great difficulty, the allies succeeded in establishing a defensive perimeter around the port
city of Pusan, one they feared might break at anytime. MacArthur realised that it could only be held if
his air arm could keep the North Koreans from massing enough men and supplies for a final effort. Allies
still controlled the air despite the reverses on the ground. In the critical early period from June to
September 1950, air power was almost certainly the margin of survival, if not necessarily of
victory.48Matthew B. Ridgway, The Korean War, New York, 1967, p. 244.

There was a lot of acrimonious debate between land and air commander especially in early desperate
stages of the war about what missions should get priority. Land commanders wanted air force to throw
every thing at ground as close air support while air force wanted to give primacy to air superiority and
interdiction. USAF prevailed and Korea demonstrated, to Futrell’s satisfaction at least, ‘one more
historical justification for the overriding priority which USAF doctrine accords to the air superiority
mission’. This strategy, he further concluded, ‘made the war too expensive for the Communists to
continue’. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950–1953, pp. 694, 703.

This war like any other war has been debated, discussed and critically analysed by many and
unsurprisingly the conclusions arrived at are not always the same. Not everyone has something nice to say
about air power. One such example has been put forth by Armitage and Mason:
The idea that superior air power can in some way be a substitute for hard slogging and
professional skill on the ground in this sort of war is beguiling but illusory ... all this
is cold comfort for anyone who hopes that air power will provide some kind of short
cut to victory. M.J. Armitage and R.A. Mason, Air Power in the Nuclear Age 1945–82, London, 1983, p. 43.
As an air power advocate I would only like to submit that airpower does not provide a short cut to victory
but sure makes the path to victory less steep for our hard slogging comrades on ground. Air power by
gaining and maintaining control of air provides a battlespace wherein the land commander can execute his
plans without fear from enemy air action. Like in this case the control of the air allowed the allies to
recover and regroup for an eventual victory.

Vietnam This war taught an important lesson that in the contest for skies Surface to Air Missiles
(SAM) and Anti aircraft Artillery (AAA) are also playing. The operators learned first-hand the great risks
to control of the air posed by Networked SAMs and antiaircraft artillery. As a result, after Vietnam, the
United States started paying more attention to electronic warfare and SAM destruction using hard kill and
soft kill. Some other issues directly related to fight for control of air like Fighter design, aircrew training
and overdependence on long range radar guided air to air missiles were also hotly debated.

The Yom Kippur War. The successful outcome of 1967 pre emptive strikes by Israeli air force lulled
them into overconfidence whereas Egypt and Syria recognized that control of the air, at least over the
battlespace can also be achieved by air defence networks which would integrate all surface to air weapons
like antiaircraft artillery and surface to air missiles. These networks were so powerful that in 1973, they
denied the kind of air dominance that Israelis had come to expect. The IAF surprised and shocked though
it was could not wish the threat away or postpone the battle for control of air to some other day. “The
Israeli Air Force fought a desperate battle, flying into the teeth of one of the most concentrated missile
systems in the world.”5. Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1975), p. 256. Even in these desperate conditions the primary campaign was the fight for
control of the air. Eventually the Israelis with generous American aid and some brilliant operational art
prevailed.
Indo Pak war of 1971. On the evening of 3 December, the Pakistani Air Force (PAF) launched a pre-emptive strike on eleven airfields in
north-western India, including Agra which was 300 miles from the border. 1 This preemptive strike known as Operation Chengiz Khan, was
inspired by the success of Israeli Operation Focus in the Arab-Israeli Six Day War. But, unlike the Israeli attack on Arab airbases in 1967
which involved a large number of Israeli planes, Pakistan flew no more than 50 planes to India and failed to inflict the intended damage.[28]
As a result, although the Indian runways were cratered and damaged were operational by the next day for IAF to execute its response. There
are claims and counterclaims about how the war progressed after that but suffice to say that this preemptive strike failed to achieve its
objective of negating IAFs advantage of numbers. The important lesson that emerges is that in this quest for air supremacy, there is no scope
for half hearted attempts. PAF copied Israeli air force but failed to deliver the knock-out blow.

Tom Cooper, with Syed Shaiz Ali. "India - Pakistan War, 1971; Western Front, part I". Air Combat Information Group.
www.acig.org/artman/publish/article_330.shtml accessed 04 Nov 10.

"Trying to catch the Indian Air Force napping, Yahya Khan, launched a Pakistani version of Israel's 1967 air blitz in hopes that one rapid
attack would cripple India's far superior air power. But India was alert, Pakistani pilots were inept, and Yahya's strategy of scattering his thin
air force over a dozen air fields was a bust!", p.34, Newsweek, December 20, 1971

Falkland (1982).The battle for Falkland Islands in 1982 could have turned on its head if the integral air power of British task
force had been unable to at least provide FAS. Royal Navy lost six ships but could still absorb these
losses. However sinking of its carriers or troopship Canberra would have been catastrophic may be even
leading to withdrawal of task force. Not surprisingly post-Falklands British maritime doctrine, for
example, emphatically states that: "The minimal requirement for a successful [maritime] operation is a
favourable air situation. Air superiority will be a requirement for sea control where a robust challenge
from the air is possible. Air supremacy is a necessary precondition of command of the sea." [emphasis in
original text].
8 Royal Navy Directorate of Naval Staff Duties, The Fundamentals of British Maritime Doctrine, BR
1806 (London: HMSO, 1995), p. 68. [Emphasis in original text] Additionally, Annex B, "The Falklands
War 1982 from the Viewpoint of Doctrine," (pp. 189-195) is a useful summary of the campaign
Kosovo war. The success of air power in this Kosovo campaign was possible because of the almost
uncontested control of the air enjoyed by friendly forces at medium and high levels. The Yugoslav air
force was quickly eliminated as a player. Either its aircraft were destroyed on the ground or its bases were
rendered non-operational. Apart from a couple of dogfights early on, the Yugoslav air force was barely
seen. At lower altitude the threat from SAMs was always present but the heat was equally felt by SAM
operators who would immediately become a target for Anti Radiation Missiles (ARM) or other such
weapons on their weapon launch. As early as May 15, Gen Jumper had declared that NATO had de facto
air superiority over Yugoslavia enabling strikes to be carried out over any part at any time. He concluded
his remarks with a caveat that skies are still dangerous.++ NATOs ability to gain air superiority in this
war was so extraordinary that it surprised many. Lt Gen Short, USAF noted in his October 21 1999
testimony to the Senate Armed service committee that, “their Mig-29 drivers turned out to be incompetent
at best and their SAM operators chose to survive as opposed to fight”.1

++ Hewson, Allied force part-II: overwhelming air power, p 109.

1. 1 The lessons and non-lessons of the air and missile campaign in Kosovo
By Anthony H. Cordesman, Greenwood Publishing Group, 2001the air and missile campaign in kosovo, p
258.

In-spite of these advantages nearly 800 SAMs were fired at NATO aircrafts over the course of 78 day air
war. Majority of radar guided SAMs were fired in autonomous mode (without radar guidance).++
Eventually Serbs were able to bring down two NATO ac – one F-117 and one F-16. In addition one F-117
reported damage due SAM detonation in proximity and two A-10 ac were hit by AAA, but these ac
recovered safely.+++ The Serbian IADS remained functional forcing NATO ac to operate above 15000
feet for most part of the operations.

++ AWOS fact sheet, HQ USAFE/SA, 17 Dec 1999.

+++David A Fulghum, ‘ Kosovo report to boost new JSF jamming role’, Aviation Week and space
Technology, 30 Aug 99, p 22

The lessons that emerge here are that although Serbian Integrated Air Defence System (IADS) succeeded
in self preservation but they failed to protect what they were there for. NATO did not enjoy uncontested
air superiority at all levels but was able to strike the targets that it wanted with reasonable accuracy Air
dominance allowed information dominance which in turn enabled NATO in using its air power advantage
to prosecute some truly remarkable precision attack missions against key targets. Under NATO attack,
Serbian forces in Kosovo felt increasingly constrained, threatened, and intimidated; as one stated later,
"They knew everything about us. There wasn't anything they didn't know. If we lit a cigarette they could
see it. God knows what they were dropping on us, all sorts of bombs. We didn't expect that intensity. We
couldn't fight planes with mortars. And our antiaircraft guys couldn't do anything."
4747 Rory Carroll, " 'I'm Not Right in the Head Now:' A Conscript's War," The Observer, London, Sunday 20 June
1999, p. 17.
The Gulf War. Operation Desert Storm, was the high point for any air power purist. The
overwhelming success for airpower in Gulf War was acknowledged not only by students of military
history but also by media and general population. There was a general acceptance that air power had
been, without question, the war’s decisive factor. President George Bush, speaking at the Air Force
Academy in 1991, stated it more bluntly: “Gulf Lesson One,” he said, “is the value of air power.”
President George Bush, transcript of remarks at the Graduation of the Class of 1991, U.S. Air Force
Academy, Colorado Springs, CO, May 1991.

Operation Desert Storm has provided several significant additional conclusions about the critical role of
air dominance. First, the Iraqi military made excellent use of its long range artillery against Kuwaiti
airfields during the initial attack from within its own borders. This certainly gives additional significance to
an army’s ability to achieve air denial or deny air dominance. Second, the significance of the ‘information
dominance’ enjoyed by virtue of air dominance by the Coalition was critical in its ability to execute entire
range of operations and deny the Iraqis the same. Achieving and ensuring air dominance by Craig A.
Hughes, Major, USAF Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama April 1998, p 18

++ sir Patrick Hine , Air operations in gulf war- - the war in air 1914-1994 (p-229)
In Desert storm the challenges for the counter air campaign were formidable++. Iraq was reported to
possess 7000 radar guided missiles, 9000 IR guided missiles, 800 fighter ac. A specialized command and
control structure--the French built KARI network--linked the various nodes of the air defence system.
Even allowing for Iraqi deficiencies in organising, training, and equipping their military forces, defeating
an air defence network of this size and complexity presented a formidable challenge.
Instead of trying to gain control of the air by conventional means; shooting down Iraqi fighters, taking out SAM sites
while they were functioning as desired, would have been daunting as well as expensive.

The planners relied on a decapitation strategy. First the nerve centre of command and control mechanism
were neutralized using Stealth and surprise which paved the way for massed non stealth platforms
carrying both precision and non precision weapons.
The plan worked very well making it look an easy task in hindsight, however in the words of Gen. Charles Horner
, “ . . . But do not get the idea that gaining control of the air was easy. It was not a ‘macho,’ ‘no sweat’ operation.
What turned into a turkey shoot in late January and February started out as a bitter struggle; those first few days
were the hardest-fought, most critical aspect of the entire war.” Clancy and Horner, Every Man a Tiger.

With control of the air assured virtually from the first night of the war, all other military operations went
smoothly. Iraqi forces in theatre had literally been bombed into submission. They surrendered in droves.
Where they did decide to fight they were overwhelmed as they could not look to skies for any help. If it
was flying it had to be a coalition aircraft. Secretary of Defence Perry stated, “ Desert Storm taught us
something about air dominance. We had it, we liked it, and we’re going to keep it.” 43 Quote from Air
Force Doctrine Center, “Historical Evidence Database,” (Maxwell AFB, AL: AFDC, 1999).

Another important lesson that emerged here was the tremendous advantage of stealth. During Operation
Desert Storm, the 42 F-117s (2.5 percent of USAF in-theater air assets) flew only 2 percent of coalition
fixed-wing sorties, yet struck 40 percent of all the "strategic" targets without losing an aircraft or even
being struck by enemy fire.14 Many of these strikes over downtown Baghdad were carried out much
before conventionally established air superiority would have permitted such attacks by non-stealthy
aircraft with a similar degree of safety. Subsequently many of the F-117 missions were also in direct
support of achieving air superiority through the destruction of the enemy's integrated air defenses.
14. James P. Coyne, "A Strike by Stealth," Air Force Magazine, March 1992, 38-44; Tony Capaccio, "F-
117 Stealth Fighter Hit 80 Percent of Its Targets," Defense Week 13, no. 15 (13 April 1992): 1, 8; and
"Nighthawks over Iraq." One might ask how the air war would have differed had the F-117 not been
available to strike the adversary's center of gravity. Whether alternative tactics had been a Hanoi-type
strike package or the nibbling away at peripheral enemy air defenses until the center could be attacked,
the battle for air supremacy probably would have been lengthier and costlier without the stealth fighter.

Gulf War-II, Op Iraqi Freedom. In his war air superiority was applied against an enemy who by then did
not possess a significant air capability. The threats to coalition air were primarily from surface to air
weapons. Nonetheless the adversary possessed a large, reasonably well equipped standing army. In
absence of any help from above the forces on ground were literally blinded and could not execute any of
their firepower and manoeuvre plans. Here it was demonstrated beyond doubt that even a modern and
well-equipped army has no chance of success against an opponent enjoying such overwhelming air
supremacy. By dominating the air over Iraq, coalition air forces shaped the fight to allow for rapid
dominance on the ground. The importance of “shaping” the battlefield with air dominance was that it
created a tactical condition whereby coalition ground forces never faced large conventional Iraqi
formations “eyeball-to eyeball.” Iraqi ground forces could not manoeuvre in large formations without the
possibility of being detected and accurately attacked, anytime, anywhere, day or night, and in any
weather
Furthermore, given the fact that the coalition enjoyed total air supremacy, or “air dominance”, aircraft of all kinds
including unmanned loitered on station with near impunity. Indeed, B-52s were used to provide CAS to ground
forces. Under this umbrella of air dominance, coupled with the capability to provide in-flight targeting to aircrews,
improved the flexibility of air power and its ability to hit not only pre-planned targets but also emerging targets. Vice
Admiral John B. Nathman, commander of the Naval air forces in OEF, later recalled, “After the first week, the pilots
didn’t know what targets they’d be striking when they launched.”20Rebecca Grant, “The War Nobody Expected,”
Air Force Magazine, April 2002, p. 37

. It is difficult to overstate the importance of air operations in the context of OIF.

Lessons

++,
Dr Sanu Kainikara. Air superiority: intangible imperatives, papers on air power, Air Power
Development Centre Canberra
Another important but easy to miss lesson that emerged from this one-sided air war was the
overwhelming technological and numerical superiority that was needed to obtain and maintain such a
state of air superiority even after the opposing air force was rendered incapable of any coherent action.
Within the current global distribution of power, such a situation can only be obtained by Western
coalitions++. Regional air force fighting on their own will have to carefully examine the degree of air
dominance that they can or can not achieve.

it would be capable of achieving vis-à-vis the projected requirements. A regional air force, fighting a limited war
should first aim at achieving FAS before trying to establish air superiority. Subsequently the scope and resources
allocated to Counter air campaign can be reassessed based on its strength, operational priority and the time that is
available. This decision would be based on:

(a) Resources available.

(b) Degree of domination required. This would in turn depend on:

(i) National military objective.

(ii) Duration of conflict.
(iii) Enemy capability especially in air and air defence.
 (c) Availability and security of air bases. This becomes more important consideration in case of
deployment on foreign soil. The fight for air superiority can be seriously hampered by attacks on air bases,
lines of supply or the aircrafts parked in open themselves. That is why security of air bases is such an
important consideration. Airpower is difficult to sustain and provision but far easy to disrupt.

Air Superiority and its relation to Surface Forces

Our idea of air superiority is not that we win the fight like the RAF won the Battle of Britain, but that we win the fight
in the other guy’s airspace. In Korea, we fought the air superiority battle over the Yalu River. In Vietnam, we fought
it over Hanoi. In Desert Storm, we fought it over Baghdad. So no American soldier presently serving in the
Army has ever been attacked by an enemy airplane. It has been 40 years since we have had anybody come
under enemy air attack. If you want to know what it is like to be attacked by an airplane, you have got to go talk to
an Iraqi or a North Vietnamese or somebody else.

— General Merrill A. McPeak

Merrill A. McPeak, Selected Works 1990-1994 (Maxwell AFB, Ala.: Air University Press, 1995), 141

The argument about primacy of ‘control of the air’ has been going on for a long time. This fact has been
so emphatically stated by air power theorists, military commanders, senior officers and strategists around
the world, over the years.

The weight of historical evidence overwhelmingly suggests that air superiority is crucial to success and
therefore, must be accepted as the first goal in any conflict. All other operations must be subordinated, to
the extent possible to its attainment. Control of the air is and will remain the centre piece of entire range
of military operations. The absolute primacy of the concept of control of the air was reinforced by the
development of the concept of manoeuvre warfare, which cannot be conducted efficiently if friendly
control of the air is not assured. Loss of air superiority equates to loss of the ability to exercise options.
Today, more than ever before, the penalty for losing air superiority is too great to risk

Surface Commander’s Perspective. Surface commanders often fail to realise the real significance of the
importance air forces lay on gaining air superiority. They generally equate proximity with security and
tend to see this ‘fighter vs fighter’ air war as a mere sideshow while the ‘real war’ is happening on ground
or over sea right in front. They would prefer to have the aircraft available to them as long range artillery
or to tackle the enemy planes if they appear. It is futile in their mind to go after airfields or aircraft
factories in the quest for air superiority, while the outcome will be determined on ground. While it is easy
to accept their desire it is difficult to accept and even more difficult to explain their fallacy to them.

The situation becomes more complex in case of a surprise enemy offensive that is either progressing well
or seems on the verge of doing so. The ground commander would expect air force to provide all effort
towards CAS expecting it to stop air superiority and interdiction operations until the emergency is over.
This can have dangerous consequences, especially if the fight for air superiority is not yet conclusive. In
absence of significant air opposition the enemy can undertake previously impossible counter air
operations to gain air superiority. He may even choose to carry out air attacks on strategic targets or
interdict lines of supply. In either case the initiative thus the advantage will lie with him. Notwithstanding
this argument, there may be situations or phases in campaign where all available air resources may be
required for ground support more so if the battle in progress is the decisive battle of the war and losing the
battle would means surrender
In very simple terms using your aircraft only for CAS role will leave them vulnerable to enemy strikes over their
staging airfields and also leave many of other strategic targets for enemy to pick and attack. The initiative will lie
with the enemy. It would be unwise to tether airpower to a static, defensive role. Air power is best employed in
offensive role and their first mission is to defeat or neutralize the enemy air force so friendly operations on land, sea
and in the air can proceed unhindered, while at the same time one's own vital centers and military forces remain
safe from air attack.

Ground commanders will often complain that they did not see a single friendly ac while they were slogging on
ground for a hard fought victory. To this they only be told that they did not see a single enemy ac unsettling their
plans.

This need for air superiority also extends to maritime operations. Though this view was not automatically
accepted by Naval commanders till Pearl Harbour and the sinking of the British capital ships Prince of
Wales and Repulse by Japanese land-based aircraft in 1941 soon made it clear that ships required air
cover to operate effectively. The armadas that conquered the central Pacific in World War II were based
on aircraft carriers, not battleships, and this emphasis has been reflected in the U.S. Navy's force structure
ever since. The planned naval invasion of Britain never took place because the German air force failed to
provide air superiority.

Progress of Ground War

In the present context, no nation has won a war without winning the air war first. The contribution of airpower would
largely depend on the campaign objectives. Wars are rarely won in a single battle and even more rarely by a single
component of military force. Thus, only a campaign perspective would reveal what advantages air force can provide
before a surface battle begins and what contribution air forces can make as the surface action unfolds. We now
proceed to discuss some situation our friendly ground forces may be involved in the impact of air superiority on
them:

Offensive operations. During these operations our forces will have to execute their manoeuvre and
firepower plans requiring them to amass and move. These operations can be unsettled by even sporadic
enemy air attacks. Situation worsens if friendly air does not show up to counter these attacks. This makes
the surface troops edgy promoting the danger of fratricide, as harassed ground forces begin to view any
aircraft as an enemy. The mindset becomes defensive, manoeuvre is hindered, and casualties increase as
combat operations take longer to conduct, and with less effectiveness. On the other hand availability of air
superiority or at least a FAS will allow much more flexibility to ground commander. Once the enemy air
is neutralised to a reasonable degree more effort can be provided for ground support. An example
illustrating this point would be early German victories in WW-II.
The silent service (Navy) often claim that they are happy with their organic air defence weapons and need not worry
about air cover. However when engaged in offensive operations the location of fleet becomes somewhat
predictable. Once located, in absence of air superiority enemy aircraft can inflict serious damage to ships primarily
by stand-off guided weapons. Damaged or sunken ships don’t make a pretty headline and the impact on morale of
sailors and even general public is shattering.

Early german victories in WW-II. Polish and French air forces were destroyed in the first few days of war allowing the German
air force to carry out interdiction and CAS in support of their army in addition allowing the german surface forces freedom to
manoeuvre without interference from enemy air. . Cajus Bekker, The Luftwaffe War Diaries, transl, and ed. by Frank Ziegler
(New York: Ballantine Books, 1969), p. 31. see also Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45
(Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air University Press, 1983), pp. 36-37.
Defensive operations. Our forces may be compelled to fight a defensive battle because of situational
limits, lack of will, doctrinal concerns, inadequate resources or asymmetry. In either case the situation
will worsen if the enemy was to possess air superiority as was the case for Iraqi troops in theatre in Gulf
War. The margin between survival and victory in this case will depend on air superiority. A suitable
example would be Guderian’s crossing of Meuse River in 1940 with his three divisions opposed by three
dug in French divisions in fortified defensive positions on the opposite bank. The French failed to protect
the skies above their surface forces allowing the Germans to succeed.

In the 1940 offensive in France, one of the first problems confronting the Germans was how to cross the Meuse River with
three divisions opposed by three French divisions dug in on the opposite bank. An attack by Stuka dive bombers offered the
key. Guderian explained that he needed to keep the enemy down while he made his initial crossings. A single attack would not
accomplish that end. The air force then agreed to provide him with a stream of Stukas. The French failed to prevent it, the air
attack took place, three divisions crossed the river to overwhelm three defending divisions, and a breakthrough was underway.
See- Williamson Murray, Strategy for Defeat: The Luftwaffe 1933-45 (Maxwell Air Force Base (AFB), Ala.: Air University
Press, 1983), pp. 125.

Retreat. The most serious situation which a ground force can find itself in is a retreat under enemy
pressure. In some cases a small group or post may have to withdraw under serious enemy opposition (a
situation often faced by ISAF troops in Afghanistan holding isolated posts coming under surprise Taliban
attack). Under such circumstances, the ground force must slow the enemy pursuit as much as possible to
make time for establishing new lines of defence, evacuation, or arrival of reinforcements. Inability to do
so can cause unacceptable destruction. This can only be achieved if air superiority has not been lost and
air interdiction is still possible. In addition air superiority allows ISR platforms to operate freely providing
advanced warning of enemy’s moves. Chinese failed to grasp this important principle in Korean War
while chasing MacArthur's 8th Army and Xth Corps retreating from banks of the Yalu river.

MacArthur's 8th Army and Xth Corps risked annihilation at the hands of Chinese when they were forced
to retreat from banks of the Yalu river. Chinese under General Lin Piao enjoyed massive superiority in
numbers on ground. However air superiority still belonged to allies. The Chinese commander threw
caution to the wind and abandoned his previous practice of marching only at night and camouflaging his
army during the day, with an aim to achieve a decisive victory. By doing so he exposed himself to
American air that still had air superiority. Chinese forces were caught out in the open and suffered
massive casualties forcing them to slow down initially and later call off their pursuit. See William
Manchester, American Caesar: Douglas MacArthur 1880-1964 (Boston: Little, Brown and Company,
1978), p. 611

Another example from recent times would be Op Anaconda (March 2002).

Use of airpower by Irregular Forces.

The Indian Army defines Sub-Conventional warfare as follows.

Sub conventional warfare is a generic term encompassing all armed conflicts that are above the level of peaceful
coexistence amongst states and below the threshold of war. It includes militancy, insurgency, proxy war and
terrorism that may be employed as a means in an insurrectionist movement or undertaken independently. Border
skirmishes also fall within this category. Doctrine for Sub conventional warfare, (Simla-India:HQ Army Training
Command,2006), p.1 The sub-conventional warfare is an army doctrine and integration of the air force element is
missing.

Definition - The United State military (JCS Pub 1-02) defines irregular warfare as “a violent struggle among state and non-
state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant population(s). Irregular warfare favours indirect and asymmetric
approaches, though it may employ the full range of military and other capacities, in order to erode and adversary’s power,
influence and will.”

Pathfinder Issue 126, January 2010

Air Superiority in Irregular Warfare (IW)

‘Tanks and armour are not a big deal. The planes are the killers. I can handle everything but the jet fighters.’

-Unknown Insurgent Fighter in Afghanistan

Military operations in Irregular Warfare are often very complex especially if the insurgency they are
trying to counter enjoys local support. The solution normally is possible only through whole of
government approach. In addition IW is predominantly a land-centric activity, especially when the
adversary merges with the local population effortlessly. Air power is generally employed in supporting
role to surface forces. Even in such a case control of the air should be the first objective, in absence of
which other air power roles like air mobility, ISR, interdiction would be jeopardised.

“There is no fate worse than being continuously under guard, for it means you are always afraid”-
- Julius Caesar 100-44 B.C

The deterrent factor, the fear of being attacked at any time at any place should always in the minds of the Irregular
Forces (IF). Without protective air cover the enemy leadership is perpetually worried, perpetually under threat and
per force perpetually on move. This is possible only if control of the air has first been achieved.

Now a days conventional military forces are being employed in irregular warfare on more regular basis.
Since the current adversaries do not have any air power capabilities, this has brought about a perception
within large parts of the land forces that resources need not be wasted on gaining control of the air. In fact
surface forces are increasingly sceptical of air power’s role in such conflicts. US Army’s Field Manual
3-24, Counterinsurgency even discourages use of air power stating popular disdain and inaccuracy of air
delivered munitions.
Department of the Army, Field Manual 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington: Headquarters Department
of the Army, 15 December 2006) Appendix E, para. E-5..
The FM ignores the two traits that have greatly aided surface forces engaged in IW; precision attack and
persistence surveillance. One just has to look at Iraq and Afghanistan. Because of the coalition dominance
in airborne intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, insurgents are unable to mass for a raid or
generate any sort of conventional response without being first detected and later attacked. These are
possible because of the uncontested control of air, which may not remain uncontested in perpetuity or in
every situation.

In this regard Western Air Forces have become victims of their own success. Since they did not have to
fight hard for control of air in recent conflicts they take for granted the freedom to operate without
interference from the third dimension. Irregular forces which are looking for a asymmetry of their own
may spring a surprise in near future. This is truer for countries operating outside of large western
coalitions. The attack on Srilankan military airbase by Air Tigers of LTTE in 2007 and later over
Colombo (capital city) in 2009 is a pointer in this direction. The proliferation of Surface to Air Guided
Weapons (SAGW) and Man Portable Air Defence Systems (MANPADS) will make the task of gaining
control of air more difficult even in IW.

The Tamil Eelam Air Force (TAF) of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), which came into being without the Sri
Lankan intelligence having the least idea about its location and capability, went into action for the first time since its creation 
in the early morning of (12:45 AM)  March 26,2007. It was a conventional air attack and not a suicide mission. Two aircraft
of the TAF flew over the Sri Lankan Air Force base at Katunayake near Colombo and dropped four bombs. At least three
SLAF personnel were killed and about 20 injured. Two helicopters, reportedly given by Pakistan, were badly damaged. There
was also some damage to the Israeli aircraft of the Sri Lankan Air Force. The LTTE later claimed that both its planes returned
safely to base and released a photograph of Prabakaran (LTTE leader) with the officers of the TAF.
http://www.southasiaanalysis.org/%5Cpapers22%5Cpaper2182.html accessed on 07 Nov 10.
Also see http://www.saag.org/papers14/paper1398.html. accessed on 07 Nov 10 In another attack on 21 Feb 09 over Colombo
at least two people were killed and 44 others injured after two Tamil Tiger aircraft attacked the Sri Lankan capital
Colombo.http://english.aljazeera.net/news/asia/2009/02/2009220162220942482.html, also see Hindu 27 Mar 09. In terms of
damage they did not achieve much but psychologically they had a far greater impact. Hindu, Wednesday, Mar 28, 2007

Another advantage control of air brings is that it somewhat binds the conflict by limiting adversary’s escalatory
options. Moreover if the IF is deriving their support and resources from a neighbouring country which lack the
wherewithal to challenge this control of air it would be less inclined to raise the tempo of conflict.

Control of air is no guarantee of success in IW and there have been some spectacular failures in past in-
spite of uncontested control of air. Examples include:

(a) The revolt against Dutch rule in what was then the Netherlands East Indies, comprising
the third largest colonial empire in the world. The Dutch aided by the RAF had complete control
of the air. Nevertheless the state of Indonesia was formed on 27 December 1949.

(b) French defeat at Dien Bien Phu in 1954. The French had complete control of the air; such
control was of no avail.

(c) Similar fate awaited the Americans in the ‘Vietnam War’ which the Vietnamese
themselves called ‘The American War’ fought between 1965-1973. The overwhelming air
superiority that American air power enjoyed over its opponents failed to bring about a decisive
American result.

(c) Years later the then Soviet Union made most of the same mistakes when they invaded
Afghanistan in the nineteen-eighties which led to equally spectacular defeat.

(d) Likewise the case in Afghanistan today, coalition enjoys total air domination but the way
this war is progressing a ‘draw’ would be more than welcome.

The fact emerges and one that must be understood clearly is ; that control of air does not guarantee
victory in irregular war or any war for that matter but not wresting control of air from the enemy will
prolong the contest raising cost in blood and treasure if not hasten the defeat altogether.

Impediments

Traditionally the battle for control of the air is commonly thought of as defeating or destroying enemy fighters in
air or on ground. But, particularly in recent years, defeating the surface-to-air threat--especially in the surface-to-air
(SAM) missile age--has taken on its own grave importance. The counter to modern long range smart SAMs like
Russian S-300 PMU or their equivalent Chinese copy pose a credible threat. These are reportedly difficult to jam
and proclaim ranges in excess of 300 km. This has necessitated the increase in support to strike ratio.

In World War II the major threat the Bombers faced was from enemy fighters. AAA was limited in range and
accuracy. In such cases the ratio of support aircraft to strike aircraft was still relatively low; for example, one raid
into Germany in the summer of 1944 involved 1,129 B-17 and B-24 bombers protected by 756 P-38, P-47, and P-
51 fighters, a ratio of 0.67 : 1. The introduction of surface-to-air missiles led to tremendous increase in the ratio of
support aircraft to strike aircraft as strike aircraft required protection from both fighters and missiles. For example, in
1972, a typical American strike package into North Vietnam consisted of fifty-eight airplanes; sixteen strike aircraft
aided by twenty-two air superiority fighters, eight chaff dispensers, eight Wild Weasels, two electronic jammers and
two post-strike reconnaissance aircraft for bomb damage assessment: altogether a ratio of nearly 3:1. The ratios
had risen even higher at the time of the Gulf War. For example, on opening night of the war, a force of 38 airplanes
attacked Tallil airfield. This force consisted of eight attack aircraft , screened by four F-4G Wild Weasels, five EA-6B
Prowler jammers, four F/A-18C Hornets flying MiGCAP, and no less than 17 F/A-18C Hornets carrying radar-
homing missiles: a support-to-strike ratio of nearly 4 : 1. In the Balkans the only threat to air superiority came from
Serbian SAMs and not their fighters. As a result and more so after shooting down of Scott O’Grady a
disproportionately large % was devoted to support aircraft in a strike package.

Extract from- Control of the Air: The Enduring Requirement by Dr. Richard P. Hallion, SES Air Force
History and Museums Program Bolling AFB, DC 20332-1111 September 8, 1999, p 61
This calculus makes it apparent that the fight for control of the air is not going to be cheap. The impact is more
telling on regional air forces fighting outside of coalitions which can not muster such huge resources. They would
have to accept a higher attrition or lower degree of control of air, both difficult choices.

Air Superiority is Not a Panacea.

Air superiority is not a panacea. This lesson was learnt, bitterly by American forces in Op Anaconda
(March 2002, Gardez, Eastern Afghanistan). The scheme of manoeuvre for Anaconda was essentially a
“hammer and anvil” operation, with special operation forces (SOF) and Afghan forces serving as the
hammer to push enemy forces against the anvil provided by U.S. conventional ground forces. This plan
was unfortunately based on incomplete intelligence about the strength and disposition of Taliban forces.
The lightly armed assaulting forces ran into “heavy enemy fire, including 122mm howitzers and mortars.”
The ‘hammer’ disintegrated. The enemy forces then focused on the ‘anvil,’” and “within a matter of
hours, American forces were fighting for its life.” Mark G. Davis, Operation Anaconda: Command and
Confusion in Joint Warfare, thesis, School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, Air University, 2004.
Eventually the pressure was relieved from the air. CAS was sought and received but was not very
effective considering the mountainous terrain. This brought out another lesson that air superiority has
situational limits. Not realising this Gen Hagenbeck, land force commander was critical of the CAS he
received from the U.S. Air Force. He implied that Air Force pilots would not fly low enough to the
ground to be effective and that they were not responsive. Robert H. McElroy and Patrecia Slayden Hollis,
“Afghanistan: Fire Support for Operation Anaconda, Interview with Major General Franklin L.
Hagenbeck,” Field Artillery, September- October 2002 .

Korean peninsula is a peculiar case where the proximity of two opposing forces makes time and tempo of
operation as two most crucial attributes. In case of a surprise massive raid by North into South there may
not be time to win and maintain air superiority. The air commander might have to throw everything at
ground right from the beginning. We all agree that South Korea with US backing will have technological
superiority. However with Seoul only an hour from the DMZ a sudden attack from the North, which
maintains about 90% of its force on the border would not be good news. With N Korea’s known
advantage of numbers in tanks and artillery pieces, undetected tunnels and initiative on their side the
battle could very well turn out to their liking, at least in initial days. In such a case air superiority will be
of little help. However if the conflict was to prolong control of the air will become crucial to success.

Not a Prerequisite for all Operations.

There are certain situations where using stealth, surprise or both air strikes can be carried out without
establishing air superiority first. This however is applicable only for short duration localized conflicts for
a small achievable political aim like sending a message. The requirement may be punitive, as in Libya in
1986, or pre-emptive, as against Osirak in Iraq in 1981.

(a) Osirak, June 7, 1981. The Israelis launched the raid from Etzion air base. The force
consisted of eight F-16s, each carrying two 2000 pound bombs with six F-15 fighters flying as
Escorts. The formation flew a well thought out tactical routing even risking flying through both
Jordanian and Saudi Arabian airspace, apparently aiming to exploit gaps in radar coverage along
the Saudi-Jordanian border. The raid was unqualified success; the reactor was destroyed with the
raiders suffering no losses. Efraim Karsh and Inari Tautsi in Saddam Hussein: A Political
Biography, Brassey’s (UK), London, 1991, p. 128

(b) Operation Eldorado Canyon April 1986. The United States raid on Libya. Various
Strike and Electronic support aircraft from USAF and USN took part in this raid striking some
‘high visibility’ targets in Libya. The aim was to send a message and not cause un-necessary
destruction. Andrew G B Vallance, The air weapon, doctrines of air power strategy and operational art
Palgrave Macmillan, 1996 , P 116
…………

Future

The current developments in airpower suggest two main trends, global reach and a gradual shift towards
uninhibited platforms. Using stealth, super-cruise and AAR, modern 5 th generation fighters/bombers or
UCAVs in future will be able to reach and strike anywhere in the world while operating from safe bases
within the nation’s own borders. This has prompted some to suggest that if one possesses strike platforms
that are capable of delivering precision weapons around the clock in any weather in any part of the world,
in the process still be able to outfight any enemy air defence fighter challenging them or overwhelm any
surface launched weapon by hard/soft kill, one wont have to fight the traditional battle for control of air
first. While this may be true for small localised conflicts with precise achievable political aims, the same
can not be applied to entire range of conflicts. If an adversary possesses means to contest control of the
air, air forces will have to conduct a counter air campaign to win and sustain the required degree of
control of the air for the duration necessary. Such a contest for control of the air may include defeating
SAMs on ground and enemy aircraft in air in addition to other traditional counter air targets. One must
remember that the control of the air is not an end state by itself and its aim is not just enabling air strikes.
Without the necessary level and duration of air control, in a joint campaign, even minimal threat from
adversary air power can affect success of surface campaigns and also lead to unsustainable friendly losses.

CONCLUSION

The biggest challenge to primacy of control of air comes from our brethren in surface forces. The need of the hour
is to first understand this fundamental requirement and then educate others of the absolute and acknowledged
need to obtain and maintain air superiority as a prerequisite for the success of all military operations.
Terminology- we can help our cause by playing around with words a little. Instead of saying gaining air dominance
which is seen by the surface forces as something of air force affair we should use the term ‘shaping the
environment’. The primary application or contribution of air power to joint service operations should be to prepare or
shape an environment in which surface forces can be deployed effectively. It will invariably involve creating air
superiority or at least a favourable air situation for surface forces to execute their missions without worrying about
enemy air. Army ground forces and naval surface forces can and have made major contributions to the air
superiority mission. Their contribution will be even greater if they are consciously integrated into the air superiority
campaign. We have read how the British sent commandos to knock out an effective German bomber unit on Crete,
how MacArthur and Kenney used ground forces to seize airfields, and how the Israelis from the 1973 war to the
1983 Lebanon incursions used naval and ground forces to knock holes in ground-based air defence systems.

In the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, Israeli gunboats attacked Egyptian surface-to-air missile systems on the
Egyptian left flank, to pave the way for Israeli air force movements through the opened corridor. The Yom
Kippur War, p. 213. (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Company, Inc., 1974, The Yom Kippur War derives from the
extensive coverage of the fourth Arab-Israeli war in the London Sunday Times during October 1973. In 1982
Israelies eliminated the surface-to-air missile system the Syrians had installed in the Bekaa Valley by an intelligent
combination of surface to surface rockets and artillery fire for closer batteries and smart weapons like ARMs along
with dumb bombs dropped by smart pilots to take out others. In the entire process they made innovative use of their
RPVs in their battle against SAMs. The resulta as we all know were spectacular. Setting the context, SEAD and
joint warfighting in uncertain world, Lt Col James Brungess , USAF, Air university press, Maxwell AFB, June 1994.
p 14-24.

Control of the air is not a permanent quality. It has to be constantly fought for, constantly ensured. In a war, gaining
and maintaining control of the air would largely depend on technological advantage, platform capability and skill
and daring displayed by the aircrew. Therefore if one is to look carefully the fight to win this control of air starts well
before the war in form of acquiring suitable aircrafts and weapon systems, training of crews, laying down doctrines
and understanding what can and can not be done by given resources.

John A. Warden III, The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat, National Defense University p 14

Although gaining control of the air is not generally the ultimate objective of a campaign, it is a
prerequisite for the conduct of all other operations to achieve campaign objectives. Having control of the
air does not guarantee success in all operations, but failure to achieve control of the air in situations where
a credible adversary air threat exists will constrain or preclude the conduct of friendly air or surface
activities. Air Power Manual. AAP 1000, p 139. The contention that air superiority is a necessity to
ensure victory or avoid defeat is based on theory as well as on an analysis of the last half century of
warfare. Theory alone would suggest that surface warfare cannot possibly succeed if the surface forces
and their support elements are constantly under attack by enemy aircraft.

+ It must also be understood that control of air does not guarantee victory but not wresting control of air
from the enemy will prolong the contest raising cost in blood and treasure if not hasten the defeat
altogether

4. Wars or conflicts are not scientific experiments following a predictable pattern leading to forecast-able
outcome. Wars bring out the worst and the best of what the humans have to offer. Relying on historical data to
predict the future of warfare is difficult. Nevertheless we can not escape our past. We need to look at the failures as
well as successes. History often gives a glimpse of the future, for in field of warfare history has taught us that the
more the things change the more they remain same .

The reputation of air power itself has changed, from the myths and misunderstandings
surrounding its use in earlier wars to the more positive sentiments often echoed today.

We cannot escape our past.

We need to look at the failures as well as the successes.
What about the art of war, of strategy, of tactical insight, of leadership? It is in these fields, perhaps, that we can extract the
most value from military history. It is in these fields that we really do need experience, and it is just these fields that first hand
experience is so hard to get in peace. We can get this experience only by the study of military history.